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REMEMBERING “RWANDA”

‘[T]here must be no more Rwandas’¹

The 1994 Rwandan genocide now occupies a special place in global and historical memory. It is widely known as the genocide that could have been prevented, the genocide that was ignored. “Rwanda”, as this event has become known in short-hand, is understood as an experience of international failure, a moment in which nation states and international institutions across the world failed to respond to the genocide of the Tutsis. Subsequently, in its wake, the experience of “Rwanda” is called upon to inspire a sense of global solidarity and rally for a more robust commitment to cosmopolitan interventionism. Commentators caution against a situation becoming the ‘next Rwanda’,² in a context where – as articulated by Evans and Sahnoun – there is a sentiment that there should be ‘no more Rwandas’. “Rwanda”, as an event of international failure and an argument for global interconnectedness, thus transcends both the borders of the Rwandan nation and the history of its people. Instead, it

circulates, exists and signifies in the narrating and making of international social, legal and political history.

At a time when “Rwanda”, as a concept and construct, enjoys such an iconic status in public, political and academic discourse, this article critically reflects on its nature and existence. It both highlights the emergence of “Rwanda” as a distinct cultural complex, and provides a sketch of its contours and content. Methodologically, I extend the existing work of Mamdani and others³ by examining in more detail how “Rwanda” has been imagined across the plethora of post-hoc responses to the Rwandan genocide (the academic books, governmental and non-governmental reports, fiction and non-fiction films and political speeches released or delivered in its wake), as well as considering how such understandings have been taken up and revised at the Rwandan national level. I demonstrate that there is now dominant discourse about the global meaning and significance of the Rwandan genocide, and the international failure to halt it, that is used to conceptualize international responsibility for violence and atrocity throughout the world.

My aim is to consider the limits and possibilities both of “Rwanda” (as a frame for non-Rwandans to relate to the Rwandan genocide and subsequent events of suffering) and of such global memory constructs more generally. In relation to “Rwanda” specifically, I argue that existing productions of “Rwanda” provide a culturally particular and restrictive mode of understanding global responsibility and interconnectedness. Concerned with the failure of the West in 1994, “Rwanda” is understood as primarily a Western event: a moment of Western indifference and inaction that is drawn upon to underscore the importance of Western intervention in

African conflicts in a time of postcoloniality. In part reflective of the cultural dynamics of global knowledge production,⁴ “Rwanda” is a Western complex. Thus, whilst it can foster a sense of proximity between non-Rwandans and both the Rwandan genocide and other African violence, it is nevertheless a particular conceptual framework, which has limits, exclusions, biases and absences. More generally, the article then uses the case study of “Rwanda” to consider how the distinctly global character and orientation of constructs such as “Rwanda” shapes their meaning and function. As there are increasing calls for certain events to be seen as global issues or matters of international concern, I illustrate how the emergence of such globally oriented complexes can – in practice – be a sign of the appropriation of particular historical occurrences to serve global social and political ends.

Structurally, the article begins by examining the cultural aftermath of the 1994 genocide, and the emergence of the figure of “Rwanda”. It then provides an account of the nature and content of “Rwanda”, before highlighting the particularity of this discursive framework and noting how it has been utilized and revised by the Rwandan government. Ultimately, without downplaying the international significance of the suffering of the Rwandan Tutsis, this article nevertheless underscores the partial and political nature of contemporary understandings of “Rwanda”, as well as drawing attention to the ethical issues posed by global memory constructs per se.

A I “RWANDA”: THE PRODUCTION OF A GLOBAL EVENT

B 1 THE CULTURAL AFTERMATH OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

It is now well established that during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, national and international actors failed to intervene effectively to stop the violence. Despite increasingly dire information about what was happening in Rwanda, both before and during the genocide, and the presence of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Rwanda during the genocide, nation states and international bodies remained reluctant to respond militarily, legally or diplomatically to the genocidal violence. The French government did send a French dominated, so-called “multi-lateral” force to Rwanda near the end of the genocide called Opération Turquoise. However, it is generally accepted that this Opération was not primarily designed to end the genocide and that while it managed to protect some Tutsi, it also provided protection to some of the perpetrators of the violence. Ultimately, the genocidal killings in Rwanda were only officially halted in mid-July, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army of Tutsi refugees, managed to militarily defeat the genocidal authorities and subsequently assert political control over the Rwandan nation.

In striking contrast, however, to the international disinterest in the Rwandan genocide at the time that it was occurring, since 1994, the genocide and the international failure to halt it have become popular subjects of discussion and objects of inquiry. In its aftermath, the genocide, and the response that it received, have been depicted, discussed and denounced across public, academic, popular cultural and political spheres. In the public arena, a plethora of non-fiction texts – non-government reports,

newspaper articles, pieces of investigative journalism and documentary films – have emerged that have sought to document the genocide and expose the “truth” behind governmental and institutional inaction regarding it.⁵ Purporting to tell ‘the full story of perhaps the darkest and most brutal tragedy of our time’,⁶ these texts endeavor to reveal what they regard as ‘one of the greatest scandals of the twentieth century’.⁷ Collectively, they have provided a vivid picture of the extent of governmental and institutional knowledge of the genocide during 1994, which is damningly contrasted with the minimal and minimalist international efforts to halt the genocide of the Tutsis. Their central revelation is thus that certain countries (predominantly the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium) and institutions (the United Nations) *knew* about the genocide whilst it was occurring and yet still failed to intervene to protect the Rwandan Tutsis. As Samantha Power argues, in her award-winning book *“A Problem from Hell”: American and the Age of Genocide*, ‘[t]he real reason the United States did not do what it could and should have done to stop genocide was not a lack of knowledge or influence but a lack of will. Simply put, American leaders did not act because they did not want to’.⁸

In the academic sphere, the genocide and the international failure have become the focus of a significant body of literature. Whilst previous academic engagement with Rwanda was primarily authored by Rwandan or African specialists, following the genocide, scholars from a variety of disciplinary and geographical locations turned their attention to Rwanda.⁹ There is now a substantial field of academic work that focuses, firstly, on the genocide, its history and dynamics and, secondly, on the international response that it received (in fact, it is now rare to find a piece of academic research regarding the Rwandan genocide that does not include a section or

more on the international failure to stop it).¹⁰ In this scholarship, the international failure to halt the genocide has been framed as a problem to be explained and understood. The failure has been problematized as an unjustifiably “indifferent” and “passive” reaction to the crime of genocide,¹¹ and academics have sought to interrogate ‘why the early warnings of an emerging genocide were not translated into early preventative action’.¹² In line with the public texts discussed above, international inaction and indifference is attributed to a lack of political will, given the strategic, political and economic unimportance of the Rwandan nation and people on the global stage. As Barnett explains, ‘Rwanda did not magically become important’ when the genocide began, rather it remained a country of little strategic, economic and political significance to “world powers”.¹³

Such understandings of the international failure are also taken up in a range of popular cultural texts that have also emerged since 2004 in particular. These films,¹⁴ novels¹⁵ and first-person accounts¹⁶ provide a more personal perspective on the lived experience of the genocide and failure; unlike other representations, they account for the ‘sounds, smells, depredations, the scenes of inhuman acts’ that constituted these events.¹⁷ As such, they are oriented towards a more affective mode of engagement, providing an opportunity for their viewers and readers to not only know about, but also feel about, these historical events. Initially authored primarily by non-Rwandans exposed to the genocide, but increasingly written by Rwandans themselves,¹⁸ these texts “bear witness” to the genocide and enable their consumers to do the same.¹⁹ Importantly, complementing the public and academic works, these popular cultural texts also “bear witness” to the Rwandan genocide as a moment of international indifference and inaction. Many of the feature films, for example, contain scenes

depicting the evacuations of expatriates from Rwanda in the first few days of the genocide that have become symbolic of the international abandonment of the Rwandan people.²⁰ International indifference is also referenced more directly at times, with one of the best known scenes in the Hollywood blockbuster *Hotel Rwanda* involving a Western reporter, Jack Daglish, explaining to the Rwandan protagonist, Paul Rusesabagina, and the film's audience, that the footage of the killings he has filmed will not spark any substantial reaction from Western viewers: 'they'll say, "Oh my God, that's horrible," and then go on eating their dinners'.²¹

Meanwhile, in the political sphere, there has been a global outpouring of remorse and regret regarding the international response to the genocide. Since 1994, governmental and institutional officials have visited Rwanda, touring the various memorial sites in the country and offering their apologies and condolences for the genocide and the international failure to halt it. The former American President Bill Clinton has repeatedly confessed that "Rwanda" constitutes one of his 'greatest regrets',²² and in 1998 he travelled to Rwanda and admitted that the international community should have done more to stop the killings.²³ The former Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan has echoed these sentiments, asserting that '[t]he international community failed Rwanda, and that must leave us always with a sense of bitter regret and abiding sorrow'.²⁴ In offering such statements, both leaders have also framed the international failure as a more personalized error or sin, which has informed their subsequent global actions. Such personalized expressions of remorse have also been offered by other political leaders, the former President of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz,²⁵ the former Prime Minister of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt²⁶ and the former President of

South Africa Thabo Mbeki²⁷ (to name a prominent few), whilst France remains the only country that Rwanda has called upon to apologize who has not done so.²⁸

A selection of governments and institutions have also conducted commissions of inquiry into their response to the 1994 genocide. In 1997, the Belgian Senate initiated the first national inquiry, followed by the French National Assembly in 1998.²⁹ Two institutional commissions of inquiry were also subsequently undertaken by independent panels charged with the responsibility of examining the respective responses of the UN and the then Organization of African Unity to the 1994 killings.³⁰ Designed to determine “what went wrong” in 1994, these reports have focused on identifying and articulating the range of ‘errors’,³¹ ‘deficiencies’³² and ‘failures’³³ that allegedly culminated in the international failure. In doing so, they present the international failure as a discrete mistake that can now be understood and hence avoided in the future. Conducted in the wake of growing public criticism of the international failure, these inquiries therefore constituted a way for governments and institutions to acknowledge and regain control of societal debates and provide their own, authoritative account of “what really happened”.³⁴ To that end, the French inquiry, in particular, has been regarded in some quarters as a ‘whitewash’ more focused on deflecting criticism from the French state than examining the nature and impact of its interventions.³⁵ Accordingly, partially in order to contest the veracity of the findings of the French government’s inquiry, the Rwandan government also launched its own inquiry into the role of France in Rwanda before, during and after the genocide, which found the French government was complicit with the *genocidaires*, both before the genocide and during its occurrence.³⁶

In recent times, both the genocide and the international failure to halt it have also increasingly been remembered through various memorials and commemorative practices situated at the national and international levels.³⁷ From 1995, the anniversary of the genocide has been commemorated in Rwanda, usually on April 7 each year, a date that marks the beginning of a national week of mourning. On the tenth anniversary of the genocide in 2004, the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre was also opened in Rwanda's capital city and is now accompanied by memorials in each district of Rwanda and by exhibitions regarding the genocide across the world.³⁸ In 2004, commemorations of the genocide also assumed a distinctly international character. The Canadian-based volunteer organization, *Remembering Rwanda*, expended time and resources on drawing attention to the tenth anniversary of the killings, underscoring the importance of commemorating a genocide that they claimed was already (or still) being forgotten by the rest of the world.³⁹ That same year, the UN named April 7, 2004 as the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda⁴⁰ and, across the world, both the genocide and the international failure to prevent it were remembered. Such international involvement in the commemoration of the genocide has continued since then with the launch of the UN's *Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations*, focusing on genocide prevention through the memory and remembrance of the Rwandan genocide.⁴¹ In such fora, the international failure to halt the Rwandan genocide is again foregrounded as a central feature of this historical event, which is said to have 'underscored the international community's failure to make the prevention of genocide a reality'.⁴²

Thus, somewhat paradoxically, while the Rwandan genocide was treated as unimportant whilst it was occurring, both the genocide and the international failure to stop it are currently understood to be extremely important – or as Howard-Hassmann claims they have ‘induced much Western soul-searching’.⁴³ Both the genocide and the international failure to prevent it now enjoy a privileged place in global memory.⁴⁴

B 2 FROM THE “HOLOCAUST” TO “RWANDA”

Writing of the ‘archetypal’ event of genocide, the Holocaust, Alexander observes that: ‘In the beginning, in April 1945, the Holocaust was not the ‘Holocaust’’.⁴⁵ His assertion has been echoed by other scholars, such as Novick and Schaffer and Smith, who have pointed to the belated nature of the construction of the Holocaust as a globally and historically significant event.⁴⁶ Collectively, these scholars demonstrate how the events that constitute what is now known as the Holocaust, were originally conceptualized as simply one example of the more generalized horror of World War II. In this earlier time, the events of the Holocaust were invoked to underscore and establish the inhumanity of the war and the Nazi state, but they were not marked and demarcated as an internationally important event in their own right. Rather, it was not until decades later, that the term “Holocaust” became instantiated as the proper name for these events, which – in turn – came to be understood in a particular way, namely as an ultimate, and generalizable, inhumanity, representative of ‘the limits of unimaginable and unspeakable trauma’.⁴⁷

Similarly, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, “Rwanda” too has emerged as a distinct discursive construct.⁴⁸ “Rwanda” is no longer a term that just refers to the Rwandan nation, its culture and its people – rather it is now a short-hand term for current global understandings of the genocide and, particularly, the international failure to stop it. As is succinctly captured in the title of the 2000 Organization of African Unity report, the 1994 Rwandan genocide is now commonly known as the ‘preventable genocide’.⁴⁹ “Rwanda” is now inscribed not just as the site of the extermination of the Rwandan Tutsis, but also a moment of international failure.⁵⁰ Within this mode of thinking, the Rwandan genocide did not just occur: it was permitted to occur. The international failure to stop the genocide is conceptualized as its condition of possibility, a necessary precondition to its occurrence. As such, the international failure to halt the genocide is now seen as both an integral element of this historical occurrence and an important event in its own right. The Rwandan genocide is conceptualized as a product of a failure, a failure not just of the Rwandan people, but of those non-Rwandan countries, institutions and individuals that did not stop or prevent it.

Since 1994, the international failure to halt the Rwandan genocide has been coded as distinctly shameful and “Rwanda” has gradually consolidated as a matter of (Western and international) shame. “Rwanda” is shameful in the sense that it is understood to constitute a failure on behalf of Western countries and international institutions to live up to national societal expectations of their global role.⁵¹ Rather than acting as the human rights defenders that they had claimed or were expected to be, actors such as the United States of America, Britain, Belgium and the UN failed to militarily intervene to stop the genocide, despite their ability to do so. This understanding of

“Rwanda” can be seen in various public sphere texts – such as documentary films and investigative journalism works – which juxtapose the failures of certain countries and institutions with their constituency’s expectations of them. In her widely read work, investigative journalist Linda Melvern, for example, explains how ‘[t]here was a time when the sight of a single blue helmet at a checkpoint flying the UN flag was a symbol of peace ... The peacekeeper’s weapon was not the rifle slung over the shoulder but his credibility’, but that ‘[a]fter Rwanda that symbol may have been irreparably tarnished’.⁵² In turn, the UN, in its inquiry into the genocide has affirmed such sentiments, describing its own inaction in the presence of the genocide as “terrible and humiliating”.⁵³

That is, whilst governmental and institutional actors have sought to respond to both the international failure and the subsequent controversy regarding it, through expressions of remorse and commissions of inquiry, they have nevertheless taken a similar approach to this event to those that have criticised them. They have admitted that the international failure was a regrettable occurrence and endorsed public expectations that there should have been a more interventionist Western and international response to the genocide. In the aftermath of the genocide, Clinton has publicly stated that there should have been an American military action in 1994, as it would have saved many lives.⁵⁴ Whilst Annan has affirmed that ‘[i]f the international community had acted promptly and with determination, it could have stopped most of the killing’.⁵⁵ There is, therefore, now a dominant discourse about the international failure to halt the Rwandan genocide, its meaning and significance. Across public, political and academic spheres, a relatively cohesive way of understanding the meaning and significance of the Rwandan genocide has emerged: the Rwandan

genocide is now understood as a genocide that should have been prevented, whilst the international response to it has been problematized as a regrettable and shameful reaction to a crime that required a more interventionist response.⁵⁶

This framing of the Rwandan genocide has also been endorsed to some extent in official and mainstream Rwandan discourse. In his speeches at the annual national commemoration ceremonies, President Kagame frequently refers to the international failure to halt the genocide (for more detail, see discussion below),⁵⁷ reflecting broader understandings of the centrality of the international failure to the historical experience of the genocide. Meanwhile, the importance of the international failure is also referenced at prominent memorial sites, such as the exhibition at the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre, which has a section on the ‘International Response’ that depicts how ‘[t]he world withdrew ... and watched as a million people were slaughtered’.⁵⁸ Rwandan civil society too has been receptive to the conceptualization of the Rwandan genocide as the ‘preventable genocide’ in calling for those external national and international actors implicated in the genocide and international failure to provide reparations and compensation to survivors.⁵⁹

Notably, the Rwandan government, in particular, has both drawn upon such modes of conceptualizing the Rwandan genocide to pursue its own political goals.⁶⁰

Understandings of the Rwandan genocide as a moment of Western inaction have lent legitimacy to the existing government, which is comprised of many former RPF soldiers, who ultimately ended the genocide.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the status of the Rwandan genocide as the ‘preventable genocide’ has also been invoked by Rwandan political actors in their international relations. Thus, for example, in response to external

criticism of legal restrictions on freedom of speech in post-genocide Rwanda, the Rwandan government has asserted that it cannot adopt the same stance as international actors did during the genocide.⁶² In this rebuttal, the government is referring specifically to the international failure in 1994 to disable the RTLM radio station (which was broadcasting hate speech and instructions regarding the genocide) and, in particular, to the American justification for not doing so (namely that it would contravene American commitments to free speech). Meanwhile, there is a cynical view expressed in academic and political commentary that not only is international aid for post-genocide Rwanda shaped by Western guilt regarding the international failure,⁶³ but that this guilt has been skillfully exploited by the Rwandan government in the post-genocide era.⁶⁴

“Rwanda” has therefore assumed a distinct identity in the wake of the 1994 genocide. “Rwanda” is, for example, a name for international inaction in the face of suffering – as in the call from Evans and Sahnoun that ‘there must be no more Rwandas’.⁶⁵ In their injunction, Evans and Sahnoun are not referring to the geographical territory also named “Rwanda”, but to the genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and the international failure to prevent it. Similarly, as media commentators warn against contemporary atrocities becoming the ‘the next’ or ‘another Rwanda’,⁶⁶ the term “Rwanda” has come to signify international indifference to genocide, as much as it refers to a particular country, culture and people. The point is that “Rwanda” – as with the “Holocaust” – now signifies an entity, a discursive construct, which did not exist prior to 1994. It is now the label for something new: a distinct cultural complex, or discourse, that has emerged in the wake of the international failure to prevent the

genocide, a regulated and productive way of thinking about this event that traverses multiple cultural sites.⁶⁷

Moreover, as with the “Holocaust”, “Rwanda” has become a ‘metaphor for other traumatic histories’.⁶⁸ As alluded to above, “Rwanda” is increasingly invoked as a frame through which to conceptualize the international implications of subsequent events of suffering throughout the world. It has been reported that it was the memory of “Rwanda” that motivated certain leaders to support an international intervention in Libya in early 2011.⁶⁹ In an American context, President Barack Obama’s support for the intervention has been attributed to the fact that he ‘doesn’t want another Rwanda on his watch’.⁷⁰ This account of the Libyan intervention references both former President Bill Clinton’s inaction regarding the Rwandan genocide and former President George W. Bush’s reaction to it and the subsequent Darfur conflict. That is, it is now well known that when President Bush received a summary of one of Samantha Power’s influential investigative journalism articles on the international failure to halt the Rwandan genocide, President Bush wrote on the document: ‘NOT ON MY WATCH’.⁷¹ This phrase is thus reiterated in 2011 to show that just as President Bush’s approach to Darfur was shaped by the experience of “Rwanda”, so too is President Obama’s more recent reaction to the Libyan atrocities and civil war.

Indeed, as many commentators have noted, it is perhaps in relation to the ongoing violence in Darfur that the invocation of the memory of “Rwanda” has perhaps been most pronounced.⁷² Mamdani, for example, notes how the American-based, yet

globally oriented, 'Save Darfur' movement developed from the commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and involved the popular portrayal of the Darfur violence as the 'next Rwanda'.⁷³ In turn, using "Rwanda" as a frame to relate to the conflict in Darfur has shaped and influenced how external parties conceptualized this suffering and conceived of responding to it.⁷⁴ Thus, in the light of the Clinton administration's reluctance to officially recognize the 1994 Rwandan killings as a genocide at the time that they occurred, with respect to Darfur, much political and public emphasis was placed on recognizing the genocidal nature of this subsequent global violence.⁷⁵

As Tuathail demonstrates in his analysis of American reactions to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, geopolitical and affective relations to the suffering of others are 'socially produced'; the way in which an event is imagined and remembered actively determines the sense of 'proximity' or 'distance' that external spectators may feel to it.⁷⁶ He examines the way in which "Bosnia", as an event, was conceptualized from two competing perspectives: firstly, as Europe's next Holocaust and, secondly, as America's next Vietnam.⁷⁷ Whilst understanding the Bosnian atrocities through the frame of the Holocaust promoted a sense of proximity between Americans and Bosnians, reducing the cultural separation Americans might otherwise feel, thinking about the violence through the lens of Vietnam instead facilitated a sense of desired distance and promoted a policy of American non-interventionism. From this perspective, it is possible to appreciate how existing global memories of "Rwanda" foster a sense of proximity between non-Rwandans and the genocide in Rwanda. Understood as a moment of Western and international failure, "Rwanda" is transformed from a potentially geographically and culturally remote event for

Western audiences to one that directly implicates them and their leaders. Moreover, the more recent use of “Rwanda” as a framework to conceptualize subsequent events of suffering on the African continent provides a means for non-Africans to understand such future violence as their concern, enabling ‘new lines of sight’ and facilitating new possibilities for global engagement with suffering across the world.⁷⁸

In this way, “Rwanda” is also an affective cultural complex.⁷⁹ For non-Rwandans, “Rwanda” has become the name for not just an event that is now known, but an interpersonal experience that is belatedly seen, felt, and appreciated.⁸⁰ “Rwanda” concerns the present remorse, shame and regret caused by past indifference, the contemporary commitments to ending human suffering that are seen to spring from the memory of past injustice (only now grasped).⁸¹ As such, “Rwanda” is a site of mourning, prompting sorrow and solemn remembrance; a means of redemption, enabling catharsis through the confession of remorse and regret about the past; and, a source of inspiration, motivating commitments to international responsibility for African suffering. The resonance and meaning of “Rwanda” on the global stage is traceable to the fact that “Rwanda” moves people, facilitating relations to the Rwandan genocide – and indeed future instances of human suffering – that are not just cognitive, but also affective in nature.⁸² It is through understandings of “Rwanda” that non-Rwandans are enabled to feel and relate to the Rwandan genocide, and the atrocities in Libya and Sudan, to experience a form of relation to these events and to experience them as historical occurrences that implicate and affect them as well.

However, the affective capacity of “Rwanda” should not obscure its cultural and political character.⁸³ Although “Rwanda” facilitates a post-hoc connection between

non-Rwandans and the 1994 Rwandan genocide, this relationship is politically, historically and culturally conditioned. The particular nature of the affective relations produced in and through the construct of “Rwanda” shape and structure the possibilities of engagement between non-Rwandans and both the Rwandan genocide and subsequent events of atrocity throughout the world.⁸⁴ As such, the next section turns to reflect on the particularities and peculiarities, limits and possibilities, of existing productions of what this event has come to mean for and about the world.

A II REFLECTING ON “RWANDA”

Writing of the post-hoc construction of the now global memory of the “Holocaust”, Alexander argues that cultural understandings of this event have assumed the form of a tragedy narrative.⁸⁵ Within this framework of understanding, those exposed to the Holocaust are asked to bear witness to this event as extreme suffering that can neither be remedied nor coherently conceptualized. He shows that the cultural traction of this rendering of the Holocaust has, in turn, led to various stories and experiences connected to this history being highlighted or downplayed. In particular, Alexander demonstrates how the production of the Holocaust as tragedy, in practice, has led to stories of Jewish agency, activism and resistance being obscured in the internationally renowned exhibition of the genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.⁸⁶ Similarly, contemporary understandings of “Rwanda” provide a socially, culturally and historically distinct mode of coming to terms with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the international failure to halt it, which emphasizes certain aspects of these events and makes it difficult to appreciate others.

Firstly, although the international response to the Rwandan genocide is deserving of analysis and attention, the current conceptualization of the international failure as *the* condition of possibility of the genocide can have undesirable implications. A focus on the centrality of the international response to the genocide can create the illusion that the genocide itself was somehow inevitable. Within this framework, the deaths of the Rwandan Tutsis become referred to as their “fate”⁸⁷ and the genocide is said to have “unfolded”.⁸⁸ Through such descriptions, the genocide is transformed from a planned, deliberate and potentially preventable occurrence into a pre-determined one. Against a backdrop of historical, and contemporary, depictions of Africa as a site of war, violence and anarchy,⁸⁹ the genocide itself is seen as one more instance of violence on the continent.

In turn, the capacity of external countries and international institutions to prevent, or stop, the genocide is figured as the only tenable way of ensuring that the genocide of the Tutsis did not eventuate. As Barnett explains, in relation to academic texts on the international failure, many studies are directed towards imagining ‘a counterfactual world in which a possible action is logically connected to a chain of events that would have caused the perpetrators to abandon their crusade’.⁹⁰ The purpose of such hypothetical endeavors is to show ‘that this genocide could have been prevented’,⁹¹ but only and always already by the external Western spectator. The agency of the Rwandan people – perpetrators and victims – is downplayed through such a focus on the power of the bystander to genocide.⁹² The stories of Rwandan resistance to the genocide at Bisesero, Bugasera and Murambi⁹³ and the emphasis on the responsibility of Rwandan perpetrators found at the Rwandan national level, have no significant

place in this dominant global remembering of the genocide and the international failure.⁹⁴

Secondly, whilst current understandings of “Rwanda” appropriately highlight the implication of external parties in the 1994 violence, they do so in a highly selective and particular manner. Conceptualized as the ‘preventable genocide’, “Rwanda” is understood as a site of failure and omission, a moment in which certain nation states and international institutions across the world failed to take action to halt the genocide of the Tutsis. Thus, in the wake of the genocide, the focus has been on the failures and omissions of countries and institutions: the failure of countries such as the United States of America to officially name the killings as a “genocide” (preferring instead the phrase ‘acts of genocide’); the withdrawal of the Belgian contingent from Rwanda in the early days of the genocide after ten of its peacekeepers were killed; the reluctance of national and international parties to exert pressure on the Rwandan authorities to stop the violence; and, perhaps most of all, the failure of the UN and its members to authorize a wider mandate and reinforcements for the peacekeeping force already inside Rwanda.⁹⁵

Occluded from view in this account of “Rwanda” are the *actions* of non-Rwandans, both during and before the genocide, which arguably contributed to its occurrence. In terms of active involvement *during the genocide*, as discussed below, the Rwandan government has consistently sought to draw attention to the potentially criminal nature of the French intervention during the genocide. Meanwhile, in his book considering the role of France in the Rwandan genocide, Wallis argues that ‘[t]he point gets overlooked that genocide often occurs because of too much, not too little,

Western interference’.⁹⁶ With respect to external involvement in Rwanda *before the genocide*, departing from mainstream academic discourse, scholars such as Uvin, as well as Newbury, Mamdani, Melvern and Orford, have sought to emphasize that it was the very involvement of outside countries and international institutions in Rwanda that contributed to the social, economic and political conditions in which the genocide occurred.⁹⁷ Uvin emphasizes, for example, how the practice and policy of development aid contributed to the environment in which the genocide occurred.⁹⁸ Further, academic literature on the genocide has also drawn attention to the ongoing legacy of colonialism on Rwandan society.⁹⁹ From this perspective, the problem of “Rwanda” becomes not one of inaction, but of action; whilst the role of countries and international institutions is no longer one of externality, as such actors were already ‘present’ in Rwanda in certain ways.¹⁰⁰

For its part, the Rwandan government has taken a more nuanced approach to the question of international responsibility for the genocide. At the 15th commemoration of the genocide, President Kagame stated that external parties bore two types of guilt, or two types of responsibility.¹⁰¹ Firstly, like some academic commentators, the Rwandan government has emphasized the ongoing impact of colonial and neo-colonial Western intervention in Rwanda, described as ‘a history going back many decades’ that created the necessary conditions for genocide to occur.¹⁰² It is in this sense that Belgium’s exacerbation of Rwandan societal divisions through their style of colonial rule and their introduction of identity cards demarcating Hutus and Tutsis is emphasized.¹⁰³ Secondly, within Kagame’s two-part framework, official government materials and speeches (as noted earlier) also highlight the responsibility of non-Rwandan actors for their failures regarding the 1994 genocide, proclaiming

that the world ‘watched as a million people were slaughtered’.¹⁰⁴ Thirdly, though, in addition to these two types of guilt, the Rwandan government has also drawn attention to a third type of external responsibility in relation to France: French complicity and participation in the genocide. This was clearly a focus of the Rwandan government’s commission of inquiry into the role of France before, during and after the genocide, as well as the 13th commemoration of the genocide which was deliberately held at a site where French troops were stationed during the killings.¹⁰⁵ The dominant Rwandan approach thus accounts for both the inactions and actions of non-Rwandan parties with respect to the 1994 violence, as well as placing such responsibility in a longer historical trajectory leading to differing forms of culpability.

Thirdly, and finally, in terms of its limits and biases, “Rwanda” in many ways constitutes a self-focused and racially structured Western construct. At a basic level, it largely concerns the actions and inactions of certain, Western countries (United States of America, France, Britain and Belgium) and it is constructed in and through visual, written and verbal texts primarily produced in Western contexts by Western academics, speakers, journalists and film-makers.¹⁰⁶ More substantively, though, “Rwanda” names a way of thinking in which the West occupies the position of subject – it is their actions and inactions that are condemned, their shame and remorse that is confessed and their lessons that are learned. Conceptualized as a moment of Western and international failure, “Rwanda” constitutes a mode of coming to terms with the genocide that foregrounds the actions, experience and emotions of the Western and international bystander to genocide.

In one respect, the Western nature of global memories of “Rwanda” could be explained as a simple function of the cultural dynamics of global knowledge production, a sign of the ongoing hegemony of the West in the international sphere.¹⁰⁷ Yet, it is also reflective of the current role of the figure of “Rwanda” on the global stage – namely, as has been argued by Dawes, Mamdani and others, as a site for the West to imagine and visualize itself as the moral, global savior it failed to be. For Dawes, this is why the international failure has ‘become a more potent and vivid story in the West than the genocide itself ever could be. We are culpable, and it feels good to be culpable. It assures us that we are good people, because we are the kind of people who feel bad about these sorts of things’.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Mamdani extends Dawes’ insight to the contemporary invocation of “Rwanda” as a frame for relating to subsequent events of suffering. Mamdani demonstrates how – through the lens of “Rwanda” – Darfur thus becomes a geopolitical location at which Western publics and governments can perform themselves as ‘good’ and ‘moral’ global subjects in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide and the second Iraq War.¹⁰⁹ “Rwanda” – as it is applied to both the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the more recent conflict in Sudan – constitutes a self-focused Western mode of understanding, concerned with how the West responds to events of suffering throughout the world. It is in this vein, that – in relation to Darfur – actor George Clooney warns contemporary international leaders: ‘[h]ow you deal with it will be your legacy, your Rwanda’.¹¹⁰

“Rwanda” is also a racially structured discursive construct. The spectre of “Rwanda” is not necessarily invoked indiscriminately. Rather, it appears as though “Rwanda” has predominantly, if not solely, been drawn upon as a means of understanding the significance and implications of violence on the African continent. “Rwanda” is

overwhelmingly conjured as a conceptual framework to relate to human rights abuses in countries such as Sudan, Libya, Côte D'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and Somalia.¹¹¹ Thus, whilst the memory of the "Holocaust" is characterized by its "generalizability" (the 'generalization' of its 'victims', 'perpetrators' and 'significance'),¹¹² the construct of "Rwanda" is less widely applicable, or is – at least – generalizable in a different way. Concerned with the problem of *Western* non-interventionism and predominantly invoked as a frame to understand the global import of *African* conflicts, "Rwanda" is a discourse premised on the relation between the West (a potential global hero) and Africa (a potential population in need of assistance).

Reflective of a more generalized historical tendency for dominant (read Western) productions of Africa to function as a means for the West to trace its own contours and justify its own actions,¹¹³ "Rwanda" thus represents the appropriation of the experience of the 1994 genocide to affirm a distinct Western subjectivity (potential and desirable global hero) and Western actions (Western military interventionism in a postcolonial world).¹¹⁴ Once again, as highlighted by Mbembe, 'narrative about Africa is always a pretext for a comment about something else, some other place, some other people'.¹¹⁵ The story of "Rwanda" is one that concerns the renewed importance of Western emotional engagement and practical intervention in African contexts in the postcolonial era. "Rwanda" is invoked in contemporary times to remind a Western "us" that – unlike 1994 – "we" should care about and actively respond to suffering and violence on the African continent, regardless of any gaps in knowledge or understanding of the conflict and the best way to resolve it.¹¹⁶

As such, although the contemporary international attention to the 1994 genocide, and the international failure to halt it, is appropriate and desirable, it is still important to remain aware of the grounds upon which “Rwanda” has risen to such global prominence in recent times. The contours and content, and limits and biases, of this discursive framework shape and constrain what forms of global connection it promotes, hinders and renders invisible. Current ways of understanding “Rwanda” offer a limited, self-focused and culturally structured mode through which non-Rwandans can relate to the 1994 genocide and subsequent events of violence through their past indifference, present remorse and future determination to react more forcefully to future suffering. The nature and function of “Rwanda” is also shaped and constrained by its distinctly global nature and orientation – it such considerations that are explored in the following and final section.

A III FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL: REFLECTING ON THE GLOBAL NATURE OF “RWANDA”

The incremental globalization of crime and justice since World War II is often celebrated as a positive and progressive historical development. The prohibition of certain acts as distinctly international crimes and the establishment of international criminal tribunals to address them have been framed as important recognitions of their universal implications and significance.¹¹⁷ From this view, international crimes are viewed as inherently international acts that offend ‘against fundamental values of the whole international community’¹¹⁸ and should be ‘rightly prosecuted at an international level’.¹¹⁹ Outside the legal arena, there is also a sense that certain events and harms should be seen as matters of global concern that demand an international

response. From the Kony 2012 campaign, which sought to draw global attention to the crimes of Joseph Kony and facilitate his arrest,¹²⁰ to the Stop Rape Now campaign, which seeks to specifically highlight rape in war as an internationally significant offence that requires global opposition,¹²¹ to the Save Darfur Campaign, that highlighted the atrocities in Darfur as the world's next genocide,¹²² there are common calls for certain occurrences to be perceived as international issues that require 'our' global attention, action and condemnation.

The emergence of "Rwanda" can be situated in this broader context. "Rwanda", that is, is a distinctly *global* discursive construct. Produced in and through internationally prominent texts and discourses,¹²³ this mode of understanding circulates beyond the Rwandan national context from which it borrows its name.¹²⁴ Moreover, "Rwanda" concerns the meaning and import of the Rwandan genocide on the global stage. It is a way of coming to terms with the genocide that locates it as an event in international social, legal and political history. As such, the emergence and circulation of "Rwanda" also affords an opportunity to reflect more generally on the contemporary globalization of crime, to consider what happens when certain events are taken up as international events of significance to 'us' all. To that end, this final section considers the global character of discursive constructs such as "Rwanda" (and the "Holocaust"), sometimes also referred to as global memories.¹²⁵ Through a discussion of how and why these constructs might be categorized as distinctly global and why this might be significant, I demonstrate how their global character and orientation shapes their nature and operation.

That is, as a global construct, “Rwanda” is not simply the Rwandan genocide and international failure finally acknowledged, or remembered, on the global stage. The emergence and ascendancy of “Rwanda” does not merely signify that (although belatedly) the Rwandan genocide has assumed its ‘rightful place in international memory’.¹²⁶ Rather, global complexes, such as “Rwanda”, have a unique nature and operation. As Santos notes, scale is productive and subjects and objects appear differently at different scalar levels.¹²⁷ Memory constructs that exist and circulate at the global scale, such as “Rwanda” and the “Holocaust”, signify and are made to signify in particular ways. More specifically, as will be discussed in this section, such global memory constructs: concern the global or international significance of certain events, are addressed to purportedly global constituencies and ultimately serve global social and political projects and ends.¹²⁸ The question of scale is thus a question of both meaning and subjectivity. It determines both how a particular cultural complex is constructed and made to mean and who it is understood to mean for.

In his book *After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights*, Meister writes of the social and political role of global memories of the “Holocaust”. He discusses the way in which “Auschwitz” emerged as a seminal moment in global affairs; belatedly configured as a ‘moment of revealed truth’ which ‘changed everything’.¹²⁹ In this discourse, “Auschwitz” symbolizes what is understood to constitute ‘radical evil’, namely human suffering, which was met with indifference in the past and thus must lead to commitments to the prevention of such suffering in the future.¹³⁰ Configured in this manner, “Auschwitz” is produced as the authorizing event for a human rights discourse (as highlighted by Levy and Sznajder and others, see below). Yet, Meister is critical of this human rights discourse, which – he argues – is problematic to the

extent that it valorizes ethical compassion, as opposed to political engagement, as the appropriate response to suffering throughout the world.¹³¹ Aside from its meaning to those who may have more directly experienced or been affected by the events known as the “Holocaust”, on the global stage, the experience of “Auschwitz” therefore comes to establish certain general principles (the ethical import of human suffering per se) and serve certain broader purposes (justifying a depoliticized approach to suffering through which international intervention becomes imperative to stop it at all costs).¹³² In this global context, “Rwanda” is “Auschwitz” repeated: human suffering met with international indifference leading to the renewal of the pledge of ‘never again’.¹³³ Although racialized as a matter of distinctly Western indifference to African suffering, “Rwanda” has functioned as a chance to renew “our” faith to the elimination of human suffering through the triumph of human rights and humanitarian intervention. Moreover, it ensures the extension of the sentiment of “Auschwitz” to the prevention of suffering in African, not only European, contexts.

As global discursive constructs circulating at the international level, both “Rwanda” and the “Holocaust” concern the broader international import of these events, their meaning for and about the world. “Rwanda” and the “Holocaust” are thus inserted into more general international narratives and meaning structures that concern the significance of these events in global legal and political history.¹³⁴ Indeed, it is through their emplacement within distinctly global frameworks of meaning that such figures come to possess such productive and positive possibilities. It is as episodes in international history that “Rwanda” and “Auschwitz” are transformed into crucial moments, lessons learned, in a broader ‘progressive narrative’ towards a more just world, free of suffering.¹³⁵ As moments in international legal history in particular,

“Rwanda” and “Auschwitz” become ‘[t]he darkest chapters of recent human history [that] have motivated the world to move toward ending impunity for unspeakable crimes’.¹³⁶

Accordingly, as noted above, the issue of scale is also a matter of subjectivity: inscribed into global legal and political history, global memory constructs concern not only the international significance of certain events, but the significance of these events *for an imagined internationalized constituency*, whether conceptualized as an international community, a broader humanity or otherwise. It is external bystanders or secondary witnesses to genocide, often generalized as the “international community” or “humanity”, that are positioned as the subject and addressee of such international discourses. It is for this community that “Rwanda” or “Auschwitz” may be remembered and thus be prevented “next time”. Unlike for the victims and survivors of the Rwandan genocide, the Holocaust and other atrocities – for whom the ‘genocide was a singular event – being murdered could happen to them only once; they could never experience it as happening *again*’¹³⁷ – it is for external parties that “Rwanda” can not only happen again but can be stopped from happening again through legal and military intervention.

As globally oriented discursive constructs – that primarily concern the global significance of certain events for an internationalized audience – such global complexes can also be defined by the fact that, in practice, they are drawn upon and utilized to achieve global social, legal and political goals. In this way, the emergence of global memory constructs can appear as a positive and ethical trend, fostering an enhanced sense of global interconnectedness and international responsibility. It is in

this vein that Levy and Sznajder (amongst others) praise the humanitarian legacy of the memory of the Holocaust, which is understood to have provided the grounds and impetus for human rights doctrine and its global acceptance and ascendancy.¹³⁸ From this view, global memories bring “us” together as well as demonstrating “our” interrelation and thereby can contribute towards the gradual consolidation of an international legal and social sphere.

In this sense, whilst the “Holocaust” is understood to have sparked the emergence of a system of international human rights, “Rwanda” is also said to have inspired much political and legal progress in the international arena, leading to the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the development of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.¹³⁹ According to the authors of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, it was past events such as the Rwandan genocide that underscore the importance of international intervention when a state neglects to protect its citizens from harm.¹⁴⁰ Welsh thus writes of the ‘Rwanda effect’ which, she argues, enabled the rearticulation of state sovereignty as compatible with human rights, which is the central tenet of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.¹⁴¹

However, what is important to note is that the legal and political initiatives associated with the global discourses concerning the “Holocaust” or “Rwanda” serve distinctly international ends, as much as or more than addressing local or national post-genocide needs. For example, despite being often justified in the name of “Rwanda”, the establishment of the “Responsibility to Protect” does not translate into material consequences for the victims and survivors of the Rwandan genocide. Instead it ensures that future events of atrocity, directed at other peoples and communities,

might receive a more multi-faceted and interventionist international response. Moreover, even the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which is more ostensibly directed towards serving the interests of the national Rwandan population, has been criticized for its lack of local relevance and significance.¹⁴² Located outside the Rwandan nation, initially without any outreach service, the Tribunal is said to appear as ‘distant’ and ‘alien’ to the Rwandan people, leading ‘many victims feel that the entire process has little to do with them and their suffering’.¹⁴³ Yet, somewhat tellingly, evaluations of the contribution of the Tribunal to international criminal legal doctrine and practice have been much more positive, with attention being drawn to the various legal achievements of the Tribunal (which, for example, facilitated the first application of the *1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*, established that rape could represent an act of genocide, highlighted the role of the media and journalists in genocidal conflict and witnessed the first guilty plea to the crime of genocide, to name a few of its legal accomplishments).¹⁴⁴ Motivated by the global memory of “Rwanda”, allegedly established as a means for the international community ‘to assuage its conscience’,¹⁴⁵ the Tribunal indeed is understood to serve important global ends and goals, even if evaluations of its national impact are more circumspect.

Due to their distinct nature and orientation, it can therefore be argued that global memory constructs – such as “Rwanda” and the “Holocaust” – have the capacity to be inherently appropriative. They involve the borrowing, or appropriation, of the name and occurrence of historically and geographically specific events – that were endured by particular people in particular places at particular times – as global experiences that can be put to various social and political uses.¹⁴⁶ Thus, at a basic level, the

constitution of “Rwanda” entails the appropriation of the proper name of the Rwandan nation as the label for a global discourse about the shamefulness of Western indifference to African suffering. Meanwhile, at a more substantive level, “Rwanda” also represents the appropriation of the event and experience of the suffering and persecution of the Rwandan Tutsis in 1994 as a site at which to condemn international inaction to genocidal suffering and affirm the need for a more interventionist response to future crimes on the African continent. As such, as discussed earlier, “Rwanda” is a self-focused way of understanding that concerns the implications of the 1994 Rwandan genocide for the non-Rwandans that did not directly experience it. This why the suffering of the Rwandan Tutsis remains the missing referent in global discourses about “Rwanda”, which focus predominantly on the actions, experiences and emotions of the Western bystander to genocide.

More generally, global discursive constructs, by their nature, entail the appropriation of specific historical events to produce global narratives about the significance of these occurrences for those who did not directly endure them. They may be memories of the event of genocide, but they are memories that serve particular global needs and purposes. They do not necessarily reflect or represent the experiences, wishes and suffering of the direct victims of the atrocities of which they speak, nor should acting in the name of these memories be confused with acting in the name of these victims and survivors. To the contrary, the existence and circulation of global memory constructs, such as “Rwanda”, bring to the fore questions of ownership.¹⁴⁷ To whom does, can and should the experience of the Rwandan genocide belong; its direct victims and survivors, its bystanders or witnesses, the broader international community or humanity that it is said to have offended against? These questions also

plague the international legal and justice measures with which these memories are associated, which have a tendency to regard – rightly, Arendt would argue – certain offences as ‘first of all a crime against mankind’ rather than just its specific victims.¹⁴⁸

The question of scale – of the trend towards global discourses and practices of international crime and justice – is thus of central, rather than secondary, importance. As Santos highlights, shifts in scale are movements of power – they are expressions of power and have powerful effects.¹⁴⁹ The construction of “Rwanda” as an international event enables the 1994 Rwandan genocide to be seen and appreciated as a globally significant occurrence, but only on certain grounds with certain effects. The writing of “Rwanda” as an event on the global stage involves a narration of this occurrence as a seminal event in global legal, social and political history, which implicates a non-Rwandan international community and acts as a justification for various internationalized legal, social and political projects. “Rwanda” is thus not only problematic at the specific level – as a political and culturally particular way for non-Rwandans to relate to the Rwandan genocide as a moment of “their” indifference and hence a motivation for “their” interventionist military action towards other African violence. The emergence, circulation and contemporary popularity of “Rwanda” also has more general implications, acting as a caution to remain reflexive about the ethics of global discursive constructs, such as the “Holocaust” and “Rwanda”, and the global legal and justice endeavors with which they are associated.

¹ G. Evans and M. Sahnoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect', *Foreign Affairs*, 81 (2002), p. 100.

² See, for example, S. Grewal, 'Somalia 'is not a human place'', *The Star*, May 12, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/News/article/213112>, accessed on March 2, 2012; J. Roberts, 'Sudan: The Next Rwanda?', *CBS News*, February 11, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/09/opinion/diplomatic/main611215.shtm>, accessed on December 1, 2011.

³ See, in particular, M. Mamdani, *Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror* (New York, Pantheon Books, 2009) and J. Dawes, *That the World May Know: Bearing Witness to Atrocity* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2007), whose work is discussed later in the article.

⁴ See J. Bennett and R. Kennedy, 'Introduction', in Jill Bennett and Rosanne Kennedy, ed., *World Memory: Personal Trajectories in Global Time* (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 4-6; K. Schaffer and S. Smith, *Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 24.

⁵ See, for example, African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance* (London, African Rights, 1995); *As We Forgive* (Washington DC, Image Bearer Productions, 2009); C. Braeckman, *Rwanda, Histoire d'un Génocide* (Paris, Fayard, 1994); *Earth Made of Glass* (New Hampshire, Sparks Rising, 2010); A. Des Forges, "Leave None to Tell the Story": *Genocide in Rwanda* (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1999); W. Ferroggiaro, *The U.S. and the Genocide in Rwanda: Information, Intelligence and the U.S. Response* (Washington, National Security Archive, 2004); *Ghosts of Rwanda* (Alexandria, PBS Video, 2004); P. Gourevitch, 'The Genocide Fax', *The New Yorker*, May 11, 1998, pp. 42-5; *Keepers of Memory* (Beverly Hills, Choices, 2005); L.

Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London, Zed Books, 2000); L. Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London, Verso, 2004); *Operation Turquoise* (Paris, Cipango, 2007); S. Power, "A Problem from Hell": *America and the Age of Genocide* (New York, Basic Books, 2002); *Rwanda: A travers nous, l'humanité* (Liege, Groupov, 2006); P. Saint-Exupéry, 'France-Rwanda: De Silences D'Etat', *Le Figaro*, January 14, 1998, p. 4; P. Saint-Exupéry, *L'inavouable: La France au Rwanda* (Paris, Éditions des Arènes, 2004); *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Journey of Roméo Dallaire* (San Francisco, California Newsreel, 2005); *The Bloody Tricolor* (Great Britain, BBC Panorama, 1995); *The Last Just Man* (Toronto, Barna-Alper Productions, 2001); *The Rwandan Genocide* (Rwanda, Ibuka, 2001); *The Triumph of Evil* (Washington DC, WGBH Educational Foundation, 1999); *Tuez-les Tous* (France, Warner Vision France, 2005); *When Good Men Do Nothing* (Great Britain, BBC World, 1998).

⁶ *Ghosts of Rwanda*.

⁷ Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 227.

⁸ Power, "A Problem from Hell", p. 508 cited in N. McMillan, "'Our Shame': International Responsibility for the Rwandan Genocide", *Australian Feminist Law Journal*, 28 (2008), p. 12. See generally McMillan, "Our Shame", for an extended analysis of these non-fiction texts.

⁹ S. Straus, 'The Historiography of the Rwandan Genocide', in Dan Stone, ed., *The Historiography of Genocide* (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 517, 537; P. Uvin, 'Reading the Rwandan Genocide', *International Studies Review*, 3 (2001), p. 76-7.

¹⁰ Straus, 'Historiography', p. 517, also notes a third area of scholarship that is currently underdeveloped but is slowly receiving more attention, namely research regarding the post-genocide context in Rwanda (see also Uvin, 'Reading', p. 99).

¹¹ See, for example, A. Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (London, Pluto Press, 1995), p. 60 and M.C. Bassiouni, 'The Establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)', in Samuel Totten, ed., *Genocide at the Millenium: A Critical Bibilographic Review*, 5 (New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 241.

¹² F. Grünfeld and A. Huijboom, *The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: The Role of Bystanders* (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), p. xv.

¹³ Barnett, *Eyewitness*, p. 161.

¹⁴ See, for example, *100 Days* (Nairobi, Vivid Features, 2001), *A Sunday in Kigali* (Canada, Equinoxe Productions, 2008), *Grey Matter (Matière Grise)* (Melbourne, Scarab Studio, 2011), *Hotel Rwanda* (United States of America, MGM Home Entertainment, 2004), *Shake Hands with the Devil* (Toronto, Barna-Alper Productions, 2007), *Shooting Dogs* (London, CrossDay Productions, 2005), *Sometimes in April* (2005, United States of America, HBO Video).

¹⁵ See, for example, R. Bazambanza, *Sourire malgré tout: L'histoire du génocide au Rwanda* (Montreal, Les Editions Images, 2005); N. Benaron, *Running the Rift* (Chapel Hill, Algonquin Books, 2012); E. Combres, *Broken Memory: A Novel of Rwanda* (Toronto, Groundwood, 2009); G. Courtemanche, *A Sunday by the Pool in Kigali*, translated by P. Claxton (Melbourne, Text Publishing, 2000); B.B. Diop, *Murambi: The Book of Bones* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006); H. Jansen, *Over a Thousand Hills I Walk With You* (Minneapolis, Carolrhoda Books, 2006); J.R. Pierce, *Speak Rwanda: A Novel* (New York, Picador, 1999); J.P. Stassen,

Deogratias: A Tale of Rwanda (New York, First Second, 2006); V. Tadjó, *The Shadow of Imana: Travels in the Heart of Rwanda* (Oxford, Harcourt Heinemann, 2002).

¹⁶ See, for example, R. Dallaire (with B. Beardsley), *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto, Vintage Canada, 2004); P. Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York, Picador, 1998); J. Hatzfeld, *Life Laid Bare: The Survivors in Rwanda Speak*, translated by L. Coverdale (New York, Other Press, 2006); F. Keane, *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey* (London, Penguin Books, 1995); L. Mushikiwabo and J. Kramer, *Rwanda Means the Universe: A Native's Memoir of Blood and Bloodlines* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 2006); P. Rusesabagina (with T. Zoellner), *An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography* (New York, Penguin Group, 2006).

¹⁷ Dallaire (with Beardsley), *Shake Hands*, p. xi.

¹⁸ See, for example, L. Chishugi, *Along Way From Paradise: Surviving the Rwandan Genocide* (London, Virago, 2010); I. Ilibagiza (with S. Erwin), *Left to Tell: Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust* (Carlsbad, Hay House, 2006); V. Kayimahe, *France-Rwanda – Les coulisses du genocide: Témoignage d'un rescapé* (Paris, Dagorno, 2001); Mushikiwabo, *Rwanda Means the Universe*; Rusesabagina, *An Ordinary Man*; I. Nganemariya (with P. Dickson), *Miracle in Kigali* (Norwich, Tagman Press, 2007); M.B. Umutesi, *Surviving the Slaughter: The Ordeal of a Rwandan Refugee in Zaire* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2004). In addition to such Rwandan memoirs, there are also an increasing amount of websites containing visual and written survivor testimonies: see, for example, http://www.genocidearchiverwanda.org.rw/index.php/Welcome_to_Genocide_Archive_Rwanda Genocide Archive Rwanda, accessed March 2, 2012;

<http://www.rwandanstories.org/> Rwandan Stories, accessed on March 2, 2012;

<http://www.foundationrwanda.org/home.aspx> Foundation Rwanda, accessed on

March 2, 2012; <http://voicesofrwanda.org/> Voices of Rwanda, accessed on March 2, 2012.

¹⁹ See also the photographic books and exhibits of A. Jaar, *Let There Be Light: The Rwanda Project 1994-1998* (Barcelona, ACTAR, 1998) and G. Peress, *The Silence* (New York, Scalo, 1995). See also the theatre productions addressed in A. Dauge-Roth, *Writing and Filming the Genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda: Dismembering and Remembering Traumatic History* (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2010) and C. Kalisa, 'Theatre and the Rwandan Genocide', *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice*, 18 (2006), pp. 515-21.

²⁰ See, for example, *Hotel Rwanda* and *Shooting Dogs*.

²¹ *Hotel Rwanda*.

²² Clinton cited in N. McMillan, 'Regret, Remorse and the Work of Remembrance: Official Responses to the Rwandan Genocide', *Social & Legal Studies*, 19 (2010), p. 85. See McMillan, more generally, for a detailed analysis of such political apologies or statements of regret.

²³ B. Clinton, *Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and U.S. and Rwandan Government Officials*, Kigali Airport, Kigali, March 25, 1998.

²⁴ K. Annan, *Rwanda Genocide 'Must Leave us Always with a Sense of Bitter Regret and Abiding Sorrow'*, *Says Secretary-General to New York Memorial Conference* (United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/9223/AFR/870/HQ/631, 2004); see also K. Annan, *Secretary-General, in 'Mission of Healing' to Rwanda, Pledges Support of United Nations for Country's Search for Peace and Progress* (United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/6552/AFR/56, 1998).

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- ²⁵ The World Bank, 'World Bank Chief Apologizes Over Rwanda Genocide', June 16, 2005,
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,date:20050616~menuPK:141292~pagePK:34392~piPK:64256810~theSitePK:4607,00.html>, accessed on August 2, 2008.
- ²⁶ G. Verhofstadt, *Discours du Monsieur le Premier Ministre Guy Verhofstadt à l'occasion de la commémoration du 6e anniversaire du début du Génocide rwandais*, Kigali, Rwanda, April 7, 2000.
- ²⁷ T. Mbeki, *Statement of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki at the Commemoration of the 10th Anniversary of the Commencement of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Kigali 7 April 2004*, Kigali, April 7, 2004.
- ²⁸ Although, it should be noted, that the Rwandan government has recently withdrawn its longstanding call for the French government to apologize, in line with renewed diplomatic ties between the two countries eventuating in 2011: see T. Hofnung and J.P.M. Perrin, "'Our Relations must not be Polluted by the Past" – President Kagame interview in La Liberation – Pariso, 13 September 2011', *Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda*, <http://www.gov.rw/Our-relations-must-not-be-polluted-by-the-past,498>, accessed on December 1, 2011. This occurred after the current French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, did acknowledge that his country had made 'errors' with respect to the genocide, see J. Lichfield, 'Sarkozy Admits France's Role in Rwandan Genocide', *The Independent*, February 26, 2010,
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sarkozy-admits-frances-role-in-rwandan-genocide-1911272.html>, accessed on March 12, 2012.
- ²⁹ Belgian Senate, *Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry Regarding The Events in Rwanda* (Belgium, Belgian Senate, 1997); Assemblée Nationale, *Mission*

d'information sur le Rwanda: Rapport D'Information (France, Assemblée Nationale, 1998).

³⁰ United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda* (United Nations, New York, 1999); Organization of African Unity, *Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide*, The Report of the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events (Addis Ababa, Organization of African Unity, 2000). The Danish Foreign Ministry also co-ordinated a multi-lateral inquiry into the international response, which did not focus on any specific country or institution, even though it was the first commission to be initiated in 1995: see J. Eriksson (with H. Adelman, J. Borton, H. Christensen, K. Kumar, A. Suhrke, D. Tardif-Douglin, S. Villumstad, and L. Wohlgemuth), 'Synthesis Report', *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Denmark, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).

³¹ Assemblée Nationale, *Mission d'information*, 3.II.A.

³² Belgian Senate, *Parliamentary Commission*, para 4.4.

³³ United Nations, *Independent Inquiry*, p. 35.

³⁴ See J. Evans and N. McMillan, 'Moving On? An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Official Responses to Structural Injustice', *Australian Political Studies Association Conference* (Werribee, Australian Political Studies Association, 2011), pp. 8-9.

³⁵ J. Borton and J. Eriksson, *Lessons from Rwanda – Lessons for Today: Assessment of the Impact and Influence of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda* (Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004), Annex 3.

³⁶ See L. Melvern, 'France and Genocide: The Murky Truth', *The Sunday Times*, August 8, 2008,

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article4481353.ece, accessed on April 15, 2011. See also a second counter-inquiry initiated in France itself: Survie, *Introducing the Ongoing Citizen Enquiry Commission (CEC)*, <http://survie.org/genocide/article/introducing-the-ongoing-citizen>, accessed on March 2, 2012.

³⁷ See, for example, the educational and commemorative materials available at the following websites: <http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/center/rwanda/> The Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law at American University Washington College of Law, accessed on March 2, 2012; <http://www.facinghistory.org/resources/facingtoday/rwandan-genocide> Facing History, accessed on March 2, 2012; <http://survivors-fund.org.uk/resources/> Survivors Fund, accessed on March 2, 2012.

³⁸ See the following museum websites: <http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/old/> Kigali Memorial Centre, accessed on December 8, 2011; <http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007216> United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed on December 8, 2011; <http://www.iwm.org.uk/> Imperial War Museums, accessed on December 8, 2011; and the travelling exhibitions facilitated through the *Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/lessonsfromrwanda.shtml>, accessed on March 2, 2012.

³⁹ See their website at http://www.visiontv.ca/RememberRwanda/main_pf.htm, accessed on January 14, 2008.

⁴⁰ See <http://www.un.org/events/rwanda/>, accessed on January 14, 2008.

⁴¹ See <http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/index.shtml>, accessed on December 8, 2011, which is now also focused on assisting survivors in the wake of the genocide.

⁴² See <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/preventgenocide.shtml>, accessed on December 8, 2011.

⁴³ R.E. Howard-Hassmann, 'Genocide and State-Induced Famine: Global Ethics and Western Responsibility for Mass Atrocities in Africa', *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 4 (2005), p. 492.

⁴⁴ This article focuses more on the memory of the international failure, as it is encapsulated in the signifier "Rwanda".

⁴⁵ J.C. Alexander, 'On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: The 'Holocaust' from War Crime to Trauma Drama', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5 (2002), p. 6.

⁴⁶ P. Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (New York, Mariner Books, 2000), pp. 19-20; Schaffer and Smith, *Narrated Lives*, p. 20-1.

⁴⁷ Schaffer and Smith, *Narrated Lives*, p. 20. See also Alexander, 'The 'Holocaust'', pp. 27-9.

⁴⁸ Although, in Whitlock's terms (as applied in Schaffer and Smith, *Narrated Lives*, p. 20), "Rwanda" 'reached a discursive threshold of intelligibility' much more quickly than the "Holocaust".

⁴⁹ Organization of African Unity, *Rwanda*. See also Straus, 'Historiography', p. 533.

⁵⁰ Although, with the passage of time, there is a sense that the international failure has been dealt with (academically and politically), whilst the genocide – on its own – has come to assume more prominence in academic work.

⁵¹ See McMillan, "Our Shame".

⁵² Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 236.

⁵³ United Nations, *Independent Inquiry*, p. 30.

⁵⁴ See Clinton in *Ghosts of Rwanda*.

⁵⁵ Annan, *Rwanda Genocide*.

⁵⁶ Thus, whilst others have engaged in detailed analyses of some of the particular texts that I have referred to above, my aim in this article is instead to highlight the way in which they collectively contribute to a *shared* discourse about the Rwandan genocide and the international failure to stop it. For examples of more focused and detailed textual analyses, see – for example – M. Adhikari, ‘Hotel Rwanda: Too Much Heroism, Too Little History - or Horror?’, in Vivian Bickford-Smith & Richard Mendelsohn, eds., *Black and White in Colour: African History on Screen* (Oxford, James Currey Ltd, 2007), pp. 279-299; Dauge-Roth, *Writing and Filming*; E. McNamee, ‘Writing the Rwandan Genocide: The Justice and Politics of Witnessing After the Event’, *Law & Critique*, 18 (2007), pp. 309-330; A. Ndahiro and P. Rutazibwa, *Hotel Rwanda, or, the Tutsi Genocide as Seen by Hollywood* (Paris, Harmattan, 2008); G. Negash, *Apologia Politica: States & Their Apologies by Proxy* (Lanham, Lexington Books, 2006).

⁵⁷ See, for example, P. Kagame, *Speech by President Kagame at the 17th Genocide Commemoration Ceremony*, Kigali, April 7, 2011; P. Kagame, *Speech by President Kagame at the 15th Commemoration of the Genocide Against the Tutsi at the Nyanza Memorial Site in Kicukiro, Kigali*, Kigali, April 7, 2009; P. Kagame, *Speech by His Excellency Paul Kagame at the 10th Anniversary of the Genocide in Rwanda*, Amahoro Stadium, April 7, 2004; and, H. Rombouts, *Victim Organisations and the Politics of Reparation: A Case-Study on Rwanda* (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004), p. 163.

⁵⁸ See Kigali Memorial Centre, *Jenoside* (Kigali, Kigali Memorial Centre, 2004), pp. 26-28.

⁵⁹ Rombouts, *Politics of Reparation*, p. 487. It is important to note that, in practice, this Rwandan framing of “Rwanda” as the preventable *genocide* has had significant implications for whose suffering during the conflict has and has not been officially and socially recognized at the national level. That is, a focus on the genocide as the defining feature of the 1994 violence (often referred to as the ‘Tutsi genocide’) has led to a downplaying of the suffering and loss occasioned by the contemporaneous civil war and particularly the harms experienced by Rwandan Hutus as part of that war or due to their resistance to the genocide: see C. Cameron, ‘“The Second Betrayal?” Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide’, in Tanya Lyons and GERALYN Pye, eds., *Africa on a Global Stage* (Trenton, Africa World Press, 2006), pp. 87.

⁶⁰ J. Meierhenrich, ‘Topographies of Remembering and Forgetting: The Transformation of *Lieux de Mémoire* in Rwanda’, in Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, eds., *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence* (Wisconsin, University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), p. 292.

⁶¹ See Kagame, *10th Anniversary*; P. Kagame in Ministry of Defence, *Commemoration of the 14th Anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide*, 2008, <http://www.mod.gov.rw/?Commemoration-of-the-14th>, accessed on December 1, 2011; see S. Straus and L. Waldorf, ‘Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State’, in Straus and Waldorf, *Remaking Rwanda*, pp. 13-4.

⁶² L. Waldorf, ‘Instrumentalizing Genocide: The RPF’s Campaign against “Genocide Ideology”’, in Straus and Waldorf, *Remaking Rwanda*, pp. 53-4. See also, more generally, Straus and Waldorf, ‘Introduction’, pp. 11-14.

⁶³ See E. Zorbas, 'Aid Dependence and Policy Independence: Explaining the Rwandan Paradox', in Straus and Waldorf, *Remaking Rwanda*, pp. 104, 106.

⁶⁴ Rombouts, *Politics of Reparation*, p. 305.

⁶⁵ Evans and Sahnoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect', p. 100.

⁶⁶ See, for example, Roberts, 'Sudan'; Grewal, 'Somalia'; The Seattle Times, 'Stop Another Rwanda in Sudan', *The Seattle Times*, July 20, 2004, <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=20040720&slug=darfured20>, accessed on December 1, 2011; T. Blair, 'Tony Blair: If Darfur Is Not To Be Another Rwanda, We Must Act, And Now, To Avert Catastrophe', *The Independent*, September 17, 2006, <http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/tony-blair-if-darfur-is-not-to-be-another-rwanda-we-must-act-and-now-to-avert-catastrophe-416305.html>, accessed on March 2, 2012.

⁶⁷ See M. Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (London, Tavistock Publications, 1972), pp. 23, 38.

⁶⁸ A. Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 14. See also D. Levy and N. Sznajder, 'Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5 (2002), p. 99.

⁶⁹ Including, interestingly, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, who wrote an article arguing for international and African intervention in Libya by invoking the memory of "Rwanda" as the 'preventable genocide': see P. Kagame, 'Africa: Rwandans Know Why Gaddafi Must Be Stopped', *The New Times*, March 24, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201103240033.html>, accessed on March 2, 2012.

⁷⁰ The Toronto Star, 'Obama Strikes the Right Note', *The Toronto Star*, March 31, 2011, <http://www.thestar.com/opinion/editorials/article/966047--obama-strikes-the->

[right-note](#), accessed on December 1, 2011. This decision has also been popularly received as a product of the support of three senior women in his administration whose different connections to the international failure to halt the Rwandan genocide led them to advocate international intervention in Libya, namely Hilary Clinton (whose husband's administration has been condemned for its response to the genocide and who has publicly expressed her own regret regarding the international failure), Samantha Power (a journalist and public policy academic, whose account of the international failure has been broadly acclaimed), and Susan Rice (who was a member of the National Security Council during the Clinton government's failure to intervene regarding the Rwandan genocide): see D. Jackson, 'One reason for Obama's decision on Libya: Rwanda', *USA Today*, March 24, 2011, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/03/one-reason-for-obamas-decision-on-libya-rwanda/1#.T0_j8ZiXtII, accessed on March 2, 2012. See also E. Harris, 'Clinton Cites Rwanda, Bosnia in Rationale for Libya Intervention', *ABC News*, March 27, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/clinton-cites-rwanda-bosnia-in-rationale-for-libya-intervention/>, accessed on March 2, 2012; S.G. Stolberg, 'Still Crusading but Now on the Inside', *The New York Times*, March 29, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/30/world/30power.html>, accessed on March 2, 2012; M. Calabresi, 'Susan Rice: A Voice for Intervention', *Time*, March 24, 2011, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2061224,00.html>, accessed on 2 March 2012.

⁷¹ Power, "A Problem from Hell", p. 511.

⁷² See, for example, Samantha Power's article 'Remember Rwanda, but Take Action in Sudan', *New York Times*, April 6, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/06/opinion/remember-rwanda-but-take-action-in->

[sudan.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm](#), accessed on 2 March 2012; and R. Dallaire, 'Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda', *New York Times*, October 4, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/04/opinion/04dallaire.html>, accessed on March 2, 2012.

⁷³ Mamdani, *Saviors*, p. 66; see also Dawes, *World May Know*, p. 72. 'Rwanda' has also been invoked at subsequent anniversaries to argue for a more robust international response to the atrocities in Darfur, see UN News Service, 'On Remembrance Day for Rwanda's Genocide Victims, UN Urges Action on Darfur', *UN News Centre*, April 7, 2011, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18100&Cr=genocide&Cr1=>, accessed on March 2, 2012.

⁷⁴ See J.E. Young, *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation* (Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 10-11, who writes about, with respect to the Holocaust, the impact of understandings of the past on the present; see also Novick, *Holocaust in American Life*, pp. 4-5.

⁷⁵ See Mamdani, *Saviors*, pp. 22-24, 37-8. Of course, this designation of the violence in Darfur has been more controversial, with a UN commission of inquiry finding that the conflict in Darfur did not fit the definition of a genocide, even though war crimes and crimes against humanity had been committed in the region. Meanwhile, Straus, 'Historiography', p. 534, also notes that despite the political willingness to accept this designation of the killings, it has not necessarily led to a more effective international response to them.

⁷⁶ G.Ó. Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 220-21.

⁷⁷ See op. cit., pp. 192-3.

⁷⁸ See M. Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009), pp. 18-9, 3.

⁷⁹ This discussion draws on recent scholarship considering the affective nature of crime, law and representations of suffering, namely A. Young, *The Scene of Violence: Cinema, Crime, Affect* (New York, Routledge, 2009), Chapter 1; R. Buchanan and R. Johnson, 'Strange Encounters: Exploring Law and Film in the Affective Register', in Austin Sarat, ed., *Studies in Law, Politics, and Society*, 46 (2009), pp. 33-60; Schaffer and Smith, *Narrated Lives*, Introduction and Chapter 1; and, R. Reichman, *The Affective Life of Law: Legal Modernism and the Literary Imagination* (Stanford, Stanford Law Books, 2009), Chapter 1.

⁸⁰ See Buchanan and Johnson, 'Strange Encounters', p. 36; Young, *The Scene*, p. 9

⁸¹ See, more generally, R. Meister, *After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights*, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. x.

⁸² Regarding the centrality of affect to the construction of meaning and the process of thinking, see, respectively, Young, *The Scene*, p. 9 and Buchanan and Johnson, 'Strange Encounters', p. 36.

⁸³ See Buchanan and Johnson, 'Strange Encounters', p. 56.

⁸⁴ See Schaffer and Smith, *Narrated Lives*, p. 6.

⁸⁵ Alexander, 'The 'Holocaust'', pp. 30-1.

⁸⁶ Op. cit., p. 55.

⁸⁷ See, for example, A. de Waal and R. Omaar, 'The Genocide in Rwanda and the International Response', *Current History*, April (1995), p. 157; see also Dallaire (with Beardsley), *Shake Hands*, p. 296.

⁸⁸ See S. Power, 'Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen', *The Atlantic Monthly*, September (2001), p. 84.

⁸⁹ See A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2001), p. 8.

⁹⁰ Barnett, *Eyewitness*, p. 18.

⁹¹ Grünfeld and Huijboom, *The Role of Bystanders*, p. xv.

⁹² M. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 196-7, writes generally about how some existing analyses of the genocide itself downplay the agency, and thus responsibility, of the Rwandan people. See also A. Orford, 'Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism', *European Journal of International Law*, 10 (1999), p. 695, in relation, more generally, to dominant narratives concerning humanitarian intervention.

⁹³ See Kigali Memorial Centre, *Jenoside*, p. 30.

⁹⁴ cf Des Forges, "Leave None", pp. 216-221; Kagame, *10th Anniversary*; <http://www.cnl.gov.rw/telling-our-stories> Rwandan National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide, accessed on March 2, 2012.

⁹⁵ See, generally, Des Forges, "Leave None"; Melvern, *A People Betrayed*; Power, "A Problem from Hell".

⁹⁶ A. Wallis, *Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan Genocide* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2006), p. x.

⁹⁷ Uvin, 'Reading', pp. 95-6; D. Newbury, 'Understanding Genocide', *African Studies Review*, 41 (1998), pp. 88-91; Mamdani, *Victims Become Killers*, pp. 1-20; Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, pp. 24-36; and A. Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 102-110. See also E. McNamee, 'Reconciling Rwandan Reconciliations: International Criminal Law versus National Politics in the Mirror of

Humanity’, in Ubaldus de Vries and Lyana Francot, eds, *Law’s Environment: Critical Legal Perspectives* (The Netherlands, Eleven, 2011), p. 100.

⁹⁸ P. Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1998), p. 3; Uvin, ‘Reading’, pp. 95-6.

⁹⁹ See Straus, ‘Historiography’, p. 520-4.

¹⁰⁰ Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 87, 96-110.

¹⁰¹ Kagame, *15th Commemoration*.

¹⁰² Op. cit. See also Kagame, *10th Anniversary*. See also McNamee, ‘Reconciling’, p. 113.

¹⁰³ See Kigali Memorial Centre, *Jenoside*, p. 9. In general, references to the acts of Belgium when it was the colonial power in Rwanda are an exception to the generalized academic focus on bystanders to the genocide as necessarily external to it.

¹⁰⁴ Op. cit., p. 28; see Kagame, *17th Genocide*; Kagame, *15th Commemoration*; Kagame, *10th Anniversary*.

¹⁰⁵ P. Kagame, *Remarks by His Excellency Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda at the 13th Commemoration of Genocide of 1994*, Murambi, April 7, 2007. See also Kagame, *10th Anniversary*.

¹⁰⁶ This might be slowly starting to change, because – as time passes – more Rwandan voices are being heard (in memoirs, documentaries, commissions of inquiry and academic research). Many of these texts, however, are also still tailored to Western audiences and Western markets.

¹⁰⁷ Bennett and Kennedy, ‘Introduction’, pp. 6-9; Schaffer and Smith, *Narrated Lives*, p. 24

¹⁰⁸ J. Dawes, *That the World May Know*, p. 21, cited in McMillan, “‘Our Shame’”, p. 26.

¹⁰⁹ Mamdani, *Saviors*, pp. 6, 61-2.

¹¹⁰ Cited in op. cit., p. 54.

¹¹¹ See, for example, respectively, Power, 'Remember Rwanda'; Harris, 'Clinton Cites Rwanda'; AFP, 'ICC wants Ivory Coast Investigation', May 4, 2011, <http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/icc-ask-judges-approval-i-coast-investigation-1>, accessed on March 2, 2012; E. Cole, 'Church Council: Don't Let Zimbabwe Become Another Rwanda', June 28, 2008, *The Christian Post*, <http://www.christianpost.com/news/church-council-dont-let-zimbabwe-be-another-rwanda-33017>, accessed on March 2, 2012; Grewal, 'Somalia'.

¹¹² See Levy and Sznajder, 'Memory Unbound', p. 101. See also Alexander, 'The Holocaust', pp. 32-4.

¹¹³ See Mbembe, *Postcolony*, pp. 2-3.

¹¹⁴ See Orford, *Reading Humanitarian Intervention*, pp. 96-99, 16-7; Mamdani, *Saviors*, p. 67. See also A. Musabende, 'Why Libya but not Rwanda?', *The Globe and Mail*, March 31, 2011, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/opinion/why-libya-but-not-rwanda/article1963957/>, accessed March 2, 2012.

¹¹⁵ Mbembe, *Postcolony*, p. 3.

¹¹⁶ Mamdani, *Saviors*, p. 3.

¹¹⁷ See A. Cassese, 'The Rationale for International Criminal Justice', in Antonio Cassese, ed., *The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 127, 130.

¹¹⁸ Op. cit., p. 130.

¹¹⁹ H.E. Judge R. Winter, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone', in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice: A World Study on*

Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-Conflict Justice 1 (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2010), p. 155.

¹²⁰ See <http://www.kony2012.com/> Kony 2012, accessed on June 8, 2012.

¹²¹ See <http://www.stoprapenow.org/> Stop Rape Now, accessed on June 8, 2012.

¹²² See <http://www.savedarfur.org/> Save Darfur, accessed on June 8, 2012.

¹²³ See Huyssen, *Present Pasts*, p. 18.

¹²⁴ Huyssen describes such constructs as ‘border-crossing’ forms of memory: op. cit., p. 12.

¹²⁵ Levy and Sznajder also discuss such constructs as ‘cosmopolitan memories’, to the extent that they are global memories taken up in different national contexts, cited in and drawing upon national and local narratives and representing the intersection and ‘interplay’ between national and international understandings of a particular historical occurrence: see Levy and Sznajder, ‘Memory Unbound’, p. 87, 88-89, 92-3 and D. Levy and N. Sznajder, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*, translated by A. Oksiloff (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2006), pp. 8-9, 11-12. See also J.J. Savelsberg and H. Nyseth, ‘Collective Representations of Atrocities and National Identity: The Case of Darfur’, in Franz Höllinger and Markus Hadler, eds., *Crossing Borders, Shifting Boundaries: National and Transnational Identities in Europe and Beyond* (Campus, Frankfurt, 2012), p. 2-3, 27-8.

¹²⁶ The quote is taken from Gourevitch, “*We Wish to Inform You*”, p. 350.

¹²⁷ B.D.S. Santos, ‘Law: A Map of Misreading – Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law’, *Journal of Law and Society*, 14 (1987), pp. 284, 288.

¹²⁸ See, in another and more limited context of legal trials, M. Koskeniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, 6 (2002), p. 34 and footnote 105.

¹²⁹ Meister, *After Evil*, pp. viii-ix, 155.

¹³⁰ Op. cit., pp. 144, 163-4, 2-3.

¹³¹ Op. cit., pp. 44, 46-47, 164-166.

¹³² Op. cit., pp. 3-5.

¹³³ See, more generally, op. cit., pp. 164-165.

¹³⁴ See, more generally, A. Riles, 'The View from the International Plane: Perspective and Scale in the Architecture of Colonial International Law', *Law and Critique*, VI (1995), p. 40.

¹³⁵ See Koskeniemi, 'Show Trials', in another context, footnote 105 and p. 34.

¹³⁶ H.E. Judge S. Song, 'The International Criminal Court', in Bassiouni, *World Study*, p. 144.

¹³⁷ Meister, *After Evil*, p. 165.

¹³⁸ Levy and Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory*, pp. 4, 5-6.

¹³⁹ The 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine is a global norm which provides that states have a responsibility, rather than a right, to intervene in the internal affairs of another state if this latter state is unable or unwilling to protect its nationals from sufficiently grave harm and suffering: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa, International Development Research, 2001).

¹⁴⁰ See Evans and Sahnoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect', p. 100.

¹⁴¹ J. M. Welsh, 'The Rwanda Effect: Development and Endorsement of the 'Responsibility to Protect', in Phil Clark and Zachary D. Kaufman, eds., *After Genocide: Transitional Justice, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Rwanda and Beyond* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 334, 337-338.

¹⁴² See J.M. Kamatali, 'The Challenge of Linking International Criminal Justice and National Reconciliation: The Case of the ICTR', *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 16 (2003), pp. 115-133.

¹⁴³ Des Forges, "*Leave None*", p. 746.

¹⁴⁴ See, for example, Annan, *Rwanda Genocide* and Z.D. Kaufman, 'The United States Role in the Establishment of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda', in Clark and Kaufman, *After Genocide*, pp. 259-260.

¹⁴⁵ A. Cassese, *International Criminal Law* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 327; Kamatali, 'National Reconciliation', p. 119.

¹⁴⁶ For an excellent discussion of the potentially appropriative nature of representations of suffering see A. Kleinman and J. Kleinman, 'The Appeal of Experience; The Dismay of Images: Cultural Appropriations of Suffering in Our Times', in Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das and Margaret Lock, eds., *Social Suffering* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1-23.

¹⁴⁷ See, in relation to the Holocaust, Levy and Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory*, pp. 12, 8.

¹⁴⁸ H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York, Penguin Books, 2006), p. 272. See also G. Simpson, *Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International Law* (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007), p. 51.

¹⁴⁹ Santos, 'Law', p. 284.

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