Title

Young people's daily activity in a globalized world: A cross-national comparison using time use data

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Abstract

How much do young people's daily activities differ according to where they live? As a global generation, young people are disproportionately subject to the risks and insecurity of globalization. However, countries differ in their support for young people's inclusion through economic and social participation. Using time use surveys from Australia, Italy, Finland, France, Korea, Spain, the UK and the USA (n=23,271), this paper investigates national differences in the amount of time young people (20-34 years) spend on paid and unpaid work, study and leisure in each country. Gender gaps in market work and non-market work were widest in the Anglo and southern European countries. In France and Finland, gender differences in daily market and non-market activity were narrower. Young women spent more daily time in study than young men in all countries except Korea, where study time was highest. Young men *and* young women in social democratic Finland had more leisure time than young people elsewhere. Results suggest that young people's experience of the consequences of globalization is not universal, but that nation-states remain relevant in determining their welfare.

Introduction

In a globalized world, how much do young people's daily activities differ according to where they live? This paper contributes to the literature on young people's social and economic participation by analysing patterns in the time young men and young women spend in paid work and in non-market activities (homemaking, volunteering, civic participation, study and leisure) in eight countries. We harmonize data from nationally representative time use surveys, from Italy, Spain, France, Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, Finland and Korea. The aim is to identify the extent to which the young generation's daily lives converge or diverge cross-nationally and gain insight into how social contexts differ in promoting young people's social and economic participation, particularly by gender.

Background

Young adulthood and global generations

Contemporary young people face more challenges than earlier cohorts in relation to income, wealth, housing and employment, constraining their ability to establish themselves as independent adults at the same pace as earlier generations ([Bessant et al., 2017](#); [Tanner and Arnett, 2009](#); [Bell et al., 2007](#)). The markers of adulthood are generally thought to include completing education, securing stable employment, leaving the family home, marrying or cohabiting, and having children ([Furstenberg et al., 2004](#); [Mahaffy, 2004](#)). In recent decades, pathways through these aspects of early adulthood have become increasingly unpredictable ([Swartz et al., 2011](#); [Hendry and Kloep, 2012](#)). This matters because early setbacks can cause lifelong economic and social scarring ([Furlong, 2009](#)). As a generation, contemporary young people have been disproportionately subject to the growing labour market risks associated with globalization, and as a cohort face the likelihood of being worse

off over their lifetimes than their parents' generation ([Beck, 2016](#); [Buchholz et al., 2011](#); [Buchholz et al., 2009](#)).

The increasing complexity of young people's experience in a globalized world has highlighted commonality across countries. Generations have tended to be conceptualized as nation-bound entities, but some have emphasized a more global approach ([Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2008](#); [Edmunds and Turner, 2005](#)). Globalization, [Edmunds and Turner \(2005\)](#) contend, has the power to produce intergenerational conflict *within* nation states, and intra-generational solidarity *across* nation-states. They note that some (global) generations are more 'active' than others, in which public events awaken the political consciousness of generations. However, this 'activation' is resources-dependent, and compared to the Baby Boomers, who had a common (direct or indirect) experience of traumatic political events, consumerism, global music and communication systems, the cohorts that followed have been "sapped [of] the resources for protest...less willing to take risks precisely because their world appeared to have less opportunity and greater dangers" ([Edmunds and Turner, 2005: 568](#)). [Beck and Beck-Gernsheim \(2008: 26\)](#) offer a slightly different perspective, arguing that globalization does not mean that the younger generation find themselves in a 'worldwide convergence of social situations', but rather, subject to differentiation by place, history and culture, some of their experiences are globalized. They note that the growing insecurity of work "is not a local, regional or national phenomenon. Rather, this insecurity is turning into a key experience transcending borders, a common one" ([Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2008: 33](#)).

However, [Beck and Beck-Gernsheim \(2008\)](#) do observe that the consequences and experiences are not universal; how young people fare can also depend on welfare provisions and cultural norms in different countries. Considering how social and policy contexts amidst global conditions support young people is a critical part of a political economy approach, which focuses on how "various political relations and processes affect the shape and distribution of valued social resources" ([Bessant](#)

et al., 2017: 4). Folbre (2012: 1) defines political economy as ‘an approach that examines the impact of group identity and collective conflict on the organization of economic activity’, extending it beyond a Marxian focus on class to insist on the importance of collective conflicts based on other dimensions of group identity, including gender and age. For Bessant et al. (2017: 52), the young generation has a group identity based on a shared space in a socio-historical process, currently characterized by a ‘neoliberal zeitgeist’ which has shaped lives “by a unique and unsettling combination of events, political ideas and policy practices set loose since the 1980s”.

Notwithstanding this general global shift, the foothold of neoliberal policy is stronger in liberal Anglo-Saxon countries (Bessant et al., 2017) than elsewhere (see for example Prasad, 2005).

Comparative research has shown that changes in emergent adulthood transcend national boundaries (Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Lloyd, 2005), but also the maintenance of distinct national or regional patterns, including a north–south divide (Iacovou, 2002; Prasad, 2005). Thus despite creating similar effects in many places, the outcomes of globalization seem to be filtered by national institutions which themselves shape patterns of social inequality (Buchholz et al., 2009).

Together the literature underlines the need to put the political economy of generations in a cross-national perspective and to also understand the differentiated experiences of this global generation of young people. Cross-national comparisons can yield important insights into the relative welfare of individuals in different countries (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Sainsbury, 1996). They can link socially structured opportunities and constraints to how people live on a daily basis (Shanahan, 2000; Walther, 2006). Nations differ in the extent to which they rely on the state, the market and/or the family to provide welfare support, and on this basis have been classified into regime types; *social-democratic* (Scandinavian countries), *liberal* (Anglo-Saxon countries), *corporatist* (Western European countries), and *familialist* (e.g. Southern European countries) (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Arts and Gelissen, 2010; Lewis, 2018). While these groupings are not determinative, research has shown they do influence patterns of daily life, including how people spend their time. For example,

on average, paid work hours are longest in liberal countries, which rely most on the market ([Gershuny and Sullivan, 2003](#)), and women's domestic work and care time is longest in familialist countries, which rely more heavily on the family ([Altintas and Sullivan, 2017](#)). In corporatist and, especially, social democratic countries which provide more extensive state welfare, average paid work hours are lowest, and leisure time is longest (Author A). Cross-national comparisons underline that gender is a strongly differentiating feature of people's life experiences and patterns of daily activity ([Bianchi and Milkie, 2010](#); [Lachance-Grzela and Bouchard, 2010](#)). There is much more disparity in men and women's time spent in leisure, employment, housework and family care in familialist and liberal countries than in social democratic countries, which supplement family care with generous public services ([Lewis, 2009](#); [Gornick and Meyers, 2003](#)) Author A).

To date, however, cross-national research on time allocation has rarely focused on young adults. There is a growing literature on the time use of children and adolescents, which indicates that gendered patterns in activities including homework, housework and leisure are evident from a young age ([Hunt et al., 2014](#); [Mullan, 2018](#); [Hilbrecht et al., 2008](#); [Zuzanek, 2005](#)). However, these studies have been mostly conducted in single countries, and none explored the years of emerging adulthood. An exception is [Gauthier and Furstenberg Jr \(2002\)](#), who used data from nine countries to assess young adult time use in association with three life course events. They concluded that time allocation was similarly affected by first employment, partnership and parenthood in all countries studied. However, comparing demographic groups *within* countries leaves unanswered the question of how young adults' behaviour patterns compare *across* countries. Therefore, to better understand whether and how country contexts shape young people's daily activity in a globalized world, we compare how they spend their time in Australia, the UK, the USA, France, Italy, Spain, Korea and Finland.

Young adulthood and welfare regimes

Scholars have investigated whether countries can also be systematically grouped according to their alignment on policies affecting young people, particularly. Some argue that in addition to the extent of social security during unemployment, and the extent of reliance on family support and care, central markers for youth are the education system and labour market regulation ([Breen and Buchmann, 2002](#); [Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)). Taking these factors into account, [Walther \(2006\)](#) shows that western countries still group together according to regime types discussed above. Other research focusing on student support models ([Schwarz and Rehburg, 2004](#)), young adults' home-leaving patterns ([Aassve et al., 2002](#); [Arundel and Lennartz, 2017](#); [Newman, 2012](#)), and youth unemployment support ([Caliendo and Schmidl, 2016](#); [Tamesberger, 2017](#)) reaches the same conclusion. These scholars argue that regime typologies are useful to frame analyses because they indicate ways institutional, historical and cultural context shape the way young people can cope with social risks and insecurity resulting from globalization ([Antonucci et al., 2014](#); [Bynner, 2005](#); [Walther, 2006](#)). Over the period of emerging adulthood, “welfare states stipulate when young people should rely on their families, when they can rely on the state and when they should enter the labour market” ([Antonucci and Hamilton, 2014: 262](#)). However, no country conforms exactly to type ([Arts and Gelissen, 2010](#)), so in addition to outlining below how the regimes broadly approach young people, we also present country-specific demographic indicators and gender attitudes in Table 1.

[Table 1 here]

Young adulthood in country context

Social-democratic countries have generous public welfare spending, and take a universalistic approach to youth policy that frames young people as social resources to be developed and supported ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#)). They foster young people's autonomy and independence by offering

benefits such as income support to study, to access affordable housing and for periods of unemployment ([Newman, 2012](#); [OECD, 2016](#); [Schwarz and Rehburg, 2004](#)). Well-developed and affordable public tertiary education promotes labour market access and facilitates early home leaving and union formation ([Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)). In this paper, this regime type is represented by Finland. Indicators in Table 1 show that Finnish youth unemployment is quite high, and that there is modest average student debt, but, likely due to the economic supports noted above, home-leaving and first childbirth occur comparatively young.

Liberal states see the market as the main source of welfare and provide only limited public supports. Represented here by Australia, the UK and the USA, they value self-reliance and assume the youth transition phase should be replaced by economic independence as soon as possible ([Walther, 2006](#)). Students contribute significantly to their education costs through tuition fees, often taking out substantial loans ([Schwarz and Rehburg, 2004](#)). As shown in Table 1, student debt is high in these countries. In liberal states the main aim of youth policies is ‘problem containment’ ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#)) and meagre economic support to disadvantaged youth is provided through highly stigmatized, means-tested benefits ([Walther, 2006](#); [Bessant et al., 2017](#)). These countries encourage early home leaving, education completion, and labour market entry ([Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)), which is consistent with the relatively low youth unemployment rates, co-residence and age at first birth shown in Table 1.

Corporatist countries, exemplified here by France, have a very paternalistic and protective approach to youth policy ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#)), which does not foster early autonomy ([Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)). Benefits to young people are channelled through the head of the family, for example via family allowance, tax benefits, and loans for parents to finance their children’s tertiary education ([Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)). Vocational education is more widespread than in other regime types and facilitates smoother labour market access ([Eichhorst et al., 2015](#)), and although in France

specifically general education dominates ([Breen, 2005](#); [OECD, 2016](#)), no student debt is accrued (see Table 1). Corporatist countries facilitate a standard linear path to adulthood ([Walther, 2006](#)), which some argue is due to the social control young people experience from the protective youth policy regime ([Breen and Buchmann \(2002\)](#)). In France, young people do not start adult life burdened with student debt, but on the other hand youth unemployment is relatively high, and nearly 40 percent of young men (and 25 percent of young women) live with their parents (see Table 1).

Southern European familialist countries, represented here by Spain and Italy, do not provide income benefits to young people, so they are highly dependent on family support ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#); [Walther, 2006](#)). This, combined with an absence of vocational training and insufficient fulltime jobs with predictable standard hours, result in the delay of all major markers of independent adulthood ([Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)). Grandfathered workplace policies mean older existing employees are protected more than young new entrants to the labour market ([Barbieri, 2011: for Italy](#); [Martínez-Pastor and Bernardi, 2011: for Spain](#)). Fertility rates are low, and although student debt is negligible, a very high proportion of young Italians and Spaniards co-reside with their parents (see Table 1).

Asian countries, represented here by Korea, combine both liberal and familialist features ([Powell and Kim, 2014](#); [Kwon, 2005](#); [Lee, 2005](#); [Ochiai, 2009](#)). A flexible labour market policy legalizes temporary work and makes it easy to lay off employees ([Kim, 2016](#)). Income security is provided for people living under the poverty line and healthcare is covered by a universal program, although high out-of-pocket payments put a greater burden on the poor ([Kwon and Holliday, 2007](#)). Other welfare support such as unemployment insurance and pensions exclude young people because eligibility depends on employment history ([Kwon and Holliday, 2007](#); [Yun, 2010](#)). Korea's dual labour market, with standard, high quality, secure jobs in large enterprises and non-standard, low quality, insecure jobs in small enterprises ([Kim, 2016](#)), makes it difficult for 'ordinary' young Koreans to find secure work and to live independently or form families ([Yun, 2010: 251](#)). Accordingly, indicators in Table 1

show that although youth employment is comparatively low, a relatively high proportion live at home, and fertility is very low.

Young adulthood, country context and gender

Welfare regimes also strongly influence gender equality ([Gornick and Meyers, 2003](#); [Lewis, 2018](#)). [Iannelli and Smyth \(2008: 228\)](#) argue that this includes the ‘gendering processes’ during the transition to adulthood. They report that in familialist and corporatist countries, young women are more disadvantaged in access to paid employment than young men. In contrast, social democracies minimize such disadvantage, for example by promoting gender equality through generous social services, including childcare and parental leaves ([Gornick and Meyers, 2003](#); [Lewis, 2018](#)). Liberal welfare states have little equivalent public assistance; most care is paid for in the market or provided privately within the family ([Iannelli and Smyth, 2008](#); [Orloff, 2009](#)). Although public expenditure on childcare is growing in Asian states like Korea ([Estévez-Abe and Kim, 2014](#)), gender gaps in earnings and participation remain wide ([Ochiai, 2009](#)). Reflecting this, in Table 1 a representative indicator (level of agreement with the proposition that university education is more important for boys than girls) suggests gender attitudes are much more traditional in Korea than in the other countries studied. Table 1 also shows that amongst the European and Anglo-Saxon countries, views are both broadly progressive and broadly similar. This implies that in the west, *ideas* of equality are widespread across this generation of youth.

Research focus and expectations

To identify the extent to which the young generation’s daily lives converge or diverge cross-nationally, we analyse how young adults across eight countries allocate their time to paid work and to non-market activities (housework and care, study and leisure). We expect the country differences in social supports and scaffolding discussed above to affect young men and women’s social and

economic life, and for this to be reflected in their daily activities. Notwithstanding generally progressive views on gender in the west, behaviour does not always align with attitude ([Thompson, 1991](#)) and we expect daily time use to differ by gender, and to do so more in some countries than others. For example, it seems likely that in social democratic Finland, the substantial state support for young people and promotion of gender equality allows young men *and* women latitude and relative freedom during their period of emerging adulthood. Thus, compared to youth elsewhere, we expect young Finns to spend more time in education and at leisure, and less but more equal time in paid work and domestic labour. Time patterns may be similar in France, given the paternalistic approach to young people described above. In liberal countries, the market is the main source of welfare, so we expect early employment entry to be reflected in young people spending more time in paid work in Australia, the UK and the USA. In Spain and Italy, where the family is the main source of welfare and youth unemployment is high, we expect a wide gender division of labour, and that daily paid work time will be lower, and daily leisure time will be higher, than elsewhere. Korea exhibits features of both liberal and familialist regimes, leading us to expect high time allocation to paid work and study, and wide gender differences in both market and non-market work.

Method

Data and sample

We use data from nationally representative time use surveys conducted by the national statistical offices of Australia (February – December 2006), Finland (April 2009 – May 2010), France (September 2009 – September 2010), Italy (February 2008 – January 2009), Korea (March 2009 and September 2009), Spain (October 2009 – December 2010), the UK (April 2014 – December 2015) and the USA (January – December 2013). It is a limitation of the study that, due to independent national data collection cycles, the time periods vary. The surveys use time-diaries to record people's activities over the course of two consecutive days (Australia and Korea), one weekday and one

weekend day (Finland, France and the UK) or one day (Italy, Spain and the US). Diary days were randomly assigned. Activity-recording intervals were five minutes in Australia, open intervals in the USA, and 10 minutes in all the other countries. Long fieldwork periods account for seasonality. Trained staff at the national statistical offices coded the time-diaries to national specifications, and we post-harmonised the countries' activity codes for our analyses (for coding details see Table A1). Final data do not include missing values for any of the time intervals and unspecified time, time to keep the diary, and private time (e.g. activities that respondents did not want to disclose) is less than 30 minutes per day on average in all countries. To capture the period of emerging adulthood, the analytic sample is restricted to young adults aged 20 to 34 years ([Cook and Furstenberg Jr, 2002](#)). It includes 32,765 time-diaries of 23,271 individuals. Table 2 gives an overview of the sample characteristics.

[Table 2 here]

Dependent variables

To capture multiple aspects of daily life, we calculate daily hours young adults spend on market and non-market work, study and leisure. *Market work* includes paid work (main and second job) and all activities related to being employed, including commuting, travel as part of work, breaks and training. *Non-market work* is defined as housework, care, and home maintenance. *Study* is defined as formal education, including taking classes, doing homework, research, administrative tasks, and internships during formal education. *Leisure* includes entertainment and culture sports and exercise, arts and hobbies, free time study, reading, listening to music, watching television, gaming, and relaxing, socializing with friends and family. Simultaneous activities are not captured across all surveys, so we present and analyse primary activity only.

Analysis plan

First, we present a descriptive overview of the amount of time young people aged 20-34 in all eight countries spend on market and non-market work, study and leisure on an average day. We use ANOVA and post hoc comparisons with Bonferroni correction ($\alpha=0.05$) to compare the amount of time spent by young people across countries. Data are weighted to match the weekly distribution of weekdays (Monday-Friday) and weekend days (Saturday-Sunday). Next, we use OLS regression models to test whether amount of time in these activities varies cross nationally, and whether there are significant gender differences in that variation. No further selection was made based on whether respondents participated in these activities. Our key explanatory variables are *country*, *gender*, and interactions between them. Finland is the omitted (reference) country in the multivariate analyses because it is most youth-friendly and gender-egalitarian (see discussion above and Table 1). Gender is captured by a dummy for female. We control for *age*, through a categorical variable distinguishing between 20-24-year-olds, 25-29-year-olds (omitted) and 30-34-year-olds. We control for *living situation*, which captures life events including home-leaving, partner- and parenthood, distinguishing between living alone (omitted), living with parents, single parent, living with partner, two-parent family, and ‘other’ households. ‘Other’ includes shared, multi-generational and extended households; due to the very limited number of young adults living in other household arrangements in Finland and France (see Table 2), a more detailed categorization is not possible. We also include as controls the interaction terms *age*×*female* and *living situation*×*female* to account for gender differences in how these factors relate to activity patterns and thus better isolate the effects of country.

Results

Descriptive analysis

Figure 1 shows average daily hours spent on market and non-market work, study and leisure by young people aged between 20 and 34 years in each country. Within each activity, country means sharing a superscript letter are not significantly different. The descriptive results indicate that as expected, average leisure is highest in social democratic Finland. Non-market work time is highest in the USA and Australia, and paid work time highest in Korea and Australia. In other respects, average activity patterns vary across countries, but perhaps due to variation by gender, age and living situation, no clear patterns emerge.

[Figure 1 here]

Multivariate analyses

We next use multivariate analysis to directly test whether and how country and gender are related to time spent on market and non-market work, study and leisure (see Table 3). In all models, the intercept represents men in Finland, aged 25-29 years, and living alone. To show the substantive differences by gender and country, the results of the interaction terms are summarized in Figure 2, across two graphs. The models hold constant age and living situation, so the figure represents the time of men/women aged 25-29, living alone. Daily time in market and non-market work are shown in the top graphs and daily time in study and leisure are shown in the bottom graphs. Where no statistically significant within-country difference between men and women is found in an activity, the point estimates overlap.

[Table 3 here]

[Figure 2 here]

The intercept of Model 1 in Table 3 shows that net of covariates young men in Finland average 4.27 hours per day on market work. The significant country coefficients indicate that young men in all the other countries spend more time in market work than young men in Finland. The estimated differences are substantial, ranging from 2.53 hours (Australia) to 0.51 hours (Spain). The coefficient for women as a main effect was not significant, indicating that net of controls there are no significant differences between the average market work hours of young Finnish men and women. The interaction terms show that, in contrast, women in Korea, Italy, Australia, the UK and the USA all spend less time in market work than young men in those same countries. As illustrated in the top left-hand box in Figure 2, the gender gap is largest in Australia, where young women are estimated to spend nearly two daily hours less in market work than young men. Young Italian women spend 1.60 hours, young Korean women spend just over an hour, young British women just under an hour, and young American women spend half an hour less in market work than their male compatriots. The interaction terms for France and Spain are not significant, indicating that, as in Finland, young men and women in those countries spend statistically similar daily hours in market work.

Model 2 presents the coefficients estimating time spent in non-market work. The intercept indicates that net of controls, young Finnish men average just over two hours a day in this activity. The significant country coefficients indicate that young men in all the other countries except the USA spend less time in non-market work than young Finnish men. The largest differences are with Korean (-1.3 hours) and Italian men (-0.83 hours) and the smallest are with Spanish (-0.29 hours) and Australian men (-0.24 hours). The coefficient for women is close to zero and not significant, so net of controls there is no statistical difference between the time young men and women in Finland spend in non-market work. Nor were significant gender differences found in France (echoing the results above showing neither of these countries had significant gender differences in daily market work time). In all the other countries young women spent more time in non-market work than young men. As shown in the top right-hand box in Figure 2, the largest gender gaps are in Italy (1.98

hours), Korea (1.61 hours) and Australia (1.49 hours), followed by Spain (0.92), the UK (0.83 hours), and the USA (0.29 hours). The results for Spain make it the only country where a non-significant gender difference in market work is not mirrored by a non-significant gender difference in non-market work (see Figure 2).

Model 3 presents the coefficients estimating time spent in study. The intercept indicates that net of controls young Finnish men average 0.5 daily hours studying. The coefficient for Korea is positive and significant indicating that young men in these countries spend 0.44 more daily hours studying than young Finnish men. Conversely, coefficients are negative and significant for Australia (-0.20 hours), the UK (-0.14 hours) and France (-0.1 hours), showing young men in these countries spend *less* time studying than their Finnish counterparts. As a main effect, young women are predicted to spend 0.35 hours a day more in study than young men. This was significantly counteracted only in Korea (by -0.54 hours).

Model 4 in Table 3 presents the coefficients for time spent in leisure activities. As indicated by the intercept, net of controls young Finnish men are estimated to spend 6.03 hours a day at leisure. The country coefficients show that young men in all the other countries spend less time in leisure than young Finnish men. The difference was widest in Australia (-1.51 hours), France (-1.2 hours) and Korea (-1.11 hours). It was narrower in Spain, Italy and the US where young men spend respectively 0.51, 0.66 and 0.72 hours less in leisure than their Finnish counterparts. The coefficient for women as a main effect was significant, indicating that net of controls young Finnish women average 0.46 hours a day less in leisure than young Finnish men. Notwithstanding, young Finnish women average significantly more total time at leisure than young people of both genders in all other countries (see Figure 2). The interaction effects (substantively represented in the bottom right-hand box in Figure 2) indicate that, compared to Finland, the gender difference is smaller in Australia (0.14 hours) and France (0.15 hours), the UK (0.19 hours) and Korea (0.21 hours). The interaction effects were not

significant in Italy, Spain, and the USA, indicating that although substantive amount of leisure time differed cross-nationally, the *relative* gender gap was the same in these countries as in Finland.

The above results are net of variations in time spent on market work, non-market work, study and leisure by age, living situation and the interaction of age and living situation by gender (see second part of Table 3). We held these factors constant to focus on country differences, but there were significant independent effects. Across countries, younger people (20-24 years) spend less time on market and non-market work and more time on study and leisure than young people aged 25-29 years. The opposite holds for young people aged 30-34 years. Gender differences are found within the youngest age group indicating that 20 to 24-year-old women spend more time on market work and less time on non-market work than young men in the same age group. Both women in the youngest and in the oldest age group average less time on leisure than their male peers. Men living with their parents or living in other household types spend less time on market work and men living with a partner and/or children spend more time on market work than men who live alone. The opposite is true for women. In addition, single mothers average less time on market work than women living alone. Time spent studying does not vary between young adults living with their parents or living alone. For young adults in all other living situations, time spent studying is lower. This difference is more pronounced for women than for men. Young adults living with their parents have more leisure time, and young adults living with a partner have less leisure time, than young adults who live alone, although the differences are smaller for women than for men. Single fathers and men living in other household types have more leisure time than men living alone. The opposite holds for single mothers and women in other household types. Young adults in two parent families have the least leisure time and no differences by gender are found.

Discussion

The aim of this study was to examine whether, in an increasingly globalized world, young people's daily lives differ according to where they live. Some argue that contemporary youth constitute a global generation facing common challenges that transcend borders and foster intra-generational similarity across nation-states ([Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2008](#); [Bessant et al., 2017](#); [Edmunds and Turner, 2005](#)); others emphasize that countries provide different resources to scaffold young people during the period of emerging adulthood ([Walther, 2006](#); [Buchholz et al., 2008](#); [Mills and Blossfeld, 2005](#); [Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)). To uncover how these factors play out in cross-national patterns of daily life, we harmonised nationally-representative time use data from Australia, Finland, France, Italy, Korea, Spain, the UK and the USA, to compare and contrast the daily time young men and women spend in market work, non-market work, study and leisure.

Overall, the analyses showed that the detail of daily time patterns differed across countries, supporting a view that “institutions and social structures [can] act as an intervening variable between global macro forces and the responses of individual actors on the micro level” ([Buchholz et al., 2011: 12](#)). In particular, we found variation in the magnitude of differences between young men and women in market and non-market work. The multivariate results showed that the gender gap in market work time is large in the liberal countries Australia, the UK and to a lesser extent the USA. It is also substantial in liberal-familialist Korea, which has contextual similarities with liberal welfare states in relation to labour regulations and conditions ([Kwon, 2005](#); [Lee, 2005](#); [Ochiai, 2009](#)). The gender differences are driven by men's relatively high market work hours in these countries, which likely reflect the broader makeup of the labour force including workforce participation and employment rates as well as average hours. For example, in Australia and the UK, a high proportion of women work part-time, and Korea's familialist aspect means female homemaking is common ([OECD, 2014](#)). Our results imply that in relation to market work young men are greater beneficiaries

of the early economic independence encouraged in liberal countries ([Walther, 2006](#)), despite young women making demographic transitions towards independent adulthood (e.g. leaving the parental home, childbearing) earlier than their male counterparts (see Table 1). This suggests that combining rhetorical encouragement of early independence with thin public services and supports ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#); [Walther, 2006](#); [Bessant et al., 2017](#); [Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)), means that in market work young women are disadvantaged relative to young men.

We also observe a substantial market work gap between young men and women in familialist Italy, but unlike in liberal countries, it was driven as much by women's relatively low time in this activity as by men's long hours. Italian women have the lowest average work time of any group studied, but part time work is rare in that country ([Pettit and Hook, 2009](#)), so the results likely reflect a high proportion of them remaining outside the market altogether. Young women in familialist countries are disadvantaged in the labour market due to sparse family services ([Iannelli and Smyth, 2008](#); [Gornick and Meyers, 2003](#); [Lewis, 2018](#)). Italy, alongside Korea, Australia and, to a lesser extent, the UK, also had large gender gaps in non-market work time, such that in these countries gender patterns in market and non-market work largely mirrored each other. Familialist Spain also had wide disparity in non-market work, despite being gender-similar in market work, probably due to high youth unemployment particularly affecting men (Authors). The results show that gendered patterns in housework and family care can persist notwithstanding time equity in market work. In this case they may arise because, due to the delay of all major transitions to adulthood ([Buchmann and Kriesi, 2011](#)), very high proportions of young Italians and Spaniards aged 20-34 co-reside with their parents (see Table 1) and suggest that in familialist countries, particularly, there are much higher expectations upon young women than upon young men to undertake non-market work in the familial home ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#); [Walther, 2006](#)). Overall, results are consistent with the interpretation that where welfare is provided mainly by the market, as in liberal countries, or by the

family, as in familialist countries, gender gaps are wider than in countries where the state is a more active welfare provider.

Thus, gendered work gaps were not found everywhere. In Finland and France, young men and women spent statistically similar amounts of time in both market *and* non-market work, indicating that these countries have relative gender symmetry amongst the young. This is in line with our expectations that both Finland and France would have more gender-similar time use patterns. Overall amounts of both market and non-market work were lowest in social democratic Finland, where the policy framework is highly supportive of young people ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#); [Newman, 2012](#)), and there is generous public provision for work-family reconciliation ([Lewis, 2018](#)). Reflecting this low overall work time commitment, leisure time for both genders was significantly higher in Finland than in all the other countries, including corporatist France, where a paternalistic and protective approach to youth policy facilitates linear pathways and relatively constrained choices ([Wallace and Bendit, 2009](#); [Walther, 2006](#)). Thus, in addition to experiencing more gender equality, young Finns enjoy more free time than their counterparts elsewhere. Arnett (2015) argues that emerging adulthood offers more freedom to focus on self-development than other life stages, and although our modelling cannot demonstrate direct causality, our results accord with the expectation that of the countries studied, Finland most facilitates this opportunity.

In addition to significant cross-national variation in amount of leisure, there were also significant gender differences favouring men in all countries (see Figure 2). This is likely because on average women spend more time than men in activities including sleep and personal care, not analysed here (Author A), as well as (in countries other than France and Finland), having higher time commitment to non-market work. Conversely, in all countries except Korea young women spend more time studying than young men (Figure 2). This echoes their higher tertiary attainment cross-nationally (see Table 1), and perhaps arises because they need higher qualifications or marks to compete with

young men in the labour market (Authors). It is pertinent that the generally progressive views on women's education across the west (see Table 1) are reflected in study time, but in the liberal and familialist countries, not in market work time. This raises the possibility that in countries in which most welfare comes from the market or the family, equal opportunity in education is insufficient to ensure equal economic participation. It suggests that more extensive state supports as available in Finland and France are required too. We cannot attribute direct causality, however, and to investigate this fully would require more focused analysis, ideally with longitudinal data, of how national contexts facilitate economic returns to education. The Korean result accords with the attitudinal difference between that country and all others in the strength of agreement with the idea that boys' education is more important than girls' (Table 1).

Limitations and future directions

We emphasize the need for caution in interpreting results because this research is subject to limitations. It uses nationally-representative secondary data sources, which although robust and generalisable at country level, mean that we are reliant on the extent to which national statistical offices conduct time use surveys and make their latest survey data available for academic use. As a result, although our data the closest in time we could obtain, they are not all commensurate, but span a longer period. The data are cross-sectional, so our analyses cannot directly show causality, but identify associations only. Cross-national longitudinal time use data is currently unavailable but were it to become so could provide explicit information on how young people's time use changes over the life course, including across life course transitions, in different countries. The results presented here are also limited because the data lacked harmonizable information on factors including parental wealth, education and occupation, which may affect young people's time use.,. We know that class differences significantly affect young people's chances, for example in liberal regimes young people's occupational success substantially depends on family support, financial as well as social and

cultural ([Chesters, 2018: for Australia](#); [Manzoni, 2018: for the USA](#)). A further limitation is that to ensure comparability across all surveys, we were unable to analyse whether the incidence of multitasking (doing more than one activity at a time) differs across countries. Prior research has shown multitasking to occur particularly for housework and care (Author A), so may have widened gender gaps beyond those noted here. This is another avenue for future work, should more detailed information become available for harmonisation.

Conclusion

This paper offered new analyses of time allocation, an aspect of the daily experiences of contemporary young people amidst a global trend to labour market disruption and deregulation. Some global commonalities in time use were found, but the results also identified cross-national variation in daily activity patterns for young people. We applied a gender lens, which suggested that the specifics of time-equality in young men and women's daily lives vary considerably, in ways consistent with broad economic and family policy frameworks ([Iannelli and Smyth, 2008](#); [Gornick and Meyers, 2003](#); [Lewis, 2018](#)). An implication is that despite the current generation of young people facing growing economic insecurity worldwide, outcomes are influenced by both support levels and whether it comes primarily from the state, market or family. This supports scholars who argue that the extent to which youth experience consequences of globalization depend upon "the nation-specific institutions that exist to shield, or conversely, funnel uncertainty to them" ([Mills et al., 2005: 450](#)), and that nation-state remains influential in determining the welfare of citizens ([Buchholz et al., 2008](#); [Mills and Blossfeld, 2005](#); [Buchholz et al., 2011](#)).

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Table 1. Contextual factors of young adulthood by gender and country

	KOR	ITA	ESP	FRA	AUS	UK	USA	FIN
Education								
Tertiary degree (% of 25-34 y.) ¹								
Men	65.6	19.6	35.0	39.3	43.9	50.6	43.5	33.2
Women	74.8	31.7	47.0	48.6	54.6	53.4	51.5	49.5
Average student debt (in USD) ²	5653	0	0	0	14985	57742	28171 ^a	6310
Labour market								
Youth unemployment rate (% of 15-24 y. labour force) ¹								
Men	11.2	33.0	39.6	23.2	13.7	13.5	10.3	20.6
Women	9.6	37.3	37.5	21.3	11.5	10.6	8.1	19.0
Leave parental home/home ownership								
Living with parents (% of 20-34 y.) ³								
Men	58.3	79.4	68.7	38.5	24.1	31.4	31.5	28.5
Women	44.7	67.9	58.5	25.6	15.4	19.5	25.8	10.6
Average age of leaving home ⁴								
Men	n/a	31.2	30.3	25.0	n/a	25.2	n/a	22.7
Women		29.1	28.3	23.1		23.6		21.1
Partnering/children								
Age at first marriage ^{5,b}								
Men	31.1	32.5	33.3	31.9	29.2	31.2	28.2	31.6
Women	32.4	34.0	34.4	32.9	30.0	32.2	29.3	32.7
Fertility rate ¹	29.8	31.0	32.2	30.8	28.4	30.2	27.0	30.4
Women's average age at first childbirth ¹	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6
	31.9	31.8	32.0	30.5	30.8	30.4	29.1	30.8
Attitude to gender and education								
A university education is more important for a boy than a girl (% agree/strongly agree) ⁶								
Men	27.6	8.9	11.9	8.3	9.4	9.4	7.5	7.1
Women	24.6	7.2	11.6	5.3	4.5	4.5	5.8	5.5

Legend. KOR=Korea, ITA=Italy, ESP=Spain, FRA=France, AUS=Australia, UK=United Kingdom, USA=United States, FIN=Finland.

Note. ^aMean of lowest debt state (Utah, 19975 USD) and highest debt state (New Hampshire, 36367 USD). ^bAustralia reports median age at first marriage.

Sources. ¹OECD Database, latest data available. ²KOSAF (2017) (KOR); *Parliament of Australia* (2018) (AUS); *Crawford and Jin* (2014) (UK); *TICAS* (2017) (USA.); *EENEE* (2015) (FIN). ³Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) latest data available. ⁴EUROSTAT Database, latest data available. ⁵Australian Bureau of Statistics (AUS); EUROSTAT Database latest data available (ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, ITA); Statistics Korea (KOR); US CENSUS Bureau (USA). ⁶World Value Survey, latest wave available.

Table 2. Sample characteristics by country (%)

		KOR	ITA	ESP	FRA	AUS	UK	USA	FIN
n		3907	6928	3378	3075	1498	1594	2288	603
Gender	Women	53.1	50.6	53.6	54.4	53.2	54.7	56.6	53.4
	Men	46.9	49.4	46.4	45.6	46.8	45.3	43.4	47.7
Age group	20-24 years	24.2	29.6	26.8	23.1	34.9	28.7	20.4	31.1
	25-29 years	37.4	30.9	29.8	34.7	31.1	33.4	33.1	33.4
	30-34 years	38.4	39.4	43.4	42.2	34.0	37.9	46.5	35.3
Tertiary degree	Yes	42.1	16.1	36.1	60.7	34.4	48.7	35.8	31.6
	No	57.9	83.9	63.9	39.3	65.6	51.3	64.2	68.4
Employment status ^a	Employed	64.4	61.2	61.2	70.2	63.3	75.6	69.4	63.1
	Unemployed		9.6	19.8	10.8	2.6	5.6	6.8	7.2
	Fulltime student	35.6	15.4	12.8	10.5	13.2	7.4	10.2	19.5
	Not in labour force		12.4	6.2	8.5	20.9	11.4	13.6	10.2
Living situation	With parents	34.6	55.0	34.2	7.9	22.9	17.2	9.3	13.4
	Alone	6.3	8.4	5.0	22.6	7.1	7.7	16.6	14.9
	With partner	9.5	8.3	13.5	23.6	20.9	20.2	9.7	33.9
	Single parent family	5.5	1.0	1.2	4.8	2.7	5.6	13.1	2.5
	Two parent family	24.6	18.4	26.4	37.2	30.0	29.2	38.9	34.6
	Other household ^b	19.5	8.8	19.7	3.8	16.5	20.0	12.5	0.7

Legend. KOR=Korea, ITA=Italy, ESP=Spain, FRA=France, AUS=Australia, UK=United Kingdom, USA=United States, FIN=Finland.

Notes. ^aNo data on labour force status provided in Korean time use database. ^bShared, multi-generational and extended households.
Sources. National Bureaux of Statistics' time use surveys of Korea (2009), Italy (2009), Spain (2009), France (2009), Australia (2006), the UK (2014), the USA (2013) and Finland (2009).

Table 3. Coefficients and standard errors from OLS regression models predicting the time spent on market and non-market work, study and leisure of young adults aged 20-34 on an average day of the week [hours per day; n=23,271]

	Model 1: Market work					Model 2: Non-market work				
	<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>95% CI of B</i>		<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>95% CI of B</i>	
Intercept	4.27	0.11	***	4.05	4.50	2.02	0.06	***	1.88	2.13
Korea	1.98	0.11	***	1.77	2.20	-1.30	0.06	***	-1.41	-1.18
Italy	1.16	0.11	***	0.94	1.38	-0.83	0.06	***	-0.95	-0.71
Spain	0.51	0.12	***	0.28	0.74	-0.29	0.06	***	-0.42	-0.17
France	1.04	0.11	***	0.83	1.26	-0.43	0.06	***	-0.55	-0.31
Australia	2.53	0.12	***	2.30	2.76	-0.24	0.07	***	-0.37	-0.11
UK	1.23	0.12	***	1.00	1.46	-0.35	0.07	***	-0.48	-0.22
USA	1.27	0.13	***	1.03	1.52	0.03	0.07		-0.11	0.16
Women	-0.19	0.16		-0.51	0.13	-0.05	0.09		-0.22	0.13
Women × Korea	-1.05	0.15	***	-1.34	-0.75	1.60	0.08	***	1.44	1.76
Women × Italy	-1.60	0.16	***	-1.90	-1.30	1.98	0.09	***	1.82	2.15
Women × Spain	-0.18	0.16		-0.49	0.14	0.92	0.09	***	0.74	1.09
Women × France	-0.26	0.15		-0.57	0.04	0.08	0.08		-0.08	0.25
Women × Australia	-1.84	0.16	***	-2.16	-1.52	1.49	0.09	***	1.31	1.67
Women × UK	-0.92	0.16	***	-1.24	-0.59	0.83	0.09	***	0.65	1.01
Women × USA	-0.51	0.17	**	-0.85	-0.18	0.29	0.10	**	0.10	0.47
<i>Controls</i>										
20-24 years	-1.79	0.05	***	-1.89	-1.69	-0.13	0.03	***	-0.19	-0.08
30-34 years	0.22	0.05	***	0.13	0.31	0.18	0.03	***	0.12	0.23
Women × 20-24 years	0.50	0.07	***	0.36	0.64	-0.25	0.04	***	-0.32	-0.17
Women × 30-34 years	0.09	0.06		-0.04	0.21	-0.02	0.04		-0.09	0.05
Living with parents	-0.62	0.07	***	-0.75	-0.48	-0.34	0.04	***	-0.41	-0.26
Living with partner	0.65	0.08	***	0.50	0.80	0.18	0.04	***	0.14	0.26
Single parent family	-0.11	0.13		-0.37	0.14	0.11	0.07		-0.053	0.25
Two parent family	0.87	0.07	***	0.73	1.00	1.14	0.04	***	1.07	1.22
Living in other household type	-0.26	0.08	**	-0.41	-0.10	0.05	0.04		-0.04	0.14
Women × living with parents	0.85	0.10	***	0.65	1.05	-0.46	0.06	***	-0.57	-0.35
Women × living with partner	-0.74	0.11	***	-0.96	-0.53	0.57	0.06	***	0.45	0.69
Women × single parent family	-1.11	0.16	***	-1.42	-0.79	2.41	0.09	***	2.23	2.58
Women × two parent family	-3.08	0.10	***	-3.28	-2.89	3.23	0.05	***	3.12	3.34
Women × living in other household type	-0.41	0.12	***	-0.64	-0.18	0.94	0.06	***	0.81	1.07
Adjusted R ²	0.10					0.42				

Legend. B=regression coefficient, S.E.=standard error, Sig.=significance (two-tailed), 95% CI of B=95% confidence interval of regression coefficient.

Levels of significance: ***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05.

Notes. Base categories are men in Finland, aged 25-29 years, and living alone. Data are weighted to match the weekly distribution of weekdays (Mon-Fri) and weekend days (Sat-Sun).

Table 3. *Continued*

	Model 3: Study					Model 4: Leisure				
	<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>95% CI of B</i>		<i>B</i>	<i>S.E.</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>95% CI of B</i>	
Intercept	0.50	0.05	***	0.39	0.60	6.03	0.08	***	5.88	6.18
Korea	0.44	0.05	***	0.34	0.54	-1.11	0.07	***	-1.25	-0.96
Italy	0.03	0.05		-0.07	0.13	-0.66	0.08	***	-0.81	-0.52
Spain	0.00	0.05		-0.11	0.10	-0.51	0.08	***	-0.67	-0.36
France	-0.10	0.05	*	-0.20	0.00	-1.20	0.07	***	-1.35	-1.05
Australia	-0.20	0.05	***	-0.30	-0.09	-1.51	0.08	***	-1.67	-1.35
UK	-0.14	0.05	**	-0.25	-0.04	-0.87	0.08	***	-1.03	-0.71
USA	-0.07	0.06		-0.18	0.05	-0.72	0.08	***	-0.89	-0.55
Women	0.35	0.07	***	0.21	0.50	-0.46	0.11	***	-0.68	-0.25
Women × Korea	-0.54	0.07	***	-0.67	-0.41	0.25	0.10	*	0.05	0.45
Women × Italy	0.01	0.07		-0.13	0.14	-0.05	0.10		-0.25	0.16
Women × Spain	-0.06	0.07		-0.21	0.08	-0.18	0.11		-0.40	0.03
Women × France	-0.06	0.07		-0.19	0.08	0.31	0.10	**	0.10	0.51
Women × Australia	0.10	0.07		-0.04	0.25	0.32	0.11	**	0.10	0.54
Women × UK	-0.11	0.07		-0.25	0.04	0.27	0.11	*	0.05	0.48
Women × USA	-0.01	0.08		-0.17	0.14	-0.02	0.12		-0.25	0.21
<i>Controls</i>										
20-24 years	1.22	0.02	***	1.18	1.27	0.59	0.03	***	0.52	0.65
30-34 years	-0.22	0.02	***	-0.27	-0.18	-0.09	0.03	**	-0.15	-0.03
Women × 20-24 years	-0.02	0.03		-0.08	0.05	-0.23	0.05	***	-0.32	-0.14
Women × 30-34 years	0.09	0.03	***	0.04	0.15	-0.13	0.04	**	-0.22	-0.04
Living with parents	0.03	0.03		-0.03	0.09	0.72	0.05	***	0.63	0.81
Living with partner	-0.40	0.03	***	-0.46	-0.33	-0.48	0.05	***	-0.58	-0.38
Single parent family	-0.40	0.06	***	-0.52	-0.29	0.45	0.09	***	0.28	0.62
Two parent family	-0.36	0.03	***	-0.42	-0.30	-1.25	0.05	***	-1.34	-1.16
Living in other household type	-0.12	0.04	***	-0.19	-0.05	0.17	0.05	**	0.06	0.27
Women × living with parents	-0.06	0.05		-0.15	0.03	-0.57	0.07	***	-0.71	-0.44
Women × living with partner	-0.22	0.05	***	-0.32	-0.13	0.14	0.07	*	0.00	0.28
Women × single parent family	-0.21	0.07	**	-0.35	-0.07	-1.08	0.11	***	-1.29	-0.87
Women × two parent family	-0.31	0.04	***	-0.40	-0.22	0.02	0.07		-0.12	0.15
Women × living in other household type	-0.11	0.05	*	-0.21	0.00	-0.57	0.08	***	-0.72	-0.41
Adjusted R ²	0.12					0.10				

Legend. B=regression coefficient, S.E.=standard error, Sig.=significance (two-tailed), 95% CI of B=95% confidence interval of regression coefficient.

Levels of significance: ***p≤0.001, **p≤0.01, *p≤0.05.

Notes. Base categories are men in Finland, aged 25-29 years, and living alone. Data are weighted to match the weekly distribution of weekdays (Mon-Fri) and weekend days (Sat-Sun).

Table A1. Harmonization of activity codes of time use surveys

	Market work	Non-market work	Study	Leisure
Australia	200-241, 271-299, 321 <i>If at work</i> 150-159, 965, 966	400-499, 500-599, 600-611, 619-622, 625, 626, 671-699, 700-799, 840-859	300, 311, 331-399	172, 173, 443, 613, 800-839, 861-899, 900-964, 967-999 <i>If not at work</i> 965, 966
Italy	111-139, 901, 9011-9013	311-363, 365-399, 411-439, 903, 904, 3121-3621, 3811-3991, 4111-4324, 9031-9043	211, 212, 2121, 2122, 219, 902, 9021	221-229, 511-533, 611-631, 711-739, 811-832, 905-908, 2221, 5121-5158, 6111-6162, 7111-7362, 8111-8311, 9051, 9082
Spain	111, 121, 129, 910	300-399, 930-940	200-212	221, 511-531, 611-631, 711-739, 811-839, 950, 960
France	142, 145, 211-234, 251, 811, 9001	123, 124, 132, 311-399, 411-439, 531-542, 813, 819, 9003-9005	261-264, 9002	271, 272, 381, 510-524, 612-678, 9007-9009
Korea	211-230, 299, 723, 822, 2601, 2602	142, 240, 411-499, 511-523, 631-639, 741-743, 841-861, 4411-4431, 5121-5509, 6101-6212, 7801, 7802	311-329, 831	711-719, 731-736, 751-799, 871, 7371, 7372, 8721, 8722
Finland	111-129, 910, 1111, 1112	300-391, 411-439, 931-943	200-219, 921	221, 511-539, 611-631, 711-739, 811-839, 951-992, 5141, 5142
UK	1000-1390, 1399, 9010, 9100-9130	3000-3611, 3619-3929, 4000-4390, 9230-9440	2000-2190, 9210	2210, 3615, 5000-5310, 6000-6312, 7000-7390, 8000-8320, 9500-9800, 9820
USA	050101-050299, 059999, 180501-180503, 180599	020101-020601, 020603-029999, 030101-039999, 040401-049999, 070101-079999, 080101-089999, 090101-099999, 100101-109999, 120304, 140101-149999, 150101-159999, 160103-160108, 180201-180499, 180604, 180699-181099, 181401-181599	060101, 060103-060199, 060299, 060301-060499, 069999, 180601, 180603-180699	020602, 060102, 060201-060204, 120101-120303, 120305-129999, 130101-139999, 180504, 180602, 181101-181399

Sources. Time use surveys of Korea (2009), Italy (2009), Spain (2009), France (2009), Australia (2006), the UK (2014), the USA (2013) and Finland (2009).

Error bars represent 95% CI of mean.
 Within activity, country means sharing a letter are not significantly different at alpha=0.05 according to pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction.
 Data are weighted to match the weekly distribution of weekdays (Mon-Fri) and weekend days (Sat-Sun).

Figure 1. Time spent on market work, non-market work, study and leisure by young people aged 20-34 years on an average day of the week across countries [hours per day; n=23,271]

Figure 2. Time spent in market and non-market work, study and leisure by young men and women aged 25-29 on an average day of the week across country [hours per day; n=23,271].

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