THE POISON GARDEN

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ABSTRACT

In their three 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passages in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari identify as sorcerers instead of as philosophers, and draw a line between the practice of sorcery and writing philosophy. At the heart of these passages, they mysteriously state "[i]f the writer is a sorcerer, it is because writing is a becoming, writing is traversed by strange becomings that are not becomings-writer...".¹ This thesis is an effort to investigate the *strange becomings* that dictate the practice of writing philosophy. More firmly, it is an attempt to *practice sorcery* through the discipline of reading and writing philosophy. To do so, it targets the *strange-becomings* that traverse Friedrich Nietzsche's writing as cues of an untimely and sorcerous philosophy. In particular, it poses Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return as a philosophically ripe motif for practicing sorcery. The allure of the eternal return is at once a blessing and a curse, depending on how its cast is received. Nietzsche articulated the weight of his doctrine philosophically in *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. He also recounts literally experiencing the thought of the eternal return in Sils-Maria in 1881. This experience haunted Nietzsche's life and his writing from its arrival until his collapse in 1889. Accordingly, this thesis will revolve with Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return at its axis, in tandem with a definition of sorcery inspired by Deleuze and Guattari. It will consider significant episodes from Nietzsche's main works, as well as biographical details, and perspectives put forth by other philosophers in his wake, such as Isabelle Stengers, Luce Irigaray, Gilles Deleuze, George Bataille, and Pierre Klossowski. This work treats citations from their texts as fragments of a larger *incantation* which, when read together, cast Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return into a new light. The practice of sorcery will be rethought philosophically as an active expression of the will to power, and further, as a means of fidelity to Nietzsche's overman and his untimely hope for the future. This will be put in direct contrast to reactive expressions of the will to power championed by ideologies of late-capitalism and neoliberalism. Throughout its course, this strange pairing of sorcery with Nietzschean philosophy is bound by an implicit thematic refrain, *The Poison Garden*, which is formally addressed and summarised at the conclusion of the work.

DECLARATION

(i) This thesis comprises only my original work towards the Master of Fine Art (Interdisciplinary arts practice) except where indicated in the preface;

(ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; and

(iii) This thesis is fewer than the maximum word limit in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Beau Deurwaarder

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I presented an early version of 'Magic and Reality', in collaboration with Sean Crossley, entitled 'The Poison Garden: Unnatural Participation', at the 'The Dark Precursor: International Conference on Deleuze and Artistic Research', held at the Orpheus Institute in Ghent, Belgium, on 9-11 November 2015. This was made possible by a Faculty Small Grants Scheme awarded to me by Victorian College of the Arts at the University of Melbourne. Thank you to Sean, Chris and Jonas at Hekla for hosting me in Brussels in the lead up to that event.

I presented an early version of 'Intension' entitled 'The Poison Garden: Anomalous Intension', at the 9th International Deleuze Studies Conference, 'Virtuality, Becoming, Life', held at the University of Roma Tre, Rome, Italy, on 11-13 July 2016. This was made possible by a Faculty Graduate Student Assistance Grant awarded to me by Victorian College of the Arts at the University of Melbourne. Thank you to Peter Villwock at the Nietzsche Haus in Sils Maria, Switzerland, for welcoming me after that event.

Attached as an appendix is a paper entitled 'The Poison Garden: Nietzsche's Flowers', that I presented at the Australasian Society of Continental Philosophy (ASCP) Conference held at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia, on 7-10 December 2016.
CONTENTS

2 Abstract
3 Declaration
4 Acknowledgements

7 Introduction
17 PHILOSOPHER COMETS
25 SOUNDERS OF THE DEPTHS
33 FIG-WASP
43 DO YOU BELIEVE IN SORCERY?
52 SORCERER LOVE
59 THE WAVES
70 POSITIVE DISTANCE
84 'IN SPITE OF'
97 INTENSION
108 Conclusion

113 Bibliography
119 Appendix
120 a: Magic and Reality
134 b: Nietzsche's Flowers
Imagine a garden with a hundred kinds of trees, a thousand kinds of flowers, a hundred kinds of fruit and vegetables. Suppose, then, that the gardener of this garden knew no other distinction than between edible and inedible, nine-tenths of this garden would be useless to him. He would pull up the most enchanting flowers and hew down the noblest trees and even regard them with a loathing and envious eye...  

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Looking back, this research began in 2013. At the time I was renting a small art studio in Northcote, which I used mostly for drinking coffee and reading philosophy. Without any clear intentions or expectations in mind, I started working on a series of experiments dedicated to the complexity of *A Thousand Plateaus*. The idea for these works came from a request to run an hour-long seminar on the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. I decided to concentrate entirely on *A Thousand Plateaus*, and found very quickly that I couldn't decide on which section to teach. Each plateau is so philosophically generous that it felt wrong to select one at the expense of all others. Moreover, each plateau runs into the next, and often blurs with those that precede it. In lieu of a preference, I decided to search for a way to teach the entirety of *A Thousand Plateaus* at once, and importantly, in a single sitting. What emerged was a year long experiment in philosophy that I referred to broadly as *Flat Multiplicities*: a series of works and performances that condensed *A Thousand Plateaus* into exactly one thousand sentences. Each sentence was extracted from the text faithfully as a citation, and rearranged alongside other citations in a manner that served the work's overarching narrative. In this way, each citation was selected and reassembled in an order that was not random, but rhizomatic. It was my intention with this work to retell *A Thousand Plateaus* in a way in which the original body of work would change, in accordance with the sentences selected, their composition, and the detail that was omitted. My hope with this work was to place the words of *A Thousand Plateaus* in a state of becoming, in line with the philosophical intentions of Deleuze and Guattari's work itself.

For the first incarnation, presented in late 2013, *Flat Multiplicities* took approximately 72 minutes to read in a single, uninterrupted sitting. Akin to the text it was abridging, the delivery of *Flat Multiplicities* was designed to be exhausting, to both the audience members and the speaker himself. In many ways, I consider *A Thousand Plateaus* to be a work of delirium. With the length and conceptual scope of *Flat Multiplicities*, I hoped to replicate this feeling. In 2014 I presented *Flat Multiplicities* again at a small arts festival in Canberra. This time I performed the work alongside a visual piece, where I captured all one thousand sentences in scrawling handwriting across a single sheet of paper. With this large text piece, also titled *Flat Multiplicities*, I was hoping

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1 *Flat Multiplicities* was first presented at the *Non-Knowledge* philosophy collective in Perth, Western Australia, on 20 November 2013. *Non-Knowledge* was a monthly philosophy and arts seminar hosted by the Paper Mountain ARI in Northbridge, directed by Eva Bujalka and Francis Russell.

2 The second incarnation of *Flat Multiplicities* was hosted by the *You Are Here* festival, at an overnight event entitled 'The Night Fort', at the Canberra Museum and Gallery on the 15-16 March 2014. That evening, I delivered the piece in full at 3:30 am to an audience of weary individuals. The visual accompaniment was exhibited at the *You Are Here* Festival Hub for the following few days of the festival.
to materialise the experience of the performance piece itself, but on a single piece of paper, instead of in a single sitting. When looking at the large sheet of cramped handwriting, the viewer could theoretically read a sentence from any page of *A Thousand Plateaus*, in any order, depending on how they directed their gaze. This work led to hosting a solo exhibition in Melbourne of the same content, as well as a looped video piece of the performance and some drawings to accompany the main work.\(^3\) Inspired by the reception of this series from my peers, I described these experiments in practice in a paper at the 7th International Deleuze Studies Conference in Istanbul, Turkey.\(^4\) The following month, I finally laid *Flat Multiplicities* to rest, at a continental philosophy camp entitled 'Get Reassembled', at Performing Arts Forum (PAF), in Saint Erme, France.\(^5\)

In the 'Introduction' to *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that "[i]he ideal for a book [like theirs] would be to lay everything out on a plane of exteriority[,] on a single sheet, the same sheet".\(^6\) This 'ideal' inspired the conceptual core of the *Flat Multiplicities* series. With that work I wanted to investigate what happens when you attempt to capture and compress *A Thousand Plateaus* into a single composition. I realised, in fidelity to the work in question, that the lines of writing that I took from the text were affected by more than just their technical rearrangement. The means of reiteration, delivery of performance, exhibition space, audience mood, even the time of day or night - all affected the work in significant ways. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari hold that "[a] multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature".\(^7\) By selecting particular conceptual dimensions of *A Thousand Plateaus*, and restating them with my own experimental efforts, I created an *assemblage*, or rather, *a series of assemblages*, that expanded the connections I saw latent in Deleuze and Guattari's work.\(^8\) Far from "reducing the number of dimensions" in their text with an abridged delivery, my work, in Deleuze and Guattari's words, "gather[ed] in all the dimensions to the extent that flat

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\(^3\) The third incarnation of this project, *Flat Multiplicities: An Exhibition*, ran from 26 April - 8 May 2014 at Balkon Art Incubator, in Preston, Melbourne, with an opening night (with readings and live music) on the 26 April 2014.

\(^4\) The 7th International Deleuze Studies conference was subtitled 'Models, Machines, Memories', and was hosted by the Istanbul Technical University, from 14-16 July 2014. For this conference I wrote a new paper entitled 'Memories of a Flat Multiplicity', which considered the conceptual parameters that underpinned this series of work.

\(^5\) The final *Flat Multiplicities* performance was presented on 18 August 2014, at the end of a week-long 'PAF Philosophy Summer University' concentrating on the philosophy of Nick Land and Reza Negarestani, entitled 'Get Reassembled: Time, Intelligence, Acceleration'.


\(^7\) Ibid, 9.

\(^8\) Deleuze and Guattari define an *assemblage* in *A Thousand Plateaus* as "precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections"; Ibid.
multiplicities - which nonetheless have an increasing or decreasing number of dimensions - [were] inscribed upon it". In other words, my work attempted to present the material conditions where a plane of becoming could be realised. Following Deleuze and Guattari, the reasonable question that one may ask of this effort is

\[\text{[d]oes a given becoming reach that point? Can a given multiplicity flatten and conserve all its dimensions in this way, like a pressed flower that remains just as alive dry?}\]

For Deleuze and Guattari, "all multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions". The challenge, when trying to conceive of a plane of multiplicity, is not to restrict or dictate its scope, by "overcoding" its dimensions with an "empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered". The means of pressing the flower, in other words, are part of the pressed flower itself. In this sense, it did not matter that I selected a thousand sentences as the guiding parameter for my series of work. In an assemblage, units of measure become part of the multiplicity in question, and vary according to the dimensions they border.

Deleuze and Guattari stress that in an assemblage there are no rules or firm points or positions, "[t]here are only lines [...] only multiplicities or varieties of measurement". To understand this, Deleuze and Guattari offer their difficult concept, the plane of consistency, which "knows nothing of differences in level, orders of magnitude, or distances". In its neutrality, the plane of consistency "bring[s] into coexistence any number of multiplicities, with any number of dimensions". Multiplicities, like assemblages, "are defined by the outside", by the lines of variation "according to which they change in nature and connect up with other multiplicities". If the plane of consistency, then, "is the outside of all multiplicities", and thereby "the intersection of all concrete forms", then it at once hosts and gives rise to new borderlines that increase the number of dimensions they border. Importantly, the plane of consistency "is by nature hidden", it "can only be inferred, induced, concluded from that to which it gives rise".

Flat multiplicities, for Deleuze and Guattari, are "asignifying and asubjective" expressions, or "indefinite articles", that hint at the imperceptible shifts that increase or decrease in intensity according to

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10 *Ibid*.
12 *Ibid*.
13 *Ibid*.
14 *Ibid*.
their impression. The plane of consistency, immanent to these shifts, causes "the given to be given, in this or that state, at this or that moment", allowing the imperceptible to be perceived, as the motion of becoming unfolds.

All of this may sound abstract, and in some ways, that's the point. An appreciation of the intricate relations of multiplicity, lines of becoming, and the plane of consistency in Deleuze and Guattari's work is crucial for making one's way through this thesis. Although this research differs greatly from the experiments that preceded it, in many ways the Flat Multiplicities series founded the principles and approaches I adopted with this current work. It was with these experiments that I started to find my voice as a writer, and develop my own unique method of practicing philosophy. My approach in that series of work was highly experimental. I did not know where each incarnation of the series would lead, or what the project would mean for my broader practice. Although I was reading citations of words that were not my own, I begun to read them in my own way, as if they were my own. This is where my interest in incantations was born. I thought long and hard about the nature of incantations, and what role they may serve in the discipline of philosophy. It occurred to me that each time that I read citations from A Thousand Plateaus out loud, I was performing a philosophical rite of some kind. The feedback that I received from my peers noted that I made Deleuze and Guattari's words sound completely different from the way that they read them in A Thousand Plateaus. I was often told that I made their philosophy sound like poetry, which for me, was an encouraging direction.

Through Flat Multiplicities, I gained the confidence to apply for a Master of Fine Art candidacy in Interdisciplinary Arts Practice at the Centre For Ideas, which is where this research project was completed. The Centre For Ideas is the interdisciplinary centre at the Victorian College of the Arts at Melbourne University. This small collective forms a unique community of creative practitioners working across all different fields of expertise, ranging from visual arts, painting, fashion, design, choreography, science, digital platforms, psychoanalysis, architecture, art-history, and the martial arts. The students at the Centre For Ideas conduct interdisciplinary research through their studio based art or performance practice, often inspired by, or in conversation with, philosophy. The collective share texts and consider interdisciplinary collaborations that challenge their own individual practice, marking a unique departure from conventional academic environments. Although my practice is firmly rooted in philosophy, I believe I approach texts of philosophy in a way that has benefited significantly from this interdisciplinary milieu. When reading philosophy, I pick and chose what is helpful to my project, and leave others to do the more systematic work that takes place in conventional philosophy departments. My approach will at times sacrifice technical detail or rigour for methodologies that I am

20 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Introduction: rhizome', 10
21 Ibid, 'Memories of a plan(e) maker', 292; 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 278.
not necessarily comfortable with, in the hope to encounter new territories of enquiry that might not have been found otherwise.

The first year of this research, for example, was dedicated to a lengthy collaboration with the Brussels-based artist, Sean Crossley. Crossley's approach to painting and the work that he makes has always inspired me to challenge the roles I attribute to art and philosophy. Our collaboration began in December 2014, when I wrote the catalogue essay for a solo exhibition of his work entitled 'Abstract Carbonara'. Crossley's paintings in this exhibition were broadly inspired by thematic crossovers between alchemy, theatre, and works of translation, which we discussed at length in the lead-up to its opening. From there, we exchanged many emails and submitted many unsuccessful arts grant applications. In November 2015 I visited Crossley in Belgium, and spent a month collaborating with him in his studio in Brussels. What emerged were a collection of 'prototype' images and fragments of text that will form the basis for a book of art and philosophy, also entitled *The Poison Garden*, that we hope to realise in late 2017. We also presented some early works in progress, mostly paintings and drawings, in an installation at 'The Dark Precursor: International Conference on Deleuze and Artistic Research' in Ghent, alongside an academic paper that I wrote as part of this research. From there, I realised the scope of this MFA candidacy was not wide enough to accommodate our collaboration, and made the difficult decision to postpone these efforts in order for my academic writing to continue. In particular, I spent my time preparing for a few upcoming philosophy conferences, as these settings are where my work is most warmly received.

Through my exchanges with Crossley I became obsessed with the three short 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passages in the 'Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...' plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*. This thesis is a response to what takes place within these pages. In particular, this fascination emerged in response to the stranger remarks that Deleuze and Guattari make at the conclusion of

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22 'Abstract Carbonara' was exhibited in December 2014 at Hekla in Brussels, Belgium. The catalogue was designed by Caroline Wolewinski, and included images, text, and an interview with art historian Jana Haeckel.

23 'The Dark Precursor: International Conference on Deleuze and Artistic Research' was held at the Orpheus Institute in Ghent, Belgium, on 9-11 November 2015. Crossley and I presented under the title 'The Poison Garden: Unnatural Participation' in two different sessions over the first two days of the conference.

24 On 11 July 2016 I presented a paper entitled 'The Poison Garden: Anomalous Intension' at the 9th International Deleuze Studies Conference, 'Virtuality, Becoming, Life', held at the University of Roma Tre, Rome, Italy. Following this, I was fortunate enough to visit the Nietzsche Haus in Sils Maria, Switzerland, for a short writers residency. These international endeavours were crucial to the development of this research. On 7 December 2016, I presented a third and final paper, 'The Poison Garden: Nietzsche's Flowers', at the Australasian Society of Continental Philosophy (ASCP) Conference held at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. I spoke on a themed panel on Nietzsche and the eternal return, alongside Amy Ireland and Suzi Elhafez. For more on my conference participation, see 'A note on the appendix', 119, below.
these passages. Here Deleuze and Guattari state that "becoming and multiplicity are the same thing".\textsuperscript{25} They layer abstract images of lines, voids, waves, planes, vibrations, spheres, dimensions, thresholds, circles, shapes, flowers, figures, and fragments, in order to exemplify the "dizzy and reachless heights of archetypal infinity".\textsuperscript{26} In these passages Deleuze and Guattari identify as sorcerers, and draw a line between the practice of sorcery and principles of multiplicity and becoming. They cite writers like Carlos Castaneda and H.P. Lovecraft and use scenes from their fiction to support their argumentation.\textsuperscript{27} Following Lovecraft, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari posit that "all becomings are written like sorcerers' drawings on [the] plane of consistency", which they say, "is the ultimate Door providing a way out" for the becomings that are drawn.\textsuperscript{28}

Contemplating how becomings can be written like sorcerers' drawings prompted many of the strange claims found in this thesis. In turn, considering the plane of consistency as a sorcerous doorway inspired many of the directions that came from there. Throughout A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari employ the 'we' pronoun as a means of writing together and including their readers. As Deleuze notes, however, what became important for them as writers "was less [their] working together than [the] strange fact of working between the two" of them, as well as between them as a pair and the content under analysis.\textsuperscript{29} In the collaboration process, Deleuze recounts that both he and Guattari "stopped being 'author'" when they ventured to "negotiate" each other's ideas.\textsuperscript{30} They elected to sign A Thousand Plateaus with their own names, they argue, "[t]o make [them]selves unrecognisable in turn[, t]o render imperceptible, not [them]selves, what makes [them] act, feel, and think".\textsuperscript{31} In all three 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passages Deleuze and Guattari adopt the pronominal expression "we sorcerers" and address their readers as "fellow sorcerers".\textsuperscript{32} In the body of this thesis I will also deliberately use the 'we' pronoun to this effect, in order for my voice as a writer to become indiscernible from the figures

\textsuperscript{25} Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 275.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 277-278.
\textsuperscript{27} Following their prominence in Deleuze and Guattari's work, Castaneda and Lovecraft have inspired significant points of the following research; see Appendix A: 'Magic and Reality', and Appendix B: 'Nietzsche's Flowers', respectively.
\textsuperscript{28} Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 277. The sorcerer's "ultimate Door" is a reference to the "Ultimate Gate" that appears in Lovecraft's 1933 short story, 'Through the gates of the silver key', written in collaboration with Edgar Hoffman Price. The phrase "the dizzy and reachless heights of archetypal infinity" also comes from this story. See The Dreams in the Witch House and Other Weird Stories (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 279-282; 283.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Introduction: rhizome', 3.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid, Memories of a sorcerer I', 264; 266; 'Memories of a sorcerer II', 269; 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 276.
it is in conversation with. This is a deliberate strategy that I have chosen to employ, in order to write with the philosophers I am writing about. It is also a tactic that ties my writing to the philosophy I am writing about.

At the heart of their passages on sorcery, Deleuze and Guattari write that

\[\text{[i]f the writer is a sorcerer, it is because writing is a becoming, writing is traversed by strange becomings that are not becomings-writer...}\]

Later on, Deleuze holds the same position when he states that "[w]riting is inseparable from becoming" and that "[t]o write is also to become something other than a writer".\(^{34}\) This thesis is an effort to investigate the strange becomings that dictate the practice of writing philosophy. More firmly, it is an attempt to practice sorcery through the discipline of reading and writing philosophy. This research holds that writing becomes something other than words when it is written and read by others. If this is the case, then I hope that what I have written, initially in response to these three passages, will be read by others. I hope that by reading this work, the reader will discover what is at stake in what makes them act, feel, and think, and render these discoveries as unrecognisable from what they will become in return.

It is here that I turn, perhaps surprisingly, to the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. In the English preface to his 1962 text, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze crowns Nietzsche as the philosopher who "alter[ed] both the theory and the practice of philosophy".\(^{35}\) In the preface to his 1968 text, Difference and Repetition, Deleuze prophesises that "[t]he time is coming when it will hardly be possible to write a book of philosophy as it has been done" traditionally, and that "[t]he search for new means of philosophical expression was begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today in relation to the renewal of certain other arts".\(^{36}\) My task with this thesis is to renew the art of sorcery by route of a return to Nietzsche's philosophy. Although Deleuze and Guattari do not cite Nietzsche in any of their 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passages, the strange becomings that traverse Nietzsche's writing have demanded me to rewrite him there. After spending so long with these passages on sorcery, I firmly believe that Nietzsche belongs alongside these words, next to Castaneda, Lovecraft, and Deleuze-Guattari themselves. This thesis targets the strange-becomings that traverse Nietzsche's writing as the impulses of an untimely and sorcerous philosophy. It will view the eternal gateway of the eternal return as a doorway akin to the plane of consistency. Moreover, it will treat the figure of Nietzsche himself as a sorcerer whose practice at

\(^{33}\) Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer I', 265.

\(^{34}\) Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 'Literature and Life', 1; 6.


\(^{36}\) Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (Great Britain: Continuum Press, 2009), 'Preface to the English edition', xx.
once determines and disrupts the course of the history of philosophy.

The credibility of these contentions hinges on an incredible belief in the elusive definition of sorcery that follows. It is not my intention to comment on historical or specific ethnographical traditions of sorcery, but rather to realise my own understanding of sorcery from my own family of sources and experiments in practice. In his 1902 text, *A General Theory of Magic*, Marcel Mauss warns against trying to discern any unifying theory of magic, as experiences of magic seen as a whole elude any formal definition or criteria. After years of research, Mauss "doubt[ed] whether [he] could find the totality of magical phenomena in one magical system", which in turn led him to "studying as many heterogeneous systems as possible". Mauss was not interested in "deducing laws applicable to all magical phenomena" but instead with the "beliefs involved in magic, the feelings it provokes and the agents who perform it". Without considering Mauss' account in great detail, this research is framed by his approach, as its purchase relies on a firm commitment to the belief, feeling, and the performance of its content, and not on the validity of its place in relation to other studies of sorcery.

Through the course of this research I have come to believe that to read these words is to perform a sorcerous rite. In a short aphorism entitled 'In what do you believe?', Nietzsche tells us that inside any act of belief, regardless of what is being believed in, "the weights of all things must be determined anew". This weight of re-evaluation was crowned by Nietzsche as the greatest weight that could burden one's thought. We must remember that to think through Nietzsche is to think through the thought of the eternal return. Accordingly, this thesis will revolve with Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return at its axis, in tandem with a definition of sorcery inspired by Deleuze and Guattari. The practice of sorcery will be rethought as an active expression of the will to power, and further, as a means of fidelity to Nietzsche's overman and his untimely hope for the future. This will be put in direct contrast to reactive expressions of the will to power found in the nihilist ideologies of contemporary late-capitalism and neoliberal culture. Throughout its course, this strange pairing of sorcery with Nietzschean philosophy is supported by perspectives put forth by other imaginative philosophers, such as Isabelle Stengers, Luce Irigaray, George Bataille, and Pierre Klossowski. This work treats citations from their texts as fragments of a larger incantation which, when read together, cast Nietzsche's thought of the eternal return into a new light. This renewed appreciation of the eternal return is the 'new knowledge' that this research offers to its reader and current exchanges between occult practice and philosophy.

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All of this is bound by a guiding analogy that I have titled *The Poison Garden*. This Nietzschean theme will appear in each chapter and in between different passages of text. It is not my intention here to spell out its meaning; that effort is reserved for the conclusion of this work. The course of this thesis takes time to unfold, and has many different directions to take. Before making our way through the text, then, it is worth offering a short summary of each chapter, in order to guide our way through its course.

This work begins by considering the destiny of Nietzschean philosophy. The first chapter, 'Philosopher Comets', discusses how Nietzsche forecast his work to be received in an *untimely fashion*. This questions the role that philosophy plays in history, by aligning the *untimely* with what Deleuze and Guattari call *geophilosophy*. The chapters 'Sounders of the Depths' and 'Fig-wasp' consider the role *the earth* plays in Nietzsche's thought. They ask what it means to remain faithful to the earth in the twenty-first century, in light of global warming and the threat of ecological collapse. These chapters challenge the ideologies inherent to neoliberalism and the logic of late-capitalism. To do so, they turn to the work of Philippe Pignarre and Isabelle Stengers, Mark Fisher, and Naomi Klein. They pit what Pignarre and Stengers call 'capitalist sorcery' against what Fisher calls 'capitalist realism', with an eye to what Klein calls 'magical thinking'. This leads to the guiding discussion of sorcery, developed in the fourth chapter, 'Do You Believe in Sorcery?'. This chapter relies on Deleuze and Guattari's 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passages in *A Thousand Plateaus*, as well as a Nietzschean analogy of *bridge-making*, to further its account. Moreover, it considers the value of the eternal return in Nietzsche's philosophy, by blending Zarathustra's call for *redemption* with Deleuze and Guattari's stance on *becoming-animal*, and distancing it from the curse of *ressentiment*. As chapters five through eight make clear, a return to the significant years of Nietzsche's biography is crucial for understanding his philosophical method and intentions. For Nietzsche, his life and his work were one and the same thing. The fifth chapter, 'Sorcerer Love', works towards explaining what is at stake in Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return. It does so by looking at the role this idea played in the context of Nietzsche's life, especially in relation to his short love affair with Lou Salomé. This analysis is interrupted by Luce Irigaray in the sixth chapter, 'The Waves', which contrasts the marine imagery of Irigaray's writing with pivotal episodes from Nietzsche's work. Chapter seven, 'Positive Distance', turns from Nietzsche to Deleuze's writings on Nietzsche, in order to consider what Deleuze calls Nietzsche's 'inverted perspectivism' and contemplate the role that *difference* plays in the eternal return. It validates Deleuze's position by returning to the passages where Nietzsche offers his prophecy of the eternal return. The final two chapters, 'In Spite Of' and 'Intension', broaden this analysis to integrate the unique reading of Nietzsche offered by his French translator, Pierre Klossowski. They use Klossowski's conceptual framework to elucidate the relationship between the sickness Nietzsche suffered and his boast of 'Great Health'. By placing Klossowski alongside Deleuze, and then alongside Deleuze-Guattari, the final chapter looks to concepts that are helpful for thinking through Nietzsche's thought further,
beyond the debilitating illness that silenced his thought. In particular, it marries Klossowski's difficult concept of the *phantasm* with Deleuze and Guattari's sorcerous alliance with the *anomalous*, in order to think through the delirious barriers that posed a threat to Nietzsche's own thought. This thesis concludes by questioning whether Nietzsche feigned his own madness, as a means to return to the work's recurring thematic refrain, *the poison garden*. 
The figs are falling from the trees, they are fine and sweet: and as they fall their red skins split. I am a north wind to ripe figs.

Thus, like figs, do these teachings fall to you, my friends: now drink their juice and eat their sweet flesh! It is autumn all around and clear sky and afternoon.

Throughout his meditation 'Why I am a Destiny', written at the end of his career, Friedrich Nietzsche asks his readers, repeatedly: "Have I been understood?" The answer today, as in his own time, is the same. The very category of understanding for a Nietzschean proposition is a compromise to the complexity of the insight being offered. In Nietzsche, there is no philosophical authority to prescribe to. In Nietzsche, there is no universal truth. The truthfulness of truth is at once a lie. Untruth, Nietzsche tells us, is "a condition of life". Everything for Nietzsche, including the reception of his work, is a mask. "Every philosophy", he writes, "also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hiding-place, every word also a mask". In this context, it does not matter that he was writing at a time that held distinctly different moral codes and values from today. Nietzsche was writing for the sake of a time that was not his own - an untimely time, a time in which we have not yet arrived. The destiny of philosophy, for Nietzsche, was the "[r]evaluation of all values", the "formula for an act of supreme coming-to-oneself on the part of mankind", the north wind which splits the "flesh and genius" of Nietzsche's fruit. Importantly, then, it is up to us to revalue Nietzsche's values, not as disciples, believers, or followers, but as those who have enjoyed his sweet fruit, those who have basked in the glory of his autumn afternoon.

The question resounds: has Nietzsche been understood? Nietzsche was the first untimely philosopher. He did not see himself as a man but as dynamite, "a fearful explosive material from which everything is in danger", a destiny that divided "the history of mankind into two parts": those that lived before him, and those that lived after him. As Nietzsche's readers today, we obviously fall into the latter period of history - but how is it that his thought remains both the fire and the ignition that sets the very binary of before and after alight? How does Nietzsche at once value the

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2 Ibid, 'Why I am a destiny' §3, 98; §7, 101; §8, 103; §9, 104.
4 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 'What is Noble?' §289, 216.
5 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I am a destiny' §1, 96.
6 Ibid, §1, 96; 'The untimely essays', §3, 58; 'Why I am a destiny' §8, 103.
arrow of time, whilst as a destiny, devalue the destination of its target? How does Nietzsche think the thought of the eternal whilst refusing to resort to the blessings of transcendence or of God? How does the untimeliness of Nietzsche's thought operate?

The French philosopher Gilles Deleuze dedicated much of his work to answering this question. Deleuze liked to cite Nietzsche's *Untimely Meditations* when discussing the responsibility that modern philosophy, after Nietzsche, must have:

> Following Nietzsche, we discover, as more profound than time or eternity, the untimely: philosophy is neither a philosophy of history, nor a philosophy of the eternal, but untimely, always and only untimely - that is to say[, and to quote Nietzsche], "acting counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit for a time to come".

In what follows, we will read Nietzsche to consider what it means to *act counter to*, and thereby, *act on* our time. By the conclusion, we will hopefully glimpse at what Nietzsche's *time to come* might look like, from the untimely perspective of today. For now, however, the key to this passage lies in Nietzsche's three words of hesitation that bridge the past and present to the betterment of the future: the three words, *let us hope*. Deleuze agrees with Nietzsche that, only in the wake of the seismic convulsions of the latter's thought, "is it possible to hope again". Long after his musings in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze returns to this *Untimely Meditations* citation with his collaborator Félix Guattari in the better moments of their final work together *What is Philosophy?* Here Deleuze and Guattari clarify that this *hopeful time to come* is "not a historical future, not even a utopian history, it is the infinite Now[::] the Intensive or Untimely, not an instant but a becoming". As we shall see, this fidelity to *intensive, untimely becomings*, as the constituent that belongs to an infinite *Now*, serves as the guiding thread that allows Nietzsche's, Deleuze's, and Deleuze and Guattari's work to intersect.

*Has Nietzsche been understood?* In an aptly titled aphorism from 1886 entitled 'We incomprehensible ones', Nietzsche claims "his fate" to be "misunderstood, misjudged, ...

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7 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 'Preface', xix. Here Deleuze is citing the conclusion of the 'Forward' from Nietzsche's 'On the uses and disadvantages of history for life' in *Untimely Meditations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 60. Deleuze also makes use of this reference in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 107, and will return to it again with Félix Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 112.
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 112.
misidentified, slandered, misheard and not heard". Instead of complaining about this destiny, as he did to his friends outside his published works, Nietzsche crowned the misunderstanding and lack of reception of his work as the "distinction" and "honour" that marks profound writing. Two years later, in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche supposes that "the disparity between the greatness of [his] task and the smallness of [his] contemporaries has found expression in the fact that [he has] been neither heard nor even so much as seen" in the philosophical circles of his time. In his essay 'Why I write such good books', Nietzsche admits that it would be a complete contradiction of myself if I expected ears and hands for my truths already today: that I am not heard today, that no one today knows how to take from me, is not only comprehensible; it even seems to me right.

Nietzsche explains that for his work a poor reception in his time was not only inevitable but crucial, because untimely thinkers paradoxically need time for their thought to mature and inseminate the future. "I do not want to be taken for what I am not", Nietzsche writes, and this requires that even he does not take himself "for what [he] is not". Nietzsche necessarily does not know what his thoughts will become after their untimely harvest in the future. Like fig trees, Nietzsche claims that profound thinkers keep growing, keep changing, we shed our old bark, we shed our skins every spring, we keep becoming younger, fuller of future, taller, stronger, we push our roots ever more powerfully into the depths - into evil - while at the same time we embrace the heavens ever more lovingly, more broadly, imbibing their light ever more thirstily with all our twigs and leaves.

Like trees we grow - this is hard to understand, as is all of life - not in one place but everywhere, not in one direction but equally upward and outward and inward and downward; our energy is at work simultaneously in the trunk, branches and roots; we are no longer free to do one particular thing, to be only one particular thing.

Those even remotely familiar with Deleuze and Guattari will instantly get rhizomatic shivers over their body. What was incomprehensible in Nietzsche's time became the

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10 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 'We incomprehensible ones', §371, 331.
11 Ida Overbeck, for instance, recounts that Nietzsche "suffered very much [...] because he was so little known and read", and consoled him by reading him passages from Goethe's Truth and Poetry regarding the separation between author and public. See Sander L Gilman, ed., Conversations with Nietzsche: A Life in the Words of his Contemporaries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 112-113.
12 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 'We incomprehensible ones', §371, 331.
13 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Forward' §1, 3.
14 Ibid, 'Why I write such good books' §1, 39.
15 Ibid, §1, 39; Nietzsche repeats this in the final line of Ecce Homo's 'Forward', §1, 3.
16 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 'We incomprehensible ones', §371, 331-332.
landmark for post-structural thought from *A Thousand Plateaus* onwards. Lets note, in passing, Nietzsche's distinction between the *evil* of the depths, and the *heavenly blessing* of the heights, the latter of which is *visible* from above the surface of the earth. Nietzsche laments that the fate of profound thought is that it appears to "grow in height", whereas its power, more specifically, is buried within the *depths*, tangled within the rhizomatic roots below the surface of the Earth that hold up the plant. In *Ecce Homo* that he "shall one day be pronounced holy", that "the fatality of the heights" might be more pronounced than their depths. As a consolation, Nietzsche notes, at least the upright tree "dwell[s] ever closer to the lightning", *the bolt of the overman*, "the lightning out of the dark cloud of man".

*Has Nietzsche been understood?* Nietzsche tells us, fittingly, that

One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as sure *not* to be understood.

Similarly, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche confides that "[e]very profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood". In the fear of a warm reception that could potentially inspire a following, Nietzsche dedicates his subsequent work "to the very few", suggesting that "[p]erhaps none of [his future readers] are even living yet". Nietzsche maintained that he didn't want the "modern men [he] knew" to read his books, as, like Arthur Schopenhauer, he didn't want to be read "by just anybody". Nietzsche did not believe that the readers of his time had enough "courage for the *forbidden*", nor "a predestination for the *labyrinth*" that constitutes his work. To Nietzsche, his peers lacked the strength of character to prefer questions that did not have firm answers, and he often advised those dear to him not to read his work. Nietzsche famously declared that his "time has not yet come", and reassures that "some are born posthumously". Implicit in his philosophy is the understanding that its reception will be ripe "*[a]ny the day after tomorrow".

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18 Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 'Why I am a destiny' §1, 96; *The Gay Science*, 'We incomprehensible ones', §371, 332.  
21 Nietzsche elaborates on this exercise of noble "self-control" in *Beyond Good and Evil*, 'What is Noble?', §283, 214.  
23 Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 'Why I write such good books' §1, 39; *The Gay Science*, 'On the question of being understandable', §381, 343.  
25 Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 'Why I write such good books' §1, 39.  
In an aphorism entitled 'Our Eruptions' from *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche describes how the maturing of thought might take place over centuries, across different figures, contexts, and bloodlines:

> Countless things that humanity acquired in earlier stages, but so feebly and embryonically that nobody could perceive this acquisition, suddenly emerge into the light much later - perhaps after centuries; meanwhile they have become strong and ripe. Some ages seem to lack altogether some talent or some virtue, as certain individuals do, too. But just wait for their children and grandchildren, if you have time to wait that long: they bring to light what was hidden in their grandfathers and what their grandfathers themselves did not suspect.27

In the context of this aphorism, the philosophers that feature throughout this thesis could be considered some of Nietzsche's illegitimate grandchildren. As we will see, the way figures like Gilles Deleuze, Isabelle Stengers, Luce Irigaray, George Bataille and Pierre Klossowski, at once behold and betray Nietzsche's thought seamlessly warrants the Nietzschean lineage. They do so by deliberately *unsettling* Nietzsche and the fate of his work from the shackles of history. Put together, these figures will allow us to *think* Nietzsche's *thought of the eternal return* in a new light, one that will hold a new currency, for today's earth. We will arrive at this position, albeit strangely, by route of a sorcerous experiment, one based in the creative task of reading philosophy, writing responses, and thinking out loud.

*Has Nietzsche been understood?* When thinking about the untimely, we need not get too concerned about particular figures or moments in time and their historical worth. This kind of thinking sets in stone the thought untimely thinking hopes to set free. Nietzsche's prophet Zarathustra warns that "[o]ne repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil".28 This does not mean, however, that we should discount the significant figures or events of history. In works of philosophy, of course it is important to turn to the great thinkers, their lives, their writings, and what their work meant. It is important to do so as long as we don't take it too seriously. Philosophy becomes interesting when it puts these events in history to task and demands their value *to be revalued*, in and for a new time. The twists of becoming that make mankind what it is, was, and will be, cannot belong to a historical account of present and past, with a nod to the future. Becoming is always and only *unhistorical*. We need seers, not historians, to track the lines of becoming. Becoming is non-linear, convoluted, confusing. It is at once more than it is and less that it will be. Following Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari clarify that the process of becoming

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does not belong to history. History today still designates only the set of conditions, however recent they may be, from which one turns away in order to become, that is to say, in order to create something new...

Philosophy cannot be reduced to its own history, because it continually wrests itself from this history in order to create new concepts that fall back into history but do not come from it.  

From a linear perspective, the historian reading this thesis might ask: what was taking place in Nietzsche's thought that flowered only later in the work of others? From a retroactive, non-linear perspective, Nietzsche answers the historian:

There is no way of telling what may yet become part of history. Perhaps the past is still essentially undiscovered! [...] Every great human being exerts a retroactive force: for his sake all of history is placed in balance again, and a thousand secrets of the past crawl out of their hiding places - into his sunshine.  

It is Nietzsche's Autumnal sunshine that will nourish this work and cultivate its growth. As a whole, this writing will form a garden bed for Nietzsche's thought. The soil, seeds and weeds will not be hard like his published work. Nor will these words want to become hard in their harvest; for the sake of today's earth, they will want to become something else. The hardness of thought that Nietzsche called for has not worked out for us so far. It has led to drastic misunderstandings with devastating consequence. Rather, the soil in this garden will be soft, rich and tender, like Nietzsche's letters of correspondence, his passion for nature, the solitude of his sadness, and the honesty of his tears. The hills of Sils Maria loom majestically over these pages. The air that surrounds these words is "an air of the heights, a robust air". The untimely horizon that Nietzsche called the eternal recurrence will animate this writing and unleash its force. A firm understanding of what Nietzsche called the overman will allow us to hear the blessing of return. What returns in the eternal return is the untimely, the empty form of becoming, the intensive, infinite Now. The return of becoming is the fertility of time, bound by expressions that become what they are in their communication and movement. Like a pure map, the territory of becoming "has neither beginning nor end but only a milieu". It is this milieu that will ground us, and direct us to somewhere new.

Let's ask, one more time: has Nietzsche been understood? It is "of time and becoming" that Zarathustra claims "the best parables should speak". If this work is a parable, it is one that hopes to remain, in Zarathustra's words, "a praise and a

\[29\] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 96.
\[32\] Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 110.
\[33\] Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'Upon the blessed isles' §2.2, 86-87.
justification of all impermanence”. When writing about the untimely, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the process of becoming "is more geographical than historical[:]
what is in the process of coming about is no more what ends than what begins". What they call geophilosophy is the earthly mutation of philosophy that takes the
uncertainty of becoming as its primary source of nourishment. Geophilosophy, Deleuze and Guattari claim, is superior to history in its ability to "wres[t] history from
the cult of necessity in order to stress the irreducibility of contingency". It is the
profound capacity of philosophy to tear history books apart.

A return to a Nietzschean landscape will set his thought in motion. It will excavate a
new territory that is faithful to the earth. For Deleuze and Guattari, any event as a
marker in history "needs becoming as an unhistorical element". This is because
philosophy, Deleuze writes elsewhere, "has an essential relation to time: it is always
against its time, [a] critique of the present world". The role of the philosopher,
Deleuze continues, is to "creat[e] concepts that are neither eternal nor historical but
untimely and not of the present". These concepts, Deleuze argues, hold promise and
offer thought protection, because of their distance from the harmful and base thinking
of today. As a creative enterprise of critique, philosophy refuses to serve the State or
the Church. Deleuze assures us that philosophy "serves no established power" but its
own. Deleuze posits, "there are truths that are more durable than all historical and eternal truths put together: truths of times to come", of which we must
be attentive if we are to pave their way. Nietzsche tells us that "[t]he greatest events
and thoughts [...] are comprehended last", and that "the generations which are their
contemporaries do not experience such events - they live past them". He also
clarifies that "the greatest thoughts are the greatest events", the ones that outshine the
thinker and their lifespan with their grandeur of insight. Nietzsche's claim is that the
fate of profound thought "is similar to what happens in the realm of stars", that "[t]he
light of the farthest star" descents upon Earth after all others. If this is the case,
perhaps we are only beginning to see the trails of Nietzsche's dark star today.

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34 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'Upon the blessed isles' §2.2, 87.
37 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 96.
39 *Ibid*.
41 *Ibid*.
42 *Ibid*.
Nietzsche understood? Deleuze appeals to the profundity of Nietzsche's thought when he crowns untimely thinkers with the title "philosopher-comets". For Deleuze, the greats of philosophy, seen as a whole, form a succession of philosophers [that] is not an eternal sequence of sages, still less a historical sequence, but a broken succession, a succession of comets. Their discontinuity and repetition do not amount to the eternity of the sky which they cross, nor the historicity of the earth which they fly over. There is no eternal or historical philosophy. Eternity, like the historicity of philosophy amounts to this: philosophy is untimely, untimely at every epoch.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, in their call for a geophilosophy, the very act of "thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth". Indeed, when talking about "philosophical reterritorialisation", Deleuze and Guattari claim that "Nietzsche founded geophilosophy". To think beyond the earth to the cosmos, to comets and distant stars, is the task of the philosopher born in Nietzsche's wake. And how can it be anything otherwise, given the gravity of Nietzsche's position? The world seen from within, according to Nietzsche's portrait, is "a becoming that knows no satiety",

a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms [...] This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expand itself but only transforms itself [...]".

For Deleuze and Guattari, "[t]he earth is not one element among others but rather brings together all the elements within a single embrace". In what follows, we will seek the splendour that grounds Nietzsche's Earth, the flesh of his sweet fruit, and the ripeness of its return.

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47 Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'New image of thought', §3.15, 106-107. Here Deleuze is building on a brief remark that Nietzsche makes relation to nature in *Untimely Meditations*, 'Schopenhauer as Educator', §7, 177.


49 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 85.

50 Ibid, 102.

51 Friedrich Nietzsche: *The Will to Power*, 'The Eternal Recurrence', §1067 (1885), 549-550. Phrasing altered. This passage is linked conceptually to *Beyond Good and Evil*, 'The free spirit’ §36, 66-67.

52 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 85.
SOUNDERS OF THE DEPTHS

The opening quotation of this thesis is taken from Nietzsche’s autobiography, *Ecce Homo*. Here Nietzsche is directly quoting himself, citing a passage from his favourite text, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. As Nietzschian scholar David Rathbone suggests, *Ecce Homo* is the first great piece of Nietzschian secondary literature, written by the philosopher in the last stages of his active life. It is fitting that Nietzsche should have the first and foremost position on his work. In the original passage, Zarathustra continues his speech by saying:

Behold what fullness there is about us! And out of such overflow it is beautiful to look out upon distant seas. Once one said God when one looked upon distant seas; but now I have taught you to say: overman.  

The overman, Zarathustra teaches, "is the meaning of the earth". Zarathustra implores those around him to "remain faithful to the earth", by letting their "will" say "the overman shall be the meaning of the earth", and by not believing those who speak of "otherworldly hopes". In this early speech, Zarathustra makes reference to the purity of the overman, casting it in contrast to the uncleanliness of mankind:

Verily, a polluted stream is man. One must be a sea to be able to receive a polluted stream without becoming unclean. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea; in him, your great contempt can go under.

Nietzsche's great contempt trickles though his pages. His visions for the future, after all, have not arrived as he had hoped. Zarathustra announced, now one hundred and thirty four years ago, that

[t]he time has come for man to set himself a goal. The time has come for man to plant the seed of his highest hope. His soil is still rich enough.

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1 Dr. Rathbone posited this in the final class of a twelve-week seminar series on Nietzsche's oeuvre on June 7 2016, hosted by the Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy (MSCP). This insight led Rathbone to teach a following semester at the MSCP on the secondary literature and reception of Nietzschian thought in the twentieth century. In relation to the wider biographical resources and the historical reception of Nietzsche's work, many points within this thesis are informally indebted to the content presented over the two evening courses Dr. Rathbone taught as part of the MSCP: ‘Nietzsche’s Philosophy: An Opera in Five Acts / A Course in Twelve Weeks’, Semester One, 2016; ‘Nietzsche as Educator’, Semester Two, 2016.

2 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'Upon the blessed isles', §2.2, 85.


4 *Ibid*.

5 *Ibid*.

But is this soil rich enough for us any more? Nietzsche located the prophecy of his highest thought, the eternal recurrence, at "the mid-point" of history, the "period of greatest danger". Nietzsche worried that if, at the close of the nineteenth century, humanity had not learnt to respect the earth, then in time this disrespect would accelerate to the point that we could no longer sustain any resistance, and the earth, epidemically, would seek its own collapse. This concern is not a stretch if we simply look at our global surroundings in the early twenty-first century. The earth is getting warmer. Earthquakes shatter towns. It is snowing in autumn.

In her most distressing work, *This Changes Everything: Capitalism Vs. the Climate*, Naomi Klein details, in broad but measured brush strokes, how the ideology of deregulated capitalism and the associated expansion of the fossil fuel industry have produced the most critical environmental problems our earth has ever encountered. In the century since Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and in particular, the thirty years or so of neoliberalism that followed, Zarathustra's prophecy of the polluted stream of man has alarmingly materialised in soaring carbon emissions and the (proven and projected) rise in the global warming of the earth's climate. Without going into Klein's expert analysis in detail, it is worth citing the main contention that underlies her account. Klein summarises, in her introduction, that

> [T]he bottom line is what matters here: our economic system and our planetary system are now at war. Or, more accurately, our economy is at war with many forms of life on earth, including human life. What the climate needs to avoid collapse is a contraction in humanity's use of resources; what our economic model demands to avoid collapse is unfettered expansion. Only one of these set of rules can be changed, and it's not the laws of nature.  

In other words, in order to remain faithful to the meaning of the earth, we need to side with nature in its increasing opposition to capitalism. Klein argues, throughout the many chapters of her book, and particularly those under the banner 'Bad Timing', that "[r]ight now, the triumph of market logic, with its ethos of domination and fierce competition, is paralysing almost all serious efforts to respond to climate change". Klein offers, quite bluntly, that today we are left with a stark choice:

> [either] allow climate disruption to change everything about our world, or change pretty much everything about our economy to avoid that fate.

Klein's account, admittedly, does not provide us with all the answers to assure that the latter scenario will arise. But it does labour, in accessible and tangible terms, the

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9 Ibid, 23.
10 Ibid, 22.
necessity of re-setting Zarathustra's goal for mankind and working towards his highest hope in an increasingly (and 'inconveniently') more urgent context.

Zarathustra's call for renewal, let's remember, does not reach those around him. Zarathustra is well aware that he "is not the mouth for [their] ears". These grand and optimistic promptings, no matter how honest and prescient, cannot be issued arbitrarily to the contemporary marketplace or agora. As Klein shows, prophetic warnings of the immediate necessity for radical action on a global scale are now the stereotype of today's environmental science. The hysterical purpose of neoliberal politics, on the contrary, is to silence any reasonable assembly of sustainable policy and action. Zarathustra warns those around him that

one day this soil will be poor and domesticated, and no tall tree will be able to grow in it. Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whirl!  

More forcefully, Klein poses today's poisoned soil as a "civilisational wake-up call". The garden bed that man has built his own bed on has been contaminated, scorched and abused, and the earth is weary of her treatment. The rapid and violent shifts in today's climate, Klein contends, act as a "powerful message - spoken in the language of fires, floods, droughts, and extinctions - telling us that we need an entirely new economical model and a new way of sharing the planet. Telling us that we need to evolve".

At this stage it is important to unpack our methodology for listening to Zarathustra's powerful call. Instead of dissecting the complexity of Klein's political account (which would be of merit in its own right), we will turn briefly to the short text Capitalist Sorcery: Breaking the Spell, written in collaboration by the celebrated contemporary philosopher Isabelle Stengers and the relatively unknown French activist Philippe Pignarre. We will do so, not to disarm or distract from Klein's sustained attack on capitalism, but to add voices to it that would otherwise remain silent, and offer her account an imaginative counterpart. In particular, we will use what Pignarre and Stengers call capitalist sorcery to complement (and complicate) what Klein calls magical thinking: the adoption of risky and nihilistic perspectives that advocate the exploitation of the earth in order to keep the growth of poisonous economic ideologies alive.

As Pignarre and Stengers make clear in their first chapter, 'Inheriting from Seattle', Capitalist Sorcery was written in response to the large N30 anti-globalisation protests

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11 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Prologue', §5, 16.
12 Ibid, 17.
13 Klein, This Changes Everything, 'Introduction', 25.
14 Ibid.
that took hold of Seattle in November 1999. Pignarre and Stengers remember November 30 1999 as "the day when [they] began to breathe a little more easily". For them, this was the day that the N30 protests announced: "another world is possible". What the protests in Seattle "put an end to", they argue, was "a veritable sorcerer's spell" that had seemingly taken hold of the world at the close of the twentieth century. A corporate "capturing" and "stupified paralysis" of the collective imagination had before then denied the possibility of the world of the N30 demonstrations from taking place. Pignarre and Stengers, however, are careful not to make their work into a historical glorification of anarchy or activism; what is important is not what happened in Seattle, but rather what was realised in these happenings, for them and their fellow protesters.

In 1999 Pignarre and Stengers realised that another world was possible. Importantly, they stress, this did not mean that certain alternatives were possible, by route of political maneuverers of which we can vaguely imagine, but that a singular, new world of a time to come, was possible. They clarify:

[I]t is not a matter of an allusion to a particular world that we would be able to define, nor is it of any matter what other world it is (any other world than this). It is a matter of appealing to the possible against the inexorable allure of the process that has set in, and, of course, continues today more than ever.

It is a matter of breaking something of a spellbinding order, a stunned impotence of which even those who were still struggling could sense the proximity. We say that this cry is the name of an event, and that the force of this event is the manner in which it makes this question exist for those who respond to it: how is one to inherit, to prolong, to become the child of this event?

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16 Ibid, 3.
17 Ibid. For an anarchist documentary of rough footage and interviews tracing the violent proceedings of these protests, see Tim Lewis' short film, 'Breaking the Spell', YouTube video, 1:02:44, posted by xarxis, 9th May 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D2MxtwAmeOY. For a more balanced documentary of the same events and their outcomes, see 'This is what democracy looks like (WTO 1999)', YouTube video, 1:08:51, posted by Occupytheplanet, 5th October 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBUZH2vCD_k&tl=1140s.
18 Pignarre and Stengers, *Capitalist Sorcery*, 'Thanks to Seattle?', 72.
19 Ibid, 73.
20 Pignarre and Stengers admit, for instance, that neither of them were actually at the protests in Seattle. Their task with *Capitalist Sorcery*, they argue, is "to keep alive a memory of what was in the process of happening at the time, in order to protect the moment against the lucidity that disenchants, and also against the bitter disappointment of those who note that they didn't succeed in changing the world"; Ibid, 72.
21 Ibid, Inheriting from Seattle', 4.
Pignarre and Stengers' task, in Deleuze and Guattari's words, is to *resist the present*, to call "for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist". Pignarre and Stengers see these future people as the children of Seattle. These children "dare[e] to inhabit the possible" that the N30 event of Seattle opened up. If the protesters act like children, it is because they act "as if" the event to which they were born made them "dare to do what [it] demands", without the "adult precautions" that would resist and condemn this action. This in turn inspired Pignarre and Stengers to find the confidence to write such an irresponsible and imaginative account, despite the vulnerability that the content would place on their adult personas and academic reputations.

In the course of their text, Pignarre and Stengers diagnose the current status of capitalism as a curse of sorcery that lacks an agent willingly accredited as sorcerer. We draw sincere inspiration from Pignarre and Stengers' account. Again, not for what it *says*, but for what it *does*, and *how it does what it says*, with confidence and conviction. Pignarre and Stengers adopt the children of Seattle because they believe that an opposition to the politics of today needs to be *born*, not reshuffled by the political will of the past. As Zarathustra teaches,

> [t]he child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred 'Yes'. For the game of creation [] a sacred 'Yes' is needed: the spirit now wills his own will, and he who had been lost to the world now conquers his own world.

The children of Seattle find their affirmation in the innocence of their cry: *another world is possible*. Pignarre and Stengers understand the pitfalls of their position and are very clear when they present their proposition:

> We understand very well that faced with the problems of a world where things really are going very badly, there is an urgent need to organise a real opposition, with everything serious that that implies. And whoever says 'opposition' often says 'credible alternative': one has to display what one would do in the place of those who are in power today. But it is precisely this 'in place of', this interchangeability that makes us pause. It is at this point that we accept the accusation of irresponsibility that accompanies every 'becoming child'. It seems to us that offering other solutions without having grasped the means, without having created the means for posing the problems differently is to behave as if everything could be sorted out with a bit of good will or

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24 Ibid.

25 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On the three metamorphoses', §1.1, 27.
humanity. It underestimates the immense challenge that the urgent cry 'another world is possible' designates.  

We must remember that it is good will and this human, all-too-human humanity that has got us into the ecological mess of late-capitalism in the first place. The world Pignarre and Stengers are calling for is the world of the overman. This world can only be arrived at by remaining faithful to the earth - by willing the overman as the meaning of this earth. This sense of fidelity to Seattle, and what it opened for them, provides the ground to which Pignarre and Stengers must fight. It is "this situation", the territory of response, which gave them "the power to make [them] think, imagine, and be adventurous" with their words. When pursing the venture of their writing, however, we get into a predicament. Pignarre and Stengers are quick to admit that, unlike Zarathustra or Nietzsche, they "are neither prophets nor theorists". Nor do they claim, unlike Klein and similar writers, to be political "strategists" or "tacticians". Instead, it is here that they assert themselves as geophilosophers, when they evoke their conceptual personae, the sounders of the depths, deriving from the French philosopher Etienne Souriau's characters from his book L'Ombre de Dieu.

The sounders of the depths are the seafarers that guide the crossing of distant seas and polluted streams, by advancing against the risks of stormy weather and rough terrain. The sounders of the depths are not the captains of the ship who actively command directions, nor are they passive passengers awaiting their destination. The sounders of the depths are those driven by the urgency of their surroundings and the electricity in the air, as well as deep sea of contempt beneath their ship. In Pignarre and Stengers' words:

Sounders of the depths may well stay at the front of the ship, but they do not look into the distance. They cannot announce directions nor choose them. Their concern, their responsibility, the reason for the equipment they use is the rapids where one can be smashed to pieces, the rocks that one can hit, the sandbanks where one can run aground. Their knowledge stems from the experience of a part that tells of the danger of rivers, of their deceptive currents, of their seductive eddying. The question of urgency poses itself for the sounder of the depths as it does for everyone else, but his or her proper question is and has to be: 'can one pass through here, and how?' - whatever the urgency, whatever the 'we have to' or the direction chosen may be.

Pignarre and Stengers, Capitalist Sorcery, 'Inheriting from Seattle', 6.
26
27 Ibid, 7.
28 Ibid, 8.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid, n3, 146.
31 Ibid, 8.
The position of this thesis is to rethink Nietzsche, *the great thinker of the depths*, from Pignarre and Stengers' perspective of *the sounders of the depths*. With a philosopher as *explosive* as Nietzsche, however, one can only be too careful. What is important, for today's earth, is no longer prophecies or stern warnings. Klein demonstrates, sadly, that the hold of neoliberalism ensures that these philosophical and scientific forecasts will not be heard. Even worse, today's research warrants the assumption that it is too late for us now to hesitate without action. What is needed, then, is an approach that we can follow from the ground up, like a strike of lightning. Following Nietzsche, we need to navigate stormy conditions as *prophetic human beings* that attract and conduct the electricity of the storm without falling victim to its shock. We need to combat the severity of the situation at hand with a critical reverence for the impotence that has taken hold so far. We need to master the courage to approach these conditions not by ignoring their threat but by welcoming their charge, and putting it to work in as many ways as possible. "The bold seafarer", Nietzsche writes, "must have mastered the art of doing a thousand things with his sails; otherwise he would be done for in no time, and the ocean would swallow him". 

We need a strategy that comes from the depth of the present, but is not bound to it. We need to learn how to use sails that will protect us from the rapids of today. We are worried, and of course we care about the future, but it is *the future that we inhabit now that we must protect, the untimely becoming of today, unfolding before our eyes*. This imaginative response might not be *right* or *realistic* on a wider socio-political scale, but these are not criteria that concern this work or its intent. As Pignarre and Stengers remind us,

> [s]ounders of the depths can be mistaken, but they know that the fact that they discern hazards accurately or not doesn't have the slightest importance if no one hears them. For them it is not a matter of being correct by themselves, or of waiting for the future to prove them right. It is this boat here that is their reason, this boat here which, in our case, gathers those who the cry 'another world is possible' has engaged...

The motley crew of philosophers that are gathered on this ship all in one way or another are trying to shift the conditions of today, for the sake of tomorrow. Our *untimely methodology of geophilosophy* is as important as it is uncertain. The main priority of the sounders of the depths is to remain "attentive to the danger of the traps

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32 As Deleuze calls him in *The Logic of Sense* (London: Continuum, 2004), 'Eighteenth series of the three images of philosophers', 146-147.

33 Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'Prophetic human beings', §316, 251. See also Nietzsche’s 1881 letter to Overbeck cited in Walter Kaufmann's commentary on this passage on the accompanying footnote, 251-252.


35 Pignarre and Stengers, *Capitalist Sorcery*, 'Inheriting from Seattle', 8.
that menace us". It is this adoption of attention, confidence and uncertainty that we must harness, philosophically, if we are to arrive at better pastures in the future.

There's a wonderful documentary entitled *The Queen of Trees* made in 2005 by Mark Deeble and Victoria Stone. The setting of this documentary is a mature sycamore fig tree, known as the Queen of Africa's trees. It is found on a riverbank deep in the tropics of Tsavo West, Southern Kenya. This extraordinary tree, as Deeble and Stone document, is famous in tribal cultures of Africa as a locus of curiosity, myth and legend. The Queen of Trees, we discover, "appears never to flower, yet mysteriously she fruits several times a year. She seems to have no regard for season, and drops her leaves when she pleases".⁠¹ Incredibly, the Queen can produce up to one hundred thousand figs every few months, and this fruit, in turn, feeds a greater variety of animals than any other tree in Africa. The life of this fig tree is impressive, and Deeble and Stone camped for two years beside its riverbank in order to capture their remarkable footage and to tell the Queen's phenomenal tale.

What is important, for our concerns, is not that this tree exists, nor the natural economy of African wildlife that rely upon her sweet figs. For us, we need to pause and consider how this tree exists. Remarkably, the Queen of Trees and her ecosystem would not survive without the tiny fig wasps that pollinate her hidden flowers and fertilise her figs, producing the seeds that will grow to be the figs of the future. In turn, the Queen's fig wasps could not survive without the sycamore's figs that provide a home and protection for their eggs. This mutual dependency between the wasps and the sycamore allow the Queen's figs to fruit every few months, in order for the menagerie of other surrounding animals to survive. It is the meeting of two completely different allies that fuel this economy of mutual dependence and co-evolution. Studies that go far beyond the scope of this documentary have discovered that the interaction between figs and fig-pollinating wasps exemplifies "perhaps the most specialised case of obligate pollination mutualism known", which, according to expert estimates, substantially predate some of the earliest fossils. This indicates a relationship that has spanned and developed for around ninety million years.² This research is staggering, but let's not get buried in the detail. What is just as remarkable, perhaps, is the extreme degree of disparity that lies between the fig-tree and the fig-wasps that depend on one another. As Ian Holm, the narrator of *The Queen of Trees*, points out:

> The two partners couldn’t be more different. One can withstand a river and flood. The other can drown in a dew drops. One lives for centuries. The other, only hours. They differ in size a billion times over. At about a millimeter long,

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the fig wasp is so small that it could fly through the eye of a needle; but no fig tree could exist without it. ³

In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari describe the mutual co-dependence of orchids and wasps as a means to demonstrate the *relative fluidity* that serves the process of *becoming*. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the *territory* of becoming is determined by mutually dependent trajectories of *determinantalisation* and *reterritorialisation*, a motion that forms connections bound together by the order of what they famously call the *rhizome*. In their words:

> The orchid determinantalises by forming an image, a tracing of the wasp; but the wasp determinantalises on that image. The wasp is nevertheless determinantalised, becoming a piece in the orchid's reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorialises the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome [...] a veritable becoming, a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. ⁴

For some readers, this Deleuze-Guattarian terminology is difficult to follow. Here Deleuze and Guattari are describing, in their own words, how the orchid and the wasp *both depend on and depart from one another* in their mutual process of becoming. The orchid and the wasp *become* both themselves and one another in their mutual dependency. "Each of these becomings", Deleuze and Guattari write, "brings about the determinantalisation of one term and reterritorialisation of the other". ⁵ As Deleuze continues to explain elsewhere, what is significant about this relationship is the "double-capture" constitutive of becoming: "'what' each [partner] becomes changes no less than 'that which' becomes". ⁶ In the pollination process, the wasp is becoming an orchid whilst the orchid becomes a wasp - but significantly, the wasp-orchid is as different from *the orchid that was* as the orchid-wasp is from *the wasp that was*. Each party has become something new in the process of cross-pollination: "[t]here is a block of becoming that snaps up the wasp and the orchid, but from which no wasp-orchid can ever descend". ⁷ Likewise, in tropical Africa, the Queen of trees *becomes other than she is* each time the fig-wasps lay eggs in her fruit. The male fig-wasps often die in order to tunnel through the fig's skin to release the female fig-wasps, who leave their eggs in pursuit of the next host. In the following few months the Queen becomes a surrogate mother for the unborn fig-wasps, and will care for them until they hatch. A new process sets in each time the figs come to fruit, and the Queen ages and grows ever more magnificent.

In their introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari advise their

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³ 'The Queen of Trees'.
⁵ *Ibid*.
readers to "[f]ollow the plants", to continually consider the "wisdom of the plants". The course of this research implored us to take this advice seriously. The wisdom of Africa's strongest sycamore fig offers a unique insight into the direction this thesis will take. For a moment, then, let's return to Ian Holm's narration:

Every few months, the Queen produces over a tonne of fruit. To reproduce, she must transfer pollen to make seeds and then disperse them inside figs. The last crop fell only days ago, but up above she is starting again. Over the next two weeks, the tiny buds swell to become young figs. Hidden inside each are the Queen's tiny flowers. At this stage the fig is not a fruit, but a secret garden whose delicate perfume attracts a flock of fig wasps. Their arrival will trigger a sequence of events that will resonate out through the bush. The wasps are all females laden with pollen and eggs. They must enter the fig via the garden gate to pollinate the flowers and lay their eggs inside. A one way passage leads to the secret garden, which is lined with a hundreds of microscopic white flowers. Some of these flowers will become seeds, others will be a nursery for fig wasps. The tree will surround each wasp egg with a capsule called a gaud, which will nourish and protect it. The wasps will soon die, but inside each hanging garden their offspring will live on.

In the context of this research, all of this is another way of saying that the figs that fall from Nietzsche's tree bare the offspring of the future, as well as tiny secret gardens lined with flowers of becoming. Nietzsche teaches his readers that "[a]ll of us harbour concealed gardens and plantings". The trick to this thesis, and for rethinking Nietzsche's thought, is to attract new ways of thinking with the perfume of Zarathustra. The hidden flowers within his thought need to lure the wasps of today. Our orchid of becoming carries fresh eggs and pollen. Nietzsche's garden is our nursery, our fidelity to the earth. This secret garden is the cultivation of the untimely. If Zarathustra is the first fruit to ripen from Nietzsche's thought, then it is time to hear Zarathustra's speeches anew, from the perspective of his children, those born of his sweet fruit. The flesh of his children's figs will taste different to each reader who is brave enough to taste them. Moreover, we must remember, and this is crucial, that the reception of Nietzsche's teachings will change the meaning of his teachings, each time their lesson is received and relayed in different ways. It is important that Nietzsche's lessons remain hopeful when they resurface, when they sprout up from the young seedlings, in their garden to come. It is this hope that forms the crown of Nietzsche's thought as the untimely, always and only untimely, the light that paves the way.

Why turn to the practice of sorcery? Pignarre and Stengers do so, and for deliberate, political reasons. In order for us to prolong the event of Seattle, they argue, we must

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9 'The Queen of Trees'.
turn to knowledge bases that modern thought, and in particular, the ideology of capitalism, have disqualified in the ruthlessness of its capture.\textsuperscript{12} The arc of \textit{Capitalist Sorcery} relies on the political catastrophe that Mark Fisher diagnosed in his 2009 book \textit{Capitalist Realism}, which he wrote ten years after the protests in Seattle had dissipated. In terms of cynicism, the shift from \textit{Capitalist Sorcery} to \textit{Capitalist Realism} is telling. In contrast to the promise of Pignarre and Stengers' subtitle, \textit{Breaking the Spell}, the rhetoric of Fisher's subtitle, \textit{Is There No Alternative?}, is weary, and pessimistic at best. Pignarre and Stengers, to be sure, are suspicious of all current political alternatives - but to have \textit{no possibility of breaking the spell of capitalism at all} undermines the very pursuit of Seattle's cry, \textit{another world is possible}. \textit{Capitalist Realism} tackles the same political terrain as \textit{Capitalist Sorcery} without recourse to sorcerous speculation or hopeful imagery, bolstered by an apathetic awareness of the 'reality' that \textit{things will not change}, or at least not for those unfavoured by capital. Following Slavoj Žižek, Fisher argues that the very structure of capitalist ideology relies on ineffective events like Seattle and figures like Pignarre and Stengers to promote it. Anti-capitalist protests provide "a kind of carnivalesque background noise" to the capture of capitalism, reinforcing the latter's dominance, as opposed to challenging it.\textsuperscript{13} Fisher's account is haunted by the depressive refrain \textit{that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism}, a slogan that is as sardonic as it is saddening.\textsuperscript{14} Championed by the writings of Žižek and Fredric Jameson, this sentiment captures the pervasive apathy that Fisher thinks characterises the contemporary neo-liberal landscape, and its lack of political escape routes. Fisher defines the post-postmodern phenomenon of \textit{capitalist realism} as

the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economical system, but also that it is now impossible to even \textit{imagine} a coherent alternative to it.\textsuperscript{15}

The strength of \textit{capitalist realism}, Fisher continues, "derives in part from the way that capitalism subsumes and consumes all of previous history", a perspective that "takes the vanquishing of modernism for granted".\textsuperscript{16} Klein extends Fisher's vision by citing

\textsuperscript{12} Pignarre and Stengers, \textit{Capitalist Sorcery}, 'Minions', 35.


\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid}, 'It is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism', 2. Emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid}, 'What if you held a protest and everyone came?', 12. In contrast to the early portraits of postmodernism in relation to capitalism held by Fredric Jameson or Jean-Francois Lyotard, Fisher believes "[w]hat we are dealing with now is a deeper, far more pervasive sense of exhaustion, of cultural and political sterility". For the distinction between Capitalist Realism and Postmodernism, see 7-8. For the way Fisher distinguishes the way he uses the term 'Capitalist Realism' from the way that Gerhard Richter or Michael Schudson did in their work, see 16.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, 'What if you held a protest and everyone came?', 4; 8. Fisher makes his point by a clever analysis of the 2006 film \textit{Children of Men} by Alfonso Cuaron, in line with a revision of Jameson's early characterisation of postmodernism.
case study after case study of what she similarly calls climate capitalism, the pervasive ideology that holds that the consequence of "chaotic and disastrous" shifts in the climate is preferable to "the prospect of changing the fundamental, growth-based, profit-seeking logic of capitalism". The shock doctrine of climate capitalism, by its very nature, benefits those in power by exploiting disaster, and Klein's task in This Changes Everything, in line with her former work, is to erode this short-sighted economical conquest with a firmer, long-sighted ethical perspective. Optimistically, Klein contends that "there is still time to avoid catastrophic warming, but not within the rules of capitalism as they are currently constructed". The threat of environmental collapse, Klein hopes, "is surely the best argument there has ever been for changing [capitalism's] rules".

Best intentions aside, however, the promise of the untimely holds no purchase within the ideological stranglehold of neo-liberal capture. Moreover, as time moves forward, acting counter to our time is proving harder to do, as the reality of capital's grasp tightens, supported by the ubiquity of technology built to ensure mass subjectification, surveillance and control. According to Fisher, today we lack the political imagination required to even begin to remember the Nietzscbean hope of a time to come. Even the tropes of post-structural philosophy are inept in offering any strategies or support to combat this prevalent neo-liberal triumph. In his book of interviews, Demanding the Impossible, for instance, Žižek talks briefly of Pignarre and Stengers' beloved Seattle protests. The problem with these actions, Žižek laments, is that up to a point the children of Seattle did not know how to move forward. They did not have the means to give birth to a new alternative. In short, the problem lies in the inspiration of their cry, another world is possible. For Žižek, the other world that the Children of Seattle must call for is the impossible that lies outside of the grasp of the possible. In the face of what he calls "capitalist socioeconomic reality", Žižek tells us that

the task of thinking today is [...] to formulate precisely in a new way to rearrange the limits of the possible and the impossible.

At certain limits Žižek continues,] things we think of as possible are probably not possible: [for example] dreams of immortality or whatever. And at certain levels, what economists are telling us is impossible is possible. The impossible happens: not impossible in the sense of religious miracles, but in the sense of something we don't consider possible within our coordinates.

17 Klein, This Changes Everything, 'Hot Money', 89.
18 Following her previous book, The Shock Doctrine, Klein claims that climate capitalism utilises the insecurity of collective panic to maintain its power: "in the desperation of a true crisis all kinds of sensible opposition melts away and all manner of high-risk behaviors seems temporarily acceptable"; see This Changes Everything, 'Dimming the Sun', 277.
20 Ibid.
21 Slavoj Žižek, Demanding the Impossible (Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity, 2013), 'The impossible happens', 143.
Following Lacan, Žižek suggests that the impossible can take place only in the domain of real action. An act, he argues, "changes the very coordinates of what is possible and thus retroactively creates its own conditions of possibility". To push at the limits of reality to get to the Real, in the Lacanian register, is to challenge the ideological hold that capitalist realism professes to have, by pointing out its inconsistent sore points. In his chapter 'Capitalism and the Real', for instance, Fisher illustrates that one of our only strategies for resisting capitalist realism is to examine the political failings of our time, such as the staggering rise of mental illness met with economic insecurities and accelerations in bureaucracy (Fisher's area of expertise), or again, the unsustainable depletion of environmental resources matched with warnings of irreparable thresholds of warming. Under the heading 'Magical Thinking', Klein discusses the lack of credible action being taken against the latter, which she aligns with a disastrous breed of environmental apathy that recent political scientists have branded extractivism, "a non-reciprocal, dominance-based relationship with the earth, purely of taking". As a response to the blanket 'Bad Timing' of climate change, Klein convincingly argues against the 'Magical Thinking' of action taken by exploitative green industries and ineffective environmental groups, empty gestures made by wealthy celebrities, and extreme solutions devised by the recent field of geoengineering. For Klein, magical thinking, like capitalist sorcery, and capitalist realism, demands those under its spell to conform to capitalism's rules at whatever cost. "The idea that capitalism and only capitalism can save the world from a crisis created by capitalism", Klein argues forcefully, is an unfortunate "hypothesis that has been tested and retested in the real world. We are now able to set theory aside and take a hard look at the results".

The reality of capitalism's promises can only be met a price that forbids the impossible. Žižek argues that for real change to occur, the activist, alongside the philosopher, must

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22 Žižek, *Demanding the Impossible*, 'The impossible happens', 143.
23 Fisher helpfully summaries Lacan's concept of the Real as "what any 'reality' must suppress; indeed, reality constitutes itself through just this repression. The Real is an unrepresentable X, a traumatic void that can only be glimpsed at in the fractures and inconsistencies in the field of apparent reality"; *Capitalist Realism*, 'Capitalism and the Real', 18.
25 Klein, *This Changes Everything*, 'Beyond extractivism', 169.
28 *Ibid*, 'Dimming the sun: the solution to pollution is... pollution?', 256-290.
blur the lines between what is possible and what is impossible and redefine it in a new way. So this would be for me the great task of thinking today: to redefine and rethink the limits of the possible and the impossible.\footnote{Žižek, \textit{Demanding the Impossible}, 'The impossible happens', 143.}

Redefining. Rethinking. Again, we return to Nietzsche. If a fidelity to the earth hinges on the willing of the overman, as opposed to the "poison-mixers" that believe in "other-worldly hopes", then we need to break with the practices that are poisoning the earth today, such as extreme energy extraction or geoengineering.\footnote{Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'Prologue', §3, 13.} For Pignarre and Stengers, the possibility of the impossible is to break with the curse of sorcery that promises the reality of capitalist realism. For Klein, the "moments when the impossible seems suddenly possible are excruciatingly rare and precious", and in that case, "more must be made of them".\footnote{Klein, \textit{This Changes Everything}, 'Conclusion', 466.}

The next time one arises, it must be harnessed not only to denounce the world as it is, and build fleeting pockets of liberated space. It must be the catalyst to actually build the world that will keep us all safe.\footnote{Ibid.}

All of this might sound sensationalist, or vaguely Badiouian, but our analysis becomes tangible if, following Klein, we look towards the Real environmental trauma of climate change that scientists have been worrying about for four decades now. With a mirror to the future, Fisher is right to argue the "real implications" of today's environmental crisis are "too traumatic to be assimilated into the system" of capitalism seriously, and are merely "incorporated into advertising and marketing" to serve political leverage.\footnote{Fisher, \textit{Capitalist Realism}, 'Capitalism and the Real', 18.} The meaning of the earth, the overman, is politically suppressed by the environmental unsustainability of capitalism and the nihilism of neo-liberal ideals. Fisher laments, alongside Klein, that \[t\]he relationship between capitalism and eco-disaster is neither coincidental nor accidental: capital's 'need of a constantly expanding market', it's 'growth fetish', means that capitalism is by its very nature opposed to any notion of sustainability.\footnote{Ibid, 18-19.}

In a paper entitled 'Staying Loyal to the Earth: Nietzsche as an Ecological Thinker', published in the same year as the Seattle protests, Nietzschean scholar Graham Parkes argues that the more we accelerate the extinction of the species in the natural world, the more impoverished our psychical life will gradually become. But the larger stakes are higher: the future of the human is in doubt, in part because the
future of the earth is imperilled. Nietzsche's philosophy [in opposition to this movement] can contribute to grounding a realistic, global ecology that in its loyalty to the earth may be capable of saving it.\textsuperscript{36}

To take Nietzsche seriously today means to \textit{redefine} and \textit{rethink} our political priorities in light of the trauma of environmental collapse. A fidelity to the earth, in line with a fidelity to Nietzsche, might be our only means to stripping neoliberalism of its alleged reality. If we take current consensus in environmental science seriously, then \textit{imagining the end of the world} should inspire the first step to \textit{imagining the end of capitalism}. In the face of these grand hopes, Parkes goes on to press that

the urgency of our current predicament does not allow us the luxury of speculating about [climate change's] truth [or hesitating in our action]. The major forces responsible for the devastation of the earth doubtless glimpse the truth of the situation already - but they are cynical enough to let the destruction continue in the belief that they can insulate themselves (and immediate progeny) from the dire consequences.\textsuperscript{37}

In an early episode of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} entitled 'On the New Idol', Zarathustra teaches his followers that the "State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters".\textsuperscript{38} The state, he continues, "tells lies in all the tongues of good and evil; and whatever it says it lies".\textsuperscript{39} Zarathustra's mistrust reaches its peak when he announces:

\begin{quote}
State I call it where all drink poison, the good and the wicked; state, where all lose themselves, the good and the wicked; state, where the slow suicide of all is called "life".\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

Now this might seem a little dramatic, but here Nietzsche is sounding the principal warning calls of his wider political philosophy. Nietzsche's distrust of the state was a deadly serious affair. For Nietzsche, the lies of the state spelt "the death of peoples" by poisoning its believers with the "will to death".\textsuperscript{41} The poison Zarathustra warns of has not yet sought all its victims and still threatens us today, as the untimeliness of Nietzsche's thought continues to unfold. Today's political refusal to act in the face of climate change is the global suicide that Nietzsche saw all too well. To think and act counter to the poisoning of the earth is what grounds Zarathustra's teachings and guides their prophecy. The state was invented, Zarathustra laments, not by \textit{creators} in their love of life, but by \textit{annihilators} in their "great service to all preachers of

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\item \textsuperscript{36} Graham Parkes: 'Staying loyal to the earth: Nietzsche as an ecological thinker', \textit{Nietzsche's Futures}, ed. John Lippitt (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 185.
\item \textsuperscript{37} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'On the new idol', §1.11, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{Ibid}, 49.
\item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}, 50.
\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid}, 48-49.
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The state was born to respond to the overpopulation of the "superfluous", the "all-too-many", in order to exploit their labour, their customs and their rights. To be clear, what Nietzsche was attacking at large was not capitalism, but the Christian morality of his time. For Nietzsche, the other-worldly hopes that undermine a fidelity to the earth lie in the promise of a life after death in God's kingdom. Today we no longer worship God, but Capital, and there is no heaven after capitalism. What marries the Church and Capital is the poisoning of the earth that constitutes the State, sanctioned by the ulterior motives of morality. According to Zarathustra, the State's cruellest lie of all is the way it assures the identification of all members of the community in its capture: "I, the state, am the people". Democracy, Nietzsche writes elsewhere, ensures the "collective degeneration of man [...] the diminution of man to the perfect herd animal". What scares Nietzsche about democracy and Christianity in general is that even the "great souls" and "vanquishers of the old god" are not immune to the state's poison. In the Genealogy of Morality, for instance, Nietzsche stages a dialogue with a "democrat" and "free-thinker" who is prepared to break with the Church, but not with the direction religion imparts. "We loathe the Church" the democrat declares, "not its poison... Apart from the Church, we too love the poison". Nietzsche's democrat has the criticality to witness the weakness of his peers, but not enough strength to know how to distance himself. In The Gay Science Nietzsche theorises that this type of individual has "just enough" education to realise the vulnerability of their position, but not enough resilience to challenge it. Such a person, Nietzsche grieves, becomes "fundamentally ashamed of his existence", and this shame consumes their very being until they arrive at "a state of habitual revenge", what Nietzsche, in The Genealogy of Morality, terms ressentiment. Under "the cloak of prudent silence, of affability, of mildness", ressentiment spreads its toxicity and infects one's most defiant values: here "spirit becomes poison, education becomes poison, possessions become poison, [even] solitude becomes poison". Those infected waive the opportunity of their insight and instead look to their neighbours for esteem. Zarathustra warns us, however, that one's "neighbours will always be poisonous flies", and that "that which is great in you, just that must make

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43 Ibid, 49-50.
47 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On the new idol', §1.11, 49.
48 Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 'Good and evil, good and bad', §1.9, 21.
49 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
them more poisonous and more like flies".\textsuperscript{53} Only solitude promises "air that is raw and strong"\textsuperscript{54}, only solitude promises protection from the curse of \textit{ressentiment}.

For the sounders of the depths, solitude is no longer an option. If we are to \textit{change everything} about the polluted stream that surrounds us, then we need to work together to dilute its poison. This means \textit{using the frightening forces of sorcery and capitalism to our advantage} - and for this, we need the help of Nietzsche.

\textsuperscript{53} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'On the flies of the market place', §1.12, 54. It is this cycle of contagion that guides the "higher men" of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} to Zarathustra's cave. Like Nietzsche’s democrat, the higher men that Zarathustra sides with miss the opportunity that the death of God announces.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{Ibid.}
DO YOU BELIEVE IN SORCERY?

The question resounds: is there a way to break the spell of capitalism? Is there a way to act counter to, and thereby on, the State? In Deleuze and Guattari’s words: *is there a way to resist the present?*¹ Alongside Zarathustra, Deleuze and Guattari assure us that the people and the earth that we are seeking "will not be found in our democracies", as the status of becoming sought "is by its nature that which always eludes the majority".² Zarathustra's task, he tells himself, is "[t]o lure many from the herd", to be the breaker of laws and the destroyer of values, and hence the one to "write new values on new tablets".³ For Nietzsche, an act of creation is the only way to act counter to the State, in order to serve life and to pursue new meaning. At the conclusion of his speech concerning the state, Zarathustra forecasts that

Only where the state ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous: there begins the song of necessity, the unique and inimitable tune.

Where the state *ends* - look there, my brothers! Do you not see it, the rainbow and the bridges of the overman? ⁴

Zarathustra's principal teaching in the first book of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is that "man is a rope tied between beast and overman".⁵ What is "great in man", he declares, is that "he is a bridge and not an end".⁶ Nietzsche's work calls for the wisdom of the future: a future that spans beyond the conflicts of today. The overman promises the wisdom of tomorrow, a pledge that must be actively pursued and relayed, not realised by whim, luck or happenstance. Nietzsche calls for tomorrow from the perspective of today. He asks us to cross the bridge that we are creating with him, in accordance with that act of creation.

In her own work, Isabelle Stengers also describes the philosophical practice of *bridge-making*. The bridge-makers of philosophy, she argues, are writers who are experts in

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¹ Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Geophilosophy', 108.
² *Ibid*. This sentiment captures Deleuze and Guattari's call for 'minoritarian' politics found throughout *A Thousand Plateaus* and in their former book on Franz Kafka.
³ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'Zarathustra's prologue', §9, 23-24. Significantly, Zarathustra comes to this realisation after "look[ing] into the woods and the silence"; Zarathustra learns more about himself and his task from the natural landscapes that surround him than those he tries to convince along the way.
⁴ Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On the new idol', §1.11, 51. In his prologue, Zarathustra suggests that "the creators, the harvesters [and] the celebrants" alone will be shown "the rainbow and all the steps to the overman*. *Ibid*, 'Zarathustra's prologue', §9, 24.
weaving relations that turn a divide into a living contrast, one whose power is to affect, to produce thinking and feeling.\textsuperscript{7}

We must keep the complexity of this sentiment in mind when we come to Stengers' characterisation of the practice of sorcery in \textit{Capitalist Sorcery}. Pignarre and Stengers define 'capitalist sorcery' as the prevalence of "what paralyses and poisons thinking and renders us vulnerable to [its] capture".\textsuperscript{8} This is a negative vision of what sorcery could be; its promise is indiscernible from the poison of its curse. A living contrast would view the poison of sorcery from the perspective of the bridge to the overman. Stengers praises the practice of philosophy as "a situated practice", one that can address and perhaps heal the "poisoned milieu[s that] must be reclaimed".\textsuperscript{9} Through philosophy, Stengers argues "we can learn to examine situations from the point of view of their possibilities, from that which they communicate with and that which they poison".\textsuperscript{10} She reveals that she became a philosopher because the act of reading, writing, and weaving citations together to her "implies feeling the text as an animating power", a feeling whose strength she simply could not ignore.\textsuperscript{11} For Stengers, philosophy is an art that, above all, "invit[es] participation" and "beckons" the philosopher to write "another footnote that will make a bridge to the past, that will give ideas from the past the power to affect the present".\textsuperscript{12}

In his book \textit{Deleuze and the Unconscious}, Christian Kerslake considers the portrait of capitalism offered by Pignarre and Stengers as a direct threat to the consumer's unconscious. "For capitalism" Kerslake writes, "the unconscious exists first of all as a force to be manipulated", a site of fascination that facilitates the consumer's fetishism of the commodity.\textsuperscript{13} "If we are bewitched by capitalism", Kerslake continues, then "the modern hermetician has to break into the arsenal of the sorcerer in order to defend their theosophical vision".\textsuperscript{14} In their own writings on sorcery, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the power to affect, to produce thinking and feeling,

is not a personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it the effectuation of a power of the pack that throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel.\textsuperscript{15}

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\textsuperscript{8} Pignarre and Stengers, \textit{Capitalist Sorcery}, 'Do you believe in sorcery?', 42.
\textsuperscript{9} Stengers, 'Reclaiming animism', 1; 6.
\textsuperscript{10} Isabelle Stengers, 'The Care of the Possible: Isabelle Stengers interviewed by Erik Bordeleau'. \textit{Scapegoat: Architecture, Landscape, Political Economy}, Issue 01 (Summer, 2011): 12.
\textsuperscript{11} Stengers, 'Reclaiming animism', 1. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid}, 175.
\textsuperscript{15} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, 'Memories of a sorcerer I', 265.
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Deleuze and Guattari insist that the power of the pack exemplifies that the "unconscious itself [is] fundamentally a crowd"; a pack of wolves, as opposed to Freud's solitary Wolf-Man.\textsuperscript{16} In "becoming-wolf", they tell us, with a classic Deleuze-Guattarian turn of phrase, that "the important thing is the position of the mass, and above all the position of the subject itself in relation to the pack or wolf-multiplicity: how the subject joins or does not join the pack, how far away it stays, how it does or does not hold to the multiplicity".\textsuperscript{17} In other words, to become-wolf is a question of paying attention to one's unconscious feelings that lead us outside of the self. It is a matter of exploring the intensive forces that connect up to other forces beyond the individual, forces that tell us that we belong to a collective. As Deleuze and Guattari put it:

The wolves designate an intensity, a band of intensity, a threshold of intensity [...] The wolf, as the instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity in a given region, is not a representative, a substitute, but an I feel.\textsuperscript{18}

To become-animal is to "feel [oneself] becoming a wolf, one wolf amongst others, on the edge of the pack".\textsuperscript{19} Here Deleuze and Guattari echo the lesson of the tortured protagonist of Herman Hesse's mysterious novel Steppenwolf. Before entering the Magic Theatre, Harry Haller, the "wolf of the steppes", identifies with an occult treatise of the personality that describes "man as an onion made up of a hundred integuments, a texture made up of many threads".\textsuperscript{20} Hesse's Steppenwolf understands that one's psychological stature "is not by any means of fixed or enduring form [but rather] an experiment and a transition[, ]nothing else than the narrow and perilous bridge between nature and spirit".\textsuperscript{21} Much like Stengers' animating power of philosophy, the power of the pack invites a weaving of relations that will view the state and its capture from the standpoint of a bridge. If we follow Zarathustra, then we will learn that to cross the bridge leading to the overman, one must affirm all that is and has been, in order to affect and create what will be in the future. Importantly, this affirmation does not impose a hierarchy across different divisions of time or perspective, but promotes a mutual standing ground that allows one to think and feel untimely contrasts as starkly as possible.

In an important episode of the second book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra entitled 'On Redemption', Zarathustra addresses a crowd of cripples and beggars that he encounters after he "crossed over the great bridge".\textsuperscript{22} Zarathustra announces that "the now and the past on earth [...] is what [he] finds most unendurable", and that he would

\textsuperscript{16} Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'One or several wolves?', 30-33.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 32.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, 35.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Hesse, Steppenwolf, 'Treatise on the Steppenwolf', 51; 73.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 74.
\textsuperscript{22} Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'On redemption', §2.20, 137.
"not know how to live if [he] were not also a seer of that which must come". Zarathustra teaches that in order to **redeem** the moral pitfalls of the present and the past, one must will them **in their entirety as necessary hurdles**, in order to release them from the critical harness of **resentment**. Zarathustra argues that "[t]he spirit of revenge [...] has so far been the subject of man's best reflection" and that "it has become a curse for everything human that this folly has acquired spirit". Here Zarathustra significantly defines **revenge** as "the will's ill will against time and its 'it was'". To cross the bridge of redemption, by contrast, is "[t]o redeem those who lived in the past and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it". We may only redeem the pain and suffering of the past, personified in the cripples and hunchbacks of Zarathustra's address, by affirming their "dreadful accident" as the "fragment" and "riddle" promised to be justified by the hindsight of the future. Nietzsche is claiming, in other words, that the only way to will the present and the past **as a living contrast** to the future is to will the poison of past as a toxin that makes us stronger. An understanding of redemption upholds the riddle of Nietzsche's work. It is our task to hear Zarathustra and to think and feel accordingly.

Deleuze and Guattari describe the mode of the **pack** as that which animates the power of sorcerous affect. The pack opens the characteristics of a divide up to a multiplicity of different ways of thinking and feeling. Deleuze and Guattari argue that the power of packs, bands, hybrids, and populations lie in their unpredictable modes of "expansion, propagation, occupation, contagion, [and] peopling", as opposed to an adherence to the conventions of the present or a resemblance of the past. Deleuze and Guattari privilege packs and multiplicities over individuals and particularities, because they believe that the status of becoming "lacks a subject distinct from itself", and are suspicious of any attempt to isolate what is currently taking place from its broader attendance within the horizon of temporality. Deleuze and Guattari here pay respect to the philosopher Herni Bergson when they argue that "the reality specific to becoming" manifests "the Bergsonian idea of a coexistence of very different

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23 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On redemption', §2.20., 138-139.
25 *Ibid*.
26 *Ibid*. Zarathustra will return to this teaching in the latter passage, 'On old and new tablets', §3.12.3, 198.
27 *Ibid*, 'On redemption', §2.20, 139. That the representative of the crowd of cripples is a hunchback is significant. The hump on his shoulders is a symbol of what Zarathustra in his very first speech identifies as the spirit of the camel, the burden of difficulty aligned with bearing the prohibition "thou shalt". Zarathustra sees this hump as something that must be overcome, in order for the metamorphosis of the spirit to become the spirit of the lion, the spirit that says "I will". Importantly, however, for the lion "to assume the right to new values", the hump of the camel must be affirmed, in order for the lion to affirm his distance from the camel in the completion of a genuine metamorphosis. See §1.1 'On the three metamorphoses', 25-28.
29 *Ibid*, 'Memories of a Bergsonian', 263.
'durations', superior or inferior to 'ours', all of them in communication". Deleuze and Guattari's position, however, not only stems from Bergson, but also salutes Zarathustra; to privilege a durational process of becoming redeems the borders of the past and the present as inseparable from what they will become in the future. Deleuze and Guattari argue that any process of becoming does not imitate or identify with what it once was, nor with a projection of what it will turn into. All a subject of becoming may do is will itself in the midst of what it once was and will be. In this sense becoming is not aligned with evolution, progress, or filiation, nor with a spirit of regression or recession. Becoming, Deleuze and Guattari argue, "is a verb with a consistency all its own", Becoming "produces nothing other than itself". Becoming is therefore "not a correspondence between relations", but rather a weaving of relations, which turns each stitch of the divide into a living contrast. Becoming is a process that takes place and can only take place as we create the connections between differences by weaving them together. Becoming, Deleuze and Guattari conclude, "is involutionary", not evolutionary, and this is because "involution is creative". When we return to Nietzsche, again, the plot thickens. Nietzsche's bridge-maker would affirm the sorcerous paralysis of capital as an opportunity to encounter the impersonality of the untimely. Bridge-makers understand that without the materials they weave they will not be able to cross to different pastures. A living contrast, following Nietzsche, would operate as a test, with thoughts and feelings that follow to crave innumerable times more. The thought of the eternal return, after all, is the living thought of all contrasts, felt all at once. Its curse rests on the reception of the wisdom it imparts. The question is whether this thought "would change you as you are or perhaps crush you". This is the question that plagued Nietzsche from 1881 until his collapse, and still curses us today, if we allow it. What is at stake is whether the poison of the state is something to be affirmed as a means to power or resented as an agent of suffering. It is a question of whether capital's poison is a gift for the earth or a curse for those living on it. We must decide whether the teachings of a sorcerer can be used to one's advantage as a bridge beyond the human and the sprawl of the state. The immediate difficulty of this thesis is the impossibility of defining with any precision what a Nietzschean practice of sorcery is or could be. The best we can do is unite a collection of rogue passages and disparate citations and bind them together in whichever manner feels right. The practice of sorcery by definition resists and refuses

30 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a Bergsonian', 263. For a fascinating account of the relationship between Deleuze, Bergson, mysticism, and sorcery, which we will not be able to unpack here, see the start of Kerslake's sixth chapter of Deleuze and the Unconscious, 'The occult unconscious: sympathy and the sorcerer', 159-186.
31 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a Bergsonian', 263.
32 Ibid, 262.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
the confines of definition. In order to hold any convincing sway at all, this resistance and refusal must be used to our advantage. The impossibility of definition is what will characterise the theoretical charter of our approach. The history of sorcery, like any history, is long and convoluted and contradictory and disputed. It is not our intention to comment on historical or specific ethnographical traditions of sorcery, but rather to realise our own understanding of sorcery from our own family of sources and experiments in practice. The eternal return is a philosophically ripe means for sorcery in this regard, because its allure is at once a blessing and a curse, depending on how its thinker receives it.

It is useful here to turn back to Deleuze and Guattari, and in particular, their three passages on sorcery buried in the lengthy "Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...' plateau in A Thousand Plateaus. Kerslake describes this plateau as "amongst other things, a late modern occult treatise", and it is with this reverence in mind that we must continue. In the first 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passage, Deleuze and Guattari propose that things become other than what they are by nuptials of affiliation and alliance. The process of becoming proceeds by virtue of an unnatural participation with heterogeneous powers and affects that challenge filiations that seem rigid and homogeneous. Sorcerers are practitioners who perform rites and rituals that call for strange and seemingly unnatural happenings to take place. For the sorcerer, however, the powers and affects of their curse are not unnatural - in fact, they are more natural than the nature they claim to unravel. Unnatural participations or nuptials, Deleuze and Guattari argue,

are the true Nature spanning the kingdoms of nature [...] That is the only way Nature operates - against itself. Sorcerous propagations, Deleuze and Guattari continue, operate against "simple dualities" and "small modifications across generations". Unnatural participations act counter to and thereby act on nature, by means of unprecedented contagions, infections, epidemics, and catastrophes. The very purchase of sorcerous symbiosis lies in the difficulty of determining familial lines of heredity or anticipating with confidence what turns will occur next. "The Universe", Deleuze and Guattari remind

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36 Kerslake, Deleuze and the Unconscious, 'The occult unconscious: sympathy and the sorcerer', 169. See, in particular, the section on 'Becoming Animal', 170-173.
37 As Patricia MacCormack puts its: "[u]nnatural alliances are molecular entrances into something else's politics, desires, alliances that traverse proportion and proportionality rather than swap it or change places within the maintained hierarchy". 'Unnatural alliances', Deleuze and Queer Theory, eds. Chryasnthi Nigianni and Meri Storr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 144.
38 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer I', 266-267.
us, "does not function by filiation"; it operates by poisonings, contaminations, and corruption. At the peak of this passage, Deleuze and Guattari ask us:

How can we conceive of a peopling, a propagation, a becoming that is without filiation bringing us back to the reproduction of given characteristics? A multiplicity without the unity of an ancestor?

Their answer, of course, is as wise as it is cryptic:

It is quite simple; everybody knows it, but it is discussed in secret.

The secret of sorcery, in turn, will not be spelt out here. We do not dare to betray its secret, or at least, not in crystal form. For the purposes of what follows, we will refer to the secrecy of sorcery as *the sorcerer's cloak*. Let's say the sorcerer wears their cloak as they build their bridge. The sorcerer bears their cloak as intimately as their skin. Its fabric is stitched by the threads that unite and divide it. What lies beneath the bridge is the depth of the abyss. Is *the sorcerer's cloak* what protects the sorcerer from the abyss? Or is it what ties the depths and the surface of their bridge together? Depending on how you read it, the answer to this riddle will be found between the words and the accounts that follow. We ask you, however, not to dwell on particular statements, or to try to rescue meaning from the depths over which we have built our bridge. Think of every idea as another panel on our bridge. Think of every citation we make as part of the wider incantation. Each piece of material is important, but only as a means to keep on moving beyond the present state of affairs. Deleuze and Guattari warn us that "[t]he more the secret is made into a structuring, organising form, the thinner and more ubiquitous [the secret's content] becomes". In sorcery, the more you search for resolution or a clear infrastructure to rely on, the less likely you are to find it, and the more tortured you will become.

From the perspective of rigour, this is all getting a little unsettling. *Can't we just return to Nietzsche? Need we listen to Deleuze and Guattari?* To wear the sorcerer's cloak is to no longer cite Nietzsche or his disciples but to embody their instruction. To wear the sorcerer's cloak is to unite their teachings according to their accord. From here on in, what will be of importance is the way in which we will place Nietzsche's thought into an unnatural alliance with Deleuze and Guattari's writings, as well as with others strangely affiliated with them (Stengers, Irigaray, Bataille, Klossowski). In their first 'Memories of a sorcerer' passage, Deleuze and Guattari write that

\[\text{Deleuze and Guattari, } A \text{ Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer I', 267.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, 266.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid, 'Memories of a secret', 319.}\]
If the writer is a sorcerer, it is because writing is a becoming, writing is traversed by strange becomings that are not becomings-writer.\textsuperscript{44}

Likewise, Stengers argues that

\[ \text{writing is an experience of metamorphic transformation. It makes one feel that ideas are not the author's, that they demand some kind of cerebral - that is bodily - contortion that defeats any preformed intention [...] Writing is what gave transformative forces a particular mode of existence.} \textsuperscript{45} \]

It is by route of \textit{sorcerous writing}, then, that we will seek to poison Nietzsche, to contaminate his writing and corrupt his thought. After spending so long with his work, this seems only fitting. Nietzsche's Autumnal afternoon calls for its corruption:

The times of corruption are those when the apples fall from the tree: I mean the individuals, for they carry the seeds of the future and are the authors of the spiritual colonisation and origin of new states and communities. Corruption is merely a nasty word for the autumn of the people.\textsuperscript{46}

The philosophers we will now turn to have all been selected for specific means. They all approach Nietzsche in a \textit{critically creative} way. When Deleuze, for instance, describes the way to approach the philosophers you admire, he offers the following advice:

You have to work your way back to those problems which an author of genius has posed, all the way back to that which he does not say \textit{in} what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to him, though you also turn it against him. You have to be inspired, visited by the geniuses you denounce.\textsuperscript{47}

On this point, we are delighted to note that Nietzsche distrusted sorcerers, mystics and magicians. For him, these figures promised a common depth of explanation to which their practice could not meet.\textsuperscript{48} Nietzsche was suspicious, above all, of any gregarious trope of tradition that relied on the given codes of social custom, superstition or belief. He says "[t]here is too much sugar and sorcery" in morality's privileging of self-renunciation, the "not for me", and urges us to take caution whenever we feel seduced into sacrificing our inner values in the name of our neighbours.\textsuperscript{49} At the heart of Nietzsche's critique of sorcery lies a deeper mistrust of all that can be offered by

\textsuperscript{44} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, 'Memories of a sorcerer I', 265.
\textsuperscript{45} Stengers, 'Reclaiming animism', 6.
\textsuperscript{46} Nietzsche, \textit{The Gay Science}, 'The signs of corruption', §23, 98.
\textsuperscript{47} Deleuze, \textit{Desert Islands}, 'On Nietzsche and the image of thought', 139.
\textsuperscript{48} In an aphorism entitled 'Mystical explanations' in \textit{The Gay Science}, Nietzsche sums up his position succinctly: "Mystical explanations are considered deep. The truth is that they are not even superficial"; §126, 182. This superficiality manifests itself in the confession of the magician in \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'The magician', §4.5.2, 255-257.
\textsuperscript{49} Nietzsche, \textit{Beyond Good and Evil}, 'The free spirit', §33, 64.
the art of persuasion, and a deep-seated belief that if he must look to others for guidance, the other that dwells inside of himself knows more than the chatter and trickery of the marketplace. Nietzsche believes that "[o]ur faith in others betrays in what respect we would like to have faith in ourselves". Nietzsche could not believe, then, in the value of sorcery, because he could not bear to betray his own values to an art form that relies on the enchantment of others. Zarathustra critiques the magician he encounters, for instance, by condemning his practice because it does not inspire ressentiment in others. The magician's riddle does not mark him from those it deceives. In Nietzsche's view, magicians enchant for the sake of applause, but betray themselves when their tricks falsely flatter their performer, leading to an inner breeding of dishonesty and distress.

All of this boils down to the following point: the only faith Nietzsche promoted was a faith in himself. Any threat to his fortitude from outside of himself was dismissed as superficial, weaker, or toxic. The only people that Nietzsche endeavoured to address were the free spirits of the future, awaiting his reception outside of his grasp. Nietzsche "did not [write] to be understood", let's remember, "by just 'anybody'". He reserved that privilege for Zarathustra's children. Nietzsche defends the inaccessibility of his writing as an esoteric virtue, when he acknowledges:

> It is not by any means necessarily an objection to a book when anyone finds it impossible to understand: perhaps that was part of the author's intention.

Here we arrive at the impossibility that characterises the Nietzschean project: the impossibility of gregarious comprehension. Nietzsche argues that a sophisticated style and taste of writing will at once "keep away, create a distance, forbid 'entrance', understanding" for those that are unworthy, while also "open[ing] the ears of those whose ears are related" to the writer. Nietzsche intended to write counter to his time, not as a form of deception, but as a means of correction, in order to create a discipline of critique for his readers in the future. Only those who have ears for his words will demonstrate that the impossibility of comprehension is possible. But is this not a form of Nietzschean sorcery, an affirmative performance of the impossible?

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53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Sorcerer Love

In order to continue, we need to return to Nietzsche. We need to get closer to him. We need to get more intimate. Deleuze is right: we need to go "all that way back to that which he does not say in what he says, in order to extract something that still belongs to him".¹ This task will require us to go back over selections from Nietzsche’s published oeuvre, as well as to examine the critical years of his biography in tandem. This process will allow us to understand how Nietzsche came to become the philosopher that he was and write the philosophy that he wrote.

Nietzsche famously detested bonds of affection and acts of sympathy. He abhorred the claim that people understood him or what he was going through. He believed that any knowledge of the other was discounted when it reduced the other to something familiar, something common. He opposed the figures and experiences which he considered singular to those which were representative of the norm, the latter of which he classified as gregarious, and thereby mediocre. In Nietzsche's philosophy, gregarious propensities are sanctioned by communication, intelligibility and exchange, whereas the feelings and thoughts that were singular were private, incommunicable, and unique.² Nietzsche pursued any hint or experience that led him further to becoming who he was. His very philosophical framework demanded that all of his actions were deemed significant, that every decision that he made was relevant to his task and would resonate beyond his time. As opposed to the "superfluous" and "all-too-many" of the state³, Nietzsche considered himself entirely necessary to the course of history.⁴ In line with Zarathustra, Nietzsche worried that a close proximity to others would weaken what was singular in his work and his thought. He argues that the pursuit for knowledge "for common people" stems from a desire for security, "to feel at home", and "the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual and questionable something that no longer disturbs" or confronts them.⁵ For Nietzsche, uncovering that subterranean domesticity within the singular promised more grief than comfort. To strip the everyday of what is strange or problematic was to strip experience of all that is worthy of attention. The strange and the unfamiliar, let's remember, are the breeding grounds for the sorcerer. For Nietzsche, paradoxically, what was important was that the other did not lie outside his grasp. A superior form of knowledge lies in what we do not know - and if we can be strangers to ourselves, how

¹ Deleuze, Desert Islands, 'On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought', 139.
² On the distinction between the singular and the gregarious, see Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 'The origin of four criteria', 76-77.
³ Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'On the new idol', §1.11, 49.
⁴ Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 'The most dangerous point of view', §233, 212-213.
⁵ Ibid, 'On the origin of our concept of "knowledge"', §355, 300.
can we be anything other than strangers to others? In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche seeks the unfamiliar within himself:

> What is familiar is what we are used to; and what we are used to is most difficult to "know" - that is, to see as a problem; that is, to see as strange, as distant, as "outside us".  

From here, it will be fruitful to consider the twists and turns of Nietzsche's life. It is only by getting closer to these turns that we may, in turn, come to understand why he sought his distance, even from himself.

In an international bestseller work of fiction from 1992 entitled *When Nietzsche Wept*, the psychotherapist Irvin D. Yalom ponders what solace Nietzsche might have glimpsed by undergoing psychoanalytic treatment. Yalom's account is as entertaining as it is plausible; set in Vienna in late 1882, it captures Nietzsche at his lowest, following the heartache he experienced in the wake of his love affair with Lou Salomé, and dealing with his constant bouts of illness that prevented further contact with others. An analysis of this text or its validity will not lead us any further. What is worth noting, however, is how Yalom's psychological narrative rotates with Salomé at its axis. Like Yalom's protagonist, Josef Breuer, who is desperate to understand his client, perhaps we need to probe at Nietzsche, and at what lies in that which he did not say in between the words of his published work.

From his first meeting with Lou Salomé in late April 1882, Nietzsche's feelings towards love and women were conflicted. Nietzsche found himself totally enchanted by Salomé, a twenty-one year old student of Zürich University who had taken absence from her studies and moved to Italy due to poor health. Anecdotal details regarding the early stages of their relationship vary, but it is generally recounted that Nietzsche proposed to Salomé around three times within the first three weeks of their friendship. His first words to her, according to Salomé herself, were "from what stars have we fallen to meet each other here?". In line with this introduction, some accounts recall that Nietzsche asked his friend Paul Reé to propose to her on his behalf. Others report that Nietzsche initially offered his hand of marriage to Salomé himself, but indirectly, by admitting a vague sense of obligation, and offering his proposal "in order to protect [her] from gossip". All accounts agree that on May 5 1882, not long after his first attempt, Nietzsche proposed to Salomé again amongst the baroque chapels on the mountain of Monte Sarco facing Lake of Orta, near Stresa in Italy. He then tried once

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7 For an account as to how bound Yalom's account is to the actual historical happenings, see Yalom's 'Author’s Note', *When Nietzsche Wept* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 307-310.

8 As reported by Siegfried Mandel in his 'Introduction' to Salomé's *Nietzsche* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2011), xlv.

9 As quoted by Hayman, *Nietzsche*, 245-246. Nietzsche would deny that this gesture was a marriage proposal around two weeks later on the 13 May 1882.
more shortly after at Lucerne's Gletschergarten, which is a Glacier garden in Switzerland. Nietzsche hoped to find in Salomé a "twin-brain" that could help him realise his philosophical vision. In late May, Nietzsche was desperate to spend time alone with Salomé, and invited her to join him on an intimate cabin retreat to a forest on the outskirts of Berlin. In his invitation, Nietzsche tried a different tactic than straight out flattery, by explaining that "solitary creatures [such as himself] must first accustom themselves very slowly even to the people who are dearest to them". Salomé refused his invitation, but did agree to visit Franz and Ida Overbeck at this time, in order to learn more about Nietzsche from his closest friends.

Tracing Nietzsche's letters to Franz Overbeck from this period, Pierre Klossowski argues that Nietzsche pursued Salomé in order to hide from "the fear of his own solitude", a "thoughtless step" that led to further isolation. Nietzsche's disappointment in being rejected, however well he masked it, remained unresolved. In a letter to Overbeck written a year after his split with Paul Réé and Salomé, Nietzsche writes that thinking of them still "makes [his] heart bleed", that no one "could imagine how this madness rages [within him], day and night", and that "everything seems to conspire to keep [him] imprisoned in [his] abyss". On Nietzsche's mind is the music from a score he composed in response to the richness of Salomé's poetry. On 25 August 1882, Salomé gave Nietzsche a poem entitled 'Hymn to Life', which he mistook as a love letter of sorts, and immediately set to put music to it. In Ecce Homo, written six years later, Nietzsche notes the significance of this poem to him, wedging his admiration for Salomé between a recounting of his 'experience' of the eternal return in Surlei, Sils-Maria, and the painful conditions that led to the writing of the first book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Haunted by the humiliation of Salomé's rejection, Nietzsche adopted the figure of Zarathustra as his only child, as his means to reproduce himself by his own virility, a "self-maternity, a giving-birth to himself". In a passage of Zarathustra entitled 'On Involuntary Bliss', Nietzsche decides that "from the depths [of oneself] one loves only one's child and work" and that "where there is great love of oneself it is the sign of

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10 These biographical details regarding May 5th come from Mandel, 'Introduction', Nietzsche, xlv-xlvi.
11 'Letter to Lou Salomé, 28 May 1882', as quoted by Hayman, Nietzsche, 247.
12 Hayman, Nietzsche, 247.
13 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The consultation of the paternal shadow', 192.
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Letter to Franz Overbeck, Summer 1883 (Sils-Maria)', as quoted by Klossowski in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 194.
15 'Hymn to Life', and the commentary surrounding it, are reproduced in both English and German in Mandel's 'Introduction' to Salomé's Nietzsche, liii-liv.
16 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', §1, 70.
17 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 188. For more on the relationship between Nietzsche, Zarathustra, and "the Lou experience", see 190-191.
As Klossowski sees it, "Nietzsche staked the entire weight of his thought on his adventure with Lou", who "flattered his need to possess - and flattered it under the guise of a feminine disciple the like of which he would never again encounter". Once Salomé had refused his proposal, Nietzsche needed a means to validate his pain, and wrote some of the most poetic pieces of his entire written work. 'The Night Song' from Zarathustra famously captures one of Nietzsche's most intimate revelations. Nietzsche describes this poem as a dithyramb of the "deepest melancholy" that speaks of a beacon, a "superabundance of light and power [that] through his nature as a sun [is] condemned not to love", despite "his soul too [being] the song of a lover". Nietzsche's love for this particular piece of writing and the sadness it celebrates is well documented. After Nietzsche's death, his sister Elizabeth commemorated his life by inscribing the refrain of this poem on a large rock and placing it in the forest of the Chasté peninsula in Sils-Maria. This stone now rests for tourists to find and marks one of Nietzsche's favorite locations to spend time alone. Nietzsche reproduced 'The Night Song' in full in Ecce Homo, stating afterwards:

The like of this has never been written, never felt, never suffered: thus does a god suffer, a Dionysus. The reply to such a dithyramb of a sun's solitude in light would be Ariadne... Who knows except me what Ariadne is! ...

Bitter at her dismissal and their eventual lapse in contact, Nietzsche still tried to claim Salomé for his own means. Nietzsche viewed the "misfortune" felt in the year after her rejection as "only as great as it is in proportion to the aim and purpose which dominates" his philosophy, and proposed that his heartache enabled "the most intense and personal productiveness". After a hurtful year of self-examination and chloral-hydrate abuse, Nietzsche revalued Salomé's rejection as not only a test to his character but as a necessary hurdle to his wider philosophical task. In a letter to his sister, who had always disapproved of Salomé, Nietzsche describes this period of writing as "almost bloodstained" by the "incredible amount of personal experience and suffering" that hides beneath his words. In a letter to Ida Overbeck, Nietzsche confides that his memories of Salomé had caused him "irreparable harm [as his] imagination [continued] to wade through the slime of [those] experiences for about a year". In an attempt to subdue his nightly episodes of delirium and depression,

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18 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Of involuntary bliss', §3.3, 161.
19 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The consultation of the paternal shadow', 195; 190.
20 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'The night song', §2.9, 105-107.
21 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', §7, 78. Nietzsche recounts the experience of writing 'The night song' earlier in §4, describing it as "a melody of unspeakable melancholy" and the "loneliest song [...] that ever was written"; 74.
22 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra', §§, 80.
23 'Letter to Franz Overbeck, Summer 1883 (Sils-Maria)', as quoted by Klossowski in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The consultation of the paternal shadow', 194.
24 'Letter to Elizabeth, 27 April 1883', as quoted by Hayman, Nietzsche, 266.
25 'Letter to Ida Overbeck mid July 1883', as quoted by Hayman, Nietzsche, 267.
Nietzsche affirmed his loneliness as a Dionysian virtue.\textsuperscript{26} From that point on, Nietzsche pledged to seek love only in the pages of his own philosophy, and learnt to relive his painful memories of Salomé only as a means to serve these pages. In a telling passage of the first book of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, Nietzsche's prophet describes "the way of the lover" as the "wish to consume [oneself] in [one's] own flame".\textsuperscript{27} To "become new", Nietzsche writes, one must "first become ashes".\textsuperscript{28} Zarathustra warns of "feelings which want to kill the lonely" and of "offer[ing one's] hand too quickly to whomever [one] encounters".\textsuperscript{29} He awards the title "the lonely one" to he who can shed their afflictions and social ties in their pursuit of becoming who they are. The lonely one \textit{leads himself past himself} towards the way of the creator and the lover. To love loneliness is to love oneself, and "therefore despise [oneself], as only lovers despise".\textsuperscript{30} It is only through a painful hatred of his life that Nietzsche could create a deeper love of life.\textsuperscript{31} On this note, Zarathustra advises Nietzsche to

\begin{quote}
Go into your loneliness with your love and your creation, my brother; and only much later will justice limp after you.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

At the close of book three of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, Nietzsche dedicates a song to his retreat entitled 'The Yes and Amen Song'. Across seven stanzas, Zarathustra painfully repeats the same refrain:

\begin{quote}
Oh, how should I not lust after eternity and after the nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?
Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted children, unless it be this woman whom I love: for I love you, O eternity.
\textit{For I love you, O eternity!} \textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

In order to keep on writing, Nietzsche needed to trade his lust for Salomé for a love of the eternal return. The humiliation from Nietzsche's desire to elope exacerbated his already heated position towards women, as Salomé's strength of character threatened the fragility of his self-proclaimed sufficiency and purpose. In an aphorism of \textit{The Gay Science} written shortly after \textit{Zarathustra}, Nietzsche took a stand against his own vulnerability, and in doing so made his position on gendered difference clear:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{26} As argued by Klossowski, \textit{Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle}, 'The consultation of the paternal shadow', 190-191.
\textsuperscript{27} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'On the way of the creator', §1.17, 64.
\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid}, 64-65. Zarathustra goes on to say that on the path to oneself, one must "create a god for yourself out of your seven devils"; Zarathustra will go on to address these seven devils as companions in the fourth book of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid}, 63-64. .
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid}, 'On the way of the creator', §1.17, 65.
\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid}, 'The dancing song', §2.10, 109.
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid}, 'On the way of the creator', §1.17, 65.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid}, 'Seven seals (Or: the yes and amen song)', §3.16, 228-231.
\end{flushright}
I will never admit the claim that man and woman have *equal* rights in love; these do not exist. For man and woman have different conceptions of love; and it is one of the conditions of love in both sexes that neither sex presupposes the same feeling and the same concept of "love" in the other.\(^{34}\)

Nietzsche believed that a feminine passion lay in the "unconditional renunciation of rights" towards man; that love for a woman meant "total devotion" and "faith" in her male counterpart, resulting entirely in the desire "to be taken and accepted as a possession".\(^ {35}\) By contrast, when a man loves a woman, according to Nietzsche, he needs not surrender himself in return; "on the contrary, he is supposed to become richer in 'himself' - through the accretion of strength, happiness and faith given him by the woman who gives herself".\(^ {36}\) The man in love wants only the woman's devotion for him and not "renunciation [or a] giving away" of himself, and is therefore "as far as can be from the presupposition of feminine love".\(^ {37}\) Nietzsche goes so far to say that a man in love who devotes himself entirely to a woman is "simply" not a man. "A man who loves like a woman", he claims, "becomes a slave; while a woman who loves like a woman becomes *a more perfect woman*".\(^ {38}\) Here Nietzsche is unfortunately following in the footsteps of his idol Arthur Schopenhauer, who infamously argued that "women exist solely for the propagation of the race and find in this their entire vocation".\(^ {39}\) Nietzsche's words here are damning, and they soil his writing. What is upsetting is that Nietzsche, unlike Schopenhauer, is not attempting to be controversial or absurd.\(^ {40}\) He sees this unequal relationship as an essential part of nature:

> I do not see how one can get around this natural opposition by means of social contracts or with the best will in the world to be just, desirable as it may be not to remind oneself constantly how harsh, terrible, enigmatic, and immoral this antagonism is. For love, thought of in its entirety as great and full, is nature, and being nature it is in all eternity something "immoral". \(^ {41}\)

Nietzsche, in other words, sought permission from the cruelty of nature to validate his misogyny and disrespect for those that do not align with his desires. If love and nature

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\(^{34}\) Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'How each sex has its own prejudice about love', §363, 319.


\(^{36}\) Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'How each sex has its own prejudice about love', §363, 319-320.


\(^{38}\) *Ibid*. For Zarathustra's similar treatment of the relationship between man and woman, see *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On little old and young women', §1.18, 65-67.

\(^{39}\) Schopenhauer, *Essays and Aphorisms*, 'On women', §6, 67.

\(^{40}\) On this, see Walter Kauffmann's 'Translators introduction' to *The Gay Science*, 24.

\(^{41}\) Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'How each sex has its own prejudice about love', §363, 319.
operate in the way that Nietzsche sees it, then we need to place Nietzsche's nature against itself and open it up to a nuptial that might renew or replace it.

In an essay entitled 'Sorcerer Love', Luce Irigaray depicts the demonic function of love as described by Diotima to Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*. In her speech, Diotima tells Socrates that love is of "an intermediate nature", "halfway between mortal and immortal"; a status that qualifies love, says Irigaray, "as demonic".42 In their own writings of sorcery, Deleuze and Guattari argue that in sorcerous practice "[t]here is always a pact with a demon", "the sorcerer has a relation of alliance with the demon".43 Deleuze and Guattari say this because they want to stray away from any reproduction associated with heredity or filiation; "in sorcery", they argue, "blood is of the order of contagion and alliance".44 Sorcerers reproduce by "illicit unions or abominable loves",45 intermediary states of becoming that Diotima loses sight of when she goes on to defend love's duty of procreation.46 For Deleuze and Guattari, the demonic stature of sorcery demands that alliances between unnatural partners are made in unprecedented and unusual contexts, without recourse to any familiarity of dialectic or domestication that makes their encounter universal. Unnatural nuptials and demonic fascinations transform the gregarious nature of commonality to a singular union that resists individual privileges or hierarchies. What is born of these unions are not children or institutional boundaries but progressive stages of becoming that surpass and further their experimental precedents and place their adversaries into crisis.

What is confounding about Nietzsche's position towards women is that he refuses to credit his exemplary experience with Salomé as anything but a disappointing fantasy. In an 1882 aphorism explicitly dedicated to love, Nietzsche offers next to nothing to further his stance, writing only that

Love forgives the lover even his lust. 47

Nietzsche famously refused excuses or tolerance when it came to heated passions or immoral ideas. The question we must ask ourselves at this stage is can we, as today's readers, forgive Nietzsche? Can we use the complexity of his thought to arrive at a place where we can redeem the catastrophe of his misogyny without ignoring it?

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46 Irigaray, 'Sorcerer Love', 38.
In 1980 Luce Irigaray wrote a beautiful essay entitled 'Speaking of Immemorial Waters', collected in her book *Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche*. Irigaray's wider task with this text was to write to both Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida from the perspective of the feminine. In this essay, Irigaray responds to Nietzsche on behalf of Lou Salomé in the form of a decisive love letter, by poetically resounding Salomé's distaste for marriage and the male appropriation she deemed his proposal to entail. In doing so, Irigaray interrupts the vanity that serves Nietzsche's broader philosophical position to remind us of Salomé and the lesson she taught him. Channeling Ariadne in pristine poetic form, Irigaray's female speaker refuses Dionysus, as the latter seeks the former only in his own image, for his own purposes and according to his whim. Unsatisfied with the marital proposal of eternal recurrence, Irigaray advises Nietzsche to let Salomé go "beyond the place of no return". Irigaray's Marine Lover refuses to be remembered eternally as the "muse", "fallen angel" or "guardian of his hearth" that completes Nietzsche's life's work. Irigaray argues that Nietzsche's eternal return of the same, by pledging a 'yes' to all that was and will be, neglects to take Salomé's 'no' for what it was, and "lacks what still sustained [the] passion" of his proposal. The circle of the eternal return transforms Salomé's rejection into an affirmation that protects Nietzsche from actually hearing her response. "Moving on" Irigaray advises, "is surely the road to take when love takes such a road" as theirs, and "surely" she claims, this farewell letter is a "sign of love" much stronger than one of compassion or forgiveness.

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1 It is not my intention, unfortunately, to unpack the entirety of this text or to address Derrida. I will limit my considerations to 'Speaking of Immemorial Waters', which is the first chapter of this book (1-73). All following footnotes will indicate which section of this chapter to which they belong. For a more in depth summary of Irigaray's account, see 'The plait of Ariadne: Luce Irigaray's *Amante Marine de Friedrich Nietzsche* by Kelly Oliver, collected in *The Fate of the New Nietzsche*, eds. Keith Ansell-Pearson and Howard Caygill (Aldershot: Avebury, 1993), 211-227.

2 Nietzsche's adoption of the figures of Ariadne and Dionysus is well documented. In his landmark text *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968), Walter Kaufmann suggests that Nietzsche's later notes reserved the figure of Dionysus for himself, whereas Ariadne represented Cosima Wagner (133-134). It is my contention that Irigaray's Marine Lover speaks as Ariadne explicitly on behalf of Salomé. In an essay entitled 'Romancing the Philosophers: Luce Irigaray', Carolyn Burke explains that Irigaray adopts this voice "because Ariadne, like all mythological figures, is fluid, metamorphic, and, in her reading, capable of resisting [Nietzsche's] definition of her as his feminine". See *The Minnesota Review* 29 (Fall, 1987): 107-108.


5 *Ibid*, 'Burning lava you carry within you', 55.

The marine imagery of Irigaray's account can be traced to respond to the nautical landscapes that populate Nietzsche's aphorisms and the narrative of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. In the passage that precedes the infamous announcement of the death of God, Nietzsche describes the sea as "infinite" and warns us "that there is nothing more awesome than infinity". He says that when he looks out to the sea, the monstrous eye of infinity stares back at him. In a lecture given in 1980, Irigaray recounts that she "chose to examine Nietzsche in terms of water because it is the place of the strongest interpellation, it is the element of which he is the most afraid". Instead of admiring the abyss that stares back at him, Irigaray argues that Nietzsche opts to build bridges, traverse tightropes, or keep to the heights of the mountain trails that look out to the skies as opposed to the seas. It is worth recounting a few examples of Nietzsche's marine imagery in order to understand why Irigaray selects the sea as her interlocutor.

In an aphorism entitled 'Women and their action at a distance', Nietzsche describes himself standing on a beach looking out towards the sea. He is taken aback by the violence of the waves that crash as if in response to the safety of his shores.

Here I stand in the flaming surf whose white tongues are licking at my feet; from all sides I hear howling, threats, screaming, roaring coming at me, while the old earth-shaker sings his aria in the lowest depths, deep as a bellowing bull, while pounding such an earth-shaking beat that the hearts of even these weather-beaten rocking monsters are trembling in their bodies.

In this scene, Nietzsche goes on to describe a magical boat that cuts across the turbulent water for him to admire.

Then, suddenly, as if born of nothing, there appears before the gate of this hellish labyrinth, only a few fathoms away - a large sailboat, gliding along as silently as a ghost. Oh, what ghostly beauty! How magically it touches me! Has all the calm and taciturnity of the world embarked on it? Does my happiness itself sit in this quiet place - my happier ego, my second, departed self? Not to be dead and yet no longer alive? A spiritlike intermediate being: quietly observing, gliding, floating? As the boat that with its white sails moves

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7 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'In the horizon of the infinite', §124, 180. For an excellent discussion of this passage, and its significance in relation to the aphorism that follows, and Nietzsche's work more broadly, see the first chapter of Jill Marden's *After Nietzsche: Notes towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 1-10.

8 Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'Towards new seas', 371. It is interesting to compare this song to Nietzsche's short aphorism on the monstrous in *Beyond Good and Evil*. Here Nietzsche famously writes that "when you gaze long into an abyss the abyss also gazes into you"; 'Maxims and Interludes' §146, 102.


10 Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 'Her ultimate depth never returns to the light of day', 52.

like an immense butterfly over the dark sea. Yes! To move over existence! That's it! That would be something!  

Despite the excitement of his vision and the feelings it elicits, Nietzsche disregards the clamor of the waves and their intermediary boat as mere illusions born of his solitude and sadness. He is hesitant to announce the underlying meaning of his spiritual visitations and what they wish to tell him. He concludes this aphorism by saying:

> It seems as if the noise here had led me into fantasies. All great noise leads us to move happiness into some quiet distance. When a man stands in the midst of his own noise, in the midst of his own surf of plans and projects, then he is apt also to see quiet, magical beings gliding past him and to long for their happiness and seclusion: women. He almost thinks that his better self dwells there among the women, and that in these quiet regions even the loudest surf turns into deathly quiet, and life itself into a dream about life. Yet! Yet! Noble enthusiast, even on the most beautiful sailboat there is a lot of noise, and unfortunately much small and petty noise. The magic and the most powerful effect of women is, in philosophical language, action at a distance, actio in distans; but this requires first of all and above all - distance.  

Nietzsche decides that distance is the only way to benefit from the mystical wisdom of the waves that glide past his ship. Following this aphorism, in 1884, Nietzsche revisits this vision, this time from the perspective of a love-drunk Zarathustra dancing with his muse:

> Into your eyes I looked recently, O life: I saw gold blinking in your night-eye; my heart stopped in delight: a golden boat I saw blinking on nocturnal waters, a golden rocking-boat, sinking, drinking, and winking again. At my foot, frantic to dance, you cast a glance, a laughing, questioning, melting rocking-glance: twice only you stirred your rattle with your small hands, and my foot was already rocking with dancing frenzy.

> [...] I fear you near, I love you far; your flight lures me, your seeking cures me: I suffer, but what would I not gladly suffer for you?

> [...] I dance after you, I follow wherever your traces linger. Where are you? Give me your hand! Or only one finger!  

Significantly, after his dance with life, Zarathustra whispers the secret of the eternal recurrence to his partner, just like his father did with his lover at the top of the Mountain of Monte Sarco in 1882. Zarathustra remembers this exchange as "dearer to

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14 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'The other dancing Song', §3.15.1, 224-225.
[him] than all [his] wisdom ever was".\textsuperscript{15} As if sealing this admission, Nietzsche follows this episode with the 'Seven Seals (or 'The Yes and Amen Song'), where Zarathustra blesses his love for the eternal return in seven different ways. Zarathustra returns to marine imagery in the fifth refrain of his ode to eternity. Here Zarathustra sings:

If I am fond of the sea and of all that is of the sea's kind, and fondest when it angrily contradicts me; if that delight in searching which drives the sails towards the undiscovered is in me, if a seafarer's delight is in my delight; if ever jubilation cried, "The coast has vanished, now the last chain has fallen from me; the boundless roars around me, far out glisten space and time; be of good cheer, old heart!" Oh, how should I not lust after eternity and after the nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence?\textsuperscript{16}

In response to Zarathustra's Dancing Song, Irigaray wrote a passage entitled 'Dance of the Abyss'. Here Irigaray argues that in his work Nietzsche had "made a choice", that his "only wife is eternity", and that his supposed fondness for the sea pales in comparison to the mountain tops and the skies of which he felt familiar.\textsuperscript{17} Irigaray maintains that by "believing that fertility can only come down from the sky", from the air of the "unbounded yes and Amen", Nietzsche decided to neglect all other landscapes that may lead to new offspring other than his own.\textsuperscript{18} In the scene 'Before Sunrise', Zarathustra looks out to the heavens that span "silently over the roaring sea", and "tremble[s] with godlike desires".\textsuperscript{19} He pledges to his own "abyss of light" that

To throw myself into your height, that is my depth. To hide in your purity, that is my innocence.\textsuperscript{20}

Zarathustra's call for affirmation is staked in the pure light of eternal recurrence that permits him to "carry the blessings of [his] Yes into all abysses".\textsuperscript{21} In his pursuit of the overman, Nietzsche's writings renounce the "drifting clouds" that threaten the fortitude of Zarathustra's horizon.\textsuperscript{22} Irigaray warns Nietzsche, by contrast, that "by preaching the eternal recurrence", Nietzsche proclaims his own decline, by "[h]eralding something that can only take place after [him], and without [him]".\textsuperscript{23} Unlike the resolve of Zarathustra's blank sky, Irigaray writes that "life never stays

\textsuperscript{15} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'The other dancing song', §3.15.1, 227.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid}, 'The seven seals (Or: the yes and amen song)', §3.16.5, 230. Here Nietzsche is making reference to 'In the horizon of the infinite' from \textit{The Gay Science}, §124, 180-181.
\textsuperscript{17} Irigaray, \textit{Marine Lover}, 'Dance of the abyss', 42.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid}; Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'Before sunrise', §3.4, 165.
\textsuperscript{19} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'Before sunrise', §3.4, 164.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid}, 165.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, 164-165.
\textsuperscript{23} Irigaray, \textit{Marine Lover}, 'Dance of the abyss', 41.
still", and that "if life doesn't flourish, it fades". She tells Nietzsche that "either you discover more and more new sources of life, or you walk toward the grave". Irigaray's point is that for Nietzsche's thought to keep on thinking in an untimely manner, it needs to give rise to new thoughts that will break with the chain of recurrence from which they were born. Nietzsche needs to give himself up in order to merge with the object of his teachings. Nietzsche's "impossible dilemma", Irigaray explains, is that "the other has given [him] what escapes [his] creation", a gift that serves as "the source of [his] highest ressentiment". Irigaray's contention is that without women or sexual difference Nietzsche would not be the man he fancies himself to be, and his work will not become anything more than it was in his time. Nietzsche's mother "poured out into [him] the overflow of her riches" physically, in pregnancy, when Nietzsche was curled in the safety of her womb. This is a gift that Nietzsche may not give to Zarathustra. Salomé rejected Nietzsche in a way that his vanity would not have withstood were it to be left to its own devices. This is a notion that Nietzsche refuses to entertain with his writing. Nietzsche routinely dismissed Hegelian dialectics, as he saw the master-slave dichotomy as a sure means to nihilism, negation and the spirit of revenge. That said, Nietzsche utilises this tactic in his position of gendered inequality to furnish his own elevated point of privilege. As the Nietzschian scholar Joanne Faulkner points out,

"Woman" plays the "slave" to Nietzsche's "master" in his texts, thus representing to him his power, identity and destiny. "Woman" is denied the alterity that Nietzsche saw as so essential [to his companions, because they serve] a utility for Nietzsche's self-representation in the text.

Faulkner expertly surmises the difference between friendship, community and love in Nietzsche's work, and shows that women do not play an active role in any of these depictions. "The love that Nietzsche demands of his women", she explains, "is a soft, benevolent love, one that affirms him but cannot present itself as a challenge". Faulkner accurately describes the women that populate Nietzsche's pages as "mere automatons" denied of their "difference from him", an "endless resource for Nietzsche's self-affirmation". If Nietzsche were to grant women the alterity that he offered his male counterparts, Faulkner warns that he might encounter "a more threatening difference that would wrest his philosophy from his control, if he were not

24 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Dance of the abyss', 41.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid, 42.
27 Ibid, 45.
28 On this, see chapter 5 of Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'The overman: against the dialectic', 147-194.
30 Ibid, 86.
31 Ibid.
to limit "woman" to meaning for him "the same".\textsuperscript{32} If Nietzsche means it when he writes that "[t]hat which is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil", then a true love would relieve the women's position of "good or bad according to [Nietzsche's] latest good or evil".\textsuperscript{33} It is for this reason that we need to look out to the sea as opposed to the sky before sunrise, to remember her depths and limitless expanse.

The sea of the Marine Lover shimmers in her immanence. Her horizon is infinite, indefinite, incorruptible. Irigaray tells us that "[n]o rapture, no peril, is greater than that of the sea", that "her ultimate depth never returns to the light of the day", that the sun always "sets before touching the sea bottom".\textsuperscript{34} The sea radiates her own light in her majesty and mystique. Across her surface, the sea can shed shimmering scales indefinitely. Her depths peel off into innumerable thin, shining layers. And each one is the equal of the other as it catches a reflection and lets it go [...]

The sea shines with a myriad eyes. And none is given any privilege. Even here and now she undoes all perspective. Countless and shifting and merging her depths.\textsuperscript{35}

This limitless rhythm of exchange and perspective breaks as waves break at the shores we have left. Irigaray asserts, however, that "the boldest navigators prefer to dry out the sea, and spread their sails at her expense. They draw, endlessly, upon her reserves to push their skiff along", to continue their conquest, to tame her waves to "fit [their] fortune".\textsuperscript{36} These seafarers, Irigaray continues, "search [for] something that offers a solid resistance and opposition to their wandering", a destination or an island they may colonise as a trophy, a secret truth they may arrive at, "within the narrow limits of their perspectives".\textsuperscript{37} Zarathustra, for instance, describes the object of his "sails search" as "a love that shall be [the seafarer's] new nobility": a passion for "the undiscovered land in the most distant sea".\textsuperscript{38} Irigaray's Marine Lover responds to Zarathustra by saying that the man has still to come who will live that love out beyond the reach of any port[, ]letting go of his rock, his ship, his island[, and] whoever looks upon her from the overhanging bank finds there a call to somewhere farther than his

\textsuperscript{32} Faulkner, 'Voices from the depths', 85-86.
\textsuperscript{33} Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 'Maxims and interludes', §153, 103; Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Beyond midnight', 11.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 46-47.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 48; 46.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 48.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 48.
\textsuperscript{38} Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'On the old and new tablets', §3.12.12, 204.
farthest far[, t]oward an other ever more other[, b]eyond any anchorage yet imaginable". 39

To live that love out means to abandon any will to dominate, conquer or surmount the undiscovered. As sounders of the depths we need to be attentive to the dangers that surround us, and not seek destinations which resemble the shores of yesterday and yesteryear. In the penultimate aphorism of The Gay Science, Nietzsche romanticises over

an as yet undiscovered country whose boundaries nobody has surveyed yet, something beyond all the lands and nooks of the ideal so far, a world so overrich in what is beautiful, strange, questionable, terrible and divine that our curiosity as well as our craving to possess it has got beside itself. 40

What is unfortunate is that Nietzsche will never find his love at sea. He will never know what it means to separate satisfaction from sovereignty. Irigaray shows us that Nietzsche's nautical "horizon has limits" and that his "world will unravel[,] it will flood to other places[,] to that outside [he had] not wanted". 41

After spending so long with Nietzsche, reading Irigaray is refreshing. She writes in a way that allows Nietzsche's work to sail towards new peaks that leave him behind, peaks that capsize and return to the depths of the sea from which they were at once born and baptised. Irigaray takes Nietzsche on his word and burns the bridges he has built behind her; she goes farther than he ever went, to the point that "there is no longer any 'land". 42 She does not do so, moreover, by setting up new coordinates or hierarchies, nor by abiding by formal academic conventions. The ocean that supports her "lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness", and needs not reflect the "inexhaustible riches" of the sun that has set. 43 As her translator Carolyn Burke notes, Irigaray adopts the same textual strategies as Nietzsche "[i]n order to talk with the philosopher rather than about him". 44 Akin to Nietzsche, Burke describes Irigaray's writing as "poetic, oracular, epigrammatic and deliberately unsystematic", in that it "refuses the demand for fixed philosophical positions in what can only be described as a highly performative kind of writing". 45 In the clamor of voices that compose Marine Lover, we feel at times like we are still reading Nietzsche - but a Nietzsche reborn from the perspective of the sea. In this way Burke characterises Irigaray's writing more broadly as performing "an unusual dialogue with her philosopher-lovers by weaving herself in and out of their arguments", a technique that

39 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Her ultimate depth never returns to the light of day', 47.
41 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Baptism of the shadow', 4.
42 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 'In the horizon of the infinite', §124, 180-181.
44 Burke, 'Romancing the Philosophers', n18, 113.
subtly "insinuates the feminine into their systems". Irigaray writes with love, and adopts an amorous language, Burke continues, "to beguile her [male] philosophical partners into a recognition of sexual difference [...] that begins with a seductive stance in order to move beyond it". Irigaray herself describes her Marine Lover as "not a book about Nietzsche but with Nietzsche, who is for [her] a partner in love". Elaborating on this sentiment, Faulkner notes that

[i]t is a text to which [both Irigaray and Nietzsche] contribut[e] and is responsible, as if the book itself were the love between them, denied within Nietzsche's own lifetime. [Irigaray] imagines a love with Nietzsche that would allow each to grow and to give of themselves, without one being consumed or exhausted by the other.

In Irigaray, we are reading a Nietzsche relieved of his failings, the embarrassment of his heartache, and his all-too-human ego. We are reading a Nietzsche actually looking at himself from the perspective of maturity that he deems his writing to require. As Faulkner puts it, "Irigaray bestows on Nietzsche the possibility of his own becoming". Irigaray accomplishes this with the mastery of her technique that invites the feminine to talk back to Nietzsche, with Nietzsche, and ultimately, without Nietzsche.

In an important aphorism from The Gay Science entitled 'Will and Wave', Nietzsche embodies the man looking from the "overhanging bank" that Irigaray describes, once again provoking the waves that lap the cliff to which he stands. Challenging the rhythm of their haste, Nietzsche asks the waves:

So? You mistrust me? You are angry with me, you beautiful monsters? Are you afraid that I might give away your whole secret? Well, be angry with me, arch your dangerous green bodies as high as you can, raise a wall between me and the sun - as you are doing now! Truly, even now nothing remains of the world but green twilight and green lightning. Carry on as you like, roaring with overweening pleasure or malice - or dive again, pouring your emeralds down into the deepest depths, and throw your infinite white mane of foam and spray over them: Everything suits me, for everything suits you so well, and I am so well-disposed toward you for everything; how could I think of betraying you? For - mark my word - I know you and your secret, I know your

46 Burke, 'Romancing the Philosophers', 105. Here Burke is not only referring to Irigaray's engagement with Nietzsche, but also of her work on the Pre-Socratics, Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas.
48 Irigaray, Le corps-à-corp avec la mère, as cited by Faulkner in 'Voices from the depths', 89. Burke also cites this passage in 'Romancing the philosophers', n18, 113.
49 Faulkner, 'Voices from the depths', 89.
50 Ibid, 93.
kind! You and I - are we not one kind? - You and I - do we not have one secret? 51

When Irigaray talks of the sea, she praises that "the voice of her abysses [may] not be folded and gathered up into a single thought".52 Nietzsche hopelessly wants to dive into the waves, to explore their green depths, to share their wisdom in unity. Nietzsche wants to know the secret of the sea's waves, but is not prepared to treat their depths as different in kind from the safety of the cliff from which he stands. He is not prepared to produce anything other than a "living lighthouse of invincible light".53 Irigaray describes the "delirium of the sea lover" as the propensity to "think of the sea from afar, to eye her from a distance, to use her to fashion his highest reveries, to weave his dreams of her, and spread his sails while remaining safe in port".54 Nietzsche refuses to encounter another with genuine intimacy, to wed Salomé "as a stranger, and to share with her without either wanting or being able to possess her".55 Irigaray taunts Nietzsche, from the emerald depth of the sea:

[H]er mystery remains whole. Has yet to appear to [him]. Because her ultimate depth does not return to the light of day [...] Rather it (elle) will bring down every sail already chartered, if it makes itself heard. 56

Irigaray describes "a limitless world of appearances [that lie] concealed beneath the great seas".57 She promises that "anyone who finds in her the efflorescent source of his dreams rises very high, drawn higher than his highest day".58 It is significant that in the opening of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche's prophet looks up to the sun and seeks its blessing before deciding to "descend to the depths", as the sun does "in the evening when [it sets] behind the sea".59 Nietzsche wants "to bring light to the underworld" of the deep ocean.60 He does not understand that his setting sun is but a reflection within the sea's shimmering and ever shifting surface.

Irigaray's waves of poetry tell us, once more:

[T]here is no higher call than the sea's. The man who can no longer hear it, has already lost his hearing to her spell. And hears only the sea, and hears no longer. But moves blindly in search of its source.61

52 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Her ultimate depth never returns to the light of day', 48-49.
53 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Of involuntary bliss', §3.3, 161.
54 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Her ultimate depth never returns to the light of day', 51.
56 Ibid, 'Her ultimate depth never returns to the light of day', 48-49.
57 Ibid, 46.
58 Ibid.
59 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra's prologue, §1, 9-10.
60 Ibid, 10.
61 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Her ultimate depth never returns to the light of day', 49.
When Nietzsche looks out to the sea, he asks himself, repeatedly: "Do I still have ears? Am I all ears and nothing else?" In a telling aphorism entitled 'In the Great Silence', Nietzsche again looks out to the sea but cannot hear her cry. He falters at her beauty, at how his heart swells, and channels that tonality of feeling into ressentiment. Nietzsche feels belittled when he hears for a moment the vastness that lies outside of himself. He arms his defence with his words, the only way he knows how. Before moving on, it is worth citing the majority of this 1881 passage. Nietzsche's honesty here seems to anticipate the confusion of feeling that his encounter with Salomé would satisfy, and the core of what Irigaray's poetry is calling for. Nietzsche has left the city and arrived at the sea:

Now all is still! The sea lies there pale and glittering, it cannot speak. The sky plays its everlasting silent evening game with red and yellow and green, it cannot speak. The little cliffs and ribbons of rock that run down into the sea as if to find the place where it is most solitary, none of them can speak. This tremendous muteness which suddenly overcomes us is lovely and dreadful, the heart swells at it. - Oh the hypocrisy of this silent beauty! How well it could speak, and how evilly too, if it wished! Its tied tongue and its expression of sorrowing happiness is a deception: it wants to mock at your sympathy! - So be it! I am not ashamed of being mocked by such powers. But I pity you, nature, that you have to be silent, even though it is only your malice which ties your tongue; yes, I pity you on account of your malice! - Ah, it is growing yet more still, my heart swells again: it is startled by a new truth, it too cannot speak, it too mocks when the mouth calls something into this beauty, it too enjoys its sweet silent malice. I begin to hate speech, to hate even thinking; for do I not hear behind every word that laughter of error, of imagination, of the spirit of delusion? Must I not mock at my pity? Mock at my mockery? - O sea, O evening! You are evil instructors! You teach man to cease to be man! Shall he surrender to you? Shall he become as you now are, pale, glittering, mute, tremendous, reposing above himself? Exalted above himself?

It is here that we shall give the final word to Irigaray. She gives voice to the silence of the sea that drives Nietzsche to the point of surrender. Irigaray is strong, but forgiving; she can see that her lover Fritz is hurting. Her Marine Lover acknowledges that "[f]or the first time, [Nietzsche has] measur[ed] himself up against a will of equal strength, yet different from [his] own, and [he is] lost". The silent voice of her depths promise her lover that "[b]eyond the horizon [that he] has opened up, she will offer [him] that in which she still lives and that [which his] day has not even imagined". If Nietzsche is not prepared to learn to "cease to be man", then Irigaray counsels him to retreat from the coast, to "get away from the sea[, s]he is far too

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63 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §423, 181.
64 Irigaray, Marine Lover, 'Mourning in labyrinths', 73.
65 Ibid.
disturbing[, her depth is too great[, too restless to be a true mirror]. Irigaray calls for Nietzsche to "[b]ecome other, and without recurrence", for "[i]t is up to her to perpetuate [his] becoming, to give it back to [him] or not, variously deformed".  

**POSITIVE DISTANCE**

At the Alpine Rose Hotel, nestled on the shores of Lake Silvaplana in Sils-Maria, Nietzsche befriended a young woman named Maria von Bradke in the summer of 1886. In her account, Bradke remembers her visit to the Engadine region of Switzerland fondly. During the daytime, she would admire the thoughtful vistas that the surrounding natural landscapes provided. In the evenings, she would frequent the restaurant at Alpine Rose Hotel, which bustled with activity, conversation and laughter.

There was a joyous, high-spirited company at meals. But the time between meals was devoted to a pensive, solitary contemplation of nature. I will never forget the quiet hours on the peninsula, which at the time was still wild and natural, with its enchanting vistas, the hikes on the little paths illuminated by alpine roses across Lake Sils, the tours to the magnificent Fex Valley and to the peaks where edelweiss grows [...] One was as if lifted to another world, beyond the dull, petty everyday affairs.¹

This world of Sils-Maria was the world that Nietzsche loved the most. It is where he felt at home and wrote his greatest works. Nietzsche would at times accompany Bradke on her walks across the alpine wilderness. One afternoon Bradke recounts Nietzsche taking her aside and directing her across a narrow path, to "a point which only he knew and which he liked above all others".² Bradke describes how they passed through the bushes and emerged from a sea of blooming alpine roses. Lake Sils suddenly looked forth from its magnificent framework. "Here is where one must sit," [she] said, and sat down under the red-glowing shrubs. This delighted [Nietzsche] extremely. "You recognised right away that only so is the picture perfect" [he responded].³

Bradke never told anyone of this secret, rose-covered location. She recounts that she has "only rarely dared to enter this place and ha[s] never betrayed it to anyone", claiming that "[i]t should belong to [Nietzsche] alone."⁴

Bradke is an interesting figure that entered briefly in and out of Nietzsche's life. Perhaps their most significant exchange that has been recorded remembers Bradke's request for "the title of the work which [Nietzsche] considered his best".⁵ Nietzsche was hesitant to respond at first, but eventually selected *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and passed on the publishing details. He warned Bradke, however, "not to read the book".

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¹ As quoted in Gilman, ed., *Conversations with Nietzsche*, 188-189.
³ *Ibid*.
⁴ *Ibid*.
that "it would only frighten and repel" her. Bradke remembers that after making this admission, Nietzsche all of a sudden became withdrawn, as if involuntarily,

and then, lost in memory, he described how the book came into being on a hill above Rapallo - almost without any action of his own. It had seemed to him as if someone were dictating and he needed only to write. In a few days, it was completed.

When reflecting on Thus Spoke Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche again speaks about the forces of inspiration that took charge of him throughout the writing process. If he "were superstitious", he says, he would "hardly by able to set aside the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely [the] medium of overwhelming forces". The revelation of writing, according to Nietzsche, allows whatever is revealed to "suddenly, with unspeakable subtlety, become visible, audible", a summoning "that shakes and overturns one to the depths". Nietzsche writes, mysteriously, that once in the depths,

one hears, one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought flashes up like lightning, with necessity, unalteringly formed - [one] never has any choice.

When reading Ecce Homo, Nietzsche gives us the impression that he was never able to withdraw from his philosophical project. He never had the option to write anything other than the books that he wrote. Nietzsche crowns the volumes of Thus Spoke Zarathustra as "the greatest gift that has ever been given" to mankind, stating that

it is not only the most exalted book that exists, the actual book of the air of the heights [...] it is also the profoundest, born out of the innermost abundance of truth, an inexhaustible well into which no bucket descends without coming up filled with gold and goodness.

Nietzsche believed he wrote with "a voice that speaks across millennia". His writing was infused by untimely becomings that he could not understand at their time of conception. Whilst writing, he was governed entirely by the forces that took possession of his thought. Nietzsche treated each aphorism that he wrote as a completely necessary contribution to his task. As Nietzschean scholar David Rathbone explains,

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6 As quoted in Gilman, ed., Conversations with Nietzsche, 191.
7 Ibid. Nietzsche reflects further on the walks that inspired the first book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, 'Zarathustra' §1, 70-71.
8 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Zarathustra' §3, 72.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
Nietzsche's aphorisms are not at all mere snippets of incomplete ideas. Each and every aphorism is a polished and self-contained whole, in which Nietzsche tries to say more in a few lines than other philosophers can say in entire books - in fact, each aphorism reflects the whole of his philosophy, for the whole of Nietzsche's works form the ultimate horizon for each aphorism[.]. Like [Gottfried Wilhelm] Leibniz's monads, each and every aphorism is a representation of the whole of Nietzsche's thought from one particular perspective; but unlike Leibniz's monads, there is no one perspective of all perspectives for Nietzsche, no one key perspective seeing into all others.  

In order to demonstrate the richness of Nietzsche's thought, we need to understand how the unity of his thinking stages a constant conversation of perspectives, that in their exchange, open up new perspectives to be cast upon all others that came before. If Nietzsche's perspectivism "is a much more profound art that Leibniz's point of view", Deleuze argues, it is because each of Nietzsche's perspectives opens itself up to "a divergence which it affirms". This divergence is only possible from a given perspective which surrenders its position for the benefit of another, in line with an arrangement of relation that will mutually benefit each perspective in their extension from there. Nietzsche describes how this affirmation, guided by his concept of the will to power, allows the world to continually "become 'infinite' for us all over again", insofar as from this broader perspective, one "cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations". Nietzsche suggests, moreover, that the very reason why his highest promise, the revaluation of all values, "is perhaps possible at all", is because he, and he alone in his time had "the skill and knowledge to invert perspectives". 

This expertise in untimely perspectivism is what Nietzsche practiced in each and every aphorism and enabled each fragment of his work to express a point of view on itself in relation to its horizon. Deleuze and Guattari propose that in each Nietzschean aphorism "it is always possible, even necessary, to introduce new relations", internally, within the aphorism itself, in order to reignite the aphorism's

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14 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 'Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events', 198. In The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), Deleuze clarifies how a monad's 'point of view' relates to 'the world' in Leibniz's 'monadology'. In short, Deleuze explains that in their point of view, every monad "expresses the entire world, but obscurely and dimly because it is finite and the world is infinite". Conversely, "[s]ince it does not exist outside of the monads that convey it, the world is included in each one in the form of perceptions or "representatives", present and infinitely minute elements". Nietzsche's perspectivism, according to Deleuze, affirms each of a monad's "minute, obscure, confused perceptions" as impressions that are as important, if not more important, as "our conscious, clear and distinct apperceptions"; see 'Perceptions in the Folds', 86. Following Rathbone's suggestion above, this kind of analysis is helpful to understanding what Nietzsche's aphoristic style allows him to achieve philosophically. 
15 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 'The will to power in nature', §636 (March-June 1888), 340.  
17 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I am so wise' §2, 10. Deleuze also cites this passage in The Logic of Sense, 'Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events', 198.
charge.\textsuperscript{18} Nietzsche's aphorisms, they continue, thereby "shatter the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the nonknown in thought".\textsuperscript{19}

The necessity of this approach is the key to understanding the systematic layering of Nietzsche's work in the context of his lifetime. More profoundly, it is what permits his thought to keep on thinking outside of its bounds. It allows the gift of perspective to be given, time and time again, as Nietzsche's horizon keeps expanding in eternally differing ways. \textit{To take a point of view on all other points of view is the fundamental principle of the eternal return.} In his approach, in line with his vision, Nietzsche committed every aphorism that he wrote with a \textit{responsibility} to all writing and thought that came before and after him. Indeed, at a crucial moment of \textit{The Gay Science}, Nietzsche claims that

\begin{quote}
What I do or do not do now is as important for everything that is yet to come as is the greatest event of the past: in this tremendous perspective of effectiveness all actions appear equally great and small.\textsuperscript{20}
\end{quote}

Nietzsche was the first to understand the necessity of the eternal return. This understanding, in line with its charter, has changed as the world has changed in the wake of its thought. Irigaray was right to call Nietzsche's writing on women into question, especially when he exchanged his insecurities conceptually with a love for the ring of eternal recurrence; yet Irigaray would not be offering her critique if Nietzsche had not written what he did in the first place. What is important for Irigaray is \textit{what Nietzsche did not do} at the time of his writing, which was permit women to enter his philosophical community. She claims that "all the sorcery and witchcraft of zeal" that motivated his prophecy left Nietzsche wretched, fragile, and infertile, a "star fallen from the heavens [that] knows not what to fecundate with its fires".\textsuperscript{21} Irigaray knew her task, moving forward, was not to vindicate what Nietzsche wrote, but to complicate it in a constructive manner. Irigaray is right, in some ways, to call Nietzsche's eternal return "\textit{the will to recapitulate all projects within [himself]}", the "burning lava" he carried within his soul.\textsuperscript{22} She deems his "highest fortune" and "most sublime contrast" to be the "recapitulat[ion of] all [of] life" in his death, a contrast that haunts the course of eternity, a curse that calls Nietzsche to recur again and again, tortured by "\textit{the ring of so much brilliance}".\textsuperscript{23} Irigaray demarcates Nietzsche's "uncommunicable" philosophical experience as "the edge of th[e]

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\textsuperscript{18} Deleuze and Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, 'Memories of a plan(e) maker', 297.
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}, 'Rhizome', 6.
\textsuperscript{20} Nietzsche, \textit{The Gay Science}, 'The most dangerous point of view', §233, 212-213.
\textsuperscript{21} Irigaray, \textit{Marine Lover}, 'Burning lava you carry within you', 53-54.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid}, 'Mourning in labyrinths', 69.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid}, 'Burning lava you carry within you', 53-54. Phrasing altered.
\end{footnotesize}
precipice" where he sought "the secret of [his] birth and [his] death" but now that Nietzsche is dead, can we affirm what he, whilst living, could not?

In his book *On Nietzsche*, Georges Bataille argues that he "think[s] the idea of the eternal return should be reversed". He explains that the eternal return is "not a promise of infinite and lacerating repetitions" but rather "what makes moments caught up in the immanence of return suddenly appear as ends". "Return", Bataille writes, "unmotivates the moment [that returns] and frees life of ends", and in doing so, abandons any moral purchase of causality. In a similar vein, Pierre Klossowski dedicates a short section of *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* to outlining the complicated roles that forgetting, anamnesis and the will play in the lived experience of eternal recurrence. Following Zarathustra, Klossowski argues that the will to power that secures the eternal return consists in one's capacity "to re-will the non-willed past". Klossowski argues that "in re-willing" what did not previously take place "the self changes, it becomes other". Like Bataille, Klossowski maintains that the "remedy" and "ruse" that belies Zarathustra's concept of redemption "removes the 'once and for all' character from [any] event". This is a difficult move that complicates Nietzsche's portrait of recurrence as a cycle that lasts for eternity as a repetition of the same.

Zarathustra teaches that in the untimely the "bellowing and smoke" of great events give way to "our stillest hours" and to what "revolves inaudibly". According to Deleuze, Zarathustra's blessing is that "under the huge earth-shattering events are tiny silent events, which [Nietzsche] likens to the creation of new worlds". Underneath what we designate as *that which takes place*, time is pure and empty in its liberation from of any form or measure that would pacify its breadth. Everything at the surface of time is as it was and will be, and cannot be exhausted by any particular manifestation. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze teaches his readers that *all that insists*

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, xxxiii.
28 See Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'Forgetting and anamnesis in the lived experience of the eternal return of the same', 56-57.
29 Ibid, 'The elaboration of the experience of the eternal return as communicable thought', 68.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, 67.
32 In her paper 'The Eternal Return and the Phantom of Difference', Catherine Malabou discusses how this reading of the eternal return, as a doctrine that *begets difference*, as opposed to the same, is a "particularly 'French' orientation of the reading of Nietzsche during the second half of the twentieth century", stemming from the popularity of Deleuze, Derrida, Klossowski and Blanchot. Malabou then offers her own account that considers how one may think through Nietzsche without returning to the thought of identity or difference. See *Parrhesia* 10 (2010): 21-29.
33 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On great events', §2.18, 131.
34 Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, 'Nietzsche's burst of laughter', 130.
at the surface are events. Every event coexists, moreover, in harmony with every other event. All events are affirmed in their coexistence. All events, in this sense, are equal and untainted, and forfeit their identity as mere occurrences to reveal the neutrality of their pure essence. The expression of each event is at once equal and the same, but only in its distinct difference from each other event; all events are equal in their inequality. The experience of the eternal return awakens the unlimited compass of difference within all events, across the eternity of time, in unison, at one and the same time. To enact this experience is to affirm the necessity of the moment and its untimely relation to all other moments.

For Deleuze, what makes Nietzsche's work so profound was that he was neither satisfied with bibliography nor biography. Nietzsche had "at his disposal a method of his own invention". Many studies, including this one, have dedicated countless pages to unpacking Nietzsche's biographical history because his work reached a point where his writing and his life become one and the same thing. Nietzsche's work writes his life, and in his life, he lived his work. Deleuze argues that Nietzsche's task "reach[ed] a secret point where the anecdote of life and the aphorism of thought amount to one and the same thing". As a disciple of Nietzsche, Bataille takes this sentiment further, and dedicates two thirds of his text On Nietzsche to fragmented diary entries instead of conventional philosophical analysis. In his preface, Bataille justifies this method of enquiry when he writes that

not a word of Nietzsche's work can be understood without [the reader] experiencing that dazzling dissolution into totality, without living it out. Beyond that, [Nietzsche's] philosophy is just a maze of contradictions.

With Nietzsche's thought came a toll that he had to live with: the toll of being the first to wear the burden of the eternal return. Nietzsche described the greatest weight that can consume one's very being as "to crave nothing more fervently than [the] ultimate eternal confirmation and seal" of eternal recurrence. With his philosophy Nietzsche served a sentence of severe psychological consequence. The thought of the eternal return consumed Nietzsche's entire being from its arrival in 1881 until his collapse. One of Deleuze's frustrations with Nietzsche's oeuvre at large, however, is that he thinks "that the Eternal Return and the Will to Power, the two most fundamental concepts in the Nietzschean corpus, [were] hardly introduced at all". Deleuze believes that Nietzsche's life work was "unfinished" when it was "interrupted by madness", and that in particular, these twin concepts "never did receive the extended

35 Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 'Eighteenth series of the three images of the philosophers', 146.
36 Ibid.
39 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 'Conclusions on the will to power and the eternal return', 117.
treatment that Nietzsche had intended". As recounted earlier, one of the select few who received a full disclosure of Nietzsche's doctrine, from the mouth of the philosopher himself, was Lou Salomé. She remembers this exchange, without betraying it, in her 1894 biography:

Unforgettable for me are those hours in which he first confided to me his secret, whose inevitable fulfilment and validation he anticipated with shudders. Only with a quiet voice and with all signs of deepest horror did he speak about this secret. Life, in fact, produced such suffering in him that the certainty of an eternal return of life had to mean something horrifying to him. The quintessence of the teaching of eternal recurrence, later constructed by Nietzsche as a shining apotheosis to life, formed such a deep contrast to his own painful feelings about life that it gives us intimations of being an uncanny mask.

Salomé draws her own conclusions about "the deep disturbance" of Nietzsche's soul, and why he needed to conceal his thought mystically under the shroud of secrecy. Philosophically, Salomé's account is at odds with Nietzsche's convictions, but existentially, she was right about one thing: the eternal return of the same forged a mask for those who could wear it. The horror of the eternal return for Nietzsche was not that he thought he would need to live his life innumerable times over. Rather, with the thought of the eternal return, Nietzsche realised how important the life he was living was for all who lived before and after him. Nietzsche realised that if he captured his thought philosophically, others after him would inevitably have to think it through too. He saw his prophecy as "the great cultivating idea", born in the "[p]eriod of greatest danger", and understood that if it were taken seriously, it would serve its "place in history as a mid-point". Nietzsche believed that his untimely philosophy brought with it "the triumphant idea of which all other modes of thought would ultimately perish". He sought in his philosophy the necessity to "push humanity to decisions that will determine its whole future". Nietzsche's fear was not that he would have to suffer more, but that his affirmation of suffering would one day be the philosophical grounds for applause, despite his inability to endure it long enough to reap its reward. Nietzsche knew that "the revaluation of all values" was the means to his endurance, that he could "[n]o longer find joy in certainty but in

40 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 'Conclusions on the will to power and the eternal return', 117-118. In the conclusion of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze returns to the incomplete exposition of the eternal return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra; see 370-372.
41 Salomé, Nietzsche, 'Nietzsche's System', 130.
42 Ibid.
43 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 'The eternal recurrence', §1053 (1884), 544; §1057 (1883-1888), 545.
44 Ibid, §1053 (1884), 544.
45 'Letter to Heinrich von Stein, 21 May 1884', as quoted by Hayman, 273. Later, towards the close of 1888, Nietzsche wrote a draft of a letter to his sister in which he claims, "quite literally", to "hold the future of humanity in the palm of [his] hand"; 'Draft of a Letter to his sister, December 1888', as quoted by Hayman, 334.
uncertainty", and that he would need to forfeit all "cause and effect" for "the continually creative", if his thought were to survive.46

Nietzsche's confidence in his philosophy, however, was not an easy mask to wear. As Deleuze writes in *Pure Immanence: A Life*, today's readers "cannot guess the peculiar solitude and the sensuality, the very unwise ends of the perilous existence that lie beneath this mask".47 Nietzsche had to *envision* and *invent* the figures who would one day bear the fruit of his writing. In 1886, in a revised preface to *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche admits that beside himself "[t]here [were] no such 'free spirits' nor have there ever been such".48 He describes how, in order to keep on writing, he nevertheless *needed to believe* that he was writing for these free spirits, whom his writing was *summoning* in its untimely fashion. Nietzsche needed "the belief that [he] was not isolated in [his] circumstances, that [he] did not see in an isolated manner" in order to forge "a magic suspicion of relationship and similarity to others in outlook and desire, a repose in the confidence of friendship".49 Nietzsche confides that he "required" the thought of their company "to keep [him] cheerful in the midst of evils [such as his] sickness, loneliness, foreignness, -acedia, [and] inactivity[.] as brave companions and ghosts with whom [he] could laugh [...] as compensation for the lack of friends".50 Nietzsche believed that these figures were not merely "shadows of a hermit's phantasmagoria", and that his writing could *will* their company into existence, if it affirmed their absence as a blessing and not a curse.51

Nietzsche's published work demands this confidence as part of its promise. His writing does not permit the possibility that these companions may not eventually arrive. Off paper, however, Nietzsche feared that the active role of affirmation would lose its traction for his successors when posed against reactive interpretations of sickness and madness. If its lesson were not received properly, the eternal return would fall victim to an endless repetition of reactive receptions and abhorrent treatises fulfilled by those unworthy of its sanction. Salomé's interpretation of Nietzsche's horror, cited in the passage above, is a clear example of his concern. For Nietzsche, suffering invited an *excess of feeling* made possible by the self-mastery of affirmation, which entitled him "to live by experiments and offer [himself] to adventure".52 Without "that excess of plastic, healing, formative and restorative powers", guided by a secure "self-control and discipline of the heart", Nietzsche would not have been

46 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 'The eternal recurrence', §1059 (1884), 545.
47 Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, 'Nietzsche', 67-68.
50 Ibid, §2, 14.
51 Ibid, §4, 16.
given access to the "many and opposed modes of thought" that characterise his work.\textsuperscript{53} Without his debilitating illness, in other words, Nietzsche would not have arrived at the conclusions that allowed his thought to endure. Salomé argues, by contrast, that Nietzsche's teachings "could only be endured by way of a love that outweighs life and would only be effective at the point where the thought of man soars up to a deification of life".\textsuperscript{54} This love, she continues, "must have been in contradiction to [Nietzsche's] innermost perceptions - a contradiction that finally destroyed him".\textsuperscript{55} Nietzsche, contra-Salomé, would argue that his inner contradictions and their turmoil must be celebrated as the disjuncture of differences that allowed his thought to keep thinking in increasingly complicated ways, even, and especially after, the silence of his collapse. With a "mature freedom of spirit", bolstered by his faith in the eternal return, Nietzsche describes "a pale, delicate light and a sunshine-happiness[,] a feeling of bird-like freedom, prospect and haughtiness, a tertium quid in which curiosity and gentle distain are combined".\textsuperscript{56} At a peak in the narrative of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, Nietzsche returns to this revelation, what he calls the "afternoon of his life", when Zarathustra bears witness to the "living plantation of [his] thoughts and [the] morning light of [his] highest hope".\textsuperscript{57} Here Zarathustra, following Nietzsche, talks of the need to find "companions" and the "children of his hope".\textsuperscript{58} Like in \textit{Human, All Too Human}, Zarathustra seeks these figures of the future not in their discovery, but in their creation and harvest by his own hand. Zarathustra decides that for the sake of his children, "the trees of [his] garden" grown by his "best soil", that he must "perfect himself".\textsuperscript{59} Zarathustra does so by stripping his happiness and faith in the future in order to "offer [himself] to all unhappiness, for [his] final testing and knowledge".\textsuperscript{60} This invitation threads different passages of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} together, as a means to conceptually address and develop Nietzsche's concept of the eternal return.

The revelation of Zarathustra's afternoon operates as a response to an earlier episode from Book II of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra} entitled 'The Soothsayer', where Zarathustra receives council from a dark prophet who claims to foretell future events. The Soothsayer warns Zarathustra that in his vision of the future "all is empty, all is the same, all has been".\textsuperscript{61} In this prophecy of empty repetition, Zarathustra's highest hope had been harvested, but all of the fruit turned out "rotten and brown"; all of his efforts had been "[i]n vain", the sea that drew his inspiration "had withdrawn", and all of his

\textsuperscript{53} Nietzsche, \textit{Human, All Too Human}, 'Preface', §4, 16.
\textsuperscript{54} Salomé, \textit{Nietzsche}, 'Nietzsche's System', 130.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, §4, 16.
\textsuperscript{57} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'On involuntary bliss', §3.3, 160-161.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, 161.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 161-162.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 162.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, 'The soothsayer', §2.19, 133.
wine "ha[d] turned to poison". After listening to the Soothsayer's prophecy, Zarathustra, like the occupants of the vision, felt "sad and weary". He fasts for three days, and falls into a deep sleep. In a dream he finds himself with his "back [turned to] life", transformed into "a night watchman and guardian of tombs upon the lonely mountain castle of death". In this graveyard scene, scored by a "death-rattle silence" and layered by images of rusted keys, menacing gates, and laughing coffins, Zarathustra laments that "[t]he brightness of midnight was always about" him, and that "loneliness crouched" next to him as his shadow. Upon waking, Zarathustra shared his dream with his disciples, as he "did not [yet] know the interpretation of his dream".

Later on, in the safety of the "blessed hour" of the afternoon, "alone with the pure sky and open sea", Zarathustra returns to the scene of the cemetery, but this time "the wind blew through [his] keyhole", calling him forward, and the door that was locked in his dream flew open. In this moment of self-overcoming, Zarathustra glimpsed at the gateway that he had previously envisioned as the enigmatic door of the eternal return. At this gateway two curious paths meet, both stretching out to eternity in differing and contradictory directions, converging together under the eternal knot that Zarathustra's riddle names the moment. In the warmth of the sunlight of the late afternoon, however, Zarathustra found himself "chained to the love for [his] children", and unable to follow the eternal call from the gateway, set in a snare of his own devise. In his hesitation, Zarathustra is at once assailed by "shadows and doubts" as "icy mists rise" within him, and the "abyss" of his thought stirs and bites him. He addresses this thought as the "abysmal thought", and asks it

when shall I find the strength to hear you burrowing, without trembling anymore? My heart pounds to my very throat whenever I hear you burrowing. Even your silence wants to choke me, you who are so abysmally silent. As yet I have never dared to summon you; but one day I shall yet find the strength and the lion's voice to summon you. And once I have overcome myself that

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62 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'The soothsayer', §2.19, 133.
64 *Ibid*.
66 *Ibid*, 135. In her account, Salomé remembers that Nietzsche literally dreamt Zarathustra's dream in the fall of 1882 in Leipzig. Here Salomé writes that "[d]reams always played a great role in [Nietzsche's] life and thinking, and during his last years he often drew from them - as with the solution of a riddle - the contents of his teachings". Of this particular dream, Salomé recounts that Nietzsche "never tired of carrying it about him and interpreting it"; Nietzsche, 'Nietzsche's system', 144.
69 *Ibid*, 'On involuntary bliss', §3.3, 162.
70 *Ibid*. 
In a crucial episode entitled 'The Convalescent', Zarathustra finds the courage to fulfil this prophecy. He summons his "most abysmal thought" to rise from its depth. This internal confrontation leaves Zarathustra again stricken as if dead, and bedridden for the following seven days. Upon recovery, Zarathustra rises as the figure of the convalescent, the eternally wakeful being, unbound by the weariness of the curse of the Soothsayer. This inner confrontation and its overcoming is the most direct expression of the eternal return found within the narrative of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and is difficult to comprehend for those bearing witness. Zarathustra receives council from his animals, who disappoint him with their interpretation of his internal conflict. They advise him to "step out of [his] cave, [as] the world awaits [him] like a garden". The garden waiting for Zarathustra in eternal recurrence would be closer to Jorge Luis Borges' garden of forking paths, than the obvious biblical reference to the garden of Eden. The garden waiting for Zarathustra is the poison garden. Zarathustra explains to his animals that in his encounter within himself he rose internally to the surface of time, in order to learn how to endure wakefully in the face of the weary order of the Soothsayer. Zarathustra "turned [his] ultimate depth inside out into the light" in order to hear the call of his abyss without reservation. In his experience Zarathustra realised that the nausea that assailed him was born from a "disgust with all existence" should his teachings permit "an eternal recurrence even of the smallest [...] the] all-too-similar to each other, even the greatest all-too-human". He realised then that overcoming his sickness is the key to introducing difference into the eternal return of the same. In painfully recounting this experience, Zarathustra resolves his own riddle and "vision of the loneliest", by bearing the Soothsayer's allure, the eternal return of the same, as his most abysmal thought.

The emptiness of the soothsayer's prophecy is that "all is the same, all has been". The purity of the promise in what eternally returns is that all will not be the same once all has been. The vertigo of the experience of the eternal return is that nothing is the same after its blessing is received. In the eternal return all that recurs is the procedure of recurrence, and in what returns we find the essence of all that differs.

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71 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'On involuntary bliss', §3.3., 162-163.
73 Ibid, 216.
74 For an acute and detailed analysis of the difference between Zarathustra's and his animals' interpretation of his experience, see Laurence Lampbert, Nietzsche's Teaching: An Interpretation of 'Thus Spoke Zarathustra' (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 211-223.
75 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'The convalescent', §3.13, 219.
76 Ibid, 216.
78 Ibid, 'On the vision and the riddle', §3.2, 155-160.
79 Ibid, 'The soothsayer', §2.19, 133.
Through the progression of these episodes of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche teaches this difficult lesson by deliberately not spelling out its instruction. As Deleuze points out in *Difference and Repetition*, Zarathustra does not correct his animals' interpretation of eternal reincarnation in the guise of convalescence, but feigns sleep whilst "conversing with his soul". Deleuze argues that Zarathustra remains silent because he has learnt that

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\text{[t]he highest test is to understand the eternal return as a selective thought, and repetition in the eternal return as selective being. Time must be understood and lived out of joint, and seen as a straight line which mercilessly eliminates those who embark upon it, who come upon the scene but repeat only once and for all.}
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Deleuze calls attention to a brief remark that Nietzsche makes in *The Will to Power*, when he defines "[t]he idea of recurrence as a selective principle". "Nietzsche's secret" Deleuze tells us, "is that the eternal return is selective". What returns in the eternal return, for Deleuze, is not an equilibrium that heralds the same or the identical, but rather a diversity of multiple trajectories that are unequal to, and hence different from where they return. This difference is what constitutes the selective, and hence transformative, charge of recurrence.

Essentially, the unequal, the different is the true rationale for the eternal return. It is because nothing is equal, or the same, that "it" comes back. In other words, the eternal return is predicated only of becoming and the multiple. It is the law of the world without being, without unity, without identity. Far from presupposing the One or the Same, the eternal return constitutes the only unity of the multiple as such, the only identity of what differs: coming back is the only "being" of becoming.

"The eternal return is repetition" Deleuze clarifies, "but it is a repetition that selects, the repetition that saves[, t]he prodigious secret of a repetition that is liberating and selecting". This saving grace is that the Same that returns is always different from what it was or will be according to the nihilism of the Soothsayer. As Deleuze writes in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*:

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80 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'The convalescent', §3.13, 221; Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 'Conclusion', 371.
81 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 'Conclusion', 371.
82 Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 'The eternal recurrence', §1058 (1883-1884), 545.
84 Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, 'Conclusions on the will to power and the eternal return', 124.
85 Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, 'Nietzsche', 91.
It is not the 'same' or the 'one' which comes back in the eternal return but return is itself the one which ought to belong to diversity and to that which differs.\textsuperscript{86}

The subject who wills the eternal return will return as different from who they once were. To re-will the non-willed past means to sublimate one's former self as someone else who did not will their actions as they have now.\textsuperscript{87} Following Klossowski, Deleuze summarises that

the world of the eternal return is a world of differences, an intensive world, which presupposes neither the One nor the Same [...] The eternal return is itself the only unity of this world, which has none at all except as it comes back; it is the only identity of a world which has no "same" at all except through repetition.\textsuperscript{88}

What is selected by the procedure of the eternal return is "the Same of that which differs", and what is "excluded, what is made not to return, is that which presupposes the Same and the Similar, [the One] which pretends to correct divergence, to recenter circles or order the chaos".\textsuperscript{89} "The secret of the eternal return", Deleuze continues, "is that it does not express an order opposed to the chaos engulfing it. On the contrary, it is nothing other than chaos itself, or the power of affirming chaos".\textsuperscript{90}

In \textit{Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle}, Klossowski tells us that the experience of the eternal return in its initial stage is nothing more than a "fluctuation of intensity", what he calls "the tonality of the soul".\textsuperscript{91} In order for this tonality to become communicable, however, "this intensity must take itself as an object, and thus turn back on itself".\textsuperscript{92} This turning back is what causes the intensity to weigh itself up against the other degrees of intensity it splits itself from. This signification, Klossowski continues, also allows its counterweight to mark its absence or lack of selection, whilst "remain[ing] a function of Chaos", subject to the victorious afflux that masks it.\textsuperscript{93} Following this, and in a more complex fashion than this account may afford, Klossowski surmises that "in each person, apparently as their own possession, there moves an intensity, its flux and reflux forming significant fluctuations of a thought that in fact belongs to no one".\textsuperscript{94} It is the communication of this anonymous

\textsuperscript{86} Deleuze, \textit{Nietzsche and Philosophy}, 'Nietzsche and science', §2.4, 46.
\textsuperscript{87} On this note, Kerslake is correct to identify the increasing influence of Klossowski in Deleuze's reading of the eternal return. See the short summary 'Repetition and eternal return' in his first chapter of \textit{Deleuze and the Unconscious}, 36-37.
\textsuperscript{88} Deleuze, \textit{Desert Islands}, 'Conclusions on the will to power and the eternal return', 123.
\textsuperscript{89} Deleuze, \textit{The Logic of Sense}, 'The simulacrum and ancient philosophy', 302.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 301.
\textsuperscript{91} Klossowski, \textit{Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle}, 'The experience of the eternal return', 60.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, 62.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
intensity with other intensities that promises a tonality of the soul that one may at once encounter and embody. In this state, further fluctuations of intensity may occur within a disjunctive synthesis of *intimacy through distance*, without recourse to dialectics, negation, or hierarchy. One's sense of self in eternal recurrence surrenders itself to *an impersonal rapture that feels like nothing and everything at once*. Following Bataille and Klossowski, and if we read Nietzsche correctly, we may travel beyond Nietzsche's "maze of contradictions" to experience the "dazzling dissolution into [a] totality" that may only be thought and felt intensively.\(^95\)

Against Hegel, Deleuze writes that "it is not difference which 'must go as far as' contradiction[,] it is the contradiction which must reveal the nature of its difference as it follows the distance corresponding to it".\(^96\) In the eternal return we are "no longer faced with the identity of contraries", but are rather "faced with a positive distance of different elements".\(^97\) In order to assure their return, moreover, we must affirm this *distance* as the *unity* between differing forms that relate to each other only insofar as they differ; a vacuous unity that builds and breaks itself down according to the profundity of the experience of the eternal return. As an instruction, Deleuze praises the performance of what he calls *positive distance*, as a

operation according to which two things or two determinations are affirmed through their difference, that is to say, that they are the objects of a simultaneous affirmation only insofar as their difference is affirmed and is itself affirmative.\(^98\)

Affirmation, Deleuze explains, is "the highest power of the will".\(^99\) If Zarathustra is the first prophet of the eternal return, it is not only because he embodies and calls for "pure affirmation", but because he also "carries negation to its highest point, making of it an action, an agency that services he who affirms and creates".\(^100\) In both instances that Zarathustra directly encounters the Soothsayer, he concludes his meeting by inviting his rival to share his food and mountain dwellings as a guest and a friend.\(^101\) Zarathustra understands that to combat the fierce force of the Soothsayer he needs to affirm their distance rather than imitate techniques of ressentiment. It is this understanding that Nietzsche will bring to his own life, in order to keep on living, to write his final texts.

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97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'The soothsayer', §2.19, 136; 'The cry of distress', §4.2, 244. The Soothsayer will also join the other six 'higher men' in Zarathustra’s cave at the conclusion of Book IV.
'IN SPITE OF'

In his writing, Nietzsche felt everything at once: the intensity of experience, the immediacy of euphoria, the pangs of torment, and pain without relief. As Eleanor Kaufman puts it, in Nietzsche "the physical and the personal are part and parcel of [his] philosophical oeuvre".1 We witness this in the honesty of Ecce Homo, when Nietzsche describes the turbulence of writing Zarathustra:

An ecstasy whose tremendous tension sometimes discharges itself in a flood of tears, while one's steps now involuntarily rush along, now involuntarily lag; a complete being outside of oneself with the distinct consciousness of a multitude of subtle shudders and trickles down to one's toes; a depth of happiness in which the most painful and gloomy things appear, not as an antithesis, but as conditioned, demanded, as a necessary colour within such a superfluity of light; an instinct for rhythmical relationships which spans forms of wide extent - length, the need for a wide-spanned rhythm is almost the measure for the force of inspiration, a kind of compassion for its pressure and tension... Everything is in the highest degree involuntary but takes place as in a tempest of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity... 2

The figure of Nietzsche is the very emblem of positive distance, the philosophical principle at one with the philosopher himself. Nietzsche notes that in his perspectivism he found his "own particular field of experience" and that "in this if in anything" he was "a master".3 Positive distance is the very essence that allowed Nietzsche to keep on writing despite the crippling pain of his poor health. As is well documented, Nietzsche suffered from constant migraines and fits of dizziness and nausea, which was thought by many to be caused by paretic syphilis. Nietzsche's debilitating illness led to his collapse in 1889, and guided his decline from there until his death. In recent research the syphilitic origin of Nietzsche's ill health has been refuted, and it has been argued that his dementia was more likely the result of a slowly growing right-sided retro-orbital meningioma.4 The debate around the origins of Nietzsche's illness, however, is irrelevant to his philosophy. Klossowski is correct to assert that what is of importance is not where Nietzsche's migraines came from, but where they affected him; Nietzsche's "cerebral organ" was where he experienced his most acute pain.5 Nietzsche's delirium in its embodied experience is what allowed its lucidity to exceed the experience itself. Nietzsche's writing celebrated the pain of

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2 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Zarathustra' §2, 72-73.
3 Ibid, 'Why I am so wise', §2, 10.
4 See Leonard Sax, 'What was the case of Nietzsche's dementia?', Journal of Medical Biography, Volume 11 (February, 2003): 47
5 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The Valetudinary States at the Origin of a Semiotic of Impulses', 22.
what he called *the Great Health*: the sacrifice of physiological and psychological comfort in the name of an untimely convalescence that will return in eternal recurrence. As he writes at the climax of *The Gay Science*, to conquer the pain of the present

[we] need for a new goal also a new means - namely, a new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health. Whoever has a soul that craves to have experienced the whole range of values and desiderata to date [...] needs one thing above everything else: the *great health* - that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up again and again, and must give it up.  

In 'The Night Song', Zarathustra teaches that "[t]here is a cleft between giving and receiving; and the narrowest cleft is the last to be bridged". To experience the sacrifice of health as a cleft to convalescence is to understand the mechanism of positive distance as a gift that gives the present an unprecedented power. Pain or illness act as liberators if affirmed as events inspired by the selective force of the eternal return. Nietzsche's life taught him that "[t]here is as much wisdom in pain as there is in pleasure" and led him to believe that both pain and pleasure "belong among the factors that contribute the most to the preservation of the species". Nietzsche goes so far to claim that it is only during "unfavourable conditions" that everything of worth comes into existence, "everything decisive comes about 'in spite of'" the present. That "pain hurts", he continues, "is no argument against [the present] but is its essence".

When reflecting on the writing process of his text *Daybreak*, Nietzsche remembers a "brightness and cheerfulness, even exuberance of spirit" which he recounts as "virtually inseparable from an extreme poverty of blood and muscle... the profoundest physiological weakness [and] an extremity of pain". This physical paralysis, Nietzsche writes later, "does not count as an objection to life"; pain is something that must be lived, the divine agent of "the tragic pathos[, ]the affirmative pathos *par excellence". In a letter to his Doctor in early 1880, Nietzsche writes that he is "happier now than [he has] ever been in [his] life", despite "continual pain[,] for many hours of the day, a sensation closely akin to seasickness, a semi-paralysis that makes

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7 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'The night song', §2.9, 106. Zarathustra repeats this sentiment in 'The convalescent', §3.13.2, 217.
9 Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 'Zarathustra', §1, 70.
11 Phrasing altered.
12 Ibid, 'Zarathustra', §1, 70. Phrasing altered.
it difficult to speak, alternating with furious attacks". As Klossowski writes in *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, it is the sharp pain of the migraines that Nietzsche suffered in his working life that rendered

[t]he act of thinking [for Nietzsche] identical with suffering, and suffering with thinking. From this fact, Nietzsche posited the coincidence of thought with suffering, and asked what a thought would be that was deprived of suffering. Thinking, suffering, reflecting on past suffering - as the impossibility of thinking - then came to be experienced by Nietzsche as the highest joy.

From the blankets of his Grand Health, Nietzsche celebrates his sickness as the agent that allowed him to "discover life as it were anew": a crippling whose severity enabled him to "taste all good and even petty things in a way that others could not easily taste them". Nietzsche's illness should not be remembered as what disabled his thought but rather as what enabled his thinking to reach new peaks. As Kaufman writes in her book *The Delirium of Praise*, Nietzsche's sickness allowed him to arrive at "altered states of being" that are significant in that they "entail[ed] fundamental shifts in perception [...] perceived only from a vantage point that is exterior to the normal parameters of healthful living". What results, Kaufman continues, is "an enabling disjunction [...] in which physical excess, here in the form of sickness, allows for an unprecedented mental purity and freedom". From the broader perspective of a "superior health", Deleuze argues that Nietzsche exhorts us to live health and sickness in such a manner that health be a living perspective on sickness and sickness a living perspective on health; to make of sickness an exploration of health, of health an investigation of sickness.

This affirmative sanction of Nietzsche's *Great Health*, deriving from his poor physical condition, invites a heightened form of lucidity into his writing and philosophical vision. In the 1886 preface to the second volume of *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche remembers "forcing himself into an utterly different and untried zone of the soul" by affirming himself as "physician and invalid in one". Nietzsche recounts that his disjunctive mastery, fuelled by a "curiosity for all that was strange" and "a distaste for fixity of any kind", led to "a great spiritual strengthening, a growing joy

17 Ibid, 103.
18 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 'Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events', 198.
and exuberance of health”. Klossowski argues that Nietzsche sought this "strange atmosphere" in order "to penetrate the shadows" cast by his troubled and tearful sense of self, and discover an intellect "infinitely more vast" than the one traditionally prescribed by health and consciousness. Deleuze writes in favour of Klossowski's portrait of Nietzsche when he considers that although illnesses separate us from our power[, at the same time they give us another power, [something] "dangerous" and "interesting”. [Illness'] bring us new feelings and teach us new ways of being affected.

Deleuze's diagnosis is all the more convincing if we remember that, like Nietzsche, Deleuze also suffered from long bouts of illness and spent most of his life on dialysis, the experience of which arguably colours his own writing. Deleuze's point is that if approached philosophically, valetudinary states reveal new registers of capacity, and endow the invalid "with a new will" that only they can make their own, in light of their circumstance, by "going to the limit of a strange power". This strangeness bears witness to a shift in the will, where the illness is treated to the extent that the sufferer is no longer "the slave of [their] illness” and rather uses its intrusion "as a means of exploring, dominating and being powerful". As Faulkner suggests, Nietzsche's "cycles of migraine, vomiting of phlegm, dyspepsia, and blindness [both] interrupted and fuelled his work". It was only "[b]y means of his sickness", Faulkner continues, that Nietzsche "was able to observe a body at war with itself", and "[u]nder such conditions, the illusion of bodily coherence could not hold". The incoherence of the healthy sickness experienced by Nietzsche as a result of his inverted perspectivism led him to marry his perception of lucidity with a dissociated mixture of delirium and delight. In his heightened episodes, Klossowski envisions that Nietzsche not only interpreted suffering as energy, but willed it to be so. Physical suffering would be livable [for Nietzsche] only insofar as it was closely connected to joy, insofar as it developed a voluptuous lucidity: either it would extinguish all possible thought, or it would reach the delirium of thought.

20 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Part Two 'Preface', §5, 287.
22 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'Ambivalence of sense and of values', §2.13, 66. Deleuze returns to this point in Essays Critical and Clinical, 'Literature and Life', 3.
23 Eleanor Kaufman, for instance, cites Deleuze's essays as "a testament to the lucidity of thought produced under conditions of extreme physical hardship”; The Delirium of Praise, n43, 192.
24 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'Ambivalence of sense and of values', §2.13, 66.
27 Ibid.
28 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The valetudinary states at the origin of a semiotic of impulses', 25.
According to Deleuze, this voluptuous lucidity is encountered when the sufferer of health "makes [his or her] distance from sickness an object of affirmation". Importantly, Deleuze clarifies that these extreme states of illness were "never a source of inspiration" or "a motive" for Nietzsche, nor did his philosophy glorify suffering or physical hardship, even when the philosopher indeed "suffer[ed] in excess". Illnesses do not "affect a body-object or a brain-object from the outside", but always, for Deleuze, from the inside of a situation, facing out. The motive for Nietzsche and Deleuze alike is always the distance one can take from the circumstance taking place, and the capacity to a draw a line between this distance and joy, by summoning "a secret intersubjectivity at the heart of a single individual". In their delirious lucidity, the healthy invalid evaluates their position, not by identifying contrary states as more desirable investments of bodily energy, but in light of how one's current state relates in its lived currency with all other states. "Distance is", Deleuze reminds us, "at arms length, the affirmation of that which it distances". The will that accompanies one's condition in all states of being is the mediator between one's bodily sensations and their reasoned reception. What is kept at bay in Nietzsche's thought is the distance to which one event that takes place lies in respect to its affirmed response in eternal recurrence. Nietzsche describes how, in order to for his writing to "speak only of [his] conquests", he needed "time, convalescence, distance [and] separation" from whatever he had "lived through and outlived". Nietzsche promises that untimely convalescence returns as a reward "for our tenacious will to life", a gift that allows us to "walk the path to a new health, a health of tomorrow and the day after". The invalid that affirms their sickness in pursuit of this trail will return as healthier than the present perspective could permit, "dangerously healthy, ever again healthy". As we walk this path, Nietzsche writes, "we receive Life's great gifts, perhaps the greatest it can bestow"; we remember why life is worth living, "we regain our task".

It is only by route of positive distance that the milieus that prohibit the possibility of thinking may unlock the fertility of untimely thought. It is only by thinking and writing 'in spite of' the present that we may transform the poison of our surroundings to the convalescence of joyous thought. By affirming everything that takes place in its distance, both Nietzsche and Deleuze alike suggest that we may strip painful events of their physicality to discover their incorporeal capacity to "endow [us] with a

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29 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 'Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events', 198.
31 Ibid, 58.
32 Ibid.
33 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 'Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events', 198.
34 Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, Part Two 'Preface', §1, 283.
strange power, as though [we] possessed a dangerous means of exploration". If the eternal return is "selective par excellence", then what is selected recovers and redeems the superior qualities of the circumstance being affirmed. Deleuze envisions, for instance, that laziness, cowardice or abjection, if affirmed properly and stripped of ressentiment, would return in the eternal return as "forms as yet unknown and unexplored", the result of "active power of affirmation" unexpected from the perspective of their currency today. The value of these qualities would turn themselves inside out if we wanted them to return innumerable times more. In this selective process, Deleuze continues, the "world of 'semi-wants' is thus eliminated"; all events that we would wish "once, only once" are left behind. Deleuze goes on to explain that

[The function of the eternal return, in every case, is to separate the superior from the moderate means, the torrid or glacial zones from the temperate ones, the extreme powers from the middles states. The words 'separate' or 'extract' are not even adequate, since the eternal return creates superior forms. It is in this sense that the eternal return is the instrument and the expression of the will to power: it raises each thing to its superior form, that is, its nth power.]

Importantly, for both Deleuze and Nietzsche, the exercise of the will to power is not only a fortitude of thought but an affirmation of life itself. Deleuze correctly identifies Nietzsche's re-evaluation of all values as the "active becoming of forces, a triumph of affirmation in the will to power" and crowns this conquest as "the highest power of the will". When we affirm how we live under the cloak of the will to power, our actions become expressions of life and becoming unknowst to the will from which they become. All events and perspectives are affirmed in this process, regardless of their distance or contradictory nature. Nietzsche maintains, for instance, that "it was in the years of [his] lowest vitality that [he] ceased to be a pessimist: the instinct for self-recovery forbade [him] a philosophy of indigence and discouragement". Everything that can be negated, Deleuze argues, "is expelled by the very movement of the eternal return[, because Being is affirmed of becoming, it expels all that contradicts affirmation, all the forms of nihilism and of reaction".

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38 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 'On the will to power and the eternal return', 125.
39 Ibid, 124.
40 Ibid; Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 'Nietzsche', 88.
41 Ibid.
42 Deleuze, Desert Islands, 'On the will to power and the eternal return', 125.
43 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 'Nietzsche', 82-83.
44 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, 'Why I am so Wise', §2, 10. In the preface to Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche also posits the "radical cure for all pessimism" as the result of "becoming ill[,] remain[ing] ill a good while, and then grow[ing] well [] for a still longer period". He describes "practical wisdom" as the capacity to "prescribe even health for one's self for a long time only in small doses"; 'Preface', §5, 17.
45 Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 'Nietzsche', 89.
Nietzsche demonstrates this movement in *Ecce Homo* when he recounts how important his sickness was to his life. Nietzsche describes how, at some of his sickest moments, he "took [himself] in hand [and] made [himself] healthy again", inviting his sickness to become "an energetic stimulant to life, to more life". Nietzsche attributed the greatest parts of his philosophy to his "will to health [and] to life". In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze and Guattari cite Nietzsche when they argue that artists and philosophers often possess fragile health, "not because of their illnesses or neuroses but because they have seen something in life that is too much for anyone, too much for themselves". This unbearable excess, Deleuze and Guattari continue, is "the source or breath that supports [the seer] through the illnesses of the lived", and allows them return to the living "breathless and with bloodshot eyes". In 'The Wanderer and his Shadow', Nietzsche diagnoses this untimely sensation as the "noontide of life", the moment where the visionary "feels his [or her] soul overcome", where their "heart stands still", and "only [their] eye lives". Nietzsche describes this "strange longing for rest" as an experience of "death with waking eyes". In this moment, the seer sees much that he [or she] never saw before, and, so far as [their] eye can reach, all is woven into and as it were buried in a net of light. [The seer] feels happy, but it is a heavy, very heavy kind of happiness.

We find the weight of Nietzsche's vision revisited in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, where "the wanderer" falls asleep happily against a great tree. Zarathustra describes himself as a "ship that has sailed into its stillest cove", "tired of the long voyages and the uncertain seas", and praises his resting place for being "more faithful" to the earth than his earlier pastures. Zarathustra welcomes this moment where "[t]he world is perfect", "[r]ound and ripe", and totally "still", but then wakes himself up, with a "sting" to the heart, and dismisses the temptation to keep sleeping. Like Nietzsche, Zarathustra returns to the land of the living to unpack the wisdom of his untimely dream.

Whatever Nietzsche saw, through his famously poor eyesight, and whatever he felt, with the thought of the eternal return, allowed him to keep on writing his most

48 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Percept, affect, and concept', 172. Deleuze and Guattari are also making reference to the Belgian writer Henri Michaux. Deleuze repeats this point in in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, 'Literature and Life', 3.
50 Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human* (Part II), 'At Noontime', §308, 524-525.
powerful texts, in spite of the pain that accompanied their labour. In a paper entitled 'Nietzsche and Geophilosophy', Stephan Günzel points out that

Nietzsche's poor health did not allow him to visit all of the places he described, and his poor sight did not allow him to see everything clearly or in detail. One consequence of this is that Nietzsche's descriptions of landscapes consist in more or less stereotypical literary descriptions that he applied to the places he imagined himself to be. Another consequence is that a second realm in Nietzsche's writings is much more elaborate than his poor visual descriptions of his environment; namely, tactile and somatic descriptions of climatic impressions, especially with regard to temperature and humidity.  

Following this, Günzel details how Nietzsche has been interpreted a "seismographer" as opposed to a philosopher, "a recording instrument equipped with a swinging needle". Nietzsche, for instance, paid attention to the temperature of the sun on the summer afternoons he spent walking around the lake of Silvaplana in Sils-Maria. He associated the cascading warmth of afternoon sunlight with firmer steps towards recovery and with an optimism that has "fallen on to [his] life". In Human, all too Human, Nietzsche describes the healing process, like a sunlit nap at noontime, as a drawing closer to life, and colours this experience with gentle hues of yellow light:

Again it grows warmer around [the convalescent], and, as it were, yellower; feeling and sympathy gain depth, thawing winds of every kind pass lightly over him. He almost feels as if his eyes were now first opened to what is near. He marvels and is still; where has he been? The near and nearest things, how changed they appear to him! What a bloom and magic they have acquired meanwhile! [...] Now he sees himself for the first time - and what surprises he feels thereby! What thrills unexperienced hitherto! What joy even in the weariness, in the old illness, in the relapses of the convalescent! How he likes to sit still and suffer, to practice patience, to lie in the sun!

Nietzsche writes that "years full of many-coloured, painfully enchanting magical transformations, curbed and led by a tough will to health" must be lived through in order for the invalid to recover. Nietzsche's principle of convalescence, according to Klossowski, is an untimely state of health held hostage by Nietzsche to "a new cohesion between his thought and the body as a corporealising thought". To

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57 Ibid, 84-85. Here Günzel is referring to post-world war two interpretations by Ernst Jünger and Thomas Mann.
58 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 'Preface', §5, 17; Ecce Homo, 'Forward', 7.
59 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 'Preface', §5, 17.
60 Ibid, §4, 16.
continue exploring the exceptionality of his Great Health, Klossowski believes that Nietzsche needed to follow "the guiding thread of the body", groping his way through a "labyrinth of the impulses" that he felt as corporeal assaults taken against his conscious mind, the "thinking Nietzsche self". For Klossowski, Nietzsche's unique contribution to philosophy lies in his desire to investigate the vicissitudes of the body at the expense of the mind and its reason, "to go back towards what, in himself, was most distant in order to comprehend the most immediate".

In situating Nietzsche within the history of philosophy, Deleuze posits that Nietzsche "distrusted the orientation [of idealism] by height and asked whether, far from representing the fulfilment of philosophy, it marked rather, from Socrates onwards, its degeneration and wandering." In contrast to the "Platonic Orient", Deleuze argues that

[The encased depths strike Nietzsche as the real orientation of philosophy, the pre-Socratic discovery that must be revived in a philosophy of the future, with all the forces of a life which is also a thought, and of a language which is also a body.]

In this important distinction, Deleuze is careful to wedge the performance of positive distance as belonging neither to the depths nor to the heights, but to "topology and to the surface". To come to terms with positive distance is to "exclud[e] all depth and all elevation", and to understand that "[e]verything that happens" happens at the surface of the earth, "which is no less explorable and unknown than depth or height". In this way positive distance becomes the perspectival gateway which allows us to open up experience as a selective means to recurrence, as opposed to condemning what happens to the order of what came before. The violent impulses of Nietzsche's sick body herald a confrontation at the surface that renders both the ascents of thinking and the corporeal depths of thought's hindrance as intertwined and in constant interaction. In The Logic of Sense Deleuze clarifies that

Nietzsche was able to rediscover depth only after conquering the surfaces. But he did not remain at the surface, for the surface struck him as that which had to be assessed from the renewed perspective of an ear peering out from the depths.

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63 *Ibid*, 23. Faulkner elaborates that, for Klossowski, an impulse designates "the most intelligible aspect of [the] human being: the incommunicable abyss from which all meaning arises... The impulse remains inaccessible to consciousness; unrepresentable within the terms that orient identification"; 'The vision, the riddle, and the vicious circle', 49-50.
64 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 'Eighteenth series of the three images of philosophers', 146.
65 *Ibid*.
Each stage of Nietzsche's convalescence in its lucidity sought its collapse as the frontier to pursue. For Klossowski, the body "is constantly being modified" in its different ages and shifts in perspective. As opposed to the self, which is anchored by its coherence in identity, "the body dies and is reborn numerous times", each age "giving birth to the next". In this sense, Klossowski classifies "the ages of the body [as] simply the impulsive movements that form and deform [the body,] and finally tend to abandon it". According to Deleuze, Nietzsche only succumbed to his sickness "when he [could] no longer affirm the distance" between each of these bodily ages, "when he [was] no longer able, by means of his health, to establish sickness as a point of view on health". Nietzsche's "illness became inseparable from the end of his oeuvre" when he could not longer draw the untimely benefits from his "art of displacement"; when his body could no longer give birth to its next age.

In *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, Klossowski concentrates primarily on the posthumous fragments of Nietzsche's late notebooks, many examples of which were letters of correspondence unavailable to the French or English speaking circles of Klossowski's time. Described by Deleuze as the period of Nietzsche's "itinerant life", these years would see Nietzsche travel across Switzerland, Italy and the south of France, seeking favourable climates to counter the overwhelming pain and paralysis he experienced with his declines in health. Klossowski reviews this period as documentation of Nietzsche's constant oscillation between convalescence and illness, illumination and relapse.

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Convalescence was the signal of a new offensive of the 'body' - this rethought body - against the 'thinking Nietzsche self'. This in turn paved the way for a new relapse. For Nietzsche, each of these relapses, up until the final relapse, heralded a new inquiry and a new investment in the world of the impulses, and in each case he paid the price of an ever-worsening illness. In each case the body liberated itself a little more from its own agent, and in each case this agent was weakened a little more. Little by little, [Nietzsche's] brain was forced to approach the boundaries that separated it from these somatic forces, in that the reawakening of the self in the brain was brought about ever more slowly [... Nietzsche's] self was broken down into a lucidity that was more vast but more brief.

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 'Twenty-fourth series of the communication of events', 198.
73 Deleuze, *Pure Immanence*, 'Nietzsche', 64-65; 58.
74 Ibid, 56.
Klossowski credits the crises experienced by Nietzsche as *corporeal disturbances* that permitted brief doses of respite from processing this intensity intellectually in his practice. According to Klossowski, Nietzsche would give his bodily forces "free rein" in his periods of sickness, and upon recovery would "scrutinise ever more carefully" over the effects this submission had taken in his notebooks.  

In line with Klossowski, Ashley Woodward explains:

> Nietzsche exploited his illness for philosophical ends, using it as an opportunity to carry out a kind of phenomenological research on the nature of the body, of thought, and their relationship. In the periods when his health improved, Nietzsche was then able to translate his reflections into rational thought and express them in written language, and this very process of translation afforded further insight into the body-thought relation.

By considering the impulses of the body to be of superior significance, Klossowski suggests that Nietzsche "developed a mode of intelligence which he wanted to submit exclusively to physical criteria", a suspension of thought that "expressed a will to break with [the] servitude" of Nietzsche's own brain. Upon examining Nietzsche's late notebooks, Klossowski speculates that the more the troubled Nietzsche listened to his body, the more he came to distrust *the person the body supported*. With this wariness a suspicion, a hatred, a rage against his own conscious and reasonable person was born... [Nietzsche] would destroy the person out of a love for the *nervous system* he knew he had been gifted with, in which he took a certain *pride*. By studying the reactions of his nervous system, he would come to conceive of himself in a *different manner* than he had previously known - and indeed, in a manner than will perhaps never again be known.

Taking the battle between Nietzsche's conscious thought and the interruptions of his nervous system as his crucial site of focus, Klossowski argues that it is here that Nietzsche's sick body, as the "product of the impulses" and "locus of their confrontation", becomes *fortuitous*, in that Nietzsche's lucidity and privileging of delirium marks an unprecedented and singular accent in the history of philosophy. For Klossowski, "Nietzsche introduced into teaching what no authority responsible for the transmission of knowledge (philosophy) has ever been advised to teach".

Here Klossowski cites Nietzsche at length, and takes him to heart, when Nietzsche declares

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The philosopher is only a kind of occasion and chance through which an impulse is finally able to speak.\textsuperscript{82}

Klossowski sees Nietzsche as the first philosopher to "rejec[t] any thought that was integrated into the function of thinking", because compared to the sovereign impulses of the body that harass this thought, the thinking that results is rendered insubordinate, inverted and filtered.\textsuperscript{83} Nietzsche's case is fortuitous in the immediacy of his incoherence. The hindrance of Nietzsche's delirium gives way to a necessity whose only resolution could be a doctrine as vertiginous as that of the eternal return: his body "is neither irreversible nor reversible, because its only history is that of the impulses".\textsuperscript{84} Nietzsche’s body becomes fortuitous, in other words, because the somatic impulses, as Nietzsche's "most immediate forces", rise to the surface and communicate through the cleft they tear in Nietzsche's stable sense of self.\textsuperscript{85} Without the regulations of reason that protect consciousness from the impulses, Klossowski describes Nietzsche's fortuitous body as

\textit{a product of chance}; it is nothing but the \textit{locus} where a group of individuated impulses confront each other so as to produce this interval that constitutes \textit{a human life}, impulses whose sole ambition is to de-individuate themselves. \textsuperscript{86}

These impulses, in other words, find their unique expression in their dissolution at the level of conscious life, a confrontation which results in bursts of pain and euphoria that lead to further perspectives and positions to pursue. Stripped of the consistency of identity upheld by consciousness, Nietzsche's body "alone remains present", and in this \textit{presence} it "no longer belongs" to Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{87} As Klossowskian scholar Ian James clarifies, "[t]his fortuitous body does not belong to anyone as such, and exceeds all categories of knowledge and representation[...] The body here is not an object or entity endowed with a certain integrity or unity but rather a site traversed by fortuitous forces which are constituted as such in differential relations".\textsuperscript{88} In this way, Nietzsche's \textit{fortuitous body} becomes analogous to Deleuze and Guattari’s \textit{Body without Organs}, a "nonstratified, unformed, intense matter", which is "populated only by intensities [that] pass and circulate", "always swinging between the surfaces that

\textsuperscript{83} Klossowski, \textit{Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle}, 'The combat against culture', 5.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid, 'The valetudinary states at the origin of a semiotic of impulses',30.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, 23.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, 26.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid, 27.
\textsuperscript{88} Ian James, 'Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Fortuitous Body', \textit{Romance Studies} Vol. 19:1 (June, 2001): 61-62. James continues: "The paradox of Klossowski's reading turns, then, around his attempt to describe a fortuitous body belonging to Nietzsche, a body which by definition cannot be described and cannot be said to belong"; 61.
stratify it and the plane that sets it free". This corporeal site forfeits its anchor of identity to favour competing hierarchies of intensities governed by excitations of the will to power. Klossowski champions the lucidity of Nietzsche's delirium as the manifestation of his fortuitous impulses. For Klossowski, the will to power connotes "the term that expresses force itself", an expression that exceeds its limits, bound by its disruptive and insatiable nature. Nietzsche equates, after all, "our entire instinctual life as the development and ramification of one basic form of will", and reserves "the right to define all efficient force unequivocally as: will to power".

Building on this principle, Deleuze joins Klossowski when he says that the will to power is "thus ascribed to force, but in a very special way: it is both a complement of force and something internal to it". The speciality of the will to power, for these three thinkers alike, lies in its creative capacity to affirm all chance as the fortuitous agent of force itself. It is what allows us to redeem contingency as the source of necessity, by affirming "an intense or intensive form, which is neither coveting nor taking, but giving, creating". The will to power, Deleuze reminds us, "is the virtue that gives"; it is the abyss that allows us to become who we are. For Nietzsche, the will to power is "[t]he world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its 'intelligible character'". This intelligibility, Nietzsche clarifies, "is actually nothing but a certain behaviour of the instincts toward one another". It is an intensive and incommunicable intelligibility, bound "by virtue of singularities that can no longer said to be personal, and intensities that can no longer be said to be extensive". The will to power, Deleuze surmises, is "the power to metamorphose, to shape masks, to interpret and evaluate". As we shall see in the following chapter, it is the will to power that the sorcerer must adopt, as the power of anomalous affect, to allow their dark magic to take place.

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89 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'How do you make yourself a body without organs?', 169; 178. James notes the firm connection between Klossowski's 'fortuitous' or 'intensive' body and Deleuze and Guattari's 'body without organs', as well as its alliance with Jean-François Lyotard's 'libidinal economy'. See Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Fortuitous Body', 61; n14.

90 Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'Attempt at a scientific explanation of the eternal return', 103.


92 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'What is the will to power?', §2.6, 49. Or, as Deleuze puts its more technically a few pages later, "The will to power is both the genetic element of force and the principle of synthesis of forces"; 51. See Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 'The mechanistic interpretation of the world', §619 (1885), 332-333.

93 "The will to power has chance at its heart for only the will to power is capable of affirming all chance"; Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'Nietzsche's Terminology', 53.

94 Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, 'Conclusions on the will to power and the eternal return', 119.

95 Ibid.


99 Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, 'Conclusions on the will to power and the eternal return', 119.
INTENSION

In his 1902 text, *A General Theory of Magic*, Marcel Mauss defines the performance of magic as "any rite which does not play a part in organised cults" or convention.¹ Anthropologically, Mauss seeks to correlate the mysterious nature of magic with any ritual of actions that are not aligned with the religious or socially sanctified practice of its time. Rites of magic, Mauss writes, are "private, secret, mysterious and approach the limits of a prohibited rite".² According to Mauss,

Magical rites are commonly performed in woods, far away from dwelling places, at night or in shadowy corners, in the secret recesses of a house or at any rate in some out-of-the-way place. Where religious rites are performed openly, in full public view, magical rites are carried out in secret. Even when the magic is licit, it is done in secret, as if performing some maleficent deed... Isolation and secrecy are two almost perfect signs of the intimate character of a magical rite. They are always features of a person or persons working in a private capacity; both the act and the actor are shrouded in mystery.³

Seventy-eight years later, in their second 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passage in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari refine Mauss' position. Sorcerers, they argue,

have always held the *anomalous* position, at the edge of the fields or woods. They haunt the fringes. They are at the borderline of the village, or between villages. The important thing is their affinity with alliance, with the pact, which gives them a status opposed to that of filiation. The relation with the anomalous is one of alliance.⁴

The anomalous position, Deleuze and Guattari clarify, is not simply a privileging of the *abnormal*, "that which [lies] outside rules or goes against the rules", but an *alliance* with an exceptional position or a set of positions *within* a given assembly of practice.⁵ The anomalous as *an-omalie* haunts the given from the outer limits of what's given, facing in, as "the unequal, the coarse, the rough, the cutting edge of deterritorialisation".⁶ The anomalous occupies an anonymous, dynamic and intensive borderline, "the enveloping line" furthest from the centre of the pack.⁷ When the sorcerer affirms their alliance with the anomalous position, it "is not simply [as] an

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² *Ibid*.
⁵ *Ibid*, 269.
⁶ *Ibid*.
exceptional individual" but rather, as a pre-subjective and singular case. The anomalous is,

neither an individual nor a species; it has only affects, it has neither familiar or subjectified feelings, nor specific or significant characteristics... It is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon of bordering.

Deleuze and Guattari's implicit contention is that rites of magic allow this phenomenal bordering to take place. The practice of sorcery promises affects that cannot be thought through or explained in great detail. Despite the pre-subjective or individual form of the anomalous, there is always a performer of its pact lurking nearby. Deleuze and Guattari state that "wherever there is a multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual, and it is with that individual that an alliance must be made". In the context of this rite, our exceptional individual is Friedrich Nietzsche. It is he that we have allied our words and our thoughts to. In the poison garden, Nietzsche is the anomalous "ploughshare of evil [that] must come again and again". In his garden we turn from figs, into wasps, into wolves, following Zarathustra, the leader of our pack. In this line of becoming Nietzsche holds the anomalous position, despite the difficulty of discerning whether he "is still in the band, already outside the band, or at the shifting boundary of the band". Our fascination with Nietzsche, let's remember, is with a Nietzsche that is no longer Nietzsche, an estranged ghost of Nietzsche, a force we cannot pin down. Once we align ourselves and our actions with the eternal return as an anomalous and untimely will to power, Nietzsche's writing will again shift in focus. His philosophy will become, once again, something new.

Hours and days pass by, and we don't seem any closer. Wherever we look, its like we can't see past his words. Nietzsche’s prophecy haunts us, just like it haunted him. We know it to be so; we understand its call. Spending time with Nietzsche aligns us all together. Bataille was right to recognise that community "was constantly on [Nietzsche's] mind", that he "never doubted that if the possibility he recommended was going to exist, it would require community". Bataille offers his writing and his "life with Nietzsche as a companion" as an utmost expression of the pact of this community. Irigaray writes to Nietzsche as a lover (not a friend). To Nietzsche, we write this work as sorcerers. We do not know where these words will lead us. Soon we have to step away, but I can't bear to bring my legs to move. My back is sore and stiff, my thoughts vacant, unamused. Nietzsche warns all sorcerers that "[i]t is

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8 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer II', 269.
10 Ibid, 268.
12 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer II', 271.
13 Bataille, On Nietzsche, 'Mr. Nietzsche', §3, 8.
14 Ibid, 9.
inhuman to bless where one is cursed". There is a contradiction here, and this contradiction is real. Deleuze and Guattari inform us that "sorcerers know quite well that the contradictions [of sorcery] are real [and] that [those] contradictions are not just for laughs". Nietzsche replies to Deleuze and Guattari that "[e]ven laughter may yet have a future". Nietzsche laughs at whomever serves "the preservation of the human race", and argues that, by contrast, it is "the most evil spirits [that] have so far done the most to advance humanity". What is evil, in other words, is the anomalous that demarcates new dimensions and limits for the future. "[E]vil instincts", Nietzsche writes, "are expedient, species-preserving, and indispensable". To harness these instincts, Deleuze and Guattari argue,

\[\text{[t]he sorcerer has a relation of alliance with the demon as the power of the anomalous [...]}\]

It is certain that the demon performs local transports of all kinds. The Devil is a transporter; he transports humors, affects or even bodies [... b]ut these transports cross neither the barrier of essential forms nor that of substances or subjects. There is a "demonic reality", in other words, "of the becoming-animal of the human being"; but this reality is a contradiction. It not something seen or heard, but felt. This demonic communion, as it plays out in Nietzsche's work, finds its personification in the force that "stea[l]s after you" when you tread furthest from the herd, "into your loneliest loneliness". The demon tells you that "[t]he eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again" and that this life "as you now live it and have lived it", you will live again, and again and again, if you align your life with the hourglass' law. This alliance, we must affirm, is at once a blessing and a curse; and it is inhuman to bless its curse, or, more humanely, to curse its blessing.

For the remainder of this chapter, we will affiliate this alliance as a fascination with what Klossowski defines in Nietzsche's work as a phantasm. For Klossowski, the allure of a phantasm lies in its esoteric, incommunicable and unintelligible nature. As

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16 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Memories of a sorcerer II', 269
18 *Ibid*, 73; 'What preserves the species', §4, 79.
20 *Ibid*.
24 *Ibid*. 
Klossowski's translator Daniel W. Smith puts it, a phantasm "refers to an obsession image produced within us by the unconscious forces of our impulsive life; the phantasm is what makes each of us a singular case". The most intense example of a phantasm that Nietzsche encountered in his life was his obsession with the "sudden unveiling" and "abrupt awakening" of the experience of the eternal return in Sils-Maria in August 1881. In the year that followed, Salomé remembers the commitment Nietzsche felt to scientifically proving the complexity of this phantasm. She recounts his desire to travel to Vienna or Paris to study physics and dense mathematics, a motion that was crushed from cursory studies and more onslaughts of poor health. What was remarkable, Salomé notes, was that

[t]hrough the moment when his frightening surmise became unprovable and untenable, it became hardened for him - as if through a magic formula - into an irrefutable conviction. What was to have become a scientifically proven truth assumed instead the character of a mystical revelation and furthermore gave Nietzsche's philosophy its final and fundamental principles. Instead of finding a scientific basis, Nietzsche's philosophy found an inner inspiration - his own personal inspiration.

What became important for Nietzsche, in other words, was the incommunicable, incomprehensible, and phantasmic force of the eternal return that he discovered within himself and his actions. Following this revelation, Nietzsche came to believe that "by far the greatest part of our spirit's activity remains unconscious and unfelt", and that the voice of unheard instincts "may well be the source of that sudden and violent exhaustion that afflicts all thinkers". As James surmises, from this point onwards, "Nietzsche's project turn[ed], then, on the paradoxical attempt to translate into the realm of thought that which conscious thought by its very nature excludes".

From here, Nietzsche developed his larger critique of conscious life, knowledge, causality and intention. According to Nietzsche, "[t]hat which becomes conscious is involved in causal relations which are entirely withheld from [that conscious state]". In his notes from The Will to Power, Nietzsche pinpoints the fundamental failing of the psychologists of his time in their favouring of distinct ideas over those that are indistinct, as if the phantasms that inhabit the muteness of thought could not impart

26 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The experience of the eternal return', 56. Smith also argues this in 'Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche', 332.
27 Salomé, Nietzsche, 'Nietzsche's System', 132-133.
30 Ian James, Pierre Klossowski: The Persistence of a Name (Oxford: Legenda European Humanities Research Centre, 2000), 92.
31 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 'The role of consciousness', §524 (Nov. 1887 - March 1888), 284.
their own coherence of clarity or purpose. On the contrary, for Nietzsche, a thought that "removes itself from our consciousness and for that reason becomes obscure can on that account be perfectly clear in itself. Becoming obscure is a matter of perspective for consciousness". Following this thread in The Gay Science, Nietzsche teaches that consciousness serves primarily as "a net of communication between human beings", and that "the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of [one's thought] - the most superficial and worst part", to put it lightly. Nietzsche's claim is that "consciousness does not really belong to [one's] individual existence but rather to [their] social or herd nature", that its privilege has "evolved through social intercourse" and is present "only to the extent that [it] is useful". In line with Klossowski's distaste for gregarious conformity, seen as the "product of the categories of the intellect" identified as consciousness, we can see Deleuze's own account of herd psychology emerging from Nietzsche's aphoristic ashes. Consciousness, Deleuze writes, "is essentially reactive", a nihilistic expression of inferior forces conserved "by securing mechanical means and final ends, by fulfilling the conditions of life and the functions and tasks of conversation, adaptation and utility". Consciousness, Deleuze continues,

merely expresses the relation of certain reactive forces to the active forces which dominate them... [a]nd what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and habit [as well as] nutrition, reproduction, conservation, and adaptation.

Counter to the coherence promised by the intellect and its reactive coalition, Klossowski learns from Nietzsche's torment that

there is something resistant in thought that drives it forward - toward its point of departure. Nietzsche, following this process to its source, thus discovers that of which [conscious] thought is only a shadow: the strength to resist.

This resistance, the will to power, as the primordial impulse, is the source that grounds sorcery and all its sorcerous excitations of force in respect to thought and agency. "The coherence felt by the agent between 'itself' and a state of the impulses is

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33 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, On the "genius of the species", §354, 298-299. Earlier on in this text Nietzsche describes consciousness as "the last and latest development of the organic and hence what is most unfinished and unstrong". Consciousness, as Nietzsche sees it, "gives rise to countless errors that lead an animal or man to perish sooner than necessary [...] all our consciousness relates to errors"; 'Consciousness', §11, 84-85.
34 Ibid, On the "genius of the species", §354, 299; The Will to Power, 'The role of "consciousness"', §524 (Nov. 1887 - March 1888), 284; §505 (1885-1886), 275.
35 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The valetudinary states at the origin of four criteria', 76-77.
36 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'The distinction of forces', §2.2, 40-41.
37 Ibid, 41.
38 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'Additional note on Nietzsche's semiotic', 256.
never anything but a redistribution of the impulsive forces at the expense of the agent's coherence with itself as an intellect". For Klossowski, we must remember that "[n]othing [of worth] exists apart from impulses that are essentially generative of phantasms". The impulsive life of the unconscious runs counter to the intellect, which can only interpret intensive interruption as a threat to the conscious agent hitherto composed. Phantasms, as offspring of intensities and obsessions, are what seduce the sorcerer to sacrifice their coherent sense of self in their pledge of alliance with their esoteric, anomalous limit. This sacrifice is what permits new registers of lucidity and perspective to emerge as the very thought of the impulses, thinking, at the expense of the phantasmic mystification itself. On this, Klossowski outlines that

The phantasm - the phantasmic coherence of the agent with a determined impulse - is thus produced at the limit-point where this impulse is turned into a thought (of this impulse) as a repulsion against the adulterous coherence - precisely so that it can appear at the level of the intellect, no longer as a threat to the agent's coherence with itself, but on the contrary as a legitimate coherence. In this way, it can retain its thinkable character for another intellect. But nothing of the phantasm remains in the idea thus transmitted, or rather created according to totally different dimensions.

There is an exorcism, in other words, of the phantasm's purity once admitted as the founding principle of an idea, and submitted to the intelligible throes of explication, expectation, and exchange. For Deleuze and Guattari, the anomalous "pact with the demon" necessitates that the sorcerous perception of the phantasm's secret "must necessarily be secret itself... a perception that seeks to be imperceptible itself". For Mauss, this is why magical acts must be performed in secret, why "both the act and the actor are shrouded in mystery". If the revelation of sorcery is the perception of the imperceptible, the sorcerer, as protector of their phantasmic secret, might not understand or enjoy the content of their secret, but they are tied to its perception, through their fidelity to the phantasmic pressure their impulses exert. The protection of the fringes, what we have called the sorcerer's cloak, does not occlude the birth of meaning or value from these sorcerous experiences or the phenomena they border as a result of their affect. The sorcerer's cloak summons an intensive re-evaluation of values as the promise of its sorcerous rite.

In Nietzschean form, Deleuze argues that the very "notion of value loses all meaning if values are not seen as receptacles to be pierced, statues to be broken open to find

39 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'Additional note on Nietzsche's semiotic', 258.
40 Ibid, 'The vicious circle as a selective doctrine', 133.
41 Ibid, 'Additional note on Nietzsche's semiotic', 260.
42 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer II', 268; 'Memories of the secret', 316.
out what they contain." It is my feeling that in these three short passages on sorcery in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari indirectly address their own phantasms, or at least pave the way for readers like us to pursue our own limits according to their schema. When sketching criteria for anomalous phenomena, Deleuze and Guattari broaden their analysis to speak about *continuous registers of multiplicity*, reminiscent of Deleuze's diagnosis of Rhiemannian multiplicities discussed in his book on Bergson. The structure of a multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari argue,

is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not by the elements that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions that encompass it in "intension". If you change dimensions, if you add or subtract one, you change the multiplicity... (beyond the borderline, the multiplicity changes nature).

The secret of the anomalous, Deleuze and Guattari remind us, "is not at all an immobilised or static notion. Only becomings are secrets; the secret has a becoming." What grounds the practice of sorcery and warrants its tradition are singular accents of multiplicity and becoming put to work inside the intellect outside its reactive traction. The indulgence of consciousness and its moral intentions are not tolerated by the sorcerer or their sorcerous acts. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche proposes that

the decisive value of an action resides in precisely that which is *not intentional* in it, and that all that in it which is intentional, all of it that can be seen, known, 'conscious', still belongs to the surface and the skin - which, like every skin, betrays something but conceals still more.

In line with this proposal, Klossowski believes that we need to embrace the decisive depths of intensity and exploit their lines of irreducibility in order to elicit new centres of force and action that act without reference to morality or intention. Nietzsche's philosophy unmasks intention as "only a sign and symptom that needs interpreting, and a sign, moreover, that signifies too many things and which taken by itself signifies practically nothing". "Nietzsche's avowable project", Klossowski surmises, is to appropriate signification for simulacrum: "to act without intention: the impossible morality".

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44 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'Nietzsche's terminology', §2.7, 55.
46 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Memories of a sorcerer II', 270.
49 Ibid.
50 Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'The vicious circle as a selective doctrine', 140.
Klossowski goes on to argue that

[the day human beings learn how to behave as phenomena devoid of intention - for every intention at the level of the human being always implies its own conservation, its continued existence - on that day, a new creature would declare the integrity of existence.]

To realise the impossible borderline of becoming, the sorcerer needs to commit their actions to the untimely promise of the overman and to the eternal hourglass of the eternal return. As sorcerers we need to step before the empty sky and affirm man as a poison that must be overcome. According to Klossowski's framework in *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, we need to hail what he calls the simulacrum as the meaning of the earth. For Klossowski, the simulacrum realises its meaning in the integrity of its imitation without intention: "it simulates, dissimulates and proclaims its difference from itself". In Zarathustra's case, the teaching of the overman as the guarantor of meaning for a meaningless earth unleashes the simulacrum of the will to power as a singular impulse that offers its own meaning, at a distance from its origin, the torment of lucid thought. The simulacrum, Klossowski writes, "in its imitative sense, is the actualisation of something in itself incomunicable and nonrepresentable: the phantasm in its obsessional constraint". The simulacrum "simulates the invisible agitation" of active forces that deliver the tonality of the phantasm to its anomalous limit, as the power of demonic and sorcerous excitation. Constitutive to the simulacrum is the perspective force of a repetition "that refuses to tolerate the durable fixity of the species [...] The function of the simulacrum is to lead human intention back to the intensity of forces, which generate phantasms". The simulacrum, Klossowski clarifies,

is not the product of a phantasm, but its skilful reproduction, by which humanity can produce itself, through forces that are thereby exorcised and dominated by the impulse.

To grant the simulacrum this opportunity, one must accept Deleuze's Nietzschean affirmation of philosophy as "a symptomatology, and a semiology" of force. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze explains that "[a] phenomenon is not an

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51 Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'The vicious circle as a selective doctrine', 139.
52 James, *Pierre Klossowski: The Persistence of a Name*, 165.
54 For an excellent explanation of Klossowski's concept of the simulacrum, see Smith, *Essays on Deleuze*, 333-224. Much of the following references to Nietzsche's work are introduced and explained in this indispensable resource.
55 Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'The vicious circle as a selective doctrine', 139-140.
56 Ibid, 133.
57 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'Sense', §1.2, 3.
appearance or even an apparition but a sign, a symptom which finds its meaning in an existing force... All force is appropriation, domination, exploitation of a quantity of reality". 58 In Deleuze's portrait of active forces, "[a]ppropriating, possessing, subjugating, dominating" are the characteristics of force that will allow us to "impose forms, to create forms by exploiting circumstances" unbridled by this force.59 This active appropriation, Klossowski responds, forms the creation of a simulacrum of the phantasm in question that fixes an economy of new goals and meanings exclusively in line with the fraudulence of its affect, its phenomenon of bordering.

\[T\]his is what the simulacrum does: a simulacrum of goal, a simulacrum of meaning - which must be invented! Invented from what? From the phantasms of the life of the drives - the impulse, as 'will to power', already being the first interpreter.60

Nietzsche's formula for living is that "Life is will to power".61 The active force that interprets power is the simulacrum wedded to the impulse selected to subjugate the drives. In itself, Nietzsche argues that each individual drive has "no moral character at all, nor even a definite attendant sensation of pleasure or displeasure: it acquires all this, as its second nature, only when it enters into relations with drives already baptised" by the certainty of other drives. 62 Thinking, at its bedrock, fuels "the reality of our drives". 63 This reality consists in "the relationship of these drives to one another", their rising of power and decline.64 "A thought only rises by falling", chimes Klossowski, "[thinking] progresses only by regressing - an inconceivable spiral".65 The pursuit of the will to power in its vicious incoherence reveals an "experimental morality" that asks its drives in question to realise their intentionless intension, "the world seen from within", a singular, intensive goal.66 In his text Daybreak, Nietzsche argues that "[h]owever far [an individual] may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his [or her] image of the totality of drives which constitute his [or her] being". 67 This incomplete image, as the simulacrum of the self, remains "wholly unknown" to the individual that it serves, yet relies on an ontological intimacy born of fortuitous nourishment: "our daily experiences throw some prey in the way of now this [drive], now that drive, and the [strongest] drive seizes it eagerly". 68 A single individual, according to this image, "contains within [them] a vast confusion of contradictory valuations [and] drives", "a multiplicity of subjects, whose

58 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'Sense', §1.2, 3.
59 Ibid, 'The distinction of forces', §2.2, 42.
60 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The vicious circle as a selective doctrine', 135.
63 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 'The Free Spirit', §36, 66.
64 Ibid.
65 Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'Introduction', xvi.
67 Nietzsche, Daybreak, §119, 74.
68 Ibid.
interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in general. Accordingly, it is not the individual but

[their] needs that interpret the world; [their] drives and their For and Against. Every drive [Nietzsche writes] is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm.

In their seizure, the strongest drives express their domination as the givers who give the given of experience to the agent. But what is given is just an expression of a particular dominant drive, "a kind of occasion and chance" in communication with an entire hierarchy of other competing drives. Nietzsche defines the tyranny of each drive in their relation to the fortuity of their affect:

each [drive] would be only too glad to present itself as the ultimate goal of existence and as the legitimate master of all the other drives... and it is as such that [each drive] tries to philosophise.

It is only by affirming one's phantasmic ensemble of drives, and by crowning this reception as a simulacrum shrouded in mystery, that one may arrive at the anomalous borderline of becoming, the singular case at the shores of the multiple. To demystify with sorcery means to remystify the source of thought further, to surrender one's cogent coherence of identity to the intensity of an anonymous fracture in thought. "The wisest man", Nietzsche writes, "would be the one richest in contradictions, who has, as it were, antennae for all types of men - as well as his great moments of grand harmony". This wisdom, Nietzsche laments, is "a rare accident[,] a sort of planetary motion". The armchair scholar of Beyond Good and Evil worries of "becoming an insect with a thousand feet and a thousand antennae", whose multitude prevents him from specialising or excelling in his field. Nietzsche, by contrast, implores the philosophers in his wake to "risk [themselves] constantly" by living "unphilosophically' and 'unwisely", to play "the dangerous game" of the eternal return. In the eternal return "the unified self gives way to a multiplicity of selves each entirely disjunctive with the other". "Everything is led back to a single discourse, namely, to fluctuations of intensity that correspond to the thought of

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69 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 'Origin of moral valuations', §259 (1884), 149; 'Belief in "the ego", the subject', §490 (1885), 270.
70 Ibid, 'Belief in "the ego", the subject', §481 (1883-1888), 267.
71 Nietzsche, Samtiche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, quoted in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, 'The combat against culture', 2.
72 Ibid.
73 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 'On the prejudices of the philosophers', §6, 37.
74 Ibid.
75 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 'We scholars', §205, 131-132.
76 Ibid, 132.
77 James, Pierre Klossowski: The persistence of a name, 93.
everyone and no one... everything is on a single circuit of intensity”. In the sorcerous pact with the demon that steals after you and summons all becomings to recur, the sorcerer becomes unrecognisable, "aided, inspired, multiplied”. Nietzsche summoned the highest of thoughts from his depths when he realised that

\[\text{From each of our fundamental impulses comes a perspectival appreciation of every event and of every lived experience.}\]

Deleuze and Guattari respond to Nietzsche and Klossowski through their antennae of alliance: "[t]he self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities", or more.  

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78 Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'The combat against culture', 2.
CONCLUSION

After his collapse in 1889, Nietzsche spent the last ten years of his life oscillating between delusion and paralysis.¹ In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche warned that "[t]he greatest danger that always hovered over humanity and still hovers over it is the eruption of madness... the joy in human unreason".² In as early as 1881, Nietzsche wrote that "all superior men who were irresistibly drawn to throw off the yoke of any kind of morality and to frame new laws had, if they were not actually mad, no alternative but to make themselves or pretend to be mad".³ The question of Nietzsche's madness, like most questions posed by his philosophy, is one that the history books have been forced to leave open. There were times in early 1890 where his closest friend Peter Gast suspected that Nietzsche was feigning his own madness. Gast worried that Nietzsche was somehow in control of his eccentric and incoherent behaviour, "as if he were glad for it to have ended this way".⁴ What was happening inside Nietzsche's mind is something that we will never know, a secret he refused to reveal in his final years. As Nietzschean biographer Ronald Hayman suggests, readers today "have no option but to follow [Nietzsche] into the impasse from which his escape was insanity. He has left us to find our own way out".⁵

Nietzsche's departure from sanity brings us to our conclusion. What are we to do in the wake of Nietzsche? In his text *Daybreak*, Nietzsche advises that to lie "silent and a joy to eternity", one must "[s]lowly, slowly[, ] become hard like a precious stone".⁶ To become-hard became one of Nietzsche's most famous proverbs, finding its place in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and reproduced at the conclusion of *Twilight of the Idols*.⁷ In 1886, Nietzsche confides that his "philosophy advises [him] to be silent", and that "one only remains a philosopher by being - silent".⁸ In his experience of the eternal return in August 1881, Nietzsche took the first step through "the ultimate Door" that eventually "provid[ed] a way out" for him.⁹ Nietzsche became as hard as the "mighty pyramidal block of stone" that he paused at on the shore of lake Silvaplana in Sils-

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¹ For a detailed biographical account of Nietzsche's last decade, see Hayman's penultimate chapter of *Nietzsche: A Critical Life*, 'Euphoria, Melancholia and Madness'. For his life after Turin in particular, see 336-350. For a fictional account of this period that has received some interest, see David Farrell Krell's *Nietzsche: A Novel* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996).
³ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 'Significance of madness in the history of morality', §14, 14.
⁵ Ibid, 11.
⁶ Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, 'How one ought to turn to stone', §541, 214.
⁸ Nietzsche, *Human, all too Human*, 'Preface', §8, 19.
Maria. \(^{10}\) After this experience, Nietzsche captured his thoughts on a piece of paper with the inscription '6,000 feet beyond man and time', marking his revelation of this moment as "the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be attained". \(^{11}\) Nietzsche's fixation with this particular location and rock has been well documented, and is known to many who live locally as the 'Zarathustra stone'. \(^{12}\) As outlined above, Nietzsche identified his heightened experience in Sils-Maria with sensations of love, and tied those feelings to his pledge to Lou Salomé. At this significant moment, the *high tonality of the soul*, \(^{13}\) Nietzsche became-imperceptible with the plane of consistency, what Deleuze and Guattari describe as "a becoming-hard now one with loving". \(^{14}\) This experience allowed him to become capable of loving; not a love tied to a particular person, \(^{15}\) nor with "an abstract, universal love", \(^{16}\) but with a love that he chose, that shall choose him in return, a *dangerous love* of the eternal recurrence. In the "tremendous perspective" of the eternal return, all of Nietzsche's actions appeared to him as "equally great and small". \(^{17}\) This contradiction would occupy Nietzsche's thoughts and his writing for the rest of his active life, culminating in his final lucid year in Turin. In the penultimate chapter of *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, Klossowski examines, in expert detail, the final six months of Nietzsche's correspondence from Turin in the second half of 1888. Klossowski's account is not always an easy one to read. His diagnosis is that although the "seduction exerted by Chaos" had clung to Nietzsche for many years, its "incoherence" reached its limit in Turin. \(^{18}\) Klossowski argues that Nietzsche's "premonition of evil [...] gave rise to an exchange, a transaction[:] the law of the Eternal Return of all possible individuations, as the justice of the universe, required the destruction of the very organ that had disclosed it: namely, *Nietzsche's brain". \(^{19}\) This threat to his own consciousness, Klossowski continues, became for Nietzsche "his own ruse, or his own genius". \(^{20}\) In his delirium before his collapse, Nietzsche set out to "express what lies at the depth of all things in a monstrous form". \(^{21}\)

\(^{10}\) Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, 'Zarathustra' §1, 69.

\(^{11}\) *Ibid*.


\(^{13}\) Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'The experience of the eternal return', 60.

\(^{14}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Year zero: Faciality', 207.

\(^{15}\) Irigaray, *Marine Lover*, 'Ice wedding', 21; 'Dance of the abyss', 42.

\(^{16}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Three novellas, or "what happened?'', 220.

\(^{17}\) Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, 'The most dangerous point of view', §233, 213.

\(^{18}\) Klossowski, *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle*, 'The Euphoria of Turin', 220; see 210-211.

\(^{19}\) *Ibid*, 220-221.

\(^{20}\) *Ibid*, 221.

\(^{21}\) *Ibid*. 
On Nietzsche's fiftieth birthday in 1894, his friend Paul Deussen remembers paying him a visit, bearing a simple birthday gift, a bouquet of flowers. By this stage Nietzsche would not acknowledge anybody except his mother and sister. Deussen recounts that "the flowers seemed to engage his attention for a moment, but then they too lay unnoticed". As the narrative of this thesis has intermittently shown, Nietzsche reserved a special place for flowers in his life. In July 1884, at the age of forty, Nietzsche confided to his friend Resa von Schirnhofer that every time he closed his eyes "he saw a profusion of fantastic flowers, twining round each other and constantly growing, changing in shape and colour with exotic opulence, one sprouting wildly out of another". Nietzsche complained that these flowers "never give [him] any peace", and then asked Schirnhofer, "with a disturbing urgency", whether she thought his flowers could be "a symptom of incipient madness". At this point we need to ask, by way of a conclusion: what exactly was growing in Nietzsche's poison garden?

The Poison Garden has been a guiding theme that has driven the narrative of this thesis. In 'Philosopher Comets', we began by considering the fertility of Nietzsche's thought. Allegorically, we looked to the figs that fell from Nietzsche's fig tree in scenes from Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Ecce Homo. We contrasted the roots of this tree to the heights of its trunk, limbs and branches. We also looked to the stars, comets, and the cosmos, in order to contemplate the profundity of Nietzsche's untimely thought. This led to a discussion of the role that the earth plays in Nietzsche's philosophy. Zarathustra teaches "[t]he overman is the meaning of the earth". He implores us to "remain faithful to the earth" by letting our "will" say "the overman shall be the meaning of the earth". This means we must not get distracted by the stars, but give birth to our own "dancing stars", by attending to "the chaos in oneself". In 'Sounders of the Depths', we used Pignarre and Stengers' analogy of careful and uncertain nautical navigation to frame this attentive relation to the depths. We posed the environmental crisis we are currently encountering in the twenty-first century as a direct consequence of a politically negligent and nihilistic disrespect for the earth and its depths. In 'Fig-Wasp', we continued this discussion, pointing broadly at the power of deregulated capitalism and neo-liberal ideologies, and looking to figures like Pignarre and Stengers, Klein, Fisher and Žižek for support. Following Nietzsche, we argued that the poison of the state, bred by the ulterior motives of morality and ressentiment, is at odds with Zarathustra's hope for the future. This argument drew inspiration from a mature sycamore fig tree that towers over a riverbank in the tropics of Tsavo West, Southern Kenya. In the following chapter, 'Do you believe in sorcery?’, we looked to Stengers and her Nietzschean analogy of

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22 As cited by Hayman, Nietzsche, 347.
23 Hayman, Nietzsche, 275.
25 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Prologue', §3, 13.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid, §5, 17.
bridge-making, in order to consider how the practice of philosophy could break the spell of capitalism. This necessitated a detour through Deleuze and Guattari's writings on sorcery and becoming-animal, as well as an introduction to the concept of the eternal return, by route of an analysis of Zarathustra's affirmation of redemption. In 'Sorcerer Love', we began to make our way through Nietzsche's biography, and in particular, the difficult years of 1882-1884. We watched Nietzsche offer himself up to Salomé, and then use the pain of her rejection to bolster some of his most important work. In 'The Waves', we returned to the depths of the sea with the help of Irigaray, to respond to the anger that tempers Nietzsche's work from that period. Importantly, Irigaray points to a renewed understanding of Nietzsche and the eternal return, without relying on the support of bridges, ships, charters or other sea-fearers. With Irigaray, we moved from Pignarre and Stengers' position of the sounders of the depths, to the profundity of the depths themselves, in order to gaze back at Nietzsche from his abyss. In 'Positive Distance', we returned to Sils-Maria, greeting Nietzsche again, this time in 1886. We looked at the way in which Nietzsche wrote his writing and what the complexity of his aphoristic form affords. Here we returned to the poison garden with Zarathustra, by considering how Nietzsche's prophet sought to "perfect himself" for the sake of his children, "the trees of [his] garden" grown by his "best soil". After Zarathustra fought to become who he was in his experience of the eternal return, he left his cave, victorious, where "the world await[ed] him like a garden". We used this literary moment of self-overcoming as a platform to liberate Nietzsche from his solitude, and unite his thought with that of others born in his wake. From here, we moved to Deleuze's unique reading of Nietzsche, in order to consider the eternal return as a selective doctrine, fuelled by the affirmation of difference and the performance of positive distance. 'In Spite of' continues this discussion, using Deleuze's diagnosis of Nietzsche's inverted perspectivism as a gateway to permit a deeper appreciation of the delirium of Nietzsche's poor health. In 'Intension', our portrait of Nietzsche became complete, through a detailed analysis of the work of Klossowski. In particular, we married Klossowski's intricate conceptual triangle, namely that of impulses, phantasms, and simulacrum, with Deleuze's theory of active force, and Deleuze-Guattari's fascination with the anomalous in their 'Memories of a sorcerer' passages. Klossowski's reading of Nietzsche, in line with Deleuze and Guattari, took us to a point where the delirium and distance that poisoned Nietzsche's thought allowed it to go beyond any height of affirmation that Nietzsche could have imagined or deemed possible.

This has been a difficult thesis to write, and there are many different paths it could have taken. In the words of the Yaqui sorcerer Don Juan Matus, this research has followed a path with heart. In order to follow its path, the writing did not take one specific direction but attempted to follow as many as possible. Don Juan teaches that

28 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 'Maxims and Interludes' §146, 102.
29 Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 'On involuntary bliss', §3.3, 162.
Despite any decision being "one of a million paths", *paths with heart* are those that make for a joyful journey.\(^{31}\) The difficulty of this thesis has been a delight. At each step of the way its wanderers encountered the joy at the crossroads of the eternal return. In this writing Nietzsche's seeds and roots have found a new place to grow. In his notebooks, Nietzsche argues that he did "not wish to persuade anyone to philosophy: it is inevitable, it is perhaps also desirable, that the philosopher should be a *rare plant*".\(^{32}\) In *The Wanderer and his Shadow*, Nietzsche declares that "we must boldly face the great task of preparing the earth for a plant of the most ample and joyous fruitfulness".\(^{33}\) Whether Nietzsche was talking about himself, or the work of his children, we need to take his lesson to heart. The task of this thesis has been to show that the urgency of our times demand a return to Nietzsche now more than ever. The curse of capitalism and the poisoning of the earth are realities that will increasingly affect our lives, and our children's lives, as time moves forward. For the benefit of a time to come, we need to stay hopeful and remain vigilant. For another world to become possible, there is still so much work to do. Deleuze and Guattari turn to H.P. Lovecraft to provide "sorcery's final word".\(^{34}\) Fittingly, we give the last word to Nietzsche:

Man is some day to become a tree overshadowing the whole earth, with millions upon millions of buds that shall all grow to fruits side by side, and the earth itself shall be prepared for the nourishment of this tree. That the shoot, tiny as yet, may increase in sap and strength; that the sap may flow in countless channels for the nutrition of the whole and the parts - from these and similar tasks we must derive our standard for measuring whether a man of today is useful or worthless. The task is unspeakably great and adventurous: let us all contribute our share to prevent the tree from rotting before its time!\(^{35}\)

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\(^{32}\) Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 'Critique of philosophy', §420 (1884), 226.


\(^{34}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 277.

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A NOTE ON THE APPENDIX

Over the course of this research, a commitment to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy led me to present a trilogy of conference papers, which punctuated the development of my thesis in significant ways. The content of these three papers was conceptually anchored by the three 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passages found in the 'Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...' plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*. After much deliberation, it has become apparent that the content of the first and third of these three presentations acted as *accompaniments* to the broader content of this thesis, and do not belong in the main body of text. These two papers address *conceptual personae* from works of fiction that informed Deleuze and Guattari’s fascination with sorcery. Although there are many Nietzschean resonances within the work of the following three literary interlocutors (Carlos Castaneda, Arthur Conan Doyle, and H.P. Lovecraft), the accounts that follow act more as a refrain to the sorcerous underpinnings we have seen at play in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, rather than in the wider work of Nietzsche.

I presented an early version of 'Magic and Reality' entitled 'The Poison Garden: Unnatural Participation', at the 'The Dark Precursor: International Conference on Deleuze and Artistic Research', held at the Orpheus Institute in Ghent, Belgium, on 9-11 November 2015. The Belgium-based artist Sean Crossley made an installation of drawings and paintings to respond to this paper, which we exhibited and discussed together at this event. The following paper (Appendix A) has been significantly revised in the wake of these experiments in collaboration.

I presented an early version of 'Intension' entitled 'The Poison Garden: Anomalous Intension', at the 2016 Deleuze Studies Conference, 'Virtuality, Becoming, Life', held at the University of Roma Tre, Rome, Italy, on 11-13 July 2016. This became the final chapter of the thesis above.

I presented 'Nietzsche’s Flowers', under the title 'The Poison Garden: Nietzsche's Flowers', at the Australasian Society of Continental Philosophy (ASCP) Conference held at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia, on 7-10 December 2016. I spoke alongside Amy Ireland and Suzi Elhafez on a themed panel concerning Nietzsche and the Eternal Return. Appendix B has been left as a direct transcript of the paper I presented at this event. It is important that its tale is told in my own voice.

All references to the citations from the appendixes are included in the bibliography above.
APPENDIX A: MAGIC AND REALITY

This account begins in the year 1973. A psychedelic collage celebrating the work of Carlos Castaneda grins from the March 5th cover of *Time* magazine, accompanied by the inscription, "Magic and Reality". Over the course of his ten year apprenticeship with the Yaqui Sorcerer Don Juan Matus, Castaneda became well known in literary circles for confronting the limits of his 'Western' reality, by following Don Juan in Yaqui rituals that induced heightened states of 'non-ordinary reality'. Castaneda's field notes captivated the Western imagination in the early to mid seventies and inspired his own devout following of spiritual disciples. Since his sophomore publication *The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge* in 1968, *Time* Magazine reports that *The Teachings* had sold over 300,000 copies, and was still selling around 16,000 paperback copies per week. In 1973, Castaneda was a celebrity, hailed for bringing the enigmatic practice of sorcery to the literary mainstream and for inspiring experimentation with psychotropic substances as a means to visit a broader, unexplainable plane of reality. Seven years later, in 1980, Castaneda and Don Juan made their way into the pages of *A Thousand Plateaus*, although little attention has been paid to their presence in Deleuze and Guattari's work.

Don Juan Matus was born in the southwest of Mexico in 1891. To the Yaqi Indians of Sonoro, Mexico, Don Juan was a *brujo*, which according to Castaneda, "means, in English, medicine man, curer, witch, sorcerer. It connotes essentially a person who has extraordinary, and usually evil, powers". Much of the research into Don Juan's life that emerged in Castaneda's wake focuses not on his teachings, but rather on the reliability of the basis of Castaneda's ethnographic studies. In his earlier, more

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1 'Carlos Castaneda: Magic and Reality'. *Time Magazine*, March 5th, 1973. An accurate reproduction of the headline article can be found within the 'interviews' resources link of the fan site Nagualism.com; http://nagualism.com/carlos-castaneda-time-magazine-interview.html

2 Ibid.

3 Castaneda is referenced by Deleuze and Guattari at least seven times in *A Thousand Plateaus*: in the 'Rhizome' plateau, when they are talking about plants, 12; in a discussion of semiotic experimentation in 'On the several regimes of signs', 153; at a crucial point in the 'Body without organs' plateau, 179-180; in their study of the dangers of the line of flight in 'Micropolitics and segmentarity', where they directly align Zarathustra to Don Juan, 250-251; in the third 'Memories of a sorcerer' passage, concerning molecularity, 274; later on in the 'Becoming-animal' plateau, when they return to a discussion of drugs, 311-312; and in the 'Treatise on nomadology', where they recite the same passage found in the Rhizome plateau. I find it intriguing, for instance, that Christian Kerslake does not mention Castaneda's influence on Deleuze and Guattari in his chapter 'The occult unconscious: sympathy and the sorcerer' in *Deleuze and the Unconscious*, particularly as Kerslake spends time unpacking the 'Memories of a sorcerer' passages and the roles that drugs and altered states of consciousness serve in their writing. Instead of Castaneda, Kerslake concentrates on the work of the Belgium writer Henri Michaux, see 182-185.

4 Castaneda, *The Teachings of Don Juan*, 17; 14.
popular works, Castaneda describes his writing as anthropological reportage, motivated by a phenomenological method that strove to "deal with sorcery solely as phenomena" that was presented to him by Don Juan. Castaneda published his early works with the admission that the events that he recorded were "incomprehensible" to his reasoned orientation in the world, and that his reportage relied on an experiential suspension of judgement and awareness in the process of completing his field notes. For Castaneda, the figure of Don Juan functions not only as a teacher within the narrative arc of his series, but more importantly as a conceptual guide to the broader, philosophical teachings that extend beyond the pages of his texts. Don Juan functions in Castaneda's work as a conceptual persona, at one with Castaneda's philosophical message itself. Citing the figures in Nietzsche's work as prime examples, Deleuze and Guattari explain that conceptual personae "are not mythical personifications or historical persons or literary or novelistic heroes", nor are they "the philosopher’s representative but, rather, the reverse". Conceptual personae are always "the becoming or the subject of a philosophy, on par with the philosopher" attempting to set them in writing. Castaneda and his reported relationship with Don Juan exhibit a perfect example of this exchange. Castaneda's field notes document Don Juan's Yaqui teachings, whilst Don Juan warns that Yaqui knowledge cannot be learnt by putting pen to paper or by reading cheap paperbacks. Castaneda utilises the persona of Don Juan, both didactically and conceptually, as a means to teach his readers the same lessons of sorcery he allegedly learnt in Mexico.

In effect, Castaneda becomes Don Juan, the embodiment of his guide's teachings, whilst the real life figure of Don Juan fades into anonymity, becoming "something

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7 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 'Conceptual persona', 65; 64.

8 *Ibid*, 64. Here Deleuze and Guattari posit that the philosopher or writer only ever writes idiosyncratically as "the envelope of his [or her] principle conceptual persona", their authored name "the simple pseudonym of [their] personae". They suggest that this is why Nietzsche, in his final letters from Turin, signed off as "the Anti-Christ" and "Dionysus Crucified" instead of his own name.

9 It is important, moreover, to note the difference between Carlos Castaneda the author, and Carlos Castaneda the character in his books; the latter of which is also technically a conceptual persona for the former.

10 This relationship becomes more complicated in Castaneda's forth book, *Tales of Power*, where it is revealed that Don Juan's companion, Don Genaro, played a dual role in Castaneda's apprenticeship. Don Juan, as a teacher, was assigned to explaining the intricacies of the *tonal*; Don Genero, as a benefactor, was committed to demonstrating the more advanced techniques of sorcery to do with the *nagual* (see 174-175). By the sixth book in the series, *The Eagle's Gift* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1981), this conceptual device takes on a firmer form in the narrative in relation to Castaneda himself. Castaneda's
other" than who he was "historically, mythologically, or commonly". 11 As Time Magazine correspondent Sandra Burton reports, the fundamental principles of Don Juan's teachings maintain his stance of elusive anonymity. 12 Don Juan teaches Castaneda that to become a sorcerer, "[i]t little by little you must create a fog around yourself, you must erase everything around you until nothing can be taken for granted, until nothing is any longer for sure, or real". 13 Put simply, according to Don Juan's teachings, "[t]hings are real only after one has learned to agree on their realness". 14 If we can agree, Don Juan argues, to put the reality of the world in question, then we need to leave the 'ordinary' world of truth and lies behind. In the sorcerer's understanding of 'non-ordinary reality', personal categories like 'truth' or 'reality' hold little sway or purchase. 15 If anything, they adopt a broader, uncertain value, in line with a more mysterious and incomprehensible horizon.

If we are to take Castaneda seriously, we need, like his persona, to suspend our critical judgement when it comes to whether or not the accounts he reports are fact or fiction. Castaneda uses the allure of this suspension, inside and outside of his work, as a didactic device to attract his readers and initiate them into his world. His method asks us to stop debating the reliability of his texts and what they say, and rather concentrate on their unreliability and what they do. Put broadly, his work asks us to question the very nature of fiction and reality, and one's role in maintaining each as mutually exclusive from one another. This is where the secondary literature challenging Castaneda's ethnographic basis misunderstand him. 16 Clearly, for Castaneda, whether the events that form the narrative of his series actually took place holds little significance. Whether he actually met an Indian named Don Juan in 1960 is of no real consequence. As Deleuze and Guattari write in A Thousand Plateaus:

companions and fellow apprentices begin to call him the 'Nagual' as he advances in his practices of seeing, dreaming, and awareness, without the guidance of Don Juan or Don Gernao.

11 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 'Conceptual personae', 64.
14 Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'An appointment with knowledge', 28.
15 For Don Juan, "lies are only lies if you have personal history"; Journey to Ixtlan, 'Erasing personal history', 15.
16 The first major works challenging the reliability of Castaneda's research was led by Richard De Mille in the mid seventies with his influential books Castaneda's Journey: The Power and the Allegory (Santa Barbara, CA: Capra Press, 1976) and The Don Juan Papers (Santa Barbara: Ross-Erikson Publishers, 1980). Castaneda's literature was then attacked more forcefully by one of his early disciples, Jay Courtney Fikes, with his book Carlos Castaneda, Academic Opportunism, and the Psychedelic Sixties (Victoria: Millenia Press, 1993). These two accounts are summarised in interviews in the 2006 BBC Four documentary entitled 'Tales from the Jungle'.
In the course of Castaneda's books, the reader may begin to doubt the existence of the Indian Don Juan, and many other things besides. But that has no importance. So much the better if the books are a syncretism rather than an ethnographical study, and the protocol of an experiment rather than an account of an initiation.17

What is of importance is the experimental nature of Castaneda's writing, and what his teachings invite if their instruction is understood. Deleuze and Guattari advise that "Castaneda[']s work] describes a long process of experimentation", and that "it makes little difference whether it is with [drugs] or other things".18 Under Don Juan's instruction, Castaneda learns that "[f]or a sorcerer, the world of everyday life is not real, or out there, as we believe it is[; f]or a sorcerer, reality, or the world as we all know, is only a description".19 In lieu of unpacking each of Castaneda's accounts in great detail20, we will look to few key episodes in his work that summarise Don Juan's position, and offer these teachings as a refrain to the Nietzschean treatment of sorcery that guided our larger body of work. We will do so by treating Castaneda's apprenticeship with Don Juan as similar in kind to our apprenticeship with Nietzsche throughout the thesis above. This will enable us to address some of the more elusive sentiments in Deleuze and Guattari's third 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passage in A Thousand Plateaus, and arrive at what Castaneda calls the totality of the self, which is essentially a Yaqui blessing of the eternal return.

In his first two accounts, Castaneda experiments with three different kinds of psychotropic plants under Don Juan's command, in order to induce lucid states of non-ordinary reality.21 He grapples with Don Juan's lessons at a frustratingly slow pace. By the third book in his series, Journey to Ixtlan: The Lessons of Don Juan, Castaneda finally begins to participate in Don Juan's rituals of sorcery, and significantly, without the aid of psychotropic substances.22 He accepts that 'the description' of the Western world is not all there is. Castaneda's apprenticeship with Don Juan, he recounts, consisted "in setting up that unknown reality by unfolding its

17 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'How do you make yourself a Body Without Organs?', 179.
18 Ibid.
19 Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan, 'Introduction', viii.
20 For a helpful summary of Castaneda's works and the cycles within its narrative progression, see Charles J. Stivale, 'Narratives and Metanarratives: Carlos Castaneda's "Textual Becomings"', http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/CStivale/StivalePapers/CarlosC.html. For the purposes of this study, we will only consider at the first 'cycle' of Castaneda's apprenticeship, culminating in Don Juan and Don Genero's mysterious departure in 1973. 21 The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge and A Separate Reality were published in 1968 and 1971 respectively. These texts were Castaneda's most warmly received works. The three psychotropic substances that feature in Don Juan's teachings throughout these works are Datura inoxia (jimson weed), Lophophora williamsii (peyote) and Psilocybe (hallucinogenic mushroom).
22 Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan, 'Introduction', vii.
description, adding increasingly more complex parts as [he] went along".²³ Don Juan tells him, in turn, that "[e]verything [he] had told [him] to do was a technique for stopping the world".²⁴ Don Juan adds, as precondition for this process, that "one had to be convinced[, ] one had to learn the new description in a total sense, for the purpose of pitting it against the old one, and in that way break the dogmatic certainty, which we all share, that the validity of our perceptions, or our reality of the world, is not to be questioned".²⁵ *Journey to Ixtlan* acts as a guidebook to these techniques.

At around the same time as Castaneda's initial apprenticeship, Deleuze was reading Nietzsche's late notebooks and preparing his text *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. In an interview from 1968, Deleuze discusses the value of philosophy, and in particular, how the thinkers he admires ask their readers to *think differently* from the description of the world they have come to adopt.

There's something extraordinary in the way [philosophers] tell us: thinking means something else than what you believe. We live with a particular image of thought, that is to say, before we begin to think, we have a vague idea of what it means to think, its means and ends.²⁶

In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze contrasts one's membership within the dogmatic image of thought with a new, Nietzschean image of thought.²⁷ The latter image is not determined by conditions of truth or falsehood, but relies "on the nature of the forces that take hold of thought itself".²⁸ The relationship between thought, thinking, and perception find their place in Deleuze's analysis of force. For Deleuze, "all force is appropriation, domination, exploitation of a quantity of reality[, and that even] perception, in its divers aspects, is the expression of forces that appropriate nature".²⁹ Reality, by route of the will to power, is determined by the capture, composition, and implementation of forces made possible by the maintenance of governing forces. A culture is formed in its uniform expectation of thought and expression, an economy of complicity shared and exchanged by all members that participate in that 'description' of reality. The 'certainty' of perception is taught and preserved through language, bound by the inheritance of forces we adopt as conservative, rational, and responsible beings.³⁰ It is what suppresses the

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²⁴ Ibid, ix.
²⁶ Deleuze, *Desert Islands*, 'Nietzsche and the image of thought', 139.
²⁷ Deleuze goes on to develop this distinction in some of the most famous moments of *Difference and Repetition*. Compare *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'New image of thought', §3.15, 103-104 with *Difference and Repetition*, 'The dogmatic image of thought', 207-208. Here Deleuze moves from elaborating three essential theses, to eight crucial postulates for and against the dogmatic image of thought.
²⁸ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 'New image of thought', §3.15, 104.
²⁹ Ibid, 'Sense', §1.2, 3.
contradictory nature of hallucinatory experience and discourages experimentation outside strictly controlled environments.

According to Don Juan, we have learnt to see the world according to this dogmatic description, and we reinforce that this is all there is to ourselves internally.\(^\text{31}\) In the practice of sorcery, however, this internal talk is silenced. At countless points in his apprenticeship, Don Juan tells Castaneda to stop talking, both to himself and others, and concentrate on the world of the dreaming. The dreamer becomes a seer when they abandon their internal talk and open their perception to the separate reality of sorcerous description. In Castaneda's forth account, Tales of Power, Don Juan reveals to Castaneda that

To change our idea of the world is the crux of sorcery... And stopping the internal dialogue is the only way to accomplish it. The rest is just padding.\(^\text{32}\)

Stopping the internal dialogue involves a variety of exercises that become increasingly nuanced as Castaneda's series continues. As an apprentice, Castaneda learns not only to step outside of his comfort zone, but to welcome discomfort as a pasture to pursue. To see the stopped world one needs to treat the world as we know it as a mysterious and bewildering place. A warrior for Don Juan is the individual who "treats the world as an endless mystery and what people do as an endless folly".\(^\text{33}\) The sorcerer sees the makeup of the world as incomprehensible and thereby leaves the world of comprehension behind. In a stoic statement that is far from defeat, Don Juan exclaims that

[t]he world is incomprehensible. We won't ever understand it; we won't ever unravel its secrets. Thus we must treat it as it is, a sheer mystery!\(^\text{34}\)

In order to stop the world the seer must affirm the mysterious nature of their vision, and not doubt or explain it. To stop the world is to see the world with the clarity of a sorcerer. To become a sorcerer is to become one with the forces that compose ourselves and our relations, and to master this attention through specific acts of awareness. For Deleuze, the first step in stopping the world would be the internal admission "that we are not yet thinking", or at least not in a way that can disrupt the dogmatic image of thought.\(^\text{35}\) It is a question of reception, possession and expression, with a clear understanding of the power of awareness. The trick to sorcery, Don Juan tells us, is to not to comprehend the incomprehensible forces of the world that

\(^{31}\) Castaneda, A Separate Reality, 'The task of seeing', 225.
\(^{32}\) Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'An appointment with knowledge', 22.
\(^{33}\) Castaneda, A Separate Reality, 'The task of seeing', 226.
\(^{34}\) Ibid, 226.
\(^{35}\) Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'New image of thought', §3.15, 108.
surrounds us, but to learn "to use such forces by redirecting [oneself] to their direction; there is very little to sorcery once you find out its trick".\textsuperscript{36}

Seeing the stopped world "only happens when one sneaks between the worlds, the world of ordinary people and the world of sorcerers".\textsuperscript{37} Towards the conclusion of \textit{Journey to Ixtlan}, Castaneda succeeds in \textit{stopping the world} after a surreal visitation from a coyote amongst the mountain peaks and plateaus of the South East of Mexico. Castaneda describes his vision of the coyote as a "fluid, liquid, luminous being" that talked to him without voice, and reminded him of a former psychedelic experience he had under the influence of peyote in 1961.\textsuperscript{38} According to Castaneda, the coyote touched [him] in some undefined part of [him]self and [his] body experienced such an exquisite indescribable warmth and well-being that it was as if the touch had made [him] explode.\textsuperscript{39}

Following this encounter, Castaneda recorded the following experience into his field notes:

I became aware then that the sun was shining on me. I could vaguely distinguish a distant range of mountains towards the west. The sun was almost over the horizon. I was looking directly into it and then I saw "the lines of the world". I actually perceived that most extraordinary profusion of fluorescent white lines which crisscrossed everything around me. For a moment I thought that I was perhaps experiencing sunlight as it was being refracted by my eyelashes. I blinked and looked again. The lines were constant and were superimposed on or were coming through everything in the surroundings. I turned around and examined an extraordinarily new world. The lines were visible and steady even if I looked away from the sun.

I stayed on the hilltop in a state of ecstasy for what appeared to be an endless time, yet the whole event may have lasted only a few minutes, perhaps only as long as the sun shone before it reached its horizon, but to me it seemed an endless time. I felt something warm and soothing oozing out of the world and out of my own body. I knew I had discovered a secret. It was so simple. I experienced an unknown flood of feelings. Never in my life had I such a divine euphoria, such peace, such an encompassing grasp, and yet I could not put the discovered secret into words, or even thoughts, but my body knew it.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36} Castaneda, \textit{A Separate Reality}, 'The task of seeing', 220-221.
\textsuperscript{37} Castaneda, \textit{Journey to Ixtlan}, 'Stopping the world', 254.
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid}, 250-252. Castaneda recounts this encounter with the "iridescent" black dog early on in \textit{The Teachings of Don Juan}, 'Monday 7 August 1961', 42-44.
\textsuperscript{39} Castaneda, \textit{Journey to Ixtlan}, 'Stopping the world', 250-252.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid}.
Castaneda woke up later amidst a rubble of rocks, disappointed to return to the world "as [he] had always seen it".\textsuperscript{41} Stopping the world means feeling the world with more aptitude, experiencing your surroundings as part of your being and becoming one with your milieu. In Deleuze and Guattari's words, to stop the world is to go "beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the lived", to become "a seer, a become[r]."\textsuperscript{42} To stop the world is to deterritorialise your self, only to reterritorialise on the world, to "launc[h] forth" in order "to join with the World, or meld with it".\textsuperscript{43} This is the Yaqui practice that Don Juan calls seeing, the act and "lull of true silence within, followed by an outward elongation of something in the self, an elongation that met and merged [with] anything within one's field of awareness".\textsuperscript{44} In this process one stops the world of everyday experience and experiences the world as it becomes what it is: imperceptible perceptions that make up the earth. Under the sorcerer's cloak, in the separate reality of sorcery, one "no longer has any secrets, having lost [their] face, form and matter... [One] is no more than an abstract line, like an arrow crossing the void".\textsuperscript{45} In the state between de- and re- territorialisation, one "become[s] like everybody/the whole world", one can "pain[t] the world on oneself, not oneself on the world".\textsuperscript{46} In this sense, it is significant that Don Juan elects rocks, pebbles, plants, water, sunlight, and other "allies" of the natural landscape, as well as members of the animal kingdom, to explicate the enigmatic capacity of sorcery to Castaneda. Don Juan's teachings are connected to the Earth, to the meaning of the Earth, and the power we give that meaning.

It is fitting that in Castaneda's first encounter with the coyote in 1961, he describes the experience of becoming-animal. Under the influence of peyote, Castaneda remembers growing "a long, lustrous, iridescent mane" that matched his companion, and running with the coyote "toward a sort of yellow warmth that came from some indefinite place".\textsuperscript{47} Castaneda describes the "euphoria that possessed [him as] indescribable", to the point that he "had forgotten [he] was a man".\textsuperscript{48} In this profound hallucination, Castaneda strangely became the luminous being that had captured his attention. In order to give weight to this experience, Don Juan explains that luminous beings have access to two different rings of power. The first ring of power, reason, is responsible for "concoct[ing] and maintain[ing] the world" under the common, dogmatic order of

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{41}] Castaneda, Journey to Ixtlan, 'Stopping the world', 253. Note the striking similarly of Castaneda's ecstasy to that of Nietzsche's sunlit convalescence and delight at noontime in Human, all too Human and Thus Spoke Zarathustra; see 'In spite of', 80-81, above.
\item [\textsuperscript{42}] Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 'Percept, affect, and concept', 171.
\item [\textsuperscript{43}] Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Of the refrain', 344.
\item [\textsuperscript{44}] Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'The day of the tonal', 137.
\item [\textsuperscript{45}] Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Three novellas, or "what happened?", 220-221.
\item [\textsuperscript{46}] Ibid, 221.
\item [\textsuperscript{47}] Castaneda, The Teachings of Don Juan, 'Monday, 7th August 1961', 44.
\item [\textsuperscript{48}] Ibid.
\end{itemize}
reality. The second ring of power, *the will*, is what gives meaning to that which lies outside of the first ring of power in its attention to a broader description of reality. The *luminosity of the world*, as miraculous and perplexing, arrives as soon as the perceiver is exposed to the overwhelming capacities of the second ring of power. From this lesson onwards, Don Juan challenges Castaneda to decide whether the description of the world that he perceives is one upheld by his *reason*, or one held in alliance with his *will*. The difficulty, however, is that Castaneda's decision cannot be made by his reason, but only willed, intuitively, in the course of his actions.

What is at stake for the sorcerer is their attention to the second ring of power. In *A Separate Reality*, Don Juan teaches Castaneda, quite simply, that the "*[w]ill is a power". The will, he continues, is "something very clear and powerful which can direct our acts", and "since it is a power, it has to be controlled and tuned". He then broadens his definition of the will to be "a power *within ourselves*, a power that "is not a thought, object or a wish", but rather a force that "makes you invulnerable". For Don Juan, the practice of sorcery is the harnessing of the will. Put broadly, to practice sorcery is to

apply one's will to a key joint [...] Sorcery is interference. A sorcerer searches and finds the key joint of anything he [or she] wants to affect and then he [or she] applies [their] will to it.

To practice sorcery is to intervene on the privileged position of reason. When one successfully perceives the world with their will, then they will see that reality "is not as 'out there' or as 'real' as [their reason might] think". The mastery of the will, according to Don Juan, determines "the true link between men and the world", by accomplishing "astonishing feats that defy our common sense". The task of *seeing* initiates the seer to *experience the perception of the imperceptible*, a clarity that returns the sorcerer to the *impersonality of perception* by attaching their will "to the world out there". Don Juan describes an imperceptible "gap" in one's navel, at the "place of [one's] luminous fibres", which "allows a space for the will to shoot out, like an arrow". The sorcerer applies their will to this opening in order to attend to their luminous fibers. If successful, the sorcerer perceives an assembly of forces whose unity is worthy of the will that conjures their alliance.

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52 *Ibid*.
To perceive and direct one's imperceptible fibers lies at the heart of the secret of the luminous beings. Don Juan teaches Castaneda that beyond the gregarious world of discourse, the body "is a cluster of luminous fibers that have awareness". To become aware of this awareness is to become this awareness. It is to escape the "vicious circle" of our reason and discover "that we all are unfathomable beings, luminous and boundless". As the first cycle of Castaneda’s studies show, it is impossible to unravel this secret within the common boundaries of reason. The best Castaneda can do is nuance Don Juan's explanations by adding more incredulous layers, which is what the later, less successful cycles of his series set out to do. At the climax of his fifth account, The Second Ring of Power, Castaneda recapitulates Don Juan's explanation of the two rings of power with more clarity:

Don Juan said that the core of our being was the act of perceiving, and that the magic of our being was the act of awareness. For him perception and awareness were a single, functional unit, a unit which had two domains. The first one was the "attention of the tonal"; that is to say, the capacity of average people to perceive and place their awareness on the ordinary world of everyday life. Don Juan also called this form of attention our "first ring of power" and described it as our awesome but taken-for-granted ability to impart order to our perception of our daily world. The second domain was the "attention of the nagual", that is to say, the capacity of sorcerers to place their awareness on the nonordinary world. He called this attention the "second ring of power," or the altogether portentous ability that all of us have, but only sorcerers use, to impart order to the nonordinary world.

In their famous plateau, 'How do you make yourself a Body Without Organs?', Deleuze and Guattari discuss the "living distinction" between the tonal and the nagual at length. The tonal, they summarise, "seems to cover many disparate things [...] In short, the tonal is everything [...] since it makes up the rules by which it apprehends the world, it creates the world". In Tales of Power, Don Juan elaborates that "the tonal is a creator that doesn't create a thing", that "it cannot create or change anything, and yet it makes the world because its function is to judge, to assess, and witness". The tonal, Don Juan continues, "is the social person" inside of us, "the organiser of the world", "a guardian that protects something priceless, our very being". The tonal, in other words, plays the role of consciousness, what Deleuze and Guattari call

59 Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'The secret of the luminous beings', 97.
60 Ibid, 100.
63 Ibid. Emphasis added. Here Deleuze and Guattari cite Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'The island of the tonal', 125.
64 Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'The island of the tonal', 125.
65 Ibid, 122.
the organisation of the organism". Don Juan summarises, "[a]nd since the tonal is its own doings, then everything, obviously, has to fall under its domain [...] the tonal is everything that meets the eye".

The nagual, by contrast, "is the part of us for which there is no description - no words, no names, no feelings, no knowledge". Like a phantasm, the nagual "can be witnessed, but it cannot be talked about". The nagual, Don Juan explains, "is like a voice that comes from the depths [...] No matter how clever the checkpoints of the tonal are the fact of the matter is that the nagual surfaces". It does so by intensive jolts and unexpected eruptions within the body that "disrupts the lull" cast and maintained by the tonal. Unsurprisingly, it is these strange perceptual interruptions that are of utmost importance to Deleuze and Guattari. At the expense of the tonal, Deleuze and Guattari argue that

the nagual is also everything. And it is the same everything [as the tonal], but under such conditions that the body without organs has replaced the organism and experimentation has replaced all interpretation, for which it no longer has any use. Flows of intensity, their fluids, their fibers, their continuums and conjunctions of affects, the wind, fine segmentation, micropereceptions, have replaced the world of the subject. Becomings, becomings-animal, becomings-molecular, have replaced history, individual or [everything in] general...

Don Juan discloses to Castaneda that the nagual "is the only part of us that can create". What the nagual creates is the sorcerous capacity to learn from the will to power, by disrupting the certainty of reason and judgement that poisons the bulk of our thinking today. When the nagual surfaces, the tonal "becomes aware that there is more to [the self]" than its legislation, and in those moments, "one can surmise and assess what we really are". For Deleuze, this embodied "force of thinking" summons "a second power of thought, [which is] not the natural exercise of a faculty, but an extraordinary event in thought itself, for thought itself". When both rings of power become linked in their awareness, we arrive at what Yaqui sorcerers call the totality of the self; it is with a short discussion of this teaching that this analysis must end.

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66 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'How do you make yourself a Body Without Organs?', 179.
67 Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'The island of the tonal', 123-124.
68 Ibid, 126.
69 Ibid, 127.
70 Ibid, 'The day of the tonal', 133; 132.
71 Ibid, 133. In particular, Don Juan teaches that the reserves of the nagual are "stored in our calves and thighs, in our back and shoulders and neck", and when they surface "they begin to expand and disintegrate" like "the beads of an endless broken necklace".
72 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'How do you make yourself a Body Without Organs?', 179.
73 Castaneda, Tales of Power, 'The day of the tonal', 141.
74 Ibid, 133.
75 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 'New image of thought', §3.15, 108. Emphasis omitted.
In a profound moment in *Tales of Power*, Don Juan claims "to utter perhaps the greatest piece of knowledge anyone can voice". Don Juan tells Castaneda that at each moment we are "surrounded by eternity", and that we "can use that eternity, if [we] so desire", by extending our self in any direction by virtue of the sorcerous practice of *seeing*. Don Juan posits that experiencing the *totality of the self* "is not a riddle [but] a fact", a ritual that is possible "if you mount that [eternal] moment and use it to take the totality of yourself forever in any direction*. The *totality of the self is an anonymous tonality at one with the ring of the eternal return*. To experience the totality of the self, for Deleuze and Guattari, is to "dismantl[e] one's self in order finally to be alone and meet the true double at the other end of the line*. It is to arrive at "neither one place nor the other", but at "both places seeing two scenes at once", bound by shifts in bodily perspective made without judgement or conscious assessment. It is "a becoming", Deleuze and Guattari suggest, "only for one who knows how to be nobody, to no longer be anybody". To apply one's will to the totality of the self is to deterritorialise one's current self in order to reterritorialise as their luminous double. Don Juan and Don Genero demonstrate this to Castaneda in a ritual that that conjures a distinct out of body experience. At Castaneda's protest and demand for an explanation, Don Juan tells him, paradoxically, that "the double is oneself and cannot be faced in any other way*. This is the principle that guides the Yaqui teaching of *the dreamer and the dreamed*, the luminous doubling of the sorcerer developed through their *dreaming*, that enables the sorcerer to transport themselves to different times and locations *in waking life*, by "making the self and the world fluid".

This all sounds abstract, and let's be clear, that's the point. Castaneda attends to the abstract in order to clarify the sorcerous order of our world. For Deleuze and Guattari, to *become imperceptible* marks the honour of becoming "a clandestine passenger on a motionless voyage". Deleuze and Guattari cite Castaneda in their third 'Memories of a Sorcerer' passage when they talk about *universe fibers* that stretch from the human

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76 Castaneda, *Tales of Power*, 'An appointment with knowledge', 17.

77 *Ibid*, 17.


80 Castaneda, *Tales of Power*, 'The dreamer and the dreamed', 75-77.

81 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Three novellas, or "what happened?", 218..

82 Castaneda, *Tales of Power*, 'The dreamer and the dreamed', 77.


84 *Ibid*, 'An appointment with knowledge', 51; 53. Dreaming, Don Juan tells Castaneda later, is "the crown of the sorcerer's efforts, the ultimate use of the nagual"; 'The strategy of a sorcerer', 245.

85 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 'Three novellas, or "what happened?", 218, 220.
to animals, then molecules, then particles, then all the way to the imperceptible. The make up of each "multiplicity", Deleuze and Guattari argue, "is symbiotic; its becoming ties together animals, plants, microorganisms, mad particles, a whole galaxy". This cosmos, or chaemos, as they define it elsewhere, is otherwise known as the plane of consistency, the imperceptible plane of perception "where the imperceptible is seen and heard". The plane of consistency, Deleuze and Guattari clarify, is "a pure multiplicity of immanence". Its purity lies in the intensity of its form: a dynamic involution of becoming, becoming what it is, in constant motion. It is in this sense that Deleuze and Guattari decide that "[t]he plane of consistency is the body without organs", or more precisely, "the totality of all BwO's", composed by "the lines of flight that draw it" and the affects that "cause it to rise to the surface". It is at the surface of the untimely that the plane of consistency is seen and felt. It is in the "great freeing of nonpulsed time" that imperceptible perceptions of peace and divinity come to pass. From here, Deleuze and Guattari advance that all becomings are written like sorcerers' drawings on this plane of consistency, which is the ultimate Door providing a way out for them.

This Door, they argue, is opened by "conjugating the intensities produced" on each Body without Organs, "by producing a continuum of all intensive continuities" on which each becoming becomes what it is in relation to all others. It is this intensive continuum of composition that one encounters in the impersonal experience of the eternal return. At the expense of one's first ring of power, this intensive field speaks "in a language that is no longer that of words, in a matter that is no longer that of forms, in an affectability that is no longer that of subjects". It speaks of an abstraction at the "intersection of all concrete forms". Deleuze and Guattari remind that this abstraction "is not an analogy, or a product of the imagination, but a composition of speeds and affects". Its perception ties all universe fibers together.

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86 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 274-275. Deleuze and Guattari here explicitly cite Don Juan in Tales of Power, 'Shrinking the tonal', 159.
87 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 275.
88 Ibid, 278. On the chaemos, see 'Rhizome', 7, and 'Of the refrain', 345. Deleuze and Guattari also refer to the plane of consistency as "the Planomenon[, ]the Rhizosphere, the Criterium[, ] the Hypersphere, the Mechanosphere[, and ]the abstract Figure, or rather, since it has no form itself, the abstract Machine"; 278. They also say that "the plane could also be called the plane of noncontradiction", as well as "the plane of nonconsistency"; 294.
89 Ibid, 'How do you make yourself a body without organs?', 174.
90 Ibid, 297. For more on the relationship between the body without organs and the plane of consistency, see 'C: Plane of consistency, body without organs', 558-559.
91 Ibid, 'Memories of a plan(e) maker', 296.
92 Ibid, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 277.
93 Ibid, 'How do you make yourself a body without organs?', 175.
95 Ibid, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 277.
97 Ibid, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 277.
These fibres, at once *imperceptibly* and *inconceivably*, return in what recurs in the eternal return, by casting all thoughts and feelings as one and the same, at the same time, immanent to one another. The life of the eternal return attests to the breath of the plane of consistency. To understand this is to become "a luminous being in a luminous world", to pass beyond Deleuze and Guattari's Doorway and to skip between different planes of reality.98 It is to become "a nameless cluster of feelings", "a glowing fog, a dark yellow mist".99 It is to become one with the plane of consistency, its composer in the process of being drawn.

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98 *Castaneda, Tales of Power*, 'An appointment with knowledge', 53.
APPENDIX B: NIETZSCHE'S FLOWERS

The third plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus* is aptly titled '10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is?)'. The premise of the plateau is a lecture on geology given by the estranged Professor Challenger, a character transplanted from Arthur Conan Doyle's science fiction novels from the early twentieth century. For us, the content of his lecture is not important, nor is its delivery. Challenger's lesson is a red herring. What is important is what happens to Professor Challenger throughout the course of his seminar. Strange transformations take place as he describes different components of Deleuze-Guattarian theory. Midway through his lecture, Deleuze and Guattari report that Challenger's "voice had become hoarser", that "[t]he change in his voice, and in his appearance, was growing more and more pronounced", and that he "seemed to be deterritorialising on the spot".\(^1\) By the conclusion of his seminar, poor Challenger is said to be "suffocating", and that his voice "had become unbearably shrill".\(^2\) Deleuze and Guattari tell us that "[h]is hands were becoming elongated pincers that had become incapable of grasping anything but could still vaguely point to things".\(^3\) In the midst of the ambiguity and the antics of the classroom, Challenger materialises the theory that he is teaching. At the end of his lecture, Challenger, "or what remained of him", dissolves into a barely perceptible sheet of mist, "slowly hurry[ing] toward the plane of consistency".\(^4\) Before departing, however, Challenger mutters to himself, in lieu of a summary:

> that he was taking the earth with him, that he was leaving for the mysterious world, his poison garden...\(^5\)

This *poison garden* that Challenger alludes to has formed the mysterious setting of my MFA research. At Challenger's point of departure, Deleuze and Guattari proceed to blend moments from Conan Doyle's 1913 novella, *The Poison Belt*, with a scene from H. P. Lovecraft's 1933 masterpiece *Through the Gates of the Silver Key*. In *The Poison Belt*, Professor Challenger and his cohort explore the remnants of an apocalyptic Earth that has become submerged by a belt of poisonous ether. The ether induces a worldwide coma for all unsupplied with cylinders of fresh oxygen. For a short period of time, humanity is "sterilised out of existence" by imperceptible particles of poison, what Challenger calls the "the universal destroyer, the great

\(^1\) Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, '10,000 B.C.: The geology of morals (who does the Earth think it is?)', 63; 72.
\(^2\) *Ibid*, 80.
\(^3\) *Ibid*.
\(^4\) *Ibid*, 82.
\(^5\) *Ibid*, 81.
Gardener's disinfectant". 6 Humanity's immanent collapse fuels the existential exchange between the few survivors fortunate to survey what has become of the geology of morals on earth.

H.P. Lovecraft's *Through the Gates of the Silver Key* recounts a departure from earth more terrifying still. Replacing Professor Challenger with the equally estranged mystic Randolph Carter, Lovecraft unveils what happened to the latter when he inexplicably "disappeared from the sight of man on the seventh of October, 1928".7 Lovecraft describes how Carter used the Silver Key, a family heirloom, to return to the "lovely, unbelievable garden lands across ethereal seas" of his childhood dreams.8 With his Silver Key, Carter "crossed the barrier [of our world] to the untrammelled land of his dreams and the gulfs where all dimensions dissolve into the absolute[, ] outside [of] time and the dimensions that we know".9 In this vortex, beyond the faculties of perception, reason, and consciousness, Carter experiences impossible impressions of floating shapes and "landscapes that bore incredible vegetation and cliffs and mountains and masonry of no human pattern".10 Carter somehow grasps this "seething chaos" that surrounds him, "though the images bore no fixed relation to one another or to him".11 At one with this "blindly impersonal cosmos", Carter "had no stable form or position, but only such shifting hints of form and position as his whirling fancy supplied",12 Assailed by "paradoxes, contradictions, and anomalies which have no place in waking life", Lovecraft assures us that Carter's endeavours can "scarcely [be] described in words"13; and I'm going to resist, unfortunately, from recounting his adventures at much further length, and restrict myself to noting the following few points.

As Carter performed the rite of the Silver Key in 1928, Lovecraft describes that

an aura of strange, awesome mutation was apparent - a sense of incalculable disturbance and confusion in time and space, yet one which held no hint of what we recognise as motion and duration. Imperceptibly, such things as age and location ceased to have any significance whatsoever [...] Carter knew that he was in no region whose place could be told by earth's geographers, and in no age whose date history could fix. 14

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7 H.P. Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 264.
8 Lovecraft, 'The silver key', 252.
9 Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 271; 273.
10 Ibid, 273.
11 Ibid, 273-274.
12 Lovecraft, 'The silver key', 263; 'Through the gates of the silver key', 274.
13 Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 272.
14 Ibid.
Lovecraft demonstrates Carter's terrestrial dislocation by blurring the narrative precedents that take place before he opens the gateway in the strange cave of Arkham. Somehow, the rite of October 7 1928 is connected to the rite that a ten-year-old Carter performed in the same location in the autumn of 1883. The same result of these rites led to a dissolution of the "distinction between boy and man". In lieu of a firm identity in time and space, Lovecraft tells us that beyond the gate "[t]here was only the entity Randolph Carter, with a certain store of images which had lost all connexion with terrestrial scenes and circumstances of acquisition". That said, the ten-year-old Carter, upon returning from the cave, could remember significant events from the future with "an odd gift of prophecy" that led him to feel and say things that he could not possibly think or know in advance.

Now I'll return to Randolph Carter at the end of my paper, but its here that I want to invoke the untimely philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, and the prophecy he offers with the thought of the eternal return. In the Autumn of 1883, at the same time that the ten-year-old Carter disappeared, Nietzsche was in the process of writing Book II of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. For a variety of reasons, I believe that 1883 and 1884 were Nietzsche's most productive years. To be more specific, his most philosophically fertile time of year was in the Autumns that followed the summer residencies he spent in the Swiss Alps of Sils-Maria, in Switzerland. The thought of the eternal return came to Nietzsche in the August of 1881. Nietzsche literally experienced the eternal return as he passed "a mighty pyramidal block of stone, which reared itself up not far from Surlei", on the coastline of the lake of Silvaplana in Sils-Maria. Nietzsche watched the waves gently come and go as they reached the crest of the pebble bank from which he sat. He thought about the air, the water, nature, and eternity, and that sacred rock that overlooked them all. Nietzsche jotted down his thoughts on a piece of paper with the inscription '6,000 feet beyond man and time', marking his revelation of this moment as "the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be attained".

On the 16 July 2016, I visited this sacred location as part of the course of my MFA research. It was a warm summer day and I spent the better half of the morning navigating my way through the labyrinth of the forest that covers the foot of the alp that towers over the Engadin region. I was unsure whether I would find it; but when I saw the *Zarathustra stone* off in the distance I knew that it was the place of which Nietzsche had written. When I arrived at the bank, strange feelings akin to exhaustion overwhelmed me. I sat at the bank and watched the calm ripples make their way back and forth across the water. In my journal, I jotted the following reflections:

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15 Lovecraft, 'The silver key', 262.
16 Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 272.
17 Ibid.
18 Lovecraft, 'The silver key', 262.
20 Ibid.
I am at the spot where Nietzsche first thought the thought of the eternal return. The stone is unmarked, quiet and beautiful. It is overlooking the mouth of Lake Silvaplana. A few tourists on bikes stop to take photos of the lake with their phones. I am sitting at the barbeque table, and I am hot, hungry, and exhausted. I felt a strange overwhelming sensation when first touching the rock - but this is most likely attributed to the emotional intensity of finally arriving at this point - this point in the trail, but also this point in my life. This point looks like the bottom of Cradle Mountain at Lake Saint Claire in Tasmania. It feels hotter, too - I have just removed my shirt and my jacket. To be here is a strange sensation. There is a lot more traffic here than there was on the mountain. Nobody else seems to mark the significance of this location. I long for solitude here, but will not get it on this day. It is too nice out. Perhaps I will ride here tomorrow morning, at 5 a.m., before sunrise. There will certainly be less people at that time. What a beautiful time to be here and to be breathing in this air. To will everything eternally means to will this moment amongst all others - which is a delightful thought. It amazes me that this rock exists here, and has done for all of time, untouched, existing every day.

I returned to the Zarathustra stone the following morning on the 17 July, at around 6.30 a.m. I had not set an alarm, but had been woken up by something, and decided to visit this site once more. I wanted to see the Zarathustra stone before sunrise. As it turned out, I got lost trying to take a short cut and arrived a little after the day had begun - but with the high peaks of the alps and my general sense of disorientation I wasn't really sure where the sun was meant to be anyway. When I arrived, there were a pair of Swiss fisherman at the site who looked tired and unsuccessful in their ventures. They seemed amused at my presence, stranding beside the large rock. It was a cold morning, and the fisherman had set up a fire in a barbeque pit just outside the pebble bank. I oscillated between standing beside the rock and the fire, where I would warm my fingers that had gone numb over the course of the bike ride to the shore. I walked up to the rock and laid against its hard surface. I spoke to the rock, and read fragments of Zarathustra to it, as if it were child. I looked for a long time to the sky. At that moment I understood what Zarathustra meant when he said to the heavens that "[n]ot everything may be put into words in the presence of the day".\textsuperscript{21} After my time with the rock, I wanted to throw my worn copy of Thus Spoke Zarathustra into the fire pit. I thought about it for a while, but eventually decided not to.

In the early hours of the morning, on his own trail, Zarathustra looks out the sky that surrounds him. He says to the heavens:

\begin{quote}

We are friends from the beginning: we share grief and ground and gray dread; we even share the sun. We do not speak to each other, because we know too much; we are silent to each other, we smile our knowledge at each other. Are you not the light for my fire? Have you not the sister soul to my insight?
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{21} Nietzsche, \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, 'Before sunrise', §3.4, 166.
Together we have learned everything; together we have learned to ascend over ourselves to ourselves and smile cloudlessly - to smile down cloudlessly from bright eyes and from a vast distance when constraint and contrivance and guilt steam beneath us like rain [...] 

But this is my blessing: to stand over every single thing as its own heaven: as its round roof, its azure bell, and eternal security; and blessed is he who blesses thus. For all things have been baptised in the well of eternity and are beyond good and evil; and good and evil themselves are but intervening shadows and damp depressions and drifting clouds [...] 

I loathe the drifting clouds, those stealthy great cats which prey on what you and I have in common - the uncanny unbounded Yes and Amen. We loathe these mediators and mixers, the drifting clouds that are half-and-half and have learned neither to bless nor to curse from the heart. 

That morning, on the 17 July 2016, the sky was blank, cloudless and all was still. 

Now I'm not going to have time to unpack all of this much further. A few questions immediately arise, and then fall, and I realise that they might have not have a real, or satisfying answer. What was I doing in Sils-Maria in July? Like Randolph Carter, I was sure, somehow, that I would find some kind of answer or response to whatever or whomever had been making their way through the inner layers of my dreams at night. I was sure, somehow, that I would experience some kind of visitation or exchange that would take the edge off my pursuit of the eternal return on my own terms. The Zarathustra stone wasn't a Silver Key, but it was a key of sorts, and it had its own gateway. 

Professor Challenger, like many of us, is worried primarily about environmental collapse and what humanity may or may not do to stand in its way. In what he thinks to be his last hours on Earth, Challenger is as animated as ever, and gives a lecture on eschatology, evolution and vegetal life to a disinterested party of anxious survivors. In the face of his own death, Challenger is at one in "complete" and "cheerful acquiescence" with his fate, despite never getting to complete his magnum opus volume, 'The Ladder of Life'. With his experiments, Challenger pushes research to its limits to find out how resilient the earth and our knowledge of its make up might be. He teaches that the earth "is a body without organs [ ] permeated by unformed, unstable matters, by flows in all directions, by free intensities or nomadic singularities, by mad or transitory particles". The earth is composed by fluctuations of intensity that demand new interpretations and new meanings "subject to a moving 

22 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'Before sunrise', §3.4, 164-165. 
24 Ibid, 124. 
25 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'The geology of morals', 45.
When I was in Sils-Maria, I thought a lot about the nature of simulacrum, and how meaning needs to be made, and made on its own terms. The rock that I visited, and the Earth that we stand on, do not have any meaning unless we give them that meaning. This is what my ritual accomplished on that cold morning in July. The meaning of the earth was that rock at sunrise, and that passage from that text, and the cloudless sky that listened.

At the time I was reading yet another detailed biography of Nietzsche's difficult life. I find his life story fascinating, but my critique of that text was that it relied too heavily on Nietzsche's troubled affairs to explain his writing. Those kind of accounts are interesting to an extent, but what is more interesting is what his writing allows itself to become, what the text permits in its unfaithful adoption. Nietzsche's texts are pregnant with meaning to be made by the reader. This is why, for instance, philosophers like Deleuze, Klossowski, Irigaray, Blanchot and Bataille are such great descendants of Nietzsche; but we need more writers like them if his thought is to keep on thinking. To think the eternal return means to come to the point where everything is important, imported, and impermanent, and all at once, all at the same time. I am comfortable with this, and I am comforted by this.

For those who have come across her work, Patricia MacCormack is an excellent reader of Deleuze-Guattari, Lovecraft, and sorcery. She describes Lovecraft's work as the "impossible project of describing the indescribable, speaking about the unsayable and explicating events which are beyond our capacity to follow". My attempt with this paper, and my research more broadly, is to make a similar gesture to Lovecraft by route of Nietzsche. Yet why am I sharing such personal thoughts and feelings when what anchors the eternal return is the impersonal? I feel myself running out of breath, as if my task is not to grasp, but to vaguely point at things. Let's return to the garden. Beyond the first gate of the Silver Key, our friend Rudolph Carter is wafted into immeasurable depths, with waves of perfumed warmth lapping against his face. It was as if he floated in a torrid, rose-tinted sea; a sea of drugged wine whose waves broke foaming against shores of brazen fire. A great fear clutched him as he half saw that vast expanse of surging sea lapping against its far-off coast. But the moment of silence was [then] broken - the surgings [of the waves started] speaking to him in a language that was not of physical sound or articulate words.

The waves of consistency shifted to whisper their wisdom to Carter. Beyond the Ultimate Gate, Carter realises in "a moment of consuming fright that he was not one person, but many persons" and that "[h]e was in many places at the same time [...] in a

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28 Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 278.
chaos of scenes whose infinite multiplicity and monstrous diversity brought him close to the brink of madness". One of the people that Carter found himself to be in his depths was Nietzsche, unwell, and unsure of how to deal with his torment. He was back in Sils-Maria, in July, 1884, and was due to receive a visit from his Austrian friend Resa von Schirnhofer, but his health was too unsteady.

[Resa] stood waiting by the table as the door of the adjoining room opened, and [Carter] appeared. He leaned wearyly on the jamb of the half-opened door, a stricken expression on his pale face, and began immediately to say how unbearable his sufferings were. He described how, as soon as he closed his eyes, he saw a profusion of fantastic flowers, twining round each other and constantly growing, changing in shape and colour with exotic opulence, one sprouting wildly out of another. 'They never give me any peace' [Nietzsche] complained.

And the waves of recurrence increased in strength. On the plane of consistency, "[e]verything becomes imperceptible, everything is becoming-imperceptible[,] which is nevertheless precisely where the imperceptible is seen and heard". What becomes perceptible to Carter is that time "is motionless, and without beginning or end". The waves tell him that the idea that time "has motion, and is the cause of change, is an illusion" and that except to the narrow sight of beings in limited directions there are no such things as past, present and future [and that] all that was, and is, and is to be, exists simultaneously.

If this is the case, I think I know what happened to Professor Challenger - and I think I understand what is growing in his garden. I don't dare to speak it, but I know it to be so, and I can feel his warm presence, underneath my cold skin.

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29 Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 279-280.
30 As recounted by Resa von Schirnhofer, quoted in Hayman, Nietzsche, 275-276.
31 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 'Memories of a sorcerer III', 278.
32 Lovecraft, 'Through the gates of the silver key', 283.
33 Ibid, 283-284.
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