Language Policies: State Texts for Silencing and Giving Voice

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In English-speaking countries there has been a growing interest in other languages. Many have promulgated policies that encourage foreign language study. There is, however, an ambivalence about languages internal to these societies; the bilingualism of minority populations. In this chapter, I discuss such language and literacy policy statements as state texts. Specifically, I consider a key issue of language planning in each of three English-dominant nations over recent decades: in Britain, Standard English and minority languages in the national curriculum; in Australia, the prioritization of Asian foreign languages; and in the United States, the officialization of English as a reaction to the federal mandate for bilingual education.

In distinctive ways, each case reveals a double standard when it comes to second-language competence, social bilingualism, and biliteracy. The policies on foreign languages display a preference for foreign, distanced interlocutors; for a sort of bilingualism for journeying away from home, a bilingualism that surfaces relations between monolingual nations. Domestic multilingualism, whether of indigenous language groups with attachment to territory or of immigrant language minorities typically in urban settings, and language diversity are considered problematical. As Romaine (1989) noted: "It is a cultural fact that no Anglophone nation anywhere has exhibited enthusiasm for any kind of bilingualism other than transitional" (p. 284).

These policies betray a concern that language is more than a conduit for fixed and invariable meanings; a neutral message-conveying machine. Policymakers seem to attribute to intergenerational language maintenance efforts social, ethnic, and even political solidarity attachments that they find difficult to reconcile with goals of national cohesion, national culture, and standard national languages for universal literacy.

On the other hand, foreign language study makes little challenge to the notion of the nation state, the state as nation, with its idealized, unilingual literacy-elaborated national standard language. Foreign language study construes the typical interlocutor as distanced, and the mastery of the language as secondary to the control of English which the learner is likely to gain. Accordingly, foreign language study has more readily been absorbed into an economistic logic and a justificatory discourse of the national interest than has the maintenance of minority languages spoken domestically.

Policymaking that addresses domestic multilingualism surfaces the symbolic domain of language as much as its communicative domain. I argue here that in its social role, in increasingly imagined communities, and culturally diverse communities, especially at a time of rapid and pluralistic globalization, language planning is increasingly used by public institutions to signal permissible or discouraged forms of social solidarity. Although statements of policy are principally concerned with a documentary function (i.e., setting out administrative action in education, law, policing, health, or some other public policy arena), they also carry a rhetorical function, validating some and silencing other interpretations of the nation.

Public authorities in England, Australia, and the United States face growing and unavoidable internal pluralism. At the same time, they integrate into regional economically driven blocs implicating them in new and additional pluralisms: the European Union, the Asia-Pacific Economic community, and the North American Free Trade Pact, and wider Western hemisphere groupings. Language policymaking in such complex environments involves selecting from the often irreconcilable language and cultural alternatives available within such demographic diversity and interdependent internationalism. Being more than simply enunciations of intended government action, language policies therefore reveal authorized forms of cultural and linguistic behavior.
LANGUAGE PLANNING

For much of language planning’s history, its task was conceived as providing assistance to developing nations (e.g., see Rubin & Jernudd, 1971).

Deriving its disciplinary inheritance in seemingly linguistically settled nations, the early conceptualizations of language planning reveal an assumption about a national order typical of modernity. The nation-state is imagined as unilingual in an unproblematical national standard language in which the population is literate (Mühläusler, 1995; Tollefson, 1990).

Language planning, however, is a prescriptive activity, an authoritative intervention for language change. It seeks to emulate processes of wider public policymaking consciously locating itself within the framework of rational planning (Kaplan, 1989). To this extent, language planning sits uncomfortably with some traditions of its parent disciplines (perhaps especially with linguistics), which often disfavor prescriptivism and prefer a descriptive approach to language (Bruthiaux, 1992). Although some commentators identify an evolution from a developing societies' focus, through a focus on all societies to a self-critical view of itself (Baldauf, 1994), much of the criticism that the practice of language planning has generated is unable to be accommodated within its present theoretical arrangements.

Since the time of the Industrial Revolution there has existed a binary notion of literacy in the industrialized nations of the West, a functional utilitarian literacy for the masses and cultural literacy for the elite (Luke, 1992). Now, infused with explicit government policies of economic rationalism and human capital economic theory, mass literacy campaigns are fostered in both advanced economies and poorer ones. Language planning has few tools of analysis to explain the appropriation of language and literacy in these ways and few tools for addressing the cultural politics of contemporary language policymaking.

With indigenous forms of national economic growth, especially in north Asia, that do not reproduce the model of the nation typical of European economic modernization, parts of the overarching paradigm of classical language planning are being set aside. For example, Romanized writing can no longer be considered an essential precondition of economic and social modernization (DeFrancis, 1977). The role of language in modernization, much of which has assumed that multilingualism necessarily correlates with poverty and underdevelopment, is under challenge. One of language planning’s founding thinkers, Charles Ferguson (1988/1996), called on researchers to examine the role of language in development without continual recourse to Westernizing assumptions. Multilingualism is a demographic fact, and policymakers need to acknowledge and incorporate this diversity in policy rather than hypothesize unilingual solutions that merely serve to distance policymaking from social reality (Mansour, 1993).

1 The following maxim is a case in point: "a country that is linguistically highly heterogeneous is always undeveloped, and a country that is developed always has considerable language uniformity" (Poole, 1972, p. 213). Fasold (1984) stated: "It is obvious that multilingual states have problems that more nearly monolingual ones do not … difficulties in communication within a country can act as an impediment to commerce and industry and be socially disruptive" (p. 4) and "there is a definite relationship between linguistic uniformity and economic development" (p. 7); although he did instance some positive benefits of multilingualism, he argued that linguistic "diversity is inversely related to development" con- ceding however that the relation may not be causal and may have to do with the arbitrary nature of postcolonial boundary settings that aggregated linguistically different groups (p. 134). Pattanayak (1987) showed that a range of modern scholars have discussed multilingualism and more generally language diversity, negatively, as causing backwardness and economic underdevelopment.
Pattanayak (1986), citing English, Hapsburg, and Japanese precedents argued that “There can be development in spite of mass illiteracy” (p. 57), but warned that restricted literacy is no longer viable for populations that under different conditions may not have needed literacy, and that illiteracy only became a problem when education "appropriated to itself the function of credentialling for all vocations and avocations" (p. 58). The stigma that attaches to illiteracy and the pervasive association of literacy with development, which Pattanayak identified in developing nations (and therefore its designation as a social and economic problem), intensified in developed nations after International Literacy Year in 1990 (DEET 1992; OECD. 1995).

But even literacy is not a unitary practice; in pluralistic nations variation within a "single interdependent communication matrix" (Pattanayak, 1986, p. 59) demands acknowledgment. Complex literacy practices are one of the consequences of multilingualism as much as they are of dialectal variation within pluricentric languages such as English (languages with diverse national centers each propagating individual norms of correctness).

**Language Planning and Discourse Politics**

Perhaps the greatest challenge to language planning, however, is to accommodate to discourse. *Discourse* is here understood in the wider sense used by Gee (1995) as "forms of life" that integrate language in use with social identities; rather than its narrower linguistic sense of "connected stretches of language" (p. 142). Discourse is two-times challenging for language planning, being more than a mere conduit for transmitting and receiving pre-established meanings, and requires a certain recursivity within the discipline of language planning. Discourse structures and pervades language planning as a practice (i.e. language planning is made in and through discourses) and, of course, the object of such discourse-made language planning is itself language (i.e., language planning plans language via discourse). Policy, as a prior practice that shapes planning, is often conducted via a contest of discourses.

According to Yeatman (1990), policymaking is a form of discursive politics in which there is contest over meanings. She argued that state-centric politics are vulnerable in a time of globalization, and that both local and global discourses can be identified in texts produced to enunciate policy. Street (1994) has also pointed out that: the power to name and define is crucial to real practices, to policy making and to design of educational programmes" (p. 16).

A common assumption in language planning theory is that the practice of language planning follows the identification of language problems. Conceived in this way, language planning becomes a future-oriented problem-solving activity, a process of the resolution for that language-communication problem. Edelman (1988) argued, however, that problems are ideological constructions, particular to given points in time and the power relations that pertain at those conjunctions. Language policy is especially amenable to analysis utilizing these insights which foreground the discursive domain, rather than relegate the process of policy formulation to the domain of politics, as if it were prior to and qualitatively different from planning. It is with this inclusion of the discursive domain that the almost frenetic language policy/politics/planning of the three case study nations is examined.

**The "Peculiar" View of English-Speaking Nations?**

During the 17th and 18th centuries, English-speaking peoples had a *laissez-faire* attitude to language; a practical mercantile view that does not elevate language to ideological status. It is often stated that British-derived attitudes reflect concern about the illiberal nature of language planning (Ferguson, 1979/1996b) and, in America's case, antimonarchical republicanism (Heath, 1976).

In Australia's case, such attitudes to language policymaking were prevalent in the 1980s. Three recurring beliefs encountered in the preparation of Australia's 1987 National Policy on Languages were language policymaking is an activity for postcolonial settings where new nations are seeking to replace an inherited colonial language; language planning is a futile chauvinism found in countries seeking to protect their language from the lexical incursions of English; or language policies reflect the efforts of non-English-speaking nations to purchase commodified English for its international instrumental value (Lo Bianco, 1990).

In these representations, English-speaking nations are the unmarked center from which language
planning activity is judged: "set-tied" states with a secure, dominant, standardized language, with literate populations at a time of instrumentally motivated global-linguistic domination for English.

During the 17th and 18th centuries, however, many British commentators viewed the French academy model as a solution to what must have seemed linguistic mayhem: English spellings were widely variant and new words were encountered very frequently due to colonial exploration and scientific advances. Daniel Defoe, and after him Jonathan Swift (who had a more authoritarian preference, to "fix" the language, and remove uncontrolled change from it) argued for an English language academy that would authoritatively police the language, largely through the excellence and reputation of its literary production; but also through more conventional linguistic means such as issuing spelling reforms, influencing punctuation, and controlling terminological development (Peters, 1992).

For Defoe, there was a metaphorical relation between monetary and linguistic currency, and he imagined criminality attaching to linguistic trespass as much as it might to monetary counterfeiting. Also influential was the Enlightenment idea of preserving in some place the exemplar of the absolute, the perfect time clock, the exact measure of length, weight or volume, against which all could be measured.

But the prevailing views were against "embalming" English, forcefully put forward by Samuel Johnson whose dictionary of 1755 served, as he saw it, to stem the "degeneration" of English, through dictionary stabilization. In America, Noah Webster's dictionary of 1827 was perceived to serve a similar role. Both gave expression to a democratic ethos and impelled against ruling on language (Peters, 1992). The next significant language-regulating effort was William Cardell's 1820 attempt to found an academy in New York. His shortlived American Academy of Language and Belle Lettres had an explicit Americanizing aim. It was not until the 1960s that commercial interests successfully developed lexicography in America. Webster's International 1961 (considered liberal for its extensive usage of colloquialisms) paved the way for a conservative reaction in the form of editions of the American Heritage Dictionary in 1971 and 1981. The failure to establish an authoritative language academy is seen as indicating a liberal, free market, linguistic preference, bolstered by the involvement of commercial interests in dictionary production.

British public debate of language issues, however, although not favoring deliberate planning, has long been conscious of the emblematic function of the national language. The Newbolt Report (Newbell, 1921), for example, spoke of "a feeling for our own native language" and saw this as a unifying element among the different social classes.

The diversity within English, traditionally imagined to derive only from sociolects and regional British dialects, is now greater than at any previous time. Indeed, English is approaching the status of Lingua Mundi (Jernudd, 1992) rapidly adding "ethnic" and national varieties; new hybrids from its remarkable global expansion. These national and ethnic varieties are intergenerationally stable expansions of the "older native" Englishes (American, Australian, etc.), and carry new and local attachments beyond the instrumental and communicative advantages "international" English offers. These new native Englishes add an expanding circle of English users to the inner circle of English (Kachru, 1986, 1992).

Much language planning is now in the wake of the spread of languages of wider communication and the cultural and political consequences of these, especially of English (Pennycook, 1994; Phillipson, 1992). The recently intensified pluricentricity of English via the evolution of its stable new native varieties and the designation world Englishes (Kachru, 1986, 1990, 1992), along with the growing ethnic and linguistic diversity within the older native English-speaking nations, have forced a change in any historical reluctance to plan language. In Britain, Australia, and the United States, language and literacy policies are now vibrant sites of cultural expression.

BRITISH STANDARDS

Standard English and the National Curriculum

Although the promulgation of a national curriculum was originally proposed by Labour Prime Minister Jim Callaghan, it was initially opposed and then ultimately introduced by a Conservative government
as part of its Education Reform Act (ERA) of 1988. The ERA brought in nationwide testing for children at ages 7, 11, 14, and 16, the results of which are publicly available. It also changed funding arrangements for schools permitting enrollment choices for pupils, and disbanded the most prominent Local Education Authority (LEA); the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA).

Key proponents of central government intervention in curriculum were think-tanks, most prominently the Centre for Policy Studies. An especially influential paper, *English, Our English* (Marenbon, 1987), influenced the high prominence given to English in the justification for a national curriculum. The Marenbon paper represents a rejection of variationist sociolinguistics and its pedagogical consequences. Its key target is the "left-loved" notion of the equality of all dialects that is bolstered by a tradition of descriptivism in theoretical linguistics, and a "politically correct" repudiation of standard English as anything other than a variety with power behind it.

For Marenbon, it was axiomatic that "When children leave English schools today, few are able to speak and write English correctly, even fewer have a familiarity with the literary heritage of the language," the cause being the "new orthodoxy," which rejects notions of formal correctness and a literary heritage (p. 5). Not surprisingly, one of the main effects of the national curriculum subject committees' work was to cast aside much of the previous work toward multicultural perspectives, especially non-Western European ones, in favor of "the Western European cultural legacy" (Wright, 1993, p. 50).

The Marenbon paper conflates concern about a perceived denigration of canonical literature with concern about declining standards in spoken language. It repudiates both "science" and "fashion." The consequences are serious if vague; Marenbon enjoins Britain's 'politicians and committees' working on the national curriculum to "keep strong ... for in the future of its language there lies the future of a nation!" (p. 40).

*English, Our English* (the title redolent with its proprietorial cause) appeared at a time of intense media and public discussion about social and "racial" varieties in spoken English being given legitimacy in public schooling. The paper represented an eloquent conservative affirmation of the cultural authority of the prestigious, the standard of English, and the right of its "traditional owners" to define the boundaries of correctness. In response the national curriculum powerfully asserted standard English and reveals the imprint of *English, Our English*.

Prior to the national curriculum, individual schools had been free to determine their curricula locally, the authority deriving from the Education Act of 1944. LEAs provided assistance and guidance to schools. Local innovation was possible under the LEAs, the ILEA being renown for its innovation in languages curriculum. Many LEAs had enacted highly pluralistic curriculums in which multiple literacy and variationist approaches to spoken language were given prominence. The "dilution of local authority power" was the hidden agenda of the 1988 ERA (Wright, 1993, p. 49). Teachers are now required to correct spoken or written language that differs from Standard, to distinguish clearly between instances of common usage which deviate from Standard, clearly designating these as non-Standard; although not necessarily to stigmatize them (Bourne, 1993).

If language regulation was eschewed in Britain because it conflicted with a democratic ethos, the entrance into schooling of the idea of the equality of all dialects appears to have been sufficient stimulus to convert politicians and committees to academy-like rulings.

**The Immigrant and the Regional**

Another language policy theme has been the status accorded to each of three categories of non-English languages: the foreign, the indigenous, and the immigrant.

Throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s, "The view of the British nation as a unitary whole with a homogenous culture was implicit in most educational thinking" (Martin-Jones & Saxena, 1995, p. 7). While the publication of *The Bullock Report* (DES, 1975) in 1975 marked the beginnings of a more pluralistic interpretation with the acknowledgment of the presence of children speaking languages other than English in England's schools, it nevertheless signaled a dominant concern for English literacy standards (Edwards, 1984). However, other forces were moderately influential. For instance, pressure on LEAs from minority communities saw a modest emergence of bilingual education. Also,
in 1977 the European Community (EC) called for the teaching of the mother tongue of children of
migrant workers from European Union (EU) member states (Edwards, 1984; Martin-Jones & Saxena,
1995).

Although bilingual programs were appearing by the early 1980s, the focus of immigrant children’s
language needs was on their lack of English. Under pressure from LEAs, parents, academics and
teachers, schools began to bridge the disparity between the oral unschooled mother-tongue
proficiency of minority children with the literate expectations of educated mastery of standard forms of
the language.

Progress toward formally addressing the lingual education of bilingual children came in the form of
The Swann Report (DES, 1985). The Swann Committee was issued a specific brief for minority
children’s education, representing “the closest Britain came at that time to having a national policy
77).

However, The Swann Report disappointed minority language advocates by failing to espouse
bilingual education. It was reluctant to do so in case this should encourage special provision for such
children, and result in curriculum segregation. The mid-1980s was a time of race relations tension in
Britain, and caution prevailed over educational evidence for supporting bilingualism, and over the
language rights claims of minority advocates. The Swann Report cast the burden of intergenerational
language maintenance onto communities, going so far as to advise schools to “not seek to assume
the role of community providers for maintaining ethnic minority community languages” (DES, 1985, p.
771).

At the same time, however, a critical distinction among the categories of non-English languages was
given institutional form. With the Welsh Act of 1967, Britain enacted a jurisdictional territory-based
devolution of decision making as part of the national curriculum in the mid-to late 1980s. This
progressively meant that Wales came to gain control over curriculum policy. This formal devolution of
autonomy in administration has since resulted in significant gains for Welsh.

This dividing line, in which language rights were governed by principles of territory and jurisdiction,
relegated urban-immigrant language entitlements to an ambivalent status, within both England and
Wales. A natural British home can be identified for Welsh (as it was previously for Scots Gaelic).
However, the territoriality principle distance Immigrant-urban minorities from the category British and
made more complex the discourse they needed to marshal to advance their claims within the new
curriculum arrangements. This compounded the effect of the EC’s concern with the children of
European immigrant workers. Regionalism, internal to Britain via the territoriality principle, and
external to Britain via its membership of the (then) EC, impacted negatively on immigrant non-
European language maintenance advocacy.

The mechanism for the resolution of these dilemmas was the autonomy of LEAs and their mandate to
respond to local characteristics. In effect, LEAs had developed their own multicultural and multilingual
programs in response to The Swann Report, financed principally by Section 11 of the Local
Government Act of 1966 (later modified in line with the ERA of 1968). The progressive weakening of
the LEAs coincided with major funding reductions to Section 11, announced in November 1992, and
the transfer of increased control over funding to the central government.

Prior to the ERA however, the displacement of minority languages was proposed in 1988 by The
Kingman Report (DES, 1986). Its terms of inquiry were to address the teaching of English as mother
tongue, thereby excluding the possibility that the learning of English as a second language (ESL)
might be associated pedagogically with mainstream English language education. The report also
denied recognition to social and racial varieties of English, acknowledging only internal British
regional variations. Its overall effect was to further marginalize the claims of minority language
speakers (Cameron & Bourne, 1988). One commentator’s view was that this effect was achieved by
false representation: "The implicit denial of social class differences in the Kingman Report is clearly
politically loaded; it is also simply false. The language of a particular class is passed off as the
language of the nation" (Stubbs, 1994, p. 198).

Although much of the prose of The Kingman Report is liberal, and concerned with social cohesion,
democracy, and individual language freedoms, these are enveloped within an overarching framework of concern for falling standards and insufficient attention to a knowledge of formal grammar.

Despite a softening of this attitude toward the concerns of minority-language speakers in succeeding reports, The Cox Report (DES, 1989) and The Harris Report (DES, 1990), the implicit goals of the de facto British language policy have altered little this century. Both The Cox Report and The Kingman Report, however, tried to locate British regional dialects of English within a description of repertoire and appropriacy. Impatient with academic dithering, the government adopted amended versions of the recommendations of The Cox Report, and derived from these the legal basis for the national curriculum in English; the orders containing attainment targets and the required programs of study.

The period since the release of The Swann Report has been interpreted as a "retreat to a much more ethnocentric view of the curriculum" with the assertion of standard English as the "emblem of a common national culture" (Martin-Jones & Saxena 1995, p. 80). The twin effects of territoriality for British indigenous languages and Europeanism for immigrant languages relegated the place of other minority languages to localism. However, and ironically, it was the adoption of formal language policy promoting modern foreign languages and the absorption of this program into a centralized policy that rendered them most vulnerable.

Modern Foreign Languages

Section 11 of the Local Government Act of 1966, whose provisions had been used to finance multicultural education, provided a financial basis for the national curriculum in the ERA of 1988. Although requiring every state secondary school in England and Wales to provide 5 years of compulsory modern foreign language study to children from the age of 11, the provision is widely interpreted as having diminished pluralism, by distancing the claims for mother-tongue education for urban immigrant populations, and by substituting central control for local innovation. Drawing on The Swann Report, (which had argued that instruction must be in English and that achievement must be demonstrated in English), the prevailing understanding of two-language competence became, (instead of adding English to a reinforced mother tongue), identified with the learning of a foreign language from a base in English.

First-language education for minority children in England became displaced into forms of transitional bilingual support, mostly dependent on bilingual aides, in mainstream classrooms (Martin-Jones & Saxena, 1995) with little likelihood of maintenance bilingual provision. Although policy for promoting modern foreign languages was promulgated, and constitutional autonomy was granted to territorial minorities (or as Edwards, 1984, called them, "the older mother tongues," (p. 75), language planning for urban-based immigrant minorities became disorganized, reluctant, and sometimes hostile.

The rationale for a modern foreign orientation was "unlike the many educational reforms ... that have political-ideological motivation, the current language policy grew out of economic necessity" with the admission of language skills to a discussion about what is "essential support to ensuring Britain's professional and industrial place within a multilingual Europe" (Hagan, 1994, p. 111).

Compromise between the imperatives of accommodating to Europe while responding to pressure from domestic communities has led to administrative schemes that give the impression of including domestic multilingualism within curriculum offerings. In fact, this is a surface appearance that silences the demands while Conceding little. 'Modern foreign' languages were originally listed in two schedules. The first schedule contained eight official languages of the member states of the EU. These were constituted as a foundation subject. One of these languages was required to be taught in every school. Schedule 2 listed a further 11 languages: being the major immigrant languages within Britain (e.g., Panjabi, Bengali, Gujarati), or other prominent non-EU world languages (e.g., Japanese, Russian). Schedule 2 languages were to be offered as additional languages in schools that obligatorily offer an EU language. Students were required to study only one language. By this means local bilingualism is displaced into a foreign language learning category. After protests, the lists were amalgamated into one containing the same 19 languages, but the basic arrangement remained the same.

According to Martin-Jones and Saxena (1995), the national curriculum has "sidetracked" the language maintenance and bilingual education needs of bilingual Britons. Hagen (1994) argued that languages
themselves would have been sidetracked altogether had it not been for authoritative intervention:

Modern languages could have easily remained sidelined in the educational reforms, had it not been for the trade factor. ... Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recognized the importance of languages and once admitted on radio that she wished she had been able to speak foreign languages during her premiership. Lobbying reached the highest levels, culminating with a dinner organized by the prince of Wales .... to discuss the situation with a team of industrialists.... A notable inclusion was (the) Minister for trade. (p. 115).

The most recent language enrollment figures for the General Certificate of School Education (GCSE) and the General Certificate of Education (GCE) provide a reasonably accurate assessment of the effects of the national curriculum on language choices (Association for Language Learning, personal communication, 1996).

The School Curriculum and Assessment Authorities are responsible for the collation of such statistical information. Examination boards - three in England and one each in Northern Ireland and Wales (Scotland is a separate system) - are commercial organizations that are under no obligation to offer exams in all the languages of the national curriculum. Although there is cooperation among these to ensure that languages whose examination is not commercially viable are offered, it is not always systematic. Hindi, for example (a major British community language and the fifth most widely spoken language in the world), was not examined at the GCSE level in 1995.

Any supposed policy of diversification away from the predominance of French has largely failed. French examination entries count about three times the entries for German (French, 1993: 318,084; 1994: 328,266; 1995: 350,017; and provisionally 342,751 for 1996; German, 108, 387; 118, 972; 129,386 for these years; and provisionally 132,212 for 1996; Spanish, 32,085; 36,332; 40,366; and 42,591 for these same years; Urdu and Italian have registered between 5,000 and 6,000 entries during these years, and Chinese was hovering around 2,000. All other languages of the national curriculum such as Bengali, Arabic, Panjabi, Greek, Turkish, Japanese, and Gujarati are well below these figures).

Languages are compulsory in the national curriculum from Year 7 (ages 11-12) through Year 10 or 11. French predominates in Years 7 through 9. Even where community languages tend to be found in areas populated by community language speakers, French predominates. The less commonly taught languages make an appearance really only in years 10 and 11 but GCE figures show that French is clearly dominant here, too. Primary schools inconsistently provide language classes and French is the preeminent language offered. In Northern Ireland, only the main European languages are systematically offered; in Wales, Welsh is the main non-English language; and in Scotland, where no statutory curriculum exists, there is little difference in the range and proportions of the languages offered and examined, with Gaelic being distinctive.

Since 1989, there has been an avowed policy of diversifying language education away from the strong domination of French. However, the enrollment numbers for GCSE and A Level exams show the policy of diversification has had limited success.

British Language Planning

In some ways, current British language planning has altered little during the present century. As Edwards (1984) said, "inasmuch as a language policy existed in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century, it focussed on the unacceptability of Celtic languages and non-standard dialects of English in education, and the importance of teaching the standard" (p. 49).

Stubbs' (1994) view is that despite the incorporation of modern foreign languages into the national curriculum, the "basic attitudes" of Britain are unchanged, these being "profoundly monolingual assumptions ... widespread apathy towards learning other languages" and moves to "strengthen Standard English" (p. 193). He also argued that the "face-value" nature of language-planning analysis fails to recognize that in political discourse, concessions may be made to certain socially claimed and demanded principles, for example, multilingual and multicultural policy in education, multiple literacy, but these may in fact be denied in practice. Stubbs (1994) approvingly cited Rosen's withering assessment of British language policy as "liberal words [which are used] to disguise sinister
messages of state coercion" (p.194).

Urban conflict and tense race relations coincided with conservative resistance to the domestic cultural effects of Britain's economic integration into Europe. The combined effect was to make insecure the sense of national cohesion and stability. The national curriculum came to reflect an idealization of the nation, traditional and stable: a standard English untroubled by social, class, ethnic, and new native variations with tame (even quaint) regional varieties. Other languages were made either foreign (i.e., safely distanced) or territorially circumscribed: During this period, it became more common for British public figures to speak of the British nation, rather than just Britain, invoking idealized associations between place, language and identity. The national curriculum embodies some of these aspirations and emotions.

Like spoken language, diverse plural literacy practices of the British community are relegated to the margins of the lives of its children. As Saxena (1984) pointed out: "Historically and ideologically Britain has largely remained a monolingual, monocultural and monoliterate state" but in this predictable and ordered linguistic universe "linguistic minorities exist as multilingual, multicultural and multiliterate subsystems both in terms of their ideologies and practices" (p. 212). The complex literacy practices of Panjabi families, for instance, offer a grid of literacy, language and orthography that invoke nationalism, religious, ideological, and immigrant-British "statuses" and choices in a marketplace of possibilities.

Although modern foreign languages have impressively secured a long-awaited curriculum presence, speakers of minority languages in Britain struggle for serious space within the curriculums of their schools. Few children are able to convert their subsystems of literacy and language into prestigious, intellectualized forms that schooling would expect if these subsystems were authorized subjects.

MAKING THE DE FACTO DE JURE: OFFICIALIZING ENGLISH IN AMERICA

A Language Law After 216 Years

In his 1780 defense of eloquence, the U.S. patriot John Adams urged the first Congress of the new republic to bolster "liberty, prosperity, and glory" by devoting "an early attention to the subject of eloquence and language." Nine years later, Noah Webster's Declaration of Linguistic Independence called for Americans to "adorn" English and use it well but also for the separation of 'American' from 'English', believing it to be both "necessary and inevitable" (cited in Crawford, 1992, pp. 32-36).

During the 104th Congress, 216 years after Adams' call for "an early attention" to language, the House of Representatives adopted a Language of Government Act. It was passed by 259 votes to 169 after 15 years of failed attempts at floor action. The Bill, yet to be debated in the Senate (at the time of writing), would ensure that there would be no tax information printed in Spanish; the provisions of the Voting Rights Act, which required that electoral information be translated in areas of high non-English-speaking population, would be rescinded; and communication between the federal government and its citizens should be via the exclusive use of English. Assessments of this piece of legislated language can be extreme:

On August 1, the United States House of Representatives passed a Bill making English the official language of the US. Take that, Spanish-speaking dog! (Dyer, 1996)

Without English as a common language, there is no [American] civilization (N. Gingrich, quoted in Donegan, 1996)

(From a New York Times cartoon): A man rhetorically asks: "once the language used by Americans in 99% of their daily transactions has been enshrined in law, will Congress work to pass equally necessary legislation?: designating the sun our official life-giving source of heat and light? ... a mandatory breathing bill?" (The New York Times, 1996)

In the House debate, Speaker Newt Gingrich commented that public schools' instruction in many languages would eventually lead "to the decay of the core parts of our civilization," earlier stating that "becoming American involves English." Opponents satirized the Bill; Thomas Foglietta saying: "since
we're legislating an official language, how about an official religion to go along with it?" and concluding "why don't we just get rid of the First Amendment altogether?"

This last comment associating official English with a restriction on freedom of speech is a crucial divide. Like John Adams many early American patriots were in no doubt that America's republicanism and democracy would give birth to a more eloquent form of English, worthy of being called American, not tied to the "Order of the Garter" (McCormick, 1923/1992) and other British cultural mores presumed to be the affectations of monarchists and tired old-world ways.

However, unlike Adams' petition for the creation of "a society ... for refining, improving, and ascertaining the English language," the House passed legislation aimed at protecting its exclusive role for official purposes. Adams' concern was for eloquence within the code: a generation of officializers have been concerned with a protection measure for the code. By early 1996, 22 states had passed legislation similarly declaring, in stronger or weaker form, the status of English.

**Bilingual Education: In the Eye of the Beholder**

Bilingual education has different meanings according to "the eye - or rather the Ideology - of the beholder" (Drake, 1984, p. 142). Drake's notion of pluralism reflects a distinctively American experience with ethnic-racial categories as an instrument of social policy and administration. "Pluralism ... insists on a rigidity of boundaries and a commitment to group that American society simply will not permit" (p. 145).

The federal mandate for bilingual education emerges from a complex series of class-action litigation in many parts of the United States, basing claims on civil rights or other authority heads as well as Congressional efforts. Prominent among the latter are the efforts of Senator Ralph Yarborough, a Texas Democrat, whose advocacy for educational action to alleviate the socioeconomic disadvantage of Mexican-American children resulted in a measure which was signed into law on January 2, 1968 by President Lyndon Johnson. This took the form of Title VII, the Bilingual Education Act, an addition to the 1968 Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

From its inception, bilingual education was a compensatory antipoverty measure expressly aiming not to entrench minority languages, nor to elevate knowledge of such languages beyond English, nor to stamp out the mother tongue, rather, as Yarborough stated: "just to try to make those children fully literate in English" (cited in Crawford, 1995, p.40).

Alleviating Spanish-speaking children's social disadvantage by bridging their access to English via temporary and transient use of the mother tongue was the unequivocal goal. At about the same time as Yarborough's moves, civil rights advocacy was at its peak. In the well-spring of U.S. "adversarial legalism" (Kagan, 1991), litigation against unequal treatment of minority-language speakers drew on the principles of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which banned discrimination on the basis of national origin (Baron, 1990; Piatt, 1990).

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2 In this section, *bilingual education* is taken to mean typically authorized programs funded under Title VII of ESEA of 1968. There are of course very many excellent two-way bilingual programs, immersion programs, language enrichment and traditional foreign language programs, and language maintenance programs, some of which also receive support from Title VII funding. However, it is the case that much of what is called *bilingual education* typically is of short duration, and is transitional to teaching in English.
In 1970, the then Office of Civil Rights ordered school districts with enrollments of more than 5% of children of national minority background to provide appropriate educational opportunities for them that would overcome the disadvantage of their not knowing the language of the curriculum. Known as the Pottinger Memorandum, this order, drawing its authority from Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in federally supported programs, required school districts to "rectify ... language deficiency." This is possibly the most critical formal involvement by the federal government, giving language rights a legalistic character and inheritance which has been significant for the discourse and ideology of U.S. language planning ever since. School districts were not necessarily required to implement bilingual education, nor specifically even to set up English teaching programs, but simply to establish some form of special provision for non-English-speaking students to assist them to gain access to their school’s curriculum.

In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the now famous Lau v. Nichols case. The case was brought by a "poverty lawyer" (Crawford, 1995, p. 44) on behalf of some 1,789 Cantonese-speaking children in the San Francisco area, and was based on the previously established legal standard of "education on equal terms" from the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education case. The court upheld the Office of Civil Rights' interpretation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; supporting thereby the Pottinger Memorandum. It too did not mandate bilingual education, simply requiring some form of special language provision. In practice its finding was that a sink-or-swim attitude violated the civil rights of non-English speaking children (Schneider, 1976).

After an Office of Civil Rights investigation finding little compliance with the ruling, the federal government issued the “Lau remedies” in August 1975. These specifically named bilingual education and ESL and specified instances when bilingual education was to be mandatory, although such bilingual education was to be only of the transitional kind. The native language was to be used for a strictly limited period until the child’s English was sufficient to enable him or her to enter mainstream classes. The result of this and the accompanying active enforcement processes from federal authorities was a proliferation of compensatory transitional bilingual education across the United States.

Also in 1974 during the reauthorization processes of Title VII, the antipoverty criterion was deleted, with the new bill approving a bilingual pathway toward English proficiency but leaving unresolved whether the maintenance of the native language was an appropriate aim of the Bilingual Education Act. Its eventual resolution clarified that bilingualism was intended to be a stepping stone to monolingualism. Political agitation for native language maintenance and enrichment, for developing an intellectualized and literate capacity in the first language, grew strongly, but the bulk of funded programs remained steadfastly transitional. The 1974 reauthorization was, however, only a reform rather than a radical reappraisal of the value of bilingualism. An analysis of the reauthorization process has shown that "no one at any time" disputed the primary purpose of educational equalization, pointing out that the legitimacy of federal support for bilingual education rested in part on its similarity to "compensatory education for the economically disadvantaged" (Schneider, 1976, p. 161).

Critics of "publicly authorized ethnicity" were vocal; for instance, John Silber (1974), an early, trenchant, and influential critic claimed a parallel between his personal transfer to standard English and his abandonment of Texan, (a process he described as learning a foreign language), and the need for immigrants to abandon their home languages (p. 11).

By the late 1970s, there emerged what has become an enduring empirical contest around bilingual education's effectiveness. In the first study of the effectiveness of bilingual education, the American Institutes for Research concluded that no added advantage existed from short-term transitional programs over sink-or-swim alternatives, and found furthermore that children were being retained in programs after the point they were assumed to be sufficiently proficient in English to learn in mainstream classrooms. Since the time of this study, the dispute over the effectiveness of transitional bilingual education compared with alternatives has been characterized by definitional contests; unresolved questions about appropriate goals and methods; methodological, pedagogical, and measurement issues; disputed consideration about the value of maintaining a first language; disagreement about the worthwhileness of affective, social, familial, ethnic and self-esteem criteria (Baker & de Kanter, 1981; Chavez, 1991; Crawford, 1995; Cummins, 1992; Porter, 1995; Ramirez, Yuen, Ramey, & Pasta, 1991; Willig, 1985).
In public discourse by the late 1970s, bilingual education came to be called "affirmative ethnicity" (Epstein, 1977), and entrenched the dangerous Silber-like association with the incipient rejection of affirmative action policies. In this way language learning, came to be viewed as a different, and an acceptable educational activity, whereas bilingual education came increasingly to assume a mantle of fostering ethnicity (Zelasko 1991). Constrained by opponents as advancing segregation for minorities and therefore undermining the preferred ideology of either assimilation (Chavez, 1991) and/or the melting pot (Hayakawa, 1985), bilingual education gained further negative baggage. This in turn made bilingual education highly vulnerable to direct political criticism.

In its 1978 reauthorization of Title VII, Congress clarified the intention of the law as strictly transitional, the native language being permitted only to the "extent necessary" to permit English proficiency to develop. It also permitted English-speaking children to join bilingual programs so that non-English speakers could learn English from them, too, but also to assuage public concern about segregation.

Spanish-speaking President Jimmy Carter toughened the Lau remedies in August 1980 (calling them the Lau regulations), going so far as to mandate bilingual education under certain enrollment conditions. There was a strong public rejection of Carter's Lau regulations leading, eventually to their withdrawal. The federal role thus shrank to operating legal compliance enforcement routines on the provisions of the Civil Rights Act and to the provision of Title VII funding.

The association of bilingual education with wider and more negative cultural messages became deeper with the election of Ronald Reagan as president. He declared that it was "against American concepts" to preserve native languages in state schooling. In Congress, Senator S.I. Hayakawa from California described the 1978 Title VII changes "official bilingualism" and called for the declaration of English as the official language of the country.

However, electoral calculations and political compromising softened the administration's opposition to the 1984 reauthorization of Title VII. A series of categories of permissible funding were added to the Bilingual Education Act: family English literacy, special populations, and developmental bilingual education. These had the effect of reducing the compensatory ethos of Title VII, but allowed a 4% to 10% use of the funds for initiatives in which no native language was used.

The Office of Civil Rights retreated effectively to a new legal position requiring federal intervention only when "discriminatory intent" was evident rather than the previous test of "discriminatory effect" and accepting that "experts" were divided about appropriate pedagogies for teaching children of minority-language background. It considered that localism should prevail unless discriminatory intent was evident. The policing role of the Office of Civil Rights remained low under President George Bush but although enforcement reviews have increased under the Clinton Administration, there has not been any serious government-sanctioned attempt to investigate the issue of the most appropriate instruction for language-minority children. Such children are widely known as Limited English Proficient indicating a persistence of a language-deficit discourse for referring to the educational situation of children of language-minority backgrounds.

Other legislative influences such as the 1974 Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) have affected bilingual education's status and reputation. The EEOA was used in a 1981 Circuit Court of Appeals case (Castaneda v. Pickard) to overrule a previous finding that overcoming discriminatory intent was an essential precondition to mandate special language provisions, that educational neglect violated children's civil rights, and that good faith efforts were an adequate substitute for appropriate intervention (Crawford, 1995, p. 44).

Importantly, in what came to be called the Castaneda standard, the court set out three criteria for programs for minority language children: the intervention must be based on "sound educational theory," it requires "effective implementation" and after a trial period, it must be evaluated as effective in overcoming "language handicaps." However, critics of the Castaneda standard rarely focussed on bilingual education. For instance, Chavez (1991) argued that it was "the first salvo in Hispanics' war to preserve their ethnic identity" (p. 10), and Porter (1995) considered it to have spawned a self-serving, biased, and politicized bureaucracy whose interests are tied to disguising the educational failure of two-language methodology.
The main failure, however, was that of the public authorities' inability to shift Title VII from its compensatory, nonlinguistically serious and primarily antipoverty orientation, and to invest it with a relevance for all children in an overarching language policy framework. The resultant vacuum was filled with legal recourse through the courts, used extensively by groups of minority-language parents and opposed by US English, a new organization.

**Hayakawa's America**

The move to officialize English in the federal jurisdiction commenced in 1981 with a constitutional amendment proposed by Hayakawa, who later founded *US English*. His concern was the "divisibility" of America.

In his key statement on the goals of his movement, Hayakawa (1985) began anecdotally with "the story of one immigrant" (p. 5), and, via a surname roll call, listed the ethnic diversity of his Congressional colleagues. His case for officializing English rests with: "What is it that has made a society out of the hodge-podge of nationalities, races and colors represented in the immigrant hordes that people our nation? It is language, of course" (p. 6).

To Hayakawa, a common language is for "dissolving distrust and fear," but language in this instrumental role is insufficient. Another element is crucial: the "melting pot idea," which creates a "new kind of human being." The "salad bowl" image, (proposed as an alternative to the melting pot image by "Hispanic activists"), imagines that the different ingredients of U.S. society share geopolitical space, even common nationalism, but retain distinctive identities. In salad bowls there is no melting.

For Hayakawa, as for other supporters of official English, American language planning is concerned with a domain of the imagination: How Americans, palpably different in every conceivable way, imagine their collective existence. But for Gingrich, official English involves a slightly different set of confluations: multiculturalism, official versus common English, "poor people," standard and African American English, "the counterculture left" and a sort of underclass bossism in which minorities are kept dependent on ethnic power brokers who manipulate them for political purposes. He concluded a chapter devoted to this rich mixture thus: " The only viable alternative for the American underclass is American civilization. Without English as a common language, there is no such civilization"(Gingrich, 1995, p. 162).

Opponents of official English legislation often claim the support of the First Amendment, a guarantee of free speech. Proponents of official English argue that free speech is about content, what may be said, permissible discourse, not the language of the discourse.

Often, bilingual education (and its other; official English) are hardly language issues at all. Finding that income criteria govern access to the claimed language rights conceded to minority groups, Sonntag (1995) argued that these are not language entitlements so much as antipoverty measures "ameliorating the circumstances of the uneducated poor," and the moves to make English the official language are "part of an attempt to replace the old liberal, New Deal/Great Society agenda with the right-wing, Reaganite Republican agenda" (p. 99; also Tatalovich, 1995).

Language-planning approaches that treat political discourse as a separate domain would therefore misconstrue bilingual-education-official-English disputes as being mainly about planning language.

**U.S. or American English?**

The first official language measure in Congress was the 1923 failed proposal by Washington J. McCormick to make "American" the official language of the United States. McCormick wanted to free American thought in a "mental emancipation" to accompany the political emancipation of 1776 (McCormick, 1923/1992, p. 41). Also in 1923 in Illinois, state Senator Frank Ryan succeeded where McCormick had failed. Ryan's proposal, to have "American" declared the official language of Illinois, expressed with "virulently anti-British" sentiment (Baron, 1986/1992, p. 39), remained state law until 1969 when the official state language was changed to "English."

For patriots everywhere, language is more than neutral form, more than a content-free social
technology for devising and transmitting messages. It has cultural and political content. Opponents of official English claim a right to be Americans in languages other than English, bilingually, in a program they call English-plus; English is acknowledged as the common tongue, but denied official standing; the First Amendment is seen to guarantee the right to the public use of other languages because language for them too is more than a conduit of content.

Bilingual education is alleged by its critics to have provided official sanction to minority languages, state allocation of exclusive domains to Spanish and other languages. The discourse frame of the proponents of official English foregrounds the officiality of the inclusion of minority languages in domains of state, a domain claimed exclusively for English.

Six states had passed official English declarations before California's Proposition 63 (Prop 63) in November 1986. Nebraska's declaration dates from 1920. Some states and jurisdictions have adopted bilingual statements. For instance, Hawaii in 1978 designated English and Hawaiian official, and New Mexico became the first of several states or jurisdictions to adopt "English-plus." But Prop 63 was critical in the modern revival of official English. Voting three to one, in one of the most populous states and the one with the highest number of immigrants, California's voters adopted an initiative to instruct public officials to ensure that "the role of English as the common language of the State of California is preserved and enhanced."

More extreme, however, was the November 4, 1980 Dade County citizen initiative Ordinance 80-128, which repealed a decade old bilingual and bicultural measure. Dade County's ordinance forbade the use of county funds "for utilizing any language other than English, or promoting any culture other than that of the United States." Although it was significantly revised and made less restrictive in 1984, its success stimulated other jurisdictions to consider similar legislation (Donahue, 1995, p. 125).

Curiously, in the same year that the Education for Economic Security Act become law, an act authorizing federal funding for the improvement of foreign language education, the 1988 Bilingual Education Act increased to 25% the Title VII funds that could be used for nonnative language instruction. Hayakawa's initiative had inaugurated a strong and pervasive national struggle for and against English's officialization, called English-only by its critics, pro-English by supporters. Many successful enactments were won but there have been important setbacks as well. U.S. District Judge Paul Rosenblatt's February 6, 1990 striking down as unconstitutional of Arizona's Official English amendment was the most significant. The basis on which the Arizona measure was struck down was the requirement that state officers and employees "act in English and in no other language" (Donahue, 1995, p. 124). This requirement was found by the judge to violate the free speech guarantees under the First Amendment.

The Foreign, the Truly Foreign, and Other Languages

Lambert (1992); Simon (1981/1992), who described the United States as "linguistically malnourished"; the 1979 President's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies (Perkins, 1979), which described U.S. foreign language study as "nothing short of scandalous" (p. 5); and many others criticize U.S. education for its neglect of foreign languages. Some make a strong distinction between "ethnic" and "foreign" language policy; in the former "Linguistic policy is hostage to ethnic politics. Foreign language policy, in contrast ... induce(s) or enable(s)' citizens to master languages of other countries ... trying to add to or sustain a national competency" (Lambert, 1992, p. 5). But the internal and external are rarely far apart. Adult literacy policy, for reasons of the "competitive stance of the United States in the world economy," necessarily draws on first-language literacy, the biliteracy, of workers who do not have English as their first spoken language (Spener, 1994).

For all its self-criticism, the United States can, in fact, genuinely claim an outstanding record of foreign language planning, research and education from the end of World War II. Indeed, at many levels of government, it is entrenched: "At least 33 federal agencies have over 34,000 positions which require foreign language proficiency" (Lay, 1995, p. I). This derives much of its discursive power and influence on public policy from appeals to geo-political security and sober assessments that strategic interests require strong investment in foreign language competence. An instance of this is the category identified by Walton (1992) of Truly Foreign Languages (TFLs), whose admittedly circumscribed presence in U.S. education came via national defense planning.
Zelasko (1991) called the appreciation of foreign language skills and the ambivalence towards minority language skills the bilingual double standard. Much of the vision of the Bilingual Education Act is, in effect, not bilingualism at all; it is an instrument of Anglification and a mechanism of "anti-bilingualism" (Fishman, 1989, p. 405).

Do Immigrants Learn English?

In the landmark study of intergenerational language shift, Veltman (1983) showed that Hispanics/Latinos' use of the home language follows the broad pattern of previous large immigrant groups into the United States. Only residualized and rarely literate standard forms of Spanish remain in the third generation. Although there is immense variation among national and social groups, Veltman found little evidence of the monolingual non-English-speaking enclaves that seem to alarm social conservatives.

A more recent study of the English of adult immigrants examines three interlocking processes that yield English proficiency: differential immigration, emigration, and English language acquisition. Stevens (1994) found that the forces of economic and social mobility are strong:

In spite of the lack of explicit U.S. legislation concerning the entry of potential immigrants according to their proficiency in English, the majority of new immigrants entering the US speak English. With time and education, the others learn English ... the nature of the selection processes underlying who immigrates ... and of the extent of the language learning that occurs after they arrive are already much more compelling declarations of the fact that English is, de facto, the nation's official language. (p. 183)

*De facto* is not enough. *De jure* is the key goal of America's English officializers. These moves suggest a desire for symbolic domination. At its most extreme, bilingualism ventures toward sedition, but "mainstream" Americans' knowledge of another language is a skill.

AUSTRALIA'S "PERPETUAL PROVISIONALITY"

An "Uncompleted" Nation

For Nile (1994), Australia in 1962 was "a tighter and less tolerant society, more self-assured and assimilationist with an uncontested mono-identity," but by 1994 seemed bent on continually reinventing itself: "making identities is the hoary old gumnut of being Australian, ... our civilisation, like our culture, should remain in a provisional and contested state" (p. x). The Committee to Review Australian Studies in Tertiary Education also finds Australia incomplete: "By staying open to the new and to the different, Australian culture is never in danger of being complete" (Daniels, 1987, p. 26).

Australian language policies have given expression to cultural imagery and intention in a dynamic and continually renewed way. Over a period of three decades, an uneasy interrelation emerged among three interpretations and visions of Australian society. Language and literacy policy became a key site for the expression of these cultural images and visions and where contest continues, in new accommodations and hybrid positions today. These forces emerged most strongly in the late 1960s to the mid-1970s.

The first of these concerns has been an evolving politics about the education of minority-language children: from immigration to multiculturalism. The second derives from the crisis in modern-classical-foreign language education: the mobilization of language professionals. The third concerns the cultural consequences of Australia's increasing integration into emerging Asian economic, security, and political arrangements: economic regionalism (Djite, 1994).

From Immigration to Multiculturalism

For some two decades, the struggle within immigrant minority education was for special teaching of ESL. Hampered by the constitutional division of responsibilities between the federal and state governments over education, there was patchy and wholly inadequate response) to children's and adult's needs. In 1971, the federal government drew on its constitutional responsibility for immigration
to issue the Immigration (Education) Act in which it formalized its rather uncoordinated English teaching programs.

Also in 1971, the federal government established the Child Migrant Education Service to stimulate state responses to children's educational needs. Significantly, this was established by the minister for Immigration and not for education (Martin, 1978). Immigration settlement had been the driving responsibility for educational provision; assimilationism the primary ideology.

With the election of the Whitlam government in December 1972, the first Labor government in 25 years, immigration became enveloped in a new discourse. This aimed at bringing about a new and transformed plural image of Australia. The first strong steps toward a cultural and political reconciliation with indigenous peoples also commenced. However, the dominant educational response to the needs of children and adults was a remediating compensatory acquisition of English. Activism from communities grew and became absorbed into a transformative ideology of multiculturalism.

Public policy interest in the educational attainment levels of minorities grew rapidly as political agitation intensified; motivated by the secondary labor market destination of disproportionate numbers of immigrant children (Martin, 1978). Through its various initiatives, the Labor government opened up discussion of these questions, but its conceptualization was wholly within the social democratic ideology of its wider project of renewing Australian national culture to distance it from dependence of Britain. Its foreign policy concern was to evolve a "middle power" independent position with wider relations than dependence on the major powers. Its domestic equity concerns for minorities focused principally on the disadvantages encountered by these groups in competing in the labor market; a standpoint influenced by its organizational base in the labour unions (Djite, 1994; Moore, 1996).

Compulsory voting, in state, local, and federal elections, is a unique feature of Australian political life. By the early 1970s, former immigrants, now ethnic minorities, were constructed by political parties as an electoral constituency capable of being appealed to on the basis of ethnic-specific agendas of political action. The re-election of a conservative government in 1975 inaugurated a dramatic reappropriation of pluralism by conservatives. This culminated in the principles and programs of the 1979 Galbally report which gave conservatives their own "politically correct" interpretation of the place of minorities within the society (Lo Bianco, 1995; Moore, 1996). Whereas the Labourist version had stressed ethnicity as a correlate of social and economic disadvantage, and construed the appropriate policy action as remediation of these problems, the conservative counter was to assert not a class analysis but a culturalist one. In this manner, cultural diversity was a feature of public and private life that enriched the national culture. Public debate oscillated between these equalitarian and culturalist emphases for more than a decade. Language issues were subsumed within these wider rubrics.

Later reworkings of the multicultural ideology came to stress its economic benefit for Australia in a new conceptualization that came to be called productive diversity. Via this concept, the retention of the languages, cultural mores, and contacts of immigrants was seen to offer trading and other commercial opportunities for Australian businesses into areas of the world in which it might otherwise struggle to gain the access it required. Linguistic and cultural differences were also construed as important aspects of domestic microeconomic restructuring that the industrial and white-collar workplaces needed to acknowledge as they made the adjustment to a less protected economy.

A rough agreement around three principles evolved, giving both major sides of politics a neutralizing consensus on multiculturalism, if not on immigration: cultural identity, social justice, and economic efficiency.

In the mid-1980s, these principles shaped public policy, preserving thereby the conservatives' interpretation of demographic diversity as principally about identity, being the Labourist one of social justice, and the new, shared ideology of economic efficiency. From 1982 to 1984, the senate inquiry into the desirability of adopting a national language policy exhibited much of this cross-political consensus.

**The Mobilization of Language Professionals.**

In 1968, university entrance requirements removed the requirement for the study of a foreign
language in schools. The effect of this change was the sharp decline in languages in school. Essentially, the abandonment of languages as a required entry criterion for tertiary study represents a shift from the previous idea of languages for mental training (Lo Bianco, 1995). The decline in enrollments had the gradual effect, however, of encouraging language professional associations to develop a political activism in support of the place of languages within educational institutions, and, ultimately, to join a coalition with ethnic minority, indigenous, and other interests (Ozolins, 1993).

The culmination of this activism was the formation in the early 1980s of the PlanLangPol, a broad alliance of otherwise disparate language professional associations concerned with linguistics, ESL, literacy, indigenous languages, hearing and sight impaired interests, and languages other than English groups including those concerned with sign language. Via this and more public advocacy, the language professionals provided both a stimulus and an intellectual legitimation of the idea of a language policy that assisted its adoption by initially reluctant government (Lo Bianco, 1989; Ozolins, 1991, 1993).

**Economic Regionalism**

The accession of Britain into the European common market during the mid-1970s created a further and ultimately very powerful force for language policy in Australia. Australia had evolving interests and relations with the Asian region for a long time, even beyond evident questions of national security. Despite growing immigration from Asian countries and the geo-political concerns these had not impacted deeply within national culture.

Economic and trade, however, made relations with Asia not optional but mandatory and urgent (Rudd, 1995). Commercial interests came to advocate a shift in language policy away from the traditionally taught European foreign languages to stress the commercial and trading languages of the Asian region. Diplomatic representatives who had served in Asian countries added strongly to an emerging discourse of Australia as a nation needing to bridge its Asian geography with its European history.

However, this stratum of public advocacy did not connect with the moves toward a shared plural conception of Australian culture. The majority of language professionals were also more representative of traditional language education. Placing Asian languages at the forefront of the policy agenda, claiming an urgency and a national need that transcended accommodations to ethnicity, produced clear points of tension with multicultural ideology as well. In addition, an Australianist discourse began to emerge (or rather revived an older anti-British nationalism) in which plural accommodations were considered a distraction from more pressing issues of reconstituting a coherent and independent national culture.

In the early 1980s, the federal government had established a high-level advisory committee on Asian studies. It devised the concept of Asia literacy as an expressive and powerful synthetic statement of its national goal. The Asian Studies Council set out a vision for Asia-literacy comprising an elite “with commercial and technical skills allied with strong language skills and knowledge of Asia for the frontline of our economic activity in Asia”; below this a “broad stratum” of technical, management, and service personnel similarly endowed with cultural knowledge and linguistic skill; sustained by a base in which there is a need for “all Australians” to receive an education which is Asia-focused. This latter group provides “the necessary constituency for our economic strategy and the reservoir from which will come the broad support stratum and the professional marketers and negotiators” (Asian Studies Council, 1988).

**A Policy Panorama**

These forces were galvanized by the ethnic community organizations in the early 1980s and succeeded in persuading the Senate to commission a consideration of the case for a national languages policy. The Senate committee survived a change of government from Liberal (conservative) to Labor, and although it recommended the adoption of a language policy it did not succeed in producing it. However, the pressures of public expectation and the wide coalition that had been formed proved an irresistible constituency leading to Australia's first explicit, multilingually oriented language policy, the *National Policy on Languages* (NPL; Lo Bianco, 1987) formally abandoning a long history of negative and mono-lingually oriented language planning.
A wide array of language support programs were established including the beginnings of national research institutions, stimulus funding for language maintenance bilingualism for indigenous and ethnic minority education, Asian languages, interpreting and translating and other language services, English literacy programs for adults and children, as well as ESL initiatives.

Subsequently, microeconomic reform agendas demanded an elevated concern for standards of English literacy and combined with an "Australianist" vision of a native culture, based on Australian forms of English and its cultural production, to begin to unravel the uneasy accommodation that had brought about the NPL. A prioritization of these concerns was the main effect of *The Australian Language and Literacy Policy of 1991* (Dawkins, 1991), which replaced the NPL. The marking of International Literacy Year in 1990 had the effect of focusing government attention on the perceived need for literacy in a successful association between transformative economic reforms to enhance trade competitiveness with Asian countries, and rates of poor literacy mastery among adult workers and unemployed people (DEET, 1992).

Since then, a broad acceptance by major political forces of similar economic doctrines (such as free market policies, privatization of public assets, more flexible labor markets); Australia's rapid enmeshment with Asia and managerialist bureaucratic forms have made of language policy an instrument of economic restructuring and economically motivated regionalism.

Prior to the NPL of 1987, language issues had been treated as a subordinate category to other concerns. Immigrant settlement policies dominated concerns for the languages of new Australians, assimilationism dominated indigenous language questions (Fesl, 1987), and Australian commercial relations with its neighbors were of only marginal importance until after Britain's accession to the (then) European common market. The subordination of language planning to economic restructuring agendas appears to have again reduced the relative autonomy of language.

In February 1994, the Council of Australian Governments that brings together the federal, state and territory governments adopted an ambitious and long-term plan for Asian languages, via a report titled *National Asian Languages/Studies Strategy for Australian Schools* (NAL-SAS, 1994). Over a 10-year period, this program aims to boost the teaching of four key Asian languages: Chinese, Japanese, Indonesian, and Korean and to ensure that 60% of language candidates at particular year levels are taking one of these languages.

In the decade from 1984 to 1995 there were no fewer than five major policy statements (not reports, of which there have been many more) at the federal government level and many more at state and territory levels:

- 1984: A national language policy, Senate Standing Committee on Education and the Arts;
- 1987: The NPL, Department of Education;
- 1989: National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet;
- 1991: The Australian Language and Literacy Policy, Minister for Employment, Education and Training; and,

**Naming Problems; Making Problems**

The NPL located itself within the tradition of accommodation to pluralism and ultimately within the socially transformative project of the pluralist reinterpretation of modern Australia. It addressed language issues as relatively autonomous from their embeddedness in other social categories. A further feature was that it attempted to link the valuing of Australia's multilingualism with the emerging and powerfully asserted need for foreign language skills and the growing concern with English literacy standards.

The NPL was contested and succeeded by *The Australian Language and Literacy Policy (ALLP)*; Dawkins, 1991), whose version of the society into which the policy intervention was to be made, the facts and problems it was addressing, were both radically and subtly different. English literacy in standard English became the primary problem it identified and foregrounded, and Australian language
diversity came to be subordinated to a trade-oriented concern for foreign language learning.

The legitimated domain of policy changed from ways of conceiving internal diversity as a resource (of national cultural value and external economic benefit) to a primary focus on advancing Australia’s external commercial, political purposes and advancing an internal agenda of human capital justifications for literacy training (Moore, 1996). According to Moore, the ALLP represents a turning away from an affirmation of pluralism to a "divisive prioritization of literacy and selected Asian languages."

To this end, the ALLP celebrated the proportion of the literacy needs of adults who were not of immigrant origin (implying a dichotomy of self-serving minorities on the one hand and a naturalized, self-evident national interest on the other). Naming the important languages as foreign implied that the interlocutors were outside the country, that the domains of use for these languages would be beyond national shores and that few emotional and cultural attachments might be implicated in their acquisition, certainly none to rival the primary affiliation to English that learners would be assumed to have. The ALLP also celebrated a native English, locating itself within an Australianist tradition, a rhetoric in which nativism (Doecke, 1993) was given sustenance contrasted with a pluralist alternative.

Meanwhile, within other departments of government, specifically the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, where the Office of Multicultural Affairs was located, a reinterpretation of multiculturalism was well advanced. In this change, economic efficiency came to be added to the previous foci of multicultural policy, now evolving independently of language policy, although with some cross articulation.

The NALSAS report eschewed the notion of a comprehensive policy approach that might accommodate indigenous languages, literacy issues, foreign and community languages, and language services such as interpreting and translating and research. It is a much more focused design concerned with the formal education system and with the teaching of a small number of Asian languages (the languages of trading partners), and primarily with learners presumed to be acquiring the languages as a foreign language.

**Corporate Federalism, Bureaucratic Managerialism, and Economic Rationalism**

Administration and management processes for language policies (i.e., their implementation), as with all public policy, must be considered an extension of the formulation of policy, of the politics and contestation of the establishment of the original policy. As in other countries, Australian education and training endeavours have become implicated in a dense, web of human capital theorizations (OECD, 1995). These have coincided with a realignment of issues: Labour governments embracing whole-heartedly economic rationalist (new right) doctrines of public policy; the devolution to bureaucracies in transition from British public service modes of operating to managerialism (Wilensky, 1986); and realigned relations between the federal and state governments.

Corporate federalism is the approach to policymaking involving a negotiated consensus among state, territory and federal ministers, which emerged most strongly from 1983 after the election of a Labour government, but seemed likely to continue after its loss of office in March 1996. Lingard (1993) considered it a technique for negotiating consensus but also for circumventing political and financial constraints dictated by the Australian constitution. It was this approach that has produced corporate statements such as the NALSAS report, and the compromise positions of multiculturalism.

In stark contrast to U.S. legalism where class action and the Bill of Rights provide a focus for policymaking via the law, Australian public policy necessarily depends more on negotiated and compromising consensus. Pusey (1991) documented how the Canberra decision-making culture strongly adheres to economic rationalism as the legitimating and justificatory discourse for public policy across virtually all domains of public administration. Language and literacy policy reflect these, the commercialization of Australia’s adult English language programs is one strong example, so too is the absorption of adult literacy planning into an economic reform agenda. What used to be the province of a welfarist orientation has become a discourse of microeconomic reform (Wickert, 1992, this volume).
Foreign-community language education is also enmeshed in similar overarching understandings (Lo Bianco, 1995). Public sector reforms in the last decade have made bureaucrats managers of program areas. They are part of the policymaking process and not merely conduits for governmentally established positions (Wilensky, 1986). They interpret, often with a high level of reinterpretive autonomy, policy positions from the political process. Wilensky (1986) described belief in the policy versus administration dichotomy as "a necessary mythology of our system of government" (p. 51).

Negotiated and publicly agreed policy becomes absorbed into processes of administration and management whose deliberations become themselves refinements and indeed elaborations of the policy. Implementation and administration are not so distinct from policy and politics as rational positivistic language planning theorizations seem to assume. More contemporary approaches to public policy see implementation as a "continuation into another arena of the political process" (Rubin, 1986, p. 118).

**Asia Literacy, Multiculturalism and Economy**

For Singh (1995), Asia literacy is "framed by the pre-existing prejudices of the Orientalist project" (p. 617). For Williamson-Fein (1994) and Rizvi (1993) also, there are residues of Orientalism (Said, 1978) within Asia-literacy. Said's contention is that the "West" constructed a way of knowing "Asia" that homogenized its vast differences and distinguished between a classical, great past and an inferior present. Orientalism was a knowledge industry supportive of the material and intellectual domination of Asia by the West. As long as Asia literacy sought to define Australians as Westernized knowers of Asia, it was vulnerable to this critique.

Such "residues" as exist are under constant challenge in curriculum writing as a new Australian imagery evolves, Australia itself construed as an Asian nation. Asia literacy is a shared goal of all main political parties and although there are conservative and Labour nuances that render it different for each, it will long remain a stimulating force in Australian language and literacy.

Meanwhile multiculturalism, renamed productive diversity to insert itself into the economics discourse that presently frames public policy; the economy that elevates a rationality of choice and scarcity that is the mainstay of "Homo Economicus," also nourishes justifications for language policy at the federal and state levels. These two forces, Asia literacy and productive diversity, are beginning to co-occur in government documentation; possibly signaling a convergence of two previously dichotomous discourses. Both, however, are infused by a metadiscourse of micro-economic transformation in which the imperatives of labor market reform dictate the nature and pace of language and literacy policy formulation.

**BRITAIN'S EUROPE, AUSTRALIA'S ASIA, AMERICA'S AMERICAS**

Regionalism may be either a transitional phase stepping toward globalization or a more stable settlement in the process of internationalization that characterizes the world. Either way, it has been a powerful force in each of the countries, although in radically different ways.

The passing of the nation-state and the emergence of "a borderless world" (Ohmae, 1990) is commonly asserted nowadays. But if regionalism is one of its consequences, nations, even English-speaking nations, experience and construe it differently. Britain's reluctant Europeanism contrasts with Australia's enthusiastic Asianism, and America's "ordeal of hegemony" (Poitrass, 1990) in the Americas. Language and literacy policies have become one key site where the cultural consequences of regionalism and globalization are played out.

Unlike the other national languages of Europe for which purificationism produced national academies. English's codification, standardization, and cultivation came about via more informal processes of dictionary production. However, the globalization of English has engendered in Britain social and "racial-national" varieties of English that challenge the dualism that accepts Standard and British regional; in the United States, immigration and the extension of civil rights principles to linguistic minorities have impelled a movement to construe English as the nation-unifying shared inheritance; and in Australia, Australian English is asserted at home to mark distinctiveness but international forms of English are commodified and marketed for sale into the Asian region.
Australia's literacy goals involve reading and functioning competently in Asia, a territorial principle long ignored now entering into problematical and challenging relation with domestic accommodations to pluralisms; indigenous, immigrant, and settler.

The British territorial principle can offer space to Welsh and Scots Gaelic within devolved administrative arrangements of state. Welsh within Wales seems to authorize English within England. It makes the position of minority languages whose territorial origins are not British more tenuous. Britain's progressive integration into Europe has led to a prioritization of official European languages over domestic multilingualism.

America's officializers sought first to name American as the nation's tongue, when British was "the other." The impact on them of successful claims by minorities has been to de jure recognition of English's de facto status. The law is the arena where limited minority linguistic rights made progress and where official English intends to intercede. In the United States, the new "other" is Spanish, 22 proximal nations, and contiguous borders. When President Clinton addressed the Florida meeting of the Organization of American States in late 1995 he used the politicians' classical urging; wanting delegates to move from words to deeds, he asked them to "hacer hechos de los dichos."

Regionalism, like its wider globalizing impetus, 'surfaces conflicts of the nation as state when such nations do not accommodate constructively to plural citizenship. Plural citizenry is the local mirror of the interconnected globe. Double standards for bilingualism in such contexts are ultimately untenable.

REFERENCES


