The Empowerment of the Slum Inhabitant as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: the Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011

KITAPATR DHBHALABUTR

Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2017

Melbourne School of Design

Faculty of Architecture, Building and Planning

The University of Melbourne
ABSTRACT

The thesis investigates the way in which slum dwellers become ‘Primary Housing Agent’ through the practice of slum upgrade programs. Thai low-income housing development in the period from 1980 to 2011 has been formulated in the context of contradiction rather than coherence of vision, agency, and practice. Importantly there is an embedded history of the slum inhabitant’s role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ at the local, national, and international terrain. However, there are gaps in knowledge in the inexplicit linkages across the three major components of the slum upgrading project, empowerment practices, and the slum inhabitant’s role. Empowerment theory is utilised as the research theoretical framework to analyse and connect the components together to explicitly articulate the slum inhabitant’s role.

The case study method is employed to examine two key cross-sections in time represented by two projects, Sengki and Tawanmai, which reflect the best practices of Thai slum upgrading and its substantial transformation in housing the slum dweller. The thesis argues that over four decades, the gradual up-scaling of empowerment practices led to the transformation process of the slum inhabitant as the Primary Housing Agent. This, in turn, led to changes in government agencies, who have been engaged with the process, and their practices. The thesis finds that the narratives of change manifest in the multi-scalar Primary Housing Agent statuses of the slum inhabitants as they experienced the long decades of evolution and transformation in the period that spans the developments of Sengki and Tawanmai communities.
DECLARATION

This is to certify that this thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all material used. The thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, references, and appendix.

Kitapatr Dhabhalabutr

October 2017
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my thesis supervisors; Dr. Sidh Sintusingha (principal supervisor) and Prof. Catherin Bull (co-supervisor). They consistently conveyed a spirit of adventure in regards to research and teaching. Dr. Sidh, in particular, strongly supported me to achieve my academic goal. He performed multiple roles as supervisor, brother and friend with his patience and enthusiasm in every step of my academic journey at ABP University of Melbourne. Without his guidance and persistence, this thesis would not have been possible.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you the thesis committee chair and members, Prof. Ross King, Prof. Hannah Lewi, Dr. Ajibade Aibinu and Dr. Hao Wu who shared their expertise, gave invaluable suggestions and diversified approaches toward the thesis.

Thank you very much Somchit Terrell and Richard Bajraszewski for providing reading materials and suggestion for writing improvement. I would also like to forward my gratitude to RHD staff and RHD friends for their innumerable discussions over coffee and wine.

I would like to mention three important organizations, the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) Thailand, Khon Kaen University (KKU) and ABP University of Melbourne who provided scholarship support, tuition fee waiver, and time allowance.

In addition, a sincere thank you to the local residents of the case study communities, the national and local organizations, and relevant participants for their contributions to the research.

Finally, I would like to specially thank my family; Dad, Mom, New, Nat, Proud and friends in Thailand who are always by my side and lend me support anytime I am in need.
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GLOSSARY

B
- BMA stands for the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority
- BMK (Baan Mankong) stands for Secured Housing program
- BUA (Baan Ur Arthon) stands for We Care Housing program
- Bangkok Phenomenon is term defined by Keivani and Werna (2001:201). It represents the highly growth of housing industry in Bangkok between 1980 and mid 1990s

C
- CBO stands for Community Based Organization
- CCO stands for the Council of Community Organization that support by the UCDO
- CDF stands for City Development Fund
- Chao Chumchon Baan Mankong Prachar Samakee is redefinition of community under BMK program. They recognized themselves as BMK community member, not slum community anymore
- CHHSS stands for the Centre for Housing and Human Settlement Studies is research centre under NHA administration
- Chum Chon Air At means Crowded Community. This is new official term approved by the cabinet in 1982 that replacing term ‘slum community’
- CODI stands for the Community Organization Development Institute, national housing organization that sponsors and organizes BMK program
- CPB stands for the Crown Property Bureau, public landlord
- CSD stands for the Centre of Slum Development, informal slum organization established since 1986 now transformed into FRSN

F
- FRSN stands for the Four Region Slum Network, nationwide network of slum organization
• Fueang Nakhon is the policy of city beautification under NHA supervisor that aimed at upgrade the properly physical environment of informal settlements

G
• GHB stands for the Government Housing Bank

H
• HSFT stands for the Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, Thai NGOs

I
• ITV stands for Independent Television. Currently ITV renames to TPBS (Thai Public Broadcast Station)

K
• The Khon Kaen Ruam Pattana Cooperative is an official name of Tawanmai housing cooperative office
• The Kere Kai Saha Chumchon or Union of Community Network (UCN) is local community network under Khon Kaen Municipality’s patronage
• Kere Kai Feunfu Pracha Sangsan or Network of People in Creative Restoration (NPCR) is slum network under the supervised of Four Region Slum Network
• KKM stands for the Khon Kaen Municipality
• KKU stands for the Khon Kaen University

L
• LOCOA stands for the Leader and Organization of Community Organization in Asia, international NGOs

N
• NESDP stands for National Economic and Social Development Plan
• NHA stands for the National Housing Authority of Thailand that organizes BUA program
• NULICO stands for the National Union of Low-Income Community Organization, the nationwide network of BMK community member

S
• SHC stands for the Sengki Housing Cooperative Office
• SRT stands for the State Railway of Thailand, public landlord
T

- Thai Kem Kaeng or Vigorously Thai is the former Prime minister Abhisit’s government policy between 2010 and 2012
- Turn-key housing means the provision of completed construction and decoration housing units where the buyers count ‘turn the key’ and ready to move in

U

- UCDO stands for the Urban Community Development Organization, national housing organization is later transformed into CODI
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Low-income households have been a target of national housing policy since 1960. Leading housing agents dealing with slum housing have been changing across the times but the contribution of slum inhabitants as active agents have not been explicitly found in the formal record. In the year 2000, the Thai government formed CODI, and three years later CODI launched a mega housing project in 2003, the Baan Man Kong program or BMK, to secure 300,000 units within 5 years. BMK is an informal settlement upgrading program that attempts to bring land tenure security to slum households across 200 Thai cities. The innovation of BMK is to promote slum community organization and their local networks as being a primary housing agent. This was the first time government officially credited slum inhabitants as legitimate agents of formal housing provisions. By the year 2008, the UN ESCAP recognized the BMK program as being one of best Asian practices for low-income housing development. This is the broad narrative of change in national housing development that has been found in the formal record.

According to the literature survey before the year 2000, there is no comprehensive study of the slum inhabitants’ role in low-income housing development in the formal records. Considerable numbers of archival resources have mainly credited government agencies as the active parties and slum dwellers as the passive recipients of state housing provision. The vast majority of the literature often emphasizes dramatic descriptions of slum inhabitants that involved slum eviction, human rights and the lack of opportunities (Yap, 2010; Boonyabancha, 2010, Uancharoenkul, 2009; NHA, 2009; Malai, 2005; CODI; 2004; Lapanun et al, 1998). Investigating the relationship between slum inhabitant roles and upgrading projects, these attempts have been approached from the expert’s perspective rather than that of the slum inhabitants (Archer, 2010; Yap and Wandeler, 2010; Viratkapan and Perera, 2006; Usavagovitwong and Postriparsert, 2006; CODI, 2005; Sapu, 2005; Savant-Mohit, 2004; Boonyabancha, 2005; Ockey, 1997). The studies do not go beyond the expert practices, project assessment and the effectiveness of project implementation. Furthermore, formal records rarely address the connection between present and previous slum upgrading programs, in particularly the period from 1980 to post-2000. The thesis argues that the formal record of Thai low-income housing development has not been well documented and is fragmentary. The study’s relevance to slum inhabitants is to contribute information about their dwellings and confirm the fact that their community environment is scarce.

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In fact, informal records provide evidences that slum inhabitants play a crucial role in low-income housing developments. There are many adaptive and active roles of slum inhabitants as the 'primary housing agent' throughout the variety of slum upgrading projects such as in the formation of informal community organizations, local networks and forced eviction resistance. By the year 1980, for example, innovative slum upgrading occurred at the Sengki community by local residents and government partners. The emergence of the Four Region Slum Network (FRSN) in 1998 was formed by slum communities across the country without government support. By the year 2009, over 80,000 BMK households have established the National Union Low-Income Community Organization (NULICO) as an independent low-income network. These selected experiences attest to the proactive role of slum inhabitants from the local to the national level. Unfortunately, these incidences have not been explicitly recognized by officials. Ignoring the slum inhabitant's role as the primary housing agent of low-income housing development prior to the BMK program invites research inquiry.

According to the historical review, the thesis argues that the period of Thai low-income housing development between 1980 and 2011 has been significantly formulated and developed in the context of contradiction rather than coherence of the vision, in particular between formal and informal housing provisions. Importantly, this period has been embedded in a long history of slum inhabitant's role as the primary housing agent at the local and national level. Next, without the knowledge of how slum inhabitant roles have responded to formal housing provisions over time, the recent arrival of the slum inhabitant as a primary housing agent of the BMK program seems to have suddenly emerged. It is clear that the nexus between formal and informal housing provisions has not been adequately studied.

The thesis addresses two knowledge gaps that have been found in the formal record of Thailand's housing development. Firstly, the slum inhabitant's role of being a 'primary housing agent' of the slum upgrading program is absent or undocumented. Secondly, there is a disconnection between formal and informal housing provisions.

1.1 Research Aims and Scope
The purpose of the study is to examine the slum inhabitant's role and impact upon Thai low-income housing development. This is divided into three aims;

2 Newspaper clippings, documents, and electronic materials which were produced by NGOs, especially the FRSN and alliances such as HSFT, NULICO, LOCOA, COPA, the assembly of the Poor and Prachathai.com

3 The FRSN claimed to be an independent slum inhabitant organization that championed the slum housing agenda at the national level, in particularly the subject on the issues of housing rights, quality of rights and social justice.
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1. To determine the connection between slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices in Thailand low-income housing evolution. The thesis utilized these three components as the framework to understand the slum inhabitant’s evolving role.

2. To investigate the evolving role of the slum dweller as the primary housing agent in Thailand across three decades from 1980 to 2011

3. To articulate the evolving process of the Thai’ slum inhabitant in becoming the primary housing agent of slum upgrading projects

The time frame is from 1980 when the first case study was implemented in Thailand and the year 2011, which represents the time the researcher conducted fieldwork at Tawanmai community, Khon Kaen, Thailand.

1.2 Research Questions

The research attempts to better understand the nexus between empowerment practices, slum upgrading projects and the roles of slum inhabitants. The relationship between these three key components leads to the formation of the research questions, which comprise of one main question and two sub-questions.

The main research question is, ‘How did empowerment practices in the slum upgrading projects assist the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘primary housing agent’ of Thai low-income housing development?’ The main research question investigates the dynamic process of the slum inhabitants’ role and intervention in slum upgrading programs in particular contexts and times.

Two sub-questions address the transformation process of slum inhabitants as the primary housing agent from the past to the present. They comprised of; firstly, ‘How were slum inhabitants previously active as the primary housing agent between 1980 and 2000?’

The second sub-question is ‘What are the slum inhabitant’s current roles as the primary housing agent, 2000 to 2011?’

The year 2000 is marked by the commencement of the CODI, the government agency that administered the BMK program, the historical milestone of change in Thai formal housing provision and slum informal housing provision regarding the introduction of the large scale collaborative network connecting the two. This new vision encouraged a growing number of slum inhabitants to become involved in national housing policies.
1.3 Research Theoretical Framework

The research theoretical framework consists of three key, interrelated components: the role of slum inhabitants, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices. The thesis focuses on the evolving role of housing agents, including the slum inhabitants and government agencies as project stakeholders. The thesis posits that the agency roles have evolved and transformed through the practices of slum upgrading. Empowerment practices have been embedded in the slum upgrading process and significantly contributed to the events that enhanced the slum inhabitant roles as the primary housing agent. In the thesis, it is argued that empowerment practice and process provide the most relevant theoretical and practical framework to explain the PHA transformation process in the practice of slum upgrading. Importantly, it also explains the process of expansion in collective action of powerless groups to influence external conditions of the political, economic and social structures as part of institutional empowerment.

1.4 Research Significance

As noted above, the slum inhabitant have been absent in the official record as primary housing agents. Hence, the thesis attempts to fill the significant gap in knowledge by addressing their evolving role through the practices of empowerment. The revision and the impacts of the slum inhabitant roles on the local and national levels will provide an alternative dimension of Thai low-income housing history. Findings from the thesis will contribute to enhance and improve the relationship between slum inhabitants and other formal development agencies. The findings can also contribute to the development of alternative housing guideline for policy makers, practitioners and stakeholders in engaging with the slum inhabitant.

‘Primary Housing Agent’ means the group of slum inhabitants with various organization forms and scales, having the capacity to influence change over two levels of Thai housing provision; the policy level and operational level. They are the primary actor at the centre of their own slum upgrading program, rather than beneficiaries of external agencies.

The significance of slum inhabitants being ‘Primary Housing Agent’ is officially recognised by relevant Thai and international housing agencies, from the Thai government to UN Habitat. Having been previously ignored, they are now the primary actor at the centre of their own slum upgrading program in Thailand. Being ‘Primary Housing Agent’, slum inhabitants play the leading role in influencing two levels of Thai housing provision, policy and operational level. Primary Housing Agents hold the power
of how projects are formulated, how decision making powers are made, how all relevant resources
are distributed. And importantly, they advocate for change in the government’s housing policy.

1.5 Structure of Thesis

This thesis consists of eight chapters, organized into three major parts. Part one is an introduction
and literature review. Part two is the research design, and part three is a discussion and conclusion.

Part I: Introduction and Literature Review

Chapter 1 Introduction

The first chapter provides the outline of the thesis. Discussed are the research aims and scope, the
research significance and the research framework. A main research question and two sub-research
questions are raised. Empowerment theories provide the analytical framework to address the main
research question on the transformation of slum inhabitants over time. The two research sub-
questions explore the slum inhabitants’ active roles through practices of slum upgrading before and
after the year 2000, marked by the inauguration of CODI.

Chapter 2 Evolution of Empowerment and the Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches in
International Housing Development

The second chapter reviews the evolution of low-income housing at the international scale and
provides the broad background of the thesis. Presented are the evolution of housing and the
relationship between top-down and bottom-up approaches. In particular the research focuses on the
interaction between international and Thai government agencies by examining the implementation of
international housing programs in Thailand. While there are many leading agencies and forms of low-
income housing provision around the world, the literature review principally covers only the agents
and policies that directly influenced Thai low-income housing development.

In two sub-sections, Chapter 2 encompasses a timeframe from 1940 up to post-2000.

Section 2.1 reviews international agencies’ housing development concepts and practices, namely:

- Political based housing development: UK and US
- Social based housing development: UN
- Economic based housing development: World Bank
- Socio-economic based housing development: UN and World Bank

Sub-section 2.2 discusses the top-down and bottom-up approaches of International agencies
and the Thai government, namely:

- Top-down approach: Public housing
- Bottom-up approach: Self-help
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Introduction

- Enable market housing and integrated top-down and bottom-up approach

The housing delivery approach gradually changed from a single to an integrated approach. Any single approach cannot stand alone and it is now recognized that the integrated approach, that addresses both social and economic objectives and is customized to particular contexts, is most effective in housing delivery. The thesis adopts the integrated socio-economic housing development approach as the background framework to review slum upgrading practice in Thailand, presented in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 Thai Low-income Housing Development

This chapter narrows down to survey low-income housing development in Thailand over the past seven decades, since late 1940 to post-2000. With the aim of formulating a framework, the thesis reviews past and present efforts of formal and informal housing provisions to meet the needs of urban slum households. The chapter pays special attention to the evolution of the relationship between formal and informal agents which shifted from conflicts to partnerships in urban slum poverty alleviation. In addition, key terms and concepts are defined in the discussion to determine the thesis framework as well as the rationale for case study selection. The literature review chapter is comprised of four parts:

3.1 Background of slum phenomenon in Thailand
   - Formation of slum settlements
   - Slum settlements and slum inhabitant characteristics

3.2 Thai housing provision
   3.2.1 Formal housing provision
      - Government agency: Public housing
      - Government agency and international organizations: Self-help
      - Government agency and private sector: Enablement Market
   3.2.2 Informal housing provision
      - NGOs and slum networks: political reform over urban land policy

3.3 Formal vs. informal slum housing provisions
3.4 Research gap identification

Part II: Research Design and Findings

Chapter 4 Research Design

Chapter 4 outlines the design of research methods and the procedures of analysing and collecting data during the fieldwork. The research design chapter is discussed in four parts.
The first part of the Chapter restates the research questions that query the link between the key components of slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices. Building on the previous literature review chapters, the second section further defines key terms and concepts of the thesis arising from the research questions. It describes the research theoretical framework that consists of research terminologies and empowerment theories. Empowerment theories and practices are identified as the links between the three key components and are utilized to articulate the narrative of change in the slum inhabitant’s role as ‘primary housing agent’.

The third part is the research design that consists of two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses research methods and tools. The thesis employs qualitative research methodology and adopts a case study approach as the major method of data gathering. This section defines how the data was collected, analyzed and structured. The main approach of data gathering and analysis is bottom-up in order to cross-check with the top-down recorded data of the formal housing agents. Various types of data to evidence the dynamic role of slum inhabitants are collected using five methods of data gathering which comprise of pilot study, archival study, in-depth interviews, questionnaires and visual recordings (photographic and audio). The second sub-section discusses the case study approach and provides the background of case study selection such as the list of alternative case studies, the selection process and the selection criteria. The final part discusses the application of research methods in the fieldwork in each case community and the limitations of research and the fieldwork. The research framework was revised accordingly.

**Chapter 5 Sengki Community Land-sharing**

This chapter presents the research finding from fieldwork in the Sengki community, while Chapter 6 presents findings from the Tawanmai community under the BMK program. The chapters emphasize the link between the two major case studies that represent their social conditions of the times, rather than comparisons between them.

Chapter 5 reveals the way in which the slum inhabitant previously performed the role of ‘primary housing agent’ and uncovers the evolving role of slum inhabitants in the Sengki community that have conducted land-sharing project since 1980. Addressing the research question, there are two major objectives for the investigation of this case study. Firstly, the chapter investigates the early link between the three components and its impact on the expansion in role and status of the slum inhabitant. Secondly, this chapter investigates how the particular aspect of empowerment reinforced the role of the slum inhabitant.

Chapter 5 starts by introducing the community background and the problem of illegal land occupation. Then the chapter discusses the various practices of empowerment to overcome the problem that
emerged along with the land-sharing process such as democratization, community participation and Community Based Organizations (CBOs). The subsection discusses empowerment through the evolving roles of: the individual slum communities socially, economically and politically; the slum network; and the stakeholders.

Chapter 5 reveals three significant findings: Firstly, the empowerment based economy played an important role in promoting the Sengki dweller to become the primary housing agent of the Sengki land-sharing project and this process resulted in the up-scaling of resident status from ‘collective slum community organization’ to ‘government-community organization partnership’. Secondly, there are three key elements of the Sengki land-sharing achievement: the significant slum inhabitant roles; the completed land sharing and housing project; and the empowerment of the slum individual and community. Sengki is a pilot project where these three elements clearly emerged as interrelated factors. These linkages and practices later provided the foundation for a broader national low-cost housing program. The primary objective of the Sengki land-sharing scheme was land tenure security. This was achieved and also raised the importance of the low-cost housing problems at the national level such as in policy, regulation and institutional reform. The third finding is the government agencies’ transformation in role and structure. Government agencies changed in their role from the leading housing agent to a partner of housing development, the facilitator and the middle party. The process also resulted in structural changes of government agencies, in particular, the transformation of the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO).

Chapter 6 Tawanmai Community (TWM/BMK)
Addressing the second sub-research question, Chapter 6 investigates the role of slum dwellers as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ from 2000-2011. There are two significant objectives to investigate the Tawanmai (TWM) case community. Firstly, this chapter articulates the explicit connection between the three components and links it back to the Sengki land-sharing project. Secondly, the chapter discusses how empowerment practices influenced the expansion in role of slum inhabitants from the local to the national level.

Chapter 6 utilizes the same structure as Chapter 5 to illustrate the evolution of slum inhabitant roles across time from 2000 to 2011. This chapter focuses particularly on the implementation of the BMK program that provides the bridge between the socio-economic and political empowerment approaches. The chapter discusses the role of socio-economic empowerment in enabling Tawanmai resident capacity during the period of BMK upgrading. In the post-upgrading period, the thesis focuses on the political empowerment in the formation of nationwide slum networks and institutional reform.
Chapter 6 reveals four evident developments. Firstly, socio-economic empowerment and political empowerment played significant roles in enhancing Tawanmai dwellers to become the primary housing agent of the TWM/BMK project and this process resulted in the up-scaling of the dweller status from 'collective slum community organization' to 'slum citywide network'. The TWM/BMK demonstrates the up-scaling of the slum inhabitant role from socio-economic empowerment to political empowerment, which CODI did not initially anticipate. Secondly, the chapter confirmed that the key element of TWM/BMK success is the link between the slum inhabitant role, the upgrading project and the application of empowerment practices. The TWM/BMK is rooted in and builds upon the three decades of experience of the government-community organization partnership since the practice of the Sengki land-sharing project. Thirdly, the TWM/BMK demonstrates two different approaches of empowerment endorsed by the government and NGOs. While formal housing provision applies social and economic empowerment as the main approach of the slum upgrading program, informal housing provision alternatively promotes political empowerment. Lastly, the TWM/BMK attests to the change in government agency role and structure and it is not only the slum dwellers who are being transformed, but government agencies as stakeholders have also been transformed through this process. The TWM/BMK case reveals that the government has been changing their role from the partnership actor of slum community organization to facilitator, middle party, sponsor and a member of the institutional citywide network.

Part III: Research Discussion and Conclusion

Chapter 7 Research Discussion

Chapter 7 discusses findings from fieldwork (Chapter 5 and 6) through the analytical framework of empowerment theories (Chapter 4). The analysis describes the evolution of the slum inhabitant's role that responds to the main question and the two research sub-questions that were formulated in the introduction (Chapter 1). The discussion chapter consists of five parts that are structured to respond to the research questions.

- The first section answers the main research question. The research argues that slum inhabitants became the ‘primary housing agent’ of Thai low-income housing due to the contribution of incremental ‘scaling up’ of empowerment practices from economic to socio-economic integration and political approaches. In other words, the empowerment approach has evolved from single factors to integrated objectives. In particular, the process has ‘up-scaled’ toward political empowerment in post-2000. The process resulted in the evolution of the slum inhabitant’s role from the ‘primary housing agent of technical and management’ toward the ‘primary housing agent of political development’.
The second section responds to the sub-questions of how the slum inhabitants performed as ‘primary housing agents’ between 1980 and 2011. This section portrays the expanding roles and scales of slum inhabitants in two phases; 1980-2000 (Sengki) and 2000-2011 (BMK and post-BMK). The research argues that through three decades, slum inhabitants have been active as a ‘primary housing agent’ since the Sengki land-sharing project until the present. The evolving role from past to present is an incremental process from collective slum community organization toward a citywide network. At the conclusion of fieldwork in 2011, the research argues that only a group of slum inhabitants have achieved a multi-scaler ‘primary housing agent’ status because they have experience from decades of the transformation process that the research articulated from Sengki to TWM/BMK to NULICO/post-BMK. The evolving role can be seen through the multi-scaler nature of the primary housing, from collective community organizations to citywide networks. Nevertheless, the thesis argues that those statuses illustrate more than just the way slum inhabitants achieve their long-term tenure security. Rather they can be seen as indicators presenting the varying degree of effectiveness of the self-governance of low-income people at different levels. The more varied and multi-scaler the slum inhabitants engage and participate in, the better the level of slum inhabitant empowerment.

The third section discusses state agency transformation in terms of roles and structural changes that are a consequence of their engagement with this process. The thesis argues that there are two significant transformations of the government agency. The first change is institutional reform of top-down planning towards more bottom-up approaches. The change has been evident through the reform of laws, regulations and institutions. The second change is in the government role that withdraws from direct intervention to indirect involvement through middle parties and facilitators. The thesis argues that the changes also tell the story of increased democratic values among marginal slum inhabitants as well as active citizens.

The fourth section identifies the relationship between Thai slum inhabitant role and Thai political decentralization. Over four decades, the empowerment practice in two slum upgrading projects highlights an essential component of state-civil society relationship reform which is the decentralization of decision making power that required the coordination between two approaches; reducing the state power and increasing civil society power. The thesis observes that the up-scale in status of slum Inhabitants as PHA reflects the progress of Thai political decentralization, from top-down to bottom-up approaches.
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Introduction

In the last section, the thesis presents the process of social power transformation into political power from the case studies. In particular, the two case studies exemplify transformation process of social power into political power at two levels, community and nationwide. At the community level, slum inhabitants strengthened their individual and collective social power as a platform to enhance their collective political power by increasing levels of political exercises associated with the empowerment practice.

Political exercises enabled the local people to participate effectively in decision making power and interact with their local organizations. At the national scale, networking played a vital role in upscaling the empowerment process from communitywide into countrywide through the extension of the slum community capacity and the supportive opportunity structure. The emergence of slum citywide network brings about the critical change in the way that social power transforms into political power because the slum community organization actively expanded at a large and, significantly, interconnected scale across the country and not only in single or a few locations. In the Thai case, the thesis argues that the balance between collective power and network shifted to the transformation process due to the openness of opportunity structure.

Chapter 8 Conclusion

The thesis articulates the evolution of the Thai slum inhabitant role as a primary housing agent in the practice of slum upgrading projects and addresses its absence from formal records. The story also reveals the link between three key components never explicitly found in the formal record of Thai low-income housing practice between 1980 and 2011. The research applied empowerment theories as the framework to connect between two key slum upgrading projects at different times to reveal the Thai slum inhabitant transformation process socially, economically and politically.

Chapter 8 consists of three sections. The first section highlights the unique research findings, restates the research contribution and significance. The next section speculates the research contribution to knowledge. The thesis proposes an alternative political empowerment framework to the Thai government, local state organization, and relevant development agency. The fundamental idea of the framework is direct participation. To refine the empowerment practice, the thesis proposes a framework to promote citywide network in policy formation which consists of four stages; Community information database, Community alternatives, Community influenced decision making power, and Local oriented policy. Furthermore, the second section also describes slum movement momentum since 2011 to 2016. Lastly, suggestions and considerations for future studies are presented.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
International Low-income Housing Development Impacts on Thai practice

Introduction
This chapter reviews the evolution of low-income housing on an international scale that provides a broad background for the thesis. In particular the literature review pays attention to the implementation of housing programs by international agencies and local practices by the Thai government. While there are many leading agencies and forms of low-income housing provision around the world, the literature review principally covers only agents and policies that have directly influenced Thai low-income housing development.

Chapter 2 reviews low-income housing history as far as back as the 1940s for two major reasons. Firstly, this period can be marked as a turning point in international housing history due to the post-World War II global and Thai housing shortage. Secondly, many countries, including Thailand, made their first attempt to develop policy with respect to housing (Harris, 2003; Harris and Giles, 2003). Policy makers recognized housing as a mechanism of urban development to restore devastated cities in Asia and Europe (Takahashi, 2009:67). This chapter contains three main sections consisting of the evolution of empowerment and the relationship between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The background of the research framework is proposed in the last section.

2.1 International Agencies Practices: from polarized to integrated approaches
This chapter examines the evolution of empowerment through the provision of low-cost housing by different global agencies over time, since 1940s to post 2000. This section outlines four approaches of empowerment across the practice of four major global agencies. They are political based empowerment, social based empowerment, economic based empowerment and socio-economic based empowerment respectively.

Since the early period of post-World War II, several countries faced a housing shortage crisis due to the destruction of war (Harris and Giles, 2003:167). Accordingly, housing development had gained significance within the public domain as a strategy to restore and strengthen urban prosperity. National housing policy was not independently initiated and implemented by individual countries and was greatly influenced by international organizations. By the 1940s, there were two leading
governments, Great Britain (UK), The United States of America (US), and one international organization, The United Nations (UN), entering the global housing stage. They had different development objectives as a strategy of promoting housing development depending on geographical division (Harris and Giles, 2003:164).

2.1.1 Political based Housing Development: UK and US
Since the late 1940s, International agencies recognized that poor quality housing and housing shortages could lead to political conflict underpinned by the polarization between capitalist and communist political doctrines. The UK’s attempts to improve housing conditions were a means of ensuring political stability in her colonial governments (Harris and Giles, 2003:170). By the 1940s, the British government began to influence the housing policy agenda of their colonies in the West Indies, Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia¹ and aimed at improving housing conditions in both urban and suburban regions (UK Central Office of Information, 1965:13-14). The critical pairing of housing strategies through the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) coupled with The UK Colonial Office (1943) played an important role to distribute wide ranging assistance for many housing categories and nurtured a network of colonies through conditional grants, housing loans and policy guidelines. Over the next decade, the Colonial Office was transferred to The Ministry of Overseas Development which focused more on technical assistance. By the mid-1960s, the colonial empire had declined and the responsibility for promoting housing policy had gradually changed. The UK passed over colonial governments to the UN and continued to provide housing support to former colonies through collaborative projects with the UN rather than direct intervention (Harris and Giles, 2003:172).

As the Cold war emerged, the US realized that better housing could assist secure alliances and guarantee political stability and began to take a leading role in housing development. In 1947, the US launched the International Housing Office (IHO) and the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) which were housing advisory and coordination offices between the US and international agencies (Harris, 1997). Over the next decade, the US continuously developed a broad ranging network both in the US and internationally in the housing field (Glick, 1957:40, US HHFA, 1951:100). Many professional organizations were established between 1950s and early 1960s including the Technical Cooperation Administration (1950), the Foreign Assistance Administration (1954), the Inter-American Development Bank or IADB (1959), the International Cooperation Administration (1960) and lastly the Agency for International Development or USAID (1961). As a result, the US became more active as an international housing agent than the UK.

¹ Singapore and Malaysia were mainly supported by the British, while the majority of Southeast Asia Countries were allied with the US.
The US promoted low-cost housing construction as one of twelve objectives in ‘The 1959 Alliance for Progress’, while the UK oversaw the overall housing categories. Recognition of low-cost housing development in the developing countries became more important under US leadership with pioneer projects undertaken in Latin America where countries faced battle against communist influence (Steeter, 1999 in Harris and Giles, 2003:169). The US also extended its geo-political influence throughout Africa and Asia (Harris and Giles, 2003:169).

Global low-cost housing development programs led to housing guidelines, technical support and housing development funds (Rist, 1997). A variety of assistance has been provided through many collaborative projects such as ‘The Alliance for Progress’ for Latin America which was subsidised by the IADB and Pan-American Union (PAU) (Gordon, 1963:122, Herrera, 1963). While the US government played an important role in housing development, many international NGOs organizations increased their roles in national housing policy including the Ford Foundation and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

The historical review suggests that despite improvements in mitigating housing shortages and housing conditions after the destruction of World War II, global housing development gradually evolved into political based empowerment since the entry of the UK and the US. Housing development has grown significantly as a policy to improve the living condition of individual countries and to secure political stability between national governments and international agencies. Consequently, increasing preoccupation with housing provision to support political stability placed the US as the leading international housing agency between during the 1950s and early 1960s.

2.1.2 Social based Housing Development: UN
While the US perceived housing as political-based development against communism’s political influence, in contrast the UN established its credibility as a global force for social based development\(^2\). By the early 1950s, the UN took interest in low-cost housing but was more concerned

\(^2\) Social base development has been increasingly emphasised through the practice of community managed savings groups. The approach increases slum inhabitants’ access to productive assets such as information, body of knowledge and skills, participation in social organizations, and financial resources which, in turn, increases their ability to achieve goals. Social based development is integrated empowerment that encompasses social capital to encourage people to act collectively in managing resource to satisfy communal priorities and goals. Social base development manifests in the formation of community organizations such as community networks, institutions and savings groups.
with study rather than taking action in local settings (Harris and Giles, 2003:171). A decade later, the UN was more active in low-cost housing through cooperation with regional commissions such as ILO, UNICEF, UNDP, and WHO. By the late 1960s, ‘The Centre of Housing Building and Planning’ was established at the UN headquarters (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1965) which launched pilot projects to improve low-cost housing productivity in building industries. The UN geographically distributed agencies in Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia including Thailand (ILO, 1961) and hosted visitors from those countries for vocational trainings. The implication of the UN social based housing development demonstrates their active role and, as a result, the UN slowly increased its prominent role in the international housing arena.

Although the goals for housing development between the UK, the US, and the UN were different they had a common perspective which manifested itself in international collaborative programs for housing low-income households. They maintained a close dialogue and a pool of experts (Harris and Giles, 2003:170) which was why these major global housing organizations promoted a similar low-cost housing agenda to developing countries and avoided treading on each other’s geographical influence.

The UN gained the benefits of housing expertise by positioning itself as an official forum of the UK, the US, and other global housing agencies. As a result, the UN became the network coordinator of the western housing specialist and resource pooling (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1971:173). Due to the UN endorsement, individual agencies were drawn to the global partnership of low-cost housing development (UK Colonial Office, 1953; Weissman, 1959 in Harris and Giles, 2003:172). Many low-cost housing development projects were implemented through the network of multi-sectorial stakeholders, for example; The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was collaboration between the US, the UK, France and the Netherlands (US Senate, 1962:54) while the Economic Commission for Africa was a partnership between the US and the UN (Weissman, 1978:232). As the extent of low-cost housing cooperation had become more visible, the emergence of new housing approaches and new agents were introduced onto the global housing stage. Within this shift, the UK and the US influence over national housing policy gradually declined and since the 1960s, the UN had become the single player influencing global housing policy based on the international organizations collaboration approach.

Soon after the 1970s, the World Bank became involved in the global housing field. The Bank was introduced to provide loans for housing projects that the UN had endorsed in many countries in Africa,

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3 The arrival of new low-cost housing agencies and new low-cost housing provisions are describing in the section 2.1.3
South America and Asia (Harris and Giles, 2001 in Giles, 2003:229). Between 1972 and 1981, about 90% of the Bank’s shelter lending went to self-help projects under UN recommendation (Arnott, 2008:24). Significantly, the entry of the World Bank restructured the UN’s role from the single predominant agent of international housing to become part of a collaborative alliance. The UN continued as the leading international agency as a policy initiator (Giles, 2003:229), while the World Bank was the most influential international sponsor of low-cost housing development (Pugh, 1988:62).

### 2.1.3 Economic based Development: World Bank

Economic based development gained increasing significance within policy arenas in the public domain at two levels. At the international level, by the early 1970s there was a significance change in global housing development with the entry of the World Bank, which became active in the low-cost housing and provided various types of funding to self-help projects. However, self-help based individual project development was affected by the problems of low-production, invisible changes in national policy, and high costs in several funding recipient countries (Cohen, 1983:29). During the 1980s, the World Bank considered withdrawing from direct involvement with self-help housing after the evaluation research indicated that 55% of the World Bank shelter programme had experienced moderate difficulties while 7% was facing serious problems that include and relate to land acquisition, cost recovery and project management (Pugh, 1988:405; Arnott, 2008:24). To solve those problems, the Bank shifted its approach on to economic oriented rather than social based development and the Bank’s lending progressively moved away from self-help toward assisting housing financial institutions (Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995:71-72). The evolution was soon reflected in the formation of a new housing provision, called market enablement.

The change of housing provision was also influenced by the increased trend in administrative decentralization across the world which led to the withdrawal of central government intervention in housing programs. Accordingly, the policy of market enablement contributed to the authorization of civil society\(^4\) and notably private housing developers, as legitimate partners of enabled market housing policy (Takahashi, 2009:75). The private sector was promoted as the primary housing agent of the World Bank policy because its investment contributed to the rapid growth of affordable housing in the capital housing market much more than other agencies. Significantly, the private housing

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\(^4\) Civil society is the "aggregate of non-governmental organizations and institutions that manifest interests and will of citizens." (www.Dictionary.com, retrieve 5\(^{th}\) April 2016). Civil society includes the family and the private sphere, referred to as the "third sector" of society, distinct from government and business (www.civilsoc.org, retrieve 5\(^{th}\) April 2016).
market also created jobs and absorbed a stream of unskilled rural migrants (Pornchokchai, 2003:13; 2004:33).

Being the biggest financial lending institution, the World Bank was able to advocate for its favoured policy in the conditionality clauses attached to loan agreements with national governments. To make the new approach move forward more productively, the World Bank actively promoted the enabled market policy in several countries in which the UN has been influencing housing developments. In effect, the World Bank’s subsidies made a broad impact in those countries (Pugh, 1997:99-109) and housing provision through market enablement steadily gained wide support in many governments who borrowed from the Bank. The popularity of the innovative housing policy led to the evolving role of the Bank from an international financial sponsor to policy maker who viewed low-income housing as a strategy to reinforce economic growth (Takahashi, 2009:75; Ward and Jones, 1997:172).

At the national level, the primary agent of low-cost housing programs has changed from government agencies to private developers. Withdrawing from direct intervention in low-cost housing production, government agencies assumed the role as facilitators in the state-private relationships (Pugh, 1997:157). The creation of linkages between state agencies and the private sector remains essential in promoting a favorable enabling environment. As Friedman (1992:7) mentioned, without the state’s cooperation, many low-income housing projects cannot be significantly improved. Therefore, the most critical component in the shift of enablement market policy led by the World Bank is the re-orientation in the relationship between the state and the private sector which makes private developers an official primary agent of state housing programs (Takahashi, 2009:77; Keivani and Werna, 2001:192; Pugh, 1997:157). On the other hand, the World Bank excludes the role of slum inhabitants or the informal housing market in the enabled market policy (Keivani and Werna, 2001:192; Baken and Van der Linden, 1993; Jones, 1996; Jones and Ward, 1994, 1995).

2.1.4 Socio-Economic based Development: UN and World Bank
In contrast, the rationale of the UN was social oriented development and integrated housing programs related to different aspects of community development such as land management, social welfare and poverty reduction (UN-HABITAT, 2003:141). Although the low-cost housing units under the self-help policy was affected by low production, it made the UN realize that even the marginalized slum community organization\(^5\) had the capacity to implement self-help housing in their setting and that

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\(^5\) Community organization represents both community-based organizations, operating as civil society non-profits, and also as a function of organizing within communities defined by geographical location, shared work
centralsed institutional structures is the universal barrier of global policy delivery. Hence, the UN requested national government deregulation to enable community organization practices and capacity (UN-HABITAT, 2011:13). The concept of ‘enabling housing market’ requires a fundamental change in the role of local governments from provider to enabler. This is clearly outlined in the UN-Habitat and World Bank’s agenda on global housing strategy. Since then, a variety of community based organizations applied many adaptive programs based on socio-economic development such as savings groups, housing cooperatives and credit unions. The UN claimed that these types of community finance would assist slum inhabitants and their organization to bypass the economic barrier and generate long-term income (UNCHS, 1996).

As discussed above, the two major global housing agencies, the UN and the World Bank, have different approaches toward low-income housing development. In particular their international housing policies were split between two scales, the UN’s project based slum upgrading concepts within a social oriented framework and the World Bank’s institutional based enabled market concept within a market-oriented framework which advocated for larger scale developments through national housing finance.

However, the market enablement approach toward low-cost housing development had been criticized by international scholars. Ward and Jones (1997:172) condemned the World Bank’s policy of enablement that is dominated by a financial supply orientation and minimized the direct production of informal housing by community developers and local residents. The significant point was that market enablement underestimated the scale of informal private markets in developing countries which created jobs and accounted for 37% of total employment (UNCHS, 2001). Similarly, Baken and Van der Linden (1993:12) pointed out that the market enabling strategy was not appropriate in the context of many developing countries because it ignored the role of informal private land markets and developers. Yeh and Laquian, (1979 in Okpala, 1999:1-17) noted that housing development for low-

space, and/or shared experience or concerns (UN Habitat, 2011. Quick Guide 6: Community-based organizations 'Housing the Poor in African Cities', The poor as agents of development. Nairobi: UN-Habitat. P.4)

There are many variations in terms of size and organizational structure. Some are formally incorporated, with a written constitution and a board of directors also known as a committee, while others are much smaller and are more informal (Community Tool Box, 2014:1). The form of community organization in informal settlement upgrading is normally co-operatives and saving group. Community organization is characterized by community planning, community action and mobilization, the promotion of community change and, ultimately, influence within larger systems. (Harvard International Review, 2009:23)
income households is usually not attractive enough for the private sector and the provision for slum households through formal market mechanisms may be the least effective path. Likewise Takahashi (2009:77-78), viewing enabled market provision from the market economic principle, mentioned that the income discrepancies affect housing inequality and allocation. Consequently, slum inhabitants were excluded from formal housing markets. According to these opposing views, for developing economies, the private market enabling policy should not become a policy of total reliance on the formal housing market or the private sector but required the integration of the informal housing sector and low-income community organizations.

Between 1987 and 1990, there were attempts for policy coordination between the UN and the World Bank approaches to resolve the conflicts between the two major agencies that highlighted the need to create partnerships amongst concerned actors to fill the gaps left by the private market (Takahashi, 2009:77; Keivani and Werna, 2001:65; Yeh and Laquian, 1979 in Okpala, 1999:1-17; Baken and Van der Linden, 1993:1-22; Ward and Jones in Arnott, 1997:172; Kirmani, 1988:7-8). Consequently, the UNCHS and the World Bank re-conceptualized enabled market policy to include local community organizations and informal housing input. The 1996 Habitat II Conference in Istanbul report on human settlement states that low-income communities should be supported through the enabling strategy as well as the private market (UNCHS, 1996:338). The integration of private markets plus informal housing market based community organization was identified as the “primary housing delivery mechanism” which formed the backbone of the “Shelter for All” policy of the UN Habitat (UNCHS, 1996). The important point to highlight is that the revision of the enablement market reflects a paradigm shift in international housing evolution. Rather than being viewed as a polarized opposition, the UN Habitat report argued for policy integration and hence, the modes and actors of housing provision have diversified and gone beyond the conventional classifications that divide them into formal and informal.

In summary, the housing development concept and practice, formerly characterized by polarized approaches, has been transformed from a single to an integrated approach. Only in the 1990s a more integrated approach was adopted, one that addresses both social and economic objectives, customized to individual conditions.

2.2 Top-down Public Housing and Bottom-up Self-help Approaches: International Agencies vs. the Thai Government
This section presents the evolution of low-cost housing policy from a top-down to a bottom-up approach through the interaction between international agencies and the Thai government. The literature reviews the way in which international housing advice was implemented in Thailand from the 1940s to post 2000. It discusses how Thai low-cost housing delivery approach was transformed and in what way this influenced the transformation of not only the slum inhabitant role but also that of government agencies. The literature survey examines many housing approaches, from public housing to self-help housing and market enablement, respectively.

Since 1945, the combined effect of World War II and the sharp rise in global urbanization resulted in the housing shortage crisis. Intense urbanization increased in developing countries more than in developed countries in this century (Dimitriou, 1990 in Takahashi, 2009:67). In Thailand, rapid growth in foreign investment and export oriented industrialization led to the major socio-economic structural change from agriculture to industry which reinforced development concentration in urban areas. Regarding the national structural transformation, internal migration from the peripheries to the city centres massively increased resulting in an exceptional level of housing demand in urban areas of major Thai cities, with the shortage most acute in Bangkok (Yeh and Laquian, 1979:27). However, the Thai government was less responsive to the considerable migrant labour population because housing for migrants was often regarded as an unproductive investment (Takahashi, 2009:67; Choguill, 1995:403). Additionally, many permanent migrants in Thailand maintain their registration in their rural settlements, so they are not administratively counted as urban residents.

According to Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1989), many western governments regard the reproduction of informal settlements as a transitional phenomenon that gradually fades away with economic growth. Housing for migrants is seen as a temporary problem and therefore it has seldom been incorporated into national policies and is undertaken slowly. As a consequence, informal settlements emerge as unseen urban inhabitants and soon the extensions of those squatters become a more visible problem relevant to social, economic and environmental development. The more rapid a country's social and economic progress, the faster slum settlements grow (Takahashi, 2009:71). Coupled with an inadequate housing policy and the neglect of the relevant agency, slum settlements have sharply increased and the situation was further complicated by conflicts between agency, vision, and provision (Yap, 1992:6). This is the context of low-income housing development that the research is focused on as the thesis views and associates the slum housing problem with the evolution of social and economic development at the national level rather than at the scale of individual households.

### 2.2.1 Top-down Approach: Public Housing
During the early industrialization phase, European governments recognized its responsibility for managing the national economy and one of the most important tasks was to pull economies out of the recession that was caused by World War II (Harris and Arku, 2006:1011). According to Bentham (2000:14), in this period national housing development was influenced by the modernist principle of “equal benefits for the greatest number”. A top-down scheme served as the major development paradigm of official housing provision because it enabled the scalability of the state program to benefit a large number of recipients. For example, public housing was positively accepted by Thai government agents since 1950s and the scheme received increased support between the 1960s and 1970s. Public housing corresponded to Thai government requirements because it delivered large scale accommodation through mass production within a short time. Addressing intensive migration, the building construction industry was the prime strategy of economic growth that employed a relatively large number of migrant labourers through public spending (Lewis, 1954:139). Hence, public housing was seen to be a solution by the Thai government to achieve quantitative targets of massive housing number as well as employment.

### 2.2.1.1 Public Housing serving Multi-Purpose Objectives

Since 1960s, public housing has been a main concern in national policy reflected by its growing significance in responding to several objectives. The primary motivation was to restore devastated cities which were regarded as a fundamental necessity (Takahashi, 2009:67). Countries damaged by war made their initial attempts to develop national policy with respect to public housing because it responded to the housing shortage, disruptions and destruction (Harris, 2003:163; Harris and Giles, 2003: 167). Coupled with that was the proliferation of informal settlements that had become a common social issue in the urban scenery of many metropolises (Takahashi, 2009:67). Public housing was a kind of social welfare that aimed to provide affordable housing for particular groups of people who could not access private housing in the conventional market such as low-income households and urban slum residents. However, the housing crisis was also linked to the expansion of global economic forces. Public housing has been widely acknowledged as the mechanism of national economic development through its impact on employment, investment and labour productivity (Takahashi, 2009:70). Lastly, public housing provision is an effective vehicle for consolidating political support because it can be used to reward supporters and it is a visible physical outcome of a government’s commitment to the welfare of its people (Harris and Giles, 2003: 174). In effect, the diverse role of public housing addressed the three major social, economic and political objectives. However, these objectives served to endorse the rationale of a centralised government structure as the major player within an overarching structure of political power (Giles, 2003: 238). Accordingly, public housing becomes the favoured provision among national governments.
2.2.1.2 Characteristics of early Thai Public Housing

Since the 1960s, public housing was commonly recognized as the main direction of housing development around the world including in Thailand. Public housing is a form of housing tenure owned by a government authority or not for profit organizations or by a combination of those. As large scale production projects, public housing programs are generally directly subsidized by the national government, finance institutions or international agencies. Some state agencies undertake mass construction directly while many are operated indirectly through solely private construction or partnerships between public and private developers. According to Takahashi (2009:70) there are three key components that generally comprise public housing provision; modern construction technology, imported materials and universal design. Such a typical standard housing style was optimistically acknowledged by a number of national government bodies to achieve a large housing stock.

The Thai government made efforts to increase new housing units with affordable prices for two major target groups: low-income households and slums inhabitants (Lee, Hongladaromp, and Pama, 1979:111). For the first recipient, low-cost public housing programs benefited general urban poor households whose monthly income was lower than the national poverty line and were unable to find adequate shelter in the private housing market. Slum inhabitants were the second target group and government public housing prioritizes those groups who were facing eviction or who had been evicted. The second scheme was specifically built to re-house slum dwellers displaced through urban renewals and the slum clearance policy. However the slum households of those removal projects consisted of various sub-groups of people such as seasonal migrants, permanent migrants and squatter households (Shlomo, and Mayo, 1985:5). Therefore, no single public housing program could address the living conditions of those sub-groups. The Thai government then implemented various types of public housing programs for instance; public short-lease housing, public long-lease housing and public purchased housing (Teinchoa, et all. 1984:33). It is obvious that the Thai government public housing was a means of supporting low-income households, whereas higher income households generally relied on their own access to housing in the private property market (Rabibhadaha, 1998:12).

In Thailand, many affordable housing programs were implemented between 1950 and 1972 through the centralized bureaucratic system of national government. Since 1973, the program was transferred to the responsibility of The National Housing Authority of Thailand (NHA) which became the primary agent of government housing policy. Although the Thai government established the NHA as a

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6 75-150 US$ per month (Lee, Hongladaromp, and Pama, 1979:111)

7 Such as the 1960-1990 Fueang-Nakhon or city beautification policy
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consolidated body and the prime organization of policy planning and delivery, prior to the year 1977\(^8\) the NHA still maintained the centralized structure and top-down approach to administer state housing programs. They provided different types of low-cost public housing including high-rise apartments, walk-up flats and row-houses. The majority of low-cost public housing projects were located on the urban fringe of Bangkok more than 20 kilometres from the centre (Dowall, 1992). Each unit has compact sized of 27-52 sq. metre with one large room and an attached bathroom/toilet. The combination of inexpensive land prices and small units allowed the NHA to sell housing at a lower price than the private market for less than 200,000 baht per unit at the late 1970s price (Crane, Daniere and Harwood, 1997).

2.2.1.3 The Practice of Public Housing: A story of few successes and many failures

Past experience in Asian countries demonstrates the dilemma of public housing provision. On the one hand, successful cases of public housing are visibly found in Singapore and Hong Kong. Significant progress in public housing for low-income households was witnessed in the 1970s (Yeung, 1983:12). Between 1960 and 1970, the Singapore government produced in total 120,669 new public housing units and by 1985, 81% of the population was living in public housing (Tai, 1988:2). Similarly, the Hong Kong government implemented an ambitious public housing program through the construction of massive high-rise buildings which were rented and sold for less than the market price. As the 1970s came to a close, the Hong Kong government launched the ‘Home Ownership Scheme’ that built 336,000 units of new public housing under the administration of the Hong Kong Housing Authority and the Hong Kong Housing Society (Yeh and Laquian, 1979:17). Rents in public housing were made affordable for low-income families and by the early 1980s around 1,000,000 low-income households had been rehoused. In the overall housing situation 45% of the total housing stock consisted of public housing (Yeh, 1982). Regarding the quantitative outcome, the success of public housing projects in Singapore and Hong Kong led to the idea that government should be the key provider of adequate housing to urban poor households and urban slum dwellers (UNESCAPE, 2008:31; UNCHS, 1996; Tan and Sock-Yong, 1991). This visible outcome persuaded the Thai government at that time to promote government led top-down public housing in countrywide programs.

However, in many countries there were failures in government led public housing attempts often unable to meet the original quantitative targets. In Thailand, public housing programs made little

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\(^8\) NHA implemented the first slum upgrading project in 1977 that applied the unconventional practice of a more bottom-up approach with community participation in state low-income housing projects (Boonyabancha, 2005:3)
impact on the housing shortage due to the low numbers of new production. Between 1940 and 1971, the combined output totaled 10,969 units while there was an officially assessed need for 100,000 units in Bangkok alone during the 1960s (Sakornpan, 1978). The Malaysian government launched a low-cost housing program under the New Economic Plan in the early 1970s which aimed at providing affordable housing for families whose monthly income was less than 750 ringgit\(^6\). The government was only able to complete 40% of the number of units originally planned (Yahaya, 1989). In the Philippines, the resettlement program, Bagong Lipunan or New Society, was executed under the Ministry of Human Settlement in 1978 to house the urban poor. However, less than 2,500 units were completed and on top of that and there were a much larger number of households displaced by the program (Berner, 1997).

Takahashi (2009:71) identifies two main reasons why massive public housing schemes in many Asian countries have suffered shortcomings. The first critical point was the costly construction. Generally, building construction technology adopted in public housing projects is based on industrial building systems. Public housing has been plagued by the expectation that modern industrial production would carry out the mass construction in a short time at a lower cost. In reality, numerous factors escalated the cost beyond the budgetary range of the low-income households such as the massive initial cost of investment, shortages of skilled labour and imported materials. Accordingly, such units can only be allocated to low-income households with very high subsidies. In Bangkok, for instance, the actual minimum rent for these units was estimated at 1,000 baht per month while urban low-income households could afford about 300 Baht\(^{10}\) per month (Yap, 1996:320). The authentic target group, the urban low-income group or urban slum dwellers could not afford such high rent and many gave up their eligibility for occupancy to the upper classes who took the benefit instead.

The UNCHS (1996 in Werna, 2001:66; Okpala, 1992:9) mentioned that public housing programs in many countries had been completed and contributed to only about 10% of the total housing stock. Together with other factors, the limited budget and the low administrative capacity of government agencies constituted significant barriers to implementation (Rondinelli, 1990) and government-led public housing attempts resulted in a failure to attain both qualitative and quantitative targets (Takahashi, 2009:71; Stren, 1978:224-225).

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\(^9\) In 1970, 2.9 Malaysian Ringgit was equal to 1 Australian Dollar (http://fx-rate.net/AUD/MYR/, 27\(^{th}\) May 2013)

\(^{10}\) Based on rents for public high-rise flat in Huay Khwang District in the early 1960s (Noranitipadungkarn, 1978:106 in Yap, 1996). One Australia dollar is approximately equal to 30 baht.
2.2.1.4 Entry of International Agency into Thai Housing; Conflicting practices between International Agency and the National Government

The visible failure of low-cost public housing provision in many Asian countries pushed international agencies to become more proactive in national housing policy. In 1951 global agencies officially stepped in Thailand when Jacob Crane, the Chief in command of the UN housing program, conducted the first UN housing mission with experts to visit Southeast Asia as a pilot study. The mission aimed at investigating the needs of and problems associated with low-cost housing in the region. Bangkok became one of the 19 specific areas identified under “The Long-Range Program” that focused on self-help as an alternative to low-cost housing provision (Bureau of Social Affairs, UN EcoSoC, 1961:249). This also included the preparation of a manual, a survey of self-help activity and training courses. Nevertheless, the mission did not conduct any tangible self-help projects in Bangkok. In 1961, the UN organized the second mission to Asia due to the promising recommendations of the report on ‘Low cost Housing in South and Southeast Asia: Report of a Mission of Experts’ (UN Economic and Social Council, 1951:30). According to the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the report comments that in self-help seems to lay the brightest hope to achieve the substantially improved output of dwelling units (ECAFE, 1952:70). Accordingly, the UN second mission recommended that the self-help policy should be included in the national housing program of all countries in Asia (Alcock, 1962:144). Moreover, the UN’s continuing enthusiasm for self-help programs resulted in the implementation of a self-help pilot project in Bangkok’s Bonkai community in 1962 (Harris and Giles, 2003:177; Giles, 2003:234; Handson, 1965; UNICEF, 1964:4, Chayachinda, 1978:171: Panichapak, 2000:1-31; Senanuch, 2004:80-81).

At the time, the housing approach of global agencies clearly contrasted with the national government housing policy. Harris and Giles (2003:167) emphasized that international agencies never endorsed public housing and apparently favoured the self-help housing policy (Alcock, 1966:144; Back, 1962; Clinard, 1966; Frieden, 1965 in Giles, 2003:176). The international expert organizations preferred and recognized self-help as a more cost effective strategy than public housing policy (Abrams, 1964:179). Subsequently, the conflicts of practice between two official agencies began with the Thai government enthusiastic for a top-down approach to mass produce public housing while the UN endorsed the bottom-up approach of self-help provision. The opposition between these two approaches resulted in major consequences in Thai practice: there were strong local resistance toward the UN’s housing advice and, consequently, international advice had little impact on national housing policy. Many case
studies around the world revealed the resistance to the UN recommendation for two decades (Harris and Giles, 2003:232) and the Thai government played a limited role in promoting self-help provision between the 1950s and early 1970s when it had been actively focused almost exclusively on public housing. According to Giles (2003:240-241) the government’s refusal to accept the UN recommendations identifies the political conflict between the two parties as the UN’s bottom up approach potentially compromises the influence of the national government over internal administrative mechanisms in particular the top-down bureaucratic structure and centralized power and decision making.

2.2.2 Bottom-up Approach: Self-help

For several decades after World War II, low-cost housing development paradigms in many countries have been dominated by government driven top-down and centralized structure. The large scale public housing program played an important role of providing affordable housing for low-income households. Once the government-led public housing encountered shortcomings in meeting the needs of urban low-income families, alternative approaches that involved ‘bottom-up’ modes requiring decentralized structure emerged that attempted to promote slum organization action in holding decision making power for its own development.

Although Garth Myers (Harris, 2003:164) claimed that self-help had been promoted in Nairobi since the early 1920s, long before the UN advocacy, its limited impact led to the practice’s decline. Four decades later, self-help was re-invented by scholars like Charles Abrams, William Mangin, and John F.C. Turner. The policy was echoed by leading international agencies especially the UN, the US and the World Bank. In effect, the low-cost housing development budget was distributed to self-help programs such as incremental housing, core housing units and infrastructure upgrades (Beattie et all, 2010:2; Abrams, 1964:175-181).

2.2.2.1 Context of Self-help Housing Formulation

From a social perspective, there were two major reasons for approaching low-cost housing. Firstly, a series of liberal movements in the 1970s gave rise to the demand for citizen control over key political and social dimensions (Takahashi, 2009:75) which saw a change of perception towards the importance of housing development as a strategy to empower urban low-income households as primary housing agents. Coupled with the collapse on one level or another of public housing practices

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11 Kenya (Stren, 1978:224-225; Hucnzermeyer, 2006; CHORE, 2006), Malaysia (Yahaya, 1989), Indonesia (Douglass and Zoglin, 1994), Mexico (Gilbert and Ward, 1985), Nigeria (Ademiluyi, 2010), the Philippines (Berner, 1997), and Thailand (Harris, 2003:165)
in many Asian countries, this resulted in the search for an alternative solution. The UN agencies and commissions proposed an unconventional “bottom-up” approach requiring less government intervention and promoting local residents as the new agents for implementing national housing policy.

Secondly, leading international housing organizations promoted self-help provision in countries under their patronage. Initially, self-help was most favoured by the US and implemented by The Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) which in turn shaped the policies of other US agencies such as Ford foundation, IADB, and USAID. The UK soon advocated assistance and distributed aid to its colonies and the case of ‘the West Indies Self-help Projects’ became one of the most encouraging social development projects of the UK (UK Central Office of Information, 1957:45). Simultaneously, ‘the Social Commission of the Economic and Social Council (SCESC)’ launched ‘Until Housing, Building, and Planning Long Range Program’ (EcoSoc, 1965 in Giles, 2003:172) which comprised of a manual for self-help preparation, a pilot project, and self-help surveying in Africa and Asia, including in Bangkok (Giles, 2003:177). The UN formally endorsed self-help which gradually increased its importance over public housing policy in developing countries.

### 2.2.2.2 Characteristics of Self-help Housing: UN advocacy of social-based empowerment

The idea of self-help was enthusiastically promoted by international agencies because self-help is more suitable for housing conditions in developing countries where units are built through individual effort and account for more than half of the total housing stock (Takahashi, 2009:72). Approached from the social perspective, self-help promoted owner occupancy that many experts believed would encourage social capital such as property rights, assets and networks (UK Colonial Office, 1945:7; UK Information Service, 1960:29 in Giles, 2003:176; Pugh, 1997). Approached from the cost-effective outlook, providing land and basic infrastructure and allowing residents to build are less expensive methods than providing completed public housing units. According to the rationale, self-help has recognized benefits to both social and economic outcomes for informal settlements.

Advocates for self-help housing viewed slum people as having the potential to solve housing issues for themselves (Chambers, 2009 in Cronin and Guthrie, 2010:130). The UNCHS (2008:16-17) survey found that even though tenure is much more uncertain, housing in squatter settlements tends to improve over time. This data is consistent with Harris’s study (2003:257) that mentioned “Such settlements were not only well adapted to the needs and circumstances of their residents, but were also typically improved over time”. An incremental improvement in a community environment demonstrates that slum inhabitants have the ability to upgrade housing and living conditions through
residents’ voluntary labour, assets and mutual support. Advocates of self-help claimed that informal settlements should be perceived not as urban eyesores but as panaceas to the housing crisis (Harris, 2003:257). Thereby, slum inhabitants were regarded as the primary agents of self-help implementation. However, the majority of slum households have very limited resource to search for land and shelter and formal agencies should assist people to overcome those barriers through empowerment (UN-Habitat, 2003:141). The UN housing approach increases the importance of social based empowerment12 and the embedded the empowerment process in the self-help scheme (Turner, 1976).

The UN calls for fundamental change at two levels, locally and nationally, toward a community led bottom-up approach. Locally, the UN attempted to include slum inhabitants as legitimate partner in the national housing policy. Slum inhabitants were encouraged to gather together and established community based organization (CBOs) such as savings group, cooperative or micro-finance which varied with each particular context. CBOs have been integrated in the self-help process that aims to meet the growing capacity of slum inhabitants to take ownership of the process. At the national level, the UN recommended the decentralization of government power and resources to the hands of local residents and their community organizations. Simply put, government top-down housing needed to be transform toward a bottom-up approach by local residents who live in a local setting. To connect between the local and national level, national governments must bring grass roots organizations into the mainstream of the formal low-cost housing system (UNESCAP, 2008:31; UN-Habitat, 2003:145; UNCHS, 1996). This is particularly important for the slum inhabitant whose housing needs were usually absent from the government planning and implementation. Thereby investing in social based empowerment and decentralization were allied in the solution of self-help housing.

2.2.2.3 The Practice of Self-help: Multiple barriers to implementation

Over 25 years of implementation, several self-help pilot projects were conducted in many countries and increased particularly between the late 1960s and the late 1970s. A high number of upgraded units were directly associated with an increasingly important role of slum community organizations as primary housing agents that commenced in earnest from this period onwards. According to Cronin and Guthrie (2011:130), slum community organizations engaging with self-help programs can draw

12 Social based empowerment relevant to social capacity that manifests in the formation of community organizations such as community networks, institutions and savings groups (UN-Habitat, 2003:142). Social based empowerment encompasses social capital to encourage people to act collectively in managing resource to satisfy communal priorities and goals (see Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2).
government attention to their constituency. After several collaborations between slum community organization and government housing programs, government and professionals began realizing that top-down projects which were designed without including slum community organizations were not achieving their overall objectives. As a consequence, state housing programs were designed with the precondition that slum community organizations should be partners in program implementation (UNESCAP, 2010:32). In addition, the government would support local people's action through many channels such as funding, skills training and decentralized decision making power under local residents’ control. Thereby, self-help created the context of social based empowerment that promoted slum community organization to become the legitimate actor of the state’s low-cost housing program.

However, like public housing, government self-help projects failed to achieved the quantitative goal because the level of output was very low in comparison to the housing shortage (Keivani and Werna, 2001:87; Arnott, 2008:21; Harris and Giles, 2003:176; Harris and Buzzelli, 2002; Takahashi, 2009:73). The World Bank study by Mayo and Gross (1987:301-35) identified that neither cost recovery nor large scale program replication achieved its goal. Burgess (1992:75-94; 1985:159) pointed out that between the year 1972 and 1981, the combined output of self-help based project was only 10% of the actual requirement in several countries. The adaptation of self-help in the private market was also unable to meet demands due to the difficulties of scaling up self-help. Those difficulties that prevent primary agents’ effective action often relates to the economic and political structures of society such as land use regulations, building codes, financial loans, interest rate subsidies and access to government land at below market prices. The complication of self-help implementation in many countries often came down to the institutional struggles over the regulations and finances. Particularly, the main difficulty is not rooted in the building of dwelling units, but rather the provision of access to land.

2.2.2.4 Implementing Self-Help at Bonkai: Conflicting and contrasting perceptions between the UN and Thai Government agencies

Past experience of self-help practices in Thailand demonstrates the dilemma and conflicts in interests in policy delivery between international agencies and national governments. The relationship results in a transition from the government’s top-down towards the UN’s bottom up approaches in Thai low-income housing. Accordingly, bottom-up self-help practices have thrived since the entry of the international agency.
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The pilot project of self-help was conducted at Bonkai community, Rama IV road, Bangkok in 1962. The UNICEF and the Bangkok Municipality undertook institutional collaboration on the tentative slum improvement program for 12,000 local residents. The experimental project aimed at renewing physical conditions, promoting self-help housing and improving infrastructure with a minimum amount of family relocation (Hanson, 1965:65). Before the project started, the Bangkok Municipality conducted a community survey and then prepared new locations for Bonkai dwellers’ temporary settlements at Prachanivech and Din Daeng. Furthermore, the post-upgrading Healthy Community Program organized a variety of socio-economic empowerment services such as healthcare, income generation and job skills training. However, once the project was completed in 1964, two contrasting viewpoints emerged towards the outcome of the renewal scheme. While the UNICEF claimed that the Bonkai project failed, the Bangkok Municipality was satisfied with the end result.

On the one hand, ineffective expenditure was seen as a problem in implementing self-help under local agency supervision. The UNICEF donated US$72,000 for community service but just over US$20,000 went towards infrastructure upgrades while two thirds of the fund was spent for vehicles and household applicants (UNICEF, 1964:4). The financial difficulties directly resulted in a delay in housing construction with a low number of self-help houses completed and with no explanation of project delays from the Municipality (Moses, 1965:3). Such evidences made Dorothy Moses, Chief of the Division of Social Affairs, consider that the Municipality resisted the UN approach and mentioned on the letter to the Chief of ECAFE that “a certain amount of reluctance or hesitancy on the part of Bangkok officials is only natural, since they do not wish to experiment with a new approach which runs counter to their traditional way of doing things for people” (Moses, 1965 in Giles, 2003:235). The UN’s negative experience with Bonkai project reflected a common assumption regarding the impact of international agencies (McAuslan, 1982; Okpala, 1990).

On the other hand, the program received praise from the Thai government, local agencies and local people (Panichapak, 2000:1-31; Senanuch, 2004:81; BMA, 1992:2-3). The Municipality encouraged Bonkai community upgrading as the pilot project of community participation in low-income housing development. Apart from the UNICEF sponsorship, the Thai government provided a further US$ 1.6 million as loans for housing repair and self-help construction. Since Thai funding covered most self-help construction costs, the UNICEF donation was spent on household assets. According to the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (1992:2-3), the community upgrading project at Bonkai opened up opportunities for community residents to conduct many adaptive communal socio-economic
activities. By integrating socio-economic empowerment through community cooperatives and credit unions, community centres and employment skills training etc. as a part of the low-income housing development process, Bonkai residents were empowered through the expansion of assets, management capacity and secured settlement tenure. Nevertheless, the financial difficulties, experience deficiency and professional staff shortages resulted in low-production and delays in construction. Although the Bonkai upgrading project was viewed as unproductive by international experts, local and national organizations were satisfied with the project outcome regarding enhanced levels of socio-economic empowerment (Senanuch, 2004:81).

The controversial critiques of self-help practices have been also discussed by several housing experts. Giles (2003:227-244) viewed the Bonkai case from a global approach and the UN database and argued that the Thai government acted against international recommendations and only adopted advice which matched with the Thai politicians’ outlook and the government top-down structure. Giles argued that the complex political interplay between global agencies and national policy resulted in the Thai government ignoring self-help. Perhaps a more serious critique was that the main barrier to a bottom-up solution to self-help housing was local authorities, not international agencies (Giles, 2003:240). In contrast, government agencies in Thailand and other developing countries argued that self-help produces instant slum conditions because the first priority for urban slum inhabitants was secure tenure rather than buildings (Takahashi, 2009:73). While the past experience of slum upgrading practices in many countries demonstrated that upgrading led to higher standards of physical environments for existing locations, improved surroundings did not address secure land tenure or prevent slum evictions (Shlomo et al, 1985:5; 1983:461-472; 1977:79-84; Yap, 1992:6).

Mukhija (2001:220) and Choguill (1999:299) argued that upgrading programs should be based on the local context and the prerequisite for any progressive informal settlement improvement to take place was securing land tenure rather than housing.

The case of Bonkai community upgrading presented here not only highlights the contrasting and conflicting perceptions between international recommendations and Thai practices, but also raises the significance of socio-economic factors in the approach to Thai slum upgrading practices. Bonkai case

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13 Socio-economic integrated empowerment depends on more than individual resources (i.e. information, body of knowledge and skills, participation in social organizations, and financial resources) but also the social capacity that manifests in the formation of community organizations such as community networks, institutions and savings groups. Socio-economic integrated empowerment encompasses social capital to encourage people to act collectively in managing resource to achieve their priorities and goals (see Chapter 4 Section 4.2.2).
study demonstrates the Thai government’s recognition of the importance of socio-economic empowerment in the low-income housing problem. Slum resettlement projects should not only aim at achieving a high number of upgraded housing units but also empower the slum inhabitant and enhance their assets and capacity. The thesis utilizes socio-economic based empowerment to formulate the theoretical framework to read and link the phenomenon of the slum inhabitants’ evolving role as being the primary housing agent and also to set up the criteria for case study selection in Chapter 4; Research Design.

2.2.3 Enable Market Housing and Integrated Top-down and Bottom-up Approach
2.2.3.1 Context of Enable Market Housing Formulation
Although low-income housing provision was regarded as social based development due to the UN endorsement since the 1960s, it was also recognized as economic based development in certain areas such as investment, employment and building construction. Harold Robbins (2006:7) noted that there were many tasks in low-cost housing development which generate economic investment such as construction material production, labour and technology. Such employment could produce higher profits for both community and national growth if all tasks are integrated as a holistic project. Similarly Crane (Harris, 1997:3-16), Curries (1976) and ILO (1968) stated that low-cost housing development was even more important as a tool to absorb the stream of unskilled labour that flowed from the country to the city. During 1695s-1960s, the USAID started making substantial housing loans for self-help projects in developing countries which aimed to contribute directly to economic growth (Robinson, 1963 and Waeyenberge, 2015:4). However, housing based on economic objectives was not widely shared among local and international organizations due to the domination of the self-help based social perspective.

2.2.3.2 Characteristic of Enable Market
As discussed, enable market policy creates the direct association between low-cost housing and market mechanisms. An important point highlighted here is the World Bank policy aimed at reducing government subsidies and direct production of low-cost housing to a minimum. Thus, enablement housing policy is compelling to governments that have a limited housing budget. Subsidy is gained from the utilization of the market and institutionalization of civil society as an official development partner. The World Bank’s “The Washington Consensus” promoted a market enabling strategy where the critical change in policy was a ‘market’ that encompassed low-cost housing mechanism and that was dominated by monetarist liberal philosophy (Ward and Jones, 1997:172; UNCHS, 1987; World Bank, 1993 in Harris and Arku, 2006:1013; Pugh, 1997:99; Gore, 2000). The Bank argued that the
need to scale up housing production in the private housing market is now accepted and acknowledged by all policy makers in the housing field (World Bank, 1993; UNCHS, 1996; Tipple, 1994; Okpala, 1992).

In brief, the enablement market housing policy is a strategy which involves the promotion of private developers in national housing programs. Two major strategies are used to encourage the growth of low-cost housing. The first strategy is to create an enabled environment to support private developers in the formal housing market. Government prescribes legislative support to mobilize all relevant housing resources of the private sector. The second approach is the shift from government direct intervention to indirect where the government performs as the facilitator to promote the private sector to become a primary housing agent. Enablement housing policy can be interpreted as a change in the nature of state low-cost housing provision from a government led top-down to a market led bottom-up approach.

Through introducing changes in low-cost housing objectives, the World Bank’s market enablement shifts the conventional approach of self-help housing provision in at least two ways. Firstly, low-cost housing plays an important role in promoting economic development because house building is a significant industry that contributes to the national growth and productive investment. In turn, low-cost housing provision can be greatly enhanced and scaled up to reach the large scale beneficiaries through the mechanism of capital housing market. Hence, the purpose of the low-cost housing has evolved from being social oriented into economic oriented. Secondly, enable housing market focusses institutional and policy reform at the nationwide scale instead of the community scale project based development. This change largely evolved due to the low productivity of self-help based projects that demonstrated that economic and political structures at the national level are major obstructions to self-help housing productivity. The World Bank viewed housing within the wider context of urbanization by incorporating low-income housing policy into a wider urban, economic and social development agenda. The Bank prescribed that low-income housing cannot stand alone but should be complemented with sufficient national administration support (Takahashi, 2009, 75). The Bank recommends that the national government must recognize the necessity of creating adequate regulatory arrangements, finance systems and domestic resources to assist the private sector.

2.2.3.3 The Practice of Enable Housing Market: Increased low-cost housing production but not for the urban poor

Owing to the strong backing of influential international agencies, the Thai government imported enablement market policy into the 6th National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP 1987-1991) (Giles, 2003:239; Kuraesin, 1998, Senanuch, 2004:88; Panichapak, 2009:3-1). The government expected to meet the housing demand of low-income households by encouraging private developers’
contribution to the low-cost housing market. Two major strategies have been promoted simultaneously. Firstly, the government attempted to create a supportive environment for the non-government sector, mainly slum community organizations and the private sector. Enabling environment strategy is an opportunity improvement at the national level to better functioning, more equitable access and more inclusive services for recipients (Baken and Van der Linden, 1993:20). This approach aimed at eliminating administrative impediments where possible for low-income households and private developers. Following the World Bank's advice, the Thai government gradually mobilized relevant strategy support for private developers such as land use reform, lower property taxes and low-interest housing mortgages (Kuraesin, 1998; Yap and Wandeler, 2010:336). For example, the Government Housing Bank (GHB) reduced housing interest rates for home buyers. The mortgage strategy encourages customers to relocate their accounts from private commercial banks to GHB. This led to more competition in the housing finance sector and it benefited homebuyers across the income spectrum. With the growth of income levels and cheaper mortgages, low-income housing became more attractive for private developers to go down-marker (Pornchokchai, 2003:13, 1992:11). As a result, many affordable housing options were supplied in the formal private property market such as the mass production of low-cost condominium, walk-up apartments and row houses (Yap, 1996:320).

Secondly, enable market focused on empowering low-income households and their community organizations. The policy prescribed investing in collective assets and capacities to increase opportunities to achieve official tenure security. The government funded an initial capital outlay of 1,250 MB, called the Urban Poor Development Fund (UCDO Funding), to strengthen slum inhabitant’s financial capacity and was later extended to promote community networks among community organizations across the country. The tangible outcome of empowering slum inhabitant capacity and asset manifested in the growth in number and scale of “Community Based Organizations (CBO)” that varied with the particular context of each local community such as savings organizations, community enterprises and income generation organizations (CODI, 1992:3).

In real world application, even though there were positive outcome in terms of increased production of affordable housing units, but enable market provision did not target nor benefit the original beneficiary, the urban slum inhabitants and marginal urban poor. For example the phenomenon of massive housing speculation can be seen in the case of Bangkok (Malpezzi, 1994:459, Pornchokchai, 2005:39). The success of housing finances deregulation and increased capacity of private housing markets has been reflected in the experience of the “Bangkok Phenomenon” between 1980 and the 1990s (Keivani and Werna, 2001:201; Dowell, 1989:327; 1992:25). Thai housing stock contributed by
private developers accounted for 36% in 1988 and rose to 50% in 1993 (Yap, 1996:307-323). Between 1994 and 1997 267,347 new low-income housing units were built and it became a main stream component of the private housing market (Yap and Wandeler, 2010:336; Pornchokchai, 2005:39). However, a relatively large percentage of low-cost housing units had been taken up by higher and middle-income households for habitation and property investment. According to an Agency for Real Estate Affairs (AREA, 1998:65) survey, by 1997 35% of almost 300,000 units built in Bangkok remained vacant despite those units having been sold. Consequently, the large quantity of units built had a minimal impact to accommodate low-income and slum households because the enablement strategy led into increased property speculation.

Practices on the ground proved that neither top-down nor bottom-up provisions on their own were effective to capture the dynamic of the low-cost housing problem. The preceding discussions led to the thesis argument that any single housing policy coupled with a sole actor cannot cope with the complexity of the low-income housing shortage. They were unable to account for the complicated needs of and relationships between different actors who were involved in various sub-markets. Moreover, the numerous international housing approaches have been adopted in Thailand has failed to reach the genuine target group, urban low-income households. On the contrary, programs benefited upper socio-economic groups. These combined factors resulted in international housing policies having less impact in the local context and failing to achieve qualitative and quantitative goals.

2.3 Conclusion
Through more than five decades of interactions between global agencies and the Thai government, low-cost housing policies at the international and domestic levels has changed in three aspects. Firstly, the housing delivery approach has gradually changed from a single to an integrated approach and from political to social and to socio-economic based development. Any single approach cannot stand alone and it is now recognized that the integrated approach, customized to particular contexts, is most effective in housing delivery.

Secondly, the housing planning approach has evolved from top-down to bottom-up. This means the power relationship between the state and citizens, in particular urban slum inhabitants, has been changing. Government intervention in low-cost housing has been transformed from centralized to decentralized model in terms of decision making power and public resource distribution. This change has resulted in the withdrawal of direct involvement of state agencies and shifted their role to that of a facilitator who prescribes legislative support for the leading agent such as private developers and local
community organizations. Simultaneously, community organizations and the private sector become the primary agents of the implementation of state housing development projects.

Finally, the practice of empowerment has been a key issue and tool when state agencies encourage decentralization and a bottom-up approach. Empowerment plays an important role in the investment of public resources in two areas of low-cost housing development. Empowerment practices focuses on local people’s assets and capacity, both of individual households and the collective community, and their function. Moreover, the practice advocates for more inclusion of local community organization's demands in the national agenda. The literature survey demonstrates that the explicit link between these international housing policies, from public housing to self-help and to market enablement, is the transformation of state intervention and housing planning approach. Decentralized and the bottom-up approach have been evolving over time and it is directly connected to the increasing role of slum inhabitants in low-cost housing provision.

The thesis argues that the role of low-income housing in Thai practice cannot be viewed from an isolated perspective. Rather, public housing, self-help and enablement market approaches discussed above have always co-existed and co-evolved. The balance between these perspectives has evolved due to the broadened contextual environment encompassing social values, economic principals and political doctrine. The diversity in provisions, socio-economic based empowerment and the bottom-up approach provides the fundamental framework for understanding slum upgrading practices in Thailand, discussed in Chapter Three.
CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Low-income Housing Development in Thailand

Introduction
This chapter narrows down the focus to survey slum housing development in Thailand over the past seven decades, from late 1940 to post-2000. With an aim to formulate the thesis framework, the chapter reviews past and present efforts of formal and informal slum housing provisions to meet the needs of urban slum households. It pays special attention to the evolution of the relationship between formal and informal agents who shifted from being opponents to partners in urban slum poverty alleviation. In addition, key terminologies are defined in the discussion to shape the thesis framework as well as the rationale of case study selection. The literature review chapter is comprised of five parts as below.

3.1 Background of Slum Phenomenon in Thailand
This section surveys three major aspects of Thai slum settlements that provide a basic understanding of broader developments. Firstly, the emergence of slum settlements is closely related to the implementation of national development plans and labour migration from rural to urban areas, in particular Bangkok. Secondly, permanent informal settlements in urban areas have gradually increased along with national economic development. Thirdly, the review defines the key terms ‘slum settlement’ and ‘slum inhabitant’.

3.1.1 Thai Economic Development and the Formation of Slum Settlements
According to Pornchokchai (1992:11 in Giles, 2003:230) slums have existed in Bangkok for a long time, but before the 1940s Thai housing policies did not benefit slum households, which were excluded from public and government concern. Slum dwellers were perceived as seasonal migrants who came into cities when the agricultural period finished and returned home once the cultivation season started. The population size of rural migrants varied significantly throughout the year and most members of migrant households maintained their registration in their home village. Thai administration therefore did not count slum inhabitants as legitimate city residents (Yap and Wandeler, 2010:332).

Another factor that catalyzed slum emergence stems from a common perception in Thai culture. Housing was considered to be an individual household rather than the government’s responsibility (NHA, 2009:13). Due to Thailand’s formerly agricultural economy, a large number of local people
usually look after their own housing, while the government regarded housing as social cost rather than a productive investment (Pornchokchai, 1992:11; 2005:29; Takahashi, 2009:67). National goals seldom focused on nor included housing policy (Takahashi, 2009:68). In this particular context, informal settlements started to emerge as a part of urban scenery as shelter for rural immigrants.

By 1957, the First National Social and Economic Development Plan (NSED) were established as the national road map towards urbanization. Implementation of the NSED has transformed almost every aspect of Thai national infrastructure from a socio-economic foundation based on agriculture to industry. A sharp rise of government infrastructure investment and import-export oriented industrialization had concentrated development in Bangkok and major regional cities such as Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen and Nakhon Si Thammarat. One of the government’s strategies to encourage foreign investment was the provision of cheap labour. Labour for industrial production was on high demand and resulted in the migration of a rural labour force searching for employment and income. Consequently, the shift of the national development pattern led to an accelerated massive internal labour migration from the peripheries to Bangkok and prime regional cities across the country (LOCOA, 2007:1, Pornchokchai, 2005:31, Rabibhadaha, 1998:4).

3.1.2 Formation and Growth of Permanent Urban Slum Settlement

Previously, rural-urban migration was often cyclic based on seasonal harvest periods. Labour migrants returned to their villages in the cultivation period because they considered agriculture to be the dominant sector. Once the main avenue of national development transferred to the industrial sector, many rural households entered cities searching for work and life opportunities. Many migrant households ended up working in urban production in the formal and informal sectors such as factories, local transportation and building construction. Slum settlements are attractive to low-income households because they supply affordable housing in a good location close to their source of employment and public facilities. They provide for flexible housing arrangements and allocate land available for self-help construction. A slum settlement also has a variety of temporary houses and rooms for rent at affordable prices. This option is suited to the condition of very poor people and recent arrivals who cannot lease or own housing. Through these reasons, the urban slum settlement becomes a permanent shelter and the number of migrants constantly increased every year, between the 1960s and the 1980s.

Intensive urbanization is associated with the influx of population from rural areas to Bangkok and closely relates to growth in the number of slum settlements. Between 1960 and 1970, the population
rose by 3.7% per annum in Bangkok compared to 2.7% for overall population growth nationwide (Burasaniri, 1983:122-123; AREA, 1999:12). This figure is also congruent with the Litchfield's proposed Bangkok Master Plan for 1960-1990. The report identifies that about 532,400 people moved to Bangkok and four times that number had moved out of rural areas (1964:59). Rural migrants were moving from different regions of the country but the largest portion came from the poorest region, the Northeast (The National Statistics Office, 1960:14).

The massive number of labour migrants has subsequently contributed to the incremental increase in the number of slum settlements in Bangkok. A comprehensive survey of slums in Bangkok was conducted in 1985 by Pornchokchai (1985:1-2) which revealed that in 1950 there were 183 slums and this rose to 361 slums in 1960. On the other hand, a slum settlement survey conducted by the Slum Upgrading Office under NHA in 1966-1967 identified only 50 slum settlements in 1968 with the number rising up to 84 slums in 1977. By the year 1981, about 410 slums housed 551,420 persons within the metropolitan area. Although the NHA’s figure presents a smaller number of slum settlements in Bangkok, their numbers reveal a consistent increase in the city as well as in adjacent provinces since the late 1960s. In a less conservative counting, Pornchokchai’s study found that by the year 1985, 943 slums were inhabited by 956,400 people in Bangkok and parts of surrounding provinces. Since the mid-1980s the number of people living in informal settlements has been consistently estimated at over one million (Giles, 2003:231).

3.1.3 Defining Thai Slum Settlement and Slum Inhabitants
Depending on different socio-cultural contexts, the term ‘slum settlement’ in Thailand can refer to different areas such as crowded communities, densely populated communities, or urban poor communities, terms that are widely known to have negative connotations. At the international level, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS/HABITAT) differentiates slums from squatter settlement based on how they were built, their location and the legal status regarding land occupation. However, the distinction between a slum and a squatter settlement in Thailand is not very precise. The UN Habitat¹ (1982:14-15) describes housing in a slum settlement as poorly maintained

¹ UNCHS/HABITAT defines slum and squatter settlements as follows: Slum settlements usually consist of legally-built, run-down housing in older and poorly maintained parts of the city proper. Squatter settlements are mainly uncontrolled low-income resident areas. The land is often occupied illegally. They are to a large extent built by the inhabitants themselves and usually poorly equipped with public utilities and community services. Overcrowded and dilapidated settlements consist of make-shift, improvised housing areas. The land occupied by squatter settlements is often located farther away from the city centre than slums (UNCHS, 1982; 14-15).
while squatters suffer deteriorated housing coupled with unsanitary conditions. Furthermore, UN Habitat III defines slum household as a group of individuals living under the same roof in an urban area who lack of one or more following condition; 1) Durable housing of a permanent nature that protects against extreme climate conditions. 2) Sufficient living space which means not more than three people sharing the same room. 3) Easy access to safe water in sufficient amount at an affordable prices. 4) Access to adequate sanitation in the form of a private or public toilet shared by a reasonable number of people. 5) Security of tenure that prevents forced eviction (UN Habitat, 2006:21). Thai slums and squatter settlements have a similar physical appearance of sub-standard housing and a low-quality environment. Informal settlements are usually built on low-lying and unfilled land which floods during the rainy season. Some houses are built on stilts over polluted water full of waste, with wooden walkways connecting between the houses and to the main road. Houses are generally made of wood, galvanized steel sheets and scrap timber. Many slum households are not allowed to build permanent structures even when families can afford them a sit hinders short notice lease termination if the landlord decides to sell or upgrade the land. As temporary structures with poor quality physical environment, most self-built houses do not comply with building standards. These conditions result in the inability to access formal infrastructure that authorities only provide to housing under local government registration. However, many slum settlements stay in place for many years with a certain level of secure land tenure and their physical environment and housing gradually improve. Some residents invest their asset to improve the dwelling and well-built houses are commonly found on secured settlements. Thereby slums and squatter settlements consist of different building types and housing conditions, with some that are relatively high in price and have a well-maintained structure.

In terms of location, the UN Habitat mentions that squatter settlements are often situated further away from the city centre than slums. On the other hand, informal settlements in Thailand, whether slum or squatter, are scattered all over the city and on relatively small plots of land in between other land uses such as high-income residential areas, business centres and industrial areas. Slum dwellers set up settlement on land which is relatively under-developed with an average settlement size of fewer than 200 houses (Yap, 2010:333). A unique feature of informal settlements, in particularly Bangkok, is their geography (Giles, 2003:231) where slum inhabitants often take over the strips of land along canals that are rarely used for accommodation. One of the most visible informal settlements is the canal waterfront settlements (Usavagovitwong and Posriparsert, 2006:523).

Lastly, the predominant illegitimate inhabitant status is a condition common to the UN Habitat’s definition and informal settlement practices in Thailand. According to the UN Habitat definition, slums
legally occupying land but squatter settlements do not. In contrast to illegal squatter settlements found in the UN Habitat definition and other cities, only 16% of informal settlements in Thailand are illegal (Yap, 1995:262). Most squatters in Thailand, in particular Bangkok, are what have been termed “renting squatter” (Angel, Benjamin, and DeGoede, 1977:81) because residents are able to seek a landowner’s oral or written consent to occupy a piece of vacant land without registration with local government agencies. But the occupancy is temporary and outside of law enforcement. Landowners can terminate land arrangements on a short notice of up to 30 days in advance. Residents live in Thai informal settlements are not really squatters in the legal sense because they have informal consent from landowner.

Apart from the three distinctive features, Thai slums and squatter settlements generally meet all four criteria of the UN Habitat’s definition; residents face property rights problems, live in poor quality housing and environment, have inadequate access to basic infrastructure, and finally suffer from overcrowding² (2003:12). In the Thai context, overcrowding is characterised by settlements that exceed 15 housing units per rai (1,600 sq. metres or 0.16 ha) (NHA, 1981). However, overcrowding is not the absolute criteria, but co-exists with other factors. For example walk-up apartments have a much higher number of housing units and density than slum settlements, but apartments are not considered informal settlements because they have well-planned physical environment, are formally registered, and have access to public infrastructure. To reflect the actual and current features of informal settlements in Thailand, the thesis employs the term ‘slum settlement' to refer to both slum and squatter settlements.

Slum settlements in Thailand consist of both formal and informal land occupancies with people living in slums consist of a wide range of households such as house owner, house renter, land owner, land-renter, and seasonal migrant. It is important to note that not all people living in Thai slums are the poor and not all poor household live in slum settlements. The thesis defines ‘slum inhabitant’ as people who live in Thai slum settlements. More often than not, they are a heterogeneous group of people of different cultures and socio-economic statuses-a mixture between very poor and wealthy, illiterate and well-educated residents, legal and illegal property occupants.

From the government’s perspective, slum settlements have been regarded as low-income residential areas resulting from inadequate housing for the poorest sector of the population (Buransiri in Yeung

² The official definition of a slum community was defined in the 1982 Densified Community Act and was revised in 1990 by The National Housing Authority of Thailand (NHA) and Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA). (http://www.nhanet.or.th/chs/homepoor.html, AREA, 1996:2).
Thailand’s official record employs the term ‘the poor’ (khon jhon) to define low-income people based on the resident’s monthly income. According to the most updated data of the Thailand National Statistics Office (TNSO) from 2010, people earning less than 1,678 baht/person/month is counted as a low-income person, while The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 2011 national data of the low-income people considers an income of below 2,422 bath/person/month for people living in Bangkok as poor (http://www.nesdb.go.th/, 21st May 2013). Based on TNSO’s categorization, 8.8 million people or 13.15% of the national population are considered poor. The thesis employs the TNSO’s and NESDB’s figures to define slum inhabitants as member of a low-income household. On the other hand, for reasons discussed above, the thesis avoids using term ‘the poor’ to represent inhabitants who live in slums as it is too general and overused. Slum residents also consist of seasonal or circular rural-urban migrants and many frequently return to their village to work on agriculture or support their relatives. As large percentage of migrant household members maintain their household registration3 in the countryside, the authorities do not count them as urban citizens based on legislation. This fact brings to light the disparity in citizen legitimacy between urban and slum dwellers. Numerous literature reviews reveal that the exclusion of slum inhabitants results in a negative bias of government and other urban dwellers towards their status, for instance, they are perceived as city eyesores, illegal invaders, aliens, source of trouble and trespassers (FRSN, 2010:4, Rabibhadaha, 2009:23, Pornchokchai, 2003:13, Senanuch, 2004:80).

Moreover, a large number of slum settlements operate illegally4 because they occupy public and private land without a formal land title. This includes those households that obtained tacit consent from landowners (Yap, 1989:36). Consequently, slum settlements often lack building permits and accessibility to basic infrastructure (Yap, 1992:6) contributing to physical environments that tend to be sub-standard. The illegal occupation of someone else’s land causes difficult relationship between government agencies and slum inhabitants. Authorities avoid engaging with slum settlements because any official provision could be seen as giving legitimacy to slum dwellers (UNESCAP, 2008:8). The slum settlements also experiences tenure insecurity and a land-rental slum could easily turn into a squatter settlement under the threat of eviction once the landowner tells the occupants to leave with a

3 A household registration is an official household census where the address, location, and ownership information of a house, including the name and relationship of all household members are listed (www.dopa.go.th, 30th March 2009)

4 “1933 Building Construction Control Act” was approved by cabinet in 1979. Building projects must obtain a construction permit from local authorities involved. Otherwise, the house owner could not have a house registration number. Without this number, the building could not receive public utilities (Pornchokchai, 2005:36)
short notice (FRSN-2/M/L/BKK). When some slum settlements resist relocation, arson is often employed to speed up the eviction process. These factors formulate violent background histories and collective memories for many slum settlements and dwellers (Chantarapa, 2009:23).

Without sufficient formal and communal support, self-reliance has always been the basic practice of slum inhabitants. They rely on their limited resources to initially search for land, shelter, and access to other amenities that are normally provided for housing with a registered title. Hence, the combination of negative features; unlawful land tenancy, sub-standard environmental conditions and networking shortages, confer upon Thai slum inhabitants an isolated and powerless household status.

### 3.2 Housing Provisions to Address Slum Housing Problems

The UN Habitat reported (The Challenge of Slum; Global Report on Human Settlements, 2003) the growing number of slum dwellers to be nearly two billion today and the amount will double by 2030 (UNHABITAT, 2003:12). Thailand is moving in a similar direction to what the international agency’s report indicates. The CODI survey (2008:2) reveals that the slum community in Thailand has expanded from 1,140,000 households or 5,130,000 people in the year 2006 to 1,630,447 household or 7,337,000 by year 2008\(^5\). As the growing number of informal settlements has become more visible, housing agencies in Thailand recognized the significance of the problem that impact on the economy, society, and the environment. A variety of housing provisions through different agencies have been proposed since the late 1970s (Harris, 2003:163 Harris and Giles, 2003:167, Boonyabancha, 2005:3). The following sections provide the background of Thai housing development since the first implementation of a national housing policy in 1932. The thesis principally focuses on particular agencies and provisions for the slum upgrading program between 1970 and post-2000. To formulate the thesis framework, this chapter classifies slum housing provision in Thailand into two modes; formal housing provision and informal housing provision. Each mode reflects the fundamental concept of slum housing provision, agency and practice. The relationship between the two provisions will be discussed to identify knowledge gaps that are later used to formulate the research questions.

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\(^5\) According to the National Statistic Office, the survey on household economic and social situation in year 2015 presents that Thai low-income household has grown up to 2.7 million but the number of slum households has decrease to 1,044,510 (NSO,2015). The annual report of BMK year 2015 presents that the lower number of slum household in Thailand has decrease because the survey has conducted after Baan Mankong Program that provided official tenure security for 110,489 slum households from year 2003-2015 (CODI, 2015:3).
3.2.1 Formal Housing Provision: Government Agencies and International Organizations

Formal housing provision is the conventional mode of slum upgrading programs in Thailand provided through official channels. Since the late 1970s, the majority of slum upgrading projects were formal housing provision that were typically found in various programs such as aided self-help, site and service, and core house. A formal mode is commonly provided by recognized government agencies or private developers who sometimes work individually or in collaboration. The thesis reviews practices of government agencies and private developers in slum upgrading projects. It emphasizes the significance of conventional modes to relieving the urban slum housing crisis. A background framework of formal housing provision toward slum upgrading projects is proposed.

3.2.1.1 Government Agencies and International Organizations

Government agencies have been intervening in housing programs for slum inhabitants in many roles, mainly through initiating housing policy and allocating funds for programs. Sometimes they perform as a facilitator of technical and management assistant to empower slum dweller capacity. As a middle party, they gather relevant agencies to assist slum inhabitant. However, there have been very few attempts to prevent slum and squatter developments by setting aside urban land for housing slum inhabitants (UNESCAP, 2008:8).

City reconstruction and public housing provisions were recognized as being among the major roles of government (Pornchokchai, 2005:30) and the Thai government made its first attempt in the housing field after World War II when housing was critically in short supply throughout Thailand (Giles, 2003:230). By 1940s, “The Town and Country Planning Act” and “The Welfare Building Act” were launched (Karnjanaprakorn and Bunnag, 1978:40) and was followed by the establishment of many national acts and new government agencies. The formal housing provisions aimed at providing sufficient housing that had been destroyed in the war. Housing needs has been more intensive in urban areas than rural areas and, coupled with the rationale that traditional rural housing is generally self-built, the rural housing shortage was not emphasized to the same extent by national policy. Thereby formal housing provision has been focused around urban areas in particular Bangkok and the provincial capitals (Lee, Hongladaromp, and Pama, 1979:112).

However, what the Thai government provided between the 1940s and 1950s did not directly benefit slum dwellers because the main objective was to accommodate government employees and upper socio-economic classes such as the technocrats and military personnel (Lee et al: 112). During the
1950s, the Public Housing Bureau constructed a public housing project for hire-purchase which later became a popular model. Several government bodies replicated the model of welfare public housing such as the Lottery Bureau, the Thailand Tobacco Monopoly, the State Railway, and the Police Department. However, those public housing projects were delivered to their personnel rather than marginal urban resident (Karnjanaprakorn and Bunnag, 1978:41). Hence, formal housing provision by the government was largely determined by social welfare objectives that purposely supported particular target recipients who were under government agencies’ patronage.

**Government Agency as Primary Housing Agent (PHA) of Public Housing Program in the 1940s – 1950s**

As the beneficiaries were government employees, the public housing program was positively accepted by Thai government bodies as a key strategy of formal housing provision. Public housing was expected to reach the maximum number of beneficiaries and public resource distribution was the goal of the public housing program in this period and was measured by quantity, or the number of completed units. The housing programs were carried out through mass production and large-scale construction using modern technology and materials. An important mechanism of state-driven public housing is government agencies and numerous formal housing organizations and Acts were established between the 1940s and 1950s consisting of the Public Housing Division (1940), the Housing Bureau Act (1942), the Public Housing Bureau (1951), and the Government Housing Bank (1953). These formal organizations strengthened state control over the centralised power structure and a top-down planning framework (Takahashi, 2009:71).

Early in the 1950s, experts from the United Nations (UN) surveyed Bangkok as one of the pilot areas under “The Long-Range Program” which attempted to promote self-help provision in national housing policy (Bureau of Social Affairs, UN EcoSoC, 1961:249). The survey aimed at examining the possibility of applied self-help housing in the local context and established a pilot study. However there was no visible practice in Thailand in this period. At the same time, there were a few private developers involved in the commercial housing market that applied the popular state public housing in the private housing market to accommodate middle and higher income households. From the 1960sonwards, National and international NGOs begun involvement with Thai housing development (Pornchokchai, 2005:30, Buranasiri, 1983:124) but they had limited role in promoting housing development. In contrast Thai government agencies were active in national public housing development and were the biggest housing developer and became the sole powerful agent in terms of policy initiation, project implementation and housing allocation across Bangkok and other major cities.
Formal Housing Provision: Public Housing for Low-Income Households in the 1950s – 1970s

From 1957 to 1960, the Thai government hired Litchfield Whiting Browne and Associates, an American consultant, to produce the Bangkok Master Plan for 1960-1990, called Fueang-Nakhon project that utilized the city beautification approach (Rabibhadaha, 1998:4, Pornchokchai, 2005:57). The proposal included redeveloping basic infrastructure and constructing new government offices. To achieve the goal, the strategy recommended land expropriation in inner Bangkok where approximately 740,000 slum inhabitants lived, based on a 1958 survey (Litchfield Whiting Browne and Associates, 1960; 84). Such a recommendation implied that, at least in the case of Bangkok, the displacement of slum settlements is directly associated with urban development.

In 1959, the Thai government under Marshal Sarit Thanarat launched the slum clearance policy as a part of Revolutionary Law No.44/2502. Rather than dealing with the slum problem as a national agenda, the Thai government delegated responsibility to the local government organization, the Bangkok Municipality. Accordingly, the first implementation of the slum clearance project was adopted in Bangkok with the establishment of ‘The Office of Slum Clearance, Urban Renewal, and Housing’ under the Bangkok Municipality in 1960. According to Senanuch (2004:79-80), the formation of this organization is considered the first acknowledgement by Thai authorities of urban slum problems. The major role of the local slum organization was to be responsible for the prevention, improvement and demolition of slum settlements across Bangkok (BMA, 1992:2). In this period, the formal slum housing provision provided limited choices for inhabitants living in slums: either move out of the city or relocate to government walk-up apartments in remote areas of Bangkok. On the other hand, the majority of displaced households gained partial compensation.

The slum eviction and resettlement scheme under the state policy was first implemented at a slum settlement nearby the Department of Highways in Bangkok in 1960. The Prime Minister and a number of key political figures became ‘conscious of some of the dilapidated residential sections of Bangkok near the King’s royal palace’ (Chui, 1981:73). According to Giles (2003:233) the clearance program that required the displacement of 10,000 people proceeded quickly and the then headquarters of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was later built in its place. Closely following this, 1,570 families were relocated from Rachavidhi and Klong Toey to the Bangkok fringes. These practices demonstrated that the government provision emphasised reducing the number of informal settlements and pushing them out of urban areas and reflected the fact that government agencies did not accept people living in slum settlements as legitimate urban citizens.
The conventional provision of formal housing mainly catered for middle income households and government employees, but the high growth rate in urban informal settlements had shifted the direction of state public housing programs towards low-income households. The Thai government reacted with the adjustment of public housing into a sub-class and contracted private developers as project suppliers. Between the years 1950 and 1973, heavily subsidized public housing was delivered in the formal housing market and comprised of walk-up apartments, duplexes, detached houses, rentals, and hire-purchase options. By 1960, the NHA undertook eight major public housing projects for urban low-income families which included two large projects of low-income public housing in the Din Daeng and Huay Khwang areas of eastern Bangkok. These neighbouring projects involved the construction of 64 five- and six-storey walk-up apartments at Din Daeng and 80 five-storey walk-up apartments at Huay Khwang, for total of 3,920 units. In addition, 780 shop-houses, a shopping centre, a secondary school, six kindergartens and several recreational and sports facilities were planned for the area (Noranitipadungkarn, 1978:106; Sakornpan, 1978:94).

A further 5,120 public housing units for rent and purchase were later built from 1963 to 1971 to assist evicted victims (Pornchockchai, 2004: 33). The construction of five- and six-storey apartments was continually built at Rang Nam road, Yommarat, Din Daeng, and Huay Khwang (Noranitipadungkarn, 1975:390; Sakornpan, 1978:94). However, public housing for low-income household programs could not accommodate the housing needs of the slum population. According to Yap (1993:13-14), many low-income households found the apartments too small, too inflexible, and too far from public transportation. As a result of these negative experiences of people in government public housing apartments, many relocated to slum settlements and sold their occupation eligibility to the upper classes. As a result, the programs were abandoned because the government policies proved ineffective (Yap, De Wandeler, Khanaiklang and Amtapunth, 1993).

Establishment of the National Housing Authority of Thailand (NHA) as Primary Housing Agent of Formal Housing Provision from 1973

Despite the Thai government’s numerous policies and agencies to address the problem of housing shortage, the effort did not produce enough new housing units in the formal market. According to the NHA’s survey, around 17,000 new public housing units were constructed by the four separate housing agencies6 between 1949 and 1973 (NHA, 1973 in Na Talang, 1978:29; Tanphiphat, 1983:113). Those numbers failed to meet the growing housing needs, for which the officially assessed demand was

6 Public Housing Division (1940), Public Housing Bureau (1951), Government Housing Bank (1953) and The Office of Slum Clearance, Urban Renewal, and Housing (1960) (Tanphiphat, 1983:113)
100,000 units in Bangkok alone during the 1960s (Chayachinda, 1978:32). The NHA identified the inefficient performance of government agencies as caused by poor coordination between existing agencies where individual housing programs were carried out independently (Karnjanaprakorn and Bunnag, 1978:42; Panichapak, 2009: 2-6). Other reasons for the low production of housing were financial shortages and a lack of serious support from the central government (Pornchokchai, 2005; 37).

By the year 1963, the committee of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) submitted a comprehensive study of ‘Public Housing Project for Bangkok and Thonburi’ to the Thai government. The report stated that the fragmentation of the housing agencies was itself a major obstacle to a productive public housing sector and recommended that all housing bodies merge into a national autonomous organization. However, the agencies involved refused to consolidate and the idea was rejected by the Council of Ministers (Chayachinda, 1978:17). In 1968, the NESDB reintroduced the institutional organization reform when they gained significant international backing from the World Bank. Moreover, Thai government representatives attended the 1969 ‘Industrialization of Housing Conference’ in Copenhagen where Thai housing problem was highlighted and that the country needed to give immediate attention to the problem of housing deficiency. The government responded to the World Bank and the international conference recommendations by including a housing development agenda in The Third National Economic and Social Development Plan (1972-1976). The plan highlighted, in particular, the promotion of low-income housing as one of the foremost priorities in national policy. Karnjanaprakorn and Bunnag (1978:43) argued that this is the first time the Thai government had fully committed itself to tackling the urban slum housing problem.

The policy was soon reflected in the merging of four housing bodies and the formation of a new housing organization, the National Housing Authority of Thailand (NHA), in 1973. From then on, two bodies became the major housing agencies in Thailand, the NHA as the state agency developer under the Ministry of Interior and the Government Housing Bank (GHB) as the government loan provider. The original objective of the NHA establishment as a state enterprise was to accelerate the production of public housing (Tanphipat in Yeung, 1983:113). To support this increase in production, the government pledged full financial support within a certain time period, normally 5 years, to correspond to the NESDB plan. The NHA also have financial alternatives through local and international subsidies. The new structural reorganization enhanced the NHA’s capacity as the prime housing agent in dealing with housing provision. Although the Thai government stepped back from its role as the leading agent of policy initiation and provision, they still influenced NHA policy through the provision of government funding. Another benefit of the structural reform was the formation of a group
of multi-disciplinary experts gathered from previous government housing bodies so the NHA became a resource pool of policy makers and practitioners who later became an expert network that aided slum communities (Tanphiphat in Yeung, 1983:113). The concept of partnership was rooted in this new organizational culture and the appointed multidisciplinary board consisted of representatives of government ministries, the budget bureau, the governor of Bangkok, the Town and Country Planning Department, the NESDB, and bankers.

From 1973, the NHA became the central organization in dealing with urban slum housing, a role that was transferred from the local authority, the Bangkok Municipality. The NHA oversaw all activities in housing slum inhabitants including slum clearance and resettlement of those households affected by clearance. According to Boonyabancha (2005:3), the NHA had maintained slum clearance and relocation as the major practice of government slum housing provision and there was no evidence of integrating empowerment as a part of any slum upgrading projects. According to the 3rd National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP 1973-1976), the NHA proposed the construction of 30,000 units for low-income households, who had monthly salary between 2,000-5,000 baht. The target group also included households living in slum settlements. The plan aimed at building around 11,273 low-cost apartment units in Bangkok and vicinity provinces that consisted of 7,211 purchased units and 4,062 rental units (Panichapak, 2009:2-18). The major projects were located in Bangkok suburbs such as Huamark, Din Daeng, Bonkai, Klong Toey, Huay Khwang, and Prachanivech. However by the end of the national plan period, only 588 units at Huamark were completed with unfinished projects postponed to the Fourth NESDP. The large amount of planned public housing construction for low-income households reflected the NHA’s perception of formal housing provision as product with quantifiable results.

Prior to 1977, the NHA and international agencies led the development of low-income housing in Thailand while the private sector and NGOs were generally absent. Private developers played an important role of providing formal housing for upper-income households in the real estate market such as the appearance of ‘turn-key housing’ in 1968 (Pornchokchai, 2005:34). A survey in 1969 documented around 40 housing estates that catered to middle and upper-middle income groups (AREA, 2005:34). Although private developers did not enter the low-cost housing market until the early 1980s, they rapidly increased production and, by 1974, built 18,690 new conventional housing units (Yap, 1989:36). In 1967, a Thai NGO for poverty alleviation The International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (www.trrm.org; Kulkanakornsakul, 1999:3) emerged with an emphasis on assisting

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7 Turn-key housing means the provision of completed construction and decoration of housing units where the buyers could ‘turn the key’ and be ready to move in (Pornchokchai, 2005:34).
people in rural areas facing the negative consequences of Thai NESDP implementation and, hence before the time, NGOs had a very limited role in the field of urban slum housing.

**NHA Formal Housing Provision for Slum Households and the Entry of the World Bank: From public housing to aided self-help practices**

The first attempt of the NHA in low-cost housing development was found in the establishment of the Accelerated Plan for 1976-1980. The plan aimed at constructing 120,000 new housing units within 5 years and gave first priority to Bangkok (Yeh and Laquian, 1979:243). The NHA targeted low-income family groups and set construction targets for each. The first eligible group was households earning less than 1,500 baht per month per family and around 50,000 units were intended for construction for this group. The second group was families earning between 1,500 to 3,000 baht per month which was allocated 56,000 units. The third project was 14,000 units for those whose monthly income was between 3,000 to 5,000 baht (Wonghanchao, 1987:178). By March 1976, the Thai government\(^8\) had approved the first NHA plan and the project was granted a 7.5 billion baht subsidy. However, after two years of implementation only 37,000 units were built and the program was terminated by the government in July 1978 due to its limited budget, lack of land acquisition and construction delays (Lee Hongladaromp and Pama, 1979:114). The new Prime Minister\(^9\) withdrew support for the NHA Accelerated Plan, announced that the government would change policy to promote construction of 1,200 public housing flats in Bangkok, and placed housing on the political agenda (Chiu, 1981:134-135).

By 1977, the World Bank advised that Thailand adopt self-help provision as an alternative approach in the national housing policy (Chiu, 1984:38; Panichapak, 2009:2-38), a recommendation that was tied to a World Bank conditional loan. Towards the end of 1978, the NHA proposed the second long-term housing development plan, The Priority Plan (1979-1982). The NHA adopted the self-help provision in the Priority Plan as a dual policy in the 4\(^{th}\) NESDP (1977-1981). The plan comprised of two schemes in which the first aimed at providing public housing for low-income households with 50,000 units for sale and 5,000 units for rent. The second scheme offered 26,800 units of self-help housing and 14,405 units of incremental housing as options for the slum upgrading program as part of the conventional clearance and relocation practice. The NHA optimistically expected that the slum upgrading pilot project could be replicated on a large scale with the full budget recovery from the occupants. The NHA plan demonstrated that the self-help provision was adopted as a way to increase housing stock numbers. Formal housing provision in this period thereby still regarded housing as a

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\(^8\) Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj (M.R.)

\(^9\) Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanan
numerical objective and the entire quantitative target gained a soft-loan from the Thai government in conjunction with the World Bank (Wonghanchao, 1987:179; Tanphiphat, 1983:115).

On the ground, the second long-term plan achieved 27,236 new housing units in total (Panichapak, 2009:2-42). The apparently low outcome was accounted for by the change in government, economic regression, and limited government subsidies. On the other hand, The World Bank was satisfied that the Thai housing agency officially promoted aided self-help in the NHA plan which presented a visible change in the national housing program. Consequently, The World Bank provided further funding for upgrading 160 Bangkok slums (Chiu, 1981:134; UN Department of Public Information, 1978:1119).

The review reveals how the NHA low-cost housing plans usually fell significantly short of its numerical objectives. The withdrawal of the NHA’s housing plans by the higher powers in government also demonstrates that NHA policy and practice were at the mercy of political interests and financial limitations. This points to a repeated pattern of long-term plans being abandoned and replaced with another program before completion could be seen through. Due to this dependence on the annual government subsidy, NHA policy had to respond to individual government priorities more than the actual needs of housing and the target group (Yap, 1992:15; Chiu, 1981:134; Giles, 2003:237; Tanphipat 1983:144; Wonghanchao, 1987:179). Giles (2003) argues that the national housing policy lacked sufficient support of politicians and therefore the well-intended efforts often faced operational problems. Subjected to constant political changes of the 1970s, a national housing policy never emerged (NHA, 2009:12; Tanphipath, 1983:116). Once the World Bank offered a loan, the NHA apparently fell unquestioningly into step with the self-help provision because they are designed to be self-financing with funding from external subsidies. According to Wonghanchao (1987:182), the international sponsorship decreased the NHA’s dependence on government as well as created a broader application of the self-help provision in Thailand. Such alternatives reduced reliance on the government budget and, by extension political domination.

The Emergence of and the Integration of Economic Empowerment as a Part of the Slum Upgrading Project

As a result in the dramatic increase of slum settlements in Bangkok mentioned in section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, the Thai government adopted slum clearance and resettlement to address the slum problem in urban areas. The later change in the state housing policy towards slum settlement resulted in the effort to upgrade slum environmental conditions. Some key factors behind this change were lessons learnt through the Thai government and the NHA practices (Burasasiri, 1983:123). Firstly, slum housing was recognized as associated with the national socio-economic structure. While economic growth stimulates the proliferation of slum settlements in urban areas, slum inhabitants provide an
economic contribution as an informal labour force. Thereby, slum dwellers deserved better socio-economic services and opportunities. Secondly, government agencies acknowledged that slum settlements are the biggest informal housing stock for low-income people. Slum clearance provision produced a negative effect on slum dwellers because it destroyed large amounts of their housing with limited compensation and importantly the displaced slum dwellers moved into other slums or created new settlements. The third factor was connected to state budgetary limitations. Formal housing provision through slum clearance and relocation proved ineffective due partly to the costs and government financial shortage. Lastly, slum eviction increased the conflict between slum settlements and landlords that usually ended up in violence such as arson, fights and shootings. Hence, the destruction of slum settlements was considered to be an ineffective and wasteful option.

In 1977, the NHA established The Office of Slum Community Development under the Department of Research and Construction while practices on the ground showed an immense change in the slum housing approach that shifted from settlement eviction to slum upgrading (NHA, 1991:72). The 1978 NHA Annual Report mentions slum upgrading as a strategy of improvement of physical, social, and economic condition with a minimum expenditure (NHA, 1981:15). There were four objectives to improve informal settlements under the new approach: upgrade the physical environment, secure land ownership, increase low-income household’s income, and provide social services for communities (NHA, 1978:8). The NHA adopted economic empowerment integrated with the slum upgrading program that had been recommended by the World Bank (Panichpak, 2009:2-38). The aim of economic empowerment in slum upgrading was to increase slum inhabitant access to economic resources and opportunities to negotiate land tenure security and basic infrastructure. Now that the NHA believed that economic empowerment contributed to housing rights and social equality, community managed saving and loan schemes played an important role in slum upgrading programs that aimed to improve the financial capacity of individual and collective slum households. As an alternative to top-down government driven approach, slum upgrading promotes slum inhabitant participation by bringing people together and helping them to manage their own resources in various measures such as asset-sharing, labour volunteering and networking with government agencies.

The slum upgrading program was first implemented in Thailand under the NHA Priority Plan, endorsed by the World Bank and the UN Habitat, which was undertaken from 1979 to 1982 with the aim to upgrade 26,800 units. Five development alternatives were adopted to be customized with individual community context including: slum upgrading in existing locations, slum re-blocking, reconstruction, slum relocation and land-sharing. The slum upgrading program set the target group of beneficiaries as the low-income people who individually earned less than 2,500 baht per month.
(Buranasiri, 1983:124). The program categorized settlements into three groups depending on land security tenure. The first option was community upgrading for permanently settled communities and provided public utilities, community facilities, socio-economic condition improvement and land tenure. The second option was community upgrading for temporary community. The third option was informal settlement designed for slum clearance, with beneficiaries provided resettlement or partial compensation. The project was financed by the Thai government annual budget of 1.5 billion baht and a 700 million baht loan from international lenders comprising the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and USAID. The housing mortgages were to be fully recovered from the beneficiaries (Panichapak, 2009:2-38, 2-46).

At the end of the 4th NESDP, the NHA had upgraded about 8,324 slum units. Subsidised by global organizations, in 1978 slum upgrading projects were undertaken at communities in Bangkok such as King Petch, WatYai Srisupan, Wat Chan Praddharam, Soi Sri Phum, and Wat Soy Thong. By 1979, slum upgrading projects under the government budget were conducted, for instance, at the Jerusalem community, WatPhaiton, Sawadee-Raksa, Trok Mamaung, and WatPraya Kai. In 1981, the NHA undertook a relocation project at Bang Bua and Lad BuaKhao community. Based on the literature survey of this period, these projects contributed critical lessons to the relevant agencies in particular the capacity of community organization as an active agent of a slum upgrading project. However, the practice on the ground resulted in a low number of upgraded units, much fewer than the original goal. There were a number of reasons for the outcome. According to Boonyabancha (2005:3), government agencies were not keen to deal with the illegal status of slum settlements and other socio-economic aspects, and mainly focussed on physical provision and upgrading of basic infrastructure such as walkway and drainage, undertaken in cooperation with landlords and other state government agencies. If any stakeholders refused to cooperate – in particularly the landlord, amenity provision was usually suspended. Panichapak’s (2009:2-41) study revealed a similar picture of compromised slum upgrading projects that attempted to address community socio-economics in a holistic housing approach. Tanphipat (1983:115) mentioned another limitation of practice where it was only during the process of project implementation did experts, including planners, architects, and economists become familiar with slum upgrading issues. Significantly, the pilot slum upgrading projects were affected by unrealistic quantitative expectations.

Buranasiri (1983:126) identifies two major problems of slum upgrading implementation which came down to land acquisition and a lack of cooperation from slum dwellers. Land acquisition was a crucial factor for any slum upgrading program. In practice, the NHA lawyers negotiated with potential landlords or developers. While simultaneously, suitable slum settlements were identified. The
negotiation process for the landlords’ consent was usually difficult and time consuming. Many landowners with unused land do not hesitate to accommodate those who seek land to build their houses as long as the occupancy was temporary as the landlord could terminate slum households on short notice when they intend to develop the land or the land value increases. But slum upgrading was a kind of land tenure formalization that landlords were unwilling to deal with. Landowners were hesitant to allow the settlement to be upgraded as upgrading means continued occupation by slum dwellers, turning temporary residents to long term or permanent dwellers. Importantly, there’s also the possibility of selling their property at a lower than market price to the urban slum households. As a result, the majority of private land owners refused to be involved in slum upgrading programs, while public landlords were more accommodating. Secondly, slum inhabitants avoided cooperating with slum upgrading projects because they were worried that the project was a means for eventual eviction. The project also required partial cost recovery on infrastructure investments from residents and many slum households cannot afford the cost. Moreover, the projects may not be in the interests of the rental households who will see their rent increase when the infrastructure is improved (Yap and Wandeler, 2010:334). While the project failed in cost recovery and timely delivery, the NHA eventually succeeded in developing a positive attitude among slum residents toward slum upgrading projects as they maintained an active role in local settings (Buranasiri, 1983:124).

Lastly, national politics often hindered progress in slum upgrading. Formal housing provisions are favoured by politicians for political gains. In 1980, the Prime Minister withdrew support for the NHA Priority Plan and promoted the construction of public housing and walk-up flats in Bangkok. The NHA Priority Plan was later placed on the new election agenda (Chiu, 1981). According Yap and Wanderler (2010:335), the Plan not only fell short of their targets, but politicians intervened to divert the funds for other purposes.

Practice of Self-help Housing: Administrative Restructure and tenure security
Toward the early 1980s, the Thai government established the 5th NESDP (1982-1986) which emphasized the reduction of rural poverty through promoting development in major regional cities outside of Bangkok. Intensive infrastructure investments resulted in higher population growth rates in regional cities than in Bangkok and nearby provinces. According to the National Statistics Office, the population growth outside Bangkok was 1.9% per year while it was 1.5% in Bangkok. The NESDP Board used these figures as the basis to determine the number of low-income housing needed that was estimated at around 117,000 units countrywide. Within this number, the government categorized two target groups according to monthly income. The first group was low-income households who earn between 10-50% above the poverty level. The government considered them low-middle income
families and provided funding for basic infrastructure including both external and internal construction. The second group was households with a monthly income lower than 10% above the poverty level where the government provided 100% financial support for housing development, an option that emphasised people living in informal settlements. Focusing in urban areas, the NESDP Board estimated that the need of housing units for low-income households was around 42,000, while approximately 30,000 slum housing units were to be upgraded (The Office of The Prime minister, 1982). This proposed goal was based on the NHA database which ascertained that about 30% of Bangkok’s population who inhabited in slums or were squatters but the majority of these were land rentals on private land (NHA, 1981:15).

The NHA and international agencies collaborated to lead the implementation of the state slum upgrading program. The 5th NESDP Board established the National Housing Committee in 1982 as a housing policy advisor to the NHA which comprised of the representatives of public and private housing organizations lead by the former NHA director. The Board acknowledged the increasing importance of a low-cost housing program as a key to solve the problem of informal settlements as well as to boost economic development. As a result, low-cost housing program was first addressed as a part of the national agenda (Panichapak, 2009:2-51) and several innovative projects were initiated by this committee such as the National Housing Database, the National Housing Report, the Housing Development Fund for community organizations and the Public-Private Partnership as the agent to deliver affordable housing (Chaiyanunt, 2007:53).

By the year 1983, the NHA was restructured to address the national policy that increasingly emphasized low-cost housing development. The Office of Slum Development, formerly supervised under the Department of Research and Construction, became an independent organization and was upgraded to become the Department of Slum Development with the authority to manage its own action plan and budget. The major role of the Department was to be responsible for program implementation in local settings. In practice, the projects were delivered by bilateral and multilateral agencies such as community organizations, private developers and local government agencies. Simultaneously, the Centre for Human Settlement Studies (CHHSS) was established to pool housing expertise in various fields such as housing finance, social welfare and community development. The centre was concerned with research development and knowledge distribution and carried out trainings. The new structure resulted in the formal separation between the agent of project initiation and the agent of project implementation. These two agencies later established progressive projects.

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10 Dr. Watanyu Na Talang was the first NHA Director between 1973 and 1975. He is recognized as the founder of low-income housing development in Thailand (NHA, 2012 and Panichapak, 2009:2-51)
such as the Centre of National Housing Data Bank, the Housing Management Information System and the Academic Centre of Housing and Human Security as important mechanism to promote housing development.

Another important aspect of the NHA re-organization was the increasing collaboration across institutions involved in the low-cost housing program. The CHHSS and The Department of Slum Development conducted collaborative projects with domestic and international organizations, for example the governments of Norway, the Netherlands, and the Asian Development Bank. Likewise, the World Bank subsidized a third loan to NHA for the low-cost housing program because they were satisfied with the NHA’s active role in promoting self-help and slum upgrading programs. Consequently, about 21 million baht was provided to slum upgrading projects in Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, Songkhla, Phuket and Sara Buri (Chiu, 1981:134; UN Department of Public Information, 1978:1119; Panichapak, 2009:2-69). The NHA restructuring, the institutional collaboration, and the international subsidy combined to enhance the NHA’s capacity as the prime housing agency in Thailand.

In 1982 the NHA, on behalf of the Department of Slum Development and the CHHSS, proposed the slum upgrading program as a part of the 5th NESDP on the basis of minimal reliance on government subsidies (Tanphiphat, 1983:116). Rental housing and the site and service projects were not subsidized and beneficiary households had to fully repay housing loans. However, slum upgrading projects were initially financed by the state annual budget with a low rate housing mortgage with the cost recoverable indirectly through taxation. The reduced reliance on Thai government subsidies meant that the NHA became less subject to periodic changes of government priorities as in the past. To reduce the cost of investment, the NHA adopted a ‘land banking’ scheme as an alternative formal housing provision for site and service and the slum upgrading projects. Land banking is the practice of purchasing un-developed land with the intent to upgrade it for future NHA housing projects.

The NHA bought and in urban areas from public landowners at a lower price than the conventional market due to negotiations between government agencies. In the case of private landlords, the NHA usually gained land in the urban fringes through different approaches such as purchasing, leasing, land expropriation and land use regulation enforcement. These areas were later upgraded for the location of site and service projects and slum relocation projects. By the end of the 5th NESDP, the NHA had purchased land in Bangkok and the vicinity to the tune of 306.6 rai\(^{11}\), 516.03 rai of land in regional areas and leased 27 rai of land from public landowners (Panichapak, 2009:2-56). Land

\(^{11}\) rai is a Thai unit of land area measurement. 1 rai is equal to about 1,600 square metres
banking brought a new approach to slum upgrading implementation. Rather than providing new locations for individual slum settlements that were affected by eviction, the NHA gathered several slum settlements together in the same place. By the early 1980s, many slum settlements were relocated from inner urban areas to alternative land banks that the NHA had continuously collected over time. For example, the seven slum settlements at Don Maung were evicted due to the construction of the Bangkok Elevated Road and Trains System mega project, also known as Hopewell. All evicted settlements were later resettled at Chalong Krung and also included slums at Rachada-pisek, Klong Toey and Rom Khao.

The NHA long-term plan as a part of the 5th NESDP was to build 30,000 new self-help units, and increase slum upgrading in existing locations to 18,000 units. It affected 55,000 people or around 12% of the total slum population in Thailand at that period. The NHA reoriented project area targets from Bangkok to nine major cities in regional areas because the NESDP policy promoted major regional cities such as Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, and Nakorn Sawan. The extension of the target areas increased the possibility of implementing self-help housing and slum upgrading programs on a large scale.

At the end of the 5th NESDP, the NHA revealed the positive outcome that a total of 31,236 new self-help housing units had been built, 13,005 units of the basic infrastructure was upgraded in existing slum communities, and just a small number of households, approximately 231 units were relocated (Panichapak, 2009:2-56, 2-57, 2-58, 2-62). This project covered several slum communities across the Bangkok metropolitan area such as Klong Toey, Sengki, Wat Lad Bua Khaow, Rom Kroaw1-6, Sam Yod, Rama IV, and On-Nuch. Between 1978 and 1991, the NHA upgraded 132 slum settlements which included 51,000 households in Thailand (Yap, 1992:15). The NHA claimed the case of Chalong Krung as a new approach to slum relocation that collected many slum settlements together in the same area, however many beneficiary households declined to exercise their eligibility because the new location was too far from their source of employment and lacked public transportation (Visetpreecha, 2008:44). For low-income earners, wasted time commuting often resulted in lost income opportunities (Yap and Wandeler, 2010:337).

Although the NHA received praise for the implementation of slum upgrading projects over the last decade, Pornchokchai's post-evaluation study (2005:59) revealed that the program was not cost effective and it created a high debt burden and noted that the limitation of this policy was the financing the provision of access to land. Due to economic growth, urban land became more valuable to develop for alternative purposes. As a result, land values were too high to be affordable and it was
costly to allocate urban land for low-income households. Land owners were another key issue which limited implementation of the slum upgrading program, as highlighted by Yap and Wandeler (2010:335) and Pornchokchai (2005:58), particularly as the majority of landlords did not consider land tenure formalization an acceptable option as the land became a more valuable asset during period of economic growth. Consequently, few private landlords participated in slum upgrading projects and, moreover, the number of slum evictions remained high, particularly on private land (FRSN, 2010:4).

Decentralization of power from central government to local organization: Emergence of community organization in urban slum development

By 1986, the slum upgrading control act was amended and the NHA devolved the slum upgrading program to local government supervision (BMA, 1992:9). The structural reform was a part of a decentralization of power from the central government to local organizations (Senanuch, 2004:88). Under the new act, the NHA performed as a know-how facilitator and financial provider. This legislation made Bangkok and local municipality’s key players in the implementation of slum upgrading projects in their authorized area. The Bangkok Municipality set up the Division of Social Work under the Department of Social Welfare and, according to Senanuch (2004:84), was the first time a formal provider promoted community based organization development in an urban slum settlement. Collective community development based projects such as drug prevention; social welfare and income generation were integrated with the slum upgrading project. The Division of Social Work created an official representative officer and a titled community developer in every district office. Along with the implementation of the slum upgrading project, the community developer assisted local residents in slum settlements to establish community organizations. Along with the inhabitants, the community developer advocated public elections for the community leader and committee members as representatives to function as intermediaries between local authorities and slum dwellers (BMA, 1992:4).

The entry of local government agencies into the slum upgrading project led to the formation of local networks across areas, savings groups and community organizations. Local government officials acknowledged community organizations more positively and recognized that local people are not a barrier and had the potential to be partners in state housing programs. Formal organization’s housing responsibilities were visible at the national and local scales and, as Giles (2003:238) noted, the period between 1977 and 1986 can be viewed as the slum upgrading phase in Thailand.

Establishment of Enable Market Housing Policy: The Private Sector and Community Organizations as PHA.
The 1980s and 1990s is considered a booming economic period in Thailand. The rapid growth of foreign investment, in particularly in manufacturing and export-oriented industrialization, could be identified as the major driver of housing in this time (Pornchokchai, 2005:37). This is the first time that the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP was significantly greater than that of the agricultural sector (Senanuch, 2004:88). Housing and real estate began booming, especially former agricultural land in the fringe area which now had higher value due to alternative industrial uses. Similarly, inner city land occupied by slum settlements could be utilized for other economic purposes. Economic growth was also associated with low-interest housing rates and decreases in oil prices, electricity and construction material costs. Hence, Bangkok had become a truly enabling environment for property investment in the private market.

In response to this phenomenon, the Thai government imported the concept of ‘Housing Market Enablement’ into The 6th NESD Plan (1987-1991) which was endorsed by the World Bank and the UN Habitat (Giles, 2003:239; Kuraesin, 1998). It must be noted that the Thai national housing policy defined the term ‘market’ here as also encompassing state low-cost housing programs. As a result, the critical change in formal housing provision can be found at two levels. At the operational level, enabling market policy renewed the role of the primary housing agent, namely the private sector and community organizations, which function in the different area of Thai housing development. Although large scale developers have not been involved in Thai low-cost housing policy prior The 6th NESDP, the small scale private sector was involved through the private real estate market. Enablement augmented the role of the private sector as the new leading housing agent in the formal housing market and private developers were introduced in joint ventures with the government housing project for urban low-income households. On the other hand, community organizations were promoted as the primary housing agent of the informal housing sector.

The NHA and Thai government focused on political, economic and financial structural reform aspects of formal housing provision as the increasing capacity of the private sector and community organizations required a supportive environment at the national level (Takahashi, 2009:75). The Thai government prescribed legislative support to mobilize relevant resources of the two new primary agencies such as low-interest housing mortgage rates for home builders, financial deregulation, and property tax decreases. The institutional reform reflects the change in the role of the NHA and the Thai government which gradually decreased their role in the implementation process, from direct to indirect involvement, while private developers and community organizations took more responsibilities to carry out state housing programs. In September 1983, the cabinet approved the first enable housing framework that emphasised the significant role of private developers in low-income housing.
and the collaboration between the NHA, the GHB and with commercial banks as the program facilitators (Pornchokchai, 2005:36; Haan and Kuilen, 1986:35). The quantitative target for low-cost housing was 22,000 units and the slum upgrading program was expanded to provide basic infrastructure for 20,000 slum housing units (Office of The Prime Minister, 1987).

In 1992 the Thai government subsidized the initial capital of 1.25 billion baht for urban community organization development. The funding administrator was a new agency, the Urban Community Development Organization (UCDO) that was administrated by the NHA. The purpose of the funding was to increase slum inhabitant financial assets and capacity through several community practices such as micro-credit, a broader collaborative network among low-income community organizations, and to boost accessibility to land tenure security (Boonyabancha, 2003:5). Panichapak (2009:3-19) argues that the establishment of the UCDO funding and office reflected the change in approach of formal housing provision, from housing as a product to housing as a process. Instead of focusing solely on unit numbers, the low-cost housing program invested in increasing community capacity that focuses particularly on community managed saving schemes.

The years between 1980 and the mid-1990s was a relative long period of economic growth in Bangkok. The deregulation of the market enabling policy resulted in the high number of new affordable housing unit (Dowall, 1992:25; 1989:327). The ‘Bangkok phenomenon’ has been widely known for the practice of enabling environment for private sector investment in a low-cost housing market (Keivani and Werna, 2001:201) which met the housing demands of the middle and low-income populations. Prior to 1986, most detached houses and townhouses catered to higher income households, but since the implementation of enabling market policy, there was a down market trend to build cheaper housing units. Many private developers competed for projects by providing a range of building types which yielded affordable prices. Most of these were four-to five-storey walk-up apartments with a floor area of 30-40 sq. metres per unit (Yap and Wandeler, 2010:336). In total 297,347 units of affordable housing were built in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) between 1994 and 1997 (Pornchokchai, 2005:36). About 41% of those units were priced at an average of 373,000 baht, which was considered a reasonable price for the low-income family. Pornchokchai (2005:50) even argued that there was no shortage of affordable housing for urban low-income households in the decade of the 1990s.

However, while the 1990s saw a boom in low-cost housing in the private market, it brought little benefit to the urban low-income households (Boonyabancha, 2005:5). A relatively large proportion of those affordable apartment units had been taken up by higher income groups as investments (Yap,
Unfortunately, finance deregulation in the early 1990s led to increased speculation of properties and according to The Agency for Real Estate Affairs of Thailand survey, 35% of about 300,000 units in 1995 remained vacant despite having been sold (AREA, 1995:65). Affordable units delivered by private developers under the market oriented enablement policy often benefited the higher socio-economic households rather than increase housing provision for low-income households, the intended beneficiaries of the policy (Keivani and Werna, 2001:202), despite the government’s claims to the contrary.

At another level, the UCDO funding brought a positive outcome to community organizations and participating households. Thavinpipatkul (1997:180) reported that 76.92 million baht in housing project loans and 27.01 million baht in non-project housing loans were approved and allocated to 17,629 low-income households between 1992 and 1996. Moreover, the UCDO claimed that 950 community savings groups and more than 100 community networks had been set up as a tangible outcome of the fund (Boonyabancha, 2003:5). Grants for minimal infrastructure upgrading had been provided in 796 communities and benefited 68,208 families. Furthermore, more than 1 billion baht had been provided in loans and assets and some 2 billion baht had been generated by the projects (UCDO: 2000:10; Panichapak, 2000:1-41; Boonyabancha, 2003:vi).

The increasing number of community organizations, brought in by UCDO funding, led to a change in state housing provision that changed from focusing on individual communities to network of communities. With the provision of capital for community development, saving groups working with the UCDO became larger and more numerous (Boonyabancha, 2005:v). However UCDO experienced difficulties connecting with many individual community organizations which implemented housing loans and the housing development process through their local networks, rather than through the UCDO. These local networks created their own agendas and ways of working together to reduce administrative procedures and better respond to actual local needs. This situation led the UCDO into a new approach of providing state housing programs and funding where loans are provided to promote community organization networks as well as individual ones. These networks became the new channel for individual community organizations to access the UCDO capital and distribute the funds to their local members. Through this mechanism, the UCDO can quickly distribute large amounts of money via networks, performing as the true facilitators of the networks. Consequently in 1996, the Council of Community Organization (CCO), an alliance of community organizations under UCDO’s patronage that developed linkages through the practice of community-managed saving schemes, was established. The objective of the CCO is to facilitate savings for housing development.
and security tenure. Once communities achieved financial strengthening, they could purchase or lease land for long-term occupancy.

Towards CODI and BMK: An Integration of Socio-Economic Empowerment as a Part of Slum Upgrading Programs

Over a decade of economic growth in Thailand from the 1980s to the mid-1990s, the government developed the long-term vision of the country by 2020 with the aim to change the development orientation of the country (Office of The Prime Minister, 1997). This manifested in the 8th NESDP (1997-2001) which shifted the national development approach from an emphasis on an economic orientation to people centred development. The new vision was consistent with the strong democratization movement of the period, manifesting in the new 1997 Constitution that advocated increasing public participation in the government decision-making process and decentralization of the government planning structure. Under the Constitution, a number of third party organizations were established, for example: the National Counter Corruption Commission, the National Human Rights Commission, the Constitutional Court, etc. These independent institutions were recognized as a key mechanism to enhance popular political power, for instance, balancing government power, providing checks on politician responsibility, and dealing with state administration.

However, within a few months of announcing the Constitution, Thailand suffered a severe economic collapse. The 1997 economic crisis had a huge impact, particularly on financial institutions and caused serious unemployment and income reductions. Urban low-income households also encountered increasing debts. A study of the UCDO commission between 1997 and 1998 reveals that 64% of 5,745 households in 130 communities with a family income in the lowest 10 per cent income bracket in Thailand faced income reductions during this period. The average income drop was 24% (UCDO, 1998:3). As a result, savings activities in many community organizations nearly collapsed because community members could not afford regular savings. On the other hand, the rate of slum evictions was reduced by the downturn in the national economy (Boonyabancha, 2005:13).

In September 1998, the Thai government launched The Social Investment Fund (SIF) for the five year period after the economic crisis in July 1997. The fund was subsidized by the World Bank and the IMF with the condition that the government implemented the Socio-Economic Investment Project as a key approach for economic recovery (Senanuch, 2004:98). The fundamental objective was to convert the economic crisis into an opportunity for national economic and social structural reform. Many adaptive measures were taken such as community empowerment, government and civil society partnership development and good governance (World Bank, 1999:21).
The economic crisis forced adjustments to formal housing provisions for low-income households. Subsequently, the UCDO promoted partnerships of urban low-income savings groups in the same city that had similar development issues and common interests such as the nature of occupation, public/private landlord and location. This provided a horizontal financial network where individual savings group transferred debt repayment to the collective. As large scale networks, community organizations could help groups manage mortgage problems together. Moreover, several programs introduced since the UCDO funding had identified productive connections and extensions such as those based on social welfare, housing-community planning, and income generation. Consequently, community networks emerged at different levels, from national, regional, within-city, and district wide. These developments suggest that community horizontal networking has been recognized and accepted by institutional and community stakeholders as a powerful mechanism for larger scale development of low-income housing.

The expansion of community networks brought about an immense change and restructuring of the UCDO. By the year 2000, the UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund to form the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI). The agency became an independent public organization under the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, rather than under NHA supervision. Within the new administrative structure, CODI was able to apply directly for the annual government budget. The CODI continued the UCDO’s housing based socio-economic development approach, and expanded the target group to cover 30,000 rural community organizations (Boonyabancha, 2005:7). The UCDO structural change was also related to the government’s12 pro-poor policy between 2001 and 2003. The pro-poor policy targeted poverty alleviation of the urban and rural poor and to guarantee equal access to national resources and opportunities (The 54th Government of Thailand, 2001). Many popular policies were launched in this period such as Debt Suspension for Farmers, One Tambon-One Product13, Drug prevention, One Million Baht Community Fund, and Universal Health Assurance.

Low-cost housing was also integral in the pro-poor policy. In January 2003, the Thai government announced two mega housing programs with different approaches to address low-income housing problems with an ambitious goal to construct 1,000,000 new low-cost housing units within 5 years between 2003 and 2007. The first national housing program is the ‘supply driven’ Baan Ur Arthorn (BUA or We Care Housing), a low-cost public housing for sale at a lower price than the conventional

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12 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
13 The project aimed at enabling individual communities to develop and market its own local product, based on traditional know-know and expertise.
housing market. The NHA was tasked with the design, construction and sale of ready-to-occupy flats and houses at a subsidized rate. The objective was to build 600,000 new housing units targeting low-income households who can afford the ‘rent-to-own’ payment of 1,200 baht per month if the family income is lower than 15,000 baht per month. The second national housing program is the ‘demand driven’ Baan Mankong Program (BMK or Secured Housing) to be implemented by the CODI. This is the slum upgrading program which channels government funds in the form of infrastructure subsidies and housing loans directly to slum communities. The program aims to improve housing quality, living conditions and settlement ownership for 300,000 slum households in 200 cities across the country (Boonyabancha, 2005:24-25). The target group of the BMK program is inhabitants living in informal settlements threatened by insecure tenure problems. Hence, the BMK project benefits different socio-economic classes living in slum settlements, not only genuine low-income families. Building on the Socio-Economic Investment Project that the Thai government launched in 1998, the CODI focused on socio-economic empowerment to promote the BMK slum upgrading program at the nationwide scale.

Community managed savings schemes are the key mechanism of socio-economic empowerment as the saving process incrementally improves resident managerial capacity and assets. This approach was soon reflected in three unique concepts of the BMK program. Firstly, the program gives first priority toward community strengthening and, when that has been achieved, to building houses. This reflects a fundamental shift from NHA’s conventional approach of the slum upgrading program that, since 1977, had focused on housing as product and quantitative outcomes. BMK regards slum upgrading as a housing process that empowers the target community as well as improves land tenure security. The processes of community managed savings and the housing planning/design/construction are the major informal learning process that leads to land tenure security. Once a community achieve strong collective power demonstrated in the various forms of community organization, the CODI channels funding for house construction.

Secondly, the CODI puts the existing slum community organization and their neighbourhood organizations at the centre of BMK development process (www.codi.or.th/baanmankong, 6th October 2004) and not individual households. In the BMK program, the community organizations are formally recognized as the local network of the low-cost housing agent which ensures real collective power among agencies. Additionally, this framework promotes slums as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of the BMK program. Thirdly, the BMK is the slum upgrading program at the citywide scale highlighting that the slum upgrading program has been integrated as a part of the city/district/national development agenda rather than as isolated, individual development issues. This includes the formation of a

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14 The Government Saving Bank (GSB) was assigned to provide housing loan for another 100,000 units
citywide network of relevant actors who are brought together as local partners across public, private and NGOs institutions. The upgrading process is implemented in many areas at the same time across the city because the process creates constant exchanges between projects for all those involved. In order to achieve the quantitative objective, the BMK program set only ten pilot communities to be implemented in 2003, which was extended to 174 in 2004. Between 2005 and 2007, the CODI expected to scale up the maximum target to 285,000 units across Thailand (CODI, (2003:11 and 2004:1).

In conclusion, since 1957 the Thai government agencies have played a leading role in providing formal housing provision to inhabitants living in slum settlements. In response to problems faced, government agencies have also worked selectively, in conjunction with international organizations and the private sector as partnerships, to deliver formal housing provision to people living in slums. Due to the different visions and practices, formal housing provisions have been formulated in the context of conflicting rather than coordinated practices. Over decades, this has evolved to the slum upgrading practice that emphasises housing as a process of empowering community organization and local networks to be the leading agent of community development. Socio-economic empowerment has become a vital development mechanism of slum upgrading programs under Thai government provisions.

3.2.2 Informal Housing Provision
This section discusses the significance of informal housing provision by NGOs and their alliances who worked with inhabitants living in slums since the late 1970s. Despite well-intentioned formal housing provision efforts, government agencies and the private sector did not have much influence in addressing slum housing problems, in particular the issue of slum eviction. This situation led to the entry of NGOs that utilized alternative approaches to strategically assist people living in slum settlements to achieve land tenure security by incorporating the slum upgrading process into political empowerment. Based on a political approach, NGOs provide support to slum community organizations in accomplishing institutional and policy reform. The development of informal housing provision is discussed chronologically in the following sections.

3.2.2.1 Slum Eviction in the Era of National Industrialization and the Entry of NGOs as Partners in Slum Housing Development
Although the Thai government has provided significant effort to address the slum housing problem through a variety of formal policies and agencies, practices on the ground substantiate the view that
those attempts are unable to accommodate all aspects of slum housing needs. Based on Thailand’s experience, the growth in the number of slum settlements is closely related to a major problem facing over one million slum dwellers: the threat of eviction. The number of slum settlements has progressively increased for many years. According to Pornchokchai (1985:1) in 1940 there were 86 slums in Bangkok, rising to 183 in 1950, and 361 in 1960. Since the mid-1970s, the number of slum inhabitant has been consistently estimated at over one million. By the end of the 3rd NESDP (1976), the NHA survey found that the number of migrants to Bangkok had dramatically increased to about 133,000 families or 800,000 persons (Senanuch, 2004:84). Although the estimates of the number of slum inhabitants varied between Pornchokchai and the NHA survey, the data is consistent in that, prior to the late 1970s, the number of slum settlements continuously increased, mainly in major cities and mostly in metropolitan Bangkok.

Before the arrival of the slum upgrading program, government agencies adopted legal measures to deal with the growth of urban slum settlements and often inhabitants ended up being forcibly evicted. Prior to the 1980s, slum eviction occurred on public land much more than on private land due to urban infrastructure development on government land that occurred between the 1st and the 4th NESDP. According to Boonyabancha (1982:4), the distribution of slum areas already evicted and under eviction on public land is 66.2% and 21.7% on private land. The evictions were widely reported in the press including the 1973 Trok Tai slum which faced eviction from the temple and Crown Property Bureau; the 1983 Klong Ban-Or community evicted from Royal Irrigation Department land; followed closely by the community clearance of TrokPhai Singto slum and Rachada slum on State Railway of Thailand land in the following year (Chantarapa, 2009:44). Such a climate resulted in the entry of NGOs in the slum housing arena who became more active in resisting eviction in the 1980s (Rabibhadaha, 2009:24; Giles, 2003:236, Mitlin, 2001; Kunkanakornsakul, 1999:91).

The first NGOs associated with slum development issues was founded in 1973 (Chantarapa, 2009:44; Tongdeelet, 2000:11; Kunkanakornsakun, 1999:91; Kongpan, 2002:7, TFF, 2010:1). They were a group of civil servants who formed the ‘Slum Problem Study Group’ to collect information and partially assisted a slum community in the Klong Toey in Bangkok. They provided community services that local authorities usually refuse to provide due to the contravention of by-laws and sub-standard aspects of slum settlements. In practice, government agencies recruited NGOs for specific project implementation that the government did not undertake and, since then, many NGOs emerged that advocated for urban slum inhabitants, particularly in Bangkok and major regional cities, such as Duang Prateep Foundation (founded in 1978), Friends of Woman (1980), and Foundation of Enfant in Slum under Royal Highness Princess Patronage (1981).
Between 1977 and 1987, individual slum households were forced to unite, organize, and protect their settlement against eviction, increasingly collaborating with NGO partners. Some NGOs also provided funding and technical support to unite individual slum households into community based organizations. Over two decades, NGOs were gradually accepted among slum inhabitants as partners who speak on behalf of their community. The proactive role of anti-settlement eviction and vigorous negotiation for land ownership is a practice that is commonly found in Thai slum communities under NGO patronage. However, at this time there was no tangible evidence of any form of NGO networks or slum federations and the many local NGOs often worked independently and had a limited contribution to individual slum communities negotiating with landowners (Vechayachai, 1984:26).

3.2.2.2 Slum Eviction in the Era of Economic Prosperity and the Emergence of NGO Slum Networks

As discussed above, in the early 1980s toward the mid-1990s Thailand became an enabling environment for the private sector to meet the housing demands of low-income families (Angel and Chuated, 1990; Dowell, 1989; Yap and Wandeler, 2010). The national economic growth rate was often 7% or more per year and consequently private real estate was booming. Massive foreign investment sharply increased in industrial and finance sectors and private developers had easy access to housing loans from commercial banks. As a result, most urban centres in Thailand expanding greatly with many affordable housing projects initiated throughout the country. In this period, the growth of the national economy directly affected slum eviction in Thailand. As the demand for land for development was high, landowners and developers often pressured slums occupying economically attractive land. The phenomenon was widely recognized by local organizations and was echoed by international agencies. In 1987, the UN announced ‘The International Year of Shelter for the Homeless and the Habitat Forum’ and The Habitat Forum was held in Berlin Germany (McLeod and Mullan, 2006:11). They emphasized the fact that strong economic growth had provided employment opportunities for all, however intensive economic development had also resulted in eviction pressure on slums and squatter communities. At these international forums, the focus was particularly on Thailand, identified as one of the seven countries which had the most serious problem of housing insecurity (Senanuch, 2004:89).

According to the FRSN (2010:4) survey, in the era of economic expansion squatter relocation was mostly instigated by developers on private land. Although many slum communities have some form of land rental agreement with landlords, their centrally located settlements were subjected to greater pressure for demolition and redevelopment. An NHA study (1980) noted that by the end of the 1980s,
of the 24% of Bangkok’s population that lived in 1,500 low-income settlements, about 21% of slum inhabitants in Bangkok reported having eviction problems. Due to the widespread practice of forced eviction, many large urban slum settlements were fragmented into smaller settlements scattered all over the suburban areas (Boonyabancha, 1982:13). As a result, slum settlements apparently decreased to only 13% in Bangkok, but in contrast settlements have been observed to increase in the adjacent dormitory provinces such as Nontaburi, Pathum Thani and Samut Prakarn (Pornchockchai, 1985:1).

In the era of rapid economic growth, increased eviction threats brought immense changes to the individual slum community organizations. Many slum community leaders sought to share lessons learned and other techniques to counter slum eviction while NGOs that advocated for slum settlements under eviction became increasingly networked with international agencies (Kunkanakornsakun, 1999:91). The significance of unifying slum households as a community organization was highlighted by the one of the Thai NGOs leader: ‘the land tenure agreement cannot be negotiated by individual slum households. Once the slum could command a large number of members, it increased its larger and louder power to negotiate. Hence, slum households must unite together in order for everyone’s needs to be met’ (FRSN-3/M/L/BKK)). The sharing of experiences and common challenges led to the formation of a slum community network, the ‘Centre of Slum’ in 1986 that registered as a non-public organization and evolved to become the unofficial resource pool of slum organizations for Thai and international NGOs (Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, 2011:1; Chantarapa, 2009:44).

During this period, civil society in Thailand was strengthened due to changes in socio-economic and political structure at the national level. Ockey (1997:8) argued that the shift in national structure was closely tied to economic growth which supported the massive expansion in the size and importance in the role of NGOs, the media, and middle class institutions. The establishment of the 1997 Constitution consolidated and manifested the growing role of civil society (Senanuch, 2004:93). From these changes, the number of NGOs addressing slum problems increased during the 1990s and by 1992, there were at least 32 registered and 19 unregistered NGOs in Thailand (Ockey, 1996:52). Key NGOs include the Four Region Slum Network, the People’s Organization for Development, the Building Together Association and The Human Settlements Foundation (Rabibhadana, 2009:29; Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, 2011:1-2; Boonyabancha, 2003:3). Thai NGOs sought subsidies from international donors, mainly from Europe, the US and Japan. There were several regional and global

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15 Such as the Human Settlement Foundation Thailand

16 FRSN, discussed in the next section below
organizations that provided financial support to Thai NGOs and slums such as the Danish Cooperation for Environment and Development (DANCED), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Unger, 1998:41).

FRSN National Network of Slum Community Organization Political Empowerment as Alternative Approach to Slum Upgrading Program

Despite the private housing market expansion between the late 1980s and 1990s, real estate housing market was unable to reach the poorest 30% of the population (Boonyabancha, 2005:2). Affordable housing became associated with the speculation of upper socio-economic classes, while the genuine target was left out. Overall UCDO practices have been ineffective to bring any visible changes in land use policies and slum evictions and NGOs and many slum communities became frustrated with the limitations of UCDO’s process (Visetpreecha, 2008:43-45). Moreover, the saving process was not an effective solution to secure land tenure for slum households because it was time consuming especially in the context of inflation and rapid land price appreciation.

The perceived slum inhabitant difficulty was not limited to financial management. Many NGOs and slum communities began to perceive the root of the slum housing problem as associated with political struggles over land. The first priority of achieving land secure tenure was not establishing a savings group, but rather the provision of access to land (FRSN, 2010; Chantarapa, 2009; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989; Hall, 1987; Mc Ausland, 1985) Hence, a group of slum communities, that were victims of violent relocations, gathered together and established the national slum organization, ‘The Four Region Slum Network’ (FRSN)17 in 1998. The FRSN claimed itself to be an independent slum inhabitant organization that championed the slum housing agenda at the national level, in particular on the issues of housing rights, quality of rights and social justice. FRSN gradually scaled up their role and expanded their alliances network through the practices of slum eviction resistance and urban poverty alleviation. Since the early 1990s, the FRSN has become one of the biggest slum organization networks, consisting of 7,000 families’ across Thailand (FRSN, 2010; Chantarapa, 2009; Visetpreecha, 2008).

In practice, FRSN have been politically active and in one of the most prominent case, the FRSN negotiated for long-term land leases and stopped eviction by the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration of over 100 slum squatter households along Bangkok canals. By year 1998, they collaborated in demonstrations and lobbied with other organizations for policy changes such as on building

17 Formerly known as the Centre of Slum, founded in 1986
regulations and also for additional BMK funding. The FRSN role went beyond the national terrain when they joined in international cooperation with slum organizations and NGOs across Asia. More recently in 1998-2000, the FRSN assisted 61 slum communities on State Railway of Thailand (SRT) land across the country to successfully negotiate long-term rental contracts of 30 years. The SRT case resulted in changes to the other government agencies’ land use policy which became more tenable to allowing slum communities to have long term rentals on their land. The change in land use policy has since been undertaken by agencies such as The Treasury Department (TD), The Port Authority (PA), The Royal Irrigation Department (RID), and The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) (FRSN, 2010:7; Chantarapa, 2009:38). As a result, the advocacy role of the FRSN in low-cost housing has become widely recognized among government agencies and public awareness.

**NULICO Slum Nationwide Network of BMK Communities**

As an effect of the 2008 global financial crisis on Thailand, BMK experienced financial difficulty which further contributed to the low-production of new slum upgrading housing and by the original August 2008 deadline, only 80,201 units or less than 30% of the set target, were completed (CODI, 2009). Consequently, several BMK projects undergoing construction could not proceed further due to the state soft-loan shortage. By September 2009, the BMK financial crisis led to the formation of an independent slum organization the National Union of Low Income Community Organization (NULICO), a collective of BMK member communities of over 80,000 households which actively worked to scale up upgrading programs across Thailand (Archer, 2010:8).

The objective of establishing the NULICO was to ensure continued funding for community members conducting the BMK process. They also assisted members to solve problems related to housing developments such as land negotiations, technical skills and social welfare. At the operational level, the NULICO forged ties with local authorities and other professional stakeholders to become active partner in the implementation of slum upgrading programs in community settings. At the policy level, the NULICO aimed at pushing forward institutional and regulatory change with the state. They undertake collaborative work with other low-income groups such as the FRSN, The Union Labour and the Assembly of the Poor:\(^{18}\). One major outcome of the NULICO has been the establishment of the City Development Fund (CDF) as an alternative credit resource. CDF was formed as one city-wide fund with the BMK savings group network at its core. Additional financial support was accumulated from external local government agencies, international organizations and NGOs. Through the

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\(^{18}\) They are Thai (NGOs) allied with other domestic and overseas NGOs. They attempt to help people affected by government and industrial development projects through the different approaches such as mass demonstration, avocation through public talks and mass media.
nationwide network and accumulated capital, the NULICO expands their ability to influence
government policy reform. Significantly, the NULICO and its alliances negotiated with the Ministry of
Social Development and Human Security to request continued funding for the BMK program and by
2009, the government\textsuperscript{19} approved new state subsidies of 15 billion baht under the new Thai Kem
Kang or ‘Vigorous Thai’ national development campaign (Archer, 2010:8; NHA, 2009:36;
Visetpreecha, 2008:60; www.codi.co.th, 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2006).

In summary, since early 1970s informal slum housing provision revealed a narrative of the bottom-up
approach of slum upgrading program embedded in the Thai formal housing history. Informal providers
have been changing strategies in response to formal housing provisions and problems faced, in
particular of forced eviction. They also developed an alternative approach wherein the solution to slum
housing lies in the political strategy and advocacy. The slum upgrading program is a means to
achieve the political empowerment of slum inhabitants who then play the primary role as the housing
program driver at different levels, from local to international networks. Partnerships were formed with
NGOs that advocated the scaling up from individual slum settlements to nationwide slum networks as
primary agent of informal slum housing provision that maintained an active role through the decades.
Key NGOs include the Centre of Slum (1986) that evolved to become the FRSN (1998-current) and
NULICO (2009-current).

3.3 Formal vs. Informal Slum Housing Provision: Defining the research framework

This section compares and discusses slum housing provision through the specific issue of land
accessibility between formal and informal slum housing practices of the UCDO (later changed to
CODI) and the FRSN. While each agent demonstrated varying perspectives and approaches on the
land availability and towards slum upgrading objectives, both agents have noticeably placed high
importance on empowerment.

The 7\textsuperscript{th} NESDP promoted increased community empowerment in order to gain resources over land
accessibility and was soon reflected in the establishment and funding of the UCDO office in 1992
(Office of The Prime Minister, 1992:15). The UCDO recognized land as a crucial element in housing
slum inhabitants and views slum problems as connected to limited household income to afford secure
settlements. They reasoned that the increase in slum household income would allow them access to
land at market prices (Pornchokchai, 1992:11). The UCDO promoted various types of funding for

\textsuperscript{19} Under Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva
income generating in low-income households with the savings process as the basic prerequisite of their approach toward official landownership. UCDO views that the savings group process encourages individual households to manage their own resources together in the form of a community organization (Boonyabancha, 2003:24). In addition, the savings group expands the community’s ability to develop communal socio-economic activities during the transition period and into the post-slum upgrading period such as the provision of social welfare, maintenance of community networks and the organization of community festivals. For UCDO, the slum upgrading program is a vehicle to improve the socio-economic capacity of individual households as well as the collective community (Boonyabancha, 2001:9).

UCDO adopted socio-economic empowerment as a key mechanism to promote savings groups and slum community organization’s roles, which was consistent to their long term slum upgrading practices (CODI/FM/L/BKK). The UCDO had two specific objectives regarding socio-economic empowerment. First, the UCDO attempted to enhance slum inhabitant assets to increase their ability to purchase land in the formal market. Once a community savings group had its own resource base and was well organized, the UCDO subsidized additional housing loans to the community savings group (Boonyabancha, 2003:5). UCDO financial support provides legitimacy to slum community organizations and, consequently, micro credit for housing mortgage could be accessed from formal financial institutions such as commercial banks, the Government Housing Bank and The Government Saving Bank (Panichapak, 2009:3-5). Hence the savings activities for slum housing transformed informal slum settlements into formal community based organizations. Second, the UCDO was determined to enhance slum inhabitant capabilities at two levels. At the community level, disparate households were brought together regularly and instructed on how to manage their own resources. At the city level, the UCDO sought to bring local organizations into a network of experts to empower slum inhabitant capacities in the area of accounting, construction and auditing (Boonyabancha, 2003:18). The savings process provided slum inhabitants with opportunities for comprehensive self-development and it created channels for slum inhabitants to communicate with their local organizations (Rosathaporn and Boonyabancha, 2009:47). From the UCDO perspective, the slum upgrading program is an informal learning process for slum inhabitants to expand their assets and capacity.

While UCDO’s formal housing provision applies social and economic empowerment as the main approach of the slum upgrading program, the FRSN alternatively promotes political empowerment. To FRSN the experiences of slum eviction are evidences that slum upgrading programs must be closely related to land accessibility in urban areas. FRSN argues that, fundamentally, slum upgrading projects
cannot happen without land and without looking at the issues of land, there cannot be any meaningful
discussion about how to solve the problem of housing for inhabitants living in slums (Chantarapa,
2011). FRSN recognizes that the provision of urban land for slum upgrading programs is complicated
as it involves political struggles over land between the government, landlords and the slum
community.

The FRSN perceives slum housing problems to be associated with the inequity of national policy in
particular on land-used and distribution, rather than the financial difficulty view of UCDO. The FRSN
advocates for slum upgrading as a political objective that secures the housing right to land as the first
priority. The FRSN political empowerment framework outlines formal institutional reforms of the laws,
rules and institutional mechanisms at the local to national level to enhance slum resident capacity and
assets. Political empowerment demands a fundamental change in land use policy and relevant
regulations to enable slum organizations to participate effectively in state housing programs and the
FRSN advocates for changes in the way the government and landlords use urban land towards social
purposes through proposing the campaign, ‘urban land reform for urban poor housing’.

There are five political empowerment strategies that the FRSN utilizes (Chantarapa, 2009:69-71). The
first is the organization of masses of people that symbolically represent slum resident solidarity.
Practically, collective mass protest brings pressure to bear on landlords and government agencies to
remind them that they are not only dealing with one slum community but the entire slum community
network across the country (FRSN-1/FM/L/BKK). Secondly, FRSN provides informal education to slum
inhabitants that catalyse self-awareness, attitude change and collective power. The FRSN organizes
meetings of community leaders wherein political empowerment is discussed; experience and
knowledge are spread to communities that lack formal education (FRSN-2/M/L/BKK). The third
strategy is collective action and participation in events with a network of allied groups. The FRSN
members are encouraged to be involved in political exercises with other civil society groups to
pressure authorities, such as mass demonstrations at Government House, public talks on Habitat
Day, and forum exchanges with national and international NGOs (FRSN-4/M/L/BKK). The fourth is
building alliances with other civil society groups to share the effective resistance tactics of each slum
community with others and put various community leaders in contact with one another. As a result,
horizontal relationships among groups have since emerged (NULICO-2/M/L/KK). The last strategy is
to raise slum upgrading and slum eviction issues in the public awareness through the connections
with allied socio-economic movements and amplify its effects through press reports and activities
(FRSN-3/M/L/BKK). The implementation of political empowerment results in the evolution of the slum
organization from individual towards a nationwide network that manifests in the formation and
expansion of the FRSN alliances around their region such as in the North, the Northeast, the South, the Central and Bangkok and its vicinity (Chantarapa, 2009:44).

The literature review demonstrates that there are shared broad ideas of how land accessibility is a crucial element in slum upgrading program between formal and informal agencies. However, the UCDO has a different approach from the FRSN to achieve land tenure security for slum inhabitants. For formal agencies, slum upgrading is seen as a socio-economic objective in contrast to NGOs and slum organization networks that also see it as political issues. These different objectives led to different approaches, roles and practices of slum upgrading programs of the UCDO and the FRSN. These differences also reflect the fundamental narrative of Thai housing development with two distinct structures, government driven ‘top-down’ and community based ‘bottom-up’. This narrative provides the background framework of the thesis to understand slum upgrading practice in Thailand. The framework, the slum upgrading program based on socio-economic and political objectives, determined the criteria for the case study selection in Chapter 4.

3.4 Identification of the Research Gap: The Practice link between the Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

The literatures of the period between 1977 and post-2000 reveals that Thai slum housing development has been significantly formulated in the context of contradiction rather than coherence of vision, agency and practice. The slum upgrading program highlights the paradox between formal and informal provision for low-income households. The prolonged conflict of interests between formal and informal housing provision also emphasises the absence of connection in the narrative between the top-down and bottom-up approaches. The literature review identifies a gap in knowledge on the way in which government driven programs link to community driven practices. Without knowing how slum inhabitant’s roles respond to national housing programs over time, the recent appearance of the slum community organization as the primary housing agent of the BMK national slum upgrading program seems to have happened overnight.

The literature review identified the research gaps in current Thai low-cost housing history that is formulated into the thesis research questions: mainly the absence of the urban slum inhabitant role as an active agent of slum upgrading programs and the disconnection in narrative between formal and informal slum housing provisions. Hence, this thesis investigates the way in which the urban slum inhabitants’ role evolved over time as ‘primary housing agent’ through the practice of slum upgrading projects. The linkages between three major subjects are of particular interest: the slum upgrading
projects, the empowerment practices, and the role of slum dwellers. The slum inhabitants’ evolving role has been closely associated with the decentralization in low-income housing provision that has resulted in the merging of government top-down provisions and community bottom up practices. The thesis examines this evolving role of urban slum inhabitants in an integrated narrative that connects the two polarized provisions through the cases of government housing agency transformation, from the UCDO to the CODI, and the formation of national slum organizations, the FRSN and the NULICO. (16,595 words)
CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN

Introduction
The thesis ascertains the significance of the evolving process of slum inhabitant’s role as primary housing agent and its consequence on the transformation of government agencies as well as low-income housing policies. The process is investigated through the identification of synergies or substantial linkages between three key components; slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices. The thesis hypothesizes that slum inhabitant roles have transformed through the practice of slum upgrading projects. The projects utilized empowerment as a basis for enhancing slum inhabitant’s capacity for being the primary housing agent. As such, the connection between the three components is identified as a unit of research analysis and became the foundation of the research questions that are comprised of a main research question and two sub-questions. The main research question ‘How did empowerment practices in the slum upgrading projects assist the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of Thai low-income housing development?’ explores the way in which empowerment practices in the slum upgrading project assisted the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of Thai low-cost housing development. The two sub-questions deal with the evolving process over time. The first sub-question examines the slum inhabitant’s role in the past: ‘How were slum inhabitants previously active as the primary housing agent between 1980 and 2000?’ The second sub-question attempts to understand the slum inhabitant’s role at present: ‘What are the slum inhabitant’s current roles as primary housing agent from 2000 to 2011?’ The year 2000 is significant for the establishment of the BMK national slum upgrading program. Therefore, the two sub-research questions emphasise the continuous link between slum inhabitant’s roles from 1980 to 2011.

The transformation of slum dweller’s role and impacts on Thai slum upgrading programs provides an alternative dimension of Thai low-income housing history that is absent or undocumented. There are many slum inhabitants’ adaptive and active roles as the ‘primary housing agent’ throughout the variety of slum upgrading projects such as in the formation of informal community organizations, local networks and forced eviction resistance. These selected experiences attest to the proactive role of slum inhabitants from the local to the national level. The findings can also contribute to the development of alternative housing guidelines for policy makers, practitioners and stakeholders in engaging with the slum inhabitant.
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Research Design

In order to address the three research questions, Chapter 4 outlines the design of research methods and the procedures of analysing and collecting data during the fieldwork. The research design chapter is discussed in four parts. The first part, as already mentioned above, restates the research questions that query the link between the key components of slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices.

The second part further defines key terms and concepts of the thesis arising from the research questions and from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. It describes the research theoretical framework that consists of research terminologies and empowerment theories. The thesis exploits empowerment theories as the analysis framework because it provides the link between the three key components and reveals the narrative of change in the slum inhabitant’s role as the primary housing agent. Five dominant empowerment theories were encompassed as the theoretical framework.

The third part is the research design that consists of two sub-sections. The first sub-section is the research methods and tools. The thesis employs qualitative research methodology and adopts a case study approach as the major method of data gathering. This section defines how the data was collected, analysed and structured. The main approach of data gathering and analysis is bottom-up in order to cross-check with the top-down data recorded by formal housing agencies. Various types of data to evidence the dynamic role of slum inhabitants are collected through five methods of data gathering comprising pilot study, archival study, in-depth interviews, questionnaires and visual recordings (photographic and audio). The second sub-section discusses the case study approach and provides the background of case study selection such as the list of alternative case studies, the selection process and the selection criteria.

The final part portrays the implementation of the research plan during the fieldwork on each case community and the limitations of the fieldwork. Accordingly, the revision of the research framework is proposed.

4.1 Research Framework and Terminology: Empowerment

The literature on empowerment constitutes the building block of the conceptual framework of the thesis because it provides the investigation tool to understand and link the evolving process of the slum inhabitant’s role as the primary housing agent. Chapter 4 makes no pretension to survey all the existing empowerment theories but only theories relating to the research context. It begins with a survey of thought about the general aspect of empowerment. Then, a number of empowerment theories that are relevant to the context of slum upgrading are specifically presented in more detail.
Accordingly, the three scales of the slum inhabitant’s role of being the primary housing agent are proposed. Finally, the research terminology is defined as the specific framework of the thesis.

In the context of Thai low-income housing, slum inhabitants are powerless groups of people whose choices are extremely limited due to their lack of access to land, security tenure and basic infrastructure. Empowerment is then grounded in the conviction that slum inhabitants are valuable partners for housing development. Cochran (1986) argues that people understand their own needs and problem far better than anyone else and should have the power to define and act upon them. Nobody has more at stake in reducing slum housing problems than the slum inhabitants themselves. Accordingly, slum dwellers are the most motivated to transcend those struggles. This is a fundamental understanding towards slum inhabitants for the organizations who play a role in Thai low-income housing development. In addressing slum inhabitant’s role as the primary housing agent, the foundation of any slum upgrading project calls for local resident empowerment.

4.1.1 Power: Fundamental Concept of Empowerment Theory
Empowerment is relevant to individuals and at the collective level, and it can be associated with economic, social and political competence (Narayan, 2002:10). The term can also be used to characterise relationships within individual households, communities and between various actors at the national level (UNICEF, 2001). Empowerment has multi-faceted dimensions and simultaneously connects to human development and their environment. In its general meaning; empowerment is an increase in the power of the powerless (Ife, 2002:7). This statement contains simple but important concept in power that the thesis considers to be at the fundamental notion of empowerment (Ife, 2002:7). The thesis discusses the concept of power that is embedded in and influences the empowerment perspective. The relationship between power and empowerment is importance because it provides the background for defining the major subject of empowerment and the research framework.

To understand empowerment, the thesis adopts Steward Clegg’s *Frameworks of Power* (1989, 1997) that mentions that at the core of the concept of empowerment is the idea of power (1997:5). The concept of power is both complex and contextual. Steward Clegg (1989:97) argued that power is a process constituted within struggles. It is the realization that power is to be understood within the ‘framework of power’ that transforms the analysis of power from the mission for essentialist definition into an interpretative practice. Empowerment seeks to enable people to increase their power through some form of direct action, or by equipping them to be more effective in the different life domains. How empowerment is applied depends on one’s understanding of power in relationships with other people and the environmental structure. Clegg proposes four perspectives on power, called the
1) Pluralist Perspective

The pluralist perspective emphasises the various individuals and groups within society that compete for power and influence. This perspective visualises the power system as a competition between groups (such as unions, employer bodies and non-government organizations) and between individuals (such as politicians, lobbyists and community leaders). Power therefore arises from one’s capacity to engage in the particular competing system, to recognising the rules of the system and to be able to exert pressure and influence. In simple term, pluralist power encourages people to be better players in the ‘game’. The conceptual idea is inherently conservative regarding its acceptance of an existing system as it is (Clegg, 1997 in Ife; 2002:64).

Approached from the pluralistic perspective, pluralist empowerment encourages recipients to be better skilled at competing with other groups for power through social action, political pressure and publicity. According to Alinsky (1971 in Ife, 2002:65), empowerment is a process of helping disadvantaged individuals and groups to compete more effectively with other interests. There are numerous delivery measures which could be implemented for example: assisting people to learn and to employ their new skills to engage with the power system, understanding how to work the system, and using the power. It is obvious that empowerment from the pluralistic view does not set out to change an existing structure, rather it aims at adapting to the ways of a community and accommodating the individuals within.

2) Elite Perspective

There is another interpretation of empowerment. Elite views power as not a game where all players have equal opportunities to win, rather it identifies particular groups who have more than their share of power and exercise disproportionate influence over decision making (Mills C.W., 1956). Elites also have control of or access to disproportionate shares of the nation’s resources and institutions for example media, education, political parties, public policy, the bureaucracy, parliaments and professionals. Thus, society is seen as hierarchical with certain groups exercising power and control. In the elite perspective, empowerment requires not only learning the ability to compete for power by playing the game, after all the rules of the game have been determined by the power of the elites so the rules are likely to be in their favour. There are many ways to connect with elite empowerment such as to join them with the aim of changing or influencing them. Another way is to seek alliances with powerful elites to pursue one’s goal. The third way is to reduce the power of elites through more
fundamental change for instance, attempting to limit the power of professional monopolies through legal challenges (Ife, 2002:65).

3) Structural Perspective
The structural perspective identifies the importance of structural inequality, or oppression, as a major form of power (Mullaly1993; Williams 1989; Gough 1979). The structural perspective maintains that elites act as representatives of dominant groups and reinforce the structural inequality that results in the unequal distribution of power. It indicates the underlying importance of class, race and gender and, thus from this perspective, empowerment is a much more challenging agenda as it can effectively be achieved only if these forms of structural disadvantage are challenged and reformed. Pluralistic empowerment and working with elites are not sufficient in bringing about a real change in power relationships. Empowerment therefore is necessarily part of a wider program of social change, with a view to dismantling the dominant structures of oppression (Ife, 2013:66).

4) Post-Structural Perspective
The post-structural perspective concentrates on the way in which power is understood and defined. Post-structure focuses on the subjective perspective of power rather than its objective existence because it underlines the personal and group experience of how power is constructed, defined and accumulated. It relies particularly on ideas, language and the definitions of knowledge that have been used as a major mechanism of control (Foucault 1973; Rouse 1994). From this view, empowerment becomes a process of challenging and changing discourse such as the communication of thought, conversation and discussion. It emphasises people’s subjective understanding and the construction of their world views and points to the need for the deconstruction of these understandings and the establishment of an alternative vocabulary for empowerment. This can be achieved by validating other voices rather than those currently dominating the discourse and by allowing those alternative voices to be heard. Post-structural empowerment thus emphasises understanding, deconstruction, education and participation in the discourse of power in which it sees a simple concentration on action alone as inadequate.

Table 4.1: The perspective of power as a core concept of empowerment (Ife; 2002:56)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>View of society</th>
<th>View of power</th>
<th>Empowerment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Completing interest Groups and individuals</td>
<td>Capacity to compete successfully, Winners and losers</td>
<td>Teach individuals or groups how to compete within the rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite</td>
<td>Largely controlled by self-perpetuating elites</td>
<td>Exercised largely by elites through ownership</td>
<td>Join and influence elites, form alliances with elites,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The discussion above highlights the complexities in the perspectives of power which are central to an understanding of empowerment. The concept of empowerment therefore is itself complex, as has been pointed out by writers such as Rees (1991), Friedmann (1992) and Narayan (2002). The survey of different perspectives of power and the complexity of empowerment provides a useful framework to understand the empowerment practice of various agents over time, in particular the formal and informal housing provisions discussed in the literature review in Chapter 3. The empowerment perspective provides the analytical framework for formulating the thesis and also demonstrates the specific empowerment strategies that have been employed by different interested agents. In the next section, the thesis discusses some contemporary empowerment theories in conjunction with the methods of empowerment.

### 4.1.2 Empowerment of Asset and Capacity

Empowerment is based on the belief that people have skills and abilities but they need assets and opportunities in order to express them (World Bank, 2006:115). Moreover, Sedan (1997) also claims that new abilities are best empowered by an expansion of assets and capacities. In the context of informal housing, slum inhabitants are a powerless group with extremely limited choices, for example, their deficiency of assets and capacity to negotiate for settlement tenure security. Increasing slum inhabitants’ assets and capacities is therefore the fundamental goal of empowerment at the personal level. According to Narayan and Shah (2000:12), empowerment means increasing one’s authority and controls over the resources and decisions that affect one’s life.

‘Asset’ refers to material assets, both physical and financial, including land, housing and savings (Narayan, 2002:11). Such assets enable slum inhabitants to expand their horizon of choices and capacity to negotiate fair deals with landlords. ‘Capacities’ are the inherent intelligence in individuals
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Research Design and groups of slum dwellers. Capabilities enable a powerless group to use their assets in various ways to increase their well-being (Narayan, 2002:11). Empowerment of powerless capabilities includes social belonging, leadership and sense of identity. Asset and capacity therefore are values that give personal and group control over power to achieve their aims, such as land tenure security.

To enhance control and power over economic resources, several reviews present methods of fostering individual and collective assets and capacity. The UN supports an extensive provision of empowerment of asset and capacity, emphasised on the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The United Nations Development Programme’s Gender Empowerment Measure (2001) underlines the inequality of access to socio-economic-political power and resources. The program proposes that an expansion of assets and capacity of the powerless could be achieved through the increasing role of those people in participation and decision making power (UNICEP, 2001:80).

The World Bank identified a two-pronged strategy to empower powerless groups, in the World Bank Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty. The strategy focuses on empowering disadvantaged people by investing in their assets and requires national governments provide adequate funding or investment to assist the powerless’ capacity (World Bank, 2000). An empowerment program should be designed to maximize powerless access to the benefits of land, financial services and life enhancing skills (World Bank, 2000:11). This framework is consistent with Narayan (2002), who suggests formal agencies should recognize the necessity of creating equitable access through an investment in the powerless’ asset and capacity, both individually and collectively. An adequate public investment allows powerless people to increase their access to resources and opportunities, obtain basic service and participate in local government (2002:11-12).

Krishna, Uphoff and Esman (1998) argue that local organization is the key agent to effectively empower powerless people to increase their assets and capacity. The study of 18 case studies of large scale development programs across Asia, Africa and Latin America concludes that the critical success factor of empowerment is creating organizational capacities at the local level that enhance management skills, knowledge and resources (1998:18). The specific solution focuses on community based organizations that connect other unrelated groups to the resources of civil society and form organized networks. Community organization not only increases collective bargaining power of individual household members but also establishes institutional networks.

4.1.3 Institutional Empowerment of Opportunity Structure
While Narayan’s study (2002) and many scholars emphasise personal empowerment through assets and capacity, Alsop and Heinsohn’s study (2005:10) extends empowerment to opportunity structure. They view the opportunity structure as the context for influencing project outcomes and agent
performances at many levels: individual households, groups or communities. There are two categories of opportunity structure: the formal and informal contexts. The formal context is shaped by legal and regulatory frameworks, while the informal context is influenced by social rules of certain groups, ethnicities or class divisions.

The significance of the opportunity structure is also mentioned by many organizations and scholars. According to the World Bank (2006:79; 2002:11), empowerment is based on the belief that people have skills and abilities, but need circumstances and opportunities in order to express them. Gruber and Trickett (1987) mention that empowerment of a person requires environmental conditions, mainly organizational ones, which will enable him/her to exercise new abilities. Lastly, the United Nations Development Programme emphasises the basic prerequisite toward empowerment, calling for a fundamental change of the political relationship between a government and all citizens, in particular the urban poor (Garau et al, 2005:22). These perspectives highlight that empowerment assets and capacity are not sufficient to bring about critical change in national structure and power relationships.

To address the challenge of unequal structure and distribution of power, many international agencies have advocated and promoted institutional empowerment. The second strategy of the World Bank Development Report 2000/2001 focuses on empowering powerless groups on a large scale by setting its strategy on achieving institutional reform. National governments are requested to improve the overall investment climate that is reflected in institutional reform, legislative support and the change in the power relationship between formal agencies and local people’s organizations (World Bank, 2000). The World Bank strategies emphasise that changes in formal regulations or informal rules must be connected to efforts to enable powerless people and other citizens to interact effectively with their government (2005:19). Moreover, the United Nations Development Programme’s Gender Empowerment Measure has increasingly recognized the centrality of women’s empowerment to the success of the UN development programs and proposes women’s participation and decision making power as a coordination strategy of effective institutional empowerment (UNDP, 1995).

In the contemporary literature, Friedmann (1992) arguably proposed the most comprehensive empowerment strategy at the institutional level. He views structural and institutional change as political empowerment. He established an empowerment model, the politics of alternative development as an empowerment framework that looks to the mobilization of civil society at the grass roots and seeks change in the system of political relations and all corresponding institutions. This approach is in contrast to the conventional empowerment approach that was devised at the top for implementation downward through a compliant bureaucracy. He argues that the initiative must emerge from the grass roots with policies in which the slum inhabitants continuously press for the support of their own initiatives. He urges that empowerment lies at the heart of practices at the locality because
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civil society is most readily mobilized around local issues. Hence, institutional empowerment centres on individuals and households, and their mobilization for political participation on a wider scale on national and international terrain. Institutional empowerment requires an open political space for civil encounters in the making of public decisions at all relevant levels. Friedmann does not imply replacing existing mainstream economic doctrines but transforming them dramatically to make it possible for the disempowered to be included in the political process and have their rights as human beings acknowledged (Friedmann, 1992:84). In other words, to act locally is not enough, but alternative development requires a transformation of local policies.

As discussed in section 4.1.1, there are many examples of empowerment strategies that have been proposed by numerous organizations and scholars. Reinforcing the theoretical framework of empowerment, the thesis classifies empowerment into two levels of application, personal and political empowerment. However, the relationship between the two levels is relative regarding co-existing mechanisms and several empowerment strategies share both levels such as participation, access to decision making power and community based organization. These strategies connect individuals with larger scale development and opportunity structure. Gutierrez and Ortega’s (1991:23-43) approach deserves particular attention for the linkage between personal and institutional empowerment. They introduce three levels of empowerment as a basic understanding of empowerment that could occur at various levels:

- Personal empowerment includes the development of personal power, efficacy and competence as a foundation for enhanced well-being and for action in the wider environment.
- Inter-personal empowerment involves interactions with others that develop critical awareness and enhance problem-solving, assertiveness and the ability to be influential in critical life contexts.
- Social empowerment or political empowerment is centrally related to collective participation in social action and change. This level includes transfer of power among groups in society.

Helling, Serrano and Warren (2005) acknowledge the connection between the two levels in the book ‘The Community Empowerment through a Local Development Framework’ (2005, 50-58). By increasing the powerless group’s access to resources, people and communities become more capable of exploiting opportunities to influence government and service provision to better meet their needs (Helling et al, 2005:50). The World Bank’s Empowerment Source Book mentions that the expansion of powerless people’s assets and capacities enables them to participate in society and to interact with their government (Narayan, 2002:19). The UNICEF Women’s Equality and Empowerment Framework
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(2001) and UNDP The United Nations Development Programme’s Gender Empowerment (1995) proposes that the powerless group’s access, control and action with regards to assets and capacities could reduce structural inequality (UNICEF, 2001; UNDP, 1995 in World Bank, 2004:10). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Garau et al, 2005:22) argue that empowerment at the local level can be a stepping stone toward empowerment at a higher level. When people become confident in their ability to change local policies or overcome local challenges, they may subsequently feel empowered to tackle challenges at a wider level, regionally or nationally (Dom, 2012:109).

These reviews correspond in the assertion that empowerment practice provides an important bridge between personal transformations (micro-practice) to institutional change (macro-practice). The thesis also focuses on institutional empowerment that attempts to change oppressed structures or to enhance the supportive environment for community driven transformation. Empowerment involves the removal of formal and informal institutional barriers that prevent the powerless from taking effective action to improve their individual or collective power (World Bank, 2005:28). Empowerment then implies the need for reform of existing socio-economic-political structures that maintains unequal power relationships between formal agencies and the powerless.

4.2 Thesis Theory Framework

This section discusses the particular attributes of the key terms derived from the research questions. The thesis synthesizes definitions from various literature reviews, housing agencies and authors. The theoretical framework is defined through the three key concepts: housing agency, empowerment and slum upgrading program. ‘Housing agency’ further comprises; Housing agency/Housing agent, Slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ and Slum inhabitant status. ‘Empowerment’ is categorized into three types; economic, socio-economic integrated and political respectively. Lastly, the slum upgrading program is specifically defined in the context of Thai practices. Addressing key terminologies and concepts, the theoretical framework help define the precise research scope as well as the selection criteria for case studies.

There is no single dominant theory employed in this study and the thesis adopts five empowerment theories proposed by Clegg (1989, 2002), Gutierrez and Ortega’s (1991), Friedman (1992), Narayan (2002), Alsop and Heinsohn (2005) as the framework. Importantly, the thesis does not adopt empowerment as an ‘assessment tool’ to evaluate the efficiency of the slum inhabitant’s role, rather it specifically utilizes ‘empowerment’ as a framework to link the evolving process of the slum inhabitant’s role as the primary housing agent over time. Integrating the concept of empowerment (Table 4.1), the research theoretical framework consists of three key, interrelated components: the role of slum inhabitants, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices. The thesis focuses on the evolving
role of housing agents that is comprised of the slum inhabitants and government agencies as project stakeholders and postulates that the agencies’ roles have evolved and transformed through the practices of slum upgrading. Empowerment practices have been embedded in the slum upgrading process and significantly contributed to the process that enhanced the slum inhabitant’s roles as the primary housing agent.

Secondly moving beyond the individual-level, the theoretical framework defines empowerment as the process of expanding a collective action of powerless groups in influencing external conditions of the political, economic and social structures that recognize institutional empowerment. The thesis empowerment framework investigates two levels of application. The first level is personal empowerment that expands an individual or collective capacity. The level comprises the pluralist and elite perspectives. The second level is institutional empowerment which focuses on empowerment for opportunity structure change to reform the existing conditions that obstruct slum inhabitants from housing development processes. The level is associated with the structural and post-structure perspectives. The second level takes into account structural inequalities that affect entire powerless groups rather than focus only on individual characteristics.

Another aspect of the theoretical framework corresponds with Friedman’s empowerment perspective. Friedmann describes the mobilization of civil society at the ground level, community, and strives for change in the opportunity structure at the national level. He argues that the dramatic transformation of all corresponding institutions ensures that the community’s voice is included in the political process and their rights as human beings acknowledged (1992:84).

Responding to the theoretical framework, the thesis adopts the bottom-up approach for the data gathering process to investigate the history of the slum role. Accordingly, the thesis proposes a threefold approach to investigate the evolving role of slum inhabitant as the primary housing agent:

- The transformation/evolution of the individual slum community
- The transformation/evolution of the slum network
- The transformation/evolution of the government agencies as stakeholders engaged with the process

The thesis articulates the threefold approach of the evolving process of the slum inhabitant role as the primary housing agent through the multi-levels empowerment of individual household, group, community, local government and national government discussed in the literature review. The first approach focuses on the role at individual community organizations. The second looks at slum networking as representative of their transformation process at the second level of political empowerment. However, it is not merely slum inhabitants who have been changed by the
empowerment process, but the external stakeholders’ roles have also been transformed as well. The growing practices of national slum organizations post-2000 reflect the important changes within government institutions and policy which defines the third approach.

4.2.1 Housing Agency
Housing Agency/Housing Agent
As discussed in Thai practice, there is no single housing agent who dominates overall policy and implementation and many housing development agencies share their role in promoting low-income housing for urban slum households. The thesis classifies housing agents into three types depending on their role and scale. The first type is international housing agent who provides a wide range of housing assistance at the upper administrative level to support local activities. They are individuals or networks of international organizations such as the UN Habitat, the World Bank and the City Alliance. As institutions, they have direct and indirect engagement with the national government or NGOs through the provision of policy recommendations, conditional funding and collaborative projects. Global agency intervention aims at influencing national housing policy and seeks to enable their endorsement to effect visible changes locally and nationally.

The second type of housing agents is the national government and government agencies. The government has been the primary agency as policy maker with autonomous power of creating, deciding and controlling at the top of the administrative structure. Sometimes, the government undertakes direct intervention of overall housing provision from administration to program implementation. Some governments provide the budget for public programs, however many programs are co-subsidized by external monetary institutions. To achieve efficient resource distribution, various government agencies often played the primary role in implementing state housing programs, including the National Housing Authority, the Public Housing Bureau and the Government Housing Bank. In many cases, government agencies involved private contractors or industrial building suppliers as partner in state housing programs. Government agencies and the private sector are recognized as a crucial mechanism of formal housing provision under centralized and decentralized government structures.

Lastly, community organizations and their residential networks are the housing agents at the local level. According to Boonyabancha (2005:11), the CODI positions the slum inhabitant and their community networks at the centre of the BMK process that is intent on developing long-term solutions and large scale networks. Formal housing provision since the year 2000 promotes them as key actors who control the funding and the management of BMK program implementation. By contrast, informal housing provision led by the FRSN and the NULICO enhances slum community organizations as the primary agent for political development, advocating for change in government policy. In this research,
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The housing agency/housing agent refers to the group of low-income people, organizations or networks who play a significant role in two levels of Thai housing provision, the policy and operational levels. Housing agents hold the power of how projects are formulated, how decision making powers are made, and how all relevant resources are distributed.

**Slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’**

The slum inhabitant is the key subject of this thesis as the driver of change in low-income housing provision at both the global and the domestic level. At the international level, the recognition of the slum inhabitant role has significantly increased in last three decades among key global housing agencies reflected in key polices such as; 1996UN HABITAT II agenda (Keivani and Werna, 2001:201), 1999 *The City Without Slum* (City Alliance, 2005:4), 2000 *The UN Millennium Declaration The Development Goal Number 7, target 11* (UN HABITAT, 2005:3). At the national level, the CODI formally declared the Thai slum community organization and their local networks as primary housing agents of the BMK program since 2003 (www.codi.or.th/baanmankong, 6th October 2004). The augmentation of the slum resident role over housing policy and practice at the global and local levels supports the significance of the research topic.

The thesis defines ‘slum inhabitant’ as people who live in Thai slum settlements. Not all people who live in Thai slums are poor and not all poor live in slum settlements. Thai slums then consist of various sub-groups of people, cultures and socio-economic status. They are a mix of different groups of people, not a homogenous group. Hence the research avoids using term ‘the poor’ to represent slum inhabitants because ‘the poor’ as a term is too general and overused. The unique characteristics of slum inhabitants which differentiate them from other general low-income groups is defined by four facets; being faced with property rights problems, living in poor structural quality of housing and environment, inadequate access to safe water and other infrastructure, and overcrowding\(^1\) (UN HABITAT, 2003:12).

Slum dweller definition from UN-Habitat (State of the World’s Cities 2006-2007:1) that defines slum household as a group or individuals living under the same roof in an urban area who lack of one or more of the following;

1. Durable housing of a permanent nature that protects against extreme climate conditions.
2. Sufficient living space which means not more than three people sharing the same room.
3. Easy access to safe water in sufficient amounts at an affordable price.

\(^1\) NHA identifies the minimum number of housing units per 1,600 m\(^2\) is 15 (http://www.nhanet.or.th/chs/homepoor.html, AREA, 1996:2).
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4. Access to adequate sanitation in the form of a private or public toilet shared by a reasonable number of people.

5. Security of tenure that prevents forced evictions

According to State of the World’s Cities 2006-2007 report (2007:2), approximately one-fifth of slum households across the world live in extremely poor conditions, lacking of more than three basic shelter needs. Generally, the lack of sanitation and water in the region’s slum is compounded by insufficient living space and inadequate housing.

There is no single dominant definition of the term slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ adopted in this present study and the thesis focuses on three distinct sources. The first is based on recent studies by development scholars such as Alsop and Heinsohn (2005), Narayan (2005), and Rao and Walton (2004) which focus on the slum inhabitant as an agent of development in their personal and group capacities. Secondly, the CODI defines the slum organizations and their community networks as the primary agents of the BMK process and recognizes the slum inhabitant’s role as technical and management expert. They play the leading role in controlling the funding and the management of savings, planning and construction (Boonyabancha, 2005:11). Finally, the FRSN practices reveal the political role of the slum organizational network on a national scale. Based on these three sources, the term is redefined within the context of Thai slum housing. In this research, slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ means the group of slum inhabitants, with various organization forms and scales, having the capacity to influence change over two levels of Thai housing provision, the policy level and the operational level. They are the primary actor at the centre of their own slum upgrading program, rather than beneficiaries of external agencies. The change in slum inhabitant roles as primary housing agent manifests in varying degrees dependent on slum inhabitant status, discussed below.

(Multi-scalar of) Slum inhabitant status

The evolving role as primary housing agent is a critical process because it transformed slum dwellers characteristics at different stages. As a result of this process, the thesis defines the change in slum dweller characteristics as slum status and consists of four degrees. The first status is the slum inhabitant in an isolated and powerless household. Illegal occupancy of someone else’s land coupled with a negative attitude can lead to confrontations between slum dwellers and external development agencies such as local government agencies, landlords and neighbourhood communities. Consequently, their shelter has no building permit and does not comply with building regulations although some are permanent structures. Approached from a legal perspective, slum settlements are not authorized to receive house registration numbers and are thus unable to access basic infrastructure services. Hence, self-reliance has always been the basic practice of slum inhabitants in
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Research Design Thailand. Sub-standard environmental conditions, unlawfulness and networking shortages are three negative factors which place Thai slum inhabitants in an isolated and powerless household status.

A second slum inhabitant status is collective slum organization. The threat of eviction forces isolated and powerless slum households to unite, organize and protect their settlements. In collaboration with NGOs or their local neighbourhoods, many isolated slum households are empowered by their group capacity through the implementation of savings groups which vary according to context. These practices may result in the emergence of the collective community organization, which is a single local institution that could be formal or informal depending on the registration. It is a local development mechanism that attempts to provide a means of resolving needs or critical community problems such as forced eviction through asset-pooling and mutual support.

The collective community organization with NGO support becomes a critical pairing for community development, but they are apparently weak when problems need to be resolved. In many cases, the collective community organization has limited capacities to engage slum problems at national levels such as policy, regulation and finance. Moreover, according to Boonyabancha (2003:23), the practice of the NHA and the UCDO over several decades proves that no single community can achieve success in their housing development process without networking support. Individual community organizations require allies to share expertise, experience and resources. Therefore, slum community organization networks have been promoted as a solution to the difficulties faced by the collective slum organization and isolated slum households. Community organization networks often connects and extends financial support based on a wide range of criteria and issues such as neighbourhood area, similar occupation, type of savings group, and shared land tenure problems. The distinctive characteristic of the community organization network is the broader city-based, horizontal collaboration networks among slum community organizations, rather than between a community and formal organizations.

Lastly, a slum citywide network incorporates institutional collaboration between several development actors in the same area such as a slum community organization, local government agencies, academics, NGOs and the private sector. Networks at the city scale facilitate community organization in developing their own plans and solutions for land and housing security. The significance of a citywide network is in extending the scope of slum inhabitant status from addressing practical to more structural issues as networks at the citywide scale, and developing a higher managerial capacity, vision and relationship with other development professionals and international organizations.
4.2.2 Economic, Social and Political Empowerment

Economic Empowerment

The thesis formulates the definition of economic empowerment from three main sources, De Soto (2000), Eyben et al (2008) and the United Nations (2000). Basically, the overall concept of economic empowerment is the way to increase people's access to economic resources and opportunities including jobs, assets and skills development (Eyben et al, 2008). In simple terms, it is about creating a just equitable economy. Due to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), The United Nations emphasises the role of economic empowerment as a prerequisite for sustainable development. This is because economic empowerment is part of the solution to economic crisis, resilience and growth. Economic empowerment occurs when people have the capacity to mobilize existing wealth to generate growth (De Soto, 2000). Hence, global agencies have been promoting the implementation of various types of community management funds as an essential component of slum housing development programs.

This thesis defines ‘Economic empowerment’ as the capacity of slum inhabitants, individuals or a collective group, to participate in, contribute to, and benefit from the slum housing based on economic processes/activities such as savings, co-operatives and loan procedure. The fundamental significance of economic empowerment toward slum housing development is in the strengthening of peoples’ rights and enabling people to achieve their secured tenure settlement, quality of life and access to basic amenities, including their house and land title, to secure funding.

Socio-Economic Integrated Empowerment

The thesis adopts the empowerment concept of the BMK program as the definition of Socio-Economic Integrated Empowerment. The BMK program formulated socio-economic integrated empowerment practices that was informed by and continuously improved through the lessons learned from previous slum upgrading practices between 1980 and 2000. The BMK’s empowerment approach aimed to achieve goals beyond the physical outcome and fosters collective power in the community to achieve housing goals. Social and financial capacities have been increasingly emphasised through the practice of community managed savings groups. The BMK approach increased slum inhabitants’ access to productive assets such as information, body of knowledge and skills, participation in social organizations, and financial resources which, in turn, increases their ability to achieve goals. Beyond individual resources, socio-economic integrated empowerment also depends on the social capacity that manifests in the formation of community organizations such as community networks, institutions and savings groups. Socio-economic integrated empowerment encompasses social capital to encourage people to act collectively in managing resource to satisfy communal priorities and goals.
Political Empowerment

The study of Friedmann (1992) and Clegg (1989) provides a comprehensive definition of political empowerment that demonstrates the expansion in the size and importance of slum networks. As mentioned, Friedmann’s empowerment model, the ‘Politics of Alternative Development’, commits to empowering local people in their own communities and encourages them towards political participation on a wider scale, on the national and international terrain. The objective of Friedmann’s alternative development is to strengthen the powerless social network into a political force which has the potential for social change (1992:33). He insists that political empowerment seeks change in an existing political system through a pro-poor policy. However, political empowerment does not aim at replacing an existing system, but rather to radically transform the political structure to enable powerless people to act effectively. As a result, the contribution of political empowerment can be seen through changes to regulations and institutional arrangements, funding subsidies and policy reform.

Similarly Clegg emphasises the importance of structural inequality and in The Structural Perspective of Power (1989) calls for a fundamental redefinition of the political relationship between government agencies and powerless people. The structural perspective promotes direct or indirect participation of the powerless agency to represent themselves or others, in political exercises at different levels from local to national. Corresponding to the structural framework, the thesis defines ‘political empowerment’ as the process of increasing access for slum dwellers and their organizations to decision making power. Political empowerment aims at strengthening the slum inhabitant’s voice to influence government policy and change political relationships. Political empowerment is thus not only the power to vote but it is the power of voice, which rises not only in their local assembly but also on national territory when it merges with the many voices of larger political associations such as slum networks, slum federations and civil society.

4.2.3 Slum Upgrading

The thesis defines slum upgrading as the process of informal settlement transformation in various aspects such as social, economic, organizational and environmental. The objective of slum upgrading is diverse but the ultimate goal of the slum dweller is to achieve settlement security. According to the City Alliance’s description (2010:3), a slum upgrading program consists of multi-dimensional community developments that attempt to alleviate the poor living standards of slum dwellers. The emphasis is on the process of upgrading that must be undertaken cooperatively and locally among citizens, community groups and local authorities. The City Alliance’s definition is consistent with the current Thai practice wherein the upgrading process includes slum dwellers and their local networks as a development agency. Perceived in this way, slum upgrading is a powerful intervention to rebuild collective socio-economic strength among residents, slum inhabitant capacity and achieve long-term settlement security.
4.3 Research Design

The historical approach is a major method of data gathering and data analysis in the thesis. The research design consists of two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses research methods and tools. This section defines how the data was collected, analysed and structured. Various types of data to evidence the dynamic role of slum inhabitants as the primary housing agent are collected utilizing five methods that comprised of a pilot study, an archival study, in-depth interviews, questionnaires and visual recordings (photographic and audio). The second sub-section discusses the case study approach and provides the background of how the case studies were selected from a list of alternatives and the criteria for case selection.

4.3.1 Research Methods and Tools
4.3.1.1 Method of Data Analysis: Historical Research Approach

The historical approach can help the researcher understand the background of the community, the reasons for settlement upgrading and residents’ role towards their settlement. The task of historical analysis in this research is to respond to specific research sub-questions; was the slum resident active as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in the past? What slum resident roles have been continuous and what changes occurred during the course of development?

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the challenge of the thesis is the fragmented and disorganized documentation related to slum inhabitant roles towards slum upgrading programs. Formal records rarely recognize and are not concerned with slum inhabitants as active agents in low-cost housing development and even more importantly, those studies are not relevant to the research objective. Hence, the thesis applied the historical approach as a method of connecting the three components: slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment. To examine the relationship between these three components, it is necessary for the thesis to conduct an in-depth investigation into specific areas. The historical approach, as Leedy (1989) suggests, requires the researcher to stay as close as possible to the actual events. This takes a great deal of time for the residents to become familiar with and significantly to build the trust with the researcher necessary for an intensive and detailed study of the case (Appleton, 2002, Stake, 1995, Yin, 1994).

Fortunately, the original inhabitants of both slum settlements, Sengki and Tawanmai, in the period of their upgrades are still there. They could provide the primary data of the community history as well as the implementation of slum upgrading projects from their personal experiences. In addition, many government agencies who were project stakeholders were presented. The researcher has access to those key informants who were genuinely involved in the upgrading process. As the slum upgrading
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Programs have been completed since 1980 (Sengki land-sharing) and 2007 (Tawanmai BMK), individual accounts of community development could be inaccurate due to the passage of time. Thereby the selected information gained from the two case studies required verification such as through history description, oral history and archival study.

4.3.1.2 A Four Steps Research Process

The thesis research process consists of four steps. The first step consists of three sub-stages, the literature review, the research framework, and the criteria for case study selection. The literature review provides a historical outline of housing development at global and domestic levels. It provides a broad framework of formal and informal housing provisions that are discussed in conjunction with empowerment practices. The document survey also builds key terms and concepts of the slum upgrading project as a major subject of the thesis that significantly constitutes the theoretical background framework. In order to address the research questions and analyse data, empowerment theory and the historical approach provides a framework for understanding and linking the evolving process of the slum inhabitant role as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ through the practice of slum upgrading projects across the times. The need for an in-depth understanding of the transformation process is a core objective of the thesis and in the application of the case study method, a bottom-up approach is essential. The third sub-step sets up the rationale for case selection and key terms that are derived from literature reviews and community surveys. Through this framework, the literature review, research theory and case study are connected.

The second step is developing research tools for data gathering and community fieldwork. The thesis applies five methods in the fieldwork in two communities: questionnaires, interviews, pilot project, archival study, and visual and audio recordings. Data gained from the field study is then analysed and discussed over a cross section in time among three major issues; housing agency, empowerment and slum upgrading practice. The thesis encompasses the following empowerment theories as a frame of analysis; Clegg (1989), Gutierrez and Ortega’s (1991:23-43), Friedman (1992), Narayan (2002), and Alsop and Heinsohn (2005). The third step is the research discussion which examines findings from the fieldwork in order to describe the evolving slum inhabitant role and empowerment practices across four decades, 1980 to 2011. Answering the research questions, the discussion aims at establishing the linkage between the three components, individual slums, slum networks and stakeholders, and government agents. The final step is the research conclusion that reinforces the research contribution at the theoretical and practical levels. Additionally, each step will involve cross checking with the previous step(s) for consistency and cohesion. The relationships between the four steps of the research methods are illustrated in figure 4.1
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT

Research Question Formulation

Literature review;
International / Thailand housing policy

Case study:
- Criteria of selection
- Selection of cases
- Description of selected cases

Research framework
Threefold empowerment theory:
- The transformation/evolution of the individual agent
- The transformation/evolution of the slum network
- The transformation/evolution of the government agencies

Formulation of outline design process

DATA COLLECT AND ANALYSIS

Field work at communities:
Questionnaire
80-100 sampler

In-depth interview 10 people

5 methods of gathering
Questionnaire, Interview, Pilot project, Archival study, Visual and audio recording

3 types of required data
1. Written archive/historical record
2. Physical evident

DISCUSSION AND GENERATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Sengki Community

Tawanmai Community

Cross section in time of 2 key projects on 3 issues:
- Housing agency
- Empowerment
- Slum upgrade project

Slum resident as ‘Primary Housing Agent’
- Individual agent
- Slum network
- Transformation of government agencies

CONCLUSION

Conclusion
Research contribution:
Proposes guideline for policy maker, planner, practitioner (Reinforce outcome of policy/active citizen)

Figure 4.1: Research Method Flow Chart
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Research Design

4.3.1.3 Method of Data Collection

To address the research questions, three categories of data collection are required. The thesis adopts the triangulation approach as a significant method to validate multi-sources and utilizes the first group of data of written archives such as news clippings, articles, research reports, annual reports, etc. In particularly, the formal Thai housing recorded history needs to be cross-checked with the historical description of the community. The benefit of this process not only supports the research arguments, the absence of slum residents as housing agents but also provides evidence to support the research findings.

The second type of data is the physical appearances of the two case studies, building types and environment. The physical material provides an additional indication of the linkage between slum upgrading, empowerment practices and slum inhabitant roles. Material evidences are collected, such as spatial mapping, aerial photographs, old pictures, blueprints of master plans and house units. Lastly, the participants’ accounts is another important type of data as local history is usually embedded in the residents’ personal experiences and those perspectives usually go unrecorded in the formal archives. However, dependence on the participant descriptions could possibly lead to biased data and to ensure consistency, the data is verified with archives and physical material. To collect the three types of data, the thesis implemented five methods of data gathering at the two community case studies. Importantly, the methods were applied consistently in both cases to establish and reinforce the explicit relationships of the two cases.

1) Pilot Study

A pilot study was conducted at an early stage of the research in 2009 as a part of a minor thesis for the MPD program\(^2\). The pilot study took place at the Tawanmai community from November 2009 to January 2010. Additionally, the researcher was a member of the design team at the BMK Tawanmai community since the project commenced in mid-2003 until the project was completed in 2007. Moreover, researchers and Khon Kaen BMK staff had been visiting the Sengki community since 2004. The CODI organized meetings between community members of Khon Kaen BMK and the previous slum upgrading projects under the NHA and the UCDO supervision, including from the Sengki community. The benefits of the pilot study included: the identification of appropriate sites for study that meet the case study criteria; the investigation of relevant secondary data prior to actual data collection; and the identification of key persons through establishing connections with local inhabitants, local networks and local government agencies. Significantly in the Thai context, initial access to local elites and their networks is crucial because building trust between the researcher and key informants required time. Moreover, local elite groups have high influence over whether marginal residents agree

\(^2\) Master of Planning and Design Program at the University of Melbourne
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to or are against development projects. The relationship between the researcher and informal community leaders was essential to ensure adequate participation in the research. Lastly, the pilot study assisted the researcher to identify key issues and methods for collecting data for particular target groups such as the community leaders, marginal residents and local government agencies.

2) Archival and Documentation Study

Archives and documentation were gathered from various sources, in particular the database of the NHA headquarter and the CODI Northeast Regional Office. They were the main organizers of the upgrading projects at Sengki and Tawanmai communities respectively. Materials gathered from both organizations including photographs of various events and the stages of program implementation, research reports and meeting reports. Although land-sharing upgrading projects at Sengki have been conduct since 1980, the project had many references recorded by national and international institutions. The NHA's library has carefully maintained the Sengki project catalogue because this is the only demonstration project of the UN HABITAT at that time and the project has often been referenced as a role model for later slum upgrading projects (NHA/M/RS/BKK).

Local residents are a significant source for accessing archives which were not found in the NHA or the CODI record. Some personal and unpublished documents of their local history were available such as the original copy of the official land title, a copy of community meeting reports and the handwritten diary of community leaders. Furthermore, the collection of pictures taken at the time of upgrading from personal collections was shared with the researcher. These primary source materials are highly valuable because the in-depth archives filled gaps in and verified the formal record.

While government archives related to slum upgrading practices are relatively abundant, formal records are rarely associated with the research objective based on the bottom-up approach. Many articles give credit to government organizations as the leading housing agent, and view slum inhabitants as beneficiaries of formal housing provision. Prior to the arrival of the BMK program, the review was more difficult due to the scarcity of text that identified the slum inhabitant as being a ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The researcher had to rely on newspaper clippings, documents, and electronic materials which were produced by NGOs, especially the FRSN and alliances such as HSFT, NULICO, LOCOA, COPA, the assembly of the Poor and Prachathai.com. Fortunately, the FRSN has an informal

3 National Housing Authority of Thailand (NHA) Head Office, Bangkapi, Bangkok
CODI Northeast Regional Office, Khon Kaen City Hall, Maung Khon Kaen
4 FRSN = Four Region Slum Network
HSFT = Human Settlement Foundation Thailand
NULICO = National Union of Low-Income Community Organization of Thailand
coalition with local scholars and international slum organizations, therefore some Thai and English publications have been continuously produced since the 1990s. However, those archives have limited publication and distribution and are not widely found in regular online sources or a general library. More importantly, those writings tend to be fragmented and dispersed. To access those archives, the researcher had to collect them from NGOs and community leaders in person, both of which are primarily located in the slums.

3) In-depth Interview

The method of interview was used for obtaining an in-depth understanding of local people’s experiences of slum upgrading projects and empowerment. Data from interviews provide how these practices led to the evolving role over time which addressed the research questions. Zeisel (2006; 227) states that the function of an interview is to explore “What people think, feel, do, know, believe and expect”. According to Hammersley and Atkinson (2007:23) ‘naturally occurring talk’ is one of the key interview methods that reveals the motive behind participant’s actions. The thesis employed in-depth interviews including semi-structured, open-ended questions as well as with informal conversation. Ten participants from each community were selected from community leaders, committees and external stakeholders. In-depth interviews took about 60-90 minutes per person.

Phone interviews were conducted with two persons at the Sengki Community case study because both interviewees lived outside Sengki community since the land sharing project was completed in 1999. The main reason for using phone interviews because the two key informants were traveling to other cities. The challenges experienced when using the phone is that the researcher can’t see the interviewees. Any visual cues the researcher might collect in person will be more difficult to discern over telephone. Therefore, the researcher must concentrate and carefully listen. It is important for researcher to reduce communication errors by using incorporate questions, for example ‘Did I explain the question clearly?’ or ‘Would you like more details?’ The next challenges are time and place. When conducting a phone interview, the researcher has to make the appointment in advance to ensure that interviewees is comfortable talking at that time and place. During the interview, it is critical to keep things going smoothly and eliminate distractions for example background noises and awareness of the approximate time interview need.

LOCOA = Leader and Organization of Community Organization in Asia
COPA = The Community Organization for People’s Action

5 SK-4/FM/CM/BKK and Mr.SJ (one of the key elite community members who has not allowed to reveal his/her real name in the thesis).
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Key informants of in-depth interview are coded in the following format:

- (TWM-6/M/L/KK) = Tawanmai case study/Male/Community Leader/Khon Kaen
- (TWM-5/FM/CM/KK) = Tawanmai case study/Female/Community member/Khon Kaen
- (SK-1/M/L/BKK) = Sengki-1/Male/Leader/Bangkok
- (KKU-1/M/S/KK) = Khon Kaen University/Male/Scholar/Khon Kaen
- (NHA/M/RS/BKK) = National Housing Authority/Male/Researcher/Bangkok
- (NULICO-1/FM/L/BKK) = National Union of Low-income Community Network-2/Female/Leader/Bangkok
- (NULICO-2/M/L/KK) = National Union of Low-income Community Network-2/Male/Leader/Khon Kaen
- (FRSN-1/FM/L/BKK) = Four Region Slum Network-1/Female/Leader/Bangkok

4) Questionnaire

The method of the questionnaire was utilized to identify the key informants as well as gather household data from the sampling group. The thesis applied structured questionnaires with closed-ended questions and open-ended questions that were comprised of 5 major parts (refer to appendix 10). The questionnaires took approximately 15-20 minutes per person. Based on qualitative research, the exact number of participants could not be fixed at the early stages of planning but would be defined on an ongoing basis as the study progressed in the field (Taylor and Bogdang, 1998:26-27).

The sampling group was slum residents and external stakeholders who have been involved in both slum upgrading projects since project implementation. Community members were subdivided by “age range classification” at the first step. Then, the participants were classified into different groups regarding to their position/role in the slum upgrading project. According to the pilot study at the Tawanmai community since 2009, data from the ground revealed that people over 18 years old are the major target group because they took responsibility for mortgage repayments. They undertook key positions in the project whereas people younger than 18 played a lesser role. From questionnaire samplings of adult residents over 18 years old, the thesis identified and gained information on “key informant sampling” based on their responsibilities in the process. Accordingly, the participants were classified into 3 groups as follows:

Group 1: Local slum inhabitants who acted as community pioneers, community leaders and/or community organization committee members.

Group 2: Local slum inhabitants who are general member of savings, construction and other social welfare groups

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6 Refer to detail of interview source at reference section
In the final step, the in-depth interview is designed for the specific participant groups. At Sengki community, the sampling group for questionnaire was 102 of 126 households. The survey was conducted between 20th and 28th March 2011. The 22 questionnaires were distributed to Group 1 and 60 for Group 2, 20 for Group 3. Tawanmai community survey, consisting of 100 questionnaires was delivered to sampling group of 120 households. The questionnaires were distributed between 20th and 27th April 2011. The researcher delivered 20 to Group 1, 60 to Group 2 and to 20 Group 3.

5) Visual and Audio Recording

Audio recording and photographs are important methods in supporting the data collection. The photographic approach was especially useful in what Zeisel (2006:159) calls ‘observing physical traces’, to read the continuity and change of the built environment. The thesis applied visual and audio recording in providing the evidence of linkages between the slum upgrading project, the role of slum inhabitants and empowerment practices. There are two sets of photos that were taken during community fieldwork at both case community studies. The first set is pictures of before and during the upgrading operations. At the Tawanmai community, the whole process of upgrading was recorded because the researcher was a team member for the Tawanmai project. As the Sengki project was conducted more than three decades ago, the research relied on copied photos of the original pre-upgrading and upgrading process from secondary sources such as reports, the NHA database, the Sengki Cooperative Office and the community leader’s photo collection.

The second photograph set was taken after the upgrading project was completed. At this stage, photos were collected in the current location of the two communities. To address the research question, the thesis employs the post-upgraded images to address three objectives. Firstly, they assist to develop an explicit connection between the upgrading project, empowerment practices and the slum inhabitant’s role. Secondly, the images are a tool for investigating the expansion of the slum inhabitants’ post-upgrading roles. How far do slum inhabitants extend their roles towards the upper levels of empowerment and/or other development issues? Once the images are grouped together, the researcher could detect the continuity and patterns of change in the physical environment as well as the relationship among the three key components. These patterns also provide evidences to triangulate with other resources. Some images also revealed the details of the environment and practices that the researcher did not focus on at the time of community fieldwork. The third benefit of the visual record is to recall the residents’ memories at the time of upgrading. Once the pictures are integrated with the interviews and questionnaires, many participants remembered many details that they were responsible for as a primary housing agent.
4.3.1.4 Limitation of data gathering

This section describes the limitation of the data and the validity of data as a result of Sengki upgrading project occurred four decades ago. Furthermore, the researcher was not involved with the upgrading project, unlike at Tawanmai. To understand the background of project, the historical research approach was applied for Sengki land-sharing project because it responds to what changes occurred during the course of development. The data gathering process was designed utilizing the integrated method and validation across multi sources.

At the early stage of data collecting, the researcher relied on secondary data from many scholars who conducted or studied about Sengki land sharing program since 1980 to post 2000. Fortunately, Sengki was acknowledged by UN Habitat as a demonstration community in the ‘1991 The Year of Shelter for the Homeless’. Hence several research reports and archives from key agents such as National Housing Authority of Thailand, UN Habitat, and Mahidol University are available which provided information relevant to the evolution of Sengki housing development project, upgrading process, and participants. Importantly, through this resource, the researcher could access contact of key persons who had taken part in the process such as NHA officers (project owner), Mahidol University scholar (facilitator), and former Sengki community leaders.

Next step, the researcher applied in-depth interview as a major tool of historical approach to gather information embedded in key persons’ experience that usually go unrecorded in the formal archives. While in-depth interview provided primary data of the community history from key agents’ personal experiences, however individual accounts could be inaccurate due to the long passage of time. Thus the selected information gained from in-depth interview were verified against the archival study, observation, questionnaire, map, visual recordings (old photos, old SHS co-op reports/forms). The methods were applied consistently in Sengki land sharing and Tawanmai BMK to establish and reinforce the explicit relationships of the two cases. By utilizing different methods, the researcher could validate data to evidence the dynamic role of slum inhabitants as the primary housing agent. The historical approach and data validation provided evidence of the linkage between two key slum upgrading projects across four decades. Significantly, the historical approach demonstrates that the slum inhabitant role was formulated and constantly developed through empowerment practices since Sengki land sharing across four decades, and is not a recent phenomenon.

4.3.2 Case Study Approach

The selection rationale for the two case studies is based on the research conditions, objectives and timeframe. The evolving process of the slum inhabitant’s role as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ is the central issue of the thesis. The research question looks at the process and pattern of change across time in the relationship between the three major components; the slum upgrading project,
empowerment practices and the slum inhabitant’s role. Hence, the research method is required that effectively responds to questions of ‘how’ and ‘what’. The thesis adopts the case study as a major method of investigating data as it is appropriate to the bottom-up approach. As mentioned by Yin (2003:13) and Shipman (1997:61), the need for an in-depth understanding of a particular place is an essential component of the research framework because a case study provides the tool to investigate the qualities embedded in each place and a view of the contemporary phenomena within their real-life context.

A key issue of the research framework is the time scale due to the fact that the research focuses on the transformation over time. The research centres around two key projects that represent the evolving process of the slum inhabitant’s role as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The thesis defines the scope of time as the period from 1980 to 2011 because in 1980, the Thai government made the first attempt to implement the slum upgrading program in the 4th NESDP (1977-1981), while 2011 was the time the researcher conducted fieldwork. This time scale influenced the selection of case studies and the conduction of fieldwork. The case studies were selected based on different responses in time to the research sub-questions. Importantly, the case study does not aim to conduct a comparative study, rather it attempts to establish the linkage between the selected cases.

However, the fieldwork was limited to only a few months due to the time and financial constraints of a doctoral research. The thesis addressed the time constraint by limiting the number of case studies to two and investing more time engaged with each case in an attempt to experience the full range of community processes and residents’ experiences. Moreover, focusing on two locations offers the opportunity to draw meaningful connections through in-depth explorations.

### 4.3.2.1 Criteria of Case Study Selection

The specific criteria for case study selection were based on the research questions, the literature review and surveys of several slum upgrading projects. On the basis of the literature survey that reviewed local and international practices, the thesis collated and analysed slum upgrading criteria from various international agencies such as Cities Alliance (2010), UN HABITAT (2009), World Bank (2009), United Nations (2008), Asian Development Bank (2008), UNHRP (2003), UNCHS (2001) etc. Moreover, a number of low-cost housing criteria have been cited from local practices to support the study, for instance, Yap (2010), NHA (2009), Rabibhadana (2009), National Research Council of Thailand (2007), Viratkapan and Perera (2006), Pornchokchai (2005), and CODI (2004). As a result, the criteria for case selection consisted of composite indicators of physical and non-physical dimensions, discussed below.
The uniqueness of the case, the thesis defines the uniqueness as the quality of the slum upgrading project in two aspects. The first characteristic is ‘the quality of the project as a pilot community’ that was primarily implemented at the time the housing program was launched by a formal or informal agency. The case study could be implemented in different forms such as an experimental project, a demonstration project or a pilot project. The communities are considered as potential case studies if they promote a bottom-up approach. The second qualification is the ‘recognition of the case’, and/or whether it brings about considerable changes toward Thai housing policy and practices. The broader conceptual applications in various areas represents how well-accepted and/or well-recognized the case is. Recognitions from international and national organizations suggests that the project has achieved a certain standard. This recognition is also echoed in regular community visits from external organizations.

Time becomes one of the most significant criteria because it defines the research scope and questions. Although the Thai slum upgrading program was first implemented since 1977, many programs did not include slum inhabitants as a key agent of low-cost housing development – until the entry of the CHHSS that promoted slum inhabitants as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in the 5th NESDP (1982-1986). Consequently, there have been many practices to integrate slum inhabitants as part of the housing programs – however they were often separately implemented by different agencies. Post 2000, the CODI had the authority to oversee the national slum upgrading program. They officially claimed to promote slum residents as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of the BMK program (CODI, 2004:8). The thesis identifies the period between 1980 and post 2000 as the crucial research time frame for investigating the slum inhabitant role. As mentioned earlier in section 4.3.2 in the case study approach, two communities which are representative of these periods will be selected as case studies. Hence, the two case communities will need to fill in the knowledge gap of the slum inhabitant’s role over three decades, from 1980 to post 2000.

The completion of a project is the third criterion and is a response to the research sub-questions. The first sub-question examines the change and continuity of the slum inhabitant’s role during the course of development, ‘How were slum inhabitants previously acting as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’?’. The second sub-question investigates the current role of the slum inhabitant that goes beyond the housing issue, ‘What is the slum inhabitant’s current role as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’?’. Only communities that have achieved project completion could provide a view of the evolving process of the slum inhabitant’s role from the past to the present, while incomplete projects have limitations, in particular on the role of slum inhabitants after the post-upgrading period. The completion of a project means the project has completed housing construction, gained official land security and have people dwelling in it for many years.
For the next criteria, the selected community must consist of **three key components**: the slum inhabitant's role as a 'Primary Housing Agent', a slum upgrading project and empowerment practices.

The first component is the **slum inhabitant's role**. The thesis focuses on the evolving role of the housing agent, not only the slum inhabitant but also the government agency who is engaged as the project stakeholder. The second component is the **slum upgrading project**. The thesis postulates that the agencies' roles have evolved and transformed through the practice of slum upgrading. Lastly, **empowerment practices** have been embedded in the slum upgrading process and significantly contributed to the informal learning process and elevated the slum inhabitant to be a primary housing agent.

**Time availability, accessibility and budget** are the final criteria. The thesis attempts to address these constraints by limiting the number of case studies to two cases and spending longer time in each community.

### 4.4 Selection of the Case Study

#### 4.4.1 List of Alternative Communities

The case study to represent early slum upgrading practices since 1980 in Thailand will inevitably be located in Bangkok, the country's primate city. A number of slum upgrading projects that have been raised in the literature review in Chapter 3 are all potential case studies including, Klong Toey 70 rai, Sengki, Wat Lad BuaKhaow, Rom Kroaw 1-6, Sam Yod, Rama IV, and On-Nuch. On the other hand, the candidates for post-2000 slum upgrading practices can be drawn from country-wide cases due to economic and urban growth in secondary cities and also the expansion of the slum community network nationwide over the past two decades. Apart from Bangkok, Khon Kaen city was selected as the location for potential case studies due to the comprehensive growth of slum settlements coupled with the city being the designated priority area for government housing.

Since the 5th NESDP (1982-1986), the Thai government has promoted the economic growth of secondary cities as industrial centres of the Mekong region. Even before this plan, Khon Kaen has emerged as one of the major cities in the Northeastern region of Thailand with a high population growth. Between 1973 and 1983, the population in Khon Kaen Municipality rose from 64,402 people to 115,515 people (Lapanunda, 1998:98) with the increase mainly from labour migration from neighbouring cities and districts in the Northeast (Khon Kaen Municipality, 1997:55). In parallel with this phenomenon, the number of informal settlements has greatly increased and Khon Kaen has the largest population with the lowest household income in the country's Northeastern region (Sununta et al, 1988). Differing from other secondary cities and reflecting its economic importance, Khon Kaen's number of informal settlements has constantly grown for many decades, while other cities
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...experienced fluctuations or are stable. According to Rabibhadana (1998) and a CODI (2003) study, slums in Khon Kaen Municipality have been continuously expanding since the 1960s. The number was 7 settlements in 1962 and grew to 11 in 1997. By 2000, the number of slum households had almost doubled to 19 communities with 30,000 people or 11.61% of the population (CODI, 2003:11).

In the context of this growth, Khon Kaen city was given priority and promoted as a pilot area of national housing programs provided by many government agencies such as NHA, UCDO and CODI. Hence, the case communities in Khon Kaen are selected to demonstrate slum upgrading projects from the period of post-2000. Since the implementation of the BMK national slum upgrading program in the city, there have been four communities involved consisting of Tawanmai, Nong Yai2, Node Nong Wat2 and a slum community network that consists of nine communities along the railway line.

4.4.2 Selected Case studies

As mentioned in section 4.3.2, two communities are required to investigate the development of the slum inhabitant's role as a 'Primary Housing Agent' from 1980 to post-2000 and how empowerment practices play an important role in slum upgrading projects and result in the expanding role of slum inhabitants from the local to the national level. Through examining alternative communities and reviewing of secondary sources, two communities clearly stand out and are responsive to the criterion in section 4.3.2, Sengki community in Bangkok and Tawanmai community in Khon Kaen.

Sengki community and Tawanmai community have been selected as the case studies because they manifest the ‘the three components’ of slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment. Three components have been embedded in the slum upgrading process of these two community case studies while they are inexplicitly found other communities from 1980 to post-2000. Importantly, empowerment practices of these two communities also significantly contributed to the informal learning process and elevated the slum inhabitant to be a primary housing agent.

To begin with the first case study, Sengki community is an urban slum settlement in the capital city Bangkok that achieved land ownership from the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) and conducted a slum upgrading scheme utilizing land-sharing. The NHA served as a key organizer and intermediary of project implementation between Sengki residents and local organizations. The collaboration between a government agency and a local community is considered the pilot effort that promoted slum community organization as an agent of low-cost housing development (NHA, 1991; Ad-am, 1988). According Boonyabancha (in Maksirisuka, 2001:153) the former director of the CHHSS who was overseeing the Sengki land-sharing project argues that Sengki community applied the best practices of the NHA know-how. Once the community went through the upgrading process in the late 1980s, Sengki established the first housing cooperative for low-income households in Thailand. Accordingly,
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Sengki community was the only community that was chosen to be a demonstration project by the UN Habitat in 1991, ‘The Year of Shelter for the Homeless’. Sengki residents were proud to be a role model for low-cost housing development and have become familiar with hosting many frequent visits from national and international guests. Sengki community provides a concrete example that the community driven process in slum upgrading was possible by successfully accommodating slum inhabitants and supporting them to become the ‘Primary Housing Agents’ in the process. What the Sengki community example also illustrated was that policy makers and practitioners realized that slum dwellers are not a barrier of urban development and can be participants in the project’s accomplishments.

Previously known as Dynamo slum, the second case study of Tawanmai community is a low-income settlement that originally settled in the Khon Kaen urban fringe in the 1970s. Between 2004 and 2007 as part of the BMK slum upgrading project, the Tawanmai residents relocated to a nearby location. The CODI was the main organizer who supported the local residents with their local organization network as the leading agents of BMK project implementation. Tawanmai is one of the ten BMK pilot projects nationwide and one of the very few conducted outside Bangkok and its vicinity. Three pilot projects were launched in Khon Kaen by 2004 and the target group had extended into 12 communities a year later. By the year 2007, Tawanmai was the only community which had accomplished the whole process of BMK in Khon Kaen, while the other communities were behind in the BMK schedule. Since the construction process had started, Tawanmai has been a regular host of educational visits from local, national and international guests. Former community leaders claim that they are the genuine pioneers of urban growth and bought prosperity to the area and its vicinity (Worayot, 2011).

From 2004-2007, the CODI and the Khon Kaen Municipality continuously supported the BMK implementation in the Tawanmai community with a view that the Tawanmai community could possibly become a role model of housing solution for other slum communities in Khon Kaen and Thailand. The community was officially opened on site by the Minister of Social Development and Human Security, the Khon Kaen Governor, and several top executives of provincial organizations. The Tawanmai community was highly praised by stakeholders, particularly the CODI and the KKM, as: the first low-income housing cooperative of the Northeast region; a role model of transparent management over debt repayment; strong-community saving discipline; and a community driven process. Taking part as a member of national slum organizations, Tawanmai community has been engaging with many political issues such as land reform, building code adjustment, and resistance to slum eviction. In this

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7 Reference from community survey between March and May 2011 and an interview with the project manager of BMK Khon Kaen at the CODI Northeast Region Office on 18th March 2011
broader role, Tawanmai community had been recognized by many countrywide agencies such as various government ministries, the NULICO, the GHB, the CODI, the FRSN, and the LOCOA. The growing participation of slum movements, mentioned above, has enhanced the profile of Tawanmai community from the local to the national level.

4.5 Implementation of Research Plan

In attempting to understand the evolving process of slum inhabitant’s role over Thai slum upgrading practices from 1980 to post-2000 as reflected in the research question ‘How did empowerment practices in the slum upgrading projects assist the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of Thai low-income housing development?’ the thesis research framework focused on investigating the connection between the three key components of slum inhabitant roles, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices. The thesis hypothesizes that slum inhabitant roles have transformed through the practice of slum upgrading projects where empowerment plays an important role as a basis for enhancing slum inhabitant’s capacity for being the primary housing agent. The final part of this chapter discusses the application of research plan in the two case communities. What the research achieved, has not achieved and the limitations of the fieldwork conducted are described. The community fieldwork at Sengki community has been conducted between 8th March and 10th April 2011. This was followed by the fieldwork at Tawanmai community conducted between 19th April and 31st May 2011.

Prior to fieldwork, the thesis focused on the evolving role of slum inhabitants as agents of technical implementation due to the influence of the mainstream literature reviews that were mainly based on formal housing agencies’ practices and point of views. Many published records have largely emphasized two main approaches. Firstly, the conventional approach, widely held in the public awareness and among national and international organizations, that credited government agencies and the formal housing provisions with leading Thai low-cost housing evolution while slum inhabitants are regarded as the recipients of state housing programs. The second more contemporary approach acknowledges slum inhabitants as the primary agents of state housing project implementation such as through savings groups, construction management and social welfare provision. A number of archives highlight the slum inhabitant’s capacity in organizing savings, loans and construction.

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Accordingly, the thesis defined the research scope at the operational level of slum upgrading projects, rather than addressing other larger issues and originally concluded the research time frame in 2007 when Tawanmai community completed its construction (as shown in figure 4.5).

Applying similar research methods and process at the two communities, the community fieldwork revealed different aspects of slum inhabitant’s roles that are absent from formal records. At Sengki community, the sampling group for questionnaire was 102 of 126 households. The survey was conduct between 20th and 28th March 2011 and 100 questionnaires have been collected. The data from questionnaire assist the researcher to identify and gain information on “key informant sampling” based on their responsibilities in the process. Then, the in-depth interview was designed for the specific participant groups. Data from questionnaire helped identify six key persons selected for in-depth interview due to their role and responsibility. At the community field work at Sengki, In-depth interviews10 played an important role in the collection of data from participants which resulted in a revision of the research framework. Prior to interviewing, the researcher made informal visits for self-introduction and familiarity. In the context of the informal settlement, building trust is a prerequisite between the researcher and key informants because eviction threats have made slum dwellers suspicious of strangers entering their community. Seen from the perspective of community leaders and NGOs, a formal letter requesting an interview is less significant than personal relationships and trust. In contrast, the formal letter is an effectively tool to gain access to key informants who work for government agencies.

The benefit of gaining trust from the community leaders11 is that it opened the door to their informal network, which is often concealed from what outsiders perceive from formal records. There are often collective groups of key persons who play covert roles relevant to slum housing at national and international levels. Close personal relationships between apparently well-known slum leaders such as


10 Six key persons has been selected for in-depth interview at Sengki community consisted of former community leader, former community secretary (who became the community leader at the time of fieldwork), Co-operative committee, and 3 residents.

11 Interview with Mr.Worathep Tienchareonchai, Sengki Community Leader, 30th March 2011 at Sengki Cooperative Office; interview with Mr.Ponganan Chuangtham, the FRSN Leader, 4th May 2011 at Human Settlement Foundation Thailand (HSFT), Ramkamheang 39, Bangkok; interview with Mr.Pirot Suwannahong, the NULICO Secretary, 9th November 2011 at CODI office, Ramkamheang, Bangkok
at Klong Toey and Sengki communities have been developing through the long shared experience of working against forced evictions. This informal network paves the way for slum inhabitants to develop a pragmatic relationship with NGOs, local government agencies and different civil societies.

For fieldwork implementation at Sengki community, in-depth interviews were a challenge because some key informants were absent or reluctant to provide information that was linked to previous community conflicts. The negative consequences of land-sharing practices at Sengki brought long-term personal conflicts between residents at both the personal and the institutional levels. Formerly, a focus group was proposed to validate information that was collected from interviewing different participants. However, some participants refused to meet face to face in a focus group meeting. For example, two former committee members moved out from the community because the majority of Sengki residents were against them (see details in Chapter 5). The researcher was unable to interview those persons but information was later filled in by a third party, the NHA staff members who were involved as project organizers. Faced with those limitations, the research plan has been changed accordingly from a focus group to re-interviews. The objective of re-interview was to cross-check data from multiple sources to minimize personal bias and to verify research findings with more accuracy.

To understand the relationship between the three important elements, the researcher utilized several data gathering methods at Tawanmai community. Three different data sources have been cross checked across the process of Tawanmai community upgrading. Firstly, the information was gathered while the researcher was a designer member of the Tawanmai project upgrading between 2003 and 2007. The researcher could access in-depth information and importantly build trust between the researcher and community leaders and members. Secondly, the information was collected between January and March 2009 when the researcher conducted the pilot project as a part of the design and planning masters program. At this stage, the pilot project provided key information and key informants for research plan implementation. Lastly, updated information was accumulated between March and May 2011, when the Tawanmai community survey consisting of 100 questionnaires was delivered to a sampling group of 120 households. The questionnaires were distributed between 20th and 27th April 2011 and 96 responses were collected. The data from the questionnaire was utilized to classified the

12 Two former Sengki community committees moved out from Sengki community without updated contacts. They had strong disagreements with other community members on the process of land plot selection. The former officer of Yan Nawa District has denied to be interviewed about the case of overcharged fees for Sengki housing permit.

13 Five persons were selected for re-interview at Sengki community Co-operative office from 8th-10th April 2011.
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to sampling group as “key informant sampling” based on their roles in the process. Once the researcher gained mutual trust from Tawanmai community leaders and many leaders of national NGOs focused on housing development for low-income households, the researcher was allowed to be involved in their activities such as the annual meeting of FRSN, NULICO public hearing, and the protest against Rama 6 slum eviction by the HFST-FRSN-NULICO alliance.

14 HSFT, FRSN and NULICO
15 FRSN national annual meeting, 8th May 2011 at Town in Town Hotel, Bangkok
16 NULICO public hearing for urban land for the urban poor, 14th May 2011 at MCOT Public Company Limited Conference Hall, Rama 9 Bangkok
17 The protest was conducted on 5th April 2011 at the Royal Thai Police Head Office.
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Figure 4.2: Tawanmai community upgrading between 2003 and 2007 (Dhabhalabutr, 2003 and 2004)

Top left: MoU Agreement Ceremony for BMK program at Khon Kaen City
Top right: Collaborative housing design process at Tawanmai community
Middle left: Collective planning process of community the master plan at Tawanmai community
Middle right: Tawanmai team presents design proposal to institutional citywide network
Bottom left: Mock-up room of two-storey row house.
Bottom right: First phase of housing construction
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**Figure 4.3**: Pilot project as a part of Design and Planning Master program conducted between January and March 2009 (Dhabhalabutr, 2009)

Top left and right: Completion of two storey row-house and main entrance to Tawanmai community

Middle left: Public space designed for playground but later becomes car parks

Middle right: Community centre and community herb garden

Bottom left: Main entrance and sign displaying community title

Bottom right: The contrast of well upgraded row-houses owned by more recent members and the informal settlement of some original Tawanmai members reflects some inconsistency in BMK’s objective and outcome at Tawanmai community.
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Figure 4.4:
Top left and right: Annual meeting of FRSN
Middle left and right: NULICO public hearing with former PM Anand Panyarachunand, a prominent monk, Phra Paisarn Wisaro
Bottom left: Protest of Rama 6 anti-slum eviction by HFST-FRSN-NULICO alliance (Bottom left and right). The banner translates as “The police have been heavy-handed, using violence to solve slum people’s problems”. (Dhabhalabutr, 2011)

While interviews at Sengki community reveal the relationship between the three components at the community scale, the fieldwork at Tawanmai community showed the expanded role of slum inhabitants on larger citywide and national scales. Importantly, in-depth interviews have been conducted with many key persons who commonly viewed the slum inhabitant movement from the policy maker’s perspective such as leaders of NGOs, NULICO and FRSN, and the CODI vice-director. They strongly advocated for the comprehensive role of the slum network rather than individual communities toward low-cost housing policy. This movement has largely flowed into the national and international levels post-2000 with many cases of alliances between slum networks and civil groups yielding concrete solutions over the housing policy such as regulation reform, the formation of national slum organizations, and the transformation of government agencies. The slum networks as agents of political transformation over housing policy have brought about a shift in the way of seeing the slum inhabitant role. Critically, the political role of the slum network has not been found in formal records as noted earlier and, as a result, the researcher decided to broaden the research scope regarding the role of slum dwellers and the research time frame.

Firstly, the level of the slum inhabitant role has been extended from project implementation in individual communities to political movements on a nationwide scale. In response, the thesis investigates the slum inhabitant role as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ at two levels. The first level examines their role as agent of project implementation in their local setting. At this level, the thesis investigates the transformation/evolution of an individual slum community through the practice of a slum upgrading project that integrates empowerment into the process. The role carries on through the practice of saving, planning and construction.

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18 Ms.Kanitha Preechaprechakub, the vice-director of CODI. Mr.Ponganan Chuangtham, the HSFT Leader, Mr.Pirot Suwannahong, the NULICO’s secretary and Mr.Prapart Sengpradab, the NULICO Leader between May and November 2011
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The second level focuses on the slum inhabitant role as an agent of political change over housing policy at the nationwide scale. Looking into the large scale movements of slum inhabitants, the thesis investigates the transformation/evolution of the slum network. The thesis explores the up-scaling of the role from an individual slum community as an agent of project implementation towards the slum network as an agent of political change. The expansion of the role has been investigated from different practices that reinforced their proactive engagements with national institutions to respond to their housing needs such as through the transformation of UCDO to CODI, the establishment of NULICO and building code modifications.

The time scale is another aspect of the research framework that had to be changed. As mentioned by UNESCAPE (2008:32) and Cronin and Guthrie (2010:130), the collective community development usually declines after implementation, however the case of the BMK slum upgrading program demonstrates ongoing practices. Rather than the pilot project being stopped or left to stand alone when external partners left the scene, the slum communities under BMK continued the upgrading momentum. They are actively involved and upscale their role into the citywide network. The data from fieldwork reveals that there are a number of significant practices of ‘political empowerment’ undertaken after post-upgrading. This is the main reason why the thesis extended the scope and the time frame in collecting data towards post-BMK upgrading.

Unfortunately, the evolving role of the slum network through the political practice is rarely found in formal archives such as research, study reports and conference proceedings. Just a few resources were available such as newspaper clippings, websites and documents provided by NGOs who have undertaken collaborative slum community development projects. However, those records were not sufficient to uncover their political practices because of their fragmented and disorganized nature. The practical approach to access unrecorded data is conducting face-to-face meetings with slum leaders and NGOs in their local setting. Those key informants were identified on the recommendation of previous interviewees. With only six weeks of fieldwork left, the researcher conducted in-depth interviews with FRSN, NULICO, CODI, HSFT, and slum community leaders19. These organization and NGOs leader are selected for interviews because they play an important role in providing information of slum inhabitant role over political empowerment practice since the establishment of the Centre of Slum in 198620 until the time of fieldwork. Many of these interviewees are also academics who regularly publish article in local and international publications.

19 Ms.Kanitha Preechaprechakub, the vice-director of CODI; Mr.Ponganan Chuangtham, the HSFT Leader; Mr.Pirot Suwannahong, the NULICO’s secretary; Mr.Prapart Sengpradab, the NULICO Leader; and Mr.Atpayuth Chantarapa, the counselor of FRSN between May and November 2011
20 Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, 2011:1; Chantarapa, 2009:44
Once slum community leaders and NGOs allowed the researcher to meet with them, each interview began with a casual discussion and avoided recording devices in the first instance. When interviewees felt more familiar and engaged in the data collecting methods, audio and video recorder were permitted. Interviewees were also allowed to see and comment on what the researcher wrote and drew. Due to the many meeting times, kinship ties between the researcher and key informants increased and this resulted in more engagement and trust. NGOs and community leaders invited the researcher to join their political exercises that were held through the collaboration of national slum networks such as the FRSN monthly meeting, the NULICO and the FRSN anti-slum eviction demonstration for Rama 6 slum community, and community visits.

Although the researcher gained crucial data relevant to the political practices of slum inhabitants, the data gathered were predominantly on the outlook of slum residents, leaders and NGOs. They have a similar approach and agenda because they have close dialogues and rely upon each other. To minimize the possibility of bias, a focus group between slum NGOs and government agencies was proposed. Unfortunately, the majority of participants refused face-to-face meetings because they were aware of future conflicts which may arise. However, they were willing to reveal the conflict issues via in-depth interviews. According to Cheng (2005:72), multiple sources provide a method to double checking results or cross examination. The researcher therefore decided not to organize the focus group discussion but to conduct a second interview with some key participants instead. The re-interviews aimed to verify the accuracy of events, evidences and research findings. Moreover, the thesis conducts data cross-verification through evidential material, written archives and community fieldwork. Important insider data and data triangulation assisted the researcher to see knowledge gaps and scope the research more clearly.

4.6 Revision of Research Framework

The figure below (4.5) proposes a research framework that was revised after fieldwork in the two communities. The significant change of the thesis framework is the extension of the research scope in terms of the slum inhabitant’s role and the time frame. Rather than investigate the evolving role of an individual slum community as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ at the operational level until the BMK upgrading period, the framework has been broadened to examine their role towards the policy level and the study flows into the post-BMK upgrading in 2011.
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**Table:**

- **Single slum community organization**
  - Let to
  - Recognition of slum as ‘Primary Housing Agent’
  - Best practice of UN-Habitat

- **Slum community network**
  - Let to
  - Formation of own slum org at national level
  - Government agency transformation

**Figure 4.5:** Proposed Model of Thai Housing Development
According to figure 4.5, the proposed research framework consists of two lines that represent the different stories of Thai housing development. The top line illustrates the conventional Thai housing history that is widely accepted among Thai society and recorded by formal agencies. In contrast, the lower line represents an alternative story proposed by the thesis. The model shows the relationship across the different issues: key housing agency, policy and time. The correlation between formal housing provision and informal housing provision over time has been highlighted. As a result, slum inhabitants have been expanding their role over time as manifest in the multi-scalar slum inhabitant status. Although the thesis does not investigate the 'isolated slum household' status, it is included in the literature review chapter. ‘Isolated slum household’ status is covered in much of the literature on the socio-economic and physical conditions of slum households and dwellers in Thailand (Kongpan, 2002:10).

The thesis focuses on the linkages through time of two major slum upgrading projects to investigate the evolving role of slum inhabitants from individual slum communities to slum networks. The first case study, Sengki community, represents their evolving role from 1980 to 2000 and is discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 presents findings from the second case study, Tawanmai community, and demonstrates their transformation process from 2000 to 2011, encompassing post-BMK upgrade. Hence, the two case studies furnish knowledge of the slum resident status as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ between 1980 and 2011. Another aspect investigated in this thesis is the change in government agency roles – as it is not merely the slum dwellers who have been transformed, but also other stakeholders who have also been transformed as a result of engagements with the primary housing agent in the process. The thesis discusses the transformation of the UCDO towards CODI to represent the evolving role of slum inhabitants in political issues.
CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH FINDINGS
CASE STUDY: SENGKI COMMUNITY

Introduction
Chapter 5 discusses the way in which slum inhabitants previously performed the role of ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The evolving role of slum inhabitants is uncovered through the practice of a land-sharing project at Sengki community since 1980. There are two major objectives in answering the research questions. Firstly, the chapter investigates an early link between the three components and its impact on the expansion of the role and status of slum inhabitants. Secondly, the chapter investigates particular aspects of empowerment that reinforced the slum inhabitants' role in low cost housing development. The thesis addresses the gap in existing housing records by emphasizing the slum inhabitants' role in a bottom-up approach rather than help from government agencies.

To investigate the evolving role of slum inhabitants as ‘Primary Housing Agents’, the thesis applies empowerment as an analysis framework (employing three components and their relationships among them). This research employs empowerment theory (reviewed in Chapter 4 section 4.1) to discuss the findings from community fieldwork in Chapter 5, which describes the role evolution of ‘Primary Housing Agent’. In the literature, the writings of Clegg (1989), Gutierrez and Ortega (1991), Friedmann (1992), Narayan (2002), Alsop and Heinsohn (2005) are particularly relevant to the context of the research and provided a framework to read the process of how slum inhabitants practiced their roles in multiple scales through the evolution of empowerment practices between the times.

Integrating the concept of empowerment (Table 4.1), the research theoretical framework consists of three key, interrelated components: the role of slum inhabitants, slum upgrading projects and empowerment practices. The thesis focuses on the evolving role of housing agents that is comprised of the slum inhabitants and government agencies as project stakeholders and further postulates that the agencies’ roles have evolved and transformed through the practices of slum upgrading.

Chapter 5 and 6 present findings and analyses in a chronological structure, as the thesis utilizes the historical approach to address the Thai low-income housing evolution. The time sequence of events is critical in understanding the transformation of the slum inhabitants’ role during the time from 1980-2011 (see section 4.3.1.1). Between 8th March and 10th April 2011, three research methods were applied at Sengki community. Firstly, 102 questionnaires were collected from 126 sampling households. Data from the questionnaires revealed key information on who played important roles in the upgrading process. Secondly, in-depth interviews were then devised for six key participants. Thirdly, repeat interviews were conducted to cross-check data from multiple sources and verify the research findings. The in-depth interview was an important method to investigate the community case.
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study because data sources related to slum inhabitants’ roles in their settlement upgrading programs are fragmented. Importantly, the majority of formal records rarely recognize slum inhabitants as active agents in any Thai low-income housing development. Therefore, it is necessary for the thesis to conduct an in-depth investigation into the Sengki community case study. Although the Sengki upgrade program has been completed since the 1980s, the thesis had access to key informants, who were genuinely involved in the upgrading process, as they were still living in the community at the time of the fieldwork. Data gathered from the field study at Sengki community was then analyzed through a cross section of time focusing on the three major elements of the slum inhabitants’ role, the slum upgrade practice and their empowerment. The findings were further verified through historical description, oral history and archival study.

Chapter 5 starts by introducing the community background and problems of illegal land occupation. The chapter then discusses various practices of empowerment that emerged, along with the land-sharing process such as democratization, community participation and Community Based Organisations (CBOs). The practices discussed resulted in the up-scaling of the slum inhabitants’ status from an individual community to a slum network and the transformation of government agencies to stakeholders who were only engaged in the process.

5.1 Pre-Upgrading Process (Pre 1940-1986): Problem of illegal Land Occupation

5.1.1 Sengki Community Background

Sengki Community is an old, low-income community located south of the historical centre of Bangkok, Rattanakosin Island. It began as a community on rented land which belonged to the Crown Property Bureau (CPB). Previously, the community was part of Yan Nawa District and was transferred to Bang Kho Laem District as part of Bangkok’s administration restructure since 1989. Prior to the 1940s, Sengki community was bordered by Charoen Krung Road on the east and the Chaophraya River on the west. To the north was Kampani lane and to the south, WatLadBuaKhao community. Demographically, the majority of Sengki dwellers were Thai and Sino-Thai families who worked in local agriculture and grew crops such as rice, bananas and sugar cane. By 1940, Charoen Krung Road, the first modern road in Thailand, was extended through to the Sengki community, resulting in

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1 Thai Chinese consist of people of full or partial Chinese ancestry, particularly Han Chinese (Barbara A. West, 2009:794). The Thai Chinese have been deeply ingrained into all elements of Thai society over the past 200 years since King Rama I. With the highly successful integration of historic Chinese immigrant communities throughout Thailand, a significant number of Thai Chinese are the descendants of intermarriages between Chinese immigrants and native Thais. Many Thai Chinese have intermarried and assimilated into Thai society and are self-identified solely as Thai (Annabelle R. Gambe, 2000:23).
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The community having two sides that faced public transportation routes with high potential, and consequently the area became a prime business area. Sengki community attracted a huge number of road construction labour who temporarily dwelled in the community. As a result, the local Thai and Chinese families changed the land-use from cultivation to row-houses for rent. Over several years, the migrants settled on a permanent basis and invited their families from rural provinces to move in together with them. By the 1970s, Sengki became a crowded community with a mixed socio-cultural-economic status with the poor forming the majority of the community population, comprising about 59% of household (Ad-am, 1988:46).

On 16th April 1978, a huge fire that started in the WatLadBuaKhao community spread to the Sengki community. Over 400 households of the community area were destroyed. Less than 20% of the households survived. These included the shop houses in the front of the community and Thai Dhanu Bank’s warehouse at the rear. According to Thai regulations, destruction from fire effectively removed residential rental rights and the majority of Sengki dwellers became homeless. A former Sengki community leader recalls that a day after the fire, dwellers returned to the ruined site and rebuilt their temporary houses in any way they could afford (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011). The combination of the original dwellers and new migrants resulted in an unplanned, over-crowded community. While the landlords, the CPB, did not attempt to evict Sengki inhabitants, they refused to renew the lease contract after the fire. Over time, the combination of Sengki residents no longer investing and maintaining their houses coupled with the landlord’s refusal to improve the community environment, resulted in the gradual deterioration of Sengki from an old community into an urban slum.
Figure 5.1: Map of Yan Nawa District and Sengki Community location (www.cpd.bangkok.go.th)

Figure 5.2: Map of Sengki community (This page Bottom left; Tienchao et al, 1984:33),
The physical environment of Sengki before upgrade (Bottom right; NHA, 1991:7)

5.1.2 Socio-Economic and Political Structure of Sengki Community: Traditional Patron-Client Tie
Based on fieldwork conducted between April and May, 2011 in the community, Sengki is not a typical slum community⁴ in terms of being a homogeneous group. Rather, dwellers consisted of various sub-groups which included some relatively wealthy, well-educated and influential persons⁵. More importantly, there were hidden conflicts between sub-groups caused by the painful experiences of competing agendas over land ownership. The survey data indicated that the residents’ relationships were based on four major characteristics: economic status, family kinship, occupation network and ethnicity. The first category of economic status is apparently based on their household income. The residents consisted of three major income groups; high-income (22.13%), middle-income (36.89%), and low-income (40.98%)⁶. Prior to the upgrading project, the high-income group didn’t often socialize with the low-income group but have since formed more positive views towards each other due to the success of their tenure right (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28⁸ April 2011). The second relationship was family kinship which has long played a crucial role in community affairs. One big family with around 60 people share the Suansakaew surname with a further 40-50 people having connections to them via marriage (Ad-am, 1988:29). This family had the largest network in Sengki community and was also an indomitable group over community affairs. They had the reputation of being local elites due to personal ties with local government officers and neighbourhood community leaders. Thirdly, the occupation network is another key connection among Sengki residents. The Suansakaew family had logistic franchises from the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT). A local member of the elite, Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew, hired Sengki residents as shipping labour at Klong Toey Port. He provided short-term and long-term employment for community members, in particular the low-income group. Lastly, an ethnic relationship could be observed since the construction of Charoen Krung Road. There were two major ethnic groups consisting of Thai (62.79%) and Chinese (29.46%). Some families later became related through marriage. The majority of Chinese families were in the higher-income group and well-connected to the Suansakaew family via business and community affairs. The low-income families were mainly Thai and Isaan (common name for Thais from the Northeastern region), families who were renters or migrated to the community after the fire. Many of these low-

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⁴ A typical slum community is classified as a slum community with relatively poor residents who predominantly migrated there from rural areas for life and work opportunities. They share similar common characteristic of the powerless such as low-income, low-literacy and day to day employment (Ockey, 1997:10)

⁵ ‘Influential person’, one who has the capacity to effect on the character, development, or behavior of Sengki resident and community affairs. The influential person is the local leader rather than the representative of local government agencies. He owed his local leadership to his personal skills, his wealth, and occasionally to his connections with official government officers. All of these character enhances his capacity to build a personal following.

⁶ The household income category is synthesized from the survey of literature from different agencies such as NHA, CHHSS, Yan Nawa District, Mahidol University. See Appendix 2
income families were employees of Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew and had less social connections with the Chinese ethnic group. The field survey revealed the inter-relationships among different sub-groups and particularly the Suansakaew family who were key actors in connecting the different sub-groups together. The relationships in the Sengki community were based on patron-client ties, exemplified by the relationship between Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew and the low-income families.

Patron-client relationships are defined as exchange relationships between roles. An individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) use his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits or both for person of lower status (client) who reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron (1972:92). In Sengki community, the research found that patron-client relationships serve as the main basic alliance system that bring together individuals and family, and as the building-blocks for elaborate networks of employment, socio-economic bond and support for, vote on community affairs.

5.1.3 Sengki Community Resistance to Eviction

After the fire in 1978, a rumour spread that the Bureau planned to redevelop the Sengki settlement due to the rapidly rising land values. As the majority of Sengki households could not give formal consent, land development would have resulted in eviction. Rather than waiting for the landowners to complete the redevelopment plan and drive the community out, the residents joined together to resist eviction. They formed an informal leadership group on behalf of particular households, involving only high and middle income groups (Tienchaow, 1984:17). On 28th April 1978, nine leaders submitted a letter to the Bureau to negotiate a deal. The letter did not receive a response from the Bureau.

In 1982, representatives from the Centre for Housing and Human Settlement Studies (CHHSS) visited the nearby community, WatLadBuaKhao which had succeeded in avoiding eviction through land-sharing. This provided an important precedent for Sengki residents to secure their existing settlement. The informal leadership group invited the CHHSS staff to visit their community. As the CHHSS was mainly a research and educational agency rather than an operational participant, they did not take any visible action at that time. However, at least now the community problem had been recognized by a government agency. Having failed to get a response from the landlord for many years, Sengki dwellers submitted a statement to Her Royal Highness Princess Galyani Vadhana on

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7. The CHHSS was a research centre under the NHA
8. According to an interview with Mr. Yongyuth Triravanich, one of the NHA head officers of the Wat Lad Bua Khoa Land-Sharing Project mentioned that one of the project partners at Wat Lad Bud Khao was the 1st Area Thai Army, which was led by the commander in chief. The personal negotiation between him, Gen. Athid Kamlang-eak, and private landlords made the agreement successful (4th May, 2011 at NHA Head Office).
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the 1st December 1982 when the HRH visited Klong Toey Slum. This was possible due to the personal relationship between the Suansakaew family and the Klong Toey Slum leader. Later, they resent the original letter to the HRH Princess Mother Srinagarindra at Chon Buri province on the 24th November 1983. The residents assumed that royal family members could help influence the Bureau to take action (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011).

Although an initial search for land tenure security did not receive an immediate response from the relevant authorities, these attempts resulted in a more positive relationship between high income group households. According to Ad-am (1988:53), ties amongst them gradually became stronger and they incrementally developed pragmatic relationships with local politicians and government agencies. Moreover, the lower income group sought an intermediary from the high income group when they needed to contact government officials. Consequently, the high income group had more substantial influence over the community affairs than any other sub-groups.

On the 24th February 1984, the CPB agreed to sell a 0.6 hectares (1,070 wah or 4,280 m²) piece of land to the community that consisting of 85 Sengki families - and not each individual family. The eligible family had to have a former land lease with the Bureau. The selling price of the land was set at 2,500 baht per wah (equal 4 m²) with a prerequisite condition that Sengki residents had to form a formal community organization that consisted of all eligible households. The other condition was that the land-sharing process had to be supervised by the CHHSS (CPB, Letter number 12/2527). A former community leader recalled that the Bureau’s proposition was accepted by the majority of residents, because the land acquisition offered a better deal than the residents expected. In fact, they originally aimed to merely renew the land lease (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011).

5.2 Upgrading Process (1986-1990) and Practice of Empowerment

This section describes the role of Sengki dwellers in mitigating socio-economic-political conflicts in the community. Many adaptive empowerment practices have been applied through land-sharing processes, and this resulted in a change of political structure, and the slum inhabitants’ and stakeholders’ roles. The section starts with the background of community conflicts between sub-groups. Then, empowerment practices through collaborations between Sengki residents and local government agencies are described. Some empowerment practices can be generalized as being ‘top-

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9 HRH was the president of The Children Foundation at Klong Toey Slum
10 Mrs. Prateep Ungsongtham Hata
11 1 wah² is a Thai unit of land measurement and is equivalent to 4 square metres
down’ and some as ‘bottom-up’ approaches. Each approach had been specifically designed and implemented, customize with local needs.

5.2.1 Community Socio-Economic-Political Conflicts
The implementation of a land-sharing project at Sengki community was formulated in the context of political conflict between the participants: high-income VS low-income groups, and residents against external partners. The competition for land became the critical point that turned neighbours into opponents. Resistance to the upgrading project began when the process to identify eligible households was undertaken. The CHHSS and the genuine residents, who were relatively better-off, had different approaches toward the criteria to identify eligible households. On the one hand, the high-income group proposed that eligible households must be consistent with the former CPB land lease. One of the high-income residents claimed that the land-sharing agreement was brought through the effort of high-income households. Low-income households, the majority of which were sub lessees and moved to the community after the fire, were not involved. Including the low-income household in the project was considered by some residents to be unfair to genuine households (SK-2/M/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). Another former member of the leader group mentioned that the number of community households after the fire was much higher than the CPB land agreement, therefore eligible households should have been limited to only genuine households (SK-3/FM/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). On the other hand, the CHHSS suggested providing land for every household who were living in the community with or without contracts. Families who left the community after the fire and held a contract were also eligible. Triyavanich, a former CHHSS leader revealed that the CHHSS attempted to include low-income households because it could prevent displaced families from simply moving into other slum areas or creating new slums (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011).

These different approaches led to conflicts between genuine families and the CHHSS. The low-income group supported the CHHSS proposal because they could change from being an illegal land occupier to a formal land owner. To ensure the maximum number of beneficiaries, the CHHSS collected all informal land occupiers together and readjusted the land into several small land plots which were distributed to every household within the new contract. To address the conflict, the CHHSS came up with a solution whereby genuine households were allocated land plots double the size of rental and squatter family plots. The CHHSS proposal also resulted in the necessity for the Sengki community to purchase more land area from the CPB to accommodate all households. The

12 He was one of the head project staff of Sengki land sharing who played an important role in making connections between NHA and community leader group and members.
13 The full land plot size is approximately 4 m wide by 12 m deep or 48 m². The half-land plot is 4 m by 6 m deep or 24 m².
CHHSS was able to convince the majority of the Sengki elite group, especially Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew, but some elites were unsatisfied, which later led to more intense conflict between them (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011).

Section 1: Individual Slum Community  
5.2.2 Application of Democratic Practices: Election of Community Committee and Political Structure Change

This section examines how democratic practices affected the community's socio-political structure in particularly between the high-income and low-income groups. In the early stage of the land-sharing project at Sengki community, two initiatives were concurrently undertaken. Firstly, the Sengki community established a community organization with an official representative of the whole community for negotiations with the landlord, the CPB. Secondly, the Sengki community applied for community registration under the Yan Nawa District, which transformed the informal settlement into a legalized community. These two significant initiatives shared the common goal of increasing the collective capacity of the Sengki residents.

The CHHSS facilitated the process whereby the local residents could form their own community committee which performed as the middle party between Sengki residents and external partners, such as CHHSS, Yan Nawa District and the Department of Cooperatives. This time the CHHSS encouraged local residents to select their own leader without external agency intervention, as they wanted to understand the relationships among the different sub-groups and the residents’ organizational skill capacity (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). On 18th October 1985, the group of informal leaders appointed 16 people to the committee which consisted of 15 persons (95%) from the high-income households and 1 person (5%) from the middle-income group with none of the low-income families represented (Ad-am, 1988:28).

The first community survey after fired was conduct by the CHHSS staff in January 1986 which intended to evaluate the committee efficacy from the residents’ perspective. They found that 68.85% of the total sampling group acknowledged the operation of the land-sharing project while the rest did not (Tieanchoa, 1984:78). The assessment study, unsurprisingly, found that the appointed committee did not represent all resident sub-groups. This was reflected in the poor information distribution that

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14 The CPB outlined the conditions in a letter to NHA (CPB, Letter number 12/2527, 9th June 1984 (2527 B.C.). The CPB will only enter into a land agreement with an official community organization rather than individual households.
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excluded the low-income group who comprised the majority of the Sengki population\textsuperscript{15}. Another study by Mahidol University (Ad-am, 1988:46) further expanded on the CHHSS study, noting that the low-income group avoided participating in the project due to their low self-esteem. These low-income perspectives are reflected in statements such as, “We don’t have the capacity to solve problems; let the wealthy people do it” and “We are poor; we don’t have a voice” (Ad-am, 1988:46-47). The NHA survey and the Mahidol University study demonstrated that the traditional political structure of patron-client ties was ineffective when required to include different sub-groups into the process. The elite group holds local power and performs the major role in the community political structure. Addressing the low-income group participation requires a political structure change that provides channels for every sub-group to more equitably access political power.

To reorganize the power relationship, the CHHSS proposed the establishment of a sub-committee that was specifically responsible for the implementation of Sengki land-sharing. For the sub-committee, three people were to represent Sengki residents to work jointly with the external partners such as CHHSS, Yan Nawa District and the Department of Cooperatives. The sub-committee was principally tasked with a number of critical issues such as land allocation, selection criteria for eligible households and the definition of tenure rights. On the other hand, the appointed committee mainly focused on community registration and other domains of community affairs, such as communal, social, cultural and economic activities.

Accordingly, the different committees had clearly defined, significant roles. The proposal was welcomed by the appointed committee (of elites) but the sub-committee process had to be simplified, because many residents were not familiar with each other, particularly between the high-income and low-income groups. In January 1986, the use of an election to select the sub-committee members became a solution that Sengki residents agreed on (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29\textsuperscript{th} April 2011). The election rule was then set that the family leader, usually father or mother, representing each individual household was eligible to vote. The family leader could propose their preferred candidate or himself/herself. The voting was done in the open where participants raised their hands and were counted, one person for one vote. At the end of the process, three well-respected persons were elected as the sub-committee members.

The sub-committee opened up space for the low-income group to access decision-making power that was normally dictated by higher-income groups. This resulted in the transformation of the low-income

\textsuperscript{15} According to the survey between 17\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} May 1986, the NHA collected Sengki monthly household income data, showing that 59.15% had a salary lower than 4,000 baht per month, the NHA’s threshold for low-income earners.
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group's perspective, behaviour, and personal attitude, reflecting in an increase of self-esteem. One of the former community leaders (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011) mentions that, “previously, the low-income group avoided being involved in the process and expressing their opinion in public”. Since then, they took the opportunity provided through the election to ask for their right to live in the existing settlement, especially since some low-income households won positions in the sub-committee. The study of Maksirisuka (2001:94) and Ad-am (1988:46) found that the effort to share political power was reflected in the behavioural change of the low-income group and the ability to vote defined how the low-income group was regarded by higher income households and government partners. As a result, the low-income group became the majority of voters, and the leader group had to take this into account for their political interests. As one respondent stated, “We have become important among the CHHSS and higher socio-economic group, because we are a large number of voters, and those leaders competed for us” (SK-3/FM/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). The sub-committee formation marks an initial change in the political structure of the Sengki community that constitutes a formal relationship between high and low-income groups, to hold and share local power in the community development project.

The implementation of land-sharing begun when the CHHSS and the sub-committee conducted two community surveys in early November 1984 and late December 1985. The surveys were aimed at revising the community database regarding existing land occupation. The resultant updated CHHSS database confirmed that the former lease contract of the CPB with individual households was no longer accurate; for instance, many families’ contracts were not renewed; some tenants moved out but maintained tenure rights; and many current households occupied land without a legal contract from the CPB at this time. To address the complexity of Sengki residents’ land occupation, the sub-committee requested the renewal of contracts and to increase the eligible household number from 85 families to 135 families.

5.2.3 Linking Socio-economic Groups: Patron-Client Ties as a Platform of Gathering Together Disparate Households

Building community solidarity was the first challenge for Sengki residents as they rarely socialized with different sub-groups (see section 5.2.1). A key strategy employed by CHHSS was to utilize the traditional socio-political structure of the Sengki community which was based on patron-client ties involving an indomitable person. Here, Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew with his high socio-economic status, had a greater capacity to personally contribute to communal work and played an important role.

16 Maksirisuka’s (2001) study investigates the relationship between the process of land-sharing and political power, from the case study of Sengki community. Meanwhile, the study of Ad-am (1988) highlighted the developmental process of land sharing towards Sengki community self-reliance and behavioral evolution.
in communicating between sub-groups. His role among high and middle income groups was acknowledged by the leader of the anti-eviction group of the Sengki community leaders17 (Ad-am, 1988 and Tienchaow, 1984:17). As a sub-contractor of the Port Authority of Thailand, he benefited from personal connections with many officials and other community leaders such as the police, Yan Nawa District officers and local politicians. These local agents were to later sponsor community infrastructure construction (NHA/M/RS/BKK). Sengki residents, from high to low-income groups, often sought his assistance when they had to make contact with local government officials (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011). As he provided labour work for low-income households at KlongToey Port, the majority of low-income groups came under his patronage (SK-8/M/L/BKK, 9th April 2011). Due to these factors, the CHHSS sought to take advantage of Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew’s connections as a key person in bringing the disparate income households into a collective community (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). In an arrangement with the appointed committee, they promoted Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew as a consultant of the CHHSS. To ensure that the community elite had a good understanding of the concepts of land-sharing and community driven processes, the CHHSS provided several trainings, conducted community visits and initiated face to face discussions (CODI/FM/L/BKK, 5th May 2011). This knowledge was later made available to marginal residents through community meetings organized by the leader group. Simultaneously, the leader group gradually consolidated a pragmatic relationship with many developmental participants who were later involved in the project as stakeholders (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011).

5.2.4 Empowering the Collective Community: Community Registration under Local Government Agency

While the sub-committee implemented the land-sharing scheme, an appointed committee processed community registration with Yan Nawa District and, on the 5th May 1986, Sengki was announced as a formal community. Gaining official status enabled the community to access basic infrastructure, social welfare and amenities that they had not received since the 1978 fire. A community gate was constructed shortly after the Sengki community obtained administrative recognition. Community gates can be regarded as a symbol of change, a transformation of social capital into symbolic capital and, in the case of Sengki, as an indication of resident achievement and secure land tenure. However, a change in community status did not reflect the excluded status of some slum residents and the conflicts between sub-groups largely remained.

17 He was one of the nine leaders who submitted a letter to the CPB (28th April 1978) to negotiate a land rent deal.
5.2.5 Empowerment through Community Participation:
5.2.5.1 The Identification Process of Eligible Households and Community survey

On the 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1986, a Sengki community meeting was held to identify eligible families on the issue of land ownership. Residents and stakeholders agreed on a broadened framework and came up with six criteria\textsuperscript{18} (NHA, 1991:3). Between 26\textsuperscript{th} February and 8\textsuperscript{th} March 1986, a community survey was conducted by a joint-committee made up of the three sub-committee members and eight representatives of the CHHSS, the Yan Nawa District and local residents. The survey aimed at identifying eligible households and whether their houses were consistent with the location that they had settled. Accordingly, the joint-committee proposed two alternatives of land purchasing schemes to the CPB. The first scheme was an upgrade for all households, including genuine households with a leased contact and rental families without a contract. However, the community needed to buy an additional piece of land of about 4.05 rai (6,405 m\textsuperscript{2}) to accommodate 135 families. Excluding the rental families, the second scheme was for 126 families and required purchasing additional land from the Bureau of 1.07 rai (1,607 m\textsuperscript{2}) in area. According to the second scheme, 9 rental families were to relocate to NHA provided housing nearby.

\textsuperscript{18} See Appendix 3
5.2.5.2 Transparency in Land Pricing and Zoning

While the official patronage under the District demonstrated a huge step for the Sengki community, legal land ownership was not guaranteed. The community realized that the top priority must be placed on land delivery and access to land. On 2nd April 1986, the joint-committee finalized which households were eligible for land allocation which they announced on April 7. The committee offered two days for households to voice disagreement with the allocations. At the community meeting on 10th April 1986, the majority of residents made complaints on the joint-committee proposed scheme. A critical point of contention emerged from the many families who were allocated land area less than what they expected. A former appointed committee asked, “How can six family members live on only 10 wah² (40 m²) of land? Before the CHHSS arrived, I had land of over 50 wah² (200 m²), but now 40 wah² (160 m²) have gone to subsidize squatter families the names of whom we don’t even know” (SK-4/FM/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). The degree of conflict became increasingly hostile due to the fierce arguments between the two appointed committees. Mr.SJ¹⁹ had strongly disagreed with the allocations and proposed to evict all rental and squatter families. In contrast, Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew and the CHHSS convinced everyone to sacrifice individual benefit for all. Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew claimed “the overall objective could be reached if everyone shared both benefits and losses” (4th April 2011). The issue was decided with a vote and the majority of residents voted for Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew’s proposal. The incident created conflicts not only between the individuals, Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew and Mr.SJ, but also extended to their followers. To address the complexity of the Sengki residents’ land occupation, the sub-committee requested the renewal of contracts and an increase in the number of eligible households to 135 families from 85 families.

The CPB decided to select the second alternative as a final deal that benefited 126 families.²⁰ However, the CPB increased the asking price on the additional land that the community requested. The price was set at 4,000 baht per wah² (4 m²) which was considerably higher than the previous price of 1,100 baht. This resulted in the rise of the average land cost to 2,900 baht per wah². At the community meeting, Mr.SJ and his followers expressed strong dissatisfaction with the increased price. A rumour spread that the low-income group had to share the higher price. The low-income families wanted to pay only 2,500 baht per wah² and to make all 4,000 baht per wah² the high-income group’s responsibility. As a result of the conflicts, the meeting was unable to progress and the leaders severed their personal relationships.

¹⁹ Mr.SJ is code for one of the key elite community members and has not allowed to reveal his real name in the thesis.
²⁰ In the first scheme the Sengki community requested rental land for 135 families but the CPB did not select the first scheme, therefore nine families had to move out from the community. NHA assisted nine families to relocate to a nearby low-income housing project maintained by NHA.
The CHHSS and external partners attempted to mitigate the conflict on the increased land price and mend relations. A cross-subsidy was applied as a land pricing model for Sengki. According to the Department of Lands, land in prime business areas was more expensive than the inner areas, so the price of individual plots depended upon the location and the physical condition of the land. For example, land plots located within 40 metres of the Chareon Krung Road cost more than inner locations. Accordingly, the CHHSS proposed land plot location, zones and a price scheme to the residents (Table 5.1) at a community meeting on 25th May 1986.

**Table 5.1**: Land plot, zone and price (NHA, 1991:15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Number of land plot</th>
<th>Land plot size (mxm)</th>
<th>Area sq.wah(4m²)</th>
<th>Price baht/sq.wah(4m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3.75X12.0</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>3,100-4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.75X11.50</td>
<td>10.78</td>
<td>2,900-3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>35 (divide into 3 zones)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.75X11.25</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.75X11.25</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.75X11.25</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3.5X6.0</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The CHHSS emphasised that the CPB sold the whole piece of land to the community and not to individual families; therefore the additional costs needed to be shared by every household. Furthermore, the extension area covered the zones of both high-income and low-income households; the latter included areas damaged by the fire. However, to decrease the financial load on the low-income group, a cross-subsidy concept was applied. The application charged higher prices to households who bought land plots in a prime business area, adjacent to Chareon Krung Road, in order to subsidize prices for low-income households with land plots located at inner locations. As one of the CHHSS researchers mentioned, “the realistic master plan and concrete facts made the residents understand what and how different land plot prices were determined” (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011). Consequently, the majority of Sengki residents accepted the CHHSS scheme.

5.2.5.3 Land Plot Allocation: Segregation Vs Mixed Socio-economic status

Once an agreement had been reached with the low-income residents, a process of land plot selection was determined. Two different alternatives emerged which resulted in another confrontation between the residents. Mr. SJ and his canvassers argued that the community master plan should correspond to household financial capacity. According to a former appointed committee member, “the high-income families claimed the land adjacent to Sengki alley, as they were capable of purchasing more desirable plots, and this also created a more attractive environment to outsiders” (SK-5/FM/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). In other words, the higher-income group did not want to live in the same cluster with the low-income group. However, this alternative was opposed by Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew and his supporters who preferred to allocate land plots that corresponded to existing locations. The former community leader claimed, “The mixture of disparate income groups could sustain the sense of community as a neighbourhood cluster and help reduce the construction budgets of many households” (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011). This resulted in another major argument which deepened conflicts between the community leaders and their allies. Due to its role as the middle party, CHHSS was burdened with finding a solution. In consultation with Sengki residents, CHHSS proposed voting to resolve the issue and the majority voted for the master plan based on existing location upgrades.

5.2.5.4 The Collective Down Payment Process

Another key issue was the 30% of the total price of land down payments that residents had to pay to the CPB. As this was a huge amount, the residents negotiated for a reduction to a 10% down payment, and finally, the landlord and residents agreed on 20% or about 885,400 baht. To assist the
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poorest group, the payment was divided into 3 installments to be paid between the 4th and 8th of every month at the Thai Danu Bank. On the 15th of each month, the bank transferred the whole sum of money to the Co-Op’s account and once all down payments were collected from the members, the Co-Op funds were transferred to the CBP account. The first down payment started in August and finished at the end of October, 1986. Table 5.2 below shows the down payment details.

Table 5.2: Sengki community down payment of land purchase (NHA, 1991:15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>Land plot number</th>
<th>Down payment/Month/pot (baht)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/August</td>
<td>2/September</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>1-38</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>1-24</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1-35</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>7-57</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.5: Map of Sengki post-upgraded master plan.
The community is divided into four zones based on land plot location and price (NHA, 1991)
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At the end of October, the sub-committee categorized households into five groups according to the completion of down payments (Ad-am, 1988:58):

- **Category 1**: Completed 3 payments = 89 families (64%)
- **Category 2**: Sent 2 payments = 18 families (13%)
- **Category 3**: Sent 1 payment = 19 families (14%)
- **Category 4**: Open account but did not send money = 5 families (3%)
- **Category 5**: Did not open account and did not send money = 9 families (6%)

According to the NHA (1987:72-73) report, categories 3-5 mainly consisted of low-income households who earned less than 4,000 baht per month, while the high-income households corresponded to categories 1 and 2. Findings from the survey conducted in April-May, 2011 suggest that the savings for housing was not a crucial stage for the high-income group, because they were capable of purchasing land with a single payment. However, the savings process benefited them in other ways, such as providing access to land ownership and building relationships with the local authorities. One of the high-income households pointed out that, "We could buy the land as soon as the CBP made the offer, but the CHHSS did not allow us to. However, the Co-op brings many local agencies to us. They could help us when we needed to deal with government officials" (SK-9/FM/L/BKK, 1st May 2011).

The sub-committee asked the CPB for an extension of the down payment deadline as many low-income households could not pay by the due date. One of the community leaders revealed that, "Many low-income families really wanted land ownership and they were highly determined to make the payment. Some families borrowed money from relatives in the rural area; some borrowed from informal lenders, and some sold paddy fields from their own regional home land. Therefore, a time extension was really crucial for those families" (SK-7/M/L/BKK, 8th April 2011). Although the time extension caused delays in the project, there was a significant increase in community solidarity across socio-economic groups. Residents accepted an increased financial burden as a necessary trade-off to be able to remain in their existing location. Despite many residents, particularly the high-income households, finding themselves with smaller plots as a consequence of this land-sharing provision, this was accepted as a necessary condition in the Sengki community.

### 5.2.5.5 Process of Land Plot Selection

After the land plot allocation was announced, twenty eight families opposed the allocation and requested reorganization. Of this group, 18 were former Sengki households who left the community after the fire, and were now determined to share the benefit once the project had become more concrete. They each obtained a half-sized land plot (6 wah² or 24 m²) per household and requested to gain a full land plot (12 wah² or 48 m²). Some also felt that there was inequity in the distribution and that the committee members had received better located plots (Yap and Shlomo, 1992:12). The other
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ten households were from the higher-income group. They were unhappy with the small number of land plots, particularly as they expected to gain more land plots, having informally occupied large land areas before the upgrade process. Hence, they refused to sign the land contract. This group also included appointed committee members, Mr.SJ and Ms.BS, a cousin of Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew. Although the CHHSS attempted to find a compromise between the different interests, it was a futile effort. Ad-am’s study (1988:53) revealed that the low-income residents and organizational partners were very disappointed with what they deemed unreasonable actions of the two appointed committee members. Many criticized those people as rich but selfish. The conflict over landownership ultimately undermined the family relationship between Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew and Ms.BS, who later sued Mr.Thongchai Suansakaew and his assistant, Mr.Worathep Tienchareonchai, in court over this issue.

Maksirisuk (2001:90-91) identified another conflict caused by the process of land allocation. By 29th May 1986, 119 Sengki families had signed the contract. However, seven families refused to sign and claimed that the contract was not acknowledged by the CPB. Their argument convinced many households to suspend signing, and later became a topic of gossip that spread across the community. Hence, the CHHSS and community committee asked for a CPB official statement, which was duly issued on the 3rd July 1986, after which the rumour disappeared. Tensions were later eased as a consequence of time and regular informal meetings between sub-committee members, the CHHSS and residents. However, the seven mentioned households did not sign and left the community.

Between 3rd and 9th July 1986, a meeting to select land plots was organized at the community leader’s house. Household members in Zone A selected land plots on 3rd July, followed by Zone B on 7th July, Zone C on 8th July and finally Zone D on 9th July. The members of each Zone made their own agreement on the process of land selection. The family representatives who came on the planned dates were eligible to choose their preferred location first, while the rest of the plots were allocated to families who were absent. Families whose house location corresponded to the new master plan gained the first priority to stay at their existing location. Some plots received the preference of more than one family, so they had to negotiate with each other. If an agreement could not be reached, the selection was determined through random draws. The process involved drawing twice. The first draw was to determine the sequence for the second draw. Pieces of paper with a number, from one to five, were put into a jar, and each family had to pick one. The family who got number one was the first eligible to pick the second draw, which was for the preferred land plot. For the second draw, the sub-committee put many pieces of blank paper mixed together with land plot numbers, for example: ‘Zone A No.9’. The purpose of putting in blank pieces of paper was to identify ineligible families; therefore those who picked up blank pieces of paper meant they could not buy further land plots, whereas families who drew a paper with a land plot number were able to take the land plot.
After the selection process, seven land plots were left due to the refusal of the seven households to sign contracts. The CPB reserved these lands until the official unclaimed statements of the seven households were completed. Consequently, the Co-op had to repay mortgage for the unclaimed lands, and to decrease the financial load, decided to sell the land through auction. Although the land auction was a transparent process and the Co-op gained profit, the low-income group was clearly disadvantaged due to their limited economic means.

The land selection process also allowed flexibility for members to exchange land plots within or across zones. However, a 15% difference in price between two land plots had to be paid to the Co-op for land plot exchanges across zones. If plots were traded in the same zone, a fixed fee of 500 baht was applied. The Co-op collected fees as one source of reserved funding. The next section describes the slum inhabitants' role in the formation of a housing cooperative that resulted in the transformation of slum status from an individual slum household towards a collective community organization. Alongside the savings process, the empowerment process was promoted in the transformation of the political structure.

5.3 The Evolution of Sengki Slum Inhabitants
5.3.1 Empowerment through Change in the Political Structure; Patron-Client relations toward Community Based Organization

Since the registration of the Sengki community under the Yan Nawa District, the community had a formal election for the community leader, committee members and administration. The legitimate status represented the transformation of the community political structure of Sengki from one based on patron-client relations to a formal community based organization (CBO). The PhD community fieldwork, in-depth interview and observation on community meetings at the Sengki community between 8th March and 10th April 2011 found that many considerable impacts could be observed from the CBO based empowerment. Firstly, a new political structure accommodated both the former local elites and low socio-economic households into the community leadership that exercised power based on their formal position rather than on a personal relationship. Secondly, traditional political ties evolved with the new structure. This was manifested in the effort of the local elites, who represented the dominant group in patron-client ties, to gain positions in the community committee. Moreover, the democratic practices of CBOs opened political space for all socio-economic groups to acquire decision making power. The number of votes became significant as the leader groups had to compete for the residents' favour. Other benefits of the new political structure based on community organization included the formation of partnerships with formal institutions which brings in external resources.

According to Boonyabancha (2007:43), the empowerment process enables the scaling up of community capacity for broader socio-economic objectives and transformation. The emergence of the
new political structure allowed the local residents to have an evolving, increasingly significant role over the state housing project.

5.3.2 Empowerment through CBOs: Sengki Housing Cooperative (SHC)

This section describes the process of the Sengki Housing Cooperative (SHC) establishment. The CHHSS promoted a housing cooperative as a major mechanism to increase financial capacity, both individually and collectively. An economic based empowerment system was integrated in the land-sharing scheme, because the many socio-economic conflicts highlighted the income disparity that affects housing inequalities. Consequently, the low-income group was excluded from housing accessibility. The process pays particular attention to increasing resident assets, financial management capacity, and providing accessibility to formal financial institutions.

The SHC was the mechanism through which the economic empowerment of Sengki residents was implemented. The objective of the SHC was to setup a community organization which had the authority to make decisions on behalf of the whole community. The SHC handled legal issues between the Sengki community and external agencies, such as the land purchasing contract, mortgage contract and financial transactions. Once the property mortgage repayment was completed, CPB transferred the land title to the SHC, which then transferred plots to individual households. In the early stage of establishing the SHC, the CHHSS raised housing awareness and increased the greater understanding of the housing cooperative that shaped the residents’ positive attitude and behaviour.

In early 1986, the CHHSS conducted a community survey and found that a very low percentage of Sengki residents understood the concept of Co-op. Moreover, some dwellers were reluctant to join the Co-op as they felt anxious about the rigid regulations, their own low financial capacity and low self-esteem. One respondent expressed that, “We can’t make it; we earn a daily wage and all income is taken up by the cost of living. We never have money for savings” (SK-5/FM/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). To mitigate the negative attitude, the CHHSS promoted the advantage of the Co-op by addressing household financial situations, and brought in specialists from the Department of Cooperatives, Thailand to train local residents. By the middle of June 1986, each household representative, mainly women, attended the Co-op training which aimed to develop financial management skills, household accounting and the savings process. According to Ad-am (1988:49), this was the first time every household member had gathered together since the conflicts over land allocation a few months earlier. However, rather than gaining more understanding about Co-ops, the local people became more confused. The CHHSS’ post-assessment (NHA, 1986:54-56) revealed that almost everyone misunderstood the Co-op concept and process due to two major reasons, inefficient communication between experts and local residents and the low literacy of local residents. On the other hand, the
CHHSS viewed that the high meeting attendance demonstrated a high degree of the residents’ participation in the project. To address the communication issue, the CHHSS promoted many young and well-educated local volunteers to run trainings, resized residents into smaller groups, and utilized informal conversations and simple presentations such as pictures, booklets and posters.

Over three months of continuous training, Sengki residents became increasingly positive towards the Co-op concept and administration. From the CHHSS post-evaluation of the trainings (NHA, 1986:55), the level of the local residents’ satisfaction was high. One respondent mentioned that, “The training was really fun as well as useful” (SK-9/FM/L/BKK, 1st May 2011), and another commented that the training was “Very good; I want to attend training again” (SK-2/I/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011). This time, Sengki residents were able to understand the links between the Co-op process and housing tenure security, with one respondent mentioning that, “the Co-op was the vital mechanism to gaining official landownership and that meant we were no longer a slum” (SK-3/FM/CM/BKK, 30th April 2011).

Consequently, residents desired to establish the housing Co-op, and in a CHHSS conducted community meeting on the 5th September 1986, the residents elected a temporary Co-op committee. The committee consisted of 17 people and was responsible for the Co-op preparation stage, including administration, registration and regulation. Once the Co-op was formally established, the term of the temporary committee ended and an election for the official Co-op committee was held. The next figure (Figure 5.6) is organization chart presenting relationship among committees who played different roles in Sengki land sharing project.
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Structure of Sengki Land Sharing Committees

I. Sub-committee; 3 pp (Sengki land sharing project implementation)

II. Appointed committee; 16 pp (Community registration and community affairs)

Yan Nawa District

III. Joint-committee
   11 people;
   3 sub-committee
   3 CHHSS
   3 Yan Nawa
   2 Dept. of Co-op

IV. Sengki Co-op Committee; 17 pp

Outcome: Established Sengki Housing Cooperative (17th Dec 1986)

Register

Department of Cooperative

Join

Local Agencies:
Dept of Cooperative
CHHSS
Yan Nawa District

Election

Outcome: Sengki community registration under Yan Nawa District (5th May 1986)

Figure 5.6: Structure of Sengki Land Sharing Committees
The makeup of the temporary committee reflected the new power relationship, changes in attitude and leadership, and the effectiveness of empowerment practices. The mixture of socio-economic households revealed the critical change in the political power balance among sub-groups, with the 17 temporary committee members consisting of 5 each from the high and middle-income groups and 7 from the low-income group. The PhD community fieldwork found that the attitude change could clearly be observed among the low-income households (SK-6/M/L/BKK and NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). Having representation in the Co-op, they became equal partners in community development to higher income families. The empowerment process was manifested in the number of new leaders with only 5 committee members from the previous appointed committee and sub-committee. 12 members were new, young and active people who had played an important role in promoting the housing cooperative with the CHHSS. In the process of Co-op formation, some local elites, in particular Mr.SJ and Ms.BS, lost influence in the community, because the lower income residents witnessed the conflicts perpetuated by them. Empowered younger residents and the low-income group collectively employed the new political structure as a vehicle to acquire decision-making power, change political relationships and resist previous patron-client influences.

On 30th November 1986, SHC members conducted an election for the official Sengki community Co-op and manager. Ten people were elected, including seven former members of the previous temporary committee while three members were new. The Sengki cooperative was registered on 17th December, and became “the first cooperative for low-income housing in Thailand” (Muksirisuk, 2001:78). Once the SHC was officially recognized, the CHHSS and outsider partners gradually stepped back from their partnership roles in the project implementation towards the role of remote advisors. In turn, the SHC committee fully took the leading role in savings management, housing mortgage payments, and the provision of land.
In-depth interviews and observation of community meetings with the Sengki community committee during the PhD community fieldwork (2011) indicated that the formation of the SHC reflected many aspects of change that related to empowerment, the slum upgrading project, and the slum inhabitants’ role. The SHC represents a tangible outcome of collective community capacity and not merely a community registration process under local government organization. Furthermore, the official recognition also represents a significant, positive attitude change of government agencies towards the Sengki community and their constructive role in the formation of SHC (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011 and SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011). Moreover, the SHC demonstrates the contribution of a long process of economic empowerment practices that resulted in an expansion of the slum residents’ role from illegal, powerless and isolated households towards a collective community organization (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011). This was an actual change in the slum inhabitant’s role, behaviour and status that did not occur merely through legal guarantees. The SHC also represented the emergence of a new socio political structure in the Sengki community that lies in a community based organization, rather than patron-client ties (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011 and SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011). The formation of SHC reformed existing local power into a new political structure and encouraged collective voices to influence community affairs. As a result, the traditional power base occupied by the local elite was gradually merged into the new structure. As the community based organization practices became more central, new community leaders emerged to take advantage of this change (Ad-am, 1988:46). The number of new committee members provided evidence of a tangible outcome of economic empowerment practice that shifted formerly marginal residents to become part of the community leadership.

Section 2: Slum Network
5.4 Application of Government-Community Organisation Partnership
5.4.1 Construction of the SHC Office
To enhance the levels of community development, Sengki residents saw the need to build the SHC office as a place where community members could frequently access and as a demonstration building type on a full land plot that could help residents visualize their future accommodation (NHA, 1991). A multi-function three storey reinforced concrete office building was constructed on a 23 wah² (92 m²) land plot, which served various communal socio-cultural-political activities, such as a community
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centre, healthcare office, training centre, etc. (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011). Construction began in July 1990 and the building was completed a year later, on 11th August 1991 with a total budget (for both construction and land price) of 2,214,957 baht. The cost was co-subsidized through asset pooling between Sengki residents and outside donors, such as the UNDP, the Netherland Habitat and local politicians. According to the NHA (1991:19), the formation of the SHC represented the achievement of the land-sharing project at the Sengki community, with the construction of the SHC office as tangible evidence of the whole community’s collective action.

Figure 5.8: The main pillar lifting ceremony of the SHC in July 1990 (Left)
The completed SHC office in 2011 (Right) (Dhabhalabutr, 2011)

5.4.2 The SHC’s Mechanism in the Emergence of a Government and Community Organization Partnership
The SHC performed two roles as the mechanism that empowered Sengki residents to be ‘Primary Housing Agents’. At the community level, the SHC functioned as the space for real participation in the project implementation for individual households. Local residents carried out their voluntary work through asset, labour and experience sharing (SK-8/M/L/BKK, 9th April 2011). Individual assets were pooled and managed by the SHC (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011). Rather than prescribing decision-making power to the leader groups, the SHC included, prioritized and encouraged its members to make decisions together with the committees and stakeholders (SK-9/FM/L/BKK, 1st May 2011). Once community members were included in the process, they played active roles over community affairs, such as monthly Co-op meeting attendance, voting for preferred alternatives, and monitoring financial transparency (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011). At the institutional level, the SHC enabled individual

21 See Appendix 4
households to function as a collective community organization. The SHC represented a formal institution of the Sengki community that became a channel for local residents to communicate with external agencies and across institutions (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011). As soon as the SHC was accepted as a developmental mechanism, Sengki inhabitants could officially collaborate with state agencies (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). With the two operational levels, the SHC offered Sengki residents the chance to act as the agents of change, locally and institutionally (CODI/FM/L/BKK, 5th May 2011). Hence, through SHC, a partnership between government and community organization emerged. The following figure illustrates the relationship between the community organization and government agencies who undertook a collaborative land-sharing project at Sengki community.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.9:** The structure of joint-committee in the land-sharing project at Sengki community

### 5.4.3 International Support in the Process of Acquiring Land Tenure Security

The partnership between SHC committees, as representatives of Sengki residents, and NHA Alliances, played an important role in the process to acquire land tenure security. On the 5th October 1987, the NHA Vice-President, Pree Buranasiri, informed the residents that the director of the Netherland Habitat Commission, Max Van Der Stoel, donated 230,000 Nfl (around 3 million baht) to the Sengki land-sharing project (letter to NHA at the 9th September 1987). Max Van Der Stoel visited

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22 The figure is derived from interviews with Sengki community leaders, Prof.Orathai Ad-am and Mr.Yongyudh Triyavanich.
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the Sengki community with the CHHSS team in January 1986 and published an article on his visit in the Netherland newspaper. Readers who read the article made donations to the project. NHA changed the funding subsidy into a revolving fund, adapted from the original objective of using the fund to upgrade infrastructure and build the SHC office (Chairat Dhamasiri’s interview in Maksirisuk, 2001:172). According to the NHA (1991:18), the revolving fund benefited a wider range of community development projects rather than a single community. Yet the fund was initially utilized at the Sengki community as a pilot project. According to the former Sengki community leader (SK-7/M/L/BKK, 8th April 2011), the Thai Dhanu Bank, a co-finance institution for down payments, initially denied housing loan to the SHC because Sengki household incomes were lower than the Bank’s criteria. The guaranteed assets from the Netherlands revolving fund\(^23\) allowed the SHC to get housing mortgage approval from the Bangkok Bank, Klong Jan branch (NHA, 1991:16).

Figure 5.10: Sengki community leader, Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew and Max Van Der Stoel (right) (Sengki SHC, 2011)

5.4.4 Process of Land Purchasing

The land purchasing between the SHC and the CPB took three months to process. On 22\(^{nd}\) May, three SHC committee members signed a contract with the CPB. The organizational witnesses were representatives of the NHA, the Co-op Department and the District. According to the NHA (1991:66), the SHC paid 885,400 baht as a down payment and then repaid about 74,813 baht

\(^{23}\) Sengki community borrowed 2,830,000 baht from the Bangkok Bank on the 14\(^{th}\) September 1986. The money was paid to purchase CPB land in October 1986. The community was to repay 50,000 baht per month (interest 7.75\%) for over 60 months with the total debt finally recovered in October 1999 (Muksirisook, 2001:76-78).
per month for five years with the first repayment made on the 5th July 1987. After many delays, the SHC completely repaid the mortgage and redeemed the official land title by late 1999.

Figure 5.11: Official land title of the Sengki community (SHC, 2011)

5.4.5 Towards a Resident-led Planning and Design Process
The CHHSS planning paradigm aimed at stimulating collective power, government-community collaboration, and the Sengki residents’ role as a primary housing agent. The CHHSS ensured that the planning was a whole community task rather than led by leader groups and experts. As the decision-making power had, by then, been decentralized from community leader groups to marginal residents, one of the CHHSS leaders, Mr. Yongyuth Triravanich mentioned that community participation in planning was effective and the collaborative activities were equally open to every household (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). The first planning stage started off with a physical survey by the CHHSS architects and community members. The objective of the community survey was to formulate a community database that contributed to the determination of the minimum space requirement of low-income households. The CHHSS conducted an action research project, The

24 Due to the extended process of land pricing and zoning, land plot selection, and the 1997 Thai economic depression.
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Minimum Standard Requirement of Household and Environment for Low-income Families (in Thai) as a part of the Sengki land-sharing project. Three surveys were conducted at the Sengki community from 22nd - 23rd and 29th - 30th August, and 5th - 6th September, 1987 respectively. All essential data such as function, affordable area, materials and structures, and infrastructure accessibility were processed into an architectural database. Based on the Sengki case, the CHHSS final report25 (Nophongladarom, 1987:3) proposed a space requirement standard for low-income households that recommended:

1. Total space requirement of 32 m² per family (up to 5 people)
2. Functional areas that include a toilet (2.88 m²) and a kitchen (4.32 m²)
3. Multi-purpose areas consisting of living, sleeping, and dining spaces (23.4 m²)
4. Two schemes of land plot: The first scheme was based on a 12 wah² (48 m²) land and a building area of 58 m². The second scheme was 6 wah² (24 m²) of land and a building area of 31.5 m². The total building area was based on the two storey, row-house typography.
5. The main road was 6 metres and alley was 3 metres wide respectively.
6. Minimum requirements could be adjusted, depending on the community context.

The CHHSS planning paradigm placed importance on collaboration and empowerment and attempted a process that promoted the Sengki residents’ leading role rather than one dominated by professional designers. Sengki residents expressed their ideas, requirements and priorities with the designers acting as technical assistants. Due to the land limitation, space planning was particularly focused on simplicity and flexibility, which also corresponded well with the residents’ financial capacity and time availability. A major road was placed at the centre of the community, which divided the settlement into northern and southern portions. Small alleys were laid to access inner plots on the north side. The master plan divided housing clusters into 4 zones according to land-plot size, density and price (Figure 5.4).

- Zone A consisted of 39 full-plots situated at the south of the community.
- Zone B comprised 26 full-plots and 1 half-plot located along the north side of the main road.
- Zone C comprised 35 full-plots northeast of the community
- Zone D comprised 25 half-plots northwest of the community.

In total 126 units, including the SHC office, were allocated for the Sengki community master plan. There were two types of land plot planned for the two occupant groups. Firstly, full-plot land, of

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approximately 45 m² (3.75X12 m), was allocated to 100 existing slum households who had prior lease contracts with the CPB and who had been living in the community before the fire. The second type was a half-plot land of 21 m² (3.5X6 m), which was distributed to 26 households who were either renting, moved into the community after the fire, or who had a contract with the CBP, but moved out of the community after fire.

On the 27th August 1987, the CHHSS designer team presented the community master plan and housing scheme to the Sengki residents. Two building types were proposed.

- The first building type was the two-storey row house for the half-plot land with a total house area of about 30 m² per unit. The house included a multi-purpose space, a bedroom and a toilet as key functional rooms. This type was available for the households living in Zone D.
- The second building type was the two-storey row house for the full-plot of land with an area of 48 m² that consisted of a multi-purpose space, a bedroom and a toilet. These were designed for families living in Zones A, B, and C.

The flexible, multi-purpose spaces were designed for future adaptation where rooms could be partitioned once the owner had the budget, time or need to accommodate new family members. Both types had reinforced concrete structures with cement block walls, cement tiles and a timber roof structure. According to Maksirisuka (2001:94), the Sengki residents generally accepted the community master plan but many were unsatisfied with the building type, in particularly the low-income families who were allocated the half-plot land. In-depth interviews during the PhD community fieldwork (2011) revealed that the occupants did not believe the design could be constructed due to the very limited space (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011). In response, the CHHSS organized a community visit to the Manangkasila community where 150 house units were each built on 5 wah² (20 m²) land plots (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). Once the low-income Sengki families had face to face discussions with the host community, their mindset changed and they had more confidence in the design (SK-8/M/L/BKK, 9th April 2011). On the other hand, households who occupied the full-plot land preferred higher, 3-storey shop houses over the proposed 2-storey row house design. While the half-plot land occupants did not require a new building type, they similarly requested to extend the building height to 3 storeys (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011). The CHHSS designer staff came up with new designs with corresponding higher construction prices. Table 5.3 provides the estimation of down payment and mortgage repayment sums for the revised design, excluding public facilities such as main roads and alleys, drainage, water supply and electricity meters. The occupants approved the revised scheme but many low-income households were worried about the increased costs. The residents sought for housing mortgages from the Government Housing Bank and the Netherlands Habitat revolving fund.
Table 5.3: The estimation of down payment and mortgage repayments of the two building types (Muksirisuk, 2001:97)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Down payment 10%</th>
<th>Mortgage payment (baht/month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>19,200</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Down payment 10%</th>
<th>Mortgage payment (baht/month)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4.6 The Construction Process

Housing construction at Sengki required skillful management because the new units were imposed on many pre-existing houses. Sengki residents undertook construction in multiple phases with around 20-30 units built per phase. This approach allowed flexibility for households who remained in their
existing location until they were ready to move. Individual or group construction could be carried out corresponding to an individual resident's assets, time and financial readiness. The SHC oversaw housing mortgage payments and credit saving. The SHC did not act as a third party intermediary between house owners and contractors, because the committee was concerned about possible conflicts over the charging of commission fees.

From August 1991, the first unit was completed construction as a pilot unit and was modified into the SHC office. By early 1999, the first set of shop houses of 37 units in Zone A was ready for construction. A reinforced concrete three storey building cost 430,000 baht to build, excluding land, any infrastructure and decoration. House owners were to pay down payment of about 10% or 45,000 baht. However, only 18 families achieved full down payment and were able to commence construction. The SHC borrowed a housing mortgage from the Government Housing Bank (GHB) of around 8 million baht for the 18 units' construction costs. The house construction at Zone B, C and D were later undertaken after the first phase was completed. At the time of the PhD fieldwork, 100% of the housing units had completed construction.

Based on the physical survey of the community conducted between April and May 2011, the completed housing reflected the limited regulation enforcement and conflicts between neighbours. For example, the half-plot land was originally designed as row houses but only a few units were adjoined. In contrast, many houses were built as detached single houses located within a very small land area of 6 wah2 (24m²). Some families who built their houses later constructed separate walls leaving gaps of just 50 centimetres from the adjacent units. They are unwilling to share walls even if their land plots were very small. “I feel more comfortable having separate walls from the neighbouring unit, because I prefer privacy and protection from potential problems in the construction process” (SK-11/FM/L/BKK, 1st May 2011). The very narrow, deep gaps became the norm among the houses in the half-plot land zone.
The construction process also included upgrading community infrastructure, such as the main road, alleys, drainage, electricity and a water supply. Several agencies provided financial support including the local district, international NGOs and local politicians. Once the SHC gained a sufficient budget, they undertook collaborative development projects with government agencies, such as The Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) who connected the electricity and water supply. The NHA provided for the construction of alleys and a drainage system. Asset pooling and internal savings augmented by external funds provided the chance to undertake the housing development based on partnerships. Even with the subsidies, the following table shows that the largest proportion of the Sengki land-sharing expenses was covered by local residents.
Table 5.4: The total expenditures of Sengki land-sharing project (NHA, 1991:21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost (baht)</th>
<th>Paid by</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Stakeholder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>4,340,750</td>
<td>4,340,750</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.46%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not include land price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>3,003,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,003,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.55%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply and electricity metre</td>
<td>592,200</td>
<td>592,200</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building construction</td>
<td>36,612,000</td>
<td>36,612,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79.85%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCH office</td>
<td>1,128,707</td>
<td>86,250</td>
<td>1,042,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.46%</td>
<td>(Land price)</td>
<td>UNDP, Netherland, BKK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Politician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The fees of property trade contact</td>
<td>170,440</td>
<td>170,440</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.37%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45,847,097</td>
<td>41,801,640</td>
<td>4,045,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>91.17%</td>
<td>8.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the PhD field work, the whole process of construction from the SHC office to community infrastructure, demonstrated the expansion of collaboration between the Sengki community organization and local government agencies. The approach, with partnership and cooperation at its core, provided a channel for undertaking collaborative housing development projects (SK-7/M/L/BKK, 8th April 2011 and NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). The Sengki land-sharing joint-committee was appointed from various government partners with all relevant development actors represented (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). Significantly, the committee included community representatives, elected by community members, who had equal status with local state agencies and other development actors (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011). Fieldwork observation and interviews revealed that this practice catalyzed a break-through in collaborations between slum community organizations and local government agencies (CODI/FM/L/BKK, 5th May 2011 and NULICO-3/M/L/BKK, 9th November 2011). Therefore, the Sengki land-sharing project was a watershed state housing development project that promoted institutional partnership instead of being driven by government agencies and patron-client ties.

PhD field work interviews with key stakeholders of the Sengki land sharing project confirms that having community representatives sitting on the highest making decision committee demonstrates significant changes in the political relationship between local residents and government agencies.
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Research Finding (UM/FM/RS/NKP, 29th April 2011). Firstly, government agencies now regard slum inhabitants as a legitimate part of state development programs, rather than barriers to development (CODI/FM/L/BKK, 5th May 2011). Based on the data from the PhD fieldwork and in-depth interviews, the slum inhabitants played constructive roles as active partners in managing savings, loans and housing construction decisions (SK-1/M/L/BKK, 28th April 2011 and NULICO-3/M/L/BKK, 9th November 2011). This change in the role of slum dwellers who participated in the Sengki land-sharing project resulted in a trend toward community-government partnership. Secondly, this partnership was embedded in the core of Sengki practices that had profound implications for the entire land-sharing process (SK-8/M/L/BKK, 9th April 2011). Thirdly, government agencies as institutional stakeholders have also transformed their role in this process through an in-depth engagement with slum inhabitants and their organization (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011).

Section 3: Stakeholders
5.5 Post-Upgrading (1992-Present)

After the completion of the first phase of construction, the Sengki community was selected by the UN Habitat to be a demonstration community included with the report ‘1991 The Year of Shelter for the Homeless’, as it represents a significant step in the process of change from the practice of forced eviction to land-sharing. This international award highlights the need for community organization to work collaboratively with government agencies as a vital component of state housing programs (UN Habitat, 1991). Accordingly, the inclusion of community organizations as project partners became a prerequisite for ensuing slum upgrade projects. Data from the fieldwork reveals a positive response from local people towards UN Habitat recognition. The Sengki people are proud of themselves as a role model for low-cost housing development on a global level. One respondent mentioned, “Although the (award) was a few decades ago, community leaders always mention it in community meetings because the award enhances members’ unity and raises self-esteem for our new generation” (SK-10/M/CM/BKK, 1st May 2011). Since winning the award, the community has frequently hosted national and international guests.

Community visits place value on knowledge exchanges between the Sengki community and external institutions that will enrich the upgrading experience for future projects. In the process, the long history of mutual distrust between sub-groups and local government agencies has gradually transformed into more positive relationships. Local government agencies are invited to participate in a number of communal activities. Sometimes the Yan Nawa District provides office space for community activities and sponsors partial funding for Sengki public events, such as annual religious festivals, traditional cerebrations and sports fairs. Today, the SHC plays an important role in keeping the residents actively
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engaged in community affairs, since the CHHSS and external stakeholders left the scene (SK-7/M/L/BKK, 8th April 2011).

Figure 5.14: The UN congratulatory letter and community visits by various international organizations (SHC, 4th April 2011)

Figure 5.15: The Sengki community offering food to monks on Songkran Festival Day, 13th April 2011 (Left top) Community sports day at the Yan Nawa District Office (left below) SHC committees list of names and positions (Right) (Dhabhalabutr, 2011)
5.6 An Evolving Role of Institutional Agencies as Project Stakeholders: A Decentralization Process

Not only were slum inhabitants changed by the empowerment process, external stakeholders as project partners have also seen their roles transformed. For over a decade, Sengki has diversified and formalized its roles and collaborations into a number of organizations which put pressure on the authorities to adjust their relationship, role, and vision concerning low-income dwellers. Section 3 presents the practice of Sengki community land-sharing that brought formal housing agencies into a new phase of change.

Firstly, the practice changed how government and other development agencies addressed how to upgrade a slum. Prior to the Sengki land-sharing project, the NHA and other development agencies conducted community development projects separately. Each government agency had their own projects, budgets and objectives consistent with the conventional, autonomous narrative of state housing development programs. The practice at Sengki community was the initial attempt at collaboration across formal institutions. Since the case of the Sengki communities, changes occurred at the levels of national strategy and local practice. At the national level, ‘the National Housing Committee’ promoted collaborative partnership across formal institutions as one of the key strategies for low-cost housing development. The goal of achieving institutional collaboration was later officially endorsed in the 5th NESDP. At the ground level, the formal practices since 1977 highlighted the complexity of the slum housing problem that exceeded the capacity of any single agency to handle alone. The National Housing Committee (Office of The Prime Minister, 1982) stated that if the collaborative partnership worked effectively, it could ensure sufficient supply in the variety of housing for low-income households.

The collaborative partnership concept focused on connecting various development actors into a professional team to assist slum community organizations. The Sengki land-sharing project was the first time that autonomous, local agencies were brought together as stakeholders of a slum settlement (FRSN-2/M/L/BKK, 9th December 2011). Rather than prescribing authoritative power to any one formal organization, the Sengki practice promoted the slum community organization as a primary agent to control program implementation (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011). Hence, the Sengki land-sharing project and Sengki inhabitants became the central focus of these formal institutions, and consequently government agencies withdrew from intervening directly and transformed its role to that of facilitator.

The core idea of a supportive role was for each stakeholder to be responsible for what slum inhabitant do best (Archer, 2010:8). The concept of collaborative partnership as defined by Archer (2010:8) is evident at Sengki community where the work of supporting government agencies, as well
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as other development actors, has been critical in enhancing the working environment of the Sengki land-sharing project. Facilitators created a common neighbourhood, including a social and physical space for collaborative community meetings and work (NHA/M/RS/BKK). Professional groups, such as architects and accountants, provided motivations for the residents’ participation. They developed upgrading guidelines and vocational training for entry into a skilled labour workforce, such as surveying, savings practices and housing mortgage management (Sapu and Usawagvitwong, 2006:15). International agencies did their part through launching global campaigns to raise awareness and publicly commend Sengki community efforts (see Section 3). International recognition becomes an important component for funding avenues and provides leverage for other national and international donors, such as the Thai government, UNDP and the Netherland Habitat (The Centre for Housing and Human Settlement Studies NHA, 199172 - see Section 5.4.3).

Another critical aspect of collaborative partnership is the change in attitude of the government agencies. For the Sengki case, this was initially reflected in the initiation of a participatory process that included representatives of stakeholders affected by state policies. The joint-committee included Sengki representatives, elected by community residents as board members who were allowed to hold decision making power and status equal to formal organization representatives. Accommodating Sengki representatives in the joint-committee represents a change in the formal administrative mechanism and the government agency’s mind-set. Formal housing provisions incrementally became a more inclusive process. Critically, it demonstrates that formal agencies accepted slum inhabitants as legitimate actors in state housing programs.

The practice changes the government administrative approach to slum upgrade programs (see Section 5.4.1-5.4.5). In a traditional ‘top-down’ state administrative approach, the connection between community and government agency is vertical, where people are dependent on institutions or officers, and patron-client ties for assistance (see Section 5.1.2). Accordingly, the conventional housing development paradigm was top-down and government-driven. Challenging conventions of the time, the practice at the Sengki community experimented with an alternative bottom-up, approach, where the process was initially driven by the community residents and the community organization (the SHC) in charge of Sengki land-sharing, instead of government agencies (NHA/M/RS/BKK, 5th May 2011).

Formal institutions became partners of low-cost housing development and performed two roles, as the middle party and facilitator. As the middle party, these government agencies promoted community networking with local organizations and neighbourhoods, such as community visits, exchange forums and meetings (see Section 5.4.5). As facilitators, they came to the area as experts who advised the community in different processes (see Section 5.4.1-5.4.5). This evolving role of government agencies
as the middle party and facilitator implied a change in the nature of government intervention from
direct to indirect, from leader to facilitator, and from vertical to horizontal.

Lastly, the practice paves the way to reform centralized government structure, where government
agencies generally control decision making power and resources. Formerly, community savings
schemes allowed local people to contribute labour, assets and cost-sharing, but only occasionally
were they allowed to manage money. This practice of financial matters kept firmly in the hands of a
government agency was seen as positive in terms of accountability (Boonyabancha, 2003:8).
However, this was a savings process without real community involvement and embedded marginal
members as recipients of the state agencies’ direction (Section 5.2.2). In contrast, the practice at the
Sengki community primarily endorsed decentralization in savings and housing provisions, with the
community managing and promoting the co-operative as a core mechanism of decentralization
(Section 5.3.1). The co-op included marginal members in the whole process and allowed them to
make their own decisions. Participation in Sengki land-sharing was about controlling savings, and
every household knew exactly where the money came from, the levels of savings, and how to
manage the money. Accordingly, the whole community became empowered through the savings
process (Section 5.3.2).

Another important determining factor of decentralization is the development of an actual community
database (Section 5.2.5 and 5.4.5). Local information is important to the slum inhabitants who had
been absent from the centralized state structure. Decisions that affected the community were often
not made by the local people, but by the government administration based far away. In such
situations, the slum inhabitants had little choice but to follow rules laid out by others. Consequently,
government programs often conflicted with the local needs of those communities. The Sengki practice
was a pilot project to create a local database that contained actual community problems, space
requirements and aspirations for urban low-income housing. The practice promoted local government
agencies, particularly the District and the CHHSS, to operate more closely with the community
organization to ensure that the local database was integrated into the Sengki land-sharing process

The Sengki land-sharing practice made visible and provided evidences that institutional partnership for
slum upgrading was possible (Section 5.4.2). Yet it must be stressed that partnerships did not emerge
suddenly through the establishment of a joint-committee; rather it took time through real interactions
between stakeholders.
5.7 Political Conflicts; Limitation of Slum Inhabitant as Primary Housing Agent

Established regulations posed structural problems for slum inhabitants and became a barrier that prevented effective resident action. The issue of enforcing regulations also resulted in institutional conflicts amongst organizational partners: the CHHSS, the Yan Nawa District and the Cooperative Department. Significantly, the issue reveals that slum inhabitants in partnership with government agencies had limits when faced with problems at the policy and regulatory levels. This section illustrates three cases of structural level problems, namely property tax, building codes, and the SHC construction approval process.

The first case presents the community struggle over property tax. On the August 25, 1987, the Revenue Department requested a tax payment, which constituted 3.85% of the total land price, from the SHC for property trading (Letter no.0802/16585 to NHA). This resulted in conflicts between two government agencies, the NHA and the Cooperative Department, as they had different approaches to address the issue. The NHA argued that the SHC should have a tax exemption as it was a low-income cooperative that did not attempt to benefit from land trading, and that the process was an essential component of land-sharing practices. In contrast, the Cooperative Department claimed that the SHC could not avoid paying the tax because there was no exemption tax for low-income cooperatives. The Cooperative Department officer also claimed that the CHHSS had invaded the department’s territory (Chairat’s interview in Muksirisuk, 2001:169-170). As a result, the SHC paid tax on income gained from the land auction and allocation fees.

The second case of political conflict at the institutional level was a result of building regulation enforcement. Sengki community residents struggled over building approval because the District did not approve the CHHSS housing scheme, and moreover, over-charged the community for new housing redesigns and approval fees. The SHC passed the additional costs onto the house owners. Individual households had to pay building approval fees that varied according to building type and the District’s decision. The first 18 units paid 7,000 baht each while the following phase was charged a much higher 40,000-45,000 baht per unit (SK-6/M/L/BKK, 28th March 2011).

The last political conflict emerged due to the construction of the SHC office. The District penalized the SHC because they built the office prior to official approval. According to Tienchareonchai (26th April 2011), the SHC committee and the District staff had a verbal agreement on the permission of the SHC office construction, and additionally, claims that the committee had already paid for administration fees. The SHC board assumed that the District gave informal approval for construction.
However, the District staff did not process the building approval, and later they sued the SHC leaders in court. Fortunately for SHC, the lawsuit became invalid due to time expiration.

The cases above highlighted the practical limitations of the slum inhabitants’ role in the face of regulatory, institutional and political struggles. They were unable to represent the voice of the disadvantaged with the aim of influencing government policy. The recognition of the slum inhabitants’ potential as ‘Primary Housing Agents’ and government partners has not been sufficient to influence change at a policy level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key dates</th>
<th>Key events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>Charoen Krung Road passed through Sengki, turned community to prime business area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th April 1978</td>
<td>Huge fire spread over Sengki After fired, CPB refused to renew land leased, Sengki community turned to urban slum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1982</td>
<td>CHHSS visited Sengki community and recognized SK requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1982</td>
<td>Sengki informal representatives submitted statements to royal families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>CPB agreed to sell land to Sengki residents, 85 families CHHSS supervised land sharing scheme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1986</td>
<td>‘Appointed-committee’ consisting of 16 representatives of Sengki high and middle income households. The appointed committee was responsible for community registration and other domains of community affairs, such as communal, social, cultural and economic activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 17th January 1986 | • Election of ‘sub-committee’, 3 representatives of Sengki residents who oversee Sengki land sharing project’s implementation with external partners  
                        • Identification of eligible families                                                                                                     |
| February 1986   | • Set up of the ‘Joint committee’ to oversee Sengki land sharing project implementation. They were a collaborative partnership of 11 members consisting of the Sengki sub-committee and external partners; CHHSS, Yan Nawa officers, and Department of Cooperatives. |
| 26th February and 8th March 1986 | Joint committee conducted community surveys to plan land allocation scheme                                                                                                                                   |
| April 1986      | • Joint committee proposed land allocation scheme  
                        • Some Sengki residents disagreed with land allocation scheme. Conflict began between Mr.Suansakaew and Mr.SJ  
                        • CPB agreed to sell and to residents and approved for eligible households number increase from 85 to 126                                         |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th May 1986</td>
<td>Sengki became a formal community under Yan Nawa District administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| May 1986    | • Sengki resident accepted Joint committee proposed land plot location, zones and price scheme  
              • Conflict at community meeting between Mr. Suansakaew and Mr. SJ over price scheme                                                                                                               |
| June 1986   | Sengki eligible household signed contract for land buying.  
              Land plot allocation followed idea of mixed socio-economic status  
              Conflict at community meeting between Mr. Suansakaew and Mr. SJ over concept of land plot location                                                                                                  |
| July 1986   | • Land plot selection  
              • Conflict at community meeting between Mr. Suansakaew and Mr. SJ/Mr. BS over land plot selection. 28 eligible households who have CPB land lease contract but left community after fire, disagreed with land plot selection and land plot size. |
| August-Oct  | Sengki eligible household sent collective down payment for land plot to Bank                                                                                                                                       |
| 1986        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| August 1986 | CHHSS conducted continuous training courses for setting up Sengki Housing Co-operative                                                                                                                         |
| 5th Septem  | Sengki residents elected temporary co-op committee, 17 members to be responsible for the Sengki Housing Co-op preparation stage such as administration, registration and regulation                                         |
| ber 1986    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 30th Novem  | Sengki residents elected official co-op committee and manager consisted of 10 people. The temporary co-op committee term expired.                                                                               |
| ber 1986    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 17th Decem  | Sengki Housing Cooperative was official registered and became “the first cooperative for low-income housing in Thailand” (Muksirisuk, 2001:78)                                                                    |
| ber 1986    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 22nd May 19 | SHC committee manager and representatives signed a land buying contract with the CPB.                                                                                                                            |
| 1987        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 27th Augus  | CHHSS designer team presented Sengki community master plan and two housing schemes to Sengki residents                                                                                                           |
| t 1987      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 5th Octobe  | The director of the Netherland Habitat Commission, Max Van Der Stoel, donated 230,000 Nfl (around 3 million baht) to Sengki land-sharing project                                                                       |
| r 1987      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| July 1990   | Co-op office started construction                                                                                                                                                                                |
| 1st August  | Sengki community was selected by the UN Habitat to be the demonstration community in the report ‘1991 The Year of Shelter for the Homeless’                                                                      |
| 1991        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| 11st August | Co-op office construction was completed.                                                                                                                                                                        |
| 1991        |                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
| January 1999| The first phased of housing in Zone A started construction.                                                                                                                                                     |
| October 199 | SHC completely paid land mortgage and redeemed the official land title                                                                                                                                          |
| 9         | About 90% of total house unit completed construction. 10% doesn’t renovate                                                                                                                                       |
or reconstruct their homes as the houses are owned by former Sengki residents who left the community after fire.

Table 5.5: A timeline of Sengki community upgrading project. This presents key dates for events including committee formations, constitution of major organizations and the periods when there were training/skills development.

5.8 Conclusion

Over a period of ten years, the Sengki community has worked with formal agencies to achieve land tenure security. Sengki demonstrates the evolving role of community residents and stakeholders who engaged in this process (Section 5.3 and 5.6 Page 137 and 155). Although the physical outcome was probably the residents’ primary concern, the formalized practice has significance beyond housing particularly skills development process that was clearly demonstrated in this case (Section 5.4 and 5.5 Page 142 and 153). Critically, the residents experienced substantial changes in their roles and status in the formation of the community-government partnership.

Chapter 5 reveals three significant findings: Firstly, an empowerment based economy played an important role in promoting Sengki dwellers to become primary housing agents of the Sengki land-sharing project, and this process resulted in the up-scaling of resident status from ‘collective slum community organization’ to ‘Government-community organization partnership’ (Section 5.4.1-5.4.2 Page 142-143). Secondly, there are three key elements of the Sengki land-sharing achievement: slum inhabitant roles; the land sharing and housing project; and individual and community empowerment. The Sengki community was a pilot project where these three elements clearly emerged as interrelated factors. These practices and linkages later provided the foundation for a broader national low-cost housing program. The third finding is the government agencies’ transformation in role and structure from leading housing agents to housing development partners, facilitators and middle parties (Section 5.6 Page 155). However, the transformation and expansion stakeholders’ roles have also developed and evolved based on conflicts and contradictions among housing agents, formal and informal agencies (Section 3.3 Page 71).

The thesis ascertain that The Sengki community’s evolution has parallels with broader changes at the national level and the case reflects the best Thai housing practice and a significant transformation in low-cost housing development. Sengki land sharing demonstrates the cohesiveness between economic empowerment and the slum residents’ evolving role, resulting in the three scales of ‘Primary Housing Agent’, individual slum household, collective slum community and government-community partnership respectively. Significantly, economic empowerment promoted the slum inhabitant roles in two highly interrelated scales: the agent’s capacity and a supportive environment. To promote the agent’s capacity, economic empowerment emphasized on providing access to financial resources for
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individual households and the collective community. It increases the slum inhabitants' capacity for effective organizational skills and financial management (Section 5.4.1-5.4.6 Page 142-152). To encourage an enabling environment, empowerment based economic objectives promoted collaborative partnerships between the community organization and formal development actors that maximized access to the larger credit institutions (Section 5.4.3 Page 144). Furthermore, the bottom up approach and decentralization of decision making power were embedded within the implementation of the project, which resulted in political and structural changes within the community.

However, the practice faced limits in expanding the Sengki inhabitants' role to achieve institutional and policy reform, where their effort was prevented by the conventional Thai urban development system, which is inflexible and not designed to provide conditions that enable slum self-determination (Section 5.7 Page 158). As such, the slum inhabitants’ potential and the willingness to contribute to positive changes to their community, neighbourhood and institutional partners are still limited. The Sengki community practice demonstrates that the effort to empower slum dwellers to address structural issues demands other mechanisms. Addressing slum housing is not merely about the recognition of the capacity as ‘Primary Housing Agents’ but also suggests the need for institutional reforms on a national scale. (15,523 words)
CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH FINDING
CASE STUDY: TAWANMAI COMMUNITY

Introduction
Chapter 6 investigates the transformation process and current role of slum dwellers as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ since the Sengki case, addressing the sub-research question: What are the slum inhabitant's current roles as the primary housing agent, 2000 to 2011? The chapter emphasises on the slum inhabitant's role as the main narrative of change in housing development. There are two significant objectives to investigate Tawanmai case community. The first aim is to investigate the relationship between the practices at a local setting with the broader historical narrative of national low-cost housing. Secondly, the thesis examines the role of empowerment in slum upgrading project and how it enhanced the slum inhabitant as the primary housing agent.

To explore the current roles of slum inhabitant as an active agent in the upgrading of their settlement, Chapter 6 applied three data sources to cross check the evolution of Tawanmai inhabitant role. Firstly, the data was collected from the Tawanmai upgrading process between 2003 and 2007. The researcher was a member of the design team responsible for community master planning and housing unit at the time of BMK program implementing at Tawanmai community. Secondly, the information was gathered from January to March 2009 when the researcher conducted a pilot study as a part of Master of Planning and Design program at the University of Melbourne. Lastly, the PhD fieldwork was conducted between April to May 2011. Here, in the community survey, 96 questionnaire respondents were gained from a total 120 sampling households. The questionnaires assisted the researcher to identify key participants for in-depth interviews. Moreover, the researcher attended slum inhabitant political activities, in particular a public hearing, meetings and a protest of anti-slum eviction. Through the several meeting attendances with low-income community leaders, the researcher was able to conduct in-depth interviews with 10 participants from the top national to local community leaders. To further triangulate data and minimize biased information, a focus group was conducted that involved participant groups of NGOs, national government agency (NHA), municipality, and community leaders.

The Chapter begins with the review of Tawanmai community's local history that provides the background behind the community movement. The chapter discusses the role of slum inhabitants in the BMK slum upgrading process from the beginning to the conclusion of the project. Post-BMK period, the chapter focuses on the expansion of slum inhabitant’s role in the formation of community networks and the structural reform of government agencies. The practice of empowerment, discussed in Chapter 4 Research Design, has been applied to frame the findings of this chapter. Chapter 6
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community employs the same structure with Chapter 5 and illustrates the implementation of BMK program that provides the bridge between the socio-economic and political empowerment approaches. The chapter also articulates how these empowerment practices enhanced Tawanmai residents’ capacity.


6.1.1 Community Background and Problem of Illegally Land Occupation

Tawanmai community was a squatter settlement of low-income people that originally formed in the 1970s. It was situated mid-way between Khon Kaen city centre and the Khon Kaen University which were the two major employment sources for the informal settlement. Before upgrading, the community was known as ‘Dynamo Slum’ in association with its location behind many dynamo generator garages. Base on local administrative structure, Dynamo Slum was included as part of the Sam Leam 2 community (Khon Kaen Municipality, 2009:5). However, the Sam Leam 2 leader and residents were reluctant to recognize Dynamo Slum as it was an informal settlement and the inhabitants did not have land tenure (S-201/M/L/KK). However, the slum had tacit consent from the landlord as the agent of the landowner has collected rent from residents on a daily basis.

As part of a common practice of employee provided housing, the settlement was set up by a sawmill owner who built temporal houses out of scrap timber from the mill for the low-income workers that supplied affordable accommodation and decreased transportation expenses. The labourers rented the house with sub-standard infrastructure for 5 baht a day. After the sawmill moved, the timber shack row-houses was opened for rent to any low-income households who were predominantly seasonal economic migrants. The population size thereby varied significantly throughout the year. Between the year 1977 and 1991, Khon Kaen city experienced enormous socio-economic growth and urbanization due to the effect of the 4th-6th NESDP which turned Khon Kaen into the second largest city of the Thai Northeastern region. According to Lapanun et al (1998:98), the intensive growth results in high levels of labour migration from rural areas and neighbouring cities to Khon Kaen. The Dynamo settlement gradually extended household units with the arrival of the new migrants and, by 1980, became very crowded with up to 200 rental, low-income families who shared a 1.6 acre piece of land (BMK, 2007:2-8).

Dynamo settlement experienced major changes in the years 1977 and 1982 because a large section of the community was destroyed by fire and, as a result, only around 53 families remained (Khon

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1 The study refers to the community as ‘Dynamo Slum’ for the pre-upgrading period
2 The currency is calculated based on the year of conducting research, 2010; 1 US dollar = 31 baht(http://www.tradingeconomics.com/thailand/currency)
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community Kaen Ruam Pattana Cooperative, 2009:1). Since then, the physical environment became gradually poorer due to a number of factors. All basic infrastructures were disconnected due to regulation controls that come into effect after fires and, moreover, almost all electricity and water supply meters were later stolen. Significantly, the landlord refused to rebuild public utility services and pushed all maintenance cost and procurement of amenities to the tenants. According to the community survey in the late 2003 by the BMK staff\(^3\) (Khon Kaen University, 2004:9), without running water and electricity supply, Dynamo residents bought water at 5 baht per bicycle-tank for washing and 1 baht per gallon for drinking water. They also bought electricity at double to triple times higher than the normal rate from nearby households at Sam Leam 2 community. They generally paid a flat rate at 450 baht per month per family for electricity, while the rent steadily increased to 20 baht per day. The rent and basic utility bills were considered relatively expensive when compared to the residents’ daily wages which were around 150–200 baht per day.

Apart from being denied access to adequate living facilities, Dynamo dwellers were also discriminated by nearby households who refused to accommodate their needs. Sam Leam 2 residents believed that the Dynamo Slum was the root cause of various community problems such as the unhygienic environment, crime and waste pollution (Punkead, 2007:9). By 1993, the population of Dynamo slum had significantly increased again due to the landlord's establishment of a school, Pongpinyo Technology, on an adjacent alley. The extension of highway no.12 as a part of ASIAN East-West Economic Corridor project (EWEC) located nearby also benefited Dynamo Slum as a source of employment. The return of former inhabitants who moved out after the fire and new migrants further enlarged the number of Dynamo population. The new migrants were not only comprised of low-income households but many were of middle and higher income households resulting in a community of more diverse socio-economic statuses. The landlord took advantage of the increased number of houses and incrementally increased rent from 5 to 7, 10, 15, and 20 baht per day respectively over two decade.

Up until 2001, Dynamo Slum faced substantial rise of drug abuse and many inhabitants were drug sellers and consumers. Dynamo Slum was on the list of communities afflicted by drug related violence and the settlement was inspected by police almost every day (Ondum et al, 2007:2–9). In 2003, the aggressive enforcement of anti-drug policy under the former Prime Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, brought to a sharp decrease of drug abuse in Dynamo Slum. Due to these negative circumstances, Dynamo settlement transformed from a crowded community into an urban slum settlement. Up until

\(^3\) BMK staff was the local institutional network for BMK program at Khon Kaen City that consisted of BMK Northeast Office, Khon Kaen Municipality, Department of Co-op and Khon Kaen University. The researcher was a design staff in BMK Northeast Office.
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2002, the only public-subsidized facilities in Dynamo Slum were an open-air pavilion and the concrete main road built by the Khon Kaen Municipality (KKM).

6.1.2 Socio-Economic Structure of Dynamo Slum and Traditional Political Structure: Patron-Client tie

According to a BMK community survey in June 2004 (Khon Kaen University, 2004:8-9), Dynamo Slum was perceived as chaotic and dangerous to outsiders because of several negative circumstances such as drug abuse, overcrowding, and the poor physical environment. In contrast to the public perception, the BMK survey also revealed Dynamo Slum inhabitants have bonds of mutual support amongst its different households. The residents were formerly rural inhabitants who migrated from several cities nearby Khon Kaen such as Roi-et, Mahasarakam and Kalasin. The families with different backgrounds shared common employment experiences and searched for work in formal and informal sectors. Employment opportunities connected the residents together as an informal network and resulted in a more intimate social relationship. The socio-economic structure of Dynamo was based on the patron-client ties of similar occupations such as groups of construction worker, market labourers, garbage collectors, and paper craft makers. Seniority, like in Thai society at large, forms an important part of the resident’s social values and the elders who were able to provide work for members became an informal leader of their clients. At Dynamo Slum, two key persons gained high respect from the marginal dwellers. The first person was a retired teacher who traded low-price water supply to local residents for over 20 years. She was recognized as an informal leader due to her former occupation as a public school teacher and the personal relationships she has with local authorities. The second person was a senior sub-contractor who organized construction work for the residents for more than two decades. His connection with local contractors resulted in the formation of an informal construction labour group.

According to the BMK survey, the main occupations of Dynamo inhabitants were as daily labourers in the service sector such as recyclable waste collectors (34.7%), retail vendors (20.2%), building construction (14.3%), pedicab drivers (8%), and government and private company employees (22.8%). The community’s housewife group also earns complementary income through making ton mai ngern ton mai thong⁴. Almost 80% of dwellers were working in temporary daily employment. Less than one fourth of members have a monthly income and these long-term employees were migrant households that benefited from the establishment of school and EWEC⁵ in 1993. The overall resident

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⁴ A flower made from paper with gold and silver color for funeral rites
⁵ EWEC refers to the East-West Economic Corridor highway that links from Myanmar to the east pass through Thailand and Lao PDRs and to southern Vietnam. The corridor passes Khon Kaen City as a strategic location of international logistics.
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Incomes were low with 59% earning lower than 5,000 baht per month and the average household income of just 6,650 baht\(^6\). While people earn up to 200 baht per day, they have to spend almost all of their income on daily payments such as for rent, food and bills. Therefore, prior to BMK upgrading, most residents did not have long-term savings. To meet the living costs, several families had to borrow money from informal sources at very high interest rates of about 10-20% per month (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12\(^{th}\) July 2004 and 22\(^{nd}\) March 2011). The problem of informal debt resulted in the community weakness and variations in Dynamo Slum’s population size as it pushed many residents who were unable to meet interest payments out of their settlement.

In terms of tenancy, the 2009 pilot study\(^7\) of Tawanmai community revealed that 86.6% of Dynamo residents were renters and 14.4% stayed in their relative’s house (Dhabhalabutr, 2009). Regarding the length of residency, the largest group, 15.8% of Dynamo residents lived in the community for 16-20 years. 9.9% of residents lived in community for more than 20 years and 8.9% lived at Dynamo Slum for 11-15 years. Only 12.9% lived in the community for 1-5 years. This demonstrates that about one-third of marginal resident, 34.6%, have stayed in the community for the long-term and explains the high level of inter-personal relationships amongst neighbourhood households as well as the established relationships formed with local government agencies.

In terms of household size, the largest group or 28.7% of households consisted of families with three people. 18% are households of two people. The highest number of people living in a house was 10\(^8\). For the purpose of planning, the data also reveals that about 14.9% consisted of family members of more than six people who have potential to separate into two families in the near future. In terms of education, 92% of residents have received formal education with 77% having qualifications lower than high school diploma, the compulsory education level that the Thai government provides to all Thais at the time. The majority of residents completed elementary level education of lower than grade 4 (46.5%), particularly amongst the group older than 40 years old. A small group of 12.9% had tertiary level qualifications and they mainly played leading roles in community affairs. The low-educational level of the majority of Dynamo Slum population influenced the project’s progression in terms of knowledge transfer, communication and time span.

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\(^6\) In the 1990s, the mean of Thai Low income household earned about 9,000 baht/month (Government Housing Bank, Year 16, Issue 61, April-June 2010: 47)

\(^7\) Pilot study has conducted as a part of the Master of Planning and Design program, University of Melbourne between 2009-2010

\(^8\) They were 2 families of cousins who shared the same house. The 10 people did not live together at the same time but alternated between day and night as one family worked during the daytime while another family worked at night.
6.1.3 Dynamo Slum’s Resistance to Eviction

The conflict over land tenure arose in mid-2003 when rental agreements for the whole community was about to be terminated (TWM-4/FM/L/KK, 22nd March 2011). An informal community collective emerged when residents united together to negotiate for a long-term lease contract at an affordable price. The landlord not only refused to extend the lease, but also set a very high land price for sale (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011). As Dynamo dwellers cannot afford the price, people had to move out without knowing where to go. Having established personal relationship with local government officers, an informal leader sought advice from KKM (TWM-8/FM/KKM, 24th March 2011).

The timing was right for Dynamo Slum as their problems coincided with the government’s latest housing policy launched at that time. By January 2003, the Thai government announced two new nationwide housing programs for the urban poor. Both programs were part of the policy that aimed to
provide affordable accommodation for one million low-income households across the country within five years (2003-2007) (Boonyabancha, 2005:3). The first scheme is Baan Ua Arthorn (or ‘We care housing’) program of direct housing construction and sale by National Housing Authority of Thailand (NHA). The ready to occupy houses and apartments were offered to general low-income households at subsidized rates. Its initial target was the production of 600,000 units. The second scheme is Baan ManKong (or ‘Secured housing’) program to be implemented by Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) which aimed to improve housing, community, and tenure security for 300,000 slum households in 200 cities across the country. Lastly, the Government Savings Bank (GSB) was assigned to provide housing loan for 100,000 units of general low-income family (NHA, 2009:14). In late 2003, KKM purposed Dynamo Slum as one of the pilot projects of BMK in Khon Kaen city because the community faced the urgent problem of eviction that fit with the program’s approach. However, the landlord and Sam Leam 2 community leader denied BMK’s offer to be part of a community partnership. This negative reaction is evidence of and emphasized Dynamo Slum’s status as an isolated and powerless community.

6.1.4 BMK Program in Khon Kaen Municipality
In 2003, the BMK master plan in the Northeast region was initiated in Khon Kaen Municipality. A year later, the CODI implemented the BMK action plan in three slum settlements consisting of 303 households (see Figure 2). The criteria of pilot project selection were based on the different types of landlord. The first pilot community was Dynamo Slum which was later renamed as “Tawanmai community” when the first phase of construction was completed. This community was selected as a model of informal settlement on private land. The upgrading solution of this project is the relocation of the community to a nearby site. The second pilot project is “Nond Nong Wat 2 community” where the community is located on land owned by a national government agency and the solution is on-site upgrading with long-term collective lease on the State Railway land. The last pilot project is “Nong Yai 2 community” where the community is located on local government land. This is another on-site upgrading with long-term collective lease on land owned by KKM. The significance of the three pilot projects to the other urban slum communities nationwide is as powerful examples of slum resident undertaking the project as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. Once the project has been developed, many slum communities from around the city and country visited to see what has been achieved and to learn how it was possible in terms of organization and cost. The process of scaling up from pilot projects to other communities emerged as other communities go through processes of their own. Hence, these three pilot projects set the precedents that promoted up-scaling and changes in nationwide practice and policy. According to one of the BMK stakeholders, “the pilot communities are considered to be the school for all following slum settlements in Khon Kaen city” (KKU-1/M/S/KK, 24th March 2011).
6.2 Upgrading Process (2004-2007) and the Tawanmai Practice

6.2.1 BMK’s Integrated Socio-Economic Empowerment

According to KKM’s 1997 Annual Report, the population in the municipality is distributed into 45 communities with 11 communities considered to be slum settlements, consisting of 9,413 people or 6.2% of the municipality’s population (Rabhiphat, 1998:12). CODI’s survey in 2003 revealed that KKM has extended its administrative area to 65 communities of which 19 settlements were categorized as slum communities containing 30,000 people or 11.61% of total population (CODI, 2003:11). In this context of slum expansion, Khon Kaen city was promoted as a pilot area of BMK implementation in 2003 and by 2004, about 303 families were identified as beneficiaries. By 2005, BMK was extended to 12 more slum settlements along Khon Kaen railway lines and covered 600 families. Between 2006 and 2007, the project targeted 1,200 families per year (KKM, 2009:3-4).

At the policy level, BMK strategy emphasises on the centrality of the slum community organization in defining and implementing responses to their own housing problems because it considers that the
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Slum inhabitants know best what their problems are but lack the resource and capacity to implement solutions (Boonyabancha, 2005:8). BMK provides flexible finance and the opportunity for communities to collaborate with their local network to improve the slum capacity as the legitimate part of the city. The BMK empowerment strategy signified that the state agencies have already recognized the slum inhabitants as 'Primary Housing Agent' because the slum organization was encouraged to lead the project implementation with experts from the government agencies acting as project facilitators.

The BMK process adopted integrated social and economic empowerment to promote collective community capacity because many previous practices, including Sengki land-sharing project, highlighted the importance of strengthening social relationships among the disparate sub-groups in the community who are not homogeneous and often have competing agendas. Social empowerment is prioritised as the first goal of BMK empowerment as illustrated in the Baan Mankong Program handbook ‘Build community first, build house later’ (CODI, 2004:1). To achieve the goal, collective action between stakeholders is the central principle of the BMK empowerment process. CODI applies the BMK empowerment strategy of ‘collective community’ in every BMK stages from the savings until building construction. Hence the new empowerment approaches emphasises on building strong social collective power as well as financial capacity.

In order to understand CODI’s approach towards empowerment practice, it is important to investigate the BMK empowerment process. There are two major empowerment provisions that have been emphasised in the state housing program. Firstly, the foundation of empowerment lies in creating power for the powerless through equipping the community to take responsibility for the savings and housing processes. This involves up-skilling individuals and interpersonal capacities to achieve their goals by themselves. Secondly, empowerment enhances the slum’s accessibility to financial resources and institutional networks which promotes supportive environment for their housing development. This change reflects the lessons learnt from Sengki land-sharing project that highlighted the crucial need to create an enabling environment to enhance slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’.

Critically, it is observed that the government strategy sets its sights on achieving slum empowerment by technical and management approach and do not attempt to change the existing socio-economic and –political structures that inhibit the slum inhabitants’ capacity in influencing broader policies and regulations that affect them.

At the local level, the BMK project at Tawanmai community aimed at integrating housing issues and community development through the participatory process between Tawanmai’s community organization and local agencies. The CODI specifically identifies three major goal of Tawanmai upgrading: to achieve security tenure in a nearby location as the first priority; to encourage local
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community resident as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in the form of community based organization; and to bring all actors together as powerful mechanism of urban development, in the form of citywide network (CODI, 2004:14).

6.2.2 Pre-Upgrading Process: Establishing the Citywide Network

In BMK practice, the establishment of a network of local institutions is to be done in the preliminary stages (Boonyabancha, 2006; 21). CODI, the main BMK organizer, initiated the BMK project in Khon Kaen city by bringing together local agencies as partners of the institutional citywide network. This network plays important roles in two levels of BMK implementation. At the policy level, they develop BMK strategy plan and oversee the distribution of CODI funding to individual community organizations. At the operational level, they provide the technical knowledge and professional support to assist the community organization implementing BMK process.

By 28th June 2003, four major local organizations became members of the institutional citywide network; Khon Kaen University (KKU), Khon Kaen Municipality (KKM), the Department of Cooperative, the Kere Kai Saha Chumchon Nakorn Khon Kaen or Union of Community Network of Khon Kaen City (UCN)9, and the Kere Kai Feunfu Pracha Sangsan or Network of People in Creative Restoration (NPCR)10. The latter two are major local community alliances, with different aims and sponsors that play crucial roles in Khon Kaen city. The first group, the UCN under KKM patronage, is a local network of savings group that has been formed since the implementation of UCDO funding in 1992. At the time of fieldwork, this network consists of 65 communities and has representative committees in the KKM community council. The second group, the NPCR under the supervision of the Four Region Slum Network (FRSN), is a network of 12 slum settlements that are located along both sides of Khon Kaen railway line.

The Secretary of Khon Kaen institutional citywide network mentioned that the NPCR leader was invited to participate in the institutional citywide committee but after a few meetings, the NPCR leader

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9 Translation and formal English name is from the study, ‘Economic and social condition of the urban local community leaders and their work performance in community organization network’ by Somchai Pongtepin (1999), Dissertation of the Master of Community Development, Thammasat University

10 Prof.Dhanu Pholawat the former Dean of Faculty of Architecture KKU is the representative of Khon Kaen University, Ms.Waraporn Boonsri, Head of Division of social affairs is the representative of Khon Kaen Municipality, Mr.Prasit Musika-Charoen the representative of Department of Cooperative, Mr.Kitti Cherdchu, the representative of Union of Community Network of Khon Kaen City and Mr.Jinda Charoensuk, the representative of Network of People in Creative Restoration.
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community decided not to be involved in BMK project due to a conflict of interests (KKU-4/M/S/KKU). The NPCR leader argues that the actual need of slum inhabitant is secured land tenure rather than savings group or housing and hence, the first priority of slum upgrading must be the negotiation for secured land tenure and only once it is achieved, other processes can then follow. The NPCR leader is critical of the BMK process that encourages slum inhabitants to organize savings group first, which is followed by housing design and construction, stating that “In the case that the BMK process is not acknowledged by the landlord, the residents become the victims of BMK program and the CODI does not have to take responsibility” (TWM-9/M/L/KK, 21st March 2011). As a result, the NPCR were not involved in the BMK Khon Kaen project but they supported their allied communities to claim BMK funding support only after an official long-term lease agreement has been reached with the State Railway of Thailand (SRT). On the other hand, the leader of UCN under KKM patronage participated in the committee board.

6.2.3 The ‘Institutional Citywide Network’ as the Medium of Empowerment

The CODI performed two crucial roles as the middle party and project facilitator. Through the intermediary role of CODI’s Northeast Region Office, various local organizations were gathered together and in July 2003, the official institutional citywide network of BMK program in Khon Kaen city was established and on the 6th October 2003, representatives of all associated partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreement. The citywide network had the responsibility to set up strategic plans for BMK at the city scale, oversee the policy level, and mobilize the network of local administrative bodies as a long-term partner of BMK. The institutional citywide network functions as a vertical network between the authorities and local communities.

The CODI citywide network facilitates action plans with the local communities and expert network. The CODI promoted and strengthened the community organization as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ through the provision of financial, technical, and local expertise network support. The CODI approved 33,395,443 baht subsidy for the Tawanmai upgrading project (Khon Kaen Ruam Pattana Cooperative, 2009:2). Figure 6.3 illustrates the structure of BMK institutional citywide network at Khon Kaen city.

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11 This interviewee raised the case of BMK at Klong Toey lock 7-12 community that did not receive an official leasing contract from the public landlord because the Port Authority of Thailand refused to sign MoU with the community and the CODI (Visetpreecha, 2008: 56).
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**Institutional level:**
- Khon Kaen University (Academic partner) 3 people
- Khon Kaen Municipality (Local government agency) 3 people
- CODI Regional office 2 people
- Union Community Network 14 people
- Other bodies as temporary committee such as Department of Co-op Khon Kaen Province Office

**Community level:**
- Tawanmai Cooperative Office
- Tawanmai Co-op members

**Figure 6.3:** Model of Institutional Citywide Network at Khon Kaen City (author)

**Figure 6.4:** MoU Agreement Ceremony for BMK program at Khon Kaen city (Dhabhalabutr, 2003)
6.3 Empowerment through Community Participation and Collective Baan Mankong Process
6.3.1 Empowerment through Participation in Community Survey

Once the institutional citywide network was established, the BMK implementation started at Tawanmai community on October 2003. The institutional citywide network conducted community visits which aimed at reaching initial consent with the local residents. A community survey was conducted at Sengki community between 8th March and 17th April 2011 and then a case study of Tawanmai community was conducted between 19th April and 31st May 2011. The data from those surveys revealed that, at the early stage, Tawanmai residents did not clearly understand the idea and benefits of BMK upgrading program. However, the awareness that they were soon going to be evicted stimulated their interest and once the dwellers agreed to be involved in BMK program, the institutional citywide network encouraged them to form community survey teams which collaborated with the experts from Khon Kaen University.

Two collaborative survey teams, consisting of resident volunteers, were formed to carry out the two main upgrading processes of savings and housing. Within the teams, a wide range of sub-working groups were set up such as groups to collect data, measure, and map. The first team was the savings group which consisted of the housewife group and staff from the Research and Development Institution Khon Kaen University (RDI), Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, and Faculty of Nursing. They volunteered to promote the community managed savings group, and later, to scale-up the group into a community cooperative for low-income housing. The second group was the design team which comprised of local construction workers and the Faculty of Architecture staff. Their responsibility was to stimulate community participation in the design of their community environment and the construction process. The significance of the citywide network's survey was to examine Tawanmai resident's capacity and responsibility toward the program. The resultant data was useful in strengthening the sense of community and was translated into the physical characteristics of the new location through the master plan and the design of public space and housing clusters.

Interviews with the locals reveal the positive outcomes and the close relationship between empowerment and the change in Tawanmai resident's capability through engaging in the community surveys at two levels (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011, TWM-4/FM/L/KK, 22nd March 2011, TWM-5/FM/CM/KK, 12th May 2011 and TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011). At the individual level, a number of local residents gradually gained knowledge and skill and were able to effectively work on the community survey with their local expert partners. Residents achieved multiple skills through the practice of ‘learning by doing’ (Punkead, 2007:9, Usavagovitwong, 2006:8).
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community participant explains that “Previously, I never did anything like this before, BMK process is the open space of real practices for marginal poor and brings out our ideas to reality. Even I’m a woman but I can make measurement using the equipment. I have skills and know how to measure because I do by myself. Once I finished my house measurement, I can advise my team members to measure their own house. They trust my abilities because I have direct experience” (TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011). The responses given by Dynamo members reflect their own experiences, expertise, and knowledge emergence and demonstrate that the community survey process played a part in transforming Tawanmai residents from unskilled to skilled labour (TWM-10/M/S/KKU, 18th March 2011).

According to Sapu and Usawaywitwong (2006:9), the access to information is an aspect of power that the marginal group has never dealt with. The tangible outcome of the community survey is a community database that was collected through the process of measurements, mappings, and interviews. Once residents had experienced of the realistic data, they were gradually able to visualize the current community problems. In doing so, they are able to prioritize needs and consider possible housing solutions appropriate to their condition. Based on pilot study fieldwork, for example, the inhabitants can understand and relate the suitable building type and reasonable construction costs with the realistic savings goal that people can reach through the integrated data. The awareness of community situation and ability to formulate viable housing solution reflects the contribution of empowerment practice at Tawanmai community in terms of enabling individual skills in forming and using knowledge.

At the interpersonal level, the process of surveying provides opportunities for the fragmented households to meet and learn about each other’s problems and establish collective power between them. The process allows individuals to gauge their neighbour’s views on similar problems and turn it into communal views. The ability to develop common perspective signifies the effectiveness of the collective community empowerment process among Tawanmai people. Moreover, the collective community survey promotes inter-personal relationship and knowledge exchanges between the different specialised sub-groups and transforms them into collective power. The pilot fieldwork confirms that the early steps of Tawanmai community scaling up into a collective community are found in this process.
6.3.2 Empowerment through Participation in Collectively Managed Savings Group

At Tawanmai community, the community managed fund is an essential component of BMK project as it is a prerequisite to receive CODI's soft-loan. Once a community cooperative with regular savings is in operation, the CODI delivers public infrastructure subsidies and housing loans through the citywide network, and then to the community organization respectively. This is the way that the CODI ensures practical and realistic changes in the low-income community structure, from one based on individual households to the collective community. Hence, the BMK savings process is an integrated socio-economic empowerment process that pays attention on social strengthening through the collective finance-based activity.

While the CODI views savings as the practical start to build the realistic collective community and internal financial capacity, the marginal residents look at community savings group as a pathway to achieve land tenure security. The two different goals are implemented through the practice of ‘daily saving’. The idea of savings group was designed to be practically based on the residents’ incomes where the poorest group could be included and drawn into the BMK process (KKU-1/M/S/KK, 24th March 2011 and KKU-4/M/S/KKU, 26th March 2011). Financial schemes that involved weekly or monthly savings was difficult for the inhabitants to make regular savings as the majority of inhabitants relied on day to day wages of the informal economic sector (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011). Thus, the information from observation and in-depth interview in the time of BMK implementation at Tawanmai community shows that daily savings became the major scheme to develop both individual financial discipline and the collective power because it made saving affordable for every Tawanmai households. The residents started from saving 20 baht per day and then gradually increase to 30 and 40 baht once they are able to maintain regular saving habit. The community-managed savings in which individual Tawanmai households save each day is promoted as the foundation for the formation of collective power between the households. The
process results in the significant transformation of Tawanmai residents into being a ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’. The PhD fieldwork, in-depth interview with community leader and community members, at Tawanmai community reveals that the daily savings practice develops the ‘sense of collective community’ among individual households that was never experienced before BMK arrived (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011, TWM-4/FM/L/KK, 22nd March 2011 and TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011). Tawanmai residents utilized household cluster as the method of collecting money from members. Small clusters of 10 households were formed based on kinship ties and each cluster selected a representative that they know well and can rely on. Every evening, the household representatives gathered together at the cluster representative’s house to deposit cash that is then sent to the community savings committee that then deposits the money into a community account at the Government Savings Bank (GSB) branch nearby. Due to the regular face to face meetings for several months, cluster members got to know their neighbour’s financial situation well and built closer inter-personal relationship. To ensure transparency, the committee also organizes a weekly community meeting to report the savings balance.

At the community scale, the regular savings group meeting was set up. Rather than inspecting the member’s financial discipline, the community savings meeting encouraged supportive learning amongst the savings group members. This approach provided a supportive environment for members to share their struggles and seek help from their neighbours. The concurrent raising of collective awareness and reciprocal help between households developed into a collective social power among Tawanmai people as it encourages individual household to share ‘I’ problems which then expanded into the of possibilities of the ‘WE’ problems (Aimmerman and Rappaport, 1988). A former community leader expressed that “Some member household faced financial difficulty due to informal debt and this trouble directly affects the household to keep regular saving. At the community meeting, the higher socio-economic members offer part-time jobs for the struggling households to generate more income” (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011).

The socio-economic integrated empowerment through daily savings also led to the change of residents’ outlooks and actions concerning savings discipline and responsibility. The data from in-depth interview, observation and pilot study reveals that savings becomes a common issue of Tawanmai residents’ discussions (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011, TWM-4/FM/L/KK, 22nd March 2011 and TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011). They aspire for a better quality of life and found that they have the ability to achieve those goals through regular savings. Savings provided incentives to many household leaders to work hard as they could potentially own land and house outright within 15 years (TWM-2/FM/L/KKU, 3rd November 2010). While husbands became eager to find part time jobs, housewives managed the financial balance between payment and income (TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011). Savings is a gradual process that helps individual
household establishes strong foundation of personal financial development. This is not short-term
behavioural change and Tawanmai residents maintained their savings account into the post-BMK
developments. After paying off their housing mortgages, they intend to save money for retirement
(TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011). Several Tawanmai residents have another
bank account for retirement funds, promoted by the community committee, Mr. Amnoy Worayot – the
committee president, loan payment and accounting team 12. Hence, daily savings is an empowerment
process that gradually coordinated and linked the residents’ collective consciousness and actions
(TWM-10/M/L/KK, 18th March 2011).

6.3.3 Empowerment through Democratic Practices in the
Election of SHC Community Committee
To deal with the formal financial sector, Tawanmai residents needed to acquire savings and loan
management skills. The CODI ran several training sessions and community visits to many BMK
communities in Bangkok and the vicinity. The socio-economic integrated empowerment promotes an
expanding community network of practical knowledge across savings based organizations. Once they
returned home from the Bonkai community site visit Bangkok, Tawanmai residents held an election for
the community savings committee which then established the community cooperative and officially
registered under the Khon Kaen Municipality (TWM-2/FM/L/KKU, 3rd November 2010 and KKU-
2/M/S/KK, 3rd April 2011). The crucial point in the formation of the 23 member joint committee,
representing residents and institutional citywide network, was the ratio between internal and external
members. Different local agencies each appointed two members for a total of eight into the
committee. The other 15 were local residents directly elected by the co-op members of Tawanmai.
This difference in the co-op committee composition was a well-intentioned empowerment strategy that
promotes community political deliberations between residents and local agencies. In this structure,
Tawanmai residents could potentially realize and exercise their role as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ at
operational and policy levels. Figure 6.6 below illustrates the organization structure of Tawanmai
cooperative;

12 Mr. Supat Promsanpong, Mrs. Srisamai Thongrit and Mrs. Siriluck Tulakan
On 26th May 2004, Khon Kaen Municipality approved Tawanmai cooperative’s application and the cooperative became formally known as ‘Khon Kaen Ruam Pattana Cooperative’, the first low-income housing cooperative in the Northeast Region of Thailand (KKM, 2009:5). Parallel to savings process, Tawanmai community organization implemented other processes such as land searching, price negotiation, and construction training. By this time the co-op achieved savings of over 200,000 baht and the committee was able to procure land for relocation. The committee then submitted the proposal for a loan for land purchasing from the CODI which was approved by the institutional citywide network in the following month. At this point, the thesis argues that Tawanmai inhabitants have achieved the scale-up in role to become a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ as a collective community. This achievement manifests in the establishment of the community cooperative office and committee that, henceforth, played the leading role in the BMK implementation.
6.3.4 Empowerment through Community Participation in Land Purchasing

Land tenure security became a crucial issue for Tawanmai community because the previous landlord discontinued the land lease contract which turned Tawanmai residents into illegal occupants. Hence, the residents agreed to relocate to a new location and looked for land nearby their existing employment sources (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011).

The process of acquiring land and land purchasing further promoted the sense of collective community among the individual households. This practice contributed to and enhanced the evolving role of being a ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’ as Tawanmai residents were able to manage the process with institutional citywide network. Their role was evidenced in their leading and active roles in the implementation of land purchasing process such as in the formation of land purchasing criterion, the recruitment of new members, the survey for alternative locations, the negotiations for land price reduction and CODI funding etc. Finally, their collective effort achieved long-term secure land tenure.

The data from practice as a design team member (2003-2007) and pilot study (2009) identified that Tawanmai residents played a leading role of housing agent in land purchasing 13. Exercising their technical and management capacity, the marginal residents realized the benefit of setting up criterion which serves as an effective tool for decision-making. After several rounds of discussions, they came up with the six communal criteria, developed based on particular community characteristics such as income, source of employment, and public infrastructure availability 14. After the data collection group searched for alternative locations from various sources such as public and private advertisements, financial institutions, and Khon Kaen slum community network, the savings group members agreed on three alternative locations 15. Utilizing KKM subsidised vehicle and petrol, land purchasing team member inspected the alternative locations together, discussed the basic information of each place, and made comparisons according to six criteria to finalize the best location. The savings group members voted for a nearby location (Figure 8) of about two kilometres away from their original settlement, so that the residents can maintain their existing sources of employment.

Offered the opportunity to develop negotiation skills through the land purchasing process, Tawanmai residents were able to negotiate the land price from 3,750,000 baht per rai set up by the private

13 Data from observation at a time of slum upgrade implementation, June 2003. Later in July 2009, in-depth interview with the Tawanmai land purchasing team was conducted during the pilot project study.

14 See the six criterion at Appendix 5

15 See three alternative locations at Appendix 6
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community landlord down to 1,400,000 baht per rai. According to one of the members involved in negotiations, the group visited the landlord many times and conveyed the strong message that the community needed land, but has limited funding as most members have low-incomes (TWM-1/FM/L/KKU, 20th March 2011). The landlord was made aware that her assistance will benefit Tawanmai people and Khon Kaen city a whole. This addressed the landowner’s doubts about the community’s capacity and resulted in the landlord’s willingness to support the project by reducing the asking price (TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011). Although land was procured at a reduced price, the physical condition of land was sub-standard with poor access to public infrastructure and low ground level and hence, needed a huge investment on physical environmental upgrading. As a result, some households disagreed with the relocation. However, the community leader was able to persuade the opposing group, particularly as KKM and CODI will subsidize the 19 million baht for public infrastructural upgrading (TWM-1/FM/L/KKU, 20th March 2011).

Another issue that proved a financial barrier for Tawanmai was their relatively small size with only 53 families and hence their internal savings fund was not sufficient to claim CODI loan. To resolve the problem, they generated multiple solutions to increase savings amount, practices that enabled Tawanmai residents to improve their technical and management skills. Firstly, they agreed to increase their savings to 80 baht per day per household, however, here they also faced problems. One was that not every member was willing to join the savings group. Moreover, for some households, once they found that they have more money in their savings account, withdrew their money rather than put up more savings into Co-op account. Other households were forced to withdraw their savings account when faced with emergency problems such as huge informal debts and a necessary move elsewhere. It was found that informal debts were one of the key factors that influenced the inconsistency of residents’ savings. Accordingly the second solution, an income generating project undertaken parallel with the BMK development, was set up to raise financial capacity for low-income members. The institutional citywide network came to assist the community in skills training, product development and marketing. However, this solution is time consuming and more effective in long-term community development.

The third proposed solution was the recruitment of new co-op members from outside and the Tawanmai co-op developed precisely defined rules16 to screen new members who sought to participate in the project. The rules were set to prevent undesired person such as higher income households and/or speculators who want to occupy the right in BMK program earmarked for the genuinely poor. The institutional citywide network assisted the community to screen and recruit the proper candidates. A few months later, Tawanmai co-op membership was enlarged from 53 to 121

16 See the rules to screen new Tawanmai Co-op membership in Appendix 7
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community families. The benefit of additional members is a more secure savings fund which also provided credit access to formal financial sources, in particular, the CODI soft-loan. Finally on 3rd June 2004, Tawanmai community was able to purchase the vacant land of 6-0-67 rai for 8,500,000 baht with the collective land title in the name of the cooperative, not individual households. This strategy helps maintain Tawanmai residents together as a collective community for the 15 years mortgage repayment period.

Figure 6.7: (Top) Map of Dynamo slum and new location
(Bottom left) Tawanmai residents conduct surveys at alternative land sites
(Bottom right) The new location before upgrading (Dhabhalabutr, 2004)
6.3.5 Empowerment through Participation in Collective Planning and Design

The third BMK process at Tawanmai community was the master planning of the community and designing of the house units. This is another empowerment practice that promotes communal strengthening between local residents through the collective planning activity. The objective of this process was to organize the physical environment to address the social aspects which manifested in the arrangements of housing cluster, common public space, and the formal meeting space. The local residents were encouraged to lead the design implementation while the professional designers acted as the facilitators. Hence, the planning stage promoted the inhabitants’ role of being ‘Primary Housing Agent’ through practical activities, divided into three main stages:

1. Pre-Design
2. Master Planning
3. Housing Design

As observed in the practice as a design team member, the PhD fieldwork and the study of Ondum et al (2007:50-59), the planning process stimulates and increases personal and inter-personal practical skills through the organization of physical space. The process encouraged and created enabling circumstances and opportunities for slum residents to exercise their collective power with their local networks.

In the Pre-Design Stage, the residents and professional architects formed collaborative design teams where residents played the leading role as design implementer advised by professional designers. Design sub-groups were also formed based on the participants’ preferences and skills such as survey and measuring team, data collecting team, and planning team (KKU-1/M/S/KK, 24th March 2011). Based on observation at a time of project implementation in 2004, an additional survey was conducted to collect essential data for the planning process. Design strategies and tools were applied under the supervision of professional architects such as surveying, spatial mapping, and building lifecycle assessing. Once the tangible database emerged, many residents can express and visualize their needs, problems, and priorities. More importantly, the realistic data made the residents aware of shared community problems.

The next stage is the master plan development where the design teams worked together to formulate a design framework, setting up the common rules for community master plan and house unit based on the realistic database (see Appendix 8 Housing framework). After much public deliberations, agreements were reached on issues such as building types, functional requirements, number of house units, and land plot size. The BMK process sets up enabling environments to engender Tawanmai

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17 See housing framework at Appendix 8
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community
collective actions through the savings and planning processes and, hence, household members of
each savings cluster continued to work together in the planning stage. The groups were formed by
residents themselves based on their kinship ties such as friendship, family, and occupation (KKU-
2/M/S/KK, 3rd April 2011). This is the empowerment strategy which ensures the new location would
sustain the sense of authentic neighbourhood through the clusters.

The data from observation at a time of project implementation shows that these small groups worked
together on locating their individual land plots within their cluster and then coordinated with household
clusters nearby. Through this process, all clusters were integrated and then arranged with public
spaces, common infrastructure, and landscape. Once the draft master plan emerged, further public
discussions between residents and the design professions were required because, at a certain level,
the community master plan had to deliver a cost effective, good quality physical environment that
sustains a sense of community (KKU-4/M/S/KKU, 26th March 2011).
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community

**Figure 6.8:** The collective planning process of community master plan at Tawanmai community

(Dhabhalabutr, 2004) Top left image: Savings group members located their individual land plots within their cluster to formulate community master plan.

Top right image: Members conducted public discussion over community master plan.

Below left image: The final design of Tawanmai community master plan

Below right image: Model of Tawanmai community master plan that assists savings group members to see the future physical environment of their community.

The last stage of collaborative planning was ‘Housing Unit Design’. This process continued from the community master planning that involved the same actors utilizing similar design approach.

Respective group clusters further developed the housing schemes because they had experienced and were now familiar with the design process. The evidences from observation as a design team member (2003-2007) shows that before February 2004 the previous meeting was poorly attended because Tawanmai co-op member did not know how to design housing (TWM-7/FM/CM/KK, 20th March 2011) but from October 2004 to February 2005 all household representatives of the savings group attended the process and several attended the earlier meetings. Tawanmai residents were eager to be involved in the process because it gives them responsibility for their own community master plan (Dhabhalabutr, 2004).

Adapting to un-trained designers, the design process started from a single unit of function, and then gradually accumulated other function towards the formation of the whole house. Tawanmai residents used small, square pieces of paper, with different colours corresponding to different functions, to determine house function. They drew grids of 1X1 centimetre on plain paper that represented 1X1 meter in the actual dimension. Next, they filled the grids with the coloured paper squares to represent functions, for instance; nine red squares represented a bedroom of 9 m², while two blue squares means a 2 m² toilet. After completing all house function arrangements, they placed the pieces of paper on the land plot to identify functional relationships. At this stage, the residents become aware of the whole space of the house unit and the proportion of the house. They were also able to re-organize space, lay out, and orientation to better relate with the neighbouring units and the master plan. Through this practice, the housing scheme emerged. In terms of organizing the maximum space within the limited land plot, the residents designed an extra-tall upper floor which can later be modified into a full second/third floor. The more additional space addressed the requirements of home-based employments which characterized the majority of the residents’ occupation or 56.6% ¹⁸.

¹⁸ See appendix 8 Housing framework
The residents' house unit proposals was then delivered to architects who assisted with structural requirements and materials in construction, façade design, the utilization of recycled material etc. Alternative and reused materials were considered and added to the design to help the residents stay within their construction budgets and also to be environmental friendly. The final housing scheme and community master plan were achieved through the practice of collaborative planning between Tawanmai residents and the experts.

The final housing scheme consists of two building types. The first scheme is a one storey row house with a total area of 32 m² (4X8 m) and on land plots of 40 m² (4X10 m). The key function consists of an open plan which, designed as a multi-purposed area, and one toilet unit. The second building type is a two storeys row house which occupied the similar size of land plot but with almost double the functional area. The main functions of a bedroom, a multi-purpose area, a toilet, a kitchen, front and rear semi outdoor spaces are contained within a compact area of 64 m². Due to the larger total land area, Tawanmai could increase the number of housing units to 145 in total, consisting of 8 units (5.5%) of one storey row house and 137 (94.5%) units of two storeys row house.
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community

Table 6.1: The prices of housing and 15 years payment rates (excluding land price) (Rosathaporn and Boonyabancha, 2009:47-49)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House type</th>
<th>Total Price (baht)</th>
<th>Government subsidy (Infrastructure/baht)</th>
<th>Payment per month (baht)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 storey row house</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>1,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 storeys row house</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>1,999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.10: Floor plan of two storey row house (original drawing scale 1:250; Unit: Metre)  
(Left) Ground floor plan consists of living room (1), Toilet (2), Kitchen (3), Service area (4)  
(Right) First floor plan consists of Bedroom (5) and Small terrace (6)

Elevation of two stories row house and one storey row house (Middle left and right)  
(CODI, 2009:22-23)
As part of the planning stage, Tawanmai residents further demonstrated their collective ‘Primary Housing Agent’ role through the presentation and negotiation for housing mortgage and for building code exemption with the relevant authorities. In April 2005 Tawanmai residents, as members of the co-op, presented their design proposal to the institutional citywide network, and requested for CODI housing loan and the local building regulation reform. They explained how the community spaces were designed through the collaborative action and resulted in the project approval from the citywide network committee. The presentation provided evidence that the BMK project enabled realistic collective managerial capacities of Tawanmai residents, and resulted in CODI’s funding approval. However, the community faced the limitation of building code and requested exemption from implementation of building set back, which did not accommodate low-income housing context. The KKM agreed to assist the community to seek out alternative solutions.

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19 Building code Issue 4, Section 7 year 2007, Ministry of Interior, 2007:2-3
20 Building set back is the distance which a building or other permanent structure has to set back from a street, river, or any other place which needs protection. According to Thai building code regulation 1979, an individual single house needs to set back from the adjacent house by at least 50 centimeters (without voids) without the need for neighbors’ approval.
Figure 6.12: Tawanmai team presents design proposal to institutional citywide network (left)
Tawanmai leader team explains the limitation of building regulation (right) (Dhabhalabutr, 2005)

Parallel with the planning process, the Tawanmai construction workers group was formed with on-site construction training courses provided by the Faculty of Architecture, Khon Kaen University (Arch KKU). The technical training resulted in the up-skilling of workers who gained construction related skills such as cost estimation, organization of building materials, and housing quality assessment. Another significant benefit of technical and management based empowerment was the labour cost savings achieved (Tongbudr; 2007:13, Rosathaporn and Boonyabancha, 2009:49). Moreover, the training enhances the residents’ knowledge, skills, and experiences that were useful in terms of future employment and the long term maintenance of their community.

The outcome of the planning process, community master planning and housing design, illustrates how the residents can collectively resolve the use of land considering social equity, sense of community, neighbourliness, and environmental friendliness. Beyond enhancing personal and inter-personal capacity, the planning process also created enabling circumstances for slum residents to exercise their collective power. The evidences could be found in the formation of the savings cluster. The Tawanmai case study makes it clear that the whole planning stage from pre-design to housing unit design, considerably developed the capacities of Tawanmai residents, confirmed the residents’ role as ‘Primary Housing Agent in Technical and Management’, and assisted in up scaling their status towards ‘Collective community organization’ though collaborations with the local institutional network.

6.3.6 Empowerment through Participation in Collective Construction: Housing and Infrastructure

The final stage of BMK at Tawanmai community was building and infrastructure construction. This process was closely associated to the previous collective savings process, as the affordable housing was enabled by internal savings and external subsidies. With limited financial resources, the
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community

residents were, by default, concerned with and involved in any effective cost saving construction management. The 2004 community survey illustrated that Tawanmai residents play the significant role of technical and management agent who constructed the well-planned design within the limited budget. Many construction stages provided the mechanism to strengthen local people’s capabilities at both individual and community levels. Furthermore, the institutional citywide network provided the supporting mechanisms of slum empowerment, signified by the provision of expert support, skill training, and financial support. As with the planning process, the collective construction process further reinforced Tawanmai residents’ status as the ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’ and also led to the expansion of Tawanmai’s role in the citywide network.

The construction process encouraged the marginal residents, who were involved based on their preferences and background skills, to collectively exercise their technical and management capacity through teamwork as it required different specialised teams of construction workers such as builders, bricklayers, and carpenters etc. (KKU-1/M/S/KK, 24th March 2011 and TWM-5/FM/CM/KK, 12nd May 2011). Tawanmai residents were further supported and empowered through the Institutional citywide network that provided additional training courses and construction site visits, where construction practitioners guided workers to information (KKM-1/FM/S/KK, 5th April 2011). In February 2004, the institutional citywide network, seeking to share successful tactics of each community with others, put Tawanmai construction worker groups in contact with other BMK communities through learning and experience exchange forums (TWM-2/FM/L/KK, 3rd November 2010). As many communities were ill-prepared to begin the BMK process, the face to face discussions was a vital learning experience, direct from the primary sources. Tawanmai residents learned by comparing the implementations in other BMK projects across the country and identified the differences to their own experiences, which also built up their confidence in their participation (KKU-3/M/S/KKU, 4th April 2011). In the process, the horizontal network of low-income community organizations expanded to a citywide scale.

Once residents returned home, the institutional citywide network conducted skills and management training courses at the construction site where individual empowerment developed through the practice of ‘learning by doing’ (KKU-1/M/S/KK, 24th March 2011 and KCU-4/M/S/KKU, 26th March 2011). As a result, Tawanmai residents built up construction skills and knowledge as evidenced in the increased in number of skilled construction workers, that for example, advised other members on the quality of construction carried out by the contractors (TWM-1/FM/L/KKU, 20th March 2011). This confidence in their capacities signifies the Tawanmai workers self-development through empowering, practical experiences.
The inter-personal empowerment among Tawanmai residents had been largely possible due to the contribution of the building construction process. Tawanmai residents spent time together on building their own and their neighbours’ houses through the two years duration of the construction process (2006-2007). This interaction with their neighbours and the new, emerging settlement fosters a sense of belonging and social cohesiveness. One of the construction workers recalls that “Almost every day, we came together and build my house and my friend’s house. We gave each other advice to improve our skills and job. The BMK project gives more than houses, it also gives me intimate friends and community” (TWM-4/FM/L/KK, 22nd March 2011). This sense of belonging led to social cohesiveness between the community members and is an essential element of building residents participation in community development (Manzo and Perkins, 2006). The field practice at the pilot project 2009-2010, and PhD fieldwork 2011 found that the substantial building construction activities and the accumulated sense of community cohesiveness contributed to further physical and social upgrading and collaborations post BMK through initiatives such as neighbourhood watch, student carpool, community herb garden, and community fund. These practices are consistent with and contribute to the BMK’s ultimate goal that goes beyond physical environment upgrading and emphasizes building up social capital in the long term (CODI/FM/L/BKK, 5th May 2011 and KKU-1/M/S/KK, 24th March 2011).

One important evidence in the collective sense of community formation is the local people’s attempt to gather all existing residents to live in the community together, rather than force households out due to the financial shortfalls. They built a ‘Central Unit House’ for the poorest households and the

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21 Central unit house is a type of social welfare that Tawanmai community learnt and applied from their site visits to several BMK projects in 2003-2004.
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community marginalized such as people with disability, single elderly and long-term unemployed people. Through the construction of this unit, the poorest group was accepted as community members and received care from fellow residents.

Furthermore, the construction process integrates three partners into the network of actors consisting of the co-op committee, individual house owners, and local expert institutions. Together, they developed the construction plan which identified the overall operation process that consists of eight stages with the three partners acting in different, specific roles. They came up with the collaborative construction management plan that involved the shared responsibility between the co-op committee and house owners to construct and audit the built quality of their own house with the construction worker team. The operation was undertaken under a professional supervisor who provided additional skills training.

In the collaborative construction process, the primary role of Tawanmai residents was further illustrated in the effective construction management. The Co-op committee took the leading role in construction implementation with building materials purchased through the co-op, rather than individually which helped minimize the total material costs. Further savings were made in construction labour costs as the majority of individual occupants built their own house under the supervision of building specialists to minimize the sub-standard quality. However, some dwellers cannot contribute their time to house construction as they have full-time jobs and the committee arranged construction worker teams, who got paid employment, to undertake construction. Many labourers, of which woman formed two-thirds, shifted from their daily jobs in the city and took up the long-term employment at Tawanmai. They gained both better pay and job security through almost two years of construction.

The construction management was divided into two phases. Beginning on 1st May 2005, the first stage involved land purchasing, land fill, and infrastructure which was subsidized with 15,530,443 baht from the CODI. The second phase, begun on the 2nd April 2006, involved the construction of 78 houses and the community was able to secure CODI loan of 17,865,000 baht. However, the construction was temporary stopped due to the military coup in September 2006. The shortage of government budget and rumours delayed the construction for about three months and construction of 67 units recommenced in November 2006, along with the community centre and public facilities such as the playground and the community welfare housing unit.

On 28th April 2005, an official opening ceremony of Tawanmai community was held and witnessed by the many high positioned national and provincial figures. The Minister of Social Development and

22 See Appendix 9: The construction process at Tawanmai community
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Human Security, Paiboon Wattanasirithum, came over to co-preserve the ceremony with the Khon Kaen governor, Jet Tanawatra. The opening ceremony was widely published in various media channels as Tawanmai community was the first BMK project that achieved cooperative status for low-income housing in the Northeast region (www.codi.or.th/baanmankong). Throughout the construction process, Tawanmai regularly hosted educational visits from local, national, and international guests. On 20th February 2007, a total of 145 housing units were completed and all members moved into their new homes.

Figure 6.14: Main pillar lifting ceremony and mock-up room (Dhabhalabutr, 2005)

Figure 6.15: First phase of construction (Dhabhalabutr, 2005)

Figure 6.16: The completion of Tawanmai construction Bottom left and right (Dhabhalabutr, 2005)
The completion of Tawanmai project resulted in the shift of outsider’s views of the local residents (Rabibhadaha; 2009:23, Ondum et al; 2007:9). Consequently, Tawanmai people gained positive self-awareness and are proud of themselves as the only community that completed BMK implementation amongst other pilot projects in Khon Kaen city. Tawanmai received high commendations from the stakeholders, particularly the CODI and the KKM, as the role model of cooperative administration characterized by transparency and good governance, and punctual debt repayments. According to Worayot, since the first installment, the community was often early on repayments to the CODI (TWM-2/FM/L/KKU, 3rd November 2010). On the 4th October 2007, Tawanmai leaders attended World Habitat Day in Bangkok as the BMK program was recognized by UNESCAP23 for the project’s initiative in empowering slum dwellers to become equal partners with government and civil society. Tawanmai was one of the case studies that the CODI proudly presented in the event.

Formerly, the CODI handled all BMK housing loan but on 21st March 2008, the CODI launched policies to transfer all BMK housing credit administration to the Government Housing Bank (GHB) consistent with Thai government24 policy to promote GHB as a partner of BMK program as a financial institution for low-income household. Consequently, with the MOU between CODI and GHB on 15th February 200725, CODI had a more specific focus on BMK process rather than financial management. As a community with the high financial discipline and responsibility, Tawanmai was formally recognized by the CODI as one of three communities26 in Thailand to complete the project (www.codi.or.th/baanmankong and Siamrat, 2009:2).

The completion of building construction has been possible largely due to the contribution of slum dwellers as ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’ and through empowerment practices. The sanction of and visits by top executive officials at the national level and the many other community visits represent the formal acceptance of Tawanmai community in the public awareness.

Section 2: Slum Community Organization Network

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24 Former PM, Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government
25 The MOU was signed at the Division of Social Development and Human Security office. Mr.Piboon Watana-siritham chaired the MOU signing ceremony. Mr.Khan Prajuabmao, the director of GHB, signed the document with Ms.Somsook Boonyabancha, the director of CODI.
26 The other two communities are BMK Maung Chantaboon, Chantaburi and BMK Nong-Sa, Ubon Ratchatanee
6.4 Empowering through an Up-scale of Community Network to Citywide Network (2004-2007)
6.4.1 Institutional Citywide Network

Tawanmai community members participated in the World Habitat Day event (3rd-8th October 2005) held at Royal Plaza (near Sanam Luang in Bangkok) with 18,000 attendants from across Thailand. Of these, around 12,500 were members of BMK program and slum organizations across Thailand, 500 people were from local government agencies and education staff, and 5,000 were from the general public. The large number of participants provide evidence that the BMK process is the platform that promoted networking among various stakeholders which resulted in the expansion of Tawanmai resident’s role from a collective community organization towards the ‘Citywide Network’.

As mentioned in section 6.2.3, the ‘Citywide Network’ has developed across the time. There is a city scale network that emerged through the practice of slum settlement upgrading project. The first, ‘The Institutional Citywide Network’ is the CODI mediated and financed formal network of local institutions and community organization under BMK structure. The network has a more vertical structure and approach and government agencies took ownership of the institutional citywide network. The rationale is that the CODI wanted to ensure the BMK national policy can be grounded in local realities and that the initiative could reach the maximum number of beneficiaries of 2,103 families in KKM area between 2004 and 2007 (KKM, 2009:5). At Tawanmai community, the BMK action plan was finalized through the consultation between the community and various local organizations, who also supervised its implementation. Once the Tawanmai proposal is backed up with solid awareness among local government agencies, the Tawanmai project is taken seriously and the residents’ requirements are more likely to be accommodated. From the perspective of the former Dean of Faculty of Architecture Khon Kaen University, the leader of BMK design team, “The Institutional Citywide Network” ensured the realistic participation between Tawanmai residents and local authorities” (KKU-2/M/S/KK, 3rd April 2011). Within this relationship, the formation of citywide network emerged as a key mechanism that strengthened the low-income people’s voice. The structure consisted of two levels with different roles that communicated via co-op committee and CODI.
Figure 6.17: The overall structure of BMK process and stakeholders at Tawanmai community

CODI = Community Organization Development Institution
KKM = Khon Kaen Municipality
CNKC = Community Network of Khon Kaen Council, a network of community in Khon Kaen Municipality administrative area that acts as a consultation council for KKM
KKU = Khon Kaen University
Co-op = Khon Kaen Cooperative Office
(Dhabhalabutr, 2005)

1. At the institutional level: Various local authorities and the representatives of community organizations work together to deliberate policies to respond to the overall project guideline, and to deal with national housing policy. Based on their area of expertise, the institutional partners assist local communities to implement BMK project. For example, Khon Kaen University (KKU) is a provider of design and construction know-how; the Khon Kaen Municipality (KKM) provides land accessibility and assists with local regulations; the Department of Cooperative is a counselor for community co-op development; and the CODI provides housing loans and infrastructure subsidy.
2. At the community level: the Tawanmai co-operative is a core mechanism of BMK implementation that undertook collaborative work at two levels. At the policy level, it collaborated with local institutional partners to oversee BMK strategy plan. At the operational level, it supervised local residents on the ground practices. Co-op and Tawanmai people carried out its work through the different specialised teams such as savings, planning, and construction groups.

6.5 Empowerment through Democratic Practices: Political Structure Change

6.5.1 The Turning Point: The Upscale of Slum Movement from Technical to Political Development

The turning point in the evolution of Tawanmai residents was catalysed by national political events which resulted in the CODI funding shortage. The event made Tawanmai people realize the need for change in their movement from technical to a more political approach and it is through the ‘Citywide Network’ that the idea of political movement translated into realistic practices (FRSN-2/M/L/BKK, 9th December 2011, FRSN-3/M/L/BKK, 4th May 2011 and NULICO-3/FM/L/BKK, 9th November 2011). The increased participation and political empowerment of Tawanmai residents in the network led to the upscale in role to become an agent of political development at the national level. The role developed further in the post-BMK upgrading and led to the broader recognition of Tawanmai residents as the ‘Primary Housing Agent in Political Development’.

After the military coup on 19th September 2006, the construction process at Tawanmai community stopped accompanied by rumours that was widely spread to BMK communities across the country that the BMK housing project would be cancelled as it was commenced by the former government. This was exacerbated as the funding cannot be processed due to the instability of the national political situation. This negative outlook resulted in several co-op members withdrawing their savings in the believe that the project will collapse. The co-op committee and the institutional citywide network attempted to stop the members leaving by informing the residents that the total budget of Tawanmai construction was approved since 2005 so the project will not be cancelled. By that time, a former community leader mentioned that over one third of co-op member had already resigned and taken their savings out (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 22nd March 2011). The instability in savings and lower number of co-op members forced the Tawanmai savings group committee to recruit new members from outside and many Khon Kaen middle income households got membership, stabilizing Tawanmai co-op’s financial situation. When the new national government was formed, BMK program funding continued and Tawanmai restarted the second phase of construction in November 2006.
The arrival of new members brought significant changes in Tawanmai population in terms of socio-economic status, social cohesiveness, and physical environment. According to the PhD survey in 2011, the questionnaire data shows that 40.6% of households have migrated from other communities and 68.5% have incomes of over 10,000 baht per month. The average household income is 14,342.71 baht and the highest income is 35,000 baht per month. At about the time of the 2011 survey, the Thai government defined low-income household as having incomes below 15,000 baht per month (NHA, 2009:36). The data from questionnaire in the 2011 survey, the average household income of the new community members was higher than the average income of Thai low-income households. A percentage of migrant household and household income illustrates that current Tawanmai residents are not genuine low-income households which is inconsistent with the original BMK objective.

Nevertheless, a public backlash against BMK project at Tawanmai community was triggered by the group of former co-op members who requested to rejoin the co-op membership once the second phase construction restarted. However, they were no longer eligible as they cannot deliver savings to the co-op. In addition, their right was already claimed by new families who were recruited by the
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community committee. These former members took their plight to the press, ITV channel\textsuperscript{27}, claiming that they are the original Tawanmai residents but they did not benefit from the BMK project as their housing rights were taken by outsiders. Once the show broadcasted, the viewing public blamed the BMK project and, in particular, the community committee. The community leader at that time expressed that “I was blamed by Tawanmai savings member in the community meeting at the community centre and by some members of Khon Kaen community council at KKM office. However, it isn’t true. We could prove the transparency of the recruitment process but we don’t have the chance to tell the truth in front of camera” (TWM-2/FM/L/KKU, 3\textsuperscript{rd} November 2010). In response, Tawanmai and the institutional citywide network invited ITV to visit the community to establish the facts and address the accusations (TWM-3/FM/L/KK, 22\textsuperscript{nd} March 2011). The aggrieved former co-op families later rented land adjacent to Tawanmai community to settle, claiming that they had nowhere to live and remain connected with relatives and friends in Tawanmai (TWM-9/M/FCM/KK, 21\textsuperscript{st} March 2011). At the time of PhD fieldwork, the strong contrast between the upgraded and makeshift settlement can be observed (Figure 6.19).

\textbf{Figure 6.19}: By the 2011 fieldwork, Tawanmai community manifested a contrast of housing and physical environment with some former members of Tawanmai savings group living in informal shelters and the current savings group members living in two stories concrete house. The contrast of well upgraded row-houses owned by more recent members and informal settlement of some original Tawanmai members reflects some inconsistency in BMK’s objective and outcome at Tawanmai community. (Dhabhalabutr, 2011)

\textsuperscript{27} ITV = Independent Television funded by the government, part of the media reform initiative in the early 1990s. In 2008, ITV was renamed TPBS (Thai Public Broadcast Station)
While the BMK program strengthened the community through the socio-economic empowerment and helped link with other communities and local organizations to form citywide networks, the fluctuations in state funding (Archer, 2010:8; NHA, 2009:36; Visetpreecha, 2008:60; www.codi.co.th, 21st March 2006) and the rigid enforcement of building regulations28 experienced by Tawanmai community (see Section 6.3.5 Figure 6.12), highlight the need for a new mechanism to provide greater access to the slum organization to influence policy. Tawanmai residents and their citywide networks found that the leading role of technical and management is not enough to bring about the real change in housing solution. A Tawanmai leader mentioned that “In the process of building construction, we struggled with the building setback regulation. If we have to follow the setback, we don’t have enough space for building. The government must resize the minimum setback for us to be appropriate to the needs of the poor. This is not an individual community problem but many BMK communities across country faced the same problem. If we don’t work collectively, the government doesn’t care about us” (TWM-2/FM/L/KKU, 3rd November 2010). Hence, the citywide network and the up-scaling of political empowerment were adopted into the slum movement, post-BMK upgrading.

6.6 Post-BMK Upgrade: ‘Primary Housing Agent’ as Slum Citywide Network (2007-2010)

6.6.1 The Upscale of Political Empowerment into the National Level

Initially, the slum citywide network, developed through connections between savings based organizations, provided horizontal and vertical support to the individual slum community to achieve settlement secured tenure. The socio-economic empowerment process further strengthened the status of the network making it possible to deal with larger issues such as building regulation, government subsidy, and city development fund. This has critical implications as the citywide network became a platform for political empowerment that upscale into the national level because it enabled the large expansion in the number of slum network, further enhancing the political base.

The two citywide networks, Slum Citywide Network and Slum Community Organizational Network, connected BMK communities across the country and established links to other civil societies such as the Assembly of the Poor, the FRSN, the Thailand Labour Union, national and international NGOs etc. A journalist and counselor to the FRSN provide the reason to connect the Thai civil societies together. “Although each group has different approaches and aims, they shared the common interest and joined together to oppose government policies such as the free trade agreement, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and urban land reform” (Chantarapa, 2009:23). According to the NULICO Secretary, through the dialogue between leader groups and the common long-term resistance to forced eviction,

28 Building code Issue 4, Section 7 year 2007, Ministry of Interior, 2007:2-3
6.6.2 Political Empowerment through Participation in the Citywide Network

In the post-BMK upgrading, the slum citywide network has become a vital ‘Primary Housing Agent in Political Development’. When thousands of people are looking for the same solution, it can translate into political power. The entry of the Tawanmai community into the political activities led to the extensive public recognition and awareness concerning the effectiveness of the slum community networks. Slum inhabitants learned that in order to make demand for real change, there needs to be a ‘critical mass’ of people which politically empowers their movement. “Government and general public won’t listen to one slum community, nor to 10, so we need 100 or 1,000 communities. To be heard slum people have to be numerous. They get power from the numbers” (TWM-6/M/L/KK, 26th March 2011).

From interviews with slum citywide network leaders (NULICO-3/FM/L/BKK, 9th November 2011, NULICO-4/M/L/KK, 12th November 2011 and FRSN-4/M/L/BKK, 11th May 2011) and observations of their activities during the 2011 fieldwork, three important initiatives provide evidences of the network’s role, effectiveness and cohesiveness; the establishment of ‘Community Development Fund’, the SRT land leasing as a result of FRSN movement; and the additional funding for the CODI.

6.6.2.1 From Social to Financial Capital Formation: the Establishment of ‘Community Development Fund’ and The National Union of Low-Income Community Organization (NULICO)

The establishment of an alternative development fund demonstrates the leading role of slum as agent of political development at national level. By December 2007, the BMK project timeframe came to an end with 76,792 unit or less than 30% of the total quantitative target completed (www.codi.or.th/baanmankong, 9th October 2009, Visetpreecha, 2008:51). Several BMK communities were delayed or could not proceed due to financial shortage. The insecure financial situation of BMK made the community network realized that they need more financial independence (Archer, 2010:8).

To ensure continued funding for BMK, over 80,000 BMK households across Thailand set up their own fund, the City Development Fund (CDF)\(^29\), as the alternative funding system for low-income people. It allows the community members to obtain loans for communal projects at a low interest rate. Moreover, as a consequence of CDF establishment, the formation of the national low-income community organization was officially established on 19th September 2009, known as The National

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\(^29\) Source of funding was initially shared by NULICO savings group members and CODI (NULICO-4/M/L/KK, 12th November 2011)
6.6.2.2 Participative Democracy Practices through Protests: the Four Region Slum Network (FRSN) and the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) Land Leasing

Political mobilization, as a key embodiment of the collective slum resident capacity, has been practiced through the variety of slum resistance tactics such as mass protests, open letters to relevant government agencies and the media, direct negotiations with the authorities who hold decision making power, and alliances with other workers and social organizations. The political empowerment practices are promoted through real participation, which are purposefully reinforced in the course of action. Slum citywide networks, such as the NULICO and the FRSN, request involvement in concrete activities from slum inhabitants. The leader of the FRSN mentions that when the FRSN enter into protests, the community leaders request every household member to send at least one of their family members to join the mass rally (TWM-6/M/L/KK, 26th March 2011).

The case of SRT land leasing illustrates the way in which the citywide network expanded political role through aggressive approach adopted by the FRSN and which characterized their image in general public awareness. This confrontational culture of the FRSN organization has been mounded in over ten years' experience of resistance and struggles against violent forced evictions (Chantarapa, 2009:16-25; FRSN-2/M/L/BKK, 9th December 2011). The slum federation gradually transformed itself into the pro-active leader in pressuring the government to accept their proposal through mobilizing mass protests. One of their most concrete successes was the case of the 61 slum communities across the country achieving long-term land lease of 30 years on The State Railway of Thailand (SRT) land. On 13th September 2000, Mr. Prasit Patrapadit, the minister of transportation, chaired the contract signing between the director of SRT and the representative of FRSN. The SRT case resulted in broad repercussions on other state agencies that subsequently adopt policies to allow slum community to formally rent on their land such as the Treasury Department (TD), The Port Authority (PA), The Royal Irrigation Department (RID), and The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) (FRSN, 2009:2).
6.6.2.3 Applying Combined Negotiation and Protest Approaches for the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) Additional Funding

Applying political empowerment, the NULICO addressed problems through negotiation with and by asking for the cooperation from the government agencies and land owners. However, in the case that the passive method does not receive timely response, NULICO, together with the other allied networks, implemented a variety of practical resistant measures. On 13th October 2008, the well-known achievement of the NULICO on policy change was made in collaboration with the FRSN. Although the first phase of BMK project was completed since 2007, many BMK communities did not achieve CODI funding due government financial shortage. Tawanmai people joined together with the NULICO and the FRSN to request government additional funding for BMK project. While the NULICO and the alliance representatives negotiated with the Minister of Social Development and Human Security to request continued funding for BMK project, Tawanmai residents and their community alliances applied pressure and protested outside the ministry office. As a result, the Abhisit government approved 6,000 million baht funding to BMK project under a re-named campaign, Baan ManKong Thai KemKaeng (Secured Housing within Vigorously Thai) (Chantarapa, 2009:134; NHA, 2009:36; Visetpreecha, 2008:60; NULICO-1/FM/L/BKK, 14th May 2011). This important achievement reflects the cohesiveness between various groups in the citywide networks in the tactical application of multiple methods towards a common goal.

6.6.2.4 Applying Combined Negotiation and Protest Approaches for the building code exemption

Post BMK upgrading, Tawanmai community further participated in the process of political empowerment that represent and strengthen the voice of slum residents at national level and moves beyond the capacity of socio-economic empowerment at community level. The evidence could be seen from the case of restrictive building codes that are impediments to the slum upgrading. Since the practice at Sengki community, residents had struggle with the enforcement of building codes. The evidence gathered from the field at the Sengki community demonstrated that ‘Primary Housing Agent of the Technical and Management’ had clear limitations when encountered with the problem relevant to bureaucratic structure. Once residents faced with the drawback due to the NHA design scheme had less set-back than the local building code allowed, the CHHSS and community residents expected that the problem could be solved through the negotiation with local authority but was ultimately disappointed. The community had little alternative but to comply with the rules. The bureaucratic view persisted that the inability to cope with the rule was the problem, not the rule (Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, 2011:2; Chantarapa, 2009:44) and hence the problem would be solve when

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30 Attaching the name of a key policy of the new government to BMK
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community community have the capability and understanding on how to work effectively with building regulation. This is consistent with the pluralistic perspective that accepts the system as it exists (Clegg, 1997:39). Rather than adapt the building code to customize to the slum settlement context, the local officer convinced the community to pay for building approvals. Eventually, The Yan Nawa District allowed Sengki people to construct buildings, turning a blind-eye towards the problem and benefitted from the gap in law enforcement, claiming costly building permit fees. The Sengki practice as agents of technical and management role did not bring any changes in the regulatory arrangement when addressing problems within a single community. The practice at Sengki represents limited political empowerment that was inclusive of marginal residents in the process of decision making, which was a watershed achievement in its time. That said, the political empowerment at Sengki case was a tool to achieve secure tenure and not broader objectives beyond that.

Two decades later, Tawanmai community faced a similar problem where the community master plan has set-backs less than the minimum local building regulation requirement, however, the different way of addressing the problem made an immense change at the policy level. The rigid building code emerged as a more serious conflict between local government agencies and slum communities across the country where many BMK projects faced the bottleneck of regulation enforcement. As socio-economic empowerment had become less efficacious in dealing with structural problems, a new role of slum inhabitants as ‘Primary Housing Agent of the Political Development’ emerged. The large scale BMK project and the resultant slum network led to the change of slum residents’ perception of the problem. In fact, the root of problem was that the local building code could not accommodate to the slum context as it is based on the middle-class living standards and requirements. The need for a resized minimum area and dimension requirements would help slum dwellers affected by the law. The slum citywide network pushed the building regulation problem into a political issue at the national level. They argued that the reform of building regulations is essential as it will create a facilitating environment for the slum to solve their own housing problems which corresponds with the government own ‘Enable Market Policy’ (The 6th NESD Plan, 1987-1991). Hence, it is important that the building regulations be adjusted, become more flexible, and responsive to slum inhabitants’ needs. To achieve the visible change at policy level, the citywide network encouraged Tawanmai residents to join the protest with the FRSN and the NULICO alliance to demand building code reform. The voice of Tawanmai people through the citywide network have become louder to the government due to the critical mass and force of political power. As a result, the building regulation was reformed and approved by government in 14th January 2011.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^{31}\) Building code Issue 4, Section 7 (Ministry of Interior, 2007:2-3)
6.6.2.5 Towards an International Network: Asian Slum Network, the Leader and Organization of Community Organization in Asia (LOCOA) Practice

Moreover, the Thai urban slum citywide networks extend their institutional cooperation beyond the national boundaries. The Leaders and Organizers of Community Organization in Asia\textsuperscript{32} (LOCOA), is an international agency that connects Asian slum leaders together as agents of anti-eviction. This organization opens up another space for Tawanmai community to upscale their role into the political movement and establish solidarity with other settlements at an international level. By October 2010, Tawanmai representatives united together with the LOCOA, the NULICO, and the FRSN in opposing the forced eviction of Cambodian slum dwellers who settle around Boeung Kak Lake in Phnom Penh. They submitted an open letter to the UN Secretary-General at UNESCAP Headquarter in Bangkok (Bangkok Post, 2010:12). Tawanmai community involvement and participation in the growing slum political movements, has significantly raised the profile of the community at the nationwide level.

\textbf{Figure 6.20:} (Top left and right) World Habitat Day 2007, UNESCAP award to BMK project. Tawanmai community leader attended the event as the community was selected as one representative of BMK best practice. Around 18,000 BMK attendants represent the empowerment of Tawanmai community as participants in the ‘Citywide Network’ (http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid).

(Middle left and right) An example participative democracy in practice: Tawanmai community leader involved in the NULICO and FRSN demonstration for additional BMK funding (NULICO, 2009)

\textsuperscript{32} LOCOA is a regional network that was founded in 1993. It consists of community organizers and community leaders from urban poor communities around Asia. LOCOA’s work focuses on coordinating among its members to stop evictions and secure housing rights, promote sustainable alternative urban development initiatives that improve the quality of life of the urban poor. LOCOA currently has members in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, and affiliates in Bangladesh, Burma, and Cambodia (http://locoa.org/about-us).
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(Bottom left and right) Tawanmai community leader attended protests to up-scale their role into the political movement in an international network. National slum organizations opposed slum evictions in Cambodia and submitted demand to UN representatives (http://prachatai.com/journal/2010/10/31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key dates</th>
<th>Key events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Dynamo slum (former name of Tawanmai) was a squatter settlement of low-income people of about 200 families. The former name was in association with its location behind many dynamo generator garages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The community was destroyed by fire with only around 53 families remained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>Land rental agreements for the whole community were to be terminated due to expiration of the tacit contract. The landlord refused to extend the lease, set a very high land price for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 2003, Thai government announced new nationwide housing programs for the urban poor, Baan Mankong program (BMK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>BMK launched three pilot projects in Khon Kaen. Tawanmai was selected as one of pilot projects and implemented relocation scheme for 126 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>CODI and local organizations set up institutional citywide network for BMK program in Khon Kaen city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th October 2003</td>
<td>Representatives of all associated partners signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreement of Khon Kaen BMK program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>• BMK implementation, relocation scheme, started at Tawanmai community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The institutional citywide network visits Tawanmai community, reaching initial consent with the residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>• Collaborative community survey by Tawanmai resident volunteers, KKU, KKM and CODI Northeast Region office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A wide range of survey groups were set up such as groups to collect data, measure, and map.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A team of savings group was set which comprised of Tawanmai housewives. The group aimed to promote community saving and set up saving group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A designer team was set which comprised of local construction workers and Architecture staff from KKU. Aimed at stimulating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>December 2003-January 2004</td>
<td>The CODI ran several training sessions and community visits in Bangkok and the vicinity for Tawanmai to promote saving management skill, networking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| February 2004  | ● Election for the community savings committee who processed Co-op establishment and management.  
                 ● Submitted saving group registration to Khon Kaen Municipality |
| March 2004    | Set up 23 member joint committee consisting of 15 residents and 8 institutional citywide network (Section 6.3.3). Joint committee responsible for Tawanmai upgrading implementation. |
| 26th May 2004 | Khon Kaen Municipality approved Tawanmai cooperative’s application and Tawanmai cooperative became the first low-income housing cooperative in The Northeast Region of Thailand (KKM, 2009:5). |
| March to May 2004 | ● Land searching, price negotiation, and construction training were processed simultaneously.  
                      ● Co-op achieved savings of over 200,000 baht and was able to procure land for relocation.  
                      ● Tawanmai submitted proposal for a loan for land purchasing from the CODI |
| June 2004    | Proposal for land purchasing loan was approved by the institutional citywide network |
| 3rd June 2004 | Tawanmai co-op was able to purchase the vacant land of 6-0-67 rai (~9,868 m²) for 8,500,000 baht with the collective land title in the name of the cooperative. |
| October 2004-February 2005 | Collective planning and design process: Community Master plan and housing unit |
| April 2005   | ● Tawanmai co-op committees presented master plan and housing unit design proposal to citywide network  
                      ● Requested for CODI housing loan  
                      ● Request local building regulation reform on building set back.  
                      ● Institutional citywide network approved 33,395,443 baht subsidy for the Tawanmai upgrading project. |
| March-April 2005 | Tawanmai construction workers group had training courses on-site construction, provided by Arch KKU |
### The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st May 2005</td>
<td>The first phase of construction started, involved land purchasing, land fill, and infrastructure with budget of 15,530,443 baht from the CODI subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd April 2006</td>
<td>The second phase, construction of 78 houses with secured CODI loan of 17,865,000 baht.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th September 2006</td>
<td>Construction was temporary stopped due to the military coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2006</td>
<td>Restart construction of 67 units, the community centre and public facilities such as the playground and the community welfare housing unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th April 2005</td>
<td>An official opening ceremony of Tawanmai community was held and witnessed by the many high positioned national and provincial figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd - 8th October 2005</td>
<td>Tawanmai community leaders attended the World Habitat Day at Bangkok with 18,000 attendant from across Thailand. Slum inhabitant network had up scaled to citywide network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th February 2007</td>
<td>A total of 145 housing units were completed and all members moved into their new homes. Housing units has increase due to land availability and effective budget management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th October 2007</td>
<td>• BMK program was recognized by UNESCAP for the project’s initiative in empowering slum dwellers to become equal partners with government and civil society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tawanmai upgrading project was promoted one of best BMK practice in World Habitat Day in Bangkok, proudly presented by CODI in the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th September 2009</td>
<td>• The National Union of Low-Income Community Organization or NULICO was officially established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 80,000 BMK households across Thailand set up their own fund, the City Development Fund (CDF), under supervision and partial subsidized by CODI and NGOs network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th October 2008</td>
<td>Tawanmai joined together with the NULICO and the FRSN to request government additional funding for BMK projects. As a result, the Abhisit</td>
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The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community

government approved 6,000 million baht funding to BMK project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th October 2010</td>
<td>Tawanmai united together with the LOCOA, the NULICO, and the FRSN in opposing the forced eviction of Cambodian slums and submitted an open letter to the UN Secretary-General at UNESCAP Headquarter in Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th January 2011</td>
<td>Tawanmai to join the protest with the FRSN and the NULICO alliance to demand building code reform. As a result, the building regulation was reformed and approved by government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: A timeline of Tawanmai community upgrading project. This presents key dates of events including committee formations, constitution of major organizations and the period when there was training/skills development.

6.7 Conclusion

Through the practices spanning from BMK to Post-BMK period, Tawanmai residents have incrementally assumed roles as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ at four scales; individual slum household, collective slum community, community organizational network, and citywide network respectively (Section 4.2.1 Page 87). They were able to successfully progress through roles at the multiple scales because they have the experience of the long transformation process though the socio-economic and political empowerment practices (Section 4.2.2 Page 91). From the case study, the BMK process in Tawanmai community confirms the direct relationship between the social and economic empowerment and its role in the evolution of slum inhabitants as the Primary Housing Agent. In the BMK period, the integrated practice of socio-economic empowerment led to the slum transformation toward ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’ (Section 6.3.6 Page 190). In the post-BMK period, the political empowerment resulted in the slum inhabitants emerging role as ‘Primary Housing Agent of Political Development’ at both the national and international levels (Section 6.6 Page 201). These two periods were connected by the transition from ‘socio-economic empowerment’ to ‘political empowerment’ which was characterized by the larger scale, role, and movement of the slum inhabitant through the citywide network. Hence, the process of slum transformation is a progressive ‘up-scaling’ of the empowerment practice developed over many years, and are not the ad-hoc projects as is the conventional view of Thai slum upgrading projects34 (CODI/FM/L/BKK, 5th May 2011). The

34 Ms.Kanitha Preecha prechakub, the vice-president of CODI means Thailand Slum upgrading projects conducted before an establishment of CODI (5th May 2011, CODI Head Office)
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Tawanmai Community empowerment practices in Tawanmai community were not only transformative experiences for the slum dwellers, other stakeholders have also been transformed through this process as a result of their engagement with the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ (Section 6.6.2.2 Page 203). The accounts of government changes in policy in response to problems faced and in conjunction with the slum networks’ political activities reflect the evolution of power relationship between them. These changes led to the broadened acceptance of slum residents as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’.
CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION

Introduction
To understand the evolution of the slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in finding solutions to their own housing problems, the significant questions of this research focused on the process (How did they evolve?) and outcomes (What are the scales of evolution?) have been examined through slum housing development from 1980 to 2011. The research places particular focus on the linkages between the two major case studies that represent their respective cross-sections in time of slum upgrading practice. The development and practice of slum dwellers as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ is conceptualized through the evolution of empowerment practice from single economic, to integrated socio-economic to political approach.

This research employs empowerment theory, reviewed in Chapter 4, to discuss the findings from fieldwork in Chapter 5 and 6, which describes the role evolution of ‘Primary Housing Agent’ that responds to the research questions formulated earlier in the introduction Chapter 1. In the literature, the writings of Clegg (1989), Gutierrez and Ortega (1991), Friedmann (1992), Narayan (2002), Alsop and Heinsohn (2005) are particularly relevant to the context of the research and provided a framework to understand the link between the two cases and to read the process of how slum inhabitants practiced their roles in multiple scales through the evolution of empowerment practices between the times. These literature have particular relevance in understanding the process of the mobilization of the powerless at the local scale that transformed social capital into political power on the larger scale, resulting in the up-scale of the role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ to the national level.

The discussion chapter consists of five parts that specifically address the research questions, ‘How did empowerment practices in the slum upgrading projects assist the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of Thai low-income housing development?’. The first section highlights the development of empowerment practice between the times which corresponds with the evolution of slum dweller as being ‘Primary Housing Agent’. This research proposes that the incremental ‘up-scale’ of empowerment practice over many years is the key to addressing the main research question. The second section respond to the research sub-questions on the way in which the slum inhabitant performs as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ previously and at the time of fieldwork and portrays the expanding roles and scales of slum inhabitant being a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ into three phases; 1973-1992 (Sengki), 1992-2003 (post-Sengki), and 2003-2011 (BMK and post-BMK). This process manifests the multi-scale ‘Primary Housing Agent’ roles which addresses the question of
The Empowerment of Slum Inhabitants as a Primary Agent of Low-income Housing: The Case Studies of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980-2011: Discussion

‘What are the scales of evolution?’ The third section articulates the transformation of state agency in terms of structure and policy changes as a result of their engagement with this process. The fourth section identifies the relationship between Thai slum inhabitant role and Thai political decentralization. The thesis observes that the up-scale in status of slum Inhabitants as PHA reflects the progress of Thai political decentralization, from top-down to bottom-up approaches. In the last section, the thesis presents the process of social power transformation into political power from the case studies. In the Thai case, the thesis argues that the balance between collective power and network shifted to the transformation process due to the openness of opportunity structure.

7.1 Slum Inhabitants as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’: The contribution of incremental ‘scaling up’ of empowerment practices

One of the core objectives of the UCDO\textsuperscript{1} when it was established in 1992 is to concurrently promote the understanding that community organization was the key actor in the development of low-income community and also to strengthen it (Boonyabancha, 2003:6). In 2000, the UCDO was transformed into the CODI\textsuperscript{2}, which further emphasized the community organization's role as the core of the development process (CODI, 2004:8). The CODI practice reflects the government agency's perspective that acknowledged the slum organization as the formal agency of Thai low-cost housing system. Through the investigation of the practice on the ground, the research found that government institutional participants in the two community case studies formed views congruent to the CODI strategy while having varied perspectives toward slum inhabitant's role. The PhD community fieldwork at Sengki community was conducted between 8\textsuperscript{th} March and 10\textsuperscript{th} April 2011 and this was followed by the fieldwork at Tawanmai community conducted between 19\textsuperscript{th} April and 31\textsuperscript{st} May 2011 which revealed that at Sengki case, 9 of 11 government representatives mentioned that the slum organization plays the central role in their settlement improvement while 8 of 11 state officer interviewees on the case of Tawanmai community stating the same.

This section addresses the main research question of the way in which previously marginalized slum inhabitants became the ‘Primary Housing Agent’, arguing that this was achieved through the empowerment practice. Importantly, the two case studies highlight the evolution of slum inhabitants’ role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ over many decades through changes in and incremental ‘up-scaling’ of empowerment practice from Sengki to Tawanmai/BMK to FRSN/NULICO. The expansion of empowerment practice changed from single economic to socio-economic integration and then during

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\textsuperscript{1} UCDO = The Urban Community Development Office
\textsuperscript{2} CODI = The Community Organizations Development Institute
the post-BMK development to political empowerment that 'up-scaled' the slum inhabitant into the agent of policy changes at the national level. Consequently, this process manifests in the evolution of the slum inhabitant's role from the ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’ towards the ‘Primary Housing Agent of Political Development’.

7.1.1 Single Objective Economic Empowerment: 
The Slum Inhabitant as Primary Agent of Technical and Management

At the Sengki community, the CHHSS$^3$ promoted the community oriented economy as the major empowerment approach of slum inhabitants through the establishment of low-income community cooperative for housing (see Chapter 3: Thai Housing Development). The significance of the savings and loan process was the key mechanism of building and enhancing community capacity to negotiate for their ultimate goal, land secure tenure. De Soto (2000 in R Harris and G. Arku, 2006:1014) mentions that empowerment occurs when people mobilise existing wealth to generate growth and that their capacity depends on whether the wealth is represented in the real property and asset such as land registries, funding, and housing. The Sengki community case study findings in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2) revealed that, through economic empowerment, the slum inhabitant achieved the recognition as the primary agent of savings and loan management (section5.4.6 and 6.3.6); however the benefits of economic empowerment to different sub-groups were limited by socio-economic conflicts.

Through seven years of Sengki project implementation, a learning space for economic self-development was created through the various financial activities for residents, particularly the low-income group. The economic empowerment transformed the low-income group manifesting in the new role as primary housing agent, changes in behaviour and social status. Ad-am's study (1988:46)$^4$ identifies that, previously, the low-income group avoid involvement in the process because they have low self-esteem and low self-consciousness of their capacity to change socio-cultural-political conditions that shape their lives. However, the positive change in low-income people’s outlook and self-image occurred when they engaged in the economic activities and co-op community election as part of the empowerment process. Ad-am's (1988) and Muksirisuk's (2001) surveys found that the community cooperative created enabling opportunities for low-income group via the co-op committee and resulted in their first-time representation in the community's new leadership where 7 of 17

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$^3$ CHHSS = The Centre for Housing and Human Settlement Studies under National Housing Authority of Thailand

cooperative committee members were representatives of the low-income households. According to the findings in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2), the endeavour to gain positions in co-op committee reflects the emergence of self-consciousness and higher self-esteem among the low-income households. The critical change in personal attitude and behaviour of the low-income group signifies, to a certain degree, the outcome of economic empowerment. Significantly, this change resulted in the formal resistances to the traditional political structure that was normally dictated by higher income households through practices such as appointment by government agency, patron-client ties, and seniority.

Another concern of empowerment based economy is to increase the community’s access to formal financial resources. The internal collective funds were often small so the low-income households cannot purchase land at the price set by the landlord. Hence, external funding is essential to augment the community resource and the key mechanism to connect internal fund and external grant is the community cooperative. Sengki residents established ‘The Sengki Housing Cooperative (SHC)’ in December 1986 which is considered the first cooperative for low-income housing in Thailand. The CHHSS identified that the formation of the SHC as a tangible outcome that illustrates the Sengki people’s achievement as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ (Hunter, 2010:64). Once the cooperative was registered under the Department of Cooperative Thailand, Sengki households have credit access to the formal financial institutions such as Thai Dhanu Bank, Yan Nawa District development fund, and The Netherlands Habitat, an international grant provider. Thereby, economic empowerment led housing approach emphasizes the growth of the slum individual’s and the community’s financial capacity to engage with the existing system. This approach corresponds to Clegg’s (1997:39) and Ife’s (2002:55) perspective of empowerment. They state that ‘the pluralistic empowerment’ is a process of helping disadvantaged groups and individuals to compete more effectively for power by understanding how to work with the system through different means such as social action, political pressure, and publicity. Yet this suggests that the economic empowerment practice at Sengki community does not set out to change existing structure, rather the practice enabled slum households to be accommodated within the savings/loan repayment system by assisting in individual and group technical and management skills and through expanded action.

The differentiation of socio-economic status is a key factor that influences the implementation of economic empowerment. Sengki community is not a homogeneous slum community and has some relatively wealthy and well-educated residents. By examining the experiences of Sengki community which have undergone the economic empowerment process, socio-economic differences and conflicts, particularly the aggressive competition over the limited land area for maximum space and good location revealed the limitation of the empowerment practice. These events led to the later
changes in the community empowerment approaches from single to integrated socio-economic objectives.

The original objective of housing cooperative is to generate community resources to achieve settlement secured tenure, whether through leasing or outright purchase. However, empowerment through the cooperative process is an economic approach which suits the needs of the low-income households who face financial shortage but is not as viable for higher income households who have the financial resources. In the case of Sengki community, the common problem of the whole community was insecure land tenure rather than poverty. Once the CPB\(^5\) offered to sell land to the local people, 27 household or 23.9% of residents eligible for land allocation were able to buy land with cash in a single payment while 61 households or 53.98% required three years repayment period. This shows that the higher income households had the ability to purchase land without the savings process. The socio-economic status gap resulted in many conflicts between sub-groups because the economic empowerment emphasized on competition to increase financial capacity which unintentionally created the perception that the more money people have, the more opportunity to access land in better location and also to achieve immediate ownership. The key lesson learned for the institutional stakeholders from the practice at Sengki community (see Chapter 5, from section 5.2.2 to 5.4.6) was that economic empowerment needed to be reformed because it was not designed for communities which consisted of diverse socio-economic groups that characterized many long settled communities. Such communities require a new empowerment approach that shifts the focus from financial competition toward strengthening social relationship among the residents. Thereby, the institutional stakeholders formulated the integrated empowerment practice to the address diversified communities with competing agendas.

7.1.2 Socio-Economic Integrated Empowerment: The Slum Inhabitant as Primary Agent of Technical and Management

Tawanmai case study saw the realization of the new empowerment approach under the BMK project, implemented through the collaborative process between the community organization and their local institutional network. The new approach involved social and economy integration to promote community capacity drawing lessons from practices at Sengki community that slum upgrading should strengthen social relations between internal residents and external stakeholders. This strategy is consistent with Friedman’s empowerment framework (1992:33) where socio-economic empowerment is concerned with the household’s access to the foundation of wealth production such as information,

\(^5\) Crown Property Bureau is the public organization land owner of Sengki community
knowledge/skill, and financial resource. When a household’s social and financial capacity increases, its access to these bases, their ability to attain objectives also increases. In other words, empowering slum households involve long-term processes which take place with the specific intention to enable people’s controlled over society’s resource (Rezaei, 2007). Hence, the Tawanmai practice promotes socio-economic empowerment in order to build strong collective power among the disparate sub-groups in the community as well as their financial capacity.

Tawanmai residents, as individuals and as a group, responded positively to the socio-economic integrated empowerment in different stages of BMK upgrading. Research findings in Chapter 6 (sections 6.3.2-6.3.3) evidently found that firstly, the community managed savings and loan process creates learning space for participants in terms of improving their leadership skills, whereby common community members were transformed into the new leaders. Woman, in particular, have always been the key stakeholder of every upgrading process. Base on the idea that women’s full participation is a key to the project’s success (UNESCAP, 2008:8), BMK encouraged woman to have full involvement in the savings process as cooperative board members. The fieldwork data revealed that woman not only held the highest positions but also formed the majority of co-op board. At the time of fieldwork (between April and May 2011), the Tawanmai community leader as well as 11 of the 15 cooperative committee members were women (Figure 6.6 in section 6.3.3).

Secondly, Tawanmai cooperative could be seen as an outcome of socio-economic integrated empowerment which strengthened local resident’s competency and improved access to financial resources. According to Couto (1989), the creation of community organization and their extension to as many life domains as possible are important indication of the community’s empowerment. By May 2004, Tawanmai residents can set up ‘The Khon Kaen Ruam Pattana Cooperative’, the first Khon Kaen city low-cost community cooperative for housing. The cooperative is a powerful mechanism to draw community members together and, moreover, it creates the channel for the community organization to access external subsidies such as CODI fund, local bank loan, and Khon Kaen Municipality Development Fund. In the post-upgrade period from 2007, Tawanmai subsequently played a more active role in maintaining and driving further community developments to address multiple needs. Projects were conceived based on social and economic activities such as income generating group of paper mache’ making, one baht a day fund, neighbourhood watch, student carpool, and community herb garden. Since post-upgrading, the diverse community development projects not only signify a degree of effectiveness of the socio-economic integrated empowerment but also illustrate that Tawanmai residents are the genuine ‘Primary Housing Agent’.
Thirdly, emerging new economic and social based activities became alternative channels to access resources available from external agencies. Instead of only depending on local organizations, the Tawanmai co-op widened collaboration with many national agencies to secure community capital flow. Several collaborative projects were undertaken with citywide network such as The Thai Health Fund, FRSN, and NULICO. Research findings from field survey identifies that Tawanmai community became less dependent on government agencies because they have more channels to access financial assistance (sections 6.3.2 and 6.6.2). External financial support contributes to Tawanmai development momentum as well as in building larger community network. They gradually moved closer to community financial self-sufficiency. Tawanmai co-op’s achievement of financial independence and stability overcame many local agencies doubt about the community’s capacity to sustain housing development in the post upgraded phase. This demonstrates the government agencies’ attitude change brought by slum inhabitant’s roles and activism. The practice proved that slum residents are not the obstacle to state policy delivery and that they have the capacity to be partners of government housing programs (TWM-10/M/L/KK, 18th March 2011 and KU-4/M/S/KKU, 26th March 2011).

While the woman led community organization process at Tawanmai is an output of economic and social empowerment, knowledge growth is also a key indication of the empowerment process. The 2011 fieldwork reveals that through knowledge gained through experience, a number of Tawanmai residents were gradually up-skilled in parallel with the upgrading implementation. In particular, various building construction technique and skills such as surveying, mapping, and construction often captured in the terms of know-how, was collectively developed in the community participation process. This practice corresponds to Achterbergh and Vriens (2002:223), who state that tacit experience is personal knowledge embedded in individual experiences. In fact, residents were able to perform certain tasks much more efficiently. Moreover many slum inhabitants already had experience in construction within different specialist teams of brick layers, carpenters, and plumbers but they often had difficulty articulating the technical or scientific principles of their work (Yap, 2010:338). Once BMK arrived, it was utilized as the space that revealed Tawanmai’s potential. According to Blanchard, K.H., and Hersey, P (2007:13), empowerment is not giving people power as people already have plenty of power in their wealth of knowledge and motivation to do their jobs well. Here, empowerment is defined as the self-acknowledging of this power.

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6 FRSN = The Four Region Slum Network  
7 NULICO = The National Union of Low Income Community Organization  
8 Khon Kaen Municipality, Khon Kaen University, and CODI Northeast Region
A respondent who gained many construction skills through the upgrading process observed: "Previously, I never did anything like this before, I got a lot of ideas via meeting with local government agencies and NGOs but I don’t have opportunity to practice. So the ideas remained just in the paper and don’t generate any tangible outcome. BMK process is the open space of real practices for marginal poor and brings out our ideas to reality. Even if I’m a woman but I can understand BOQ, I can make bricks and mortar, I can make measurements using the equipment. BMK is the process of transforming the poor from unskilled to skilled labour. Somebody gain improved competency for 50% or 100% depending on their ability but at least we got it, we can make it" (TWM-5/FM/CM/KK, 12th May 2011).

Based on the fieldwork, two factors signify the progression of socio-economic integrated empowerment: 1) the individual and group skills had been gradually developed through collective experience for a large number of people and 2) the knowledge had emerged in a number of neighbourhood clusters in the process.

Lastly, the socio-economic integrated empowerment opens up the possibility of huge expansions in the number of slum networks with connected financial based organization. Prior to 2003, Tawanmai community did not engage as a member of The Union of Slum Community Network, under the Khon Kaen Municipality patronage because they didn’t have formal tenured right. While FRSN advocated for the nine slum communities along railway line in Khon Kaen city through The Network of People in Creative Restoration, Tawanmai community were not involved due to their location. As a result, Tawanmai was excluded from both low-income networks. Once Tawanmai had entry into BMK, they were no longer an isolated community and had allies with similar slum communities. Currently, Tawanmai community is a member of Khon Kaen BMK citywide networks which scaled up their membership to include 2,103 families across Khon Kaen Municipality (FRSN-1/FM/L/BKK; Lapanun et al., 1998:101). The larger size of slum network forms a more effective platform to negotiate for their objectives. The thesis argues that achieving the collective force of huge numbers and negotiation capacity that goes beyond individual households or community has been possible due to the contribution of the BMK empowerment.

As discussed above, the outcomes of social and economic integrated empowerment include; leadership ability, establishment of community organization and fund, knowledge growth, the ability to access useful information, individual and group skills development, and the collective negotiation strength of a critical mass of people. Through achieving these outcomes, Tawanmai residents experienced growth in the slum power to access opportunities and resources in order to make choices.

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9 BOQ is a short term of Bill of Quantity
10 Such as accounting, planning and design, building construction
over their settlement, consistent with ‘pluralistic empowerment perspective’ (Clegg, 1997:39) and ‘social empowerment’ (Friedmann, 1992:33). The research argues that the contribution of social and economic integrated empowerment promoted the slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent of the Technical and Management’. However, the role has been less effective once the community encountered problems at policy level such as state funding shortage, building code restrictions, and slum eviction. The two community case studies have limited alternatives and contribution to government policy reform when approaching those problems as ‘Primary Housing Agent of the Technical and Management’.

7.1.3 Empowerment as Political Approach: The Slum Inhabitant as the Primary Agent of Political Development

Although the social and economic integrated empowerment have been widely implemented as the mainstream practice of Thai slum housing development through BMK projects, empowerment as a political approach, while not entirely neglected, was implemented within a narrow scope in the socio-economic based empowerment process. The upgrading process concurrently promotes the real action of people participation in decision making which opens up political space for marginal residents. The Sengki case demonstrates how the co-op community election contributes to the political empowerment and results in the community political structural change particularly between the high-income group and the low-income group. The vote provided opportunity to the low-income group to access decision-making power that was normally monopolized by the higher income group. The proportion of cooperative committee could be seen as the evidences of political structural change from patron-client based practices to community based organization. The process altered power balance among the income groups and the 17 temporary committee members consisted of 5 high-income, 5 middle-income, and 7 low-income people (see detail in p.89). With this new practice, the low-income group was recognized as legitimate members of government housing programs.

While the practice demonstrates resident’s capacity to manage their decision making power, it is limited to self-government at the community level. Once the two communities faced structural housing problems, they did not have sufficient capacity to address housing problems that are related to policy level. According to Narayan (2005:55), working with pluralist empowerment is not enough to bring about the real change in power relationships, empowerment therefore is necessarily part of a broader agenda of economic, social, and political structural change. The limitations of practice at Sengki and Tawanmai point to the need for policy reform which corresponds with many empowerment notions and theories such as Friedmann (1992:84) who argued that to act locally is not enough but alternative development requires a transformation of the national policy. Moreover, the notion of empowerment
as structural perspective (Clegg, 1997; Ife, 2002) has particular potential for an empowerment model that can effectively reform the dominant structure of oppression at the national level. Some theorists (Mullaly, 1993; Williams, 1989, Gough, 1979) also mention that the structural perspective resists against the elites who act as representatives of the unequal power structure. However, what is particular in the Thai slum cases is that the resistance is not directly class, race and gender based, but rather against state apparatus. Ockey’s study (1996:47) at several Thai slum communities revealed that the confrontation with government agencies has important implications for the development of democracy in Thailand. The theory frameworks above highlight the need for political empowerment as an essential mechanism to provide greater access for the slum organizations to influence policy. The Sengki land-sharing practice (section 5.3.1) and the Tawanmai relocation practice (section 6.6.2) provided evidences that the objective is for stakeholders to advocate for and recognize the need for adjustment towards an integrated political approach to slum people empowerment. The tangible implementation of political empowerment requires the creation of adequate institutional, regulatory arrangements and policy reform to assist community based development (Takahashi, 2009:75).

In the Thai context, political empowerment has been promoted in on the ground practices rather than through government driven policy. Whereas government agencies maintain the community organization empowerment as a socio-economy strategy, the FRSN and other NGOs moved into the area of political empowerment as the driving force of slum upgrading program. For FRSN and other NGOs, over ten years’ experience of resisting forced slum evictions are evidences that savings group did not ensure settlement tenure security for low-income community. Instead, the growth of slum networks is the potential platform to provide greater access to influence over policy level. Through political empowerment practices, FRSN and alliances mobilized the larger collaboration of community organization network to transform social-economic based capital to political power.

In summary, the practice demonstrates the direct connection between the implementation of political empowerment and the evolution of slum role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The thesis proposes that the gradual ‘up-scaling’ of empowerment practice over many years has contributed to the growth of slum movement participation at the national level. The change in empowerment approach translated into the critical changes in the level of movement and roles from being the ‘Primary Housing Agent of Technical and Management’ at their local setting to ‘Primary Housing Agent of Political Development’ with the substantial citywide network that go beyond the socio-economic empowerment practices.

7.2 The Evolution of role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ from past to present: An incremental ‘scaling up’ of
slum organization from a collective slum community organization towards citywide network

At the World Habitat Day 2007, the UN-HABITAT and CODI directors credited the BMK program for the slum inhabitant’s transformation from the beneficiary of state policy towards the leading agency of Thai low-income housing development\textsuperscript{11}. One explanation provided is that the entire evolution was dominated by external agents and the slum inhabitants have apparently been the recipients of the CODI’s empowerment (Visetpreecha, 2008:40). Here, the relationship between the CODI and slum residents was basically defined in the direct process of action and reaction between provider and receiver.

The thesis acknowledges CODI’s practice, rooted in the UCDO practices since early 1990s, and its significant role in making available relevant resources as one of the crucial contributors to the empowerment of slum inhabitants and their transformation. However, any kind of social development is not limited to “once the provider offer and follower received” (Huntakul in Tanphiphat, 1983:198) and, hence, overlooking the slum inhabitant’s contribution to housing development is to understand only half the story. The research argues that the slum inhabitants have the capacity to take advantage of BMK program’s offerings, and ‘up-scale’ their status and role into the large network through their own initiatives and long term practices.

This section addresses the research sub-questions of the way in which slum inhabitants were previously active and their current role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The research argues, that through four decades, the slum organization have been active as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ since the case of Sengki community and are still evolving and expanding in roles/scales as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ at the national level, post-BMK upgrading. The research categorizes the story of slum transformation process into four phases:

- 1973-1992: the socio-cultural-political transformation of a single slum household to a collective slum community organization (represented by Sengki community and the practice of land sharing)
- 1992-2003 the socio-cultural-political transformation of the collective slum community organization to slum community organization network
- 2003- Post BMK upgrading: socio-cultural-political transformation of the slum organization network to the slum citywide network (Tawanamai community and Baan Mankong practices)

\textsuperscript{11} Baan Mankong Program received the initiative program award of empowering slum dwellers to become equal partners with the government and local government agency.
The evolution of government agencies as stakeholder; role and structural changes
This process manifest on the gradual ‘up-scale’ of slum role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in four scales as follows;

- Collective slum community organization (within a community)
- Government and slum community organization partnership
- Slum community organization network (horizontal network between slum communities)
- Slum citywide network (vertical and horizontal network between the slum network and local organizations)

At Sengki community, the land-sharing practice achieved the successful breakthrough in collaboration between the slum community organization and the state housing program (NHA, 1991:24). The establishment of ‘the first cooperative for low-income housing in Thailand’\(^{12}\) signifies the effectiveness of resident capacity as primary agent. After the project completion, Sengki community was selected to be the demonstration project for housing the urban poor by international agencies. Consequently, this practice brought new perspectives toward the formal housing providers in two major aspects. Firstly, the practice proved that the slum residents have the capacity as partners of state housing program, and are not the barrier to the program. This change led to the positive awareness of the slum’s role among government agencies. More evidence can be seen through the subsequent state housing programs that advocate community organization as project partner (UNESCAP, 2008:24).

Secondly, this practice brought about changes in the way state funding policy addressed new targets. The conventional policy that catered to the interests of the higher socio-economic classes was revised and the government considered the interests of low-income households and allocated alternative funding for the poor as part of its pro-poor policy\(^ {13}\). As a result, the UCDO fund was established to strengthen slum organization capacity through the financial based, savings activities. Although the savings process led the community to having higher economic capacity, the implementation of UCDO fund had limitations to overcome housing problems at the structural level such as the inaccessibility to land tenure, rigid building code enforcement, and the problem of violent slum eviction (Visetpreecha, 2008:43-45; FRSN, 2010:5; Chantarapa, 2009:127-133). Consequently, some of these slum networks and NGOs left the government initiated network to form their own national lobby group (Ockey, 1997:8). The FRSN, for example, is an independent slum community network which promoted the political approach as an alternative approach to housing development.


\(^{13}\) Officially proclaimed in the 7th NESDP (1992-1996)
At Tawanmai community, FRSN’s practice led to the incremental ‘up-scaling’ of slum movement and the number of people engaged at the national level. Once Tawanmai community linked with other community organizations at city and national levels, they became part of a critical mass and political force. The increase in number of the community network of 80,000 households, linked across the country, demonstrates the contribution of the up-scaling practice after the project completion (www.nulico.com, June 2009; Archer, 2010:1). UNESCAPE (2008:14) claims that undertaking slum upgrading program at the citywide scale of BMK is only possible because the Thai community organization networks were already large and active. The constructive role of slums as primary agent of political movement explicitly manifest in the emergence of the slum citywide network. The evidence can be seen through the cases of the network’s demand for building regulation reform, additional BMK funding, and the establishment of their independent ‘City Development Fund’. This momentum flowed to the post-upgrading phase, especially with the up-scale of political empowerment that led to the formation of their own national slum organization, the NULICO (see section 6.6.2.2-6.6.2.4).

7.2.1 1973-1992: The Socio-Cultural-Political Transformation of a Single Slum Household to a Collective Slum Community Organization (Sengki Community/Land Sharing)

At Sengki community, pioneering housing practices were implemented that proved the viability of including slum community organization as a part of government housing program. The project was regarded as the role model of a settlement that achieved tenure security through a government housing program which is responsive to the slum community in contrast to the solutions of slum eviction and relocation. The project was widely recognized in the global stage especially when the UN HABITAT credited the Sengki land-sharing project as the demonstration project of ‘The Year of Shelter for the Homeless’ in 1991. Consequently, the Sengki project had wide repercussions that resulted in changes in government strategy and the NGOs movement. On the one hand, collective slum organizations were recognized as the primary housing agent by formal housing agencies. Due to the contribution of Sengki land-sharing project, the collective slum community organization and government partnership became the norm and the state housing projects since have been designed with the precondition that the community organization had to be partners in the project. Nationally the Fifth NESDP (1982-1986) emphasised the promotion of community organizations and participation in the government projects (Office of The Prime Minister, 1982). Internationally UNESCAPE (2008:4) observed that involving the community organization in the state development program as a new practice in Asia in the 1980s. Locally, many slum communities and NGOs promoted land-sharing scheme as the solution for slum upgrading at existing location (Chantarapa, 2009:13; Visetprecha,
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2008:46). This was considered as a new strategy to push landowning state agencies to adopt existing community upgrading for the slum settlement which conflicted with the conventional government strategy at that time of slum settlement relocation.

Apart from land-sharing at Sengki community, there are other slum community driven projects that empowered the slum to gain the capacity to manage their own projects. According to Boonyabancha (2005:4), several slum upgrading projects had shown promise in improving housing for and by the low-income community. According to Kongpan’s survey¹⁴ (2003:7), around 50 community driven housing projects had been conducted across the country between 1980s and 1990s. Based on a literature survey of this period (Kongpan, 2003:7), the research found that these projects contributed many lesson to the relevant agency. However, these projects were individually conceived and conducted by different agencies with independent aims and approaches. Moreover, the new knowledge was not always scalable to benefit slum recipients at large and the evidence can be seen through the decline of land-sharing interventions after Sengki community. Some example could be found in the studies of Ad-am (1988) and Maksirisuka (2001) which reveal that the struggle with building codes, property tax fees, and insufficient funding for house and public facility construction also proved to be key barriers.

The Sengki case study reveals the limitation of the formal system that is not appropriate for the slum’s actual needs and result in the low production of slum housing. This critical point is highlighted by Takahashi (2009:75) that, although the marginalized groups have the potential and willingness, the economic and political structures of society often prevented them from moving into action. The Sengki community case study findings show that community based activity needs the systematic support and organization. Sengki community case study reveals a need for more community options such as the availability of state funding, property tax fees exemption, and the flexible application of building regulations. The strength of the Sengki practice is in the utilization of experts as community partners who contributed knowledge and skills training to residents that resulted in the empowerment of local residents. Nevertheless, the negative feedback on the specialist support is the lack of coordination between the specialists that caused conflicts among community residents. This leads to the need for community empowerment requiring more collaboration between relevant agencies with the slum community organization, the Sengki Housing cooperative, to create the network of actors in the same area addressing the same issues.

After Sengki, a new housing government agency, the Urban Community Development Organization (UCDO), was established to address the need for the community organization as a vital component of

¹⁴ Kongpan surveyed slum upgrading projects in Thailand with CODI funding and reported to CODI.
the housing project. It was visibly evident that UCDO promoted low-income organizations involvement in the UCDO board membership amongst other relevant institutions (Boonyabancha, 2005:22). Significantly, four elected representatives of community organizations were included in the 11 UCDO board members along with four representatives of government organizations and three professionals from NGOs and the private sectors \(^{15}\) (Boonyabancha, 2003:9). Having community representatives sitting on the highest policy making committee demonstrates the recognition of the collective slum community organization as the official partner of government agency. The research argues that the significance of Sengki practice in the slum transformation is the process of ‘up-scaling’ the slum role from individual slum community organization towards government-slum community organization partnerships. This new status contributes to official acknowledgement of slum organization as the legitimate part of state housing program among formal providers. The evolution of slum role and the change in attitude of government agencies toward the slum organization ushered the initial changes to formal policy in terms of the creation of adequate institutional and funding arrangements to assist community organization based savings.

### 7.2.2 1992-2003 The Socio-Cultural-Political Transformation of a Collective Slum Community Organization to Slum Community Organization Network

#### 7.2.2.1 Government Agency’s Socio-Economic based Approach to Slum Role: the Formation of the Urban Community Development Organization (UCDO)

At the early stage of operation, UCDO provided loans to individual savings group and community. The UCDO savings scheme expanded to address the critical needs of individual communities under threat of eviction, and resulted in the up-scale of the community organization in terms of larger membership, asset, and area. The multi-dimensional change in scale of the community organization led to the new strategy for UCDO to also utilize state funding for alternative purposes, namely to promote the networking between community organizations. Hence the horizontal network of community organization extended into an interconnected financial network linked through a wide range of shared attributes such as neighbourhood area, similar occupation, type of savings group, and shared land tenure problems.

However, there are also other factors underpinning the change in the up-scaling of slums from individual slum community organization towards community organization network. Firstly, the emphasis on community organization network was a result of the effectiveness and the extension of

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\(^{15}\) Such as the Human Settlement Foundation, Thailand
savings scheme across Thailand and other developing countries. Internationally, the positive
text经验 of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (Yunus, 2003) and the Community Mortgage Program in
the Philippines (Cacnio, 2001) demonstrate that the urban poor were capable of running their own
savings groups and taking responsibility for the repayment process. Locally, the intervention of
community savings programs, initiated and practiced for several decades, identified that Thai low-
income communities had efficient and productive community network connections and extensions
(Boonyabancha, 2003:1).

By the year 2000, the UCDO reported that their funding resulted in a very large amount of community
organization initiatives which was recognized as the tangible outcome of economic empowerment
process.16 The practice of UCDO promoted the linking of individual slum organizations through micro-
credit based activities in which more than 1 billion Baht had been provided in loans and, by 2000,
more than half of the loans had already been fully repaid (Boonyabhancha, 2005:vi). A result of
UCDO’s practice was that these microcredit linked community organizations gathered and established
the horizontal network of The Council of Community Organization (CCO). In turn, this emergence of a
slum organization network at a larger scale influenced UCDO to transform their role and financial
policy, from subsidizing individual communities towards the promotion of community organization
linkages. Such relationship departs from the conventional top-down approach that forces people to
accept government provision without choices. Here, government policies were affected by the
advancement of community organization networks which is a more bottom-up approach in a process
where action and reaction occurs in both directions. The thesis argues that the emergence of CCO
network is evidence of the economic empowerment outcome of UCDO practices that resulted in the
substantial growth in collective community power.

7.2.2.2 Alternative Political Based Approach of Slum Role:
The Formation of the Four Region Slum Network
Although UCDO practice made significant contribution to the increase in the community organization’s
financial capacity, there are limitations to what enabling savings and loans approach can resolve.
Saving to buy land at the market price is not an appropriate solution to the slum household as the
land in urban areas are costly and usually cater to the better-off (Hall, 1987:238; Hardoy and
Satterthwaite, 1989:245). Hence the main difficulty for low-income households is accessing urban land
in the conventional market, which is a policy issue.

16 UCDO Annual Report 2000
On top of this, from 1987-1997, slum eviction and displacement sharply increased across the major cities due to the economic boom (Viratkapan and Perera, 2006:160). At the time, NHA (1981:15) reported that only five per cent of slum and squatter settlements were located on government land and, thus, the rate of squatter and renter in slums on private lands was high in Bangkok (FRSN, 2010:4). Furthermore, with the adoption of ‘Market Enablement Policy’ in 1983\(^\text{17}\), Bangkok had become a truly enabling environment for private sector driven developments that led to the rise of evictions from private land (Keivani and Werna, 2001:201).

Due to the largely uncensored press\(^\text{18}\), the public were widely aware of slum demolition such as the cases of Kong Bang-Or (1983), Trok Phai Singto (1987), Ban Khrua slum (1988-1992). Such a climate of increased forced slum relocation led to the gathering of slum community leaders and NGOs to support each other against the threat of eviction. By the year 1986, they formed an informal organization, Centre of Slum Development (CSD), which was the network of slum communities across four regions that pooled together resources of people, technical assistance, and funding (Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, 2011:1; Chantarapa, 2009:44) to work against slum eviction as well as search for formal secure tenure in urban areas. With experiences of the reality on the ground, the CSD slum network perceived the slum situation with a different perspective from the UCDO.

From the UCDO perspective, the slum housing problem is caused by the shortage of financial and networking accessibility. The solution then emphasised on increasing slum residents’ ability to access those resources through the savings process. The UCDO strategy is consistent with the empowerment as pluralistic perspective by Clegg (1997:39) and Alinsky (1971). In contrast, the CSD believes that the slum crisis is a result of unfair structure of policy initiation and delivery, particularly in the provision of access to urban land. For them, any slum development project, land delivery and land secure tenure must be prioritized first (Chantarapa, 2009:13). The leader of Human Settlement Foundation Thailand (HSFT) argued that “The slum powerlessness is not only an individual and group problem, but also relate to structural economic, social, and political conditions. Such structures maintain the status quo in individual and group power. The oppression cannot be changed by raising resident skills in savings and construction, rather dramatic structure transformation is necessary to bring about the real change in slum power. That is the main reason why the CSD network emphasised on the political movement and policy reform” (FRSN-2/M/L/BKK, 9\(^\text{th}\) December 2011). The

\(^{17}\) In September 1983, the cabinet approved the first enable housing framework that emphasized the significant role of private developers in low-income housing and the collaboration between the NHA, the GHB and with commercial banks as the program facilitators (Pornchokchai, 2005:36; Haan and Kuilen, 1986:35).

\(^{18}\) Even during the military dominate government of the 1970s to 1980s.
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HSFT’s perspective highlights that the slum plight is not a technical and management issue, but a political problem. The key solution is to seek social justice in national policy particularly on the issues of urban land reform for urban poor security tenure. This perspective corresponds to Clegg’s “Structural Empowerment” (1997:39) and Friedmann’s “Political Empowerment as an Alternative Development” (1992:33).

Over a decade, the process of political empowerment resulted in the up-scaling of the slum residents’ network from the CSD into the Four Region Slum Network (FRSN) in the year 1998. The FRSN consists of 10 networks or around 7,000 slum households membership across Thailand (FRSN, 2007:1). The formation of FRSN demonstrated the increasing significance of the slum network in the way that was difference from the government’s conception. Findings from PhD fieldwork and pilot study reveal that the FRSN performs as the leading agent that promoted the new perspective of slum crisis as a structural problem for instance; The FRSN promoted a slum community organization network anti-slum eviction demonstration over Rama 3 community at the Royal Thai Police Head Office (observed by researcher on 5th April 2011; see section 4.5 Figure 4.4). This approach forms a new self-awareness amongst slum residents that helps them to better understand their rights and ability to influence changes at policy level. Luttrell (in Morgen, 1988:136) argued that the change in slum people’s outlook on themselves is important and the self-consciousness expresses into action with others. The research observes that the rise of this perspective reflects the slum network’s independent initiatives and informal resistance to the mainstream UCDO empowerment approach.

In terms of anti-slum eviction, the FRSN performed as the mobilizer of slum community movement to oppose forced relocation and demand settlement secured tenure. Through over ten years of fighting against eviction, many adaptive measures have been utilized through a variety of resistance tactics which include petitioning government officials, publicizing evictions in the media, and enlisting the support of elected politicians. According to Chantarapa (2009:69-71), who studied FRSN values and their struggle experience, self-consciousness amongst the slum inhabitants further increased through the informal education, training, and real participation in political mass protests.

7.2.3 2003-Post BMK Upgrading; Slum Citywide Network (Tawanmai Community/Baan Mankong)

The up-scaling of the slum inhabitants’ role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ from the citywide network into the national level was apparent in the post-BMK upgrading. This section addresses the more recent role by examining the case of the establishment of The National Union of Low-Income Community Organizations (NULICO) as a way in which slum inhabitants exercised their collective power.
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The thesis argues that the lessons from the UCDO and the FRSN practices are the key drivers behind the transformation from the UCDO to the CODI. On the one hand, community practices under the UCDO since the 1980s provided evidences that the slum organization have the capacity to implement government housing projects. Critically, the UCDO practice highlights the need for collaboration between the community organisation with their local partners as a vital component of the project. The revision of this practice then led to the CODI strategy of building slum community network towards the citywide network. One of the tangible outcomes of the incremental up-scale empowerment of slum organization role is the formation of NULICO. As the BMK program funding is subsidized by the state, the relationship between the government and slum community organization network shifted from confrontation to being dependent, at least with regard to financial support. When the CODI revolving fund experienced shortage, BMK project was suspended across the country (www.codi.or.th/baanmankong, 9th October 2009). At Tawanmai community, construction stopped and many cooperative members withdrew their savings, thinking that BMK funding may be cancelled by the new government.

This event led to the formation of a new national slum organization, the NULICO\textsuperscript{19}, when the slum community network at citywide scale realized their need for more financial independence to ensure continued funding for BMK. In 2009 around 80,000 low-income BMK households nationwide linked their savings group capital together and established the alternative City Development Fund (CDF) .Under the NULICO administration, the CDF\textsuperscript{20} was established with the pilot fund of around 1.45 billion baht provided by various agencies including community micro-credit network, national organizations\textsuperscript{21}, and the local municipality (Nongpon and Tungsakul, 2012:58). As a result, the slum communities had the guaranteed funds available for the low-income community which has not yet undertaken BMK upgrading. One respondent noted the reason the CDF was established was that “CODI does not have much strength, so the community residents have to use their own strength. NULICO emerged from the community residents as a reaction to the lack of representation and solution (for BMK funding) from the state” (NULICO-2/M/L/KK, 10\textsuperscript{th} June 2011). Moreover, the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ citywide network was able to continue and maintain the momentum of Tawanmai post-upgrading through the CDF and the NULICO.

\textsuperscript{19} www.nulico.com

\textsuperscript{20} The idea for such a fund has been discussed by the UCDO institutional collaborative committee since 1990s (Boonyabancha, 2003:18)

\textsuperscript{21} Such as the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR)
The NULICO puts into practice the BMK ideals of shared community experiences. Between the year 2008 and 2010, the Tawanmai community members, which have already completed upgrading and know best what the experience entails, came to advise slum communities along Khon Kaen railway line as many were ill-prepared to begin BMK. NULICO created an identity for the urban slum inhabitants, who called themselves the ‘Chao Chumchon Baan Mankong Prachar Samakee’, sang NULICO composed songs, and all members wore green shirts that symbolized their unity (Archer, 2010:5). As a result, the NULICO became the centre of BMK upgrading rather than the CODI and, claimed the leader of NULICO, “people look at us as the heart of BMK” (NULICO-3/M/L/BKK, 9th November 2011). The leader of Bang Bua community, one of the NULICO leaders of Bangkok region, mentions that “NULICO stays constant, but the government and CODI can change” (NULICO-4/M/L/BKK, 12th November 2011).

The thesis observes that the role of slum inhabitants through the intervention of the NULICO and CDF facilitated the continuation of the slum residents’ active involvement in the development of their city and, critically, illustrated how the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ takes community development into their own hands. This has been possible due to the dedication of a large number of community members in the citywide network. The CDF fund affords the slum communities a certain degree of independent organization as they are no longer solely reliant upon the CODI loan.

At the time of fieldwork, the thesis argues that only a group of slum inhabitants have achieved a multi-scalar ‘Primary Housing Agent’ status because they have the many decades of experience of the long transformation process from Sengki to Tawanmai/BMK to NULICO/post-BMK articulated in the research. At the policy level, they form the leadership representing slum dwellers in the CODI, the FRSN, and the NULICO which are pushing for further expansion of the network through the technical and political empowering process. At the operational level, empowerment practice enables the active slum inhabitants’ participation in project implementation as well as political capacity to influence government policy. The two parallel policy and operational practices are interrelated and connected at many scales of their local and national institutions. Significantly, it gave rise to the new characteristic of slum inhabitant, as the ‘Primary Housing Agent of Political Development’

7.3 The Evolution of Government Agencies as Stakeholder; Role and Structural Change

The practice of the slum upgrading in Thailand over four decades demonstrates that state intervention is one of the key factors in building the slum capacity as an agent of housing development. The availability of public resources led to the significant transformation of the slum inhabitant into being the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ as the technical expert. However, this process goes beyond the conventional
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idea of empowerment where the state, as helper, confers distinctive power to the slum inhabitants, the helped, and makes the beneficiaries change. Rather from the case studies findings, it clear that the empowerment practice led to the change of state agencies through their engagement with the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in the process.

According to Friedmann (1992:74-76), alternative empowerment aims to mobilize civil society at the grass roots or in communities. The practice seeks to transform social into political power and to change the system of political relationships and all corresponding institutions in the larger national terrain. However, Friedmann focused on the theory more than practice and was not specific on the questions of ‘what’ and ‘how’ mobilizing the marginal poor at national level will lead to the slum inhabitant expansion of their role as the ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The thesis addresses these gaps and finds that the practice of slum inhabitant and their community network at national scale in Thailand has achieved political relationship change. These changes in response to slum housing problems contributed to the increase in democratic value of the marginal slum inhabitants as well as their activeness as citizens. Moreover, the changes transformed and are transforming other stakeholders, particularly government agencies, through the process articulated in Chapters 5 and 6 that spans over four decades.

This section addresses the process of slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in their expanding role over the policy and political issues at the national scale. The thesis specifically focuses on the change in the government’s response to this process where the case study clearly reveals the change in nature of Thai government intervention and policy was significantly driven by the national networks of slum organization. The concrete role of slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ manifested in the regulation arrangements and in the formation of institutions to invest in the slum’s asset and capacity. These visible changes represent the transformation of traditional relationships between government and slum inhabitant from vertically oriented towards more horizontal, and also illustrated the up-scaling of ‘political empowerment’ into the national level.

The thesis articulates the government’s change in policy and structure in response to the problems faced and in conjunction with the slum community networks through two cases across the times from early 1990s to post-BMK development. The first case is the government housing agency’s transformation from the UCDO to the CODI. The second is the previously discussed FRSN movement to demand formal land lease from the SRT.
### 7.3.1 Slum Inhabitants' Roles in the transformation of the Urban Community Development Organization (UCDO) to the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI)

According Putman (2000) and Woolcock (1998), social capital is the capability of household and community, especially those with few individual resources, to act collectively in pursuit of their socio-economic aspirations. While it could be said that in the early stage of social capital development in Thai slum community, the funding was set up and delivered by government agencies, while the slum organizations were the recipients and in 1992, Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun’s government approved the establishment of the Urban Community Development Organization (UCDO) funding and established the UCDO office, as funding organizer. Boonyabancha (2003:v), a former director of the UCDO, noted that the UCDO funding was generally perceived by government agencies as part of the pro-poor policy that aimed to promote the positive relationship between the urban poor and the government. Moreover, Boonyabancha noted that the emergence of UCDO represented the state’s acceptance of the slum inhabitant as an urban force. The government fund catered to the need for systematic arrangements in terms of creating adequate institutions, funding, and networking support. Housing loans at low-interest rate were made available to the financial based community development projects such as savings group, community micro-credit, and cooperative for housing development. Consequently, the slum community organization had access to assets through a variety of savings groups. Although the primary objective of the state funding was to promote community asset to purchase property, the other important goal was to reinforce community organization and their local network through the economic based activity. The implementation of the UCDO funding brought about the large number of new slum community organizations across Thailand and, in 2000, there were 950 community savings groups established in 53 provinces.

While more than 1,000 community networks based occupation and social welfare had been set up to strengthen the community organization capacity (Boonyabhanca, 2005:vi), there were limits to promoting economic empowerment based in individual projects. Such strategies did not address the increasing number of slum organizations in terms of scale and diverse needs. As a result, several

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22 7th NESDP mentioned the significance of the urban poor in providing the work force for the country’s continued economic growth (Office of The Prime Minister, 1992) which signified government agencies’ awareness of the low-income household at the national level. Moreover, the NESDP Board mentioned that the urban poor deserved better social services and investment opportunities that other socio-economic classes had access to. The Board identified slum housing problem was caused by the insufficient income to purchase land, house, and repay loans and, hence, the solution was to promote income generation in low-income communities and provide soft loan for housing development.
community organizations worked actively with other local development actors and created community network with their own agendas such as the FRSN and the Assembly of the Poor. Moreover, to reduce the resultant administration burden, the development process and loans has been implemented through the community organization network, rather than through the UCDO (Boonyabancha, 2003:8).

These movements forced the UCDO’s structural reorganization to reflect the new stage of development that emphasized the linking of community networks with local organizations in their area, known as the citywide network of actors for citywide program. To address the diverse needs of the large scale community organization network, the UCDO reorganized their financial subsidy, under the citywide program, to community organization and the channeling of funding distribution based on key objectives. The first objective is on promoting the linkage of institutional network at the city scale whereby cities were given support to set up their own citywide network committee, the joint-committee of various key actors. Secondly, funding provision was reformed to provide loan to the citywide network rather than delivering state funding from the UCDO directly to the community organization. The aim was to create channels for community organization to communicate with their local agencies and to then undertake collaborative development projects together.

The change of UCDO financial administration demonstrates the enabling of local power in two ways. First, it reflects the decentralization process that transferred government power to the local community networks that now have decision making power to control and determine their own needs. Secondly, the emergence of the citywide slum community network represents the ‘bridging capital’ and ‘linking capital’ which are forms of social capital according to the World Bank (Helling, Serno and Warren, 2005). The citywide network horizontally connects the slum community organizations with similar socio-economic status, while vertically connecting them with other formal organizations that have different roles and statuses such as government agencies, academic institutions and NGOs in their local area.

By 2000, the UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund to become a new public organization called the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI). Under the CODI, the different understanding of the slum’s role can be seen. Firstly, the CODI realized that the role of community organization is as the leader of project implementation and not merely as a government partner. According to Boonyabancha (2005:8), the CODI believed in local people’s capacity to manage their own needs collectively as evidenced by the many slum upgrading projects that the UCDO supported since the early 1990s. Moreover, the CODI encouraged local organizations within the same city to work collaboratively with the slum community organizations as the facilitator network of expertise.

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Secondly, the empowerment approach to strengthen slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ shifted from empowerment approach at individual slum communities to the integrated empowerment approach at the citywide network. As part of a new strategy, the CODI advocated the co-existence of economic and social empowerment approaches to the large scale network of the citywide program.

The thesis argues that the citywide network is the main community-led development mechanism for slum inhabitants that changed the way housing agencies relate to each other, from a vertical to a more horizontal structure. The findings, (Chapter 6 sections 6.2.3, 6.4 and 6.6) reveal that the structural changes in government housing agency affected the local empowerment. The UCDO response to the growing importance of slum citywide network led to the transformation of the relationship between government agencies and slum inhabitants. The traditional links between them was usually vertical, with the state in control. Once the citywide network emerged, the slum inhabitant has a large platform to influence political power through the decentralization of decision-making. The developed links with a wide network of institutions across the country led to the Thai government’s recognition of the necessity to create adequate funding, technical and knowledge support to assist the slum inhabitant in their role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’, at the citywide scale. This change manifested in the inclusion of slum community representatives in the policy making committee at different levels of the state’s housing projects.

In summary, the transformation of the UCDO to the CODI represents a very significant change in the government agencies’ formal approach as a result of their involvement with the ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The formal approach is the state agencies’ gradual changes through the policy implementation. According to Hall (1987), putting the housing policy into practice necessitates considerable efforts at the administrative levels. The experiences from the ground provided lessons to state agencies that addressing housing issues cannot stand alone without sufficient resources which resulted in the adjustments and changes in their policies and institutions in response to the resource needed. In this sense, the transformation of the UCDO strategy reveals the limitations of the formal approach as it is reactive rather than pro-active in addressing slum housing problems. The formal response was to invest in building partnerships across institutions after the community citywide network has grown in importance.

The cases reveal that the conditions for enabling slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ are heavily dependent on two factors. Firstly, it needs change in institutional reform of top-down government practices towards a more bottom-up approach. Change could be implemented through the reform of laws, regulations, and incentives that guide the behaviour of public officials. Secondly, it also crucially depends on the presence of and support for an active citizenry. These have been
implemented in the representation of the slum organization at the institutional levels, the promotion of the network of slum organization at different scales, and the promotion of the community to lead the government's housing program.

The discussions above demonstrate the relationship between the slum inhabitant as a 'Primary Housing Agent' and the state policy reforms as a two-ways process. The process transformed the role/scale/function of both agents and also changed the socio-political relationship between them. While the state policies have been reformed to strengthen the slum people's organization, the political power devolved towards a more horizontal network especially in the government's transference of its original role as the leading housing agency to the slum inhabitants.

7.4 The Signification of Thai Political Democratization and Decentralization in the Up-scaled Status of Slum Inhabitants as Primary Housing Agent

This section discusses the relationship between slum inhabitants' role and Thai political decentralization. Evidences from practices on the ground confirm that an up-scaled status of slum inhabitants as PHA reflect the development of Thai political democratization, from government driven policy to citizen control over policy initiation and program implementation.

7.4.1 Top-down Approaches Prior to Sengki Community Upgrade

In Thailand, the government first adopted slum upgrading scheme in 1977, in the context where eviction and relocation were once the only formal housing strategy, into the policy of city beautification program, Fueang Nakhon (section 3.2.1.1). The initial attempts of slum upgrading program aimed at the improvement of the settlement's physical environment rather than providing land tenure security (Rabibhadaha, 1998:4). The conventional slum upgrading practice in this period was entirely planned and decided by government agencies with project implementation by private contractors (Pornchokchai, 2005:57). A single state agency, mainly the NHA since 1973, played the leading role over the implementation on an individual community basis (section 3.2.1.1). Consequently, the slum people have been left out from the development process and were regarded as the beneficiaries of state housing program (Pornchokchai, 2005:30, Buranasiri, 1983:124). In this period, there were no evidence of a civil society that promoted secured tenure for low-income household and the government did not recognize the necessity of creating institutional linkages to assist slum based activities (Vechayachai, 1984:26). Hence, the collaborative network of different interest groups were absent in both the state agency and slum community (Tongdeelert, 2000:11; Kunkanakornsakun, 1999:91).
From the literature, the affiliation between state agency and slum community was a top-down power relationship (Giles, 2003:230). The state housing program was totally devised at the top level of administration for downward implementation through a compliant bureaucracy. The thesis argues that the conventional top-down relationship between state and slum settlement was based on a legalistic perspective. The government agencies were usually reluctant to deal with informal settlements because any official collaboration with ‘illegal’ occupants of land can be translated as giving legitimacy to slum dwellers who were in contravention of by-laws in their illegal occupation of land and the poor conditions of their shelter. According to the official report of Sengki land-sharing project by the NHA and the Mahidol University (Ad-Am, 1988:18), government agencies viewed the slum people as recipient of state agency projects because they usually sought out initial assistance from the government rather than rely on their own ability. Without the empirical evidence of the slum capacity to be responsible housing agents, state agencies perceived slum people as project recipient rather than potential development partners.

From the Sengki case study findings, the relationship between Sengki dwellers and outside authorities was consistent with the broader practice of Thai administrative top-down approach in this period. The relationship was primarily based on patron-client ties where government agencies provided assistance in different ways such as free health care service, consumer products, and funding. The interview with a Yan Nawa District officer (2011) reveals the attitude behind the cash and service donation practices, that Thai social value emphasizes the reciprocal patron-client relationship between higher and lower socio-economic status. The authorities perceived themselves as the protector, sponsor, and benefactor of the “weak” residents who are expected to offer their resources in return when needed (SK-7/M/L/BKK, 8th April 2011). In return, the residents who were the beneficiaries of those services felt more secure as a client of the powerful authorities. While local people gained benefit from the goods and services, the authority also takes advantage from the residents who were used mainly for political objectives, free labour, and cost recovery to meet the government authority’s project goals.

7.4.2 An Early Stage of Integrated Bottom-up Approach in Government Housing Program in the Sengki Upgrading Period

The practice at Sengki community opened a new chapter in Thai housing with the collaboration between slum community and state housing agencies. In a departure from wholly state-driven projects as was the conventional practice, a partnership between the community and multi-state agencies was adopted as a new strategy to empower slum inhabitants to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’.
Identifying Sengki land-sharing as the pilot project, the CHHS\textsuperscript{23} experimented with the possibility to create channels for the low-income community to communicate with their local government agencies and undertake the collaborative development project in housing upgrading. To achieve this goal, the power relationship between formal agency and local community needed to be reconsidered.

There are two levels in the mechanism that created the collaborative partnership between different participants at Sengki, institutional and local levels. At the institutional level, the NHA established ‘The National Housing Committee’ in 1983 (NHA, 1982:5) which promoted the collaborative partnership between the NHA and different authorities. The committee consisted of the representatives of local and national government bodies and housing experts, but did not include slum community representatives (Panichapak, 2009:3-5; Karnjanaprakorn and Bunnag, 1978:42). The body provided a framework for housing agencies to assist the slum community to improve their settlement. The NHA invited many housing agencies to attend training by national and international agencies, with some state agencies and local organizations facilitated to become involved as ad-hoc project partners (section 3.2.1.1). The regular meetings created opportunities to develop networks across government institutions, particularly between the NHA and local government agencies.

At the local level, the Sengki Housing Cooperative Office (SHC), the community organization, performed as a facilitator and middle party that modified and changed the power relationships between different actors: community sub-groups and external stakeholders (sec 3.2.1.1). The SHC was conceived as the space for real sharing between individual households such as money, labour, ideas, and mutual support. As a facilitator, the SHC promoted activities that turned individual households into a collective community (NHA, 1991:72). This process gradually improved and consolidated Sengki inhabitants’ collective capacity to resolve housing needs. With the marginal residents forming a sense of community, the relationship between different socio-economic groups was further shifted as a result of the SHC committee election.

The reform of political power relationship was carried out to reorganize the patron-client ties and balance power within the community between groups of different socio-economic statuses. Some higher income households had personal relationship with local officers and they exploited that tie to exercise the decision making power on behalf of whole community. The SHC election turned different sub-groups into equal political power holders, with one person counting for one vote, which incrementally transformed the patron-client relationship into organizational relationships. Through the

\textsuperscript{23} Centre for Housing and Human Settlement Studies was a research centre under NHA administration
SHC election, the low-income group had, in practice, access to decision making power normally dominated by higher income groups.

As the middle party, the SHC promoted connections across institutions between the community organization and local government agencies, rather than individual households. The joint-committee of Sengki land-sharing project was established to receive continued support from the CHHSS, Yan Nawa District, Department of Co-operative Promotion, and the public landlord, The Crown Property Bureau.

Although the joint-committee activities declined after project completion, the lesson learnt from the Sengki land-sharing resulted in the significant breakthrough in the nature of state housing program as well as in the new relationship between the state agency and local residents. Firstly, this practice led to the profound change in the conventional state housing program from top-down to an integrated bottom-up approach. Secondly, the practice provides conclusive evidences that the partnership of actors, particularly of state agencies and the slum community organization, is possible, and this relationship was one of the critical determinants for the project completion at Sengki community. This relationship change became an important precedent for later network expansions between the slum organization and other development agencies at a larger scale.

7.4.3 Bottom up Approaches at Tawanmai and Post-BMK Upgrading

From 2003 onwards, the BMK program became the vital development mechanism for slum housing in Thailand. In particular, the concept of citywide network connected different development actors together across institutions such as the state authority, local government agencies, and slum organizations. The collaborative approach was a crucial platform that up-scaled slum community organization, through political empowerment, into the slum-based citywide network. As a result, in the post-BMK upgraded period, the slum movement extended to the political issues at the national scale. The tangible evidence is the formation of network among slum community and people organizations. These led to changes in the conventional state control over housing policy (Chantarapa, 2009:38; FRSN-3/M/L/BKK) and consequently, the thesis argues, the relationship between government agency and civil society changed from top-down to bottom-up.

In the BMK upgrading period, evidences from fieldwork at Tawamai community revealed the substantial expansion of individual community organization towards citywide network. As discussed in Chapter 6 (section 6.3.2), building site visits linked the small Tawanmai savings group with other community organizations in Khon Kaen City. The sense of network became more apparent to the community when they joined forces with neighbours to undertake concrete collaborative actions and
resource pooling, which further connected the communities financially (section 6.3.2). In total, 72 communities were accommodated in BMK project in Khon Kaen City and later, the active slum network attracted numerous external actors as partners of various development projects. Many local authorities increasingly realized the potential in working with these slum networks, instead of against them as previously practiced. Over the years, several collaborative projects between the formal agents and Khon Kaen slum citywide network grew in scale and then into more formal programs for example; the recycling project with the Khon Kaen Municipality, healthcare project with the Thai Health Promotion Fund, and City Development Fund with the Government Housing Bank.

The BMK practice built a large decentralization platform that transferred the decision making power to the community organization network. What has emerged from the BMK practice at Tawanmai community was the considerable increase in community control over slum upgrading project implementation. At the institutional level, the CODI transferred their authority to Khon Kaen citywide network committee to manage BMK funding, initiate their own strategies and approaches, and approve projects. Khon Kaen BMK included the Tawanmai leader in citywide network committee who has an equal status and role with other formal housing agencies which reflected the decentralization of the decision making power closer to the slum inhabitant. At the community level, the CODI encouraged local people and their organization to become ‘Primary Housing Agent’ who exercises decision making power over the BMK implementation at their local setting. Through this structure, the decentralization of power is gradually strengthened within all levels of the BMK implementation, from the community to institution levels.

Post BMK upgrade period, through political empowerment, the slum citywide network exercised their power at national level. From 2007 to 2010, Tawanmai residents joined the forces with other grass root societies such as the LOCOA, the NULICO, and the FRSN to push for policy reform (section 6.6.2). With the large number of protesters reported in the press, other organizations joined them such as the Labour Union, the Assembly of the Poor, and the LOCOA. The growing number of slum citywide network and other organizations led to the emergence of active civil society in Thailand that

24 The project under KKM strategic plan that aims at promote KKM as a low carbon municipality (http://www.lcm.in.th/content-361.html)
25 The project under Thai Health Promotion Foundation promotes an enhancement of health for local community in KKM area. Tawanmai sets up retirement funding that subsidized by THPF (Galbally et al, 2001)
26 The project under CODI and GHB provides housing loan for low-income community organization (CODI, 2007)
27 Bangkok post, Published: 24th October 2010, title ‘Urban poor uniting across borders’
demands for change through the collective political force and the critical mass of people. Working in conjunction with the leadership representing slum dwellers in state housing agencies, the slum citywide network were successful in pushing the government to approve additional BMK funding (section 6.6.2.3) and building code changes (section 6.5.1)

The partnership between state agency and civil society in Thailand is embedded within a long history of urban slum upgrading policy and practice. Over four decades, the practice led to the adjustment in attitudes and mindset on both sides. Their relationship gradually shifted from one based on confrontation to negotiation, from resistance to collaboration. The shift occurred through a period of time in a reconfiguration of the state and civil society roles that, significantly, was developed through the real practice. The practice highlights an essential component of state-civil society relationship reform which is the decentralization of decision making power that required the coordination between two approaches; reducing the state power and increasing civil society power. The state is required to withdraw from direct intervention and leave actual housing provision to the civil society while enabling and including civil society to participate effectively in the decision making process of state policy at different levels. With the decentralization approach, a favourable enabling environment as well as strong and pro-active civil society is required to promote slum inhabitant role as leading agent. Hence, creating and maintaining synergies between responsive state agents and civil society remains essential in the Thai environment.

7.5 The Process of Social Power Transformation into Political Power
7.5.1 Socio-Economic Capacity and Asset as the Platform of Transformation Process in Sengki Land-sharing
At the Sengki community, economic empowerment played the crucial role in the transformation of social power into political power. In particular, the community based organization was a key mechanism in the promotion of resident capacity and role over land-sharing implementation process which resulted in the Sengki residents access to formal funding, assets and political power.

Data from the ground\(^{28}\) (section 5.2.2 and section 6.3.2-6.3.3) reveals that the political power is closely linked with the real improvement in the household social power. At the individual household level, when low-income group became the SHC member with their own savings account, they have

\(^{28}\) 1) Fieldwork was undertaken between April and May 20112; 2) Observation of the FRSN meeting at Town in Town Hotel, Ramkamheang 39, Bangkok on 8\(^{th}\)-9\(^{th}\) May 2011; and 3) Community visit with FRSN staff at Rama VI community, Bangkok on 14\(^{th}\) May 2011.
access to decision making power through the eligibility to vote and ability to negotiate with a more powerful voice. The upper classes and local state agency recognized the low-income group as community members because they are official members. Having saving accounts and SHC memberships secured the low-income group’s social power which led to the political power. Hence, the enhancement of the low-income groups’ socio-political power led to the reform of existing power relationships between local residents and external stakeholders. With the power, they were capable to compete for the better location and priority. On the other hand, the high-income household benefited from the socio-economic empowerment process. The case of land auction demonstrated that higher social power led to the greater political power of access to better resources. After SHC conducted the process of land selection, seven land plots were left as some eligible household member refused to further participate. With permission from the CPB, the SHC conducted land auction for local resident who required more living space. Although the process was transparent, it immediately excluded the low-income household’s access to those lands because they have less socio-economic capacity and all seven land plots went to high-income households. These practices are congruent with the Pluralist Perspective (Steward Clegg, 1997) that empowerment is a process of helping the disadvantaged to compete more effectively with other interests or existing systems.

At the community level, Sengki was symbolically recognized as a formal partner of state housing project with the completion of and activities in the SHC office that visually represented the collective social power. The SHC benefits Sengki residents as a whole community to access the political power through the negotiation with landlords and local state agencies. At this stage, networking is the key driving factor of the transformation process at institutional level and ensured the community’s collective social power, the community as organization, and inclusion as a member of the decision making group. Moreover, having the SHC committee representatives sitting on the joint Sengki land-sharing committee with institutional partners resulted in the community access to decision making power to voice actual needs of local residents at the highest level.

However, the transformation process of social power into political power has limits because it effectively functions at only the community scale. Although, Sengki resident became an active agent of settlement development and the community achieved a proper living environment, these benefits do not reach similarly disadvantaged neighbouring communities. Economic empowerment at community scale cannot be broadened because the socio-political environment and the opportunity structure (Kitschelt, 1986:57) obstructed the range of slum inhabitant’s action. Hence, the transformation process requires investing on more empowerment provisions and changes in socio-political environment to support empowerment.
7.5.2 Supportive Environment as the Driving Force for Transformation Process at Tawanmai

The practice of Sengki land-sharing highlighted the need for change in the opportunity environment to enable slum inhabitants as well as the community empowerment practices. Thereby, the practice at Tawanmai community utilized the socio-economic integrated empowerment as the major mechanism in the upgrading process. This, in turn, influenced the socio-political process that focused on the institutional and funding reform. The supportive environment and integrated empowerment approach influenced the process that transformed social power into political power at the citywide scale and the post-BMK period demonstrated the up-scaling of political power to the national level.

In particular, the Tawanmai case study exemplifies this transformation process of social power into political power at two levels, community and nationwide. At the community level, Tawanmai residents individually and collectively applied the two key driving factors of collective power and networking to enable the social power and stimulate the collaborative network between community organization and external development actors. Through socio-economic integrated empowerment (section 4.2.2), Tawanmai inhabitants were able to access new knowledge, asset, and partnership with formal providers. The residents strengthened their individual and collective social power as a platform to enhance their collective political power by increasing levels of political exercises associated with the empowerment practice, in the process of slum upgrading since the first to final stage, for example; Cooperative election in the savings process, negotiation for land security at the land inquiry process, public hearing in the planning process, and the lobbying of local authorities for funding in the construction process (section 6.3.2-6.3.6). These political exercises enabled the local people to participate effectively in decision making power and interact with their local organizations. These practices led to the institutional reform that changed the relationship between Tawanmai community and state agencies into a more horizontally network.

At the national scale, networking played a vital role in up-scaling the empowerment process from communitywide into countrywide through the extension of the slum community capacity and the supportive opportunity structure. The emergence of the new slum status as citywide network brings about the critical change in the way that social power transforms into political power because the slum community organization actively expanded at a large and, significantly, interconnected scale across the country and not only in single or a few locations (sections 6.2.3, 6.4.1, 6.6.1 and 6.6.2). Moreover, the massive connected financial capacity further reinforces the economic and social power of slum citywide network, becoming the platform that turned the nationwide scale social power into the political force.
Through this process, the opportunity structure was reformed to support the enabling environment for slum inhabitant's action at the local and national level. The change has been particularly visible in the post-BMK upgrading period and many political movements, previously discussed in Chapter 6 (sections 6.6.2.2-6.6.2.4)\textsuperscript{29}, exemplified this change such as the demands for BMK additional funding, building code modification, and urban land-use reform.

It is clear from the findings from the case studies (section 6.5 and 6.6) that the collective power is a central principle in creating social power and which then transforms into political power. However, collective power alone is not enough to enable the up-scaling into the citywide scale due to the limited socio-political enabling environment and therefore, networking is essential to reforming the opportunity structure. Although, collective power and network plays the significant roles at different levels, they do not operate separately and these two driving factors have always co-existed. In the Thai case, the thesis argues that the balance between those factors shifted to the transformation process, from socio-economic empowerment to political empowerment, due to the openness of opportunity structure.

### 7.6 Conclusion

This chapter outlines how the empowerment practice enabled slum inhabitant to become ‘Primary Housing Agent’ through the slum upgrading project. The discussions of the case studies redress the knowledge gap through establishing the explicit link between these projects of the empowerment practices and the slum role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The thesis finds that the transformation process has been possible due to the contribution of incremental ‘up-scaling’ of empowerment practice in the slum upgrading projects. The research proposes that slum inhabitants become ‘Primary Housing Agent’ since the implementation of Sengki case (economic empowerment) which demonstrated how and what the previous active roles of slum inhabitants were. The thesis articulates the evolution and expansion of this role to the Tawanmai community/BMK (socio-economic integrated empowerment) in the ensuing period. Lastly the thesis discusses the expansion of the role post-BMK, in particular how the growth of political empowerment led to the formation of the NULICO, policy reforms, and state agency transformation. The scaling up of empowerment practices is the solution to slum housing in building the community into citywide network which, in turn, expanded slum inhabitants’ role from the local into national level. The thesis argues that this expansion process has been a process of constant refinement based on the complexities and contradictions among formal

\textsuperscript{29} The case of FRSN and SRT Land Leasing (section 6.6.2.2); the case of the CODI additional funding (section 6.6.2.3); the case of Asian Slum Network, LOCOA practice (Section of 6.6.2.4); the case of the slum network’s demand for building code reform (Building code Issue 4, Section 7 year 2007: Building setback)
and informal development agencies and is a process that was rooted in four decades’ experience of practice.

The process manifests in the multi-scalar practices of the slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ from the smallest unit at the local constituency towards the larger collective scale of national networks. The research proposes four scales of slum transformation which result in the gradual ‘up-scaling’ of empowerment practices as follows:

The socio-cultural-political transformation of the individual household:

1. The collective slum community organization
2. Government and slum community organization partnership

The socio-cultural-political transformation of the slum network:

3. The slum community organization network (horizontal network between slum communities)
4. The slum citywide network (vertical and horizontal network between slum community itself, and local organizations)

Importantly, there are factors that made the Thai slum inhabitant being ‘Primary Housing Agent’ specific in character and in the practice of empowerment. Stakeholders in each of the four scales, more often than not, had competing agendas between themselves. In addition, it is not just the slum inhabitants who are transformed but also the government agencies as stakeholder as a result of their involvement with the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ in the process. The national policy and institution transformation in response to the forceful activities of the slum network could be considered as the change in the power relationship (sections 5.6 and 6.2.3). Hence, this bottom-up story of slum dwellers’ evolving role into ‘Primary Housing Agent’, read through the framework and practice of empowerment, also signifies the increasing decentralization in the Thai political environment over the decades.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Introduction
In Thailand, slum upgrading is acknowledged as the solution to the informal housing problem, and, since the early 1980s, the Thai government, NGOs, and international agencies have provided and implemented settlement upgrading. In particular, the BMK program is now internationally recognized as an initiative program that empowers slum inhabitants to become an equal partner with government agencies and other civil societies. However, the research argues that the development of slum upgrading in Thailand was not based on effective collaborations among those formal actors; rather it came about from the conflicts in vision, practice, and agency. The literature survey of the period before 2003 (before the official launch of BMK program) reveals that the evolution of Thai slum upgrading has not been well-documented and the connection between the previous and present upgrading programs is missing. On the top of that the slum inhabitants’ role as PHA has been left out from formal Thai low-cost housing accounts.

The thesis focused on the cross sections in time of two major projects that is representative of the broader reviewed narratives of change in Thai low-cost housing and its manifestations on the urbanization processes. Critically, the fieldwork identified a vital gap in knowledge where the connection between the three key components of the slum upgrading project, the empowerment process, and slum inhabitants’ role are not clearly linked and emphasised. Hence, the thesis establishes the linkages between the components to redress the slum inhabitant absence in formal narratives. The main objective of the thesis is to propose the transformation process of the slum inhabitants’ evolving role as a ‘Primary Housing Agent’ across the times, examined through connecting slum upgrading practices between 1980 and 2011.

At the theoretical level, the thesis explores the concept of empowerment and applies it to understand the evolution of the slum inhabitants’ role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. At the practical level, the thesis investigates the key driving factors and the correlations that affect the transformation process in addressing the three research questions. The main research question is ‘How did empowerment practices in the slum upgrading projects assist the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of Thai low-income housing development?’ The two sub-research questions are: ‘How were slum inhabitants previously active as the primary housing agent between 1980 and 2000?’ and ‘What are the slum inhabitant’s current roles as the primary housing agent, 2000 to 2011?’
8.1 Key Findings
8.1.1 The up-scale of empowerment over four decades and the transformation of the marginalized slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent’ of Thai low-income housing development

The thesis found that empowerment practices has been key in the role of slum inhabitant as leading housing agent and the socio-political power relationship between slum community organization and the local housing authorities. Significantly in the research, empowerment provides the theoretical framework to analyse and connect the transformation process between the times of slum upgrading practices and the evolving role of the slum inhabitants. Five key empowerment theories Clegg (1989), Gutierrez and Ortega’s (1991), Friedman (1992), and Narayan (2002), Alsop and Heinsohn (2005) were applied to the context of slum upgrading in Thailand. More importantly, it must be stressed that the thesis does not employ these empowerment theories as an evaluation tool to assess the effective role of the slum inhabitants, rather it is utilized as a framework to establish the linkage between slum inhabitants’ role and the slum upgrading project.

Representing over four decades of Thai low-cost housing development since the first slum upgrading project launched in early 1980s, the practices at Sengki and Tawanmai demonstrate the direct association between the implementation of empowerment and the alteration of slum inhabitants’ role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The specific objective of applying empowerment in the slum upgrading process is to get slum inhabitants, from the scale of community organization to the citywide network, to be the main actors of implementation process. In particular, the three types of empowerment approaches adopted in on the ground practices of (single) economic empowerment, socio-economic integrated empowerment, and political empowerment results in the up-scale of slum inhabitants in many aspects such as up-scale of status, of collective group interests, and of numbers. In the early stage of slum upgrading in Thailand, (single) economic empowerment was promoted as the major approach to enhance slum households’ assets and financial capacity through the process of saving and mortgage. Economic empowerment approach has its own benefits that could promote slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ but it cannot cope with the slum housing complexity that involves a wide range of struggles at the operational up to the policy levels. In the period of BMK upgrading, the empowerment practice was expanded into socio-economic integrated empowerment recognizing the lesson that slum upgrading should encourage social relationship among different socio-economic households and external partners. In the post-BMK upgrading period, the empowerment practice has been shifted into the political approach when the number of slum inhabitants became large in scale and network with linkages to other civil societies and local authorities. The large scale slum community network is a very powerful platform for boosting political empowerment because the network gives the slum inhabitant enormous accesses to decision making.
power and influence state policies that concerns the poor. Political empowerment brings slum city network into direct contact with state policy with the inclusion of community representatives on the highest policy making committees and through strategic mass demonstrations. Another critical aspect of this phase of empowerment is in the agency –as for the first time, it is led by the slum inhabitants themselves. Previous empowerment practice has been government facilitated, by comparison. Hence, the implementation of empowerment in slum housing context has been constantly transformed through time.

The thesis argues that the slum inhabitant becomes ‘Primary Housing Agent’ with increase in roles and influence due to the incremental up-scaling in the implementation of empowerment between 1980 and 2011, from Sengki to Tawanmai/BMK and Post-BMK. The slum inhabitant have been active as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ since the case of Sengki land-sharing upgrade and – through many ensuing slum upgrading programs – transformed, enlarged and expanded in roles and scale. The thesis proposes that the scaling up of empowerment practice is the solution to building the slum community organization into the slum citywide network and this process expands the slum inhabitant’s multi-scalar roles from the local into national level. The thesis synthesizes four scales of slum inhabitants as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ as a result of findings from the linkage of the two case studies.

The socio-cultural-political transformation of the individual household

1. Collective slum community organization
2. Government and slum community organization partnership

The socio-cultural-political transformation of the slum network

3. Slum community organization network (horizontal network between slum communities)
4. Slum citywide network (vertical and horizontal network between slum community and local organizations)

8.1.2 Socio-Economic Empowerment and the slum inhabitants’ active role as the primary housing agent of Technical and Management between 1980 and 2000

From the case study investigation, the thesis finds that the slum inhabitants were active as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ since the land-sharing practice at Sengki between 1980 and 1992. After 1992, the project brought about changes in Thai low-cost housing development to the formation of BMK program in 2003. The Sengki case study illustrates the importance of economic based empowerment, actively promoted through the partnership between the community organization and government housing agencies, on the growth of slum inhabitant role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The empowerment practice aimed at enhancing financial household capacity and up-skill financial management of slum inhabitants through the savings and loan process, which were the key mechanisms that drove the building of individual and community capacity. Through over a decade of
implementation, Sengki community obtained official land title from the public landlord and formed the first housing cooperative for low-income people in Thailand. After the project was completed in early 1990s, Sengki community was selected to be a demonstration project for urban poor housing by the UNHABITAT. The practice at Sengki provided evidences that slum inhabitants have the capacity as partnership of state housing development program which, from the 1990s onwards, advocated community organization as project partners.

Economic empowerment played an important role in promoting the slum inhabitants toward the primary housing agent of technical and management based savings process. This process manifests in the up-scale of slum inhabitants' role from single slum community organization to government-community partnership. However, the transformation process is limited to the community scale.

8.1.3 Political Empowerment and the slum inhabitant’s current roles as the Primary Housing Agent of Policy Development 2000 to 2011

Empowering slum inhabitants as leading housing agent depends on more than creating access to productive assets. The lessons learned from previous practices, including Sengki land-sharing, highlight the need for improved social relationship among different development agencies. The addition of social empowerment shifts the focus from the community and household financial capacities to also enable people to act collectively in communal social activities through the wide range of the BMK processes - particularly of collective savings, planning, and construction.

Moreover, the Tawanmai case study reveals a new vision to address slum housing problems at a citywide scale. At Tawanmai community, the slum inhabitants in conjunction with local development agencies adopted socio-economic integrated empowerment into the slum upgrading process. The collective practice in socio-economic empowerment provided the communication channel between Tawanmai residents, their local government agencies, and neighbourhood slum communities. Hence, the community citywide network emerged as a solution to the struggles faced by individual slum community organizations such as access to housing loan and technical knowledge, income generation etc. BMK promoted individual slum organizations to link across the city based micro-credit network which led to the establishment of Khon Kaen Institutional Citywide network. The citywide network, consisting of 72 community organizations across Khon Kaen city and national and international partners, is a powerful platform for larger scale developments that involves numerous slum communities making demands for change. The network undertakes collaborative projects which go beyond the original objective of BMK program, such as recycle network, social welfare network, and the city development fund.
After four years of BMK project implementation (2003-2007), Tawanmai achieved collective land title, new location and accommodations, and the first housing cooperative organization in Khon Kaen city. The completion of Tawanmai/BMK project further reinforces the direct linkage between the implementation of empowerment and the slum inhabitant role as ‘Primary Housing Agent’. The practice at Tawanmai exemplifies that slum inhabitant becomes agent of technical and management due to the application of socio-economic empowerment which substantiates the up-scaling of slum inhabitants’ role from single slum community organization to the citywide network. Since then, formal development agencies in Thailand accepted community citywide network as an important development mechanism. Significantly, this transformation process into the citywide network and the growing role of slum community network in low-income housing development was not limited to Khon Kaen, but has been substantially extended across the country.

However, the slum inhabitant being ‘the technical and management expert of saving process’ faced clear limitations in dealing with the slum problems at the structural level such as the case of CODI revolving fund shortage in 2008. Moreover, BMK upgrading projects across the country encountered the problem of local building code enforcement. Post-BMK upgrading period, the growing political role of slum citywide network in demanding for policy change clearly emerged with the network (and their national and international alliances) that actively utilized political empowerment to seek changes in the existing political system and advocate for pro-poor policies. On the ground, the citywide network organized political exercises such as committee elections, public hearings, and forums to exchange ideas with neighbourhood communities. At the national level, NGOs alliances play an important role in promoting political participation for a large number of slum inhabitants through various measures. Specifically, the alliance’s (with FRSN) representatives’ negotiations with the state agency in conjunction with the ‘critical mass’ demonstration against the state agent has been considered a practical and effective strategy with the two activities connected via the network of community leaders in the citywide scale. This new approach of political based empowerment movement did not emerged independently, rather it has been developed with and is closely connected to the socio-economic based empowerment practices as collective assets and social power are fundamental to strengthening slum people’s political rights.

The citywide networks’ collective activism on building code reform, land used reform, and the formation of city development fund are key examples that affirms the importance of the up-scaling to political empowerment as part of the evolving role of slum inhabitant to become the ‘Primary Housing Agent of Policy Development’. The thesis stresses that this enabling of slum inhabitants as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ is only achieved through the incremental up-scaling of empowerment that has been integral in the slum upgrading practice and process across four decades.
8.2 Research contribution to knowledge

8.2.1 Implications for practice: Alternative political empowerment framework

The thesis argues that political empowerment to promote slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ should be more than making them the leading actors in implementing the upgrading process, as already emphasized by the CODI, and to also include the voice of the large scale slum inhabitants in the process of policy deliberations. While achieving some goals, the slum citywide network’s political movement illustrates that the representative negotiation paired with mass demonstration approaches are not sufficient to influence state policy, although those cases clearly represent the growth in political empowerment of the slum citywide network at the national level.

In response to this issue, the thesis proposes an alternative political empowerment framework to the Thai government, local state organization, and relevant development agency. The fundamental idea of the framework is direct participation. The framework promotes the slum citywide network to have a say in policy formation, informing the experts, authorities and politicians. This could occur through the creation of access for the slum inhabitants to have direct participation in the policy initiation process. Rather than let distant government ministries, agencies have central roles over policy making process, the thesis proposes that the networked slum inhabitants should undertake the collaborative role of policy initiation with city, region and state agencies. The government should undertake political and institutional reforms to include the slum inhabitants’ voice in the political system. These can be done through the various measures of direct participation such as public hearings, public forums, and community consultations.

The thesis proposes the ‘local oriented policy’ as part of an alternative framework to promote the political empowerment at the national level for the citywide network of slum inhabitants. This empowerment practice can be developed from the thesis findings on the practice of Thai slum upgrading from 1980-2011, which demonstrated the incremental ‘up-scale’ of empowerment practice from single economic to socio-economic integration and then to political empowerment and is the thesis’ main contribution to knowledge. To refine the empowerment practice, the thesis proposes a framework to promote citywide network in policy formation which consists of four stages; Community information database, Community alternatives, Community influenced decision making power, and Local oriented policy. The figure below illustrates the outlined of the purposive political empowerment framework.
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Empowerment Agency

Slum organization

Create demand for change:
Direct participation in state housing policy initiative
Aim: Increase slum inhabitant power

Empowerment Process

Process of local oriented policy:
1. Community information database
2. Community alternatives
3. Community influenced decision making power
4. Local oriented policy

Empowerment Outcome

1. City-based information
2. Alternative plan
3. Decision Making Power control
4. Pro-slum policy

Empowerment Goal

The slum inhabitant as political ‘Primary Housing Agent’

State agency

Strengthen response to demand:
Opportunity Structural Change
- Institutional reform
- Regulation reform
- Funding channel reform
Aim: Decrease state power

Figure 8.1: The refined empowerment framework

1. Community information database: building on CODI’s practices (section 6.3.1), the development of local information about the city’s problem, needs, and aspirations must be integrated in the empowerment process. This is the collective information from the local community that connects the individual into the citywide scale (section 6.4.1). The outcome is the city-based database that feeds into the initiation and development process of state housing policies and programs, ensuring that the real, actual needs of the local people are included as the essential part of the policy initiation process.

2. Community alternatives: this is a community led process that deliberates planning options and solutions for slum housing problems. Rather than depend on the state’s prescribed solutions, more appropriate solutions to the local context could emerge from the ground (section 6.3.4 and 6.3.5). As a result slum inhabitants have the freedom to initiate and explore alternatives and make choices based on their context, needs, and priorities towards a responsive outcome that reflects their housing need and capacity (section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3). The alternative plan could be undertaken through collaborative projects between the slum community and their local development actors such as the municipality, NGOs, and universities. Plans that are outcomes of operation and
consultation between various interest groups are often more in keeping with grounded realities, have more transparency and participation (section 6.3.5). In particular, this process promotes state agencies, at local and national levels, to work closely with the community (section 6.3.1-6.3.6).

3. **Community influenced decision making power;** the community is in control of decision-making and the government agency enters into the process as required by the community (section 6.4.1). This is the type of community participation where the community has full ownership over policy initiation process, while the state agencies and other formal development actors respond and support. Direct participation in state housing policy-making is carried out through various strategies such as public hearing, public forum, community consultation, and city development strategies (section 6.6.2). The effective implementation of this stage lessens potential conflicts between government agendas and local needs. Importantly, it promotes the value of democratic decentralization of power to the marginal inhabitants and breaks the monopoly on decision making traditionally held by politicians, developers and government officers (section 6.6.2.3).

4. **Local oriented policy;** this is the ultimate goal of the alternative political empowerment framework. Local oriented policy focuses attention on the extent to which slum inhabitants are able to participate in, contribute to, and benefit from state housing policy (section 6.6.2.4). It represents and strengthens the voice of the slum inhabitant with the aim to influence government policy.

Through this refined framework, in the future the slum inhabitants could be further up-scaled to become the Primary Housing Agent of policy initiation as well as implementation.

### 8.2.2 Slum movement momentum post-2011 research fieldwork

The empowerment practices in Thai low-income housing development have influenced the general awakening of slum inhabitants and organizations as active agent of changes in directing external conditions of the political, economic and social structures. Since post TWM/BMK, empowerment practices have become the concrete foundation in the promotion of the slum inhabitant as primary agent of low-cost housing development not only in Thailand but also at the international level. The tangible evidences include the expansion of slum network and political movement across Asian countries such as the People Movement for Social Justice (PMOVE), The Leaders and Organizers of Community Organization in Asia (LOCOA), and Southeast Asian Slums Network for Housing Rights (SASNHR). Their movement has clearly evolved beyond the original government housing objective and policy.
Observed recently, the FRSN and grass root organizations’ coalition of about 500 people organized a walking demonstration to submit an open letter to the representative of Prime Minister Prayudh Chan-o-cha on the World Habitat Day on 3rd October 2016 in front of Thailand Government House. While another group of 2,000 protesters managed by PMOVE demonstrated at the UN Thailand Head Office (see figure 8.2-8.3). These protests occurred amidst a military junta government that has been in power since May 2014. These movements reflect the dynamic momentum over time of slum organizations independent of national political fluctuations. Thai governments, official housing agencies may have changed but the slum organizations have sustained their collaborative movement in fighting for urban poor housing and quality of life.

Figure 8.2 FRSN had demonstration at Thailand Government House

Figure 8.3 PMOVE run protest at UN Office, Thailand

8.3 Future Research Implication
This thesis investigates the relationship between slum upgrading practice, empowerment, and the role of slum inhabitant as ‘Primary Housing Agent’ across two key case studies. The research also demonstrates the process of how the broad concepts of social-economical-political empowerment have been contextualized at the specific locations and powerless groups. Although one cannot jump
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into generalizations based on the results from two case communities, the long period of time of approximately four decades covered by the case studies can be considered representative of the likely situations and complications to be encountered in other contexts. There are research findings that could be further interrogated in potential future research focusing on the powerless groups, the development project, and gender factors.

The strengthening of disempowered people to become primary development agent is the key driving factor of the decades-long development program’s success. This was achieved since the early practice of Thai slum upgrading at the Sengki land-sharing in the 1980s. There is an opportunity to investigate the process of slum inhabitant transformation to become the leading development agency as a model to investigate the process of how other urban and rural disadvantaged groups such as the labour union of Thailand, the Assembly of the Poor, and the Four Region Slum Network established their organizations. The question is why many of these federations face significant limitations to achieve multi-scalar agent status, in contrast to the slum citywide network. In addition, there are opportunities to apply the thesis’ research methods to focus on ethnic, regional and political backgrounds, migrant labour from Indochina, Thai ‘Red Shirt’ and ‘Yellow Shirt’ political groups. Many of these groups have been involved in collaborative partnerships with slum citywide network since its inception. The post-BMK upgrading period political movements demonstrate that the hundreds of thousands of poor households are the key drivers of the concrete resistance to government policies and state agencies (section 5.7 and 6.6.2). Thus research on other powerless groups is important to understand how these networks developed and functioned because they could inform policy makers and practitioners in the context of the general trend in the increased decentralization in Thailand.

The Thai slum upgrading projects is comprehensive with the robust association between savings process and socio-physical environment. This is achieved through the integrated approach that utilizes and involves citywide network of development actors, social-economic-political empowerment, and citywide upgrading program – key components that set slum upgrading program apart from other poverty alleviation programs that usually focus on single aspects such as location, agency, and

1 The Red-Shirts are formally known as the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD). The focus of many Red-Shirts’ campaigning zeal is former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted by a military coup in September 2006. The Yellow-Shirts represent those opposed to Mr. Thaksin and they were the force behind the street protests that led to the 2006 and 2014 coups. They are a loose grouping of royalists, ultra-nationalists and the urban middle class also known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268, access 5th November 2015), which later evolved into the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC).

2 Arguably, even in the context of the recent military coups – an area beyond the scope of the thesis.
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approach. The lessons learned from slum upgrading program have potential contribution to address the limits of the conventional development programs and to enable the scalability of those programs. Research projects on poverty reduction projects can be further conducted in the areas of income generation, mortgage recovery, retirement funds, healthcare and many social welfare services at the upgraded BMK projects.

Another issue for future research is the association between gender and the role of slum inhabitants as primary housing agent in the context of slum upgrading project. The research found that empowering slum people as active agent has strong association with gender, not in terms of gender equity, but has been gender driven. In particular, the leading role of women in settlement upgrading process has to be recognized. The findings from fieldwork reveal that the key agents in any community housing programs are always women whether the community leader is a woman or not. Women dominates the upgrading process in a wide range of roles such as savings groups, community planning committee, financial management, price negotiation, and even in construction labour teams. They have the effective ability to mobilized support for or against interventions in their settlement and, it can be argued, the participation of women is the key to slum upgrading project’s success. Future research can investigate the linkage between gender, empowerment, and slum upgrading practices and how they transform and up-scale women as the key drivers of projects, rather than men. And what about the women role’s on state agency side (state government officers)? Are they active agents of slum upgrading projects in government?

The thesis fieldwork concluded at what can be considered as a nearly stage of the growth in the role of slum inhabitant network and their civil society alliances in policy at the national level. What is observed as the up-scale in political empowerment of slum inhabitants is not completed and has been constantly evolving through time. This long-term tendency demonstrates that the slum inhabitants’ movement has progressed far beyond the original objectives of the upgrading program. The research on slum inhabitants’ evolving role as primary housing agent in the Thai context of increasing political decentralization is therefore crucial to generate a better understanding of the slum inhabitant transformation process. To re-investigate the slum inhabitant evolution in next ten or twenty years could provide knowledge of how these active agents developed and how the characteristics of primary housing agent’, generally and specifically, changed from their roles as outlined in this research.
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**Interview**


(FRSN-2/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Ponganan Chuangtham, FRSN Leader, 9th December 2011 at CODI Head office, Pangkapi, Bangkok

(FRSN-3/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Ponganan Chuangtham, FRSN Leader, 4th May 2011 at Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, Ramkamheang 39, Bangkok

(FRSN-4/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Atpayuth Chantarapa, FRNS Leader, 11st May 2011 at Human Settlement Foundation Thailand, Ramkamheang 39, Bangkok.

(NULICO-1/FM/L/BKK) = Ms. Angkana Khaopuek, The NULICO board of Bangkok and Eastern region, 14th May 2011 at Mass Communication Organization of Thailand

(NULICO-2/M/L/KK) = Mr. Pirot Suwannahong, The secretary of NULICO, 10th June 2011 at CODI office, Bang Kapi Bangkok

(NULICO-3/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Pirot Suwannahong, the secretary of NULICO Secretary, 9th November 2011 at CODI office, Ramkamheang, Bangkok

(NULICO-4/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Prapart Sengpradab, the NULICO Board of Bangkok and Eastern Region, 12th November 2011, at Bang Bua Community Bangkok

(UM/FM/RS/NKP) = Prof. Oratha Ad-am, the researcher at a time of Sengki’s project implementation, 29th April 2011, at the Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University

(NHA/M/RS/BKK) = Mr. Yongyudh Triyavanich, The National Housing Authority, 5th May 2011

(CODI/FM/L/BKK) = Ms. Kanitha Preechaprechakub, the vice-president of CODI, 5th May 2011. She was a former staff of CHHSS at Senkgi community upgrading project.

(KKU-1/M/S/KK) = Prof. Dhanu Pholawatr. Leader team of Designer of Tawanmai community and the former Dean of Faculty of Architecture, Khon Kaen University, 24th March 2011 at the Faculty of Architecture Khon Kaen University

(KKU-2/M/S/KK) = Prof. Dhanu Pholawatr, Leader team of Designer of Tawanmai community and former Dean of Faculty of Architecture Khon Kaen University, 3rd April 2011 at the Faculty of Architecture Khon Kaen University

(KKU-3/M/S/KKU) = Prof. Buapun Prompakping, The expert of community development, 4th April 2011 at Faculty of Humanities Sciences, Khon Kaen University

(KKU-4/M/S/KKU) = Prof. Teeravisidh, Apisak, The secretary of Khon Kaen BMK project, 26th March 2011 at Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University

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(SK-1/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew, The former Sengki community leader, 26th April 2011 at Sengki Cooperative Office

(SK-2/M/CM/BKK) = Mr. Pipatr Boontepsuk, Unit 33, 30th April 2011, at Sengki Community

(SK-3/FM/CM/BKK) = Mrs. Renu Adsakorn, Unit 136/2, 30th April 2011, at Sengki Community

(SK-4/FM/CM/BKK) = Mr. Bunjong Suansakaew, Unit 60, 30th April 2011, at Sengki Community

(SK-5/FM/CM/BKK) = Mr. Sawai Chuensawad, Unit 49/8, 30th April 2011, at Sengki Community

(SK-6/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Worathep Tienchareonchai, Sengki Community Leader. 28th March 2011, at Sengki Cooperative Office

(SK-7/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Worathep Tienchareonchai, Sengki Community Leader. 8th April 2011, at Sengki Cooperative Office

(SK-8/M/L/BKK) = Mr. Thongchai Suansakaew, Former Sengki Community Leader, 9th April 2011, at Sengki Cooperative Office

(SK-9/FM/L/BKK) = Ms. Wilailak Waikut, Sengki Community, 1st May 2011, at Unit 90.

(SK-10/M/CM/BKK) = Mr. Wanchai Surasee, Sengki Community, 1st May 2011, at Unit 82.

(SK-11/FM/L/BKK) = Ms. Patum Sriwan, Sengki Community, 1st May 2011, at Unit 112.

(TWM-1/FM/L/KK) = Ms. Amnoy Worayot, The former Tawanmai community leader, 20th March 2011, at 204/89 Moo 14, Na Muang sub-district, Tawanmai community Khon Kaen

(TWM-2/FM/L/KK) = Amnoy Worayot, The former Tawanmai community leader, 3rd November 2010 at 204/89 Moo 14, Na Muang sub-district, Tawanmai community Khon Kaen

(TWM-3/FM/L/KK) = Mrs. Amnoy Worayot, The former Tawanmai community leader, 12th July 2004 and 22nd March 2011 at Tawanmai community Khon Kaen

(TWM-4/FM/L/KK) = Mrs. Sai-Adul Ngo-budha, Leader team of land negotiation, 22nd March 2011, at Tawanmai community

(TWM-5/FM/CM/KK) = Ms. Mali Tong-yang, construction worker, 12th May 2011, at Tawanmai community

(TWM-6/M/L/KK) = Mr. Kitti Cherdchu, The leader of FRSN, 26th March 2011 at Theparak no.5 community Khon Kaen

(TWM-7/FM/CM/KK) = Mrs. Siriluck Tulakan, Secretary of Tawanmai Cooperative Committee, 20th March 2011, Tawanmai community Khon Kaen

(TWM-8/FM/KKM) = Ms. Waraporn Boonsri, Head of Division of Social Affairs Khon Kaen Municipality, 24th March 2011, at KKM office Khon Kaen

(TWM-9/FM/FCM/KK) = Mr. Yod Kungseang, the former member of Tawanmai saving group, 21st March 2011, at informal house nearby Tawanmai community.

(TWM-10/M/L/KK) = Mr. Prasit Musika-Charoen, the representative of Department of Cooperative, at the Department of Cooperative Khon Kaen Regional Office

(S-201/M/L/KK) = Mr. Udom Sawai-ngern, Sam Leam 2 community leader, 22nd March 2011, at Sam Leam 2 Community Khon Kaen.
Appendix

Appendix 1: The CHHSS survey of the average monthly household of Sengki Community (Aid-am, 1988:46)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Monthly salary (Baht)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low income household</td>
<td>0-4,000</td>
<td>59.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income household</td>
<td>4,001-8,000</td>
<td>21.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,001-12,000</td>
<td>9.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,001-16,000</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,001-20,000</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income household</td>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,001-40,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 40,001</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average monthly salary per household is 5,393 baht. The survey was conduct by CHHSS and University of Mahidol research team in 1988.

Appendix 2: The community survey of the average monthly household of Sengki Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Monthly salary (Baht)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low income household</td>
<td>0-4,000</td>
<td>40.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium income household</td>
<td>4,001-8,000</td>
<td>15.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,001-12,000</td>
<td>12.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12,001-16,000</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,001-20,000</td>
<td>3.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High income household</td>
<td>20,001-30,000</td>
<td>10.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,001-40,000</td>
<td>9.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than 40,001</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sampling group was 102 of 126 households. The average monthly salary per household is 7,955 baht. The survey was conduct between April and May 2011.

Appendix 3: Criteria of Eligible Household for Land Allocation

1. The dweller must be presently living in the community or had been living in community before the fire in 1979
2. One land plot had area 12 sq.wah (48 sq.m) approximately wide 4 m. X 12 m deep.
3. One land plot available for one family which consisted of less than 10 people
4. The allocation will be prioritised based on land tenure status from directly tenant of the CPB, to sub-tenant, and to rental without land lease respectively
5. The urgent need of accommodation would be listed
6. The voluntarily for community development or community participation would be listed

**Appendix 4:** The table demonstrates the source of SHC office construction funding;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction cost</th>
<th>Budget (baht)</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>86,250</td>
<td>Dweller shared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>1,342,457</td>
<td>UNDP (100,000 baht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Netherland Habitat (400,000 baht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bangkok Politician (200,000 baht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dweller shared (256,207 baht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SHC lending from MHA revolving fund (300,000 baht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,428,707</td>
<td>Internal budget source 386,250 baht (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>External budget source 1,042,457 baht (73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 5:** The key criteria of Tawanmai land selection;

1. Land should less expensive and members were able to repay regularly without obstructing their income balance. The realistic price was calculated from the resident existing household payment per month such as rent and all infrastructure bills.
2. Resident agreed with the rough estimation on land area that one family will occupy land plot of approximately 40 sq.m per unit. Therefore, the total area of new location should larger than 6,300 sq.m or 4 rai (including open space i.e. community centre, playground 30%).
3. The land must be located inside Khon Kaen Municipality boundary
4. New land should be connected public infrastructure and land-filled to save cost for the residents
5. Location can access to public infrastructure and transportation to work, school, and other public amenities.
6. Community lifestyle at new location should reveal positive change or better standard.

**Appendix 6:** Three alternative locations for Tawanmai relocation

According to the institutional citywide network meeting report on 18th May 2004, three final locations were shortlisted;

- The private land at Soi (alley) 5 behind Khon Kaen University sale at 2 MB per rai
- The private land behind Lotus Superstore in front of Kean Nakorn school sale at 600,000 baht per rai
The Empowerment of the Slum Inhabitant as a Primary Agent of Low-Income Housing: the case study of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980 and 2011: Reference and Appendix

- The private land nearby Srachaphun tennis court and Khon Kaen University sale at 1.4 MB per rai

Appendix 7: The rule of screening new Tawanmai Co-op membership

According to KKM (2009:5), key criterions for selecting new membership were defined as below:

- Candidate must presently and continuously live in KKM area at lease for 5 years (the qualified people were identified by KKM housing registration and database)
- Candidate have total family income per month not over 15,000 baht
- Membership was eligible for family unit not individual people
- One family was eligible for one declaration of land and house unit
- Other conditions was absolutely judged by the saving committee

Appendix 8: Housing framework

Four major issues:

1. Land plot have an area approximately 10 sq.wah (40 sq.m) per unit and one family was eligible for only one land plot allocation.
2. The amount of housing and land mortgage was calculating based upon the residents daily salary which ensures that they can afford repayment, totally around 2,000 baht per month.
3. The public space would consist of about 30% of the whole community area to well address the local building code. In the case that more space is available, it will be exploited for future extensions of housing construction.
4. Every community member desired low-rise housing (one or two stories house) within their own plot of land. They do not prefer high-rise housing apartment blocks as this did not accommodate their home base economic activities and lifestyles.

Design Framework of Tawanmai community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of housing development</td>
<td>Relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total area of community</td>
<td>The minimum area of new location; 4 rai or 6,300 sq.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public land use</td>
<td>Public space occupies 30% of total area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing characteristic</td>
<td>1 storey row house / 2 storeys row house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land plot allocation</td>
<td>10 wah² (40 m²) per unit per family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public facilities</td>
<td>Multi-purpose building (Community hall, Co-op office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Playground, sport fields, Community welfare housing unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 9: The construction process at Tawanmai community (Dhabhalabutr, 2009)

Appendix 10: In-depth interview and questionnaire (60-90 minute)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-depth interview / Focus group discussion from</th>
<th>Code:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For local inhabitants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewer:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Participant’s background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Surname:</th>
<th>Date:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age:</td>
<td>Time:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex:</td>
<td>Location:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Empowerment of the Slum Inhabitant as a Primary Agent of Low-Income Housing: the case study of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980 and 2011: Reference and Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of person per household:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of residence in community:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original Place of resident:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. The role, responsibility, or relationship between participant and slum upgrading program

- What are you working on with slum upgrading program?
- What is your title/task and responsibility in slum upgrading program?
- What is your degree of participation with slum upgrading program?
- How many days/hours a week do you work on slum upgrading program?
- Why the resident is working with slum upgrading program?

### 3. The experience of change after involved in slum upgrading program

- What resident’s perception change emerged due to slum upgrading program comparing between before and after involved in program? (perception, self-awareness, self-esteem)
- What changes in social relationship have emerged as direct and indirect result of implementation (Between you and family member, neighbourhood, outsider stakeholder)?
- What social status, economic, political changes did you experience?
- What internal and external factors influenced on your change?
- What are positive and negative consequences of the change to resident/community?

### 4. The method, device, communication that was employed to community organization management

- What method, device, mechanism was utilized to achieve community objective?
  - Saving and preparation stage
  - Acquiring land ownership
  - Planning and Design stage
  - Construction (Building and infrastructure)
  - Post-upgrading

- How do the tools function?
- How you and your community influence on slum upgrading program?

Note: Question no 2-5 below will be used for focus group discussion too.

**Questionnaire (15-20 minute)**

**Topic:** The poor as a Low-Cost Housing Agent: Case studies of slum upgrading in Thailand

**By:** Researcher

Please answer the followed questions;

**Location:** .......................................................... ..........................................................

**Date:** ................................................................................................................................

### Part 1: Personal Background

1. **Name (or family’s leader name):** .......................................................... ..........................................................

2. **Gender**
   - [ ] Male
   - [ ] Female
The Empowerment of the Slum Inhabitant as a Primary Agent of Low-Income Housing: the case study of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980 and 2011: Reference and Appendix

3. Age
   □ < 18 □ 18-30 □ 31-40 □ 41-50 □ > 51

4. Education
   □ Primary □ High school □ College/Undergrad □ Postgraduate

5. Religion
   □ Buddhism □ Christianity □ Islam □ No religion □ Others

6. Nationality
   □ Thai □ Others

7. Native habitat
   □ Bangkok □ Khon Kaen □ Others

8. Length of residence in community:
   □ < 1 yrs □ 1-5 yrs □ 5-10 yrs □ 10-30 yrs □ > 30 yrs

Part 2: The responsibility or relationship between participant and slum upgrading program

10 How you involved in slum upgrading program?
   □ Apply/Walk in □ Community leader suggestion □ Family member suggestion
   □ Government officer □ Friend suggestion □ Others

11 How many days a week on slum upgrading program?
   □ 1-2 day □ 3-4 day □ 5-6 baht □ 7 day

12 What is your team position on slum upgrading program?
   □ Community leader / President □ Vice President □ Accountant
   □ Counsellors Board □ Administration / Management □ Secretary
   □ Information / Public relationship □ Committee of CBO, Saving
   □ General Saving committee □ Member of COB, Saving group
   □ Member of planning and design group □ Member of construction group
   □ Member of social welfare group □ Others

13 Why resident is working with slum upgrading program?
   □ Develop strong community □ Change government policies
   □ Lack of help from parties (government authorities) / need help □ Government policy
   □ A sense of pride in doing things for themselves □ Get security tenure
   □ Norm of self-sacrifice to community / others □ Others

Part 3: The experience of change after involved in slum upgrading program

14. What improved outcome has occurred to you and community after complete program?
   □ More involved in community activity (apply to community group, access to decision making process, spend more time to interact / meeting with community)
   □ Better relationship b/w resident, outsider stakeholder, and neighbourhood (more participate, meeting, better service, well cooperate and inform, expand connection to various group)
   □ Empower your ability (involve in community network, well-organized on expense, human resource development program)
   □ Enhance personal skill and self-development (management, accounting, construction) via learning process (training, workshop, site visit)
   □ Positive perception, self-awareness (proud of themselves as role model, pilot study, site visit host, attain admiration from neighbourhood/ friend/ family member/ government officer/ network)
The Empowerment of the Slum Inhabitant as a Primary Agent of Low-Income Housing: the case study of Sengki and Tawanmai Communities, Thailand 1980 and 2011: Reference and Appendix

- Increase sense of place (develop community welfare/fund, form new cluster of friendship, create common space, recover community tradition, and establish new regulation)
- Increase sense of belonging (feel more secured, willing to invest/improve in house, more saving, set up realistic future plan, volunteer to community organization)
- Identify community future plan (saving for retirement, part-time job, further education, investment)
- Create community database, internal resource in term of saving and social welfare
- Better build environment and security tenure (authorized land and house ownership, access to public welfare/facility, environment friendly, energy saving)
- Others

Part 4: Method, tool, device is employed in slum upgrading program

15. How you and community influence the implementation of slum upgrading program?
- Force outsider network (municipality, university, NGOs) to solve problem together
- Expanding network to various level (horizontal and vertical)
- Unite people solving problem together under particular process
- Set up community organization (saving group) as core unit mechanism
- Enlarge period of time interaction between community member/stakeholder
- Encourage the young to be involved in community work
- Create/Participate in public forum with academics, journalists and mass media
- Hold public forum with academic, journalist, and NGOs network
- Set up community organization (saving group) as core unit mechanism
- Others

16. How you participate with the slum upgrading process?
- Meeting panel, audience
- Community member (General)
- Support/volunteer labour or money
- Give feedback/comments (idea)
- Community committee/Board
- Monitoring, answer the question/support information

17. How you communicate with member or stake holders?
- One-way communication
- Formal conversation
- Verbal conservation
- Two-way communication
- Informal conservation
- Others

18. How you receive information?
- Informal conversation (chat, gossip, asking friends)
- Formal conversation (community meeting, official document from board)
- Community leader/committee transfer to resident (pay visit)
- From media, poster, printing, board
- Internet, online
- Community radio
- Telephone, mobile phone, message
Part 5: Other comments about slum upgrading program

1. ................................................................................................................................. Sug1

2. ................................................................................................................................. Sug2

3. ................................................................................................................................. Sug3

........................................................................................................................................