Integration or Separation?

Educational Justice Requirements for the Disabled

Brigid Evans

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (Advanced Seminar and Shorter Thesis)

Philosophy Department
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies
Faculty of Arts
The University Of Melbourne
May 2018
For my sister Laura and for my student Seth.
Special education gave one of you great joy while integration brought pain for the other.
Your experiences have been kept at the forefront of my mind throughout this project.
Statement

This thesis is solely the work of its author. No part of it has previously been submitted for any degree, or is currently being submitted for any other degree. To the best of my knowledge, any help received in preparing this thesis, and all sources used, have been duly acknowledged. This thesis is fewer than the maximum word limit in length, excluding footnotes and bibliographies.
Acknowledgements

Many people have helped me both intellectually and personally in completing this thesis. I would like to give thanks and acknowledgement first to Daniel Halliday. Your support and enthusiasm for this project is deeply appreciated. From initial discussions, to taking me under your supervisory wing (and so rescuing my project and work-study balance from near defeat), to your assistance in securing a future for my research: your help has been truly invaluable.

My sincere thanks goes to Karen Jones who has always pushed me to improve. I am grateful for the time and support you have given throughout my entire career at the University of Melbourne. My thanks also goes to my fellow postgrads at the University of Melbourne, especially the regular attendees at Postgraduate Philosophy Colloquium, my fellow Philosophy Postgraduate Group committee members, and the occupants of area 675. You have all been a source of support, friendship and inspiration. Special thanks to Kieran McInerney for reading my thesis, providing valuable feedback and championing the use of the oxford comma. A further thanks to Antonia Smyth for her final proofread and comments.

The completion of this thesis has required a balancing act between my work as a teacher and as a research student. Finding this balance would not have been possible without the support of the staff and students at Girton Grammar School, Bendigo. My thanks go to my philosophy students for being such a joy to teach, you made the Vline worth it. Thanks to the EI team whose training sessions I will miss, and to both Matthew Maruff and Alex Fisher in always responding to my research with thoughtfulness and enthusiasm.

The speed with which I was able to complete this thesis is partly due to the insightful conversations and feedback provided by Matthew Clayton, Kimberley Brownlee, Lorella Terzi, John Vorhour and Han van Wietmenschen. I am incredibly grateful for their willingness to meet with me and for the interest each showed in my research. Thank you as well to the postgraduate community at Warwick University, you were so welcoming throughout my visit, and to Adam Swift for the loan of his office.

Audiences at the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia’s Fiji conference, the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference and the Australasian Association of Philosophy’s Postgraduate Conference also contributed useful feedback and criticism at several stages. My research and travel was generously funded by the Miranda Jane Hughes Scholarship, the Australian Government Research Training Program, a Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia Travel Grant, and an Australasian Association of Philosophy Postgraduate Subsidy.

Finally love and thanks to my parents, Les and Leonie Evans, for their significant support, both material and emotional. My appreciation for all that you have done for me cannot be put into words.
Abstract

In academic political philosophy, there is currently much enthusiasm surrounding the development of integration as a requirement of social justice. The application of integration to educational policy already exists but has centred on overcoming racial and/or economic segregation. Integration as a moral ideal is yet to be fully tested with respect to the situation of disabled students, a small heterogeneous group with complex and diverse educational needs. Underdeveloped but well-intentioned skepticism about inclusion policy has arisen within education research. This thesis takes this skepticism seriously but seeks to build a constructive response.

The concerns regarding integrating disabled students will be framed as a question of the just distribution of costs associated with bringing integration about. This will involve an assessment of whether integration’s costs are transitional or permanent, and whether they are necessary or contingent on institutional design. The resulting argument will posit the processes and conditions that can justly be imposed by integration, and on whom integration’s burdens ought to fall.

It will be proposed that the primary duty of schools is to secure educational goods for students. Thus, integrating schools is unjust if it blocks the ability of schools to provide educational goods to the disabled. Here, a contingent justification for not integrating disabled students will arise from current non-ideal conditions. More positively, the thesis proposes that educational costs may be minimised by reforming the way in which teachers are trained. This training becomes necessary for teachers in already integrated schools as, without such training, they are unable to attend to their professional moral duties.
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Introduction

There is currently much enthusiasm in political philosophy surrounding the development of integration as a requirement of social justice. The outcomes and processes that arise in response to group difference can be distinguished as integrating or segregating in nature. In the latter case, segregation may refer to either a process by which one group closes its network to another, or the outcome of such a process. Group differences here support obstructed or distorted interaction, leading to and reinforcing segregation. This in turn creates antagonistic and hierarchical relations making segregation a self-reinforcing cause of group inequality. Integration will also see some level of group difference preserved. These differences, however, do not lay the foundations for inequality but are instead recognised on equal terms. Integration involves and furthers ‘the free interaction of citizens from all walks of life in terms of equality and mutual regard.’

Anderson’s reinvigoration of integration highlights the relationship between successful integration and achieving both educational and social justice. Integration’s connection to justice can be seen clearly when applied to racial or religious groups. The historical segregation of Black communities in the United States, for example, arose from and was reinforced by inequality and de jure discrimination. This idea of integration as a moral ideal is yet to be fully tested with respect to the situation of disabled students, a small group with complex and diverse educational needs. Underdeveloped but well motivated skepticism about inclusion
policy has arisen within education research. In determining if the imperative of integration ought to extend to disabled students, I will take this skepticism seriously while proposing a constructive response.

The concerns for integration of disabled students will be framed as a question of the just distribution of costs associated with bringing integration about. I will assess whether or not a just distribution of costs within this domain is possible. I will argue that schools are specially tasked with the provision of educational goods in society. The imperative of educational integration is unjust if it would result in a failure to provide the educational goods that are owed to the disabled by schools. These educational costs are more ethically significant in the given context than the costs of not integrating.

In this thesis, I will identify and diagnose the problems of extending the imperative of integration to educational inclusion policy. I will do this by attending to the often overlooked questions that arise in response to educational integration. There is good reason to consider the task of educational integration separately from other integrationist initiatives. Education offers unique concerns and benefits integration as an imperative. Unlike housing for example, education is not a single good. Rather, education is a large cluster of goods. The hard question of exactly which goods ought to be part of this cluster must then be considered. This is an important question to answer, as certain goods will inevitably conflict. This is not true of housing. Extending integration as an imperative in educational contexts is
problematic as it will involve trade-offs with other goods. Where integration conflicts with other goods in the cluster of educational goods, it will need to be determined which goods ought to take priority. If integration is to be considered an imperative, it seems prima facie that integration ought to take priority over other goods within the cluster.

States owe certain goods to their citizens. States may provide access to these specific goods via specially tasked institutions. For example, such states, henceforth institutionalised states, provide access to adequate healthcare for their citizens via the healthcare industry. Within institutionalised states schools are institutions charged with securing educational goods for the citizenry. Examining the role of education in institutionalised societies, will demonstrate that in the case of a conflict between integration and educational justice, integration may not take precedence over goods for which education is given the special task of securing.

Education is further distinguished from other integrationist initiatives as its success is not pursued at point of access. Again, unlike housing, we must avoid the trap of thinking that a school is successfully integrated when a certain quota of diversity within the student population has been met. While this may be enough for a neighbourhood to count as integrated, schools differ in that their integration is a facilitated process. Success in educational integration is not simply a matter of placing diverse students in the same classroom. Physical proximity of students, even with curriculum or environmental accommodations, does not ensure that students
will interact in meaningful ways, nor that they will attain the goods education owed to them. Rather, teachers have a special role of facilitating the process of securing educational goods for students, with integration being one such good that requires teacher facilitation to secure.

Successfully securing educational goods can be more closely likened to the medical context. Patients require the facilitatory role of a doctor to secure medical goods. How and whether these goods will be secured will be informed by certain stigmatising background conditions. These background conditions inform doctors’ attitudes and beliefs (held consciously or otherwise) regarding their patients’ race or class, for example, which may then influence their treatment plan. This can be seen in the increased rate of opioid addiction found in White populations in the United States. Doctors, influenced by stigmatising beliefs regarding pain tolerance and race, have been found to be less inclined to prescribe pain medication to Black patients as compared to White patients. In education too, background conditions will inform teachers’ attitudes towards their students. As teachers’ attitudes are one of the strongest determinants of students successfully securing educational goods, overcoming stigmatising background conditions will be essential in successfully securing integration.

Thus, while school segregation typically follows neighbourhood segregation the latter is a point of access concern and a singular good, education offers a unique set of challenges requiring separate analysis. While segregated neighbourhoods function
as a practical barrier to school integration, it would be a mistake to think that
neighbourhood integration would have a significant impact on the success of school
integration. The successful integration of schools, on the other-hand, can assist in
securing the success of integration in other contexts. Through the application of
theoretical ideals to an important area of practice, I will provide an argument for the
processes and conditions that can justly be imposed by integration and on whom
integrations’ burdens ought to fall.

In Chapter One of this thesis, I will provide a detailed overview of Anderson’s
argument for integration. In Chapter Two, I analyse the broader literature that has
offered support for, and criticism of, integration as a moral ideal (both generally and
within the classroom context). This literature will inform my subsequent argument
regarding the just processes and conditions that constrain integration as a moral
ideal. In Chapter Three, I will apply the imperative of integration to the education of
the disabled. In this chapter, I will also consider the requirements of educational
justice for students with and without disability. From this, I will examine the
conflicts and alignments between integration and educational justice requirements. I
will go on to consider the respective costs and benefits of integration compared to
separated learning for the disabled. This will involve an assessment of whether
integration’s costs are transitional or permanent, and whether they are necessary or
contingent on institutional design. In Chapter Four, I will contend that the current
approach to integration involves a permanent disproportionate burden of costs for
disabled students. These costs, however, are contingent on the current institutional approach to integration. Thus, burdens may be alleviated or more justly distributed via institutional change. I will conclude this chapter with a proposal that progress may be made by reforming the way in which teachers are trained. I will argue that this reform ought to be considered a professional moral duty in cases where integration already exists within the schooling sector.

I take a similar methodological approach to Anderson; utilising non-ideal theory in order to identify and diagnose a problem as it currently stands. The task of a non-ideal approach is to develop explanations giving consideration to the causal mechanisms of problems that may arise for integration and disability, as they are currently understood. Through this examination, we can determine what can and ought to be done about arising problems, and who should be charged with correcting them. According to Anderson, ‘this requires an evaluation of the mechanisms causing the problem, as well as the responsibility of different agents to alter these mechanisms. If they are unjust, we then consider how these mechanisms can be dismantled.’

The non-ideal approach requires examining how disability is currently understood, rather than beginning with how it could or ought to be understood. Thus, I will examine how philosophical understandings of integration can be extended to disability, and what problems arise for those considered to be disabled within the current education system, before considering what can and ought to be
done about these problems. Consequently, I use the terms ‘disability’ and ‘disabled’ broadly as per their definition in the Australian Government’s 2005 Disability Standards for Education. The Standards state that:

**Disability**, in relation to a person, means:

a) total or partial loss of the person’s bodily or mental functions; or

b) total or partial loss of a part of the body; or

c) the presence in the body of organisms causing disease or illness; or

d) the presence in the body of organisms capable of causing disease or illness; or

e) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of the person’s body; or

f) a disorder or malfunction that results in the person learning differently from a person without the disorder or malfunction; or

g) a disorder, illness or disease that affects a person’s thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgment or that results in disturbed behaviour.

The question of what counts as justice in education for the disabled appears to have been answered with the call for inclusion. Over the last twenty years governments throughout the world have increasingly moved to implement inclusive policies. While these policies have been informed by the unique social and political environments of each country, they have all been shaped by a similar and growing concern for the rights of disabled children to an education that is equal to their non-
disabled peers. Focus on the rights of the disabled to an education, particularly an education at their local school, however, has incorporated little reflection on the justice and purpose of such an education. What it is that might make inclusion more or less just has seemingly been based on the assumption that attending a special school is less than ideal.

As stated, education is a cluster of goods. Which goods then constitute the ideal cluster that defines educational justice will inevitably be contested. Further, attempts to define a just education often focus on the education of students without disabilities. Taking a broad view of educational justice then is needed in order to ensure that education will attend to the needs of all students. With this in mind, just education outcomes ought to be reflective of student capabilities and effort, and involve the attainment of goods such as economic productivity, autonomy, democratic competence, healthy personal relationships, treating others as equals, and/or personal fulfilment through education. A student may not attain each of these goods, but may still have received a just education, as student capacities and societal need will influence the specific requirements of educational justice. For example, a severely cognitively disabled student may not benefit from an education focused solely on democratic competence. Rather, their educational wants and needs would be better attended to where education furthers their personal flourishing.

Additionally, on a similar line to Anderson, I contend that educational justice should not simply be focused on private goods such as academic results or
job preparedness. While harder to measure, educational justice must also incorporate positive and fulfilling experiences during one’s schooling (for example, taking into account how students relate to each other). The assessment of whether educational outcomes constitute ‘just outcomes’ then is not solely dependent upon the desirability and equality of outcomes between privileged and underprivileged groups. Rather, schools also play a crucial role in developing empathy and understanding across social groups. A significant cognitive deficit arises when students are unable to develop meaningful relationships beyond their own cultural or familial groups. This directly hinders students’ attainment of private educational goods. Educational justice will also require the collective attaining of certain educational goods—meaningful relationships or democratic competence is of little value to students in isolation.

The assessment of whether integration or special education is best equipped to meet the requirements of educational justice must not be based exclusively on individual outcomes. Further, these assessments cannot solely take into account the benefits either educational system has for the disabled. Rather, they must also consider systemic concerns. Specifically, justice in education requires the attainment of specific goods during and after one’s schooling, with some of these goods needing to be attained not just by oneself, but also by one’s peers.

Through educational integration, stigma induced deficits in wellbeing may be alleviated. Further, knowledge may be shared between the disabled and non-
disabled, leading to greater social, democratic, and educational outcomes. Prima facie, it seems integration ought to further educational and social justice. However, questions arise regarding how well Anderson’s integration model can apply to disability and whether it ought to impel the integration of disabled students into general schools.
Chapter 1. The Imperative of Integration

1.1 Inclusion and Integration

The work of this thesis is to clarify both philosophical understandings of integration and the subsequent moral constraints that ought to be imposed on integrationist educational policies. As such, it is important to begin this project by defining key terms, especially as certain terms I will use frequently have different meanings within the educational sector as compared to their philosophical meaning. Specifically, I refer to distinctions that need to be made between the educational terms ‘inclusion’, ‘integration’, ‘mainstream’, and the use of the term ‘integration’, within philosophy.

Within education theory and policy, inclusion is distinct from integration and mainstreaming. These latter two approaches to educational provisions for the disabled are concerned with a disabled student’s preparedness for or deservingness of accommodation within general classrooms. This may involve tests, with certain thresholds needing to be passed by the student. Here the onus for change is on the student, rather than changing the educational content, context, or pedagogical approach to suit student needs. In contrast, inclusive education is founded on a belief that each child has a right to participate in general education and, thus, each school has a duty to include and accommodate all children. Historically, this approach has rarely involved schools and curriculums being designed so that
diverse populations are taken as the norm. Inclusion has typically involved accommodating students with disabilities within general classrooms that were initially designed with non-disabled students in mind. While this has been inclusion’s typical formulation, the underlying principles of inclusion do not necessitate this approach. Rather, inclusion simply stands opposed to the segregation or exclusion of students based on disability or learning needs. This does often include a ‘within reason’ clause, but the underlying principled distinction remains: inclusive education being focused on a child’s rights to general education while integration and mainstreaming are concerned with a student’s readiness or suitability for general education.

In the last thirty years inclusive education has been the accepted ideal within most nations. This acceptance being furthered by UNESCO’s 1994 Salamanca statement and framework for action on special needs education. The framework takes an inclusive approach to the education of disabled students that ‘recognises the uniqueness of each child and their fundamental human right to an education.’ The statement holds that inclusion and participation within general education is ‘essential to human dignity and to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights’. The Salamanca Statement strongly advocates that general schools adopt inclusive approaches, as inclusion is seen to be the ‘most effective means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, building an inclusive society and achieving education for all’ while providing an effective education to
the majority of children in a cost-effective manner.

The Salamanca Framework for Action supports and offers guidance in the adoption of child-centred pedagogies so that all children can have their educational needs met in general schools. As per inclusive approaches, the framework posits that education systems must cater for diversity and special needs in order to create genuine equality of opportunity. The statement and framework are both founded on the belief that difference is a normal part of life and that diversity of learning needs must be attended to. This is in contrast to insisting that students must meet a perceived normative standard in order to gain access to a general education as, under this view, such a standard would not exist. For this reason, mainstreaming and integrationist educational approaches do not make conceptual sense within the Salamanca framework. The statement and framework have thus asked governments to prioritise the improvement of their education systems by adopting laws and policies that reflect the values and aims of inclusion.

The Salamanca Statement and Framework represents a worldwide consensus on the direction of special needs education, having been adopted unanimously by ninety-two governments and twenty-five international organisations during the 1994 world conference on Special Needs Education: Access and Quality. Despite this, in many education systems throughout the world, inclusion has often been adopted merely as a change of language rather than a change of practice. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), for example, reported a three percent overall increase in the number
of Australian schools between 1999 to 2013. During the same period there was a seventeen percent increase in special schools.21

Despite the adoption of the Salamanca Statement, other considerations may have an equal if not greater bearing upon policy formulation, implementation, and parental school choice. For example, the UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities recognised that special schools may have to be considered where general schools are not able to make adequate provisions.22 While inclusive perspectives may question the necessity of a segregated special education system, the specific type and severity of a child’s disability and their subsequent needs (educational, behavioural, emotional, or otherwise), continues to play a central role in determining that child’s access to (or parental selection of) a general school setting. This is especially the case where such general schools are adapting to diversity post hoc rather than assuming diversity from the outset. The remaining right of parental partiality in school selection and the feasibility of schools fully attending to specific needs of each child, impacts the in-practice adoption of inclusion.

It is not my intention to evaluate the specific strengths and weaknesses of inclusion as compared to integration or mainstreaming education approaches. This has been explored extensively within educational research already. Rather, my overarching concern is to investigate to what extent ought the imperative of integration (in the philosophical sense) extend into schooling, specifically the
schooling of students with disabilities. As ‘inclusion’ is the dominant policy and exists in clear contrast to special, separated, or segregated education, it shall be the focus of this thesis (while ‘integration’ and ‘mainstreaming’ as educational approaches will be set aside).

With the exception of this section, where the term integration is used I refer to the terms usage within political philosophy (explained in detail in the following section). ‘Inclusion’ will refer to educational policy approaches that seek to design schools, classrooms, learning programs, and activities so that all students learn together, founded on a belief in a child’s right to such an education. This unfortunately is a somewhat vague definition. The vagueness of what ‘inclusion’ specifically involves has been a long running criticism of inclusion. “It [inclusion] is now part of our jargon with little consideration of its meaning and the assumptions it embraces”.23 This is in part due to the confusion between the use of the term in education and philosophy. ‘Inclusion’, as well as mainstreaming and integration approaches, are integrationist in the philosophical sense of the term. Education policy has predominantly turned to inclusion as the ideal, with decreasing enthusiasm directed towards educational integration. Because of this, the communication that inclusion is integration in the philosophical sense, and thereby that inclusive processes ought to be bound by the same moral constraints that apply to integration, inevitably becomes lost in translation. Despite this confusion of terms, integration (in the philosophical sense) has become a major focus of governments
across many parts of the world, with policy-makers becoming interested in the role education reform could play in achieving integrated social conditions.

The task of this thesis is to clarify the conditions and processes that can justly be imposed by integration. This inevitably has moral implications for inclusion policy as integration. Specifically, the ways in which inclusion policy justly and successfully attends to the aims of integration provides the missing detail of what specifically inclusion can and should entail. This detail can allow decision-makers to accept or reject the appropriateness of the imperative of integration within the education context. Importantly, my assessment of whether and to what extent schools are impelled to integrate will also have implications for the continuation of current inclusive approaches. To further clarify inclusion as integration, I turn to Anderson’s articulation of the imperative of integration before applying the imperative to the education of disabled students.
1.2 Anderson and the General Imperative of Integration

Anderson argues that the segregation of social groups ‘is a principal cause of group inequality.’ Group based inequality here involves the subjugation or systematic disadvantage of one social group in relation to a more dominant group or groups. While Anderson holds that it is individuals, not groups, who have claims to equal justice, she argues that if we care about justice, we ought to hold concerns for unjust relations between groups. This is due to the role of group-relations in determining whether or not inequalities between individuals are just or unjust. For Anderson, inequalities of any kind are unjust if they are ‘causally connected to’ or ‘implicated in’ unjust intergroup-relations.

Group-relations are defined as norm-governed practices or social habits by which one group affects the interests of, interacts with, or avoids another group. Unjust group-relations constitute group-based oppression where the practices or habits of a dominant group impose severe or systematic disadvantage onto a subordinate group or groups. Such oppressive group-relations are typically marked by marginalisation, exploitation, powerlessness, violence, cultural imposition, and stigmatisation.

This form of inequality is created and sustained by social closure: the set of practices relied on by a dominant group to maintain their control over resources and opportunities while preventing subordinate groups from gaining fair access to these
goods. These practices are diverse but interconnected. They include the limiting of disadvantaged groups access to social, political, and economic goods. This may involve monopolising the means of production or warfare, exploiting the vulnerable, or controlling state institutions. Practices may further involve the limiting of access to goods such as public and private resources, sources of human and cultural capital, and social networks that govern access to employment, business or political opportunities, depress financial opportunities, and reinforce inequality. Additionally, Anderson references practices such as intolerance of cultural deviations from dominant norms, violence and intimidation, bias and discrimination, spreading stereotypes and legitimating ideologies, and segregation.

While there are many forms of social closure, segregation is especially adept at maintaining oppressive relations and sustaining a dominant groups’ monopoly over resources and opportunities. The segregation of social groups then is self-reinforcing; creating and sustaining stigmatisation, oppression, and discrimination and leaving the resulting injustices durable over time. Consequently, for Anderson segregation is the 'linchpin' of group based oppression and inequality.

Segregation can be a process or a condition. Segregating processes are practices or norms that result in the closing of a group's social network to out-groups. This can involve, or result in, spatial or role segregation, or a combination of the two. Spatial segregation exists where segregating processes apportion groups to different geographic or institutional spaces, while the process of role segregation involves
assigning persons to different social roles depending on their group identity. Segregated conditions arise where the members of two or more groups are spatially or role separated from each other, although segregated conditions may also arise from other processes.

Segregation is not inherently unjust. Rather, segregation is deemed unjust where it embodies, results in, or arises from, unjust group inequalities or hierarchies. As stated, unjust group-relations are determined by a group's ability to monopolise fair access to a vital resource to the exclusion of other groups. Once unjust group inequalities or hierarchies are established, segregation may be all that is needed to maintain their existence.

Status inequality undermines democracy. For the democratic ideal to be realised, society must have a culture and political institutions that recognise citizens as equals. In this, democracy requires that political institutions be equally responsive and accountable to the interests and concerns of all citizens. Unjust segregation directly undermines the attainment of this goal. This is due to the limiting of communication and understanding between groups that arises from segregation. Anderson contends that segregation directly ‘limits information of intergroup political collations, facilitates divisive political appeals, and enables officeholders to make decisions that disadvantage segregated communities without being accountable to them.’ Further, officeholders are removed from the consequences of their decisions due to a decreased awareness of the needs and practices of
segregated groups. This limiting of knowledge and responsiveness to the impact of their decisions undermines officeholders’ job competence.

This directly impedes both participatory and deliberative democratic ideals. Participatory paradigms promote the political inclusion of all individuals.\textsuperscript{35} Legitimacy in democracy entails the active and persistent political participation of the citizenry in a breadth of arenas such as the home, workplace, or civic associations, not simply within public institutions. Genuine democracy not only involves this participation but also would actively encourage the political engagement of its citizens.\textsuperscript{36} The segregation and oppression of groups directly undermines the full and equal political participation of all citizens. Through opportunity hoarding, social isolation, and limited knowledge exchange, active democratic participation is undermined. As such, ideal participatory democracy is in conflict with segregation.

Deliberative democratic ideals are also contrary to segregation practices. Deliberative democracy is based on the philosophical traditions of Rawls and Habermas. The core assertion from both theorists is that in order for political choice to be legitimate, it must arise from the deliberation of ‘free, equal and rational agents.’\textsuperscript{37} Deliberative democracy proceeds and is justified by discourse and argument. This justification can be seen simply via the means of ‘rational discourse’ or understood by the more inclusive forms of communication such as storytelling, testimony, rhetoric, and humour.\textsuperscript{38} In either conception, in order to maintain
legitimacy in democracy, the political sphere must be free from ‘cultural domination, power relations, and non-rational attitudes.’\textsuperscript{39} As this democratic ideal ‘requires equal consideration of the interests of each member... collective choices that depend on discriminatory views based on hostility or stereotyping do not give equal weight to the interests of each who is governed by them.’\textsuperscript{40} To not ensure the equality of the voice of the citizenry, thus, is to undermine the discursive quality of the democratic space.

While some theorists argue that participatory and deliberative democratic ideals are incompatible, one being quantitative and the other qualitative in nature, the emphasis here is not to resolve tensions between theories.\textsuperscript{41} Rather, regardless of the ideal that one accepts, segregation is in conflict with democracy. Even, simpler ‘thin’ or procedural concepts of democracy may be undermined by segregation. This is through the limiting of knowledge and responsiveness of elected officials to the needs and concerns of segregated groups. Further, segregation can directly impede the voting and representation of segregated groups and individuals within the political arena. This directly diminishes not only the political voice of those within segregated groups, but it undermines the procedural legitimacy of the democracy as the voting power of certain groups is weakened.

‘If segregation is a fundamental cause of social inequality and undemocratic practices, then integration promotes greater equality and democracy.’\textsuperscript{42} For those disadvantaged by social and cultural deficits, integration achieves what simple
desegregation cannot.\textsuperscript{43} Integration can be likened to anti-discrimination or to affirmative action and reparations. In the case of the former, integration can be thought of as a set of principles and policies for preventing injustices, while in the case of the latter, integration rectifies harms and disadvantages resulting from past injustice. Anderson understands integration as a combination of both normative approaches to corrective justice.

Anderson defines integration as ‘the free interaction of citizens from all walks of life in terms of equality and mutual regard.’\textsuperscript{44} Integration then seems to require a level of freedom, equality, and trust between citizens. It is somewhat unclear whether this requirement is causal or constitutive, although in the following section I will contend that these requirements of integration ought to be separated into causal processes and constitutive conditions. In so doing, certain levels of or impositions to freedom, equality, and trust will be justly required to establish and then to maintain integration.

Integration’s success requires recognising and holding others as equals within one’s moral community.\textsuperscript{45} As a result, social capital ties can be bonded rather than bridged, establishing common social identity rather than commonalities across social identities. Social capital is understood as the network of associations through which knowledge of and access to opportunities are communicated, enforcing norms of trust and reciprocity. As integration promotes social and democratic ideals, Anderson heralds it as an ‘imperative of justice.’\textsuperscript{46}
Integration creates a more just society, in part by preventing such things as opportunity hoarding by sections of the populous. Importantly, integration also enables social elites to be more responsive to the needs of the citizenry. Elites, for Anderson, are ‘those who occupy positions of responsibility and leadership in society: managers, consultants, professionals, politicians, and policy-makers.’ For the elite to be effective, they must be ‘so constituted as to be systematically responsive to the interests and concerns of people from all walks of life.’\(^47\) This responsiveness requires that elites have an ‘(i) awareness of the interests and problems of people from all sectors and (ii) a disposition to serve those interests.’\(^48\)

From here, Anderson argues that an integrated elite class is necessary in order to produce a democratically effective elite. This is due to the understanding that is reached between individuals and groups when they interact in a regular and meaningful way. ‘When the elite is drawn overwhelmingly from multiply advantaged, segregated groups, their cognitive deficits hurt the disadvantaged, because elites constituted in this way lack awareness of, and responsiveness to the problems and interests of the disadvantaged.’\(^49\) Developing an effective elite is not merely beneficial to the disadvantaged. Through integration, the elite overcome their cognitive deficits, increase their job competency, and create systemic social and economic benefits for all.

The view that inclusive education is ‘essential to human dignity and to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights’ and is the ‘most effective means of
combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming communities, and building an inclusive society’ aligns inclusion with integrationist theory. Inclusion is directly opposed to separate schooling based on ability levels or learning needs. Thus, inclusion is an integrationist education policy. The social, educational, and democratic benefits of integration, therefore, ought to similarly result from inclusive education. Additionally, justice concerns that arise from inclusive practices may be able to shed light on the moral constraints of integration processes.

In the next chapter I will take up the task of assessing the moral constraints on the processes and conditions of integration. I will consider the problems of extending the imperative of integration to the generalist and specialist education sectors. This will include a discussion of the value educational integration offers to the pursuit of social justice, and whether or not integrations benefits can (and something should) be attained via other means.
Chapter 2. Reconsidering Integration

2.1 Successful Integration?

Like segregation, integration ought to be understood as a process and a condition. In reverse of segregating processes, integrating processes are practices or norms, which result in the opening of a group’s social network to out-groups. Again, this can involve or result in spatial or role integration, or a combination of the two. Spatial integration exists where integrating processes apportion groups to common geographic or institutional spaces, enabling regular and meaningful interactions with diverse others. Also enabling regular and meaningful contact, the process of role integration involves assigning persons to common social roles regardless of, or based on an equal regard for, group identity. Integrated conditions arise where the members of two or more groups are spatially or role integrated. Importantly, equal respect and mutual regard must be felt between diverse groups. This distinguishes integration from desegregation, where role and spatial diversity may exist but equality of respect and regard for group difference are not present.

Integrating processes ought to secure integrated conditions. Certain moral constraints must extend to these conditions and processes in order to ensure that integration is just. Equally, certain practical constraints may extend to integrating processes. These constraints will in turn limit the likelihood of securing the condition of integration. Further, how we define the success of integrated conditions will
determine the justice and feasibility of integration. In this chapter, I will examine moral and feasibility constraints that ought to be placed on integration as both as a process and as a condition. I will go on to consider what integration may look like within the education context broadly, considering the benefits that education contexts can offer in securing integration for society. This will lead to two questions; on whom should the benefits and burdens of integration fall, and should certain individuals or groups be allowed to opt out of integration? The answer to these questions will provide a theoretical foundation for a possible justification for the voluntary separation of stigmatised disabled students into special education classrooms, an argument I will explore in Chapter Three.

Wong questions what the success of integration would look like. Wong posits that diversity must be desirable in order to ensure integration’s success. Further, how we measure or define integration’s success may leave integration undesirable. Integration policies may then be politically infeasible where the requirements of integration impose to great of a cost on the citizenry.

Segregation is often thought of in terms of schools, neighbourhoods, or cities, but according to Wong, ‘the units chosen are crucially important for how we measure the problem’. Integration of schools, neighbourhoods, or cities may do little to ameliorate the problem of segregation on a state or national level. Put simply, a state or nation will not be successfully integrated just because a few schools or neighbourhoods have achieved integrated conditions. Citizens of highly segregated
states have very little chance of achieving regular and meaningful interactions with diverse others. Thus, while areas of that state may be integrated, the state as a whole may not be. Failing to integrate the state would mean that many of its elite would remain unresponsive to the needs of diverse groups. Stigmatisation, social and cultural capital deficits, and anti-democratic effects would then continue at the state, and by extension, national level.\(^5\)

To overcome this, it seems that the success of integration requires state or even nation wide diversity, with all areas reflective of national demographics.\(^5\) This, however, may have negative democratic consequences. Where neighbourhoods or states are largely made up of a particular minority group, a voting block is formed leading to a greater likelihood of that identity being present within the elected elite. Promoting integration on a national level may decrease the ability of minority groups to elect leadership from within their identity group. Further, state-based integration initiatives may limit the likelihood of meaningful interaction with minorities if said groups membership is very small. As a result, elected elites would come increasingly from the dominant majority who could remain unresponsive to the needs of the minority without threatening their likelihood of re-election.

Additional questions arise for the implementation of integration if its success is measured by social distance or assimilation. Here, rather than assessing integration on a macro scale, Wong considers diversity in the private sphere. If we consider successful integration on this scale, concerns arise for social connectedness, comfort,
and freedom.

As Plato observed in *Phaedrus*, ‘similarity begets friendship’. Most people find homophily comfortable. Within the private sphere of friendships, communities, social networks, and intimate partners, people tend towards familiarity and similarity. This similarity breeds connection, with the strength of social ties tracking commonality. Popielarz and McPherson found that, in reverse, the ‘closer one is to the edge of a group niche (i.e. the more they are unlike the other members of the group), the more likely it is that they will leave the group’. So too in intimate relations; the rate of divorce increasing and marital satisfaction statistically decreasing when a couple’s cultural or religious backgrounds differ.

The strength of homophilic relationships highlights further concerns for integration. Contact between diverse groups does not necessarily lead to increased connection and trust. Trust is more resistant to change than is tolerance. ‘Trust is more than the absence of negative stereotypes. It involves viewing others as part of our moral community’. Simple diversity without trust can lead to decreased community attachment, less favourable attitudes towards out-group members, unwillingness to provide benefits to minorities, reduced civic participation, and withdrawal from collective life. Successful integration requires more than diverse contact. Rather, ‘only the type of contact that leads people to do things together is likely to result in changing attitudes’. This active contact must be ‘sustained, positive contact between members of the two previously antipathetic groups’ if
trust is to be established and the negative consequences of diversity are to be mitigated.

Promoting more positive relations between diverse groups, however, ‘may only be achieved with diminished comfort and freedom’. Similarity increases community connectedness and strengthens social ties. While trust may be promoted through sustained positive contact, experiments have demonstrated that this still comes at the cost of comfort and satisfaction. In experiments where college students were assigned dorms, both White and Black students were assigned roommates of a different race. These students, at the end of their year together reported decreased satisfaction with their residential experiences, were less likely to be good friends, or to continue living together the following year. While the short-term strength and satisfaction of relations and connectedness to community were decreased, positive transferable outcomes also arose. Namely, White students reported more positive racial attitudes while Black students’ grades improved.

Hostility between diverse groups has arisen where those subject to the process of integration resent or are burdened by said process. Such hostility leads to greater tensions between diverse communities, which directly impedes integrated conditions. Integration processes, however, require more than the existence of diversity. Rather, processes must involve meaningful, sustained, positive contact between diverse groups. This may mean that integration processes will impose certain transition costs, such as limitations of freedom and comfort. As such, the
process of integration may have self-reported undesirable elements but, through this process of meaningful sustained interactions, integrated conditions arise. Where integrated conditions are defined by the ‘free interaction of citizens from all works of life in terms of equality and mutual regard’ it seems the costs to freedom and comfort by definition are transitional rather than permanent in nature. Thus, an undesirable process may secure a desired condition.

The condition of integration may be impeded where the process of integration is undesirable. If integration is assessed on a micro or macro scale, it appears that its success may come at the cost of self-reported comfort or freedom. These self-reported consequences, however, must be read cautiously as individuals often fail to accurately recognise and report such transaction costs. Regardless, policy-makers may be unwilling to implement successful integration if it would directly impact their job security. Integration policy is unlikely to gain enough support to secure implementation if doing so would cost policy-makers the support of their constituency. Additionally, individuals may lack the motivation required to secure integration’s success due to the personal costs they would need to shoulder.

In the next section, I consider the extent to which such transition costs ought to be imposed on individuals and groups. Under consequentialist frameworks, certain costs may be acceptable if integration is a moral ideal. Non-consequentialist approaches, however, will place more specific constraints on integrating processes. Examining both consequentialist and non-consequentialist frameworks will
highlight the moral constraints of just integration. The constraints on integration, both practical and moral, will direct the subsequent analysis of the role of schools in attaining integrated conditions, explored in section five of this chapter. Schools provide a unique set of conditions which can greatly assist in securing integrations success for society. Many feasibility constraints discussed in the current section can be reduced if integration processes are attended to in the education context. Whether or not schools ought to play this role, however, will be determined by the moral constraints that I now turn to.
2.2 Requirements for Just Integration

An important task arises if it is accepted that integration is a valuable state of affairs that ought to be brought about. Namely, the task of determining the impermissibility or permissibility of particular actions that would achieve the state of integration. This task is especially important not only in understanding how the condition of integration can be brought about, but in determining how it ought to be brought about. After all, the pursuit of integration ought to be just if integration is indeed a requirement of justice. This claim may impose minimal constraints if a consequentialist framework is adopted as compared to a non-consequentialist one.

Under a consequentialist framework, actions that integrate particular individuals would be morally required where the integrated state is deemed to be the best state or better than a non-integrated state, and the transition costs don’t exceed the value of the end state. Here, we would be morally required to act in ways that produce an integrated state of affairs. When deciding where one will live for instance, one may be morally required to select a more diverse neighbourhood or to select a neighbourhood where one’s living therein would increase its level of diversity. A consequentialist approach to considering morally required integrating actions may go as follows;

P1. Integration is the best state of affairs

P2. We are morally required to act in ways that bring about the best state of affairs
P3. Integrationist processes bring about integrated conditions

P4. Integration’s transition costs don’t exceed the value of the end state

C. The actions entailed in integrationist processes are morally required.

Thus, the consequentialist task in assessing the requirements of just integration is to determine whether or not integration is the best or better state of affairs, which actions would bring about integration, and whether the costs associated with these actions are outweighed by the good of integrated conditions.

While integration may be a requirement of justice and it may result in positive conditions, it is not the only requirement of justice, and these positive conditions may come at the sacrifice of other (potentially more) positive conditions. Where integration can be seen to conflict with other justice requirements or result in worse conditions than not integrating, consequentialists would be unlikely to select integration as the best state of affairs. For example, if integration of students with disabilities into general schools results in a worse state of affairs than not integrating, then integration ought not be imposed or we ought to pursue means of integrating that would minimise negative consequences.

A non-consequentialist approach may leave certain actions impermissible, even where those actions would bring about integrated conditions and even when integration is the best state of affairs. This approach to considering morally required integrating actions would contest the second premise in the above consequentialist argument. Rather, certain actions will be impermissible regardless of their ability to
bring about integration. We may achieve integration if we temporarily revoke individuals’ freedom to associate with individuals or groups of their choosing, or to select where they will live, and which school their child will attend. For a consequentialist, if we accept for the moment that the best state of affairs is integration and that associated transition costs don’t outweigh integration’s benefits, then we are morally required to shoulder these costs. For non-consequentialists, even if integration is the best state of affairs, the means of achieving it may render integration unattainable via morally permissible actions. It may not be permissible to completely revoke individual freedoms in this way, even if such actions do achieve a more desired state of affairs, or if such freedoms of association could be returned thereafter. This may hold regardless of whether these are the only means of achieving the condition of integration.

Such impermissible actions may, for example, entail not unjustly burdening vulnerable groups in the process of bringing about integrated conditions. The extent to which integration processes disproportionately burden vulnerable groups may render the process itself unjust, even where said process would still result in just conditions. Thus, even if integrating students with disabilities into generalist schools would result in a better state of affairs than not integrating, if the processes required to achieve this state of affairs impose unjust disproportionate burdens on disabled students, then they ought not be imposed. If the actions required to achieve integration also result in a less desirable state of affairs than not integrating, then
under either framework, integration ought not to be pursued. Thus, we must consider the morally permissibility of the actions required to bring about integration as well as the desirability of the states of affairs that would be brought about by integrating disabled students into general classrooms.
2.3 Integrating Schools for an Integrated Society

Generalist schools offer highly valuable facilitative conditions for securing integration within and beyond the confines of the classroom. Schools are compulsory social institutions, often being the main or only compulsory social institution in any given society. While religious institutions, sporting clubs, neighbourhood associations, and so on, may see their constituencies lasting far longer than those of schools’, they are not typically compulsory institutions. As such, they rarely capture the potential diversity that schools are so well placed to capture. Further, while there are many social institutions that span significantly longer periods than compulsory schooling years, the vast majority of school-aged children attend schools, and most adults have already done so. Importantly, a person’s school years are typically the malleable foundational years of their life. As such, even if school graduates enter homogenous communities, their early exposure to diversity may overcome the cognitive deficits associated with segregation in an enduring way.

Generalist schools are uniquely positioned to undermine or reinforce group inequalities. Schools can play a significant role ‘in promoting norms of respectful discourse and undermining prejudice’ or alternatively in enabling the reproduction of oppressive practices. Rather than simply enabling contact between diverse groups, through active, sustained, positive contact between members of diverse groups, trust is developed and stigma is overcome. It is because of the ability of schools to set and reinforce norms that Anderson calls for the state to take steps to
prevent marginalising ‘patterns of affiliation from reproducing themselves in institutions of civil society such as public schools.’\textsuperscript{68} Anderson emphasises the importance of early intervention and using schools to expose students to other students from different groups.\textsuperscript{69} In so doing, social hierarchies and stereotyping can be dismantled.

The sustained and active contact that can occur within schools provides a unique environment to promote trust-based integrated relations. Where contact between students is meaningful rather than superficial, the risks of diversity may be minimised. Further, additional goods can be seen to arise from diversity within schools. As Brighouse argues, the aim of diversity ‘is not to promote toleration (although that too is important) but to enable children to learn more about alternative ways of living and new perspectives.’\textsuperscript{70} There is less value in outsourcing education to schools if they are merely reflective of students’ home demographics. Here, it is the diversity of staff and students that sees schools become places that facilitate autonomy.\textsuperscript{71} Diversity within schools supplements rather than replicates the home, ‘challenging students experience, understanding and exposure to others.’\textsuperscript{72} Diversity exposes students to alternate ways of life, allowing them to self-select choices and life paths that are right for them.\textsuperscript{73}

As stated previously, just educational outcomes ought to be reflective of student capabilities and effort, and involve the attainment of goods such as healthy personal relationships, treating others as equals, economic productivity, autonomy,
democratic competence, and/or personal fulfilment through education. A student may not attain each of these goods, but may still have received a just education, as student capacities and societal need will influence the specific requirements of educational justice. Further, educational justice should not simply be focused on attaining private goods such as academic results or job preparedness. While harder to measure, educational justice must also incorporate positive and fulfilling experiences during one’s schooling (for example, taking into account how students relate to each other). With this view of educational justice in mind, it seems that certain educational justice requirements may conflict with integration processes. On the other hand, educational justice and integrated conditions may be well aligned. Questions regarding the moral constraints of just integration again arise as, while outcomes of integration are aligned with educational justice, the transition costs may be too great. Here, as per consequentialist and non-consequentialist constraints, the transition costs of integrationist processes cannot outweigh the benefits of integrated conditions. Thus, the conflict between educational justice and integrationist processes must be further examined so as to ensure that integration is just.

Concerns arise for educational integration and social integration alike. In order to attain the positive outcome of integration, the freedom and comfort of students and their families may need to be sacrificed. The success of integration may be undermined if parents retain a right to select where their child will attend school. Without parents placing a strong value on the benefits of integrated schooling, they
may be unlikely to select diverse schools. If we extend the benefits of diversity to include the diversity of staff, employment practices of schools may also see their freedoms limited. Students and staff, however, may see diminished connectedness and participation in school life from this diversity. Relationships may not be as strong and may not be sustained over time.

It seems that schools are well placed to execute the process of integration successfully. However, this may come at the cost of educational justice requirements regarding positive and fulfilling in-school experiences or to student academic outcomes and post-school preparedness. These costs seem contingent upon institutional design and would be alleviated where it could be guaranteed that student’s social, emotional, and academic needs are attended to regardless of the school they are required to attend under an imposed integration policy. As stated, the limiting of parental, student, and staff freedom and comfort may be required in order to secure integrated process and, by extension, integrated conditions. This limiting of freedom may specifically involve the state removing parents’ current right to select where their child will attend school. It might further require diversity of staff to be secured, limiting freedom of enrolments in teacher training and in subsequent employment. The limitations of freedoms here may not necessarily constitute a social or educational injustice unless the burden falls disproportionately on vulnerable groups or if such restrictions impede the equality or adequacy of educational experiences and outcomes.
While diverse relationships may not be as strong or sustained as homophilic relations, it is not clear that strength of relationships is the mark of successful integration. The aims of integration may be met whether integrated schooling establishes lifelong friendships or merely temporary contact with diverse others. It is often the case that students from even the most diverse schools graduate and enter highly segregated workplaces, neighbourhoods, and associative groups. Schooling years take place early in life, during a highly malleable period. A significant barrier against reestablishing stigma related cognitive deficits is erected when stigma is overcome during this early age. It becomes harder to explain why enforcing post-school integration remains an imperative of justice when individuals depart school with a greater awareness of and responsiveness to diverse others, with their stigmatised beliefs overcome, and where equality and citizenship has been effectively promoted. In such cases, while individuals may live or work in segregated conditions, the concomitant concerns of segregation are alleviated. Here it becomes important to determine whether it is segregation in and of itself that is bad, or whether it is the concomitant conditions that ought to be opposed.

The goals of integration are well aligned with many common school commitments, such as healthy interpersonal relationships, autonomy, equality of opportunity and citizenship. If schools are able to achieve successful integrated conditions, this may achieve the ends of integration in a more significant and lasting way than integrating neighbourhoods. However, while many educational goods
may align with integration, if the processes required to attain integrated conditions conflict with important educational goods, then we will need to determine which goods ought to be prioritised. It may not be morally significant that schools can attain lasting goods associated with integration if they ought to instead attend to important educational goods which exclude the attainment of school-based integration. The following section takes seriously the potential of minimising educational costs and maximising goods associated with integration through the voluntary separation of stigmatised groups. If integration’s associated goods can be attained via separation, special education would not necessarily conflict with or require trade-offs between educational and integrational goods.
2.4 Voluntary Separation

According to Merry, while segregation and disadvantage commonly coexist, there are many forms of segregation that are compatible with the liberal democratic ideal of equality and citizenship.\(^{76}\) Further, it is not simply that both equality and citizenship can be cultivated and maintained under segregated conditions. In certain cases, spatial concentrations actually facilitate these ends.\(^ {77}\) Specifically, Merry contends that voluntary separation into spatial concentrations by stigmatised minority groups facilitates self-respect and civic virtue, conditions necessary for equality and citizenship. Merry, to clarify his argument, offers definitions for segregation, voluntary separation, stigmatisation, self-respect, and civic virtue. I will provide details for each of these in turn.

Segregation refers to the de facto situation of demographic spatial or role concentrations.\(^ {78}\) These concentrations may arise purely through involuntary background conditions or may also involve a voluntary response to a person’s state of affairs. Almost invariably, segregation will involve involuntary background conditions, shaping opportunities and choices through imposed or inherited forces.\(^ {79}\) Voluntary responses, however, can and often do simultaneously or subsequently occur. While segregation may arise through a process of exclusion, it can also subsequently or at the same time result from voluntary clustering. Further, Merry clarifies that this voluntary clustering need not arise simply because members of particular minority or and stigmatised groups ‘have had to lower their expectations
or “make do” with involuntary constraints.\textsuperscript{80} Rather, living in homophilic communities is preferable for many, even if and when so doing results in segregated conditions. Voluntary separation then refers to stigmatised minority groups’ ‘pragmatic and only partially institutionalised response... to existing in segregated conditions.’\textsuperscript{81}

By stigma, Merry refers to the ‘strong disapproval of some unspecified person or group(s) they belong to by most members of the relevant majority group(s).’\textsuperscript{82} These negative associations are typically attached to race, ethnicity/culture, religion, mental illness, speech patterns, social class, weight, disability, or sexual orientation. Stigmatised perceptions of persons and groups may vary over time and between contexts. It is important for Merry’s arguments to note that stigma does not limit one’s ability to cultivate or manifest important forms of equality and citizenship.

Merry posits that these important forms of equality and citizenship are self-respect and civic virtue. Self-respect in this sense refers to an individual’s positive self-regard and dignity, as well as their self-determination with respect to choices, and the ability to act meaningfully on those choices.\textsuperscript{83} Self-respect varies widely, fluctuating according to an individual’s psychological and social conditions in conjunction with their individual contextual circumstances. Stigma and disadvantage are circumstances that present special challenges to self-respect, with self-respect having a seemingly inverse relationship to stigma. Under inequality-producing segregated conditions, stigmatised minority groups may be better able to
access the necessary resources for improved self-respect via voluntary separation than they could through integration. Integration under these non-ideal conditions instead may increase inequality, restrict choices, and undermine dignity for stigmatised minorities.

Civic virtue refers to dispositions, habits, and actions rooted in the character of an individual, which contribute to and strengthen the communal good. Merry here aligns his claims in regard to civic virtue with Melissa Williams’ attempt to reconcile the tensions caused by pluralist democratic societies. In so doing, Williams describes citizenship as a ‘shared fate’ in which individuals ‘see themselves as enmeshed in relationships which they may or may not have chosen, with individuals who may be very different from themselves.’ Virtues necessary for this understanding of citizenship then revolve around a person’s capacity for enlarged thought, their imaginative capacity to see themselves as bound up with others through interdependent relations, shared history and institutions, as well as their capacity to reshape shared practices and institutions through direct participation. While these virtues can be fostered in integrated conditions, stigmatised minority groups may have an increased capacity for or interest in civic participation and reshaping shared practices or institutions if they have established greater network density and self-respect therein.

Self-respect and civic virtue are furthered by the density of one’s associated networks. Merry provides an example of the political inroads for aspiring politicians
which are furthered by spatial concentrations. These leaders in turn will be more responsive to the concerns of their local citizenry. Density of associated networks can then bolster rather than impede civic virtue and political trust.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, it is not clear that segregation is necessarily harmful. Rather, its potential harms may be contingent on institutional design or stigmatising attitudes towards minority groups.

Where minorities are highly spatially dispersed they have little opportunity to interact with others from their own identity group, hindering their sense of community connection and positive regard for themselves as a member of that community. Equality that is defined and offered on another’s terms can undermine the cultivation of self-respect and civic virtue just as seriously as stigmatisation. Self-respect is furthered where a person holds themselves as an equal within their own community, or where equality and membership in the broader host community is established on their own terms. Thus, dispersion of stigmatised group members may be undesirable due to its potential negative impact on the self-respect and civic virtue of individuals.\textsuperscript{87} These arguments align with Wong’s concerns regarding the success conditions for integration. Specifically, the disproportionately high personal costs of integration for stigmatised groups demonstrate the desirability and feasibility of voluntary separation.

Voluntary separation for Merry ‘describes efforts to resist, reclaim, and rearrange the terms of one’s segregation when those terms are counterproductive to equality and citizenship.’\textsuperscript{88} The end or purpose of voluntary separation may be resistance,
empowerment, or simply to make life more pleasant. The justification of voluntary separation, however, hangs on its ability to enhance the conditions necessary for equality and citizenship. Further, sometimes the most desirable and effective response to involuntary segregation is not to integrate neighbourhoods or schools, but to change the conditions under which segregated experience occurs. Thus, Merry argues, integration is not a proxy for justice, rather, its laudable ends can, and sometimes should, be achieved through other means.

Merry makes three key arguments against the repudiation of segregation; that not all forms of separation are morally untenable, that spatial clustering brings significant value for certain minorities that should not be overlooked, and that integration and separation are not conceptually opposed. Empirical evidence demonstrates that segregation and separation have been with us for millennia. It would be demographically naive and morally presumptuous to suggest that any form of separation is fundamentally untenable. Many, if not most, groups who find benefit in the spatial clustering and communal attachments that arise from separation are integrated in important ways. To then suggest that segregation in any form is unjustified underestimates and undervalues its benefits and the reasons particular minority groups might voluntarily separate. These arguments do not necessarily justify segregation in any and all cases. Rather, in order to be justified, voluntary separation must ‘enable and enhance equality and citizenship in ways that matter not only to the groups in question but also to the host societies.'
separation does not necessarily supplant integration. However, its justification does challenge the view that integration is an imperative in the pursuit of justice.

Placing Merry’s arguments within an education context, the justification of voluntary separation may have interesting implications. Non-stigmatised groups, for example, may lack a moral justification for their voluntary separation into segregated schools. This may mean private or select entry schools with high concentrations of non-stigmatised groups attending are morally untenable. This may indeed be the case, although it seems unlikely that the sole moral justification for school demographics would rest on concentrations of stigmatised or non-stigmatised student numbers. Rather, schools may be tasked with facilitating equality and citizenship, which may be most sensibly or effectively pursued via separation in some cases or via integration in others.

Within the educational context, whether or not separation is best placed to facilitate equality and citizenship will depend on the answers to several important questions: does integrated learning offer significant educational benefits as compared to separated learning? Is it better, or educationally important, for children of different backgrounds to come together and focus on what they share in common, or to be educated where they feel comfortable and welcome? (Schools are tasked with attending to educational needs of students. Integration then ought not, at the very least, negatively impact a student’s education.) Is an integrated school system feasible? (Schools, after all, are located in neighbourhoods and cities that are often
themselves highly segregated along multiple lines. Schools then almost inevitably reflect this, so overcoming segregated contexts may require undesirable or untenable impositions. Approaches might involve school vouchers and bussing students to schools from segregated areas so that they might attend a diverse school. This approach has been adopted in some American school systems. Universalising such approaches, however, must ensure that self-respect is not undermined by integrating minority student on the terms of majority groups.

Ensuring the feasibility of integration may involve demographic quotas in neighbourhoods. This would promote diversity in local schools without relying on lengthy commutes. This would assist in promoting meaningful interactions that do not end at the school gate. However, this would then give rise to another question; how can conflict between securing integration and retaining liberty be resolved? Liberty plays a significant role in choosing both where to live, which schools to attend and for whom one votes. If individuals want to retain these first two liberties, they are likely to exercise the third to secure them. Thus, if integration is especially onerous it is unlikely to be secured.

Integration and separation each have their associated costs. ‘Who ought to shoulder the burdens of integration or separation’ must also then be answered. This is a pressing question within the education context as many of the burdens may fall on children. Further, approaches that integrate minority students into majority populated schools will place significantly more burdens on minority students. As
Merry articulates clearly,

‘even if we all were to agree on the integrationist ideal, integration invariably entails far less sacrifice for members of majority groups whose background more closely corresponds to the institutionalised habits, norms, and values of the mainstream. Unsurprisingly… even so called integrated schools in fact are asymmetrically organised to benefit members of the majority group\(^{94}\).’

This may be inevitable to some degree. However, if burdens of integration or separation can be shifted to less vulnerable groups it seems that this is a more desirable path.

The many questions above can be boiled down to two essential questions: is it segregation itself that ought to be challenged (rather than its associated but separate conditions)? And, should schools be impelled to integrate (or achieve its associated conditions)? These questions are especially important both due to the fact that schools are so frequently sites of segregation, and because, as this chapter has explained, they offer many facilitative conditions for achieving the ends of integration. While schools may be well placed to achieve successful integration for society, it is not clear that it is necessary for schools to be integrated to achieve the central aims of education. If conflicts exist between securing integration’s ends and securing important educational goods, policy-makers will need a method of assessing and resolving such conflicts. If integration is deemed an imperative, then it seems policy-makers ought to resolve conflicts in favour of integration. On the other
hand, if schools play an important role in securing educational justice for society, schools may need to be exempt from the imperative of integration. Thus, it is important to determine which ends schools ought to be impelled to serve and whether conflict can be minimised in a way that is feasible, desirable, and does not place unjust burdens on vulnerable groups.

This chapter has supplied an outline of integration. As a process, integration requires meaningful, sustained, positive contact between diverse groups. It may involve the limiting of individual freedom and comfort, but in order to be deemed just under a non-consequentialist framework, it must not disproportionately burden vulnerable groups or require morally impermissible actions in establishing integrated conditions. As a condition, integration is witnessed in bonded social capital ties, establishing common social identity between the diverse groups. Diversity of groups will be retained, but said diversity is held in terms of equality and mutual regard. Further, meaningful interactions between diverse groups are maintained freely and positively.

If integration is an imperative of justice, as a process or a condition, integration by nature ought to be just. This section provides a means of assessing whether integrating students with disabilities is a moral imperative. If such integration requires morally impermissible actions, or if it results in a worse state of affairs than not-integrating, then integration is not a moral imperative.

The following section will apply this analysis to the case of special education. It
will establish the specific distributive justice concerns that arise and to whom associated costs and benefits accrue. As articulated in this chapter, for the imperative of integration to be justly extended, it ought not disproportionately burden vulnerable groups or conflict with any overriding justice concerns. The distribution of costs and benefits will then be assessed, not just in regard to social or democratic outcomes (e.g. more aware elites), but in terms of the educational goods owed to the disabled by schools.
Chapter 3. Inclusion as Integration

Disabled students should not be impelled to integrate into generalist schools if doing so would place unjust burdens on them. These unjust burdens could be either transitional or permanent costs that outweigh the benefits of attaining integrated conditions. If these costs outweigh the benefits to the disabled then they are more ethically significant than the costs associated with voluntary educational separation. Such ethically significant costs include the failure to provide disabled students with the goods they are owed within the context of schools. Determining the permissibility of educational integration will then need to recognise the special role of schools in securing educational justice, which in turn requires a substantive conception of which educational goods constitute educational justice for the disabled. This will provide a means of determining the benefits and burdens of integration, on whom such benefits and burdens fall, and importantly, if any of these burdens are more ethically significant than others.

This chapter will attend to each of the above considerations in turn. I begin by exploring what educational goods are owed to the disabled. This understanding of educational justice will provide a foundation for determining the benefits and burdens of integration, discussed in section 3.1. In this section I will include an assessment of whether or not these benefits are constitutively educational, whether they offer some other form of benefit, or both. I will further consider by whom such benefits and burdens are felt, and the ethical significance of these burdens. I will go
on to argue in 3.2 that the educational costs the disabled face are not inevitable, but are rather contingent on institutional design. I will argue that teachers’ attitudes function as gatekeepers to the justice of integration. In order for this claim to be substantiated, I will begin this chapter with an assessment of the special role of schools in securing educational justice, and which goods compose a just education.

Special roles and responsibilities for the education sector arise from the moral division of labour that has been struck within institutionalised societies. Schools, and the education sector broadly, have been specially tasked with securing educational goods for society. While these goods may vary somewhat based on contextual factors, the securing of these goods ought to be taken as the priority of schools. Schools do not have the same responsibility to provide non-educational goods. This is the case even where these goods may be desirable or more easily secured within an educational context, or even where they are considered an imperative for society more broadly. The imperative to integrate then only extends to schools in so far as it does not conflict with educational justice. Thus, if integration impinges on disabled students’ attainment of educational goods, regardless of whether in so doing integrated conditions are attained, integration is rendered unjust.

As stated, determining whether integration promotes or limits educational justice for the disabled will require an assessment of the aims of education itself. The educational goods that must be justly secured for disabled students can be
determined by assessing the goals of education. The most commonly promoted candidates for the goals of education are: rational autonomy and self-governance, the general flourishing of students, and creating effective democratic citizens. These goals, however, were determined with the non-disabled in mind. Thus, these goals may not perfectly extend to the disabled. Education’s goals must then be examined to ensure that they are appropriate for all students, not just the non-disabled. If integration instead conflicts with the educational goals of the disabled, then the disabled may indeed problematise integration as an imperative.

Integration may further democratic educational ends for the disabled. As stated, special sector graduates rarely gain positions in Anderson’s ‘elite’. Further, because of the social isolation of the disabled in special schools, the elite not only lacks members who are disabled, they lack members who have had meaningful interactions with the disabled. The elite then are unable to be truly responsive to the needs and wants of the disabled. Integration can then promote understanding and empathy towards the disabled while decreasing hostility and stereotyping. This would then increase the ability of the non-disabled to give equal weight to the actual interests of the disabled in their decision making. Thus, integration promotes democratic goods and overcomes cognitive deficits within the non-disabled.

While integration may further the democratic ends of the disabled, procedural or deliberative democratic engagement does not appear to be an educational goal for every individual with a disability. Rather, these paradigms render the disabled as an
educational aid for the educational goals of the non-disabled. The disabled may benefit from this. Through greater recognition of their needs, the disabled may attain greater social justice. This greater social justice, however, ought to be seen as distinct from educational justice.

Educational justice for the disabled ought to recognise the educational interests of the disabled, rather than the educational benefits their classroom presence can bring for others. Thus, even though integration may support the democratic educational goals for the non-disabled and the disabled may benefit indirectly from this, integration may not support the educational goals of the disabled broadly speaking.

As educational goals, rational autonomy and self-governance may be more appropriate goals for the disabled than democratic ends. Critical thought and self-determination may be unachievable for some students. Some disabled individuals will remain entirely dependent on others throughout their lives; others’ disabilities render critical thinking a difficult or perhaps impossible task. Whether these goals are ruled out may depend on what threshold we determine educational goals to have. If this threshold is determined collectively, involving a minimum adequacy standard that all students must surpass, then this baseline would need to be low enough that all students could realistically achieve this. Surely, however, having the same very low adequacy standard for all students removes an expectation of educational rigour. If we are to say that attending to this aim of rational autonomy
and self-governance involves meeting or surpassing the threshold requirement in a way that reflects a rigorous educational standard that is specific to the individual student, we may have an appropriate educational goal.

To what extent integration actually serves the ends of rational autonomy and self-governance must then be brought into question. As already stated, Brighouse argues that the aim of diversity ‘is not to promote toleration (although that too is important) but to enable children to learn more about alternative ways of living and new perspectives.’ Through diversity, students are exposed to alternate ways of life and can self-select choices that are right for them. As per democratic goals, integration appears to further the ends of the non-disabled more so than the disabled. This is because the severely disabled will not be able to reciprocate the understanding or empathy that is promoted by an integrated classroom. Although coming at the cost of developing empathy and understanding on the part of non-disabled, segregation could better allow for increased focus and support to be directed towards the disabled. This could promote the autonomy and rational capacities of the disabled in ways that are relevant and desirable for them. As such, if we accept this goal, integration may not promote educational justice for the disabled, even if it does result in a more just education for the non-disabled.

Creating effective democratic citizens, rational autonomy, and self-governance may contribute to the flourishing of some students. However, the goal of flourishing may capture what democratic competence, rational autonomy, or self-governance
are not able to capture alone. Like rational autonomy and self-governance, flourishing may look different for different students. A minimum adequacy standard for flourishing does not give rise to the same problems as those created by these other goals. This is because flourishing incorporates student differentiation in a more meaningful way. Specifically, flourishing refers to each student’s optimal positive functioning. Each student’s flourishing is furthered by education, although their outcomes and interests may be different. Disabled and non-disabled students alike are capable of achieving such an educational end. This is regardless of the severity of a student’s disability. The flourishing of a severely cognitively disabled student will look radically different from that of a student without such a disability. The flourishing of a physically disabled student will be distinct in some ways from those without physical limitations. All students can flourish in an education that furthers their ends and interests. Therefore, flourishing will be taken as the essential goal for educational justice for the disabled.

A person’s own flourishing is furthered in a significant way by the belief that one is understood and seen as an equal by others. Integration promotes empathy and understanding between diverse groups, which may promote the flourishing of the disabled. Beyond social and emotional gains, the reduction of negative attitudes also promotes better academic outcomes for all students. Quantitative data, however, suggests that significant negative attitudes towards disability exist within mainstream classrooms. Where these negative attitudes hinder student
flourishing, integration in its current form may not lead to educational justice for the disabled. Here arises the question; which educational setting is best placed to meet the requirements of educational justice? The following section will provide an assessment of the benefits and burdens of voluntary separation in specialist education as compared to integration into generalist education.
3.1 Special Schools and the Value of Segregation

The role of schools in developing empathy and understanding across social groups gives rise to a requirement that school populations be adequately diverse. This claim may be somewhat obvious, or at least not controversial, when directed towards most identity groups. For example, the benefits of a diverse and integrated educational systems in terms of race and class are significant. It would be naïve, however, without further investigation, to list disability here amongst other student groups who would benefit from a diversity of ability.

The disabled have significantly diverse educational needs. Despite this, the disabled do benefit from inclusive and diverse educational systems in many ways. Further, there are significant benefits for everyone else in developing a just and diverse educational system that includes the disabled. The complexity of the debate comes in when we consider whether these benefits outweigh the benefits of special schooling for the disabled.

Determining whether integration overcomes or in fact constitutes an injustice, requires an assessment of what costs may arise, by whom they are felt, if these costs are transitional or permanent, and if they are necessary, or contingent on institutional design. Unless we consider the weight and distribution of educational integration’s costs, we risk privileging collective goods ahead of the educational wants and needs of the disabled. With this in mind, this section will assess the nature and distribution of costs associated with bringing integration about. This will
involve a survey of the costs and benefits of integration and segregation within the context of the education of disabled students.

Much of the debate currently centres on public versus private schools’ abilities to adequately foster diverse student bodies. While the private sector is often seen to produce the social ‘elite’ of which Anderson speaks, these schools typically lack the social and economic diversity to produce an ‘effective elite.’ Rather, these school cohorts are often made up of singular class or religious groups. As a result, they lack the diversity to enable students to have meaningful interactions with diverse others. Where this is the case, students are leaving schools with a significant cognitive lack. This is concerning where these students are going on to make decisions on behalf of groups they neither know nor understand.

While the special school may better enable some educational justice conditions to be met, it can be seen to have significant negative long-term consequences for the disabled and society as a whole. Here arises a key distinction in the risks and outcomes of integration for the disabled. Unlike the groups considered in detail by Anderson, the success of educational integration for the disabled is dependent upon a facilitator from outside that group. That is, non-disabled teachers are tasked with integrating the disabled. Many of these teachers have minimal experience or exposure to disability, and some even hold negative or hostile attitudes towards the idea of inclusive classrooms. This is of particular concern as teacher attitudes and expectations are one of the biggest determinants of student success.
The ideal outcomes for this facilitated integration are not the same as Anderson’s ideal outcomes. Specifically, it is unclear whether fully integrating the disabled into the elite is a true goal for the integration of the disabled. Especially if we consider the full diversity of disabilities that would then be required to call the integration of the elite successful. Rather, it may be the case that successful integration for the disabled is distinct from ideal outcomes for other groups. Rather than promoting an integrated elite, integration promotes an empathetic and responsible elite. This would be seen as a good for the disabled and non-disabled alike.

Integration’s burdens fall disproportionately on the disabled, although some burdens may still fall on the non-disabled. For integration to be complete, it may need to be reflective of social demographics, thereby taking away the freedom and choice of education provider from families. If this approach is taken, however, the disabled may end up isolated and the goods that come from the community and specialised attention of special education classrooms are lost. The non-disabled on the other hand suffer minimal comparative costs in order to attain the positive outcomes that would come from full integration. What costs are felt by the non-disabled are not exclusive to the integration of the disabled, nor do these costs result in failure to attain educational goods. As such, the costs fall disproportionately on the disabled. If, alternatively, integration is self-selected, it must be promoted as a good for all, not just for the disabled. Parents, teachers, and students may otherwise continue to see integration as a good merely for the disabled and a burden for the
non-disabled. These attitudes directly undermine the success of integration, again leaving the risks placed on the shoulders of the disabled.

McMenamin argues that the privileging of inclusion ‘unjustly represents special school provision as a barrier to achieving just educational provision for disabled children and young people when it may actually represent exactly that for some of them.’\textsuperscript{110} McMenamin rightly identifies the complexity of attaining educational justice for a group with highly diverse educational needs. Rather than damning inclusion policy outright, she argues that the privileging of inclusion negatively impacts the special education sector. Special education for many students can be seen as the ‘best choice’ in meeting their educational and behavioural needs. The stigma often directed towards the sector, however, may decrease the likelihood of these students being sent to a special school. Further, such stigma has a significant impact on policy decisions. When inclusion is defined as every child attending their local school, McMenamin contends that ‘a world class inclusive education system could be understood to mean an education system in which there would be no place for special schools.’\textsuperscript{111} The implication here is that ‘the presence of special schools provides a state-funded alternative that contradicts and undermines that intention.’\textsuperscript{112}

As a stigmatised minority group, disabled students may experience a loss of self-respect and civic-virtue when impelled to integrate into general education providers. This may be true regardless of the severity of disability as stigma can be attached to
any form of disability. As a small and highly diverse minority group, integration into
general education may result in students being isolated from other members of their
minority group. The limited scope for homophilic relations could have a negative
impact on both self-respect and civic virtue where disabled students face
stigmatisation from their fellow students or teachers. This could lead to isolation
within the integrated community, diminishing the student’s feelings of self-
determination, dignity, or community connectedness. Where this occurs, stigmatised
disabled students will have lost some of the goods they are owed as part of
educational justice - specifically, goods connected to flourishing such as positive and
fulfilling experiences during one’s schooling and positive peer relationships.
Importantly, these goods often determine access to other educational goods. When
students feel unsafe or disconnected from others within their schools their academic
outcomes are negatively affected. Voluntary separation may become the just and
rational choice for families where special education providers not only better attend
to the educational justice requirements owed to students, but also better foster
students’ self-respect and civic virtue.

McMenamin is correct to point out that significant stigma is directed towards the
special education sector. However stigma is also directed towards disabled students
within general classrooms. Stigma may here undermine the success of integration
and justify voluntary separation into special education providers. Negative attitudes,
and desires for higher concentrations of non-disabled students within general
classrooms, may be merely transitional costs in attaining successful integration. If this is the case, justifications for voluntary separation must be balanced against the societal and individual goods that arise from mixed classrooms. Further, in the longer term, integration might allow stigma to be challenged and overcome. If the transitional costs associated with overcoming stigma are too high or if these costs are inevitable, voluntary separation into special education classrooms may remain justified.

We must also consider the idea that integration may not be necessary within the educational context. Integration ought not be an imperative for schools if the goods that integration offers can be attained, or perhaps can even be better attained, in separated classrooms. If the overriding goal of integration is to attain equality of status and opportunity for disadvantaged groups and minimise harms associated with segregation, it ought to be this goal that is pursued in the context of schools. Thus, if separation can attain the same ends, or if integration in this context perpetuates stigma and inequalities, educational integration may not be an imperative of justice.

The following section will examine generalist teachers’ attitudes towards disability and integration. The nature of these attitudes is important as teacher expectations are one of the strongest determinant of student success within the classroom. Students will be prevented from attaining educational goods where teachers hold negative attitudes towards them. The necessity and permanence of
integration’s associated costs can be determined by examining stigmatising attitudes towards integration and disability. If attitudes within integrated classrooms prevent the disabled from attaining educational goods, then integration is unjust. As stated, this would then provide a contingent justification for disabled students to voluntarily separate into special education providers.
3.2 Teacher Attitudes as Gatekeepers for Successful Integration

Significant qualitative research\textsuperscript{116} within education has found that both teacher and non-disabled students hold negative attitudes towards disabled students. When disabled students are included within the general classroom stereotypes about them can be tested. Where these stereotypes are seen as unreflective of reality, they could be set aside. Negative emotional responses are harder to overcome, especially where individuals are not taught to recognise, understand, and regulate their emotions. Additionally, these stereotypes and emotional responses affect the actual success and likelihood of full inclusion.\textsuperscript{117} Where negative attitudes are affecting the success of inclusion, a risk arises that these attitudes and stereotypes will be reinforced rather than overcome. Thus, poor inclusive practices have potentially worse outcomes than segregation.

Teachers’ attitudes are significant factors in the success or failure of inclusion and, by extension, just educational experience and outcomes.\textsuperscript{118} Teacher perceptions of disability significantly affect student social, emotional, and academic success. Examining the origin and impact of teachers’ attitudes can assist in promoting more positive attitudes. Changing how we conceive of disability is central to the success of inclusion. This is a good not only for the disabled, but also for society.

Qualitative research surrounding inclusion has found significant trends in
teacher attitudes. The majority of surveyed teachers are supportive of inclusion policies and recognise inclusion as beneficial for students with disability. Support, however, declines with teacher experience and the severity of disability. Further, collected data typically focuses on the benefits inclusion has for the disabled student, with little consideration for the benefits inclusion offers to everyone else.

Underlying attitudes towards disability in the classroom are reflective of broader societal beliefs surrounding disability. The classroom plays an important role in constructing, and so reinforcing or eradicating, negative attitudes and beliefs. Balancing the responsibility of educators against any rights they may have to desirable employment will be important in securing just educational experiences and outcomes. This calculation must incorporate a sound understanding of the nature and impact of attitudes towards disability. This will ensure that the right to desirable employment is not distorted by wantonly held stigmatising beliefs regarding the disabled.

Teacher estimates of student achievement are the most significant factor contributing to student actual achievement, amounting to a 1.62 effect size. Unsurprisingly then, teachers’ attitudes towards inclusion have been found to dramatically affect the success of students with disabilities in the classroom. Teachers’ attitudes towards inclusion appear to vary with their perception of the specific disability itself, as well as with their beliefs regarding the demands placed on them by that students’ instructional and management needs. These concerns
also centre on the curriculum modifications that may need to be made, their own lack of training and support, and how they will teach this student effectively while also teaching a large number of non-disabled students.\textsuperscript{125}

These concerns are of course very real for teachers. Many of these attitudes will be based not simply on concepts and stereotypes surrounding disability, but also on their prior experiences of having students with disabilities in their classroom and knowing how difficult this can be. Here of course, there is a difficulty knowing whether these initial experiences were in part due to the impact of ideology on teacher confidence and, consequently on teacher ability. Regardless, teachers form a particular idea of what disabled students are like that is combined with and influenced by pervasive ideology of disability more broadly.

These ideas of what disabled students are like may lead teachers to feel like they cannot teach these students, or if they can it will be at the cost of teaching the class as a whole.\textsuperscript{126} Here arises a sense that they cannot control their classroom, and as a result, they may even question their worth as a teacher.\textsuperscript{127} Teachers only have a limited amount of armour and skills to deal with the emotional drain and anxiety that comes from this felt ‘failure’ when classroom control or success is lost.

Studies have revealed common negative attitudes towards inclusive education, with many teachers expressing resistant, hostile or noncommittal attitudes towards teaching students with disabilities within general education classrooms.\textsuperscript{128} Qualitative research conducted by Trump and Hange led them to conclude that
students ‘lives are being negatively affected today, as some are being placed in
general education classes with untrained teachers who are angry at being forced to
receive within their class a student with disabilities’.129

Teacher’s individual experiences and attitudes towards diversity and disability vary. These attitudes, however, impact significantly on the success of their students.130 Common attitudes were influenced by teacher training, support or collaboration opportunities, teaching experience and the nature or severity of disability.131 While many factors contribute towards the positivity or negativity of teacher’s attitudes, teacher efficacy and experience are central to shaping attitudes.132 The nature and number of disabilities within the classroom also contributed significantly.133 Negative attitudes impact considerably on the experience and success of education for both disabled and non-disabled students alike.

Determining whether segregation constitutes an injustice for students must factor in the realities of integration. Teacher attitudes function as a gatekeeper to integration’s success. The wants and needs of teachers must be taken into consideration. This is not to say that segregation of the disabled is justified if teachers desire higher concentrations of non-disabled students in their classrooms. Rather, as this is a common desire within the profession, it must be understood so that it can be overcome. This is especially important because poor outcomes arise where students with disabilities are taught by teachers who hold negative attitudes towards them.
Teachers’ positive attitudes are central to effective, successful integrationist practices. Such negative teacher responses to disabled students can have a flow on effect to how students perceive and interact with disabled peers. Where difficulty and difference are highlighted in interactions, peers may be more likely to recognise difference and place this at the centre of their interactions. This may result in failed peer-to-peer interactions and increased stigma directed towards disabled students. It is here that the necessarily facilitated nature of school-based integration is made clear. Integration is not achieved in schools by simply placing diverse students in the same classroom, nor by making accommodations in curricula or architecture. Success requires the effective facilitation of integration by a teacher. Teachers, however, cannot facilitate integration successfully if they hold negative attitudes or stigmatising beliefs towards groups they are integrating. This is true whether these beliefs and attitudes are held consciously or unconsciously.

As already stated, to be deemed successful, integration requires citizens ‘from all walks of life’ to interact freely in terms of ‘equality and mutual regard.’ As inclusion policy currently stands it is not reflective of these ideals of integration. Instead, it is marked by negative attitudes and unjust educational experiences and outcomes. Similarly, the segregation of disabled students into special schools cannot achieve all the ideal ends of integration, although it may be more successful in achieving educational justice, civic virtue, and self-respect for the disabled. Voluntary separation may then be justified for the disabled where stigma prevents
the goods of integration from being attained and segregated schooling better attends to their educational needs.

Where integrated conditions are already successfully attained, integrated schooling would assist in securing educational goods for the disabled and non-disabled. This is because successful integrated conditions, by definition, would see students integrated with equal respect and mutual regard for their differences. As such, negative attitudes would not be held and therefore would not block the attainment of educational goods. Integrated conditions are unlikely to be attained, however, when integrating processes are hindered by negative attitudes towards the disabled and the special education sector. Importantly, educational goods are unlikely to be secured in such hostile conditions either. This is important due to the role of schools in securing educational goods. Due to the division of labour that is struck within institutionalised societies, schools ought to prioritise educational goods over and above other types of goods.

The justification for the voluntarily separation of disabled students is contingent on the failure to include students as equals on their own terms, to foster positive self-identity and self-determination, or to ensure that their needs are fully attended to. As these are contingent costs many, if not all, could be alleviated through institutional change. One such change may be in overcoming the stigmatising teacher attitudes that foster exclusion and ill-fitting educational provision. If this can shift burdens to less vulnerable groups or minimise conflict between integration and educational
justice so that schools can attend to their primary role of securing educational goods, then integration ought to be pursued in this way.

The disproportionate burdens shouldered by the disabled in the process of integration are not inevitable. Rather, these costs are contingent upon institutional design. Overcoming justice concerns while retaining the ideal of integration then requires establishing a process that does not disproportionately burden the disabled. One such method may involve teacher training that places integration and diversity as the expectation rather than the exception. Training all teachers to meet the educational needs of disabled students and placing disability at the centre of general education could respond to inclusion skeptics, while also ensuring just experiences and outcomes not only for the disabled but for all school staff and students. In the following chapter I will argue that the costs of overcoming stigma in the classroom can be alleviated by appropriate teacher training and support. Thus, these costs, though no doubt a feature of many current experiments in integration, are not inevitable. I will further argue that teachers have a moral duty to secure educational goods for all their students. However, they are unable to do this for the disabled when they continue to hold negative attitudes towards them. Thus, teacher training and support become a moral imperative for already integrated schools.
Chapter 4. Shifting Burdens: Teachers as Facilitators

Education is distinguished from other integrationist initiatives as its success is not secured at point of access. A school will not count as successfully integrated simply when a certain quota of diversity within the student population has been met. Nor will success be determined purely by architectural or curricular adaptations. Rather, integration in schools is achieved via successful facilitatory processes. Within the context of schools this may involve, but is not limited to; modelling of and explicitly teaching inclusive behaviour, treating all students as equal members of the community, attending to diverse needs, and challenging negative assumptions regarding students’ unchosen characteristics. This facilitation ensures that students learn about diversity, interact with diverse others in meaningful ways, and overcome stigma-based cognitive deficits. Additionally, students feel welcome, understood, safe, and treated as equals; all of which are essential in creating an effective learning environment.139

Stigmatising background conditions influence the success of facilitated integration. As the previous chapter detailed, integration is unsuccessful where teachers hold either conscious or unconscious negative attitudes towards disability. Teachers in such classrooms fail to model inclusive behaviour to students, while entrenching stigma and impeding the social, emotional, and educational success of students. It is here that the facilitatory role of teachers can be likened to the medical context. Just like students require a teacher to attain educational and integrationist
goods, patients require the facilitatory role of a doctor to secure medical goods. Stigmatising background conditions inform doctors’ attitudes and beliefs (held consciously or otherwise) regarding their patients, which in turn may influence their treatment plan. Stigmatising beliefs regarding pain tolerance, for example, has led to White patients being significantly more likely to receive pain medication compared to Black patients.\textsuperscript{140} Stigma and stereotyping regarding gender, race, class, age, mental illness, and disability can all influence a patient’s likelihood of being taken seriously by a medical professional and having their medical needs met.\textsuperscript{141}

Background conditions will inform teachers’ attitudes regarding the students within their class. Where a student is perceived to be disruptive or less academically capable their behaviour is more likely to be attributed to these characteristics, confirming the teacher’s initial beliefs regarding the student.\textsuperscript{142} This confirmation bias can apply to any student. While confirmation bias is a natural tendency, and one that could assist teachers in maintaining classroom control, it can entrench student reputation. This may result in students who are perceived as ill-behaved having their behaviour pulled up more often and for increasingly minor infractions as their reputation grows. If a teacher already consciously or even subconsciously suspects that the student is misbehaving, their mind will instinctively search for evidence to confirm their beliefs while downplaying or dismissing conflicting evidence.\textsuperscript{143} If the student has not actually behaved poorly or is making attempts to rectify their behaviour, confirmation bias may serve as a significant barrier and disincentive for
behavioural change.

A student’s reputation may arise not from their behaviour, but from stereotypes and attitudes towards inherent characteristics such as race, class, ethnicity, or disability. These background conditions will affect teachers’ understandings, actions, and decisions in response to student behaviour in an unconscious manner. As the last chapter detailed, negative attitudes and stereotypes surrounding disability paint disabled student as disruptive, overly demanding of time and resources, and less socially and academically capable. If an individual is then identified as ‘disabled’ teachers may be subconsciously primed to interpret their actions as conforming to this stereotype. This may occur regardless of whether that student’s disability actually impacts their behaviour, social skills, or academic capabilities. Further, students may find their actions attributed to their disability rather than to them as an individual. This may disincentivise student learning, negatively impact on peer relations, and diminish self-respect.

As teachers’ attitudes are one of the strongest determinants of students successfully securing educational goods, overcoming segregated background conditions will be essential if integration is to be just. This is especially the case as the imperative to integrate should only extend to schools in so far as it does not conflict with educational justice. Stigma increases conflict between integration and educational justice for disabled students. In order to minimise conflicts where disabled students are integrated, teachers cannot hold stigmatised attitudes.
Teachers, and the education sector more broadly, are tasked with the special moral responsibility of securing educational justice for students. As stated, where the achievement of educational justice conflicts with other justice concerns, the education sector ought to pursue education justice as its priority. This may mean students with disabilities are best educated in separate schooling. Alternatively, general teachers may need to be supplied with resources to promote positive attitudes towards integration so that conflict is minimised.

Teachers, as professionals within the field that is tasked with the special moral duty of attaining educational justice for all students, hold special obligations in regard to the promotion of such goods. By extension, those training, leading, and supporting teachers have an obligation to best prepare and support teachers in facilitating educational justice. Where diversity is increasingly part of the general classroom, teacher training must identify and overcome negative attitudes so that stigma will not prevent the successful facilitation of educational goods. Teachers qua teachers simply cannot retain negative attitudes towards disability if the schooling system is integrated. To do so would undermine their special moral duty to secure educational justice for all students. If the profession is unable or unwilling to do this, then separate schooling would be justified for disabled students.

Negative attitudes have long-term consequences for disabled and non-disabled students alike. As Trump and Hange concluded, ‘lives are being negatively affected today, as some are being placed in general education classes with untrained teachers
who are angry at being forced to receive within their class a student with disabilities’. Forcing unwilling teachers to teach students with disabilities leads to unjust educational experiences and outcomes. Teachers, occupying a significant position ‘of responsibility and leadership’ in the lives of their students, ought to be considered a member of Anderson’s described elite. Where teachers in society are arising out of ‘multiply advantaged, segregated groups’ and go on to teach ‘multiply advantaged, segregated groups’, social hierarchies, stigma, and cognitive deficits become further entrenched. Their students then leave these classrooms and may go on to become societal elites. The decisions of these elites will be informed by the resulting cognitive deficits that come from failed understandings between groups. These negative attitudes then have a lasting consequence, not just for disabled students, but also for everyone else. Overcoming these attitudes then becomes necessary in promoting a just society. Further, teachers striving for professional excellence will need to overcome their cognitive deficits in regards to stigmatised perceptions of the disabled.

Worrisome data mentioned in the previous chapter suggests that the more experience generalist teachers have, the more negative their attitudes towards integration will be. Negative beliefs regarding disability may be reflected in the pedagogy of teachers, impacting on disabled and non-disabled students in a way that lessens student educational outcomes socially and academically. Teachers found to hold negative attitudes towards disability may be seen as failing their professional
moral duties. This ought to be treated in the same way that schools would treat any dereliction of duty. Such cases would typically see the teacher tasked with rectifying their professional standards, rather than requiring the student to attend a different school.

The research around teacher professional development suggests that one-off inservice training does not work in changing behaviour or underlying attitudes. One-off sessions do not appear to factor in teacher improvement in regards to job performance when compared to teachers who received no training in the specific development session. Improvement is incredibly difficult to secure in the teaching profession. Teaching preservice training, incentive schemes, accountability measures and collaborative opportunities all appear to generate more lasting change than one-off in-service training.

Overcoming both teacher perceptions and the unique challenges presented by disabled students is too complex a challenge for a simple professional development session alone to solve. This is especially the case when these two separate issues are conflated. Teacher perceptions result from both actual classroom experience of disability and broader societal concepts surrounding disability. Resultant teacher perceptions then directly affect the potential success of integrationist processes, reinforcing negative perceptions of the disabled and decreasing teacher efficacy. These classroom concerns are very real, with disabled students often presenting academic, emotional, or social needs that differ from their non-disabled peers. Where
these needs are not met, behavioural concerns and poor educational outcomes can arise. These concerns arise in part due to an educational system that is built by the non-disabled for the non-disabled.

It is here of course that McMenamin’s highlighted benefits of special schooling are once again raised. With specialist trained teachers and disabled peers, an increased understanding of disability exists within the special education classroom. Special education teachers are able to provide this successful and de-stigmatised in-school educational experience for their students, in part due to their specialised training and interest in providing an education to disabled students. Within this space, the impact of stigmatised expectations may be decreased. This may result in a more positive in-school experience. Additionally, with this increased understanding comes the potential for teachers to better meet students’ academic and behavioural needs. Again, however, this social isolation may have negative consequences for the disabled and for everyone else.

Integrationist processes may be defeated and may undermine the attainment of educational goods if general education teachers do not have positive attitudes toward disability and integration. Through increased recognition of the origin and impact of teacher attitudes, negative attitudes in general classroom teachers can be overcome. The success of integration is related to several factors, most important amongst these being teachers’ preparation, attitudes, and opportunity for collaboration. Many of the factors that increase positive attitudes then are simple;
pre and in-service training and providing time for teachers to collaborate. These factors have been found to impact positively on teacher efficacy, which can then have a profound impact in reshaping attitudes.\textsuperscript{155}

Reynolds and Birch document that teachers in fact desire special education training prior to receiving students with disabilities in their classrooms.\textsuperscript{156} They found that such training is not only desired by teachers, but that it also significantly shifted the attitudes of those who received training prior to entering the classroom.\textsuperscript{157} Evidence here found that these teachers felt better prepared, better understood the likely challenges they would face, and had increased efficacy in regard to their ability to overcome challenges and teach disabled students effectively.\textsuperscript{158} This in turn leads to more positive teacher attitudes regarding integrated classrooms.\textsuperscript{159} A single preservice unit in special education can significantly assist in changing teacher attitudes.\textsuperscript{160} Minimising conflict between integration and the attainment of educational goods could be achieved through preservice training rather than segregating disabled students. Receiving training prior to teaching ensures that integrationist transition costs are minimised as students are less likely to enter a classroom where they are not wanted. Preservice training could further provide those entering the teaching profession with skills and knowledge so that they can collaborate with and challenge the views of future co-workers. Training, therefore, should occur at the preservice level.\textsuperscript{161}

While teaching qualifications vary throughout the world, teachers’ reported
feelings of preparedness to teach students with disabilities is typically low. Most teaching qualifications in Australia still do not formally require their preservice teachers to undertake any units related to special education while even fewer require a special education placement. This is despite 90% of disabled students receiving their education in general education classrooms in Australia alone. Further, research has demonstrated that best-practice teaching in regards to disability is in fact best-practice teaching for all students. Requiring at least one unit with an accompanying practicum in a special education classroom would increase teacher efficacy in regard to the teaching of students with and without disabilities. Importantly, integrationist goods may be better attained for all students if teachers are required to undergo at least one practicum in a special education classroom. While some disabled students may never enter an integrated classroom, all teachers would have had meaningful and sustained interactions with such disabled students. Subsequently, teachers could better provide tools to further students’ understanding of diversity in such a way that their students are primed to better overcome the concomitant conditions of segregation.

Further, preservice teachers’ attitudes toward disability should be continually assessed. The retention of negative attitudes by preservice teachers ought to be reflected in their graduating reports and references. As schools are increasingly integrated and teachers have a moral duty to facilitate student attainment of education goods (which is undermined by negative attitudes), we ought not allow
into the profession those who are unable to meet the demands justice places on them as a teacher. This may seem like a strong claim, however; wantonly held negative attitudes by teachers towards their students ought to be considered a dereliction of teachers’ professional duty. Such teachers ought to be treated in the same way that anyone failing a moral and professional duty ought to be treated.

Teachers need to broaden their understanding of the needs and abilities of their students, not only those with disabilities. It has been found that students are most effectively taught by those with whom they identify in terms of race, ethnicity, or class. Teachers who share a similar background to their students have greater empathy in regards to student needs and, thus, have a greater impact. Equally, students may feel a greater sense of trust and understanding between themselves and a teacher with whom they identify. This ought not lead to the conclusion that teachers ought to teach only students of the same identity group as their own. This would be unfeasible and could reinforce many of the concerns regarding segregation that this thesis has examined. Rather, teachers need to become more open to and aware of the circumstances students face and be willing to adapt to their needs. So doing can assist in overcoming the achievement gap between homophilic and diverse classrooms.

Requiring that teacher training reflect the diversity of student populations may go a significant way to ensuring that teachers are able to teach in diverse classrooms and feel confident in so doing. Further, through this increased efficacy and
understanding, teachers’ desire to attend to the educational needs of all students may also be increased. In addition, teacher education and subsequent employment ought to be founded on the expectation of integration rather than the risk of integration. Teachers who, even with appropriate training and support, would remain hostile to diversity may then be less inclined to enter or remain in the profession. Such a shift may be seen to unduly burden the teaching profession in order to alleviate burdens currently facing the disabled. This critique could be dismissed by pointing out that the profession is freely entered into and can be freely exited, something that cannot be said so easily of disability. Perhaps more convincingly for those currently teaching or thinking about becoming teachers, would be the claim that becoming excellent teachers involves overcoming cognitive deficiencies. Assuming those entering the profession are wanting to be excellent teachers and provide the best education for all students, successful integration and the training required to achieve integrations success becomes a good not just for students but also for teachers.

Schools are specially tasked with attending to the attainment of educational goods within the school aged population. The non-ideal circumstances in which schools are situated may mean that separation is justified or perhaps required so that students with disabilities can attain a just education. This will ensure that the costs of integration do not burden students in a way that undermines their just educational provision. Such burdens, however, are largely contingent on
institutional design. Specifically, where teachers continue to hold negative attitudes towards disability and integration they are unable to provide educational goods for their students. Costs associated with integration can and should then be redistributed or alleviated through teacher training. Due to the severity of their disability and/or their specific needs or interests, some students may remain better served in separate classrooms. If preservice training requires special education placement, such separated classrooms do not have to undermine the goods that arise from integration. Here, teachers are able to facilitate integration both within and beyond their classroom through the provision of skills, knowledge, and understanding of diverse others.
Conclusions

The underlying question this thesis has sought to answer is in regard to how ethical work ought to be distributed. This has been directed at the context of schools and the education of students with disabilities more specifically. Within this context, the distribution of ethical work is such that schools’ primary duty is to educational justice. Other imperatives ought not then be extended to the education context where so doing would undermine the ability of schools to attain educational justice for students.

The imperative of integration can be seen to conflict with disabled students’ attainment of educational goods. The term ‘disability’ picks out a highly diverse group of students. This creates significant variation in regards to the impact integration may or may not have on individuals. Many of the risks regarding the extension of integration as an imperative for special education provision result from the scale and diversity of those picked out by this term. Specifically, integration into general education may result in students being isolated from other like-members of their minority group. The limiting of scope for homophilic relations could have a negative impact on both self-respect and civic virtue, especially where disabled students face stigmatisation from their teachers or fellow students. This could lead to isolation within the integrated community, diminishing students’ self-determination, dignity, or community connectedness. Where this occurs, stigmatised disabled students will have lost some of the goods they are owed by education;
specifically, goods connected to flourishing such as positive and fulfilling experiences during one’s schooling and positive peer relationships. Importantly, these goods often determine access to other educational goods, as students’ academic outcomes are negatively affected where they feel unsafe or disconnected from others within schools. The resultant learning environment is unlikely to fully attend to the student’s social, emotional, or educational needs, rendering the generalist classroom unconducive for the attainment of educational goods. This is exacerbated where segregated background conditions, combined with difficult in-classroom experiences, create hostility towards integration within the teaching profession.

Within already integrated classrooms, segregated background conditions influence the scale and burden of conflict between integration and educational justice. Successful integrated conditions are unlikely to result where integrating processes are informed by negative attitudes. Thus, integration will be unsuccessful where teachers hold either conscious or unconscious negative attitudes towards disability. Teachers in such classrooms fail to model inclusive behaviour to students, while entrenching stigma and impeding the social, emotional, and educational success of students. Importantly, educational goods will not be successfully attained where poor facilitatory processes are in play.

This thesis has highlighted moral constraints that apply to integration within the context of the classroom; namely that integration must not come at the expense of
educational justice. Many of the moral constraints detailed in this thesis can apply beyond the confines of the classroom. Specifically, integration as a process requires meaningful, sustained, positive contact between diverse groups. It may involve the limiting of individual freedom and comfort but, in order to be deemed just, it ought not;

1. disproportionately burden vulnerable groups,
2. perpetuate the harms it proposes to resolve, nor
3. impede the special moral duties of institutions or groups.

As a condition, integration is witnessed in the freely and positively maintained meaningful interactions between diverse groups. These interactions establish common social identity and bond social capital ties. Diversity of groups will be retained, but said diversity is held in terms of equality and mutual regard. Further, integration’s transition costs must not outweigh the benefits of integrated conditions. This is both a political constraint and a moral one.

Inclusion policy as a form of integration is a politically desirable integrationist policy. Despite having gained near-global support, inclusion does not meet the moral constraints of just integration. Inclusion places disproportionate harms on vulnerable groups, limits said groups’ attainment of educational justice, and can reinforce negative attitudes towards disability. Within schools, integration currently entails undesirable processes and fails to bring about the state of affairs schools are tasked with; that is, securing educational goods within the school-aged population.
Integration within the context of special education may then be left impermissible under both consequentialist and non-consequentialist frameworks. A state of affairs in which schools are impeded in their ability to bring about educational justice is not one that would reasonably be deemed the best state of affairs. If integration is an imperative of justice, as a process or a condition, integration by nature ought to be just. If integration requires morally impermissible actions or if it results in a worse state of affairs than not-integrating, then integration is not a moral imperative for schools.

This leaves voluntary separation justified for disabled students. For Merry, voluntary separation is justified in its ability to enhance the conditions necessary for equality and citizenship. I would further contend that within the educational context, voluntary separation is justified for stigmatised groups where integration undermines their access to educational goods. Voluntary separation may become the just and rational choice for families where special education providers not only better attend to the educational justice requirements owed to students, but also better fosters students' self-respect and civic virtue.

While voluntary separation may indeed be justified under present integrated conditions, integration is not inherently impermissible within the classroom context. Integration would be morally impermissible if the disproportionate burdens shouldered by the disabled in the process of integration were necessary rather than contingent upon institutional design. This is regardless of whether such costs are
transitional or permanent due to the three moral constraints on just integration. Overcoming justice concerns while retaining the ideal of integration then requires establishing a process that does not disproportionately burden the disabled, impede their attainment of educational goods, nor perpetuate the harms integration intends to resolve.

Due to the division of labour that is struck within institutionalised societies, schools ought to prioritise educational goods over and above other types of goods. However, if conflict can be minimised or burdens can be shifted to less vulnerable groups in such a way that schools can attend to the element of justice that they are tasked with, then integration ought to be pursued in this way. Progress may be achieved through teacher preservice training and ongoing support, enabling teachers to acquire sufficient knowledge and understanding of the diversity they are likely to encounter in a classroom. Through increased teacher efficacy and empathy, teachers’ desire to attend to the educational needs of all students may also be increased. In addition, where teacher education and subsequent employment is founded on the expectation of integration rather than the risk of integration then those who, even with appropriate training and support, would remain hostile to diversity may be less inclined to enter or remain in the profession.

This is important as teachers are facilitators of educational justice and school-based integration. Negative attitudes regarding the latter impede their successful facilitation of the former. As the final chapter outlined, teachers are morally required
to overcome negative attitudes to disability and integration. Without so doing, teachers would be unable to attend to their professional moral duty of securing educational justice for their students. This moral requirement arises from the reality that integration is already a common feature of schools. As integration conflicts with educational justice where teachers fail to successfully facilitate integration and because teachers have a professional moral duty to attend to educational justice requirements, teachers by extension have a professional moral duty to successfully facilitate integration where schools are integrated. Integration can be better facilitated through teacher preservice training, practicums, and collaborative opportunities. Thus, teachers must be provided with such opportunities. This does not leave integration an imperative for schools. Instead, where integration already exists within schools, schools become morally required to ensure its success. To not do so would undermine the imperative schools are tasked with; to secure educational goods for students.

Several conclusions result from the above. Firstly, as integration can and does conflict with the attainment of educational goods for students with disabilities, it follows that the imperative of integration ought not extend to schools. From this arises the subsequent conclusion that voluntary separation is justified within the context of special education, in so far as separated learning better attends to educational justice for the disabled. Thirdly, as integration has already been adopted within the education context, significant work can and should be done to
redistribute the burdens integration places on disabled students so that they can justly attain educational goods within an integrated classroom. Finally, as schools are charged with the work of educational justice, it ought to be concluded that it is the professional moral duty of teachers to attend to the requirements of educational justice. As schools are already commonly integrated, it then becomes the duty of teachers to minimise conflicts between integration and educational justice. This can be done via relatively minor institutional changes, such as preservice training, special education practicums, and collaborative opportunities between teachers.

This thesis has drawn attention to the concerns of extending integration into new domains without the proper caution. I have demonstrated that where integration already exists teachers ought to shoulder the associated burdens and minimise conflict. A question then remains: ought parents opt to integrate their child? I have concluded that voluntary separation is justified under current non-ideal conditions. Such justification may theoretically be eroded where teachers attend to their professional moral duties and minimise conflicts between integration and educational justice. Serious thought would then need to be given to the idea that parents of disabled children ought not opt for segregated schools where schools are able to achieve a satisfactory level of successful integrating practices. While some partiality on the part of parents is acceptable and desirable, it may not follow that parents should segregate their child’s learning where they are not justified by the moral constraints of integration. It could further follow from this thesis that in ideal
conditions the imperative of integration can, and therefore should, extend to schools. Determining whether integration ought to be an imperative of schools in ideal cases was not the task of this thesis, nor was determining how this might impact on school choice. Such concerns, however, are worthy of further examination.

The conclusions drawn by this thesis regarding the burdens of integration may not be felt equally or in some cases at all by each individual disabled student within general classrooms. Equally, not all teachers hold negative attitudes towards disability and integration. It is the case, however, that where hostile attitudes are held integration will impede the successful attainment of educational goods. This leaves integration unjust within the school context. As such, it ought not be conceived of as an imperative for schools. The imperative of justice for schools is to attend to educational justice. When classrooms are already integrated negative attitudes towards disability must be overcome. This is so that teachers can attend to their professional moral duty of facilitating the production of educational goods for all their students.

Within inclusion policy, focus needs to shift from inclusion being a right to the goods we wish to provide to students. The focus on the ‘right to inclusion’ obscures what it is that we want to secure; namely equal educational opportunity and outcomes for the disabled. For some students within the current educational context, separation may remain their best chance at securing educational goods. The justification for separation, however, is contingent on institutional design and costs
associated with integration. The role and duty of teachers means that these costs can be shifted and minimised. The demand and feasibility of this claim may leave the most severely disabled better served in segregated conditions. This is because the educational needs of the severely disabled may simply be better attended to via segregation, while the goods that integration could provide them are comparatively minimal. Education in each case should remain the paramount focus. The educational context, thus, demonstrates that integration is not an overriding imperative. Rather, it is a complex good that needs to be weighed against conflicting goods in order to determine whether its pursuit is justified.

Word Count: 21,586
Footnotes


6 Anderson (2010). 22

7 This secondary analysis falls outside the scope of these extracts.


11 The specific goods owed to the disabled will be examined in closer detail in Chapter Three.

13 Ibid.


16 Ibid.

17 UNESCO. 1994. The Salamanca statement and framework for action on special needs education

18 Ibid. 11

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Data on Schools, Australia, 2013.

22 UN. 1993. UN standard rules on the equalisation of opportunities for persons with disabilities, New York: UN.

23 Pugach, M. C., & Johnson, L. J. (1988). Rethinking the relationship between consultation and collaborative problem solving. Focus on Exceptional Children,
21(4). 6

24 Anderson (2007). 2

25 Ibid. 67

26 Ibid. 16-21

27 Ibid. 18-19, 67

28 Ibid. 17

29 Ibid. 13-17

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. 16, 25, 67, 136

33 Ibid. 9-10

34 Ibid.


Science”, 10, 4, 23-34.

40 Cohen (2009). 158-9


42 Anderson (2010). 95

43 Anderson (2010). 33-38

44 Anderson (2010). 95


46 Anderson (2010).

47 Anderson (2007). 602

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid. 354

51 Ibid. 356

52 Ibid.

53 Plato. Phaedrus. 240c.


55 Ibid.

57 McPherson et. al. (2001)


60 Ibid.


64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.; Uslaner (2012)


67 Anderson (2010). 20

68 Ibid. 20

69 Anderson (2007). 596


71 Ibid.

72 Ibid. 22


Anderson (2010). 602


Politicians (amongst others) have been known to misunderstand and overinflate costs felt by the non-disabled within inclusive classroom. (ABC News (2017) ‘Pauline Hanson comments about kids with disabilities, autism misguided, education expert says’ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-22/pauline-hanson-autism-comments-misguided-education-expert-says/8641440 Updated 22 Jun 2017, 6:08pm)

Costs such as reduced teacher attention towards non-disabled students may very well be felt. Near-identical costs, however, would also be felt where gifted, highly inquisitive, misbehaved or demanding students are present in a classroom. Teachers will always need to divide their time amongst their students. Teacher training and support can minimise associated costs. Further, Hattie (2008) reports minimal academic gains in terms of streaming for ability levels, while the social, emotional and democratic benefits of integration are significant.

Ibid. 7

Anderson (2007).


D’Alonzo, Giordano and Cross (1996)


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teachers’ perceptions and inservice needs concerning inclusion.” International journal of disability, development and education 46.2 : 143-156.


125 Avramidis and Burden (2000); deBettencourt (1999); Buell et. al. (1999); Trump and Hange. (1996).


127 Ibid.

129 Ibid. 342

130 Ibid.


132 Ibid.

133 Ibid.


135 deBettencourt (1999).

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid.


139 Hattie (2008).

140 Pletcher, Kertesz, Kohn, Gonzales (2007).


143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

Trump and Hange. (1996). 342


Ibid.


Ibid.


Buell et al. (1999).


Ibid.


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163 Ibid.

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165 Ibid.

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