Foreigners and Propaganda

War and Peace in the Imperial Images of Augustus and Qin Shi Huangdi

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TRANSLATIONS AND TRANSLITERATIONS

All translations in this thesis are my own unless explicitly stated otherwise. The sole exception is the stele inscriptions of Qin Shi Huangdi. Martin Kern provided a high-quality and literal translation of the steles.¹ The literal nature of this translation makes it apt for an analytical study. Of course, there are parts of the translation with which I disagree, which I will point out as they appear in the thesis.

All extant passages of Latin or Greek in the body of this thesis will be translated with the original text in the footnotes. Relatively shorter quotations will be kept untranslated. Any Latin or Greek quotations that only appear in the footnotes will remain in the original language. Any quotations in Classical Chinese, whether in the main body or the footnotes, will always be translated.

Any quotations of foreign-language (European) scholarship will be translated in the main body with the original in the footnotes; if the quotation appears only in the footnotes, it will remain in the original language. Chinese-language scholarship will simply be quoted with the translation; the original text will not be provided.

Commonly recognised transliterations from Chinese, Latin, and Greek (such as Confucius, instead of Kongzi, or Octavian, instead of Octavius) will be used. Transliterations from Chinese will use the Pinyin system; Wade-Giles will only be used if I am quoting a text that utilised Wade-Giles.

All secondary scholarship is cited in a minorly modified Chicago citation system, so as to accommodate British English and Classical Chinese. All Greco-Roman sources are cited in-text according to the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 4th Edition: Abbreviations List.

Furthermore, as both Augustus and Qin Shi Huangdi went through numerous name changes throughout their lives, a naming convention will hereby be clearly established. Augustus will be called ‘Octavian’ until his adoption of the title ‘Augustus’ in 27 BCE, and by that title or the ‘princeps’ thereafter.² Although Qin Shi Huangdi (often simply shortened to Qin Shi Huang) also underwent numerous name changes, this thesis will concern itself entirely with the imperial period.³ Thus, he will simply be titled Qin Shi Huang or the ‘First Emperor’.

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² Augustus was born as Gaius Octavius [Thurinus]. After Julius Caesar posthumously adopted him after the former’s assassination, Octavian took the name Gaius Julius Caesar [Octavianus]. Between the early 30s BCE and 27 BCE, Octavian adopted the titles Imperator (Commander) and Divi Filius (Son of a God) as parts of his name. In 27 BCE, the senate voted him the title of Augustus (The Venerable/August). He became known as Imperator Caesar Divi Filius Augustus – or Augustus for short – until his death in 14 CE. The title princeps – ‘First Man’ or ‘First Citizen’ – was an additional title adopted by Augustus.
³ Qin Shi Huangdi was born as either Ying Zheng or Zhao Zheng (Ying was his Ancestral Name and Zhao was his Clan Name). He became the King of Qin, with the regal name Zheng – Qin Wang Zheng (King Zheng of Qin) – in 247 BCE. He adopted the title Qin Shi Huangdi – literally ‘The First Emperor of Qin’ – in 221 BCE.
INTRODUCTION

‘[Below is a copy of] the deeds of Divine Augustus, by which he placed the whole world under the command of the Roman people’

(Aug. RG. Pref.).

‘He launched punitive attacks against the rebellious and recalcitrant, His might shook the four extremities; (...) now today, the August Thearch has unified All under Heaven under one lineage’

(Mt. Yi Stele, 4 – 5, 28 – 29).

Shortly after Augustus’ death in 14 CE, the Res Gestae Divi Augusti, penned by his own hand a few years before, was displayed on two bronze columns erected outside his mausoleum. On the other side of the world, some two centuries prior, the First Emperor of China – Qin Shi Huangdi – toured his newly conquered empire and raised seven steles, each seeking to glorify his achievements to the world. With the above phrases, the first emperors of Rome and China opened their laudatory inscriptions, presenting to their audiences an image of themselves which they wished to leave in perpetuity.

Already, certain similarities are apparent. Both emperors claimed to have subjugated the known world, and both inscriptions have an unmistakably martial theme to them – Augustus’ use of subiecit and Qin Shi Huang’s ‘might’ which ‘shook the four extremities’. However, this ‘martial’ theme creates a curious contradiction when examining the rest of the texts. Despite having the distinctive persona of an ‘emperor of war’ in their inscriptions, both emperors simultaneously exalted their persona of ‘peace’. Augustus proudly recollects how the Temple of Janus, which only closed when Rome was entirely at peace, was closed thrice during his reign (Aug. RG. 13). Cassius Dio described

4 Aug. RG. Pref.: ‘rerum gestarum divi Augusti, quibus orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit’.
this as the act most pleasing to Augustus: ‘yet the action which pleased him the most beyond all
others was that they [the Senate] closed the gates of Janus, because all wars were brought
completely to an end’ (Cass. Dio 51.20.4). Even Rome’s arch-nemesis, Parthia, received a strange
treatment. Phraates, King of the Parthians, is explicitly noted to have ‘submitted’ to Augustus
despite the fact that ‘he was overcome in no war’: ‘non bello superatus’ (Aug. RG. 32). Likewise, Qin
Shi Huang’s ‘martial valour’ is glorified as it ensured a world where ‘warfare will not arise again’. In
countless sections of his stele inscriptions, the First Emperor’s martial prowess is immediately offset
by equally emphatic claims to an end of all warfare and the beginning of universal peace. It is
exploring this juxtaposition between the two emperors’ personae of war and peace, particularly in
the context of how they were reflected in the representation of foreigners and enemies, that will be
the main focus of this thesis.

**Current Scholarship**

This puzzling contradiction is well-noted in current scholarship (particularly for Augustus), with
copious works published on the subject. Some seminal works include the numerous publications of
Gruen and Galinsky. Other notable examinations of Augustan ideology particularly involving the

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8 Cass. Dio 51.20.4: ‘πλεῖστον δὲ δή όμως υπέρ πάντα τά ψηφισθέντα οί υπερήσθη δτι τάς τε πύλας τάς τοῦ Ιανοῦ

9 Immediately after the section as quoted in the introduction, the First Emperor declares that ‘warfare will not

10 See E. S. Gruen, ‘The Imperial Policy of Augustus’, in Between Republic and Empire: Interpretation of


contradiction of war and peace include Gurval, Koortbojian, Lange, Lobur, Rich, and Woolf. Influential analyses and commentaries on the *Res Gestae* include Cooley, Damon, Güvan, and Ramage. Yavetz also published explicitly on Augustus’ public image in the *Res Gestae*. Ridley’s work is also of particular interest, discussing what is revealed by the omissions in the *Res Gestae*, rather than purely its contents.

Aside from literary sources, Ferris and Zanker both produced prominent pieces on the portrayal of foreigners and ‘barbarians’ in sculpture and architecture. Kuttner’s authoritative work also inspects Augustan imagery in the context of the Boscoreale Cups. There have also been numismatic studies,

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22 Yavetz, *The Res Gestae*.
such as those by Grant\textsuperscript{26} and Simon,\textsuperscript{27} which explore the change in Roman coinage between the Triumviral period and the early Principate and the implications thereof. Due to the word limit, this thesis will limit itself predominantly to the analysis of literary sources and will be able to afford only a cursory look at other forms of evidence. A more comprehensive comparative analysis involving all such displays of propaganda will be left to a future study of a wider scope.

While the \textit{Res Gestae} (and Augustan self-portrayal and propaganda in general) is a rather well-studied topic in academia, there are still aspects of the text that remain puzzling. By far the most common way in which scholars have reconciled these two seemingly disparate images of war and peace is by viewing one through the lens of another: peace is based on success in war. While this interpretation certainly is not incorrect (Chapter Three of this thesis will argue that it does, in fact, explain a sizable proportion of Augustan propaganda), scholarship tends to be too focused on viewing all of Augustus’ interactions with foreigners through a military lens. Rosenstein argues that ‘peace’ was those weaker being kept in check by the ‘fear’ of Rome’s military might.\textsuperscript{28} Gruen makes a similar contention, positing that foreigners submitted to Augustus as they were ‘overawed’ by his martial prowess.\textsuperscript{29} Havener, in particular, conducts an entire study analysing Augustan self-portrayal purely from a military standpoint.\textsuperscript{30} He concludes that the most central aspect of his rule was his military persona in the role of a leader and a victor.\textsuperscript{31} Utilising a wide range of evidence, Havener asserts that victory (and peace as a by-product) was almost the sole dimension of Augustan self-portrayal.\textsuperscript{32} Zanker also states that ‘military victories occupy a special place in Augustan ideology (...) every new victory automatically becomes a justification for the ruler’.\textsuperscript{33} Through a comparative

\textsuperscript{26} Michael Grant, \textit{From Imperium to Auctoritas: A Historical Study of Aes Coinage in the Roman Empire 49 BC – AD 14}, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1946.
\textsuperscript{29} Gruen, \textit{Augustus}, 55.
\textsuperscript{30} Havener, \textit{Imperator Augustus}.
\textsuperscript{31} Havener, \textit{Imperator Augustus}, 31.
\textsuperscript{33} Zanker, \textit{The Power of Images}, 185.
analysis, this thesis will instead argue that Augustus’ interactions with foreigners, even in contexts of war and peace, were manipulated so as to accentuate non-military aspects of Augustan self-portrayal: morality and divine support.

In contrast to the copious scholarship on Augustus, Qin Shi Huang’s public image and propaganda are seriously under-studied, receiving only the most passing of comments in most works, with almost no full-scale study on this topic. Pines is one of the few scholars to have published extensively on the self-portrayal and propaganda of the First Emperor. Kern has provided extensive analyses of the steles, authoring the only critical translation of all seven steles in English. The study of Qin Shi Huang is equally paltry in modern Chinese scholarship. The authoritative biography of Qin Shi Huang by Ma utilises later sources virtually exclusively, rather than the contemporary steles. Qian’s Qin Han Shi (History of Qin and Han) devotes a single page to the steles, with hardly any critical analysis. The only annotated edition of all seven steles (with a few fragments of other Qin dynasty texts) published in Chinese academia is also a modest work of no more than 60 odd pages. Moreover, most of the commentary is simply translations into Modern Chinese, rather than an analytical examination of the text. At this stage, there have been no studies examining the relationship between Qin Shi Huang’s propagandistic self-image and his portrayal of foreigners.

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37 Qian Mu, 秦汉史 (Qin Han Shi), Beijing: Jiuzhou Press, 2015.

38 Feng Zuozhe et al., 秦始皇帝金石刻辞注 (Qin Shi Huang Jinshike Cizhu), Shanghai: Renmin Press, 1975.
The comparative study of Rome and China is a nascent field, although some pivotal works have already emerged. Edited volumes by Scheidel, Mutschler and Mittag represent some of the pioneering works in this field, covering areas such as political and economic systems, religion, and warfare. Mutschler and Mittag’s *Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared* is structured with distinct chapters on Rome and China, each written by experts in their respective fields (the chapters are still grouped together by theme). Scheidel’s two volumes engaged with Rome-China comparative studies in a different fashion, with each contributor authoring a comparative piece on both cultures. Both approaches have great advantages and disadvantages. Without a binding, comparative analysis, the placement of separate studies on Rome and China side-by-side at times does not allow for deeper interdisciplinary and comparative insights. Yet, experts focusing on a single cultural area do allow for in-depth and accurate analyses (although the burden of the comparison falls entirely on the reader).

On the other hand, Scheidel’s approach of encouraging experts in one field to author comparative pieces on another cultural sphere (such as classicists Rosenstein and Noreña writing on China, or sinologists Lewis and Puett writing on Rome) – while allowing a fascinating comparative analysis to develop – at times runs the risk of such pieces becoming overly reliant on existing scholarship and not critically examining the primary evidence, particularly if a language barrier is present. Current research on Rome-China comparative studies, thus, while doubtlessly fruitful and ground-breaking, has some lingering methodological issues that need to be more fully addressed. The recently published volume edited by Kim et al. attempts to ameliorate these aspects by containing a

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40 There has also been budding interest in popular history on comparing Rome and China. See Sunny Y. Auyang, *Dragon and Eagle: A Comparison of the Roman and Chinese Empires*, New York: Routledge, 2014; Yi Zhongtian, *两汉两罗马* (Liang Han Liang Luo Ma), Zhejiang: Wenyi Press, 2014; and Michael Scott, *Ancient Worlds: A Global History of Antiquity*, New York: Basic Books, 2016. However, these books – although well written – present a narrative history with relatively minimal analysis and no systematic methodology. As such, they will largely be discounted from this discussion.
combination of both approaches: comparative historians penned comparative chapters, while
monocultural experts focused on their own area of cultural expertise.\textsuperscript{41} The volume, however,
focues on ‘a holistic, truly Eurasian perspective’ and investigates the ‘points of contact, interactions
and mutual influence between the two civilizational spheres’ and thus its purpose differs from that
of this thesis.\textsuperscript{42}

Often when Augustus and Qin Shi Huang are compared, they are often mentioned only casually due
to their obvious parallel as the first emperors of their respective empires. Yakobson and Pines each
attempted a comparison of Augustus and Qin Shi Huang but did not engage in a full-scale
comparative analysis due to their self-professed lack of expertise of the other culture (Pines is a
sinologist and Yakobson is a Roman historian).\textsuperscript{43} Thus, a comparative study examining the \textit{Res Gestae}
and the stele inscriptions of Qin Shi Huang has yet to be attempted in detail. This study will hopefully
not only broaden our understanding of Augustus but fill a long-standing gap in Sinology.

\textbf{Methodology}

As Graeco-Roman and Chinese comparative studies, especially the ethnographical aspects, are still in
their infancy, a widely-accepted and utilised methodological framework has yet to emerge. Thus,
this thesis will both draw from existing methodologies currently employed by scholars in Graeco-
Roman and Chinese comparative studies, and explore more established fields of comparative
studies, such as comparative politics and comparative literature, to formulate a methodology that
suits its needs and is capable of refuting the major criticisms against comparative studies. This
section will first refute some common criticisms against the comparative field to establish its validity,
then construct a methodological framework applicable for the purposes of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{42} Kim et al., \textit{Eurasian Empires}, 2 – 3.
The first major criticism against comparative studies is that, since irreconcilable or incomprehensible differences between cultures cause any comparative study to distort the culture/s under examination, proper comparative studies are simply impossible. This criticism that comparative studies across different cultural spheres are impossible has been questioned by numerous scholars. Lloyd, a pioneer in Graeco-Chinese comparative studies, argues that since all human cultures have the common factor of being human, there cannot be such a difference in cultural frameworks that comparisons become impossible, stating that, despite misunderstandings, ‘there is no human society with which communication has proved impossible’.

Lloyd further elaborates that even when there are diversities in human thought and culture, they still exist within the scope of a shared humanity, since all human mentalities are human. Wellek, from the field of comparative literature, similarly contends that it is rather preposterous to assume that motifs and themes in one culture are not ever repeated anywhere else. Bassnett agrees, asserting that all humans share ‘common faculties, psychological and physiological’. Thus, the criticism that comparative studies between cultures are impossible to undertake is untenable, as the simple fact that human cultures are based upon humans implies that there must be at least some areas that share similarities or are mutually intelligible.

The second major criticism is that comparative studies are pointless, with monocultural analyses yielding more effective and in-depth results. However, this criticism misses one of the main foci of comparative studies: challenging what is considered ‘natural’, ‘obvious’, or ‘self-evident’ by introducing an ‘independent cultural sphere’ or ‘outside control’. This goal has been well-established in many comparative fields. In comparative politics, it has been argued that only by

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comparison can the ‘regular’ and the ‘unique’— or what Kim calls the ‘peculiar or particular’— be distinguished on a systematic scale. By contrasting causal factors within differing societies, one could glean the causes behind the rise of different political systems. In comparative literature, numerous scholars have argued that studying literature only within a single cultural or national sphere reduces the field to an ‘isolated and fragmentary’ state, with some scholars viewing comparative studies as inevitable. Jost declares that studying the literature of only a single culture or nation can be ‘limited’ with comparative studies being ‘ineluctable’ due to its comprehensive nature. This view is shared in the existing works of comparative Graeco-Roman and Chinese studies. Kim, in analysing the Huns, argues that an over-dependence on Graeco-Roman sources has often led to a ‘limited research’ which ‘produces erroneous conclusions’, and that comparative analyses must be adopted to gain more valuable insights, particularly since the Huns also had interactions with the Far East. Scheidel asserts that a comparative study ‘defamiliarizes the deceptively familiar’ and, by removing the label of ‘self-evident’, one could explore alternate questions and answers not immediately apparent in monocultural analyses. For Rome and China specifically, Scheidel argues that, by comparison, one could gain deeper insights into the causal factors behind any apparent convergence or divergence in these two societies. This argument that comparative studies elucidate causal factors not otherwise visible is shared almost wholly with Lloyd.

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51 Kopstein et al., Comparative Politics, 1 – 2.
55 Scheidel, State Power, 3.
56 Scheidel, Rome and China, 4 – 5, 8.
57 Lloyd, Demystifying Mentalities, 130 – 133.
Certainly, this thesis will not go as far as to agree with scholars such as Jost by diminishing the unquestionable utility of monocultural studies. Rather, it is countering the criticism that comparative analyses yield studies that lack the depth of monocultural analyses. Such criticism misunderstands the salient point of comparative studies: to question the ‘self-evident’ and to offer alternative viewpoints not immediately obvious otherwise. These strengths help turn comparative studies into a powerful complement to monocultural studies.

The third criticism, often levelled particularly against comparative studies in Classics, is that comparative analyses ought to focus on historically linked cultures, such as the Graeco-Roman world and the Near East. Examining cultures with minimal contact, such as Rome and China, result in ineffective comparisons. Again, this criticism fails to recognise the strength of comparative studies. By analysing similar outcomes that arose in historically distinct societies, it highlights the causal factors behind their similarities, as they arose independently. Likewise, causal factors are also emphasised in different outcomes arising from otherwise identical (or near identical) backgrounds, allowing one to challenge the idea of ‘natural’ progressions or outcomes by exploring the cause of the divergence. In fact, choosing societies that are culturally linked or dependent can sometimes be detrimental to these forms of studies, as the causal factors become much more difficult to separate from mutual influences. Within comparative literature, the concept of ‘indebtedness’ jeopardises the entire comparative field as it becomes nearly impossible to distinguish which themes/motifs arose independently and which are allusions/influences. Thus, it has been asserted that far more can be learnt through the study of literature from cultures without any mutual influences than between authors who either unilaterally or mutually influenced the other’s works. Of course, this

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61 Wellek, *The Concept of Comparative Literature*, 3.
thesis certainly does not suggest that all comparative studies ought to be between non-related cultures; rather, it contends that cultures with mutual influences simply require a different set of methodological and theoretical frameworks. To give one example, Martin, in discussing Greek and Phoenician Art, is examining two cultures with ‘intense interaction’, forcing her to develop a model that accounts for syncretisation and hybridity – an aspect entirely missing in Rome-China comparative studies.\(^62\)

Whilst Rome and China had indirect contact through the Eurasian trade network,\(^63\) they never had any direct contact (during the time period under consideration) and their portrayals of ‘barbarians’ and formulation of imperial images were certainly not mutually influenced.\(^64\) This lack of direct influence and contact allows one to analyse these independent cultures more clearly without having to extricate independent causal factors from mutual cultural influences.

With the major criticisms against comparative studies discussed, the second part of this section will formulate a methodological framework suitable for this thesis. This thesis aims to explore the manner by which the first emperors of Rome and China manipulated the portrayals of ‘barbarians’ and foreigners to generate their imperial image. As will be shown later in the thesis, both the historical background of ancient Rome and China and how the two emperors portrayed ‘barbarians’ share a striking number of comparable aspects.\(^65\) Thus, this thesis requires a methodology adept at analysing and/or discovering causal factors behind similar outcomes evolving from similar contexts. Of the current methodological frameworks within comparative works, ‘Type Comparison’, as advocated by Kim, and ‘Analytical Comparison’, forwarded by Scheidel, suit the purpose of this thesis the best.\(^66\)

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\(^{63}\) Kim, *Ancient History and the Classics*, 260.

\(^{64}\) Scheidel, *State Power*, 5.


‘Type Comparison’, originally a comparative anthropological methodology developed by Salzman, focuses upon similar outcomes that arose in historically distinct societies.67 Analysing these outcomes, this methodology seeks to explain or locate the causal factors that gave rise to such similar patterns. Salzman gives several case studies that utilised ‘Type Comparison’, most clearly in the analysis of the close relationship enjoyed by a son and his mother’s brother. Utilising ‘Type Comparison’ across BaThonga, Nama, and Pacific Islander cultures, Salzman was able to argue that the common causal factor for this relationship was an indulgence to the maternal line within a patrilineal and patriarchal society.68 Repurposing this methodology for Classics, Kim utilised ‘Type Comparison’ for a comparative study between Herodotus’ and Sima Qian’s portrayal of ethnicity and foreigners in Ancient Greece and China.69 He then challenged current academic views on the Huns through another comparative study between Rome and China.70

Scheidel, in his works, comprehensively lists most of the current comparative methodologies in Rome-China comparative studies, but only ‘Analytical Comparison’ is of any immediate relevance to this thesis.71 Almost identical to ‘Type Comparison’, Scheidel states that ‘Analytical Comparison’ is a ‘comparison of equivalent units for the purpose of identifying independent variables that help explain common or contrasting patterns or occurrences’.72 In both methodologies, the predominant aim is to discover the causal factor/s or variable/s that explain common or similar outcomes in historically distinct, but comparable, societies.

However, one major potential flaw exists in the deployment of this methodology. As noted in comparative literature, one common mistake is holding European sources as the norm, and

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70 See Kim, *The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe*.
71 For a summary of other methodologies present in Graeco-Roman and Chinese comparative studies, see Scheidel, *Rome and China*, 5 – 9.
analysing why non-European sources diverged from this ‘norm’, removing such sources from their proper context and creating a ‘Eurocentric’ and corrupted interpretation.\textsuperscript{73} For this thesis, by contrast, utilising causal factors derived from Chinese sources to re-interpret Roman sources could inadvertently create a ‘Sinocentric’ reading. Doing so may create false equivalents where there are none, or conflate mere coincidences with an invented ‘shared cause’, with evidence from one cultural sphere too selectively or loosely applied to fit this ‘causal factor’. Thus, to combat this, this thesis will ensure that the ‘causal factors’ derived from one cultural sphere to aid in the interpretation of the other can also stand and be proven independently within its own historical and literary contexts to prevent an incorrect or even nonsensical reading.

Following this criterion, this thesis will first set out to argue that the early imperial period of Rome and China possessed significant similarities and that Augustus and Qin Shi Huang also shared parallels in their portrayal of foreigners and in how they established their imperial image. Due to the comparable nature of their background context, the utilisation of ‘Type Comparison’ or ‘Analytical Comparison’ between the two is feasible. Chapters One and Two will be devoted to this. Then, this thesis will focus on aspects of the formation of their imperial image and utilise conclusions drawn from analyses of the Chinese sphere to challenge existing understandings of Augustan propaganda by testing such conclusions as hypotheses against the Roman sphere. The rest of the thesis will explore the commonly shared themes in the imperial images of Augustus and Qin Shi Huang to gain an understanding of any common causal factors.

Sources

Before the contention of this thesis can be elaborated, it is first important to discuss which sources are most appropriate for this investigation. The primary sources to be analysed will be the Res

Gestae of Augustus and the seven stele inscriptions of Qin Shi Huang. As both texts represent an image the emperors wished to leave to posterity, they are suitable for a comparative study.\(^{74}\)

Since this thesis is within the field of Classics, a brief introduction to Qin Shi Huang’s steles will be provided. After Qin Shi Huang’s unification of the Chinese states in 221 BCE, he erected seven steles across his new empire: three steles were erected in 219 BCE, on Mt. Yi,\(^{75}\) Mt. Tai and Mt. Langxie; two steles in 218 BCE, one on Mt. Zhifu and one in an unascertained location during his eastern travels; one at the gate of Jieshi in 215 BCE; and the final one in late 211 or early 210 BCE, on Mt. Kuaiji.\(^{76}\) The purpose of these inscriptions has been agreed upon unanimously by ancient and modern scholars alike: to glorify the achievements of the First Emperor.\(^{77}\)

Yet the intended audience of these steles has deeply divided current scholarship. It is of great importance to determine who the audience was intended to be, as it would change one’s interpretation of the inscriptions. It is noticeable that five of the seven steles were erected on holy mountains,\(^{78}\) with the erection of the steles intimately tied to, or even being a part of, religious ritual.\(^{79}\) Kern notes that the Mt. Tai and Mt. Yi steles were erected as part of a sacrifice to Heaven and Earth (Shiji 6.242), the Mt. Zhifu stele was dedicated to the Yang cosmic force (Shiji 6.244), while Mt. Langxie stele was in honour of the four seasons (Shiji 6.244).\(^{80}\) Kern also notes that the repeated

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\(^{75}\) The act of erecting the stele on Mt. Yi is recorded in the *Shiji*, although the contents are not (it is the only stele of the seven not to be recorded in full in the *Shiji*). Nevertheless, its contents survived to the modern day. According to 封氏聞見記 (*Fengshi Wenjian Ji*), written during the Tang Dynasty (618 – 907 CE), the original stele was destroyed during the Northern-Southern Dynasties (420 – 589 CE). However, a wooden replica was preserved before being re-carved into stone during the Song Dynasty (960 – 1279 CE) in 993 CE (see 鄒縣志・古蹟卷 [*Zouxian Zhi, Guji Juan*]), which survives to modern times.

\(^{76}\) Kern, *Announcement of the Mountains*, 217.


use of religious vocabulary ‘forms a ritualistic mode of speech’. Sanft concurs that the steles were ‘ritual literature’. This has led numerous scholars to argue that the steles were never aimed at ‘mere mortals’, but were intended to broadcast Qin’s achievements to Heaven. Yet it would have been unrealistic to assume that no humans visited the steles. None of the aforementioned mountains is particularly difficult to ascend, and the common people did so with such frequency that, in fragments of Qin dynasty legal codes, laws were set indicating when and for what purpose they were allowed to climb these mountains (such as a ban on collecting firewood during certain months, implying that they were permitted to do so in other months). Moreover, Yates and Sanft have argued that the common people would have been more literate than previously thought due to universal conscription. The contents of the inscriptions, too, lend credence to the idea that the common people were part of the intended audience. None of the steles contain any messages that could be classified as ‘gloating’ or invectives against the conquered peoples. The steles took extensive care to stress the benefits of the new empire to all ‘black-haired people’. Furthermore, none of seven steles was erected in the traditional homeland of the Qin but all were erected in the newly conquered eastern parts of the empire. Ancient sources also confirm that the common people were one of the intended audiences for the steles. Han dynasty scholar Wang Chong commented: ‘The Qin (...) erected these steles in order to camouflage their sins from the world with fine words, so that those who view and read [the steles], [would only] see the beauty of Yao and Shun (mythical sages) and, because of such words, give praise to its [Qin’s] glory’ (Lun Heng Zhu Shi, Announcement of the Mountains, 227).

81 Kern, Announcement of the Mountains, 227.
82 Charles Sanft, Communication and Cooperation in Early Imperial China: Publicizing the Qin Dynasty, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014, p. 91.
83 For a summary of such scholars, see Kern, Announcement of the Mountains, 223.
84 Sanft, Communication and Cooperation, 91.
85 Sanft, Communication and Cooperation, 91. Yates also states that military laws in the Qin army were often posted on boards for all to see, implying that the soldiers must have been literate, or at least that there were sufficient numbers of people who could read well enough to disseminate the messages to their comrades. See Robin D. S. Yates, ‘Law and the Military in Early China’, in Military Culture in Imperial China, ed. Nicola di Cosmo, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 35. For a more detailed analysis of literacy among the soldiery, see Robin D. S. Yates, ‘Soldiers, Scribes, and Women: Literacy among the Lower Orders in Early China’, in Writing and Literacy in Early China: Studies from Columbia Early China Seminar, ed. Li Feng and David Prager Branner, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011, pp. 360 – 364.
86 Kern, The Stele Inscriptions, 106.
While the ritualistic and religious connections of the steles are undeniable, the inscriptions can most certainly also be viewed as propaganda aimed at the common populace.

In examining other potential supporting Chinese sources, one major problem becomes immediately apparent: there are no surviving sources contemporary to the First Emperor. Even the original seven steles are now all lost. However, although the original steles are now lost, there is very little to suggest that they, as recorded in the Shiji of Sima Qian as well as physical reproductions from the later Tang and Song dynasties, were fabricated or edited in any way. Numerous passages in the Shiji imply that Sima Qian was well-travelled (Shiji 130.3293). He accompanied Emperor Wu to the mountains upon which the steles were erected, making it quite feasible that Sima Qian recorded the steles first-hand. Furthermore, later textual recordings of the steles (such as in the 1st century CE Book of Han and the 14th century CE Book of Steles) and even physical ink rubbings and reproductions of the steles (of which some survived to the modern day) show little to no deviation from those recorded in the Shiji. Kern, who undertook a linguistic analysis of the steles, reveals that the structural and rhyming style is evidence of a 3rd century BCE composition and they are unlikely to have been later fabrications.

Looking beyond the steles themselves, several other texts can also help elucidate Qin-era propaganda. While most Han dynasty texts are fiercely anti-Qin and pro-Han, many of them can still be feasibly used as part of an analysis of Qin, as they follow a reliable series of – albeit now lost – historical sources and even begrudgingly acknowledge favourable aspects of Qin, making it unlikely that Han dynasty records were entirely prejudiced and slanderous fabrications. Early Han dynasty scholar Jia Yi (200 – 169 BCE), who penned a work discussing the ‘faults’ of Qin, was born only six years after the collapse of the Qin dynasty (206 BCE) and would have written his work well within

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87 Lun Heng Zhu Shi 20.855: ‘秦，无道之國，刻石文世，文謂文飾其過。觀讀之者，見堯、舜之美。由此言之，須頌明矣’ For a discussion on how this is evidence that the common people would have viewed the steles, see Sanft, Communication and Cooperation, 91.
living memory of the First Emperor, who died in 210 BCE. Essays (collectively called the *Huainanzi*)
collected by the King of Huainan, a vassal of the Han Emperor, around the year 139 BCE, as well as
Sima Qian’s own *Shiji* (completed around the 90s or early 80s BCE), all discuss the actions and
attitudes of the Qin dynasty which, although sometimes dramatised, depict the Qin as
quintessentially ‘Legalist’ in its ideology and can be feasibly utilised to analyse the rationale behind
Qin activities and propaganda.\(^{90}\) Furthermore, Sima Qian and Jia Yi most certainly had access to the
parts of Qin’s imperial archives that survived, rendering their works unlikely to have been entirely
fabricated or based on hearsay.\(^ {91}\) Prior to the imperial era of the Qin dynasty, the *Lüshi Chunqiu*, an
encyclopaedic work sponsored by Lü Buwei, was compiled around the year 239 BCE, only 18 years
before Qin Shi Huang proclaimed himself emperor.\(^{92}\) Moreover, Lü Buwei was the Prime Minister of
Qin and the regent to the young Qin Shi Huang. As such, the *Lüshi Chunqiu* is also an invaluable work
in the assessment of Qin attitudes and methods in its propaganda. Thus, despite the absence of
contemporary sources, there are sufficient supporting sources for an investigation of imperial Qin
propaganda to take place.

Turning now to Roman sources, the *Res Gestae*, which will be the main focus of this thesis, is
undoubtedly a piece of Augustan propaganda due to it being a self-written work.\(^ {93}\) However, to say
that other Augustan authors can be clearly delineated into pro- or anti-Augustan – thus denoting
unambiguously which texts are or are not admissible as additional evidence in such an examination –
has been heavily challenged by current scholarship.\(^ {94}\) Authors traditionally thought to be rather

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\(^{90}\) ‘Legalism’ was the state philosophy of Qin. In short, it stated that humans were naturally selfish and evil and
could only be controlled via the law with extreme deterrence and punishments. For a short description of


subversive,\textsuperscript{95} such as Propertius\textsuperscript{96} and Ovid,\textsuperscript{97} still have clear passages in their works that praise and glorify Augustus and his regime (although academia still debates the extent of their sincerity).\textsuperscript{98}

Conversely, authors who are generally thought to be pro-Augustus include sections in their works that do not conform to the ‘official’ Augustan stance. Horace, named by Dunstan as the ‘court poet’ of Augustus,\textsuperscript{99} follows the Augustan line by conspicuously neglecting to name Marc Antony as the enemy at Actium (Hor. \textit{Carm.} 1.37).\textsuperscript{100} Yet, contrary to Augustus’ own portrayal of Sextus Pompeius as a mere pirate,\textsuperscript{101} Horace names him as ‘Neptunius dux’ (Hor. \textit{Epod.} 9.7 – 8).\textsuperscript{102} Likewise, there has been extensive discussion on the works of Virgil, another poet commonly thought of as purely pro-Augustus. His early works such as the \textit{Georgics} carry an advisory or cautionary tone to the future emperor, rather than blanket praise.\textsuperscript{103} Others, such as Tibullus, do not even mention Augustus.\textsuperscript{104} Prose writers such as Livy are also problematic. Livy, despite being a friend of Augustus, is described by Campbell as nevertheless presenting a ‘gloomy’ account of the Augustan political revolution.\textsuperscript{105}

This is without taking into account the fact that many of these authors’ works were written over a


\textsuperscript{96} The first book of Propertius, for example, ends conspicuously with two poems referencing the Perusine War (41 – 40 BCE), where Octavian sacked and massacred the Italian city of Perusia as part of the Roman civil wars. See Prop. 1.21 and 22.

\textsuperscript{97} Despite Augustus’ passing laws such as the \textit{Leges Juliae} in an attempt to control marital and sexual morality, Ovid still penned works such as \textit{Ars Amatoria}, which is essentially a ‘handbook’ on love affairs.

\textsuperscript{98} For example, Propertius ‘praises’ Augustus extensively in 2.10. Yet he ends his list of Augustan military achievements with a mention of his Arabian campaign, which ended in disaster.


\textsuperscript{101} Gurval, \textit{Actium and Augustus}, 146.

\textsuperscript{102} Zanker, \textit{Power of Images}, 44.

\textsuperscript{103} Nappa, \textit{Reading after Actium}, 30, 65, 219.

\textsuperscript{104} Harrison, \textit{Time, Place, and Political Background}, 141; Santirocco, \textit{Two Voices of Horace}, 9.

period of decades, with their perception of the Augustan regime undoubtedly changing as the years went on.\(^\text{106}\) Thus, much of academia has agreed that a clear dichotomy between pro- and anti-Augustan writers can no longer be sustained and, as a result, one cannot easily decide which works to include or exclude based on authorship alone.\(^\text{107}\) However, it has been noted that regardless of individual authors’ own perceptions of the Augustan regime, they all hold similar ‘patriotic’ ideals for Rome and their praise for Augustus in regards to peace and war, even if insincere, still reflects contemporary attitudes (albeit with their personal peculiarities and biases).\(^\text{108}\) Therefore, this thesis will include a broad range of Augustan authors (and post-Augustan historians, for a record of events) in its examination of Augustan ideology.

**Contention**

Adhering to its methodology, this thesis will first demonstrate that Rome and China shared sufficient similarities for its theoretical framework to function. Thus, Chapters One and Two will be devoted to China and Rome respectively in an examination of pre-imperial attitudes towards war and foreigners. This thesis will argue that both cultures developed their concept of the ‘barbarian’ over many centuries, with significant influences from the military encounters against them. Whilst there were obvious differences, which will be discussed, both China and Rome, at the advent of the imperial era, held foreigners to be inferior and developed a worldview where Rome/China ought to rule the known world due to their self-perceived cultural and moral superiority.

The comparability of both background and ‘end-product’ – *Res Gestae* and the steles – allows for a comparative analysis to be undertaken: if both texts developed out of such similar backgrounds, could the rationale, purpose, and literary techniques/motifs also share similarities? By analysing the


rationale behind and methods of Qin propaganda, one could gain potential insights into Augustus’ propaganda, since the First Emperor had less need to obfuscate his rationale and methods compared to the princeps as he had no ‘republican sentiments’ which he had to avoid overtly offending.¹⁰⁹

This thesis will then examine the current academic interpretation of Augustan propaganda towards foreigners: peace through warfare. Chapter Three will show that, aided with a comparative reading, this interpretation does hold for a considerable proportion of Augustan propaganda. However, current scholarship’s over-reliance on viewing Augustan self-portrayal (in relation to foreigners and ‘barbarians’) purely through a military lens leaves some interpretations puzzling, if not conflicting.

Subsequently, Chapters Four and Five will examine the portrayal of foreigners in Qin Shi Huang’s propaganda to argue that such portrayals not only served to advance the First Emperor’s military persona, but also his ‘superhuman’ morality – visible by the ‘willing’ submission of foreign peoples – and his special connection to the divine – manifested by his success in fulfilling his divine destiny of conquering ‘All under Heaven’. Turning to Rome, the thesis will advance a similar reading for Augustus: Augustan portrayals of foreigners, too, served to evince the princeps’ impeccable moral character and his divine support; much like Qin Shi Huang, Augustus was, in his self-portrayal, also so moral that he ruled with consensus universus and succeeded in creating the divinely-ordained ‘Empire without End’ (imperium sine fine).

¹⁰⁹ Of course, as will be elaborated later in this thesis, that is not to say Qin Shi Huang ignored popular sentiments. Rather, the establishment of the imperial format was much more palatable to a Chinese populace than to a Roman one. Despite being an innovative act, Qin Shi Huang’s ascension to Emperor was viewed as a continuation of, rather than a break with, established tradition. See Yakobson, The First Emperors, 280 and Achim Mittag, ‘Forging Legacy: The Pact between Empire and Historiography in Ancient China’, in Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared, ed. Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 146.
CHAPTER ONE
PRE-IMPERIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS, EXPANSION, AND PEACE IN EARLY CHINA

As this thesis will argue in later chapters, neither Augustus nor Qin Shi Huang formulated their imperial images arbitrarily, nor did they craft an image that was alien to the perception of their subjects; they certainly did not force it upon an unreceptive populace. Rather, both emperors contemplated the existing expectations and attitudes of their subjects and cleverly tailored their propaganda to construct an imperial image that met those expectations. As such, it is important to examine first the historical and cultural contexts leading up to the ascension of both emperors as well as the evolution and establishment of existing attitudes towards conquest, peace and foreigners, before pursuing an analysis of how the two emperors manipulated such sentiments for their own benefit. Therefore, this chapter and the next will be devoted to this investigation, with this chapter focusing on ancient China and the next on Rome.

Focusing on ancient China, this chapter will closely follow the transformation of Chinese attitudes towards foreigners and ‘barbarians’ across the Spring and Autumn period (770 – 476 BCE), then the later Warring States period (476 – 221 BCE), with a particular focus on how the manner of their portrayal intersected with attitudes towards warfare, expansion, and morality. This chapter will argue that, in the early Spring and Autumn period, the people who would later become Han Chinese did not have a clear-cut definition of the ‘barbarian’ nor did they regard themselves as absolutely superior to foreign peoples. Rather, the development of the ‘barbarian’ and the belief in the

110 Pines, The First Emperor, 237. Of course, it must be stated that Qin Shi Huang did not pen the stele inscriptions himself. Nevertheless, the accompanying scholars responsible for the composition of the steles were in the presence of the First Emperor when they did so, and the content would certainly have been read and approved by Qin Shi Huang before being carved into stone. See Kern, Announcement of the Mountains, 220.

111 In Classical Chinese, there is no single word for ‘barbarian’. Rather, the various ‘catch-all’ terms used for the peoples who lived around the Central States (Man, Yi, Di, Rong) eventually came to carry such negative connotations that they became equivalent to the word ‘barbarian’ and ceased to be a reference to the original peoples.
innate superiority of ‘China’ was the result of changing attitudes over an extensive period. The civilised-barbaric divide formed conjointly with, and became heavily dependent on, the Chinese need for expansion. With the intensification of warfare as China transitioned from the Spring and Autumn period to the Warring States period, the states that could afford to expand, and thus survive, were at the peripheries of the Central States. In response to the need to assuage their populaces, who became increasingly anti-war (as will be elaborated upon later in this chapter), as well as their requirement to expand while simultaneously contending with hostile neighbours, Chinese states began relegating foreign peoples to barbarism, often on a moral or cultural basis, in order to justify their constant wars of expansion to their own antipathetic populace. As the expansions increased in frequency and scale, the moral arguments for war became more complex, shifting from ‘punishments’ or ‘punitive’ campaigns against a specific wrong to the permanent relegation of ‘barbarians’ to immorality, with the Central States gaining a divine mission to expand and conquer foreign peoples with impunity. As non-Chinese states around the Central States were absorbed into the latter, the charge of barbarism, and with it a righteous casus belli, was even levelled against fellow Central States in order to justify war. The development of ‘barbarians’ was thus intricately entangled with warfare.

112 At this point in time, China, or 中国 (Zhongguo), technically means ‘the Central States’ and refers to the core states that constituted the Zhou polity and the later Warring States, who thought of each other as sharing a common culture, of whom the imperial dynasties considered themselves to be the rightful continuation. 113 The ‘barbarians’ became the main enemies against whom the various Zhou states, particularly those on the peripheries such as Jin, Qi, Chu or Qin, constantly waged war. See Herrlee G. Creel, The Origin of Statecraft in China vol. 1, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970, p. 195.
116 Even the state of Qin, which formed the first imperial dynasty, was charged with immorality and ‘barbarism’. See Mark Edward Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires: Qin and Han, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007, pp. 39 – 40.
Western Zhou Dynasty and Early Spring and Autumn Period (11th – 6th century BCE)

After the sack of the Western Zhou capital by the Rong peoples in 771 BCE, the Zhou royal house shifted their capital east, beginning the Eastern Zhou dynasty. However, this shift also brought with it a rapid disintegration of the power of the royal house, with many of its former vassals becoming de facto independent. Warfare, both between various Zhou states and against foreign tribes, increased in intensity and frequency.

During the early Spring and Autumn period, one encounters the first extant surviving pieces of Chinese literature. Two texts in particular are an invaluable reflection of the attitudes of both nobles and the common people during this period. The first of these texts, 詩經 (Shijing), or Book of Songs, is a collection of songs and poems from the 11th century BCE to the 6th century BCE and, at least according to tradition, was compiled into a single volume by the philosopher Confucius in the late 6th century BCE. Consisting of both popular folk songs/poems collected from the various Zhou states and official court songs/poems from the royal house of Zhou, this text allows one to examine the attitudes of the early Spring and Autumn period towards warfare, expansion, and foreigners from the perspectives of the aristocracy and the common people. The second text, the 書經 (Shujing, also known as the 尚書 Shangshu), or Book of Documents, is a series of political speeches and rhetoric recorded from as early as 1000 BCE and was, again, reputed to have been compiled by Confucius. However, this second text has been the subject of much academic controversy, with numerous scholars believing that many sections were later fabrications and could date as late as the 4th century

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CE. A discussion on the authenticity of the chapters in the *Shujing* is far beyond the scope of this thesis. As such, it will only look at the chapters in the ‘New Text’ version of the *Shujing*, which are generally accepted to be genuinely from the early Spring and Autumn period.

Examining firstly the folk songs of the *Shijing*, it is immediately noticeable that no cultural or moral divide is evident between ‘barbarians’ and the Zhou states. The folk songs were collected from numerous states, including the state of Zheng and the state of Qin, both of which would later suffer accusations of being ‘barbaric’. Furthermore, there are several songs that make references to military actions against the Rong, a group of peoples who were unambiguously denoted as ‘barbarians’ in later Chinese works. Yet these songs make no attempt to barbarise or demonise these people, even when the composer refers to an act of hostility from them.

In the poem 載馳 (*Zaichi*), the daughter of Duke Xuan of Wei pleads with her father’s allies to come to their aid when the Rong besieges and sacks their capital. When the allies, all of whom are Zhou states, refuse, she accuses them of immorality for dishonouring the alliance, yet makes no disparaging or alienating remarks towards the Rong. Another poem, 無衣 (*Wuyi*), seemingly written from the perspective of a Qin soldier going on campaign, makes no negative remarks against the Rong despite being otherwise a pro-war poem. There is no change in the vocabulary or attitude in the folksongs when referring to peoples from other Zhou states or from the peripheries. A clear Chinese-barbarian divide is simply not visible in these folk songs and poems.

In the court songs of the *Shijing*, however, the beginnings of an oppositional identity are visible. In the numerous songs praising the kings of Zhou, a clear distinction is made between those who are his

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122 For Qin, see Lewis, *The Early Chinese Empires*, 39 – 40. For the state of Zheng, the *Zuo Zhuan* exhibits passages where the Zheng is equated with barbarians. See *Zuo Zhuan*, 13th Year of Duke Zhao, where an emissary from the state of Lu criticises the Duke of Jin, who was planning to defend the Zheng from invasion, for ‘trusting the words of the barbarians and abandoning both brotherly states and the royal house of Zhou’.
vassals and those beyond. The author of the poem 采薇 (Caiwei) – seemingly a soldier – blames the Xianyun peoples to the north and west of Zhou for military unrest, revealing that he would much rather remain at home in peace. The poem 六月 (Liuyue) is also centered on Zhou’s campaigns against the Xianyun peoples, albeit this time in a glorifying manner. In 採芑 (Caiqi), the poet rejoices in the defeat of the southern Man peoples, declaring that, by their conquests, they have ‘sent fear through the hearts of the Man’. The poem 江漢 (Jianghan) applauds the conquest of the eastern Hua Yi peoples and proclaims that, with their subjugation, ‘virtuous rule has spread amongst the people and there is peaceful cooperation amongst nations’. However, it must be noted that while certain vocabulary used to denote those beyond Zhou, such as Rong and Yi, became unambiguously used to denote ‘barbarians’ in later times, there is scant evidence in the Shijing to suggest that these words were intrinsically derogatory. Their conquests might have been celebrated, but there is no hint in the vocabulary used to describe these foreign peoples that they are less moral or cultured. It is entirely possible that, at this time, the Zhou and non-Zhou separation only denoted the political reality de facto, and was not a demarcation of a civilised-barbaric divide.

One particular aspect of rulership, however, is constantly accentuated in these court songs. The first references of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ appeared and soon became intimately linked with the virtue of the ruler. In several poems, the poet repeatedly states that the last ruler of Shang lost the mandate by being cruel and capricious; as such, Heaven passed the mandate onto King Wen, the first ruler of the Zhou dynasty. Not only is the right of rulership linked to both virtue and divine

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123 Shijing, Xiaoya, Caiqi: ‘征伐玁狁，蠻荊來威’.
124 Shijing, Daya, Jianghan: ‘矢其文德、洽此四國’.
125 Kim, Ethnicity and Foreigners, 34.
127 See Shijing, Daya, 大明 (Daming): ‘有命自天，命此文王。于周於京 (…) 保右命爾，燮伐大商 (Heaven sent forth its mandate to King Wen and granted him the royal capital (…) With his life protected by Heaven, he thus raised his army against the Shang)’. See also Shijing, Daya, 文王 (Wenwang): ‘文王在上，於昭於天。周雖舊邦，其命維新。有周不顯，帝命不時。文王陟降，在帝左右 (King Wen stands above, his virtue
patronage, another aspect of rulership also began to be developed. In almost all poems referencing the virtue of the ruler, his ability to pacify 'All under Heaven' is stressed. In the poem 皇矣 (Huangyi), the poet declares that: 'Di [帝, the chief deity of the Shang and Zhou dynasties] is above, and sees all below (...) [he] seeks peace for the people (...) the god lays his cares on Zhou, and set about increasing its empire', and later that: 'with their sacrifices to Heaven before and after their battles (...) none within the four directions dare to invade (...) none within the four directions dare to resist'. In the poem 仰 (Yi), it is said that ‘to your [King Wen’s] virtuous conduct, All under Heaven come in submission (...) therefore, prepare your horses and chariots, string your bows and arm your soldiers, so as to prevent war and win over the Man tribes from afar’.

This aspect of rulership is highlighted extensively in the Shujing. Almost every passage references the morality of the ruler and how the possession or lack of virtue is a determining criterion in whether Heaven will impart its divine mandate. Particularly in the 周書 (Zhou Shu, or Books on Zhou) chapter, there are numerous instances of Zhou kings arguing that their current rulership was due to their morality and that the previous Shang dynasty lost it due to its lack thereof. The use of virtue and divine blessings as a justification for the Zhou kings to overthrow the previous Shang dynasty is continuously employed. In several passages of the Shujing, the concept of a ‘just war’ is utilised not only as a justification for rebellion, but also for further conquests into non-Zhou lands. When King Qi of Xia fought the You Hu tribe, he is said to have declared that ‘Heaven has chosen to end their lives. illuminating the heavens. The Zhou may be old, but its mandate is new. The Zhou was not elevated before, but now Di has granted His mandate. King Wen ascends to and descends from the side of Di’. Note: Di (帝) was the chief deity of the Shang and Zhou dynasties.

128 天下 (tiānxia).
129 四方 (sìfang; lit. the four directions); 四極 (sìjí; lit. the four extremes); 四海 (sìhǎi; lit. the four seas).
130 Shijing, Daya, Huangyi: ‘皇矣上帝、臨下有赫。監觀四方、求民之莫’.
131 Shijing, Daya, Yang: ‘是類是禡、是致是附。四方以無悔 (…) 四方以無拂’.
132 Shijing, Daya, Yang: ‘有覺德行、四國順之。 (…) 脩爾車馬、弓矢戎兵。用戒戎作、用逷蠻方’.
133 There is an abundance of such examples. In the 商書 (Shang Shu, or Books on Shang) chapter, this is reflected in the 湯誓 (Tangshi) and 西伯戡黎 (Xibo Kanli) sections. In the 周書 (Zhou Shu, or Books on Zhou) chapter, this can be seen in the 召誥 (Zhaogao), 多士 (Duoshi) and 多方 (Duofang) sections.
Thus, I have come to deliver Heaven’s punishments to them today’. The utilisation of a ‘just war’ to justify an invasion of a non-Zhou people is most clearly illustrated in the 邕刑 (Lüxing) section in the Books on Zhou:

‘In ancient times there was a rebellious leader called Chi You from the tribe of Miao (…) they [the Miao] were deceitful towards one another, caring little for oaths and treaties. They utilised cruel punishments against their own people and killed indiscriminately. Thus, the Miao people begged Heaven. Heaven saw little virtue amongst the Miao but smelled only the stench of blood. So, Zhuan Xu (one of the mythical emperors), pitying those suffering, returned violence with violence and annihilated the Miao peoples. Now, none of their descendants remains in the world.’

However, it must be noted that such representations of non-Zhou peoples as immoral to justify their conquest were in the minority. The clear majority of passages in the Shujing and Shijing that do mention non-Zhou peoples do so in a neutral way, with no indication in the language utilised designating them unambiguously as the ‘other’ and at no point are they consistently demonised or barbarised. Thus, in the Early Spring and Autumn period, there is almost no evidence of a Chinese-barbarian divide. However, several important developments during this period – divine patronage for a ruler, virtue as a requirement for rulership, and the expectation that ‘All under Heaven’ ought to submit to a virtuous ruler – were conceived and would be developed further in later periods. Morality would begin to be adopted as a demarcation between the civilised and the ‘barbarian’ with the conquest of non-Zhou peoples being justified within a moral framework.

Late Spring and Autumn Period (6th century – 476 BCE)

By the Late Spring and Autumn period, warfare in the Zhou states – both amongst themselves and against the peripheries – increased in frequency significantly. In the 春秋 (Chunqiu, or Spring and Autumn Annals), reputedly written by Confucius, and the 左传 (Zuo Zhuan), a commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals supposedly written by a contemporary of Confucius, Zuo Qiuming, both

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134 See the 甘誓 (Ganshi) chapter in the 夏書 (Xia Shu, or Books on Xia): ‘天用剿絕其命，今予惟恭行天之罰’.
135 邕刑 (Shujing, Zhou Shu, Lüxing): ‘若古有訓，蚩尤惟始作亂（…）罔中於信，以覆詛盟。虐威庶戮，方告無辜於上。上帝監民，罔有馨香德，刑發聞惟腥。顓頊哀矜庶戮之不辜，報虐以威，遏絕苗民，無世在下’.
136 Bodde, The State and Empire of Ch‘in, 21 – 22.
record an almost innumerable number of battles and wars during this period.\textsuperscript{137} With the increased level of warfare, political rhetoric surrounding war also intensified in complexity. Morality was increasingly woven into their \textit{casus belli} and a ‘just war’ – a morally superior state punishing a morally inferior enemy for a transgression or a crime – became one of the most popular reasons cited for war. It was also during this time period that a ‘just war’ was not only cited against the ‘barbaric’ peripheries but even against fellow states of the Zhou.\textsuperscript{138} From this, the Chinese-barbarian divide, although still in its infancy, began to gain visibility. For the first time in Chinese historiography, passages where non-Zhou states were deliberately dehumanised and barbarised to justify war appeared.

On a pragmatic level, there seems to be little divide between Zhou states and non-Zhou states.\textsuperscript{139} There were numerous records of alliances and joint campaigns by Zhou states and those that would later become ‘barbarians’. In the opening of the \textit{Zuo Zhuan}, it is mentioned that the Rong tribes of the north approached Duke Yin of Lu to renew an ancestral alliance, implying that alliances between the Central States and non-Zhou peoples were common and had existed for extended periods of time.\textsuperscript{140} Numerous joint campaigns between Zhou states and non-Zhou states were also recorded. The Duke of Qin and the Bai Rong tribes jointly invaded the state of Jin, as the Zhou vassals had lost their faith in the Jin (\textit{Zuo Zhuan}, 9\textsuperscript{th} Year of Duke Cheng).\textsuperscript{141} Marriage alliances also existed between

\textsuperscript{137} The actual authorship of the \textit{Zuo Zhuan} is still heavily debated, with some scholars suggesting that the work dates as late as the late 1\textsuperscript{st} century BCE, well into the imperial period. Again, a debate on the actual authenticity of the work is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, there is still a consensus that, even if the work was compiled far later than tradition suggests, it still drew from texts and a textual tradition that is reflective of the late Spring and Autumn period. See Anne Cheng, ‘Ch’un Ch’iu, Kung Yang, Ku Liang and Tso Chuan’, in \textit{Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide}, ed. Michael Loewe, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 67 – 77.

\textsuperscript{138} Note that in the Early Spring and Autumn period, a ‘moral cause’ for war against the peripheries was often cited as a belated explanation for mythical battles. There is very little evidence to suggest ‘moral causes’ formed any contemporary \textit{casus belli}.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its Enemies}, 93.

\textsuperscript{140} See \textit{Zuo Zhuan}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Year of Duke Yin: ‘二年, 春, 公會戎于潛, 修惠公之好也, 戎請盟, 公辭 (In the spring of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} year of Duke Yin, the Duke met the Rong at Yuqian county to renew an alliance established during the time of Duke Hui. The Rong requested an alliance, but the Duke refused)’.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Zuo Zhuan}, 9\textsuperscript{th} Year of Duke Cheng: ‘秦人白狄伐晉, 諸侯貳故也 (The Qin and the Bai Rong invaded the Jin, as the vassals ‘were of two hearts’)’. ‘Were of two hearts’ refers to the fact that the Jin refused to aid other allied vassals in war, thus the other vassals lost their faith in the Jin as the leader of the alliance.
the Zhou states and the Rong.\(^{142}\) There is also evidence of marriage alliances with the Di, as Sima Qian states that the mother of Chong Er, who later became Duke Wen of Jin, is from Di (Shiji 39.1656).\(^{143}\) Furthermore, there are several instances where both Zhou states and non-Zhou states were listed as tributaries to the King of Zhou with no differentiation.\(^{144}\) Nor, at this point, did the Zhou states claim military, economic or political superiority over the non-Zhou, as it would simply not be true.\(^{145}\) The number of invasions by the Rong (and other ‘barbaric’ tribes) against Zhou states significantly outnumber Zhou states’ invasions into the peripheries, with one particular invasion threatening enough that the Zhou states had to rush to the royal capital to prevent its fall to the Rong.\(^{146}\) As such, when recording battles or campaigns, neither ‘Confucius’ nor ‘Zuo Qiuming’ utilised negative vocabulary against non-Zhou states and almost always described their actions in the same manner as they would for Zhou states.

While, on the whole, non-Zhou states were not particularly ‘othered’ in records of battles and campaigns, an increasing level of hostility can be seen in certain sections of the texts. ‘Zuo Qiuming’ complains that the various Zhou vassals were sharing war booty taken from the ‘barbarians’ amongst themselves when they ought to be handed over to the King so that he might use them as a warning against the ‘barbarians’ (Zuo Zhuan, 31\(^{147}\) Year of Duke Zhuang). An advisor to the Duke of Lu counsels him to aid the smaller states of the Zhou polity against the ‘barbarians’ who harass them

\(^{142}\) See Zuo Zhuan, 28\(^{th}\) Year of Duke Zhuang, where it is recorded that Duke Xian of Jin married two women from the Rong tribes because his first wife could not produce a son. There was no negative vocabulary or remarks made in regard to this act. Interestingly, the same event as recorded in 郭璞 (Guoyu), a 5\(^{th}\) – 4\(^{th}\) century BCE text, is presented exceedingly negatively. However, much of the criticism is levelled against Duke Xian on account of his lust and for trusting women from a state with whom the Jin were only recently at war, rather than attacking the Rong women for any intrinsic ‘otherness’. See Jin Yu 1 in Guoyu.

\(^{143}\) Shiji 39.1656: ‘重耳遂奔狄。狄，其母國也’.

\(^{144}\) See Zuo Zhuan, 28\(^{th}\) Year of Duke Xiang. A list of tributary states to the King of Zhou places the Bai Rong tribes alongside Zhou states with nothing to indicate a difference between them.

\(^{145}\) Kim, Ethnicity and Foreigners, 38.

\(^{146}\) See Zuo Zhuan, 16\(^{th}\) Year of Duke Xi. Again, despite the Rong peoples invading deep enough into the Central States that the royal capital was under threat, there were never any attempts at ‘barbarising’ the Rong, at least in this passage.

\(^{147}\) Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 112.
In a later passage, the state of Jin is criticised for laying siege against a fellow Zhou state, since ‘one ought to use virtue to pacify the Central States, and punishments only against the barbarians’.

When the state of Lu is contemplating breaking its alliance with the state of Jin and forming a new alliance with the southern state of Chu, which was not originally part of the Central States, they are dissuaded from doing so, as ‘the Jin may be without dao (i.e. a moral course/government), but one cannot betray them, for their state is large and their officials harmonious. They are also our kin (…) the Chu might also be large, but they are not our kin. How can they genuinely love us?’

While in the early Spring and Autumn period the differences between the Zhou and non-Zhou states seemed to be drawn on the political reality facing these states, one can see that by the time of the late Spring and Autumn period and early Warring States period, a clear separation between the Zhou and non-Zhou states appeared in the political rhetoric of the time, even if this was not reflected in reality. In times where such an ‘othering’ of non-Zhou states does appear, it almost always appears in the context of justifications for war and alliances.

However, it must be noted that such hostile portrayals did not automatically imply moral inferiority. On the contrary, one particular passage in the Zuo Zhuan records the Duke of Jin summoning a Rong chief to his court and admonishing him for a perceived betrayal. The Rong chief defends himself, arguing that ‘the Jin is above and the Rong below (…) We, the Rong, have always fought by your side in a hundred wars (…) and never retreated. We, the Rong, have different foods and clothing to the Central States. Our currencies are not accepted and our languages are mutually unintelligible. What evils could we possibly harbour [against the Jin]?’

Despite this unambiguous alienation of a non-

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148 Zuo Zhuan, 21st Year of Duke Xi: ‘保小寡，周禮也，蠻夷猾夏，周禍也 (protecting the weaker states, that is how the Zhou conduct affairs. When the barbarians harass us, that is our [Zhou’s] woe).

149 Zuo Zhuan, 25th Year of Duke Xi: ‘德以柔中國，刑以威四夷，宜吾不敢服也，此誰非王之親姻，其俘之也 (You ought to use virtue to pacify the Central States, and punishments only against the barbarians! That is why we dare not to surrender. Are we not all relatives of the royal house [of Zhou]? It is not right for us to become your captives!).


151 Zuo Zhuan, 14th Year of Duke Xiang: ‘晉禦其上,戎亢其下 (…) 是以來,晉之百役,與我諸戎相繼於時 (…) 豈敢離逖? (…) 我諸戎飲食衣服,不與華同,茲幣不通,言語不達,何惡之能為?’
Zhou people (from the non-Zhou themselves), the Rong chief is presented as educated and righteous, even penning a poem after his defence speech to illustrate his unhappiness at being accused of treachery. Seeing this, the Duke is recorded to have regretted his actions and apologised to the chief.\textsuperscript{152} In an earlier passage, the Rong tribes arrive in the Central States to pay tribute to the King of Zhou and are noted to have been received as 賓 (bin), or ‘honoured guests’, by all except Duke Fan, whom the Rong promptly kidnap as punishment.\textsuperscript{153} This action is not condemned by the author. Rather, the implication is that Duke Fan was the one who committed an offence for his refusal to honour a guest of the King. Likewise, the Zuo Zhuan records the Rong punishing the State of Wen for the latter’s repeated dishonouring of alliances (Zuo Zhuan, 10\textsuperscript{th} year of Duke Xi). This action is portrayed as entirely justified, as even the King of Zhou refused to aid the Duke of Wen. In the Analects, when Confucius’ disciples show surprise at the philosopher’s desire to go live with the Yi tribes and interject that ‘they are so uncouth!’, Confucius simply replies: ‘If a sage were to live amongst them, what uncouthness could there be?’ (Analects 9.14).\textsuperscript{154} Later, Confucius declares that ‘being honest and trustworthy in one’s speech and being respectful and sincere in one’s actions, this is honoured even amongst the Man and the Mo tribes’ (Analects 15.6).\textsuperscript{155} As such, despite the level of alienation increasing in the Late Spring and Autumn period, non-Zhou peoples were still not yet permanently relegated to the state of immorality or ‘barbarity’.\textsuperscript{156}

One passage in the Zuo Zhuan, however, deserves a closer analysis as it not only ‘others’ non-Zhou peoples but also implies a moral or cultural deficiency on their part. In Zuo Zhuan, 1\textsuperscript{st} Year of Duke Min, the Rong peoples are described as ‘insatiable, like jackals and wolves (...) but the various states of the Xia (i.e. the Central States) are kin and should not be abandoned’.\textsuperscript{157} This is one of the only occasions in the Zuo Zhuan where a non-Zhou people is both ‘othered’ from the Zhou states and

\textsuperscript{152} Zuo Zhuan, 14\textsuperscript{th} Year of Duke Xiang.
\textsuperscript{153} Zuo Zhuan, 7\textsuperscript{th} Year of Duke Yin.
\textsuperscript{154} Analects 9.14: ‘子欲居九夷。或曰：“陋，如之何！”子曰：“君子居之，何陋之有?”’
\textsuperscript{155} Analects 15.6: ‘言忠信，行笃敬，虽蛮貊之邦行矣’.
\textsuperscript{156} Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 93, 99.
\textsuperscript{157} Zuo Zhuan, 1\textsuperscript{st} Year of Duke Min: ‘戎狄豺狼，不可厭也，諸夏親暱，不可棄也’. 
portrayed as barbaric and immoral. Despite this portrayal being rare, the context of this passage is incredibly important in understanding the development of the Chinese-barbarian divide. The quote is part of a political rhetoric coming from an advisor persuading the Duke of Qi to honour an alliance with the State of Xing when the latter was being invaded by the Rong. The reason for ‘barbarising’ non-Zhou peoples as part of a persuasion for war can only be fully understood by also analysing the evolution of the idea of ‘just war’ from the Early to the Late Spring and Autumn Period.

The concepts of ‘virtue’ and ‘just war’ had been slowly evolving during the Spring and Autumn period. By the late Spring and Autumn period, the Central States had been in a constant state of war for the past 300 years and hatred towards warfare, especially by the common populace, is well attested in the *Zuo Zhuan*. Warfare is described as a fire by which you consume yourself (*Zuo Zhuan*, 4th Year of Duke Yin). In a later passage – in which a new Duke of Song initiated 11 wars in 10 years – the people grew so sick of warfare that they assassinated their Duke (*Zuo Zhuan*, 2nd Year of Duke Heng). The idea of a ‘virtuous’ or ‘just’ war gradually became more and more prominent to justify the constant warfare to both the common populace and other aristocrats. An overwhelming number of wars recorded in the *Zuo Zhuan* claimed a moral *casus belli*. When discussing the wars waged by the southern state of Chu, Chu is described as ‘not having deviated from their righteous and moral laws’ and as such ‘is unstoppable and cannot be conquered’. Because Chu was so righteous, ‘they invaded Chen the year before, and Zheng this year. Yet the people do not tire of war

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158. As presented in the *Zuo Zhuan*, warfare was almost constant amongst the Zhou vassals. It is difficult to say if such ‘constant’ warfare was viewed as ‘civil strife’, as that is dependent on the extent to which the Zhou vassals considered themselves part of the same political entity, which is still heavily debated. Regardless of whether such wars were thought to be internal or external, the detestation of warfare was still stressed.


160. Listing every instance would be overwhelming. To give one example, in the 11th Year of Duke Yin, the Duke of Zheng justifies his invasion of the Dukedom of Xu as that the divine was displeased with the latter and sent him (Duke of Zheng) as a punishment.

and the ruler is not criticised’. In a later passage, this idea of a ‘just war’ is most clearly stated by an advisor to the Duke of Song:

‘Without war, one cannot chastise the proud and those prideful will begin rebellions, which will lead to destruction (…) Warfare is an ancient institution to punish the rebellious as well as to spread virtue afar. The sage is elevated by war, and the rebellious are destroyed by war’ (Zuo Zhuan, 27th Year of Duke Xiang).

Thus, one can see that the idea of a ‘just war’ was pervasive in the political rhetoric of the time. While in the vast majority of cases the casus belli most cited was revenge for a particular crime or wrong, one can see the incipient stages of the barbarisation of non-Zhou peoples in the previously examined ‘jackal and wolf’ passage. By ostracising non-Zhou peoples and declaring them to be innately immoral or barbaric, the Zhou states could permanently justify their expansions into ‘barbaric’ lands. It was this pejorative portrayal of barbarians, rather than the more neutral portrayals common in the Spring and Autumn period, that came to dominate in the following Warring States period.

**Warring States Period (476 – 221 BCE)**

As demonstrated, the ‘othering’ and barbarisation of non-Zhou peoples was intricately linked with the Central States’ need to justify their expansion and warfare. By the Warring States period, both warfare and the barbarisation of non-Zhou peoples increased to an unprecedented level.

‘Barbarisation’ would become the common method by which China portrayed foreigners throughout the imperial period. As such, it would be prudent to examine first the change in the political situation of China between the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States.

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162 Zuo Zhuan, 12th Year of Duke Xuan: ‘昔歲入陳，今茲入鄭，民不罷勞，君無怨讟’.
164 Creel, Origin of Statecraft, 198; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 106, 112.
165 Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 112.
166 Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 106; Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 39 – 43.
As China moved into the Warring States period, the chaotic and numerous political ‘proto-states’ in the Spring and Autumn period, with hundreds of statelets contending for supremacy, had given way to seven major states. The Zhou kingship continued to decline in its influence before formally ending in 256 BCE with the major states each claiming kingship for themselves. As the surviving states now incorporated significantly larger areas and populace, warfare increased in scale and brutality. Warfare shifted from forcing nations to pay tribute or coercing them into alliances to a struggle for survival from outright conquest. In the Zuo Zhuan, a battle in which a mere 250 captives were taken prisoner was deemed important enough to record. Yet, by the time of the Warring States, warfare had increased to such a scale that at the Battle of Changping, the Qin captured some 400,000 Zhao troops, all of whom were buried alive (Shiji 73.2335). As it was now the very existence of the state which was at risk, states that could afford to expand and gain additional land and populace did so in order to survive. As noted by Hsu, every Spring and Autumn state that became powerful by the time of the Warring States period had been on the peripheries of the old Zhou sphere of influence and thus could afford to expand into ‘barbaric’ lands.

However, due to the constant level of warfare which had lasted several hundred years, the hatred for war and desire for unity and peace became significantly more prominent in Warring States

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167 Bodde, *State and Empire of Ch’in*, 22.
169 Yang, Zhanquoshi, 291.
170 See Zuo Zhuan, 2nd Year of Duke Xuan.
171 The Battle of Changping occurred in the late 260s BCE. Yang, Zhanquoshi, 286; Jiang, Zhongguo Gudai Shi, 72. It must be noted, however, that this figure of 400,000 was probably highly exaggerated. Despite that, even if the figure had been inflated tenfold (or even one-hundredfold), the number of captives would still have been tremendous compared to numbers in the Spring and Autumn period.
173 Hsu, *Spring and Autumn Period*, 500.
174 In the Spring and Autumn Period (771 – 476 BCE), only 38 years were without war. In the Warring States period (475 – 221 BCE), only 89 years were without war. See Bodde, *The State and Empire of Ch’in*, 24. While, on the surface, the Warring States period had more periods of ‘peace’, when warfare did occur it was on a significantly larger scale and was far more brutal.
literature.\textsuperscript{175} Almost every philosophical school reflected this aversion to warfare. Mencius states that ‘if a ruler does not seek the righteous path and set his mind towards virtue but focuses only on warfare (...) even if he gains the world he cannot hold it for a day!’ (Mencius 6B9).\textsuperscript{176} In a later passage, Mencius argues that ‘there were no just wars in the Spring and Autumn period (...) for [a just war ought to be] the Son of Heaven punishing vassals, not vassals fighting each other’ (Mencius 7B2).\textsuperscript{177} The author/s of \textit{Dao De Jing} (traditionally considered to be Lao Zi), states: ‘to allow the people to be free from strife (...) and to bring to their hearts peace. This is the way a sage rules the world’ (Laozi 3).\textsuperscript{178} Zhuangzi, a Taoist philosopher, defines ‘a battle that saves the people (...) [and] a war that saves the world’ as one that ‘ceases strife and lays to rest the army’.\textsuperscript{179} Xunzi, a Confucian philosopher whose works inspired the Legalists, outright laments: ‘why do humans have warfare? I am ashamed of this!’\textsuperscript{180} Lord Shang, an advisor to the Qin court, states bluntly that ‘the people hate all those who wage war’.\textsuperscript{181} Despite this anti-war sentiment being visible in almost all social strata, the incessant struggle for supremacy between the Warring States forced constant warfare. Driven by both the need for war and the need to portray themselves as wanting peace for the people, the idea of the ‘just war’, already developing in earlier periods, was reaffirmed with unprecedented intensity in the Warring States Period.

In order to justify warfare to the populace, conceptions of a ‘just war’ evolved from simply punishing a specific wrong or crime to a ‘moral’ war against those who were portrayed as innately bellicose, so that, through righteous warfare, a virtuous king could bring peace to ‘All under Heaven’. Therefore, even though almost all the literature was vehemently anti-war, the necessity of ‘just wars’ to

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\textsuperscript{175} Yang, Zhanguo Shi, 381.
\textsuperscript{176} Mencius 6B9: ‘君不顧道，不志於仁，而求為之強戰 (...) 雖與之天下，不能一朝居也’. Please note that the passage/section numbers for Mencius differ from edition to edition. The edition I used did not have any at all. As such, I have utilised D. C. Lau’s section divisions here.
\textsuperscript{177} Mencius 7B2: ‘春秋無義戰 (...) 征者上伐下也，敵國不相征也’. For a further analysis of this passage, see Liang Qichao, \textit{Xianqin Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi} (Xianqin Zhengzhi Sixiang Shi), Beijing: Renming Daxue Press, 2012, p. 173
\textsuperscript{178} Laozi 3: ‘使民不爭 (...) 使心不亂。是以聖人之治’.
\textsuperscript{179} Zhuangzi, \textit{Tianxia}: ‘救民之鬥， 禁攻席兵，救世之戰’.
\textsuperscript{180} Xunzi, \textit{Rongru}: ‘人之有鬥， 何哉？我甚醜之’.
\textsuperscript{181} Book of Lord Shang, 18: ‘凡戰者，民之所惡也’.
ultimately bring peace was still contemplated. When asked ‘who can wage war’, Mencius replies: ‘a representative of Heaven can’ (Mencius 2B8). Mencius even declares that, if the virtue of a ruler is so great, people will even look forward to being conquered: ‘[when] Tang (a mythical sage king) invaded (...) east, the western barbarians complained. When he invaded south, the northern barbarians complained. They asked him, “why do you invade us last?” The people looked out for him as if for rain in a drought’ (Mencicus 1B11). Xunzi, despite deploring war, still criticises those who do not look forward to ‘unification’, and believes that one ought to ‘use a virtuous army to conquer All under Heaven. All nearby will love their virtue and all faraway will love their righteousness.’ Lü Buwei unambiguously states that ‘righteous war is the best medicine for curing the world’, and that warfare is like a parent punishing a child to prevent further wrongdoings. Thus, the concept of a ‘just war’ grew in sophistication. Rather than punishing a specific wrong, a

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182 Numerous philosophers use the word ‘— (yi)’ to describe their desired state of the world. As a noun, ‘—’ means ‘one’. As a verb, ‘—’ means ‘to bring into the state of “oneness”’, that is, ‘to unify’. However, what ‘unification’ refers to changes throughout history. By the imperial period, the term almost certainly implied the rule of a single ‘Son of Heaven’ in the form of the emperor. There is little to suggest that this was the case in the Warring States period. While all philosophers sought to ‘—’ the world, almost none of them advocated for the abolition of other states or kingdoms. It is highly likely that this ‘unification’ was the establishment (or re-establishment) of the Zhou-style hegemonic rule, rather than the creation of a whole new system, as the imperial Qin dynasty would go on to do.

183 Mencius 2B8: ‘彼如曰: 孰可以伐之? 則將應之曰:為天吏,則可以伐之 (If they should ask: “who can wage war?” I shall reply: “a representative of Heaven can.”)’.

184 Mencius 1B11: ‘湯一征 (…) 東面而征,西夷怨;南面而征,北狄怨。曰,奚為後我? 民望之,若大旱之望雲霓也’.

185 Xunzi, Fei Shierzi: ‘不知壹天下 (…) 然而其持之有故,其言之成理,足以欺惑愚眾 (There are those who do not advocate for unification (...) yet they pretend that their cause is righteous and that their words are rational, so much so that the people are deceived by them)’.

186 Xunzi, Yibing: ‘皆以仁義之兵,行於天下也。故近者親其善,遠方慕其德’.

187 Lushi Chunqiu, Dangbing: ‘義兵之為天下良藥也亦大矣’.

188 Lushi Chunqiu, Dangbing: ‘家無怒笞,則豎子嬰兒之有過也立見;國無刑罰,則百姓之悟相侵也立見;天下無誅伐,則諸侯之相暴也立見。怒笞不可偃於家,刑罰不可偃於國,誅伐不可偃於天下 (…) 故古之聖王有義兵而無有偃兵 (If a household lacks discipline, then the servants and children would be immediate in their wrongdoing. If a state is without punishments, then the people would be immediate in the robbing and assaulting of each other. If there is no warfare under Heaven, then the vassals would be immediate in resorting to violence. A family cannot be without discipline, a state cannot be without punishments, and the world cannot be without war (...) thus, the sage kings of old never ceased in their warfare, but were righteous in their warfare)’. 
‘just war’ became that of a sage, one hoped by all to unify ‘All under Heaven’, to conquer all those who do not submit, as only those who are immoral would not submit willingly.\footnote{See particularly Lüshi Chunqiu, \textit{Huaichong}: ‘若此而猶有憂怨冒疾遂過不聽者，雖行武焉亦可矣’ (Therefore, if there are those who, due to stubbornness or jealousy, still refuse to submit, then the use of warfare against them is acceptable).} 189

As a result of this, one finds that the dehumanisation and the relegation of enemies to a permanent position of immorality became much more frequent. There were almost no positive portrayals of ‘barbarians’ during the Warring States period.\footnote{Of course, it must be noted that the sources available in the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period are different. The \textit{Zuo Zhuan} is annalistic, while many texts during the Warring States period are philosophical texts that began exploring ‘human nature’, ‘civility’, and ‘barbarity’. See Kim, \textit{Ethnicity and Foreigners}, 59, 64 for an examination of this.} 190 Their alien nature or their immorality were emphasised and this was often followed by an explicit or implicit urge for them to be subjugated.\footnote{Di Cosmo, \textit{Ancient China and Its Enemies}, 125; Poo, \textit{Enemies of Civilization}, 123.}

Mencius affirms the moral and cultural inferiority of ‘barbarians’, declaring that he has only ‘heard of using the Xia (the culture and morals of the Central States) to convert the Yi (i.e. barbarians), but I have never heard of one [of Xia] converting into a Yi’ (Mencius 3A4).\footnote{Mencius 3A4: ‘吾聞用夏變夷者，未聞變於夷者也’.} 191 Han Fei Zi, in his eponymous work, records an instance where the Duke of Qin invades the Rong as the Rong king has been enthralled by women and lavish feats and ceased managing his country.\footnote{Han Fei Zi, \textit{Shiguo}: ‘舉兵而伐之，兼國十二，開地千里’.} 193 Han Fei Zi applauds the Duke for ‘conquering a dozen states and thousands of square miles of land [from the Rong]’.\footnote{Di Cosmo, \textit{Shiguo}.}

Referring to the same event, Lü Buwei declares that the Duke of Qin, by ‘maintaining his righteousness, was able to wash away the shame of past defeats and expand Qin territory into the west’.\footnote{Lü Buwei declares that the Duke of Qin, by ‘maintaining his righteousness, was able to wash away the shame of past defeats and expand Qin territory into the west’.} 195 The Qin also portrayed the King of Shu (modern day Sichuan) as lustful and greedy, thus justifying Qin’s conquest of his state.\footnote{The Qin also portrayed the King of Shu (modern day Sichuan) as lustful and greedy, thus justifying Qin’s conquest of his state.} 196 The ‘barbarian’ became consistently equated with immorality, someone that a virtuous ruler ought to punish, subjugate and conquer.\footnote{The ‘barbarian’ became consistently equated with immorality, someone that a virtuous ruler ought to punish, subjugate and conquer.}

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connection between immorality and barbarism became such a defining feature that many states that formed part of the Central States and were not designated as the ‘other’ previously became designated as ‘barbaric’ to justify campaigns from other states. The concepts of ‘barbarism’, immorality, and a ‘just war’ were so intertwined that Di Cosmo argues that by the end of the Warring States period, ‘barbarism’ became almost entirely a political denunciation for the purposes of rhetoric with no cultural or ethnic differentiation.

In summary, the populace during the Warring States period resented the constant state of warfare and craved peace. Yet, due to the political situation at the time, the rulers of the various states could not lay down their arms, regardless of their own wishes. Thus, a justification for their continued warfare and expansion was required. The various political texts of the Warring States period ‘updated’ the ideal of a sage ruler to one who uses a righteous army to punish all those who are immoral with the ultimate purpose of unifying ‘All under Heaven’ and bringing to the populace the peace they desire. It was in this context that the portrayals of barbarians evolved during this period. Non-Zhou peoples were unambiguously ‘othered’ and, more often than not, relegated to the sphere of immorality and cultural inferiority to justify the wars the Warring States waged against them. This new portrayal of barbarians became the norm throughout the early Imperial period.

Conclusion

From this examination of the evolution of Chinese views on the ‘barbarian’, it is clear that it was the result of a long period of development and change. The earliest surviving Chinese texts of the Early Spring and Autumn period show almost no evidence of a clear-cut division between the Zhou states and non-Zhou peoples. While some passages seem to imply a difference between Zhou vassals and

198 In the earlier periods, the differing customs of such states may have been highlighted, but they were never barred from entry into the political stage of the Zhou polity. Yet by the end of the Warring States period, Qin and Chu, both major members of the Zhou political sphere, repeatedly suffered charges of ‘barbarism’. See Yuri Pines, ‘Beasts or Humans: Pre-Imperial Origins of the Sino-Barbarian Dichotomy’, in Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World, ed. Reuven Amitai and Michael Biran, Boston: Brill, 2005, p. 89 and Lewis, The Early Chinese Empires, 39.

199 See Di Cosmo, Ancient China and Its Enemies, 102.
those outside of Zhou control, there was little to suggest that this was anything more than a political
division reflecting the real limitations of the Zhou state at the time. There was nothing in the
vocabulary to suggest any cultural alienation and certainly not ‘barbarisation’. However, it was
during this period that the idea of a ‘virtuous’ ruler, one who was tasked with the ‘Mandate of
Heaven’ to rule and pacify ‘All under Heaven’, developed. At this time, this political ‘ideology’ was
used predominately by the Zhou aristocrats to justify their overthrow of the former Shang dynasty
and only rarely utilised against non-Zhou peoples.

By the Late Spring and Autumn period, the concept of a ‘virtuous ruler’ had solidified in Zhou
political thought. A ruler ought to be virtuous in all his actions. Thus, the idea of a ‘just war’ was
further developed: a ‘just war’ became one waged by a virtuous ruler who used the army to chastise
and punish the crimes of another ruler. The vast majority of the portrayals of non-Zhou peoples
remained entirely neutral with nothing in the vocabulary to suggest any *de facto* inferiority, which
was an accurate representation of the political situation at the time. Even though there were
passages in the literature suggesting a cultural difference, there was still very little to suggest that
the non-Zhou peoples were permanently relegated to barbarism, with some passages even placing
the non-Zhou peoples in a position of moral superiority with the Central States in the wrong.
However, in the rare passages where non-Zhou peoples were not only ‘othered’ but also barbarised,
one finds that the context of such passages was almost always part of some political rhetoric to
justify war. As a result, the portrayal of non-Zhou peoples and warfare began to form an interlinked
relationship.

By the Warring States period, warfare had increased to an unprecedented level. As a result, the
common populace repeatedly expressed their antipathy towards war, and their desire for peace was
reflected in almost all literature during this time. Therefore, the concept of a ‘just war’ also grew in
complexity. Rather than simply punishing a specific wrong, a virtuous ruler was now expected to use
his armies righteously to pacify ‘All under Heaven’ and bring peace to the people. Utilising such a
rhetoric to justify continued conquest, portrayals of non-Zhou peoples during this time period became unambiguously hostile and polarising. Non-Zhou peoples were portrayed as culturally inferior and thus needing to be ‘enlightened’ by Chinese rule. They were deliberately portrayed as immoral and hubristic for refusing to submit to a virtuous ‘Son of Heaven’ and thus needing to be conquered. This new requirement of being able to pacify ‘All under Heaven’ as a prerequisite for becoming a virtuous ruler was twofold. First, it involved being able to put an end to the constant warfare that had enveloped the Central States and bring peace to the people. Second, it required the subjugation of those beyond the Central States. Non-Chinese peoples needed to submit either because they recognised the virtue of the ‘Son of Heaven’, or they needed to be conquered forcibly as they were impious and immoral. Their conquest thus ‘preserved’ the peace of the Central States and the integrity of the Sinocentric cosmic world order, which developed further in the imperial era. However, it must be stressed that, even in the contexts of war and peace, portrayals of ‘barbarians’/foreigners were not exclusively limited to the military context; their subjugation was considered ‘moral’, even ‘divinely-ordained’, rather than just a sign of the military prowess of the ruler.

Thus, it was this two-fold requirement of pacification, both internal and external, that became a precondition for a virtuous ruler. Pacifying ‘All under Heaven’ became the sign of a virtuous ruler tasked with the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. With the violent closing of the Warring States in 221 BCE as Qin Shi Huang unified China, this was the framework in which he constructed his imperial image in order to justify and legitimise his rule to the new empire.
CHAPTER TWO
PRE-IMPERIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGNERS, EXPANSION, AND PEACE IN ROME

This thesis will now analyse Republican Roman attitudes towards foreigners, expansion, and peace from as early as the surviving sources allow for a reasonable examination down to the formation of the Second Triumvirate. Much like ancient China, Rome did not have a static attitude or perception towards warfare or foreigners. Rather, Roman attitudes of a ‘just war’ – *bellum iustum* – and a civilised-barbaric divide, both of which were abundantly visible by the Triumviral (43 – 27 BCE) period, were the result of shifting perceptions over many centuries.

Thus, this chapter will argue that Rome also had a strong concept of a *bellum iustum*. The incipient stages of this idea were already visible during the Early Republic, but they intensified during Rome’s expansion into the Mediterranean, particularly due to its interactions with the Hellenic world. As this chapter will show, Rome’s idea of a ‘*bellum iustum*’ was first conceived of as punishments for specific wrongs, much as in ancient China. As Rome’s empire expanded, this concept continued to evolve both to justify the successes of Rome as well as to cement its position as ‘moral’ in its imperial wars of conquest. This developed into the idea of a divinely-blessed mission to subjugate the known world.

This chapter will further argue that a civilised-barbaric divide also began to form alongside Rome’s expansions. Rome’s interaction with other Mediterranean cultures, particularly Hellenic culture, spurred it into defining its own cultural identity; this cultural identity highlighted its ‘superior’ moral qualities both as a rebuke against Hellenistic views that Romans were ‘barbarians’ as well as to explain Roman successes. By the Late Republic, ideas of morality, warfare, and foreigners were all intrinsically linked.
Early Rome (Regal Period to the First Punic War, 753 – 264 BCE)

Exploring the history of the Regal and Early Republican period of Rome is fraught with difficulties. There are no significant Roman records until the late 3rd century BCE. Even then, they only survive in a fragmentary state with the best preserved sources on early Roman history, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy, written well into the early Principate. As this chapter focuses on attitudes and perceptions, it could easily become overly speculative, as there is insufficient evidence to prove that the perceptions and attitudes of later authors were a genuine reflection of the views held in earlier periods. There is a risk that those authors were applying their own prejudices and biases to previous events, revealing more about the authors’ own time period than the period under investigation. Even analysing the events recorded to extract early Roman attitudes towards warfare and foreigners is precarious. Forsythe suggests that a number of events recorded by later authors, such as Livy’s accounts of the conquest of Fidenae (Liv. 4.17.1) and the wars against the Veii during the 5th century BCE (Liv. 4.30 – 4.31), were deliberately altered in order to maintain a moralistic narrative, often one of a ‘righteous’ Rome. For Fidenae, Forsythe posits that the slaying of the ambassadors, cited by Livy as the casus belli of Rome, may have occurred in the middle of the war rather than at the beginning. Other tales, such as the First Veientine War in the early 5th century BCE and the ten-year siege of the Veii in the Third Veientine War, were suggested to have

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been consciously composed to mimic the Battle of Thermopylae and the siege of Troy, respectively. Richardson argues that later Romans would often write their history based on what was considered plausible or within the expectations of the audiences of the later period, rather than as a strict record of events. With the historical record of events being of dubious veracity – and delving into archaeological evidence to prove the accuracy of later accounts being beyond the scope of this thesis – this section will focus solely on events that can be reasonably proven to have happened or agreed upon by academic consensus.

Both Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus document a tremendous amount of warfare during the Early Republic and, as a result, numerous treaties signed between Rome and non-Roman peoples. One such treaty, the *Foedus Cassianum*, signed between Rome and its allies who formed the Latin League, seemed still to exist in the Late Republic and thus was likely to have been recorded accurately. Cicero mentions that the treaty was common knowledge, as it had been ‘carved and inscribed into that bronze column behind the rostra’ (Cic. *Balb.* 53). Despite Livy’s and Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ portrayal of Rome as parallel to their own times, there is little in the language of this treaty to suggest any form of Roman superiority. In a fragmentary recording of the treaty, the vocabulary seems to imply that the leadership of the alliance was rotated between the cities, rather than held purely by Rome.

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208 Cic. *Balb.* 53: ‘*in columna ahenea (...) post rostra incisum et perscriptum fuisse*’.
209 See Liv. 2.33.4 and Dion. Hal. 6.95.2 for their record of the treaty. See also Forsythe, *Critical History of Early Rome*, 187 – 188.
Even as Rome achieved hegemony over the Italian peninsula and its rising power brought it into closer relations with foreign states outside of Italy, there was still a lack of evidence to suggest any ‘othering’. Polybius records and translates a series of treaties signed between Rome and Carthage with the first occurring ‘28 years before the invasion of Xerxes’ and the last ‘during the invasion of Pyrrhus’ (Polyb. 3.22 – 3.25). The records of such treaties are considered genuine, as they still survived during Polybius’ time and his text implies that he personally translated them. The very first treaty opens with this line: ‘there will be friendship (φιλίαν) between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies’ (Polyb. 3.22.4). Scullard argues that the use of ‘φιλίαν’, within the context of this treaty at least, implies that there was no ‘othering’ or ‘inequality’ between Romans and non-Romans (in this case, Carthage and its allies). Further, if Justin’s quotation of Pompeius Trogus is accurate – and if Trogus himself was recording the events truthfully – Rome and Massalia also entered an ‘alliance with equal rights’ – ‘foedus aequo iure’ – after the sack of Rome by the Gauls (Just. Epit. 43.5). Moreover, the defeat of the Latins often involved annexation followed by the distribution of full Roman citizenship and even non-Latin peoples during this time were still incorporated, also with full citizenship if not at least civitas sine suffragio (citizenship without the vote). Yet, during this time, the cultural differences between the various...

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212 Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, 211. See Polyb. 3.22.3: ‘ἀς καθ’ ὅσον ἦν δυνατόν ἀκριβέστατα διερμηνεύσαντες ἠμεῖς ὑπογράφαμεν. τηλικαύτη γάρ ἡ διαφορὰ γέγονε τῆς διαλέκτου καὶ παρὰ Ρωμαίους τῆς νῦν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχαίαν ὡστε τοὺς συνετωτάτους ένια μόλις εξ ἐπιστάσεως διευκρινεῖν’. See also Polyb. 3.26.1: ‘τούτων δὲ τοιούτων ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ τηρουμένων τῶν συνθηκῶν ἐτὶ νῦν ἐν χαλκώμασι παρὰ τὸν Δία τὸν Καπετώλιον ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀγορανόμων ταμείῳ (...).’  
213 Polyb. 3.22.4: ‘ἐπὶ τοίοδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ρωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ρωμαίοις συμμάχοις καὶ Ἐλληνισμός τοὺς Ἀρκάδους συμμάχους καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις συμμάχους.’  
Italian peoples were significant, with differences in language, customs, religion, and level of urbanisation persisting even down to the Social War (91 – 88 BCE).\(^{217}\) Despite this, there was little to suggest any ‘othering’ or ‘barbarisation’ of non-Romans, or even non-Latins, during this time period.\(^ {218}\)

However, similar to the early Spring and Autumn period, the level of warfare Rome engaged in during this period increased over time, as they often maintained their complex system of alliances by continual warfare.\(^ {219}\) As a result, rhetoric surrounding warfare also began to develop. While the idea that Rome always fought – or at least, ought to have fought – ‘just wars’ sanctioned by its gods would not be clearly visible until much later, it had already begun to emerge in the Early Republic. According to Livy, early Romans practised the ritualistic declaration of war by the Fetiales priests as a direct attempt to garner the favour of Jupiter and would also curse themselves with exile had they acted ‘\textit{iniuste impieque}’ in declaring war (Liv. 1.32.5 – 14).\(^ {220}\) While the existence of this ritual seems to confirm that early Rome did indeed have the concept of a ‘just’ and ‘pious’ war, it is difficult to ascertain the reliability of Livy’s account, as the ritual had ceased to be conducted by roughly 280 BCE. As Harris argues, accepting the record of this ritual, particularly its alleged claim of justifying warfare, is dangerous due to the potential historical inaccuracy.\(^ {221}\) However, Livy also records that Titus Quinctius erected a tablet in the year 380 BCE, which Cornell asserts ‘survived to the Late Republic’ and thus indicates that Livy’s record of it would most likely have been accurate, inscribed with the words: ‘Jupiter and all the gods granted [T. Quinctius] this, that the dictator T. Quinctius


\(^{219}\) See Cornell, \textit{Beginnings of Rome}, 366. Most of Rome’s alliances were military alliances where allies only provided troops. If Rome did not engage in war, as Cornell argues, then it was wasting its command of the alliance and weakening its position as the hegemon of Italy.

\(^{220}\) For another record of the ritual (although still contemporary to Livy), see Dion. Hal. 2.72, particularly section 4, where Dionysius of Halicarnassus also claims that the function of the priests was so that ‘\textit{μηδένα Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεμον ἐξενέγκωσι (…) ἀδικοὺν’}.

would seize nine towns’ (Liv. 6.29.9).\textsuperscript{222} While the authenticity of the ritual remains contentious, the survival of Quinctius’ tablet implies that in the Early Republic, rhetoric surrounding war had already begun to suggest the idea of a \textit{bellum iustum}, although such instances are rare (possibly due to a lack of surviving sources).

In summary, during the Early Republic, there was no concrete evidence that Rome ‘othered’ non-Romans in any way, nor portrayed themselves as indisputably superior. Even as Rome succeeded in its struggles on the Italian peninsula and gained dominion over the area, it then had to contend with foreign peoples and states that were as powerful, if not more powerful, than Rome. Thus, also taking into account the minimal level of surviving texts and records, there is insufficient evidence to suggest any visible civilised-barbaric divide during this period. However, one can see the incipient stages of the idea of ‘just war’ as well as divine sanction and support in regard to warfare. Finally, as Rome expanded and contended further with its Mediterranean neighbours, such interactions, particularly as a reaction to Rome’s Hellenisation, began to form a civilised-barbaric divide.

\textbf{Mid-Republic (First Punic War to the end of the Macedonian Wars, 264 – 148 BCE)}

As Rome gained dominion over the Italian peninsula, its rising status in the Mediterranean world also brought it into closer connection, and later conflict, with other Mediterranean powers. This section will analyse Rome’s interactions with foreign peoples and the development of the civilised-barbaric divide in the Middle Republic, particularly focusing on the Punic and Macedonian Wars, as these wars were not only the first to be fought on foreign soil but also marked Rome’s acquisition of an overseas empire. As this chapter will show, Rome’s Hellenisation during and after the Macedonian Wars motivated it to define its own cultural identity, often one that was morally

\textsuperscript{222} Liv. 6.29.9: ‘\textit{Iuppiter atque divi omnes hoc dederunt, ut T. Quinctius dictator oppida novem capere’}. Cornell, \textit{Beginnings of Rome}, 323.
superior to its neighbours. One of the major sources for this period is the Greek historian Polybius. A question immediately arises as to the extent to which a Greek like Polybius would have accurately reflected the attitudes and perceptions of Rome. This issue is compounded by a general lack of Roman sources: despite this period seeing the emergence of Roman literature, such sources are either lost or fragmentary. With the lack of supporting sources, it is difficult to assess fully to what extent Polybius’ own views even reflected those of other Greeks, let alone how far they aligned with the Roman aristocracy.

However, Polybius’ works were quickly accepted and adopted by Roman authors, heavily influencing their own views: Livy’s descriptions of various ‘barbarian’ peoples echoed Polybius extensively. For example, in 2.30, Polybius records the undisciplined and panicked manner of the Gauls in battle. Then in 11.32, he describes the Iberians with words such as ‘παροξυσμένες οἱ βάρβαροι’ and ‘ἀλογίστως’, portraying the barbarians as ill-trained and chaotic. Livy, too, in his account of the Gauls, presents them to be ‘ira et pavore occaecatis animi’ during battle (Liv. 38.21.7).

Polybius’ moral views on the success of Rome were also well received by the Roman aristocracy, with Ogilvie and Drummond arguing that Cicero, in his own analysis of early Rome, was strongly inspired by Polybius. Moreover, Polybius was closely associated with the Roman aristocracy and was even a

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226 Polyb. 2.30.4: ‘τέλος δ’ (…) περικακοῦντες δὲ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι τοῖς παροῦσι, οἱ μὲν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας εἰκῇ προπίπτοντες καὶ διδόντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑκουσίως ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δ’ εἰς τοὺς φίλους ἀναχωροῦντες ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ προδήλως ἀποδειλιῶντες διέστρεφον τοὺς κατόπιν’.
228 For a further discussion on how portrayals of barbarians in Livy echoed those in Polybius, see Eckstein, *Moral Vision*, 120 – 123.
229 See Ogilvie and Drummond, *The Sources for Early Roman History*, 2, where they mention the influence of Polybius on Cicero, particularly Book 2 of Cicero’s *de Re Publica*. See also Emma Dench, *Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
personal friend to Scipio Aemilianus (Polyb. 31.23.1 – 3). As such, Polybius’ views sufficiently influenced those of the Roman elite to justify his inclusion in this analysis.

While there had been inklings of the idea of a ‘bellum iustum’, it is difficult to determine to what extent it permeated the views of the aristocracy. Certainly, Rome had no shortage of wars in the Mid-Republic; yet it would not unambiguously denote its wars as motivated by a moral cause until the early 2nd century BCE. In convincing the Roman populace to go to war against Carthage in the First Punic War (264 – 241 BCE), the reasons cited included both political concerns and the fact that much plunder could be gained in Sicily (Polyb. 1.11.1 – 2). When Rome did produce a moral cause for war, it was framed as a punishment for a specific wrong. This is most clearly displayed by the Roman embassies to Teuta, Rome’s adversary in the Illyrian War (229 – 228 BCE). There, the emissaries declared: ‘the Romans, O Teuta, have a most righteous custom where through our State we pursue private acts of injustice and aid those who have been wronged’ (Polyb. 2.8.10).

While Rome’s incursion into Illyria could be construed as a punishment for a crime (that is, the killing of a Roman ambassador, see Polyb. 2.8.12), there is still very little to suggest an overarching ‘moral’ casus belli, as opposed to a specific and fabricated pretext for invasion. Nevertheless, after Rome’s Illyrian War, Rome sent embassies to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues explicitly so that they could explain themselves: ‘they gave an account of the causes of the war and [the reasons] for their crossing [into Illyria]’ (Polyb. 2.12.4). While Polybius was not overly clear as to the exact rationale

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231 Harris, Roman Imperialism, 63, 185.
232 Polyb. 2.8.9 – 10: Ῥωμαίοις μέν, ὦ Τεύτα, κάλλιστον ἔθος ἐστί τά κατ’ Ἰδίαν ἀδικήματα κοινή μεταπορεύεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις’.
233 For the record of this event, see Polyb. 2.8.12. For a discussion of Rome using the murder of the ambassador as a pretext for war, see Harris, Roman Imperialism, 195. For an argument on how this casus belli did not constitute a moral justification, see Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 144 – 145.
234 Polyb. 2.12.4: ‘ἀπελευθήσαντο τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως’.
behind this action, Champion argues that Rome sent embassies to justify their war to the Greeks (albeit after the war was already over). He further contends that, due to Rome’s increasing contact and connections to the Hellenic world with its invasion of Illyria, it realised the necessity of vindicating its actions in war, vis-à-vis the Hellenic world.

However, the Hellenic world’s attitude towards Rome remained negative. Despite Rome’s victories in the First and Second Macedonian Wars (214 – 196 BCE), the absence of a clear, moral justification for war only led to a renewed Panhellenism in the Greek world. Lyciscus criticises other Greeks for seeking aid from Romans, as they were foreigners threatening to enslave Greece (Polyb. 9.37.7), before outright vilifying the Romans as barbarians (Polyb. 9.38.5). Similarly, an embassy from Rhodes to the Aetolians criticises Roman conduct as ‘ὡμὸν (...) καὶ βαρβαρικὸν’ (Polyb. 11.5.6); the Aetolians’ treaty with Rome was judged likewise: ‘you have handed over all the other Greeks to the barbarians and into the most disgraceful violence and lawlessness’ (Polyb. 11.5.7). As shown by the embassies after the Illyrian War, Rome realised the importance of diplomacy in the Hellenic world. Thus, in order to survive diplomatically in the greater Hellenic and Mediterranean world, Rome needed to alter its presentation further into how and why it went to war.

In order to gain the support of the Greeks and isolate Philip V of Macedon, Titus Quintius Flaminius famously proclaimed at the Isthmian Games in 196 BCE that Rome was now fighting for and guaranteeing the freedom of all Greeks (Polyb. 18.46.5). The Greeks received the news

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237 In the words of Walbank, the Greeks still viewed Rome as ‘an alien non-Greek threat’. See Walbank, *Polybius*, 262, 277.
239 Polyb. 11.5.6. – 7: ‘ἀπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἐκδότους δεδώκατε τοῖς βαρβάροις εἰς τὰς αἰσχίστας ὑβρίδες καὶ παρανομίας’.
ecstatically, with Polybius recalling that ‘[those present], due to the excess of their joy, almost killed Titus while trying to thank him’ (Polyb. 18.46.11).241 By injecting this moral dimension into Rome’s war against Macedon, the Roman senate not only was able to justify its actions but simultaneously portrayed Philip V of Macedon as the new villain of the Greek world.242 Furthermore, by proclaiming a guarantee of peace and freedom for the Greeks, Rome was able to exert its moral and political superiority, as the implication of such a guarantee was that Greek freedom was Rome’s to bestow.243 This casus belli continued to be utilised by Rome in its dealings with the Hellenic world, with Rome maintaining its status as the guardian of Greek freedom as a way of justifying its war against Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire.244 While the decision for this proclamation might have been a pragmatic move to break up Macedon’s hegemony over the rest of Greece, it marked a significant shift in the Roman representation of war. The Roman idea of bellum iustum was no longer simply punishment for a specific wrong, but could now contain an entire moral dimension.

It was also during this period that an unambiguous ‘othering’ of non-Romans began to emerge, a result both of Rome’s newfound martial superiority in the Mediterranean world and of its reaction to the rapid Hellenisation of its aristocracy. With the success of Rome in subjugating the Hellenic world, its aristocracy was increasingly exposed to Hellenic customs and culture, which were embraced enthusiastically.245 However, faced with this seeping Hellenic influence in which Rome had been designated as the ‘barbarian’ only a few decades before, the Roman aristocracy strove to

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241 Polyb. 18.46.11: ‘διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῆς χαρᾶς μικροῦ διέφθειραν τὸν Τίτον εὐχαριστοῦντες’. Flaminius’ proclamation was so well received that he was apparently granted divine honours. According to Walbank, he was hailed with the same ‘cult-titles under which Zeus was worshipped at Athens and Plataea for help against Persia’. See F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967, pp. 613 – 614.

242 Derow, Arrival of Rome, 31.

243 Waterfield, Taken at the Flood, 96; Auyang, Dragon and Eagle, 94.

244 See Polyb. 21.22; Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 153; Dmitriev, The Greek Slogan, 158; Erskine, Roman Imperialism, 26.

245 Gruen, The Hellenic World, 250. Gruen contends that the philhellenism of the Roman aristocracy in the 3rd and 2nd century BCE was undeniable. Even the first known works of Roman history composed by a Roman (Fabius Pictor) were written in Greek.
demarcate a distinct identity for itself, one which could assert and justify its successes over the Hellenic world.246

One major aspect of this newly cemented Roman identity was its moral superiority. This new-found superiority – and redesignation of non-Romans as the immoral ‘barbarian’ – was illustrated best by Cato the Elder. Cato, despite knowing the Greek language and being engaged in Hellenic culture himself, was staunch in his defence of the Roman mos maiorum and traditional morality.247 Plutarch records that Cato, ‘out of his love for [Roman] honour, scorns all Greek literature and learning’ (Plut. Cat. Mai. 23.1 – 4).248 In an earlier passage, Cato even defends his ‘Roman’ bathing customs, attacking the Greeks for their customary nudity (Plut. Cat. Mai. 20.5 – 6).249 Polybius himself notes how, when Aulus Postumius apologised to his audience for writing in less-than-perfect Greek, Cato rebuked him harshly for apologising that his Greek might not be perfect (Polyb. 39.1).250 Almost all other aspects of Hellenic culture were attacked as well. Cato viewed Greek rhetoric as inferior to Roman rhetoric, as ‘the words of the Greeks are carried on their lips, but [the words] of the Romans come from their hearts’ (Plu. Cat. Mai. 12.5).251 Even Greek doctors were not immune, as Cato detested the fact that the Greeks viewed the Romans as barbarians and that their doctors allegedly refused to treat any non-Greek patients (Plut. Cat. Mai. 23.2 – 4). Cato’s views on the Greeks were most succinctly recorded in Pliny, with Cato declaring to his son that the Greeks were ‘a most vile

246 Waterfield, Taken at the Flood, 208, 211, 213; Dmitriev, The Greek Slogan, 155. See also Gauge, Le Barbare, 66 – 70, where Rome is described as having ‘un complexe d’infériorité’ from being barbarised themselves, which in turn influenced its own development of the ‘barbarian’.
248 Plut. Cat. Mai. 23.1 – 4: ‘πᾶσαν Ἑλληνικὴν μοῦσαν καὶ παιδείαν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας προπηλακίζων’.
250 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 257; Gruen, The Hellenic World, 264. See particularly Gruen, Culture and National Identity, 74, where he contends that Cato did not criticise Postumius for his philhellenism, but rather his apology, which ‘reversed the power relationship’ between Rome and Greece due to an aristocrat from the former seeking ‘indulgence’ from the latter.
and unruly race’ (Plin. *HN*. 29.14). As Gruen argues, Cato was displeased that the Greeks, whom the Romans conquered, viewed the Romans as barbarians. As such, Cato constructed an ethnic and cultural identity to assert Roman cultural superiority. His criticisms of Hellenic rhetoric were not targeted at rhetoric *per se* but aimed to demonstrate that Roman methods were superior. For example, when Cato delivered a speech to the Athenians, he deliberately chose to do so in Latin, despite knowing Greek (Plu. *Cat. Mai*. 12.4). Even his rebuke against Greek doctors was not an attack on medical practice in general, but again to show that Roman ways were better, since Cato had his own methods of maintaining his health (Plu. *Cat. Mai*. 23.4). Rosenstein also asserts that Cato believed that Rome gained its empire due to its ‘stern morality and self-restraint’. Gruen argues that the Romans felt that eastern rulers, such as Antiochus and Eumenes, lost their right as leaders of the Mediterranean world due to their lack of such morality and restraint. This new concept of Roman cultural superiority during this time period can also be seen in works beyond Cato. To give one example, to drink the day and night away was described as ‘*pergraecamini*’ (literally: to act like the Greeks) in Plautus’ *Mostellaria* (Pl. *Mostell*. 21).

Thus, during this time period, Rome developed two crucial attitudes. First, as a diplomatic measure, Rome began to incorporate a more expansive moral dimension into their *casus belli*. Rome gradually shifted away from presenting warfare as fought to punish a specific wrong towards being the guardian of peace and freedom of the Hellenic – and the Mediterranean – world, with the implication that anyone acting against Rome would therefore be acting against peace. Second, the combined factors of the Roman aristocracy’s increasing security in its superiority due to its military successes as well as a backlash against the percolating influence of Hellenism amongst the

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256 Gruen, *Culture and National Identity*, 78 – 79.  
258 Gruen, *Culture and National Identity*, 75.  
259 For a further analysis of this line, as well as a discussion on the numerous other negative portrayals of foreigners in the plays of Plautus, see Gruen, *The Hellenistic World*, 261.
aristocracy led it to formulate more definitively its own cultural identity. Of course, this Roman
civilised-barbaric divide did not precisely mirror the emergence of the concept in ancient China. The
Chinese idea of the ‘barbarian’ was developed as a way of justifying China’s wars of aggression
against non-Chinese peoples, rather than as an explanation of their superiority after their successes
in warfare or as a reaction to the influx of a foreign culture. Nevertheless, the manner in which it
manifested in both cultures was remarkably similar. For both Rome and China, the key differences
between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘barbarian’ were culture and morality.260

Late Republic (End of the Macedonian Wars to the Second Triumvirate, 148 – 43 BCE)

As Rome became the dominant power in the Mediterranean in the Late Republic, its perceptions of
warfare and foreigners also shifted. By the Late Republic, it had become difficult to maintain that
Rome’s expansionary wars were ‘defensive imperialism’, or that every war was fought with Rome
defending justice.261 Furthermore, a combination of factors – such as civil strife262 and military
careers no longer being an absolute necessity for political office263 – led to the re-examination of the
purpose of war. As Harris argues, by the late Republic, pax (peace) began to be seen as an ideal end-
goal of warfare and conquest.264 However, as the army, particularly after the Marian Reforms (107
BCE), became increasingly useful to advance a general’s own political agendas through the threat or
actual use of force, war and military command were still desired by ambitious aristocrats.265 Thus,
the concept surrounding what constituted a ‘moral’ war evolved to one where ‘imperial expansion’

261 Although the idea that Rome gained its empire via ‘defensive imperialism’ has been convincingly refuted by
Harris’ War and Imperialism, Eckstein argues that it would be equally wrong to portray Rome as wholly the
aggressor, as Rome still had to contend with numerous other Mediterranean states who were also aggressively
seeking to expand. See Arthur M. Eckstein, Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2009, pp. 119, 176. Harris, however, disagrees, and does argue that
Rome was indeed far more aggressive than other states, considering the number of risky expansions Rome
undertook during the Mid-Republic. See William V. Harris, Roman Power: A Thousand Years of Empire,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 37. For an earlier work where the idea of ‘defensive
imperialism’ was defended, see Homo, Primitive Italy, 254.
263 Harris, Roman Power, 53.
264 Harris, Roman Power, 55; Harris, War and Imperialism, 36, 174.
265 Harris, Roman Power, 66, 88.
in and of itself was not only admirable but divinely sanctioned, as it would ultimately bring pax with
the complete subjugation of Rome’s enemies.\textsuperscript{266} It will be shown that, with the expanding idea of
divine approval for its empire and Rome’s security in its own superiority due to its successes, the
relationship between Rome and foreign states was also transformed. Rarely would such a
relationship, even when described as ‘friendship’, be viewed on a basis of equality.

From around 120 BCE onwards, military service as a criterion for holding political offices became less
strictly applied.\textsuperscript{267} Cicero (106 – 43 BCE), in particular, spent such a short period in military service
that Plutarch devotes only a single line to his military career in his biography of Cicero (Plut. Cic.
3.1).\textsuperscript{268} At the same time, most of the Late Republican writers composed their works during a period
when Rome was already secure in its empire.\textsuperscript{269} These, combined with the continued influx of Greek
philosophy into Rome, led the aristocracy to redefine their attitudes towards war.

The idea that Rome was fighting for the freedom of the Greeks during the Mid-Republic evolved to
encompass all its allies and dependencies. Cicero defends Rome’s empire by declaring that: ‘our
people gained possession of the whole word by defending our allies’ (Cic. Rep. 3.24).\textsuperscript{270} The
possession of Rome’s empire was also due to their justice and morality:

‘But, as long as the empire of the Roman people conducted itself with acts of kindness, not injustice,
wars were waged on behalf of our allies or for our empire, the end of our wars [marked out] either
by lenience or out of minimal necessary punishment, then our senate was a haven and refuge for
kings, peoples, and tribes. Our magistrates and commanders strove to gain great glory in one thing
only: to defend our provinces and allies with justice and loyalty. And so, our [state] could be more
truthfully called a patron of the world than an empire’ (Cic. Off. 2.8).\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{266} Gruen, The Hellenic World, 274, 286; Harris, Roman Power, 55; Gauge, Le Barbare, 85.
\textsuperscript{267} Harris, Roman Power, 53.
\textsuperscript{268} Although it must be stated that Cicero’s political progression is an anomaly. Other political leaders, such as
Crassus, Pompeius Magnus, and Julius Caesar, still had significant military experience and prestige.
Nevertheless, the political career of Cicero showed that it was now possible to achieve high political office
without any notable military experience.
\textsuperscript{269} Gruen, The Hellenistic World, 278.
\textsuperscript{270} Cic. Rep. 3.24: ‘noster autem populus sociis defendendis terrarum iam omnium potitus est’.
\textsuperscript{271} Cic. Off. 2.8: ‘Verum tamen, quam diu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut
pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum,
nationum portus erat et refugium senatus, nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam
laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent; itaque illud patrocinium orbis
terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari’. For analyses of this passage, see Erskine, Roman Imperialism,
This idea, in which Rome not only gained its empire but also held it due to its justice, was so strong in the Late Republic that certain members of the Roman aristocracy viewed it as a criterion for war, not merely an ideal. Cato the Younger, for example, argued that any unjust wars— that is, wars fought without a just cause— should not be fought at all.272 This new view of warfare, in which Rome ought to act as the arbitrator of all peoples and nations in the known world, implied that, if successful, there should ideally be no wars. For the first time, an ideal goal for warfare— pax— could be seen in Roman writings.273 Cicero illustrated this most clearly, by asserting that ‘indeed in my opinion (…) one always ought to keep peace in mind’ and that the only reason for war is ‘in order to live in peace without injuries’ (Cic. Off. 1.11).274 He even suggested that certain laudable pursuits, such as oratory, were only possible after peace had been secured (Cic. De Or. 1.4).275 Yet, despite this shift in Roman perception towards warfare, with war becoming a means to an end rather than an end in and of itself, aristocratic competition did not cease. Ambitious aristocrats still needed to conquer in order to gain wealth, prestige, and power.276 In particular, a victorious and successful commander could have control of an army loyal to himself, which he could then use to exert pressure in the political arena.277 Thus, military successes became even more connected with
prestige and power. As such, while peace was portrayed as an end goal, the idea of ‘empire’ was also lauded and viewed as a concept that was inseparable from this ultimate peace.

For many writers in the Late Republic, war in and of itself may no longer have been endorsed, but ‘empire’ and its profits and protections were.278 Cicero, too, alongside his claims that wars ought to achieve peace, also defends wars waged for empire – a war for an empire is still acceptable as long as the cause is just: ‘even when it is fought on the grounds for an empire or when glory is sought in war, it nevertheless must not lack the same causes which I mentioned before as the just causes for waging war. But even wars waged for the glory of empire should be conducted with the least possible bitterness’ (Cic. Off. 1.12).279 In the Eighth Philippic, he states plainly that Romans ‘used to take up arms not only to be free but also to rule’, but defends such an action as preventing servitude, asking rhetorically: ‘do you believe that we ought to cast aside our arms and be slaves? What is a more just cause for waging war than to ward off slavery?’ (Cic. Phil. 8.4).280 This dual argument – that only just wars ultimately led to peace and that war in order to gain an empire was also righteous – implied that the idea of empire was not incompatible with peace or just wars, and might be considered to be a moral good in and of itself.281

This complex development and entangling of many different attitudes and justifications for warfare is perfectly encapsulated in the works of Julius Caesar. The established concept of ‘defensive imperialism’ is highly conspicuous in the Bellum Gallicum: Caesar went to great lengths to maintain

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278 With the large corpus of surviving literature from the Late Republic, there were certainly views that differed. In Sallust’s view, Rome needed an external enemy, without which – such as after the fall of Carthage – Rome would be swallowed up in internal troubles, a view that is in opposition to Cicero’s endorsement of peace. See Daniel J. Kapust, Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political Thought: Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 30, 45, 70 and T. J. Luce, Livy: The Composition of His History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 288.


280 Cic. Phil. 8.4: ‘non modo ut liberi essent sed etiam ut imperarent, arma capiebant. tu arma abicienda censes ut serviamus? quae causa iustior est belli gerendi quam servitutis depulsio?’

the idea that he was a ‘man of peace’ who was forced to wage defensive wars on behalf of Rome’s allies against bellicose and unreasonable foes. Caesar’s reasons for marching into Gaul were to defend allies (Caes. BGall. 1.11, 1.45) and to prevent the Helvetii migration from threatening Roman lands (Caes. BGall. 1.10). He defended his invasion of Britain by suggesting that British tribes were conspiring with Gallic ones against the interests of Rome (Caes. BGall. 3.8 – 9) and he undertook his crossing of the Rhine ‘to defend all of Gaul from the wrongdoings of Ariovistus’ (Caes. BGall. 1.31). Caesar also portrayed his war against the Helvetii as ‘due to the ancestral wrongs committed against the people of Rome by the Helvetii’ (Caes. BGall. 1.30), from which one can discern the echo of older sentiments of punishing a foreign people for a specific transgression. Yet, the Ciceronian ideas of peace and empire are also visible. In several passages, Caesar opted to use ‘pacata’ (pacified), or variations thereof, to describe his conquest of Gaul, rather than words more explicit in their suggestion of conquest. However, Caesar was also utterly unapologetic for his imperialism, declaring that ‘nor did he [Julius Caesar] deem it right for Ariovistus, rather than the people of Rome, to take possession of Gaul’ (Caes. BGall. 1.45). To Caesar, pax was not necessarily equitable, and libertas (freedom) for Rome did not always mean libertas for others; he implies this in the opening of Book VII, where the leaders of Gaul, wishing to gain their freedom, plot against Caesar and Rome.

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283 Caes. BGall. 1.31: ‘Galliamque omnem ab Ariovisti injuria posse defendere’.
284 Caes. BGall. 1.30: ‘pro veteribus Helvetiorum injuriis populi Romani’.
286 See Caes. BGall. 2.1: ‘omni pacata Gallia’; 2.34: ‘his rebus gestis omni Gallia pacata’; 3.7: ‘Caesar pacatam Galliam existimumet’; 3.28: ‘omni Gallia pacata’ and 6.5: ‘hac parte Galliae pacata’. See also Caes. BGall. 4.37 for a similar description of Britain: ‘Morini, quos Caesar in Britanniam proficiscens pacatos reliquerat’. In Edward’s commentary in the Loeb edition of the Bellum Gallicum, he notes that this is ‘a euphemism for ‘subdued’’. The fact this word requires a euphemism implies that outright unjustified conquest must have been frowned down upon. See also Harris, War and Imperialism, 174 – 175 for a discussion on the extent Caesar went to justify his wars.
To understand these antithetical ideas of peace and empire – a crucial factor in Augustus’ dual image of a ‘bringer of peace’ and a ‘conqueror’ in the *Res Gestae* – it is prudent to analyse how Roman perceptions of themselves in relation to foreign peoples changed during this period. Mid-Republican Roman aristocrats, such as Cato, suggested that Roman superiority was justified by Rome’s surpassing morality and customs. By the Late Republic, this concept had cemented fully into the attitudes of the Roman aristocracy. Both Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy\(^{289}\) attribute Rome’s success to its moral and cultural superiority. Dionysius, in the opening of his work, explains to his Greek audience that Rome was successful explicitly because ‘it produced countless virtues in men immediately from its beginning after its founding. No city, whether Greek or barbaric, has ever produced men more pious, or just, or regarded as more prudent in all one’s life, or a more valourous combatant in war’ (Dion. Hal. 1.5.3).\(^{290}\) He further argues that Roman dominion was justified, as ‘the common law of nature in all things, which no amount of time will destroy, is that those superior will always rule their inferiors’ (Dion. Hal. 1.5.2).\(^{291}\) Likewise, Livy recalls a (most likely invented) tale of the Falerii, who were so moved by Roman righteousness and justice that they went to the Roman senate to surrender, declaring: ‘we will be better off under your rule than under our own laws’ (Liv. 5.27.12).\(^{292}\)

On the other hand, foreign peoples were often ‘barbarised’ on the basis of their perceived inferior culture or moral character. Numidians were described as lustful and greatly lacked self-control: ‘*sunt ante omnes barbaros Numidae effusi in Venerem*’ (Liv. 29.23.4). Livy called the Greeks cowardly and ‘*gente lingua magis strenua quam factis*’ (Liv. 8.22.8). Gauls

\(^{289}\) Although these authors predominately wrote during the early Augustan era, their formative years were spent during the Late Republic.

\(^{290}\) Dion. Hal. 1.5.3: ‘μυρίας ἤνεγκεν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὰς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετὰ τὸν οἰκισμόν, ὃν οὐτ’ εὐσεβεστέρως οὐτε δικαιοστέρως οὐτε σωφροσύνη πλείονι παρὰ πάντι τὸν βίον χρησαμένους οὐδέ γε τὰ πολέμια κρείττους άγωνιστάς οὐδεμία πόλις ἤνεγκεν οὔτε Ἑλλάς οὔτε βάρβαρος’.

\(^{291}\) Dion. Hal. 1.5.2: ‘φύσεως γὰρ δὴ νόμος ἁπασὶ κοινός, ὃν οὐδέσεις καταλύει χρόνος, ἀρχεῖν ἀεὶ τῶν ἡττῶν τοὺς κρείττονας’.

\(^{292}\) Liv. 5.27.12: ‘*melius nos sub imperio vestro quam legibus nostris*. See Luce, *Livy*, 287, where Luce argues that, for Livy, Roman imperialism and conquest requires no justification, as Roman national character and morality validated its right to rule by itself.
were ‘a race [too] soft for toils’ and had ‘soft bodies and soft minds’ which were driven by a ‘blind anger’ (Liv. 22.2.4, 38.17.7). Easterners were portrayed as overly luxurious and decadent, with Antiochus described as incapable of managing his war with Rome due to his over-indulgence for wine and his nuptial bed (Liv. 36.11.1 – 2). Often, when Romans are described as committing an immoral act or begin to be ‘decadent’ themselves, Livy still levels his criticisms at the morals and customs of outsiders. For example, when Roman ambassadors violated a peace during a mission to the Gauls, Livy accused them of acting ‘more like Gauls than Romans’ (Liv. 5.36.1). The Bacchic rites corrupted Roman youths because they were introduced into the city by a foreigner (Liv. 39.8.1 – 8). Roman character, ‘unpolluted’ with outside influence, was portrayed as entirely good. Even when certain portrayals of non-Romans were positive, they often served to further augment the superiority of Rome, or to draw attention to the superiority that Rome ought to have had. Caesar, ‘complimenting’ the valour of certain Gauls, did so as a deliberate attempt to self-aggrandise his own successes at being able to subjugate such a dangerous enemy.

As Rome moved from the Middle to the Late Republic, ideas surrounding ‘bellum iustum’ and barbaric foreigners continued to develop from their incipient stages after the Punic and Macedonian Wars. By the Late Republic, a combination of factors had led to a renewed examination of what constituted a ‘bellum iustum’. For the first time, an end result – pax – was lauded. Yet, as individuals still required conquest to gain personal glory, prestige, and political power, wars could not cease. Thus, this peace was portrayed as not incompatible with empire: the subjugation of the world under Rome would also produce ‘peace’. To further justify this concept of ‘empire’ as being compatible

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293 Liv. 22.2.4: ‘mollis ad talia [toils] gens’. Liv. 38.17.7: ‘mollia corpora, molles (...) animos (...) caeca ira effundunt’.
294 Liv. 5.36.1: ‘Gallis (...) magis quam Romanis similes’.
295 See Liv. 2.12.9 – 12 and 5.27.8.
with peace, the civilised-barbaric divide deepened. Whereas the civilised-barbaric divide was initially a reaction to being ‘barbarised’ themselves by the Hellenic world during the Mid-Republic, the Roman elites developed a sense of superiority in the Late Republic, one where the morally superior Rome was justified in conquering those morally inferior and acting, in the words of Cicero, as the ‘*patrocinium orbis terrae*’.\(^{298}\) Rome’s successes had given it a sense of superiority over foreign states and peoples.\(^{299}\) As a result of this, one can begin to see the basis of the idea of the ‘*imperium sine fine*’ in Augustan propaganda.

**Conclusion**

From these analyses of the development of attitudes towards warfare and foreigners in China and Rome, several differences can be immediately noted. First, China had a significantly less overtly militant elite than Rome, despite being in a similar state of constant war. This could possibly be explained by the fact that, by the Warring States period, the Chinese states – the (former) fellow vassals of the King of Zhou – had a sense of joint cultural identity, which made justifying warfare more difficult. Rome, despite also developing the idea of peace as the ultimate goal of war in the Late Republic, was still largely pro-war, while China grew increasingly anti-war as the centuries went on. Second, a crucial factor differentiated China’s and Rome’s development of the civilised-barbaric divide. By the advent of the imperial era, the inhabitants of the Central States did not view themselves as having any cultural equals – certainly not superiors; thus the ‘barbarisation’ of non-Zhou peoples was very much one-sided. Rome, however, had to contend with numerous states in the broader Mediterranean world which considered themselves to have easily outstripped Rome in their own cultural complexity, even going as far as ‘barbarising’ Rome. Thus, Rome had to develop a cultural character and identity that could assert its own superiority even in the face of perceived

\(^{298}\) Cornwell, *Pax*, 34.

inferiority. This was an aspect entirely missing from Chinese attitudes in their own civilised-barbaric divide.

Despite these major differences, the resulting Chinese and Roman views towards warfare and outsiders were surprisingly similar. Both slowly developed the idea of a ‘just war’, beginning from an early notion of war as punishment for specific transgression and moving towards the later idea of wars fought for specific moral goods: peace, freedom (in the Roman context), and other similar ideals. Likewise, the civilised-barbaric divide is also largely comparable. Both cultures ‘barbarised’ others on moral and cultural grounds, while asserting their own moral and cultural superiority. From this sense of superiority, they further developed a worldview where they were not only able but were destined to conquer all others and pacify their known world. This pacification was not at all incompatible with their idea of ‘empire’. As the Chinese and Romans would argue, it was only through their guidance and patronage that the rest of the world could live in peace. Thus, the perception of an ideal ruler was one who brought peace to all those within his sphere of influence and subjugate those refusing to be a part of it.

Therefore, it is clear that, despite their differences, Roman and Chinese attitudes towards warfare and foreigners were quite alike by the Late Republic and the Warring States period. Thus, the first emperors of Rome and China would develop their propaganda and imperial images from similar contexts. It also must be noted that, much like China, Rome’s portrayal of ‘barbarians’/foreigners did not purely take place in a military context: the subjugation or submission of foreign peoples was also deeply connected with ideas of morality and the divine order. Rome did not view themselves as superior simply because they were more militarily potent. This will be explored in more depth in the following chapters.

In subsequent chapters, this thesis will analyse how Qin Shi Huangdi’s continued conquests after his ascension as emperor helped illustrate his virtue and connection with the divine. By examining the

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methods and rationale behind Qin Shi Huangdi’s self-portrayal in his imperial propaganda, this thesis hopes to be able to shed new light on the dual image of Augustus in the Res Gestae as a peace-bringer and conqueror.
CHAPTER THREE
PEACE THROUGH WARFARE

As a result of the intensification of warfare – particularly those perceived to be ‘civil’ in nature – ‘peace’ became a focal aspect in Late Warring States and Late Republican Roman thought. Ever careful of public opinion, Qin Shi Huang and Augustus meticulously shaped their public personae to portray themselves as the bringers of this much desired peace.\textsuperscript{301} In the steles of Qin Shi Huang, the First Emperor depicts himself as the one who brought this peace to the ‘black-haired people’ via a series of unavoidable but morally righteous wars against those who would threaten such a peace. After the unification of ‘All under Heaven’, the Emperor was able to ‘lay aside his arms’ and usher in a new era of peace for all.\textsuperscript{302} Yet, this portrayal of a ‘bringer of peace’ was not simply a glorification of past victories. Through the stele inscriptions, Qin Shi Huang not only establishes himself as the one who obtained this peace, but, more importantly, as the only one capable of sustaining it – thanks to his military prowess, his impeccable moral character, and his superhuman connection to the divine. In examining the \textit{Res Gestae}, one notes the similar ‘peace-bringing’ qualities of Augustus. Like Qin Shi Huang, Augustus does not merely portray himself as the bringer of peace but also as the only one able to protect the \textit{Pax Romana}. This chapter will argue that both emperors utilised the ‘peace’ they had created – the preservation of which supposedly depended on themselves (along with their immediate heirs) alone – as a way of justifying their command of both the army and the state.

\textit{Qin Shi Huangdi}

One of the most prominent themes apparent in all seven steles is the emperor’s transformation of the chaotic and bloody Warring States into the ‘Great Peace’ that was the first empire.\textsuperscript{303} This is

\textsuperscript{301} Havener, \textit{Imperator Augustus}, 31.
\textsuperscript{302} See the Steles at Mt. Langxie and the Eastern Vista.
\textsuperscript{303} See the Steles at Mt. Tai, Mt. Langxie, and Jieshi.
most evident in the stele erected on Mt. Yi, which depicts the chaos and suffering that was present before the arrival of the first emperor:

“They recall and contemplate the times of chaos: when they apportioned the land, established discrete states, and thus unfolded the impetus for struggle. Attacks and campaigns were daily waged; how they shed their blood in the open countryside—that had begun in highest antiquity. Through untold generations, one [rule] followed another down to the Five Thearchs, and no one could prohibit or stop them” (Mt. Yi Stele, 19 – 27).

This was followed with the arrival of the First Emperor:

“Now today, the August Thearch has unified All under Heaven under one lineage” (Mt. Yi Stele, 28 – 29).

With the arrival of the First Emperor, peace was established across the land:

“Warfare will not arise again! Disaster and harm are exterminated and erased, the black-haired people live in peace and stability, benefits and blessings are lasting and enduring” (Mt. Yi Stele, 30 – 33).

The structure of this stele perfectly epitomises the self-representation of the First Emperor in his propaganda as a ‘bringer of peace’. This role is not only stressed by the active agency of the First Emperor – ‘the August Thearch has unified All under Heaven’ – but by the very placement of this line, as the introduction of the First Emperor demarcates the previous age of chaos with the subsequent age of tranquillity, further cementing the First Emperor’s role as the messianic bringer of peace. Furthermore, it is not merely this act which is lauded, but the very person of the First Emperor himself, with the explicit statement that none before him were able to put an end to warfare. Peace is not merely associated with the First Emperor, but is dependent upon him; only he is capable of achieving and maintaining peace. In fact, the stress upon his peace-bringing qualities in

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305 Mt. Yi Stele, 28 – 29: ‘乃今皇帝，壹家天下’.
306 Mt. Yi Stele, 30 – 33: ‘兵不復起，災害滅除。黔首康定，利澤長久’.
his propaganda was so strong that numerous Han dynasty writers, despite being overwhelmingly anti-Qin, still begrudgingly commended the First Emperor for his bringing of peace.\textsuperscript{308}

Of course, declaring a total state of peace and a complete cessation of arms would be a piece of propaganda that no one would believe. As mentioned before, the First Emperor continued the institution of universal conscription, both before and after his ascension as emperor.\textsuperscript{309} He embarked on a series of brutal wars during his unification of China. Even during the post-unification imperial period, Qin Shi Huang continued his military expansion with two campaigns, one against the northern nomads and one against the southern Yue peoples. Moreover, the Qin dynasty required large tracts of land to settle veterans and exiles.\textsuperscript{310} Thus, it was also imperative for the First Emperor to justify and include his undeniable use of warfare in his persona of ‘peace’.

Following expected paradigms during the Warring States period, the First Emperor repeatedly stressed the ‘moral’ aspect of his war to unify China. He portrayed his conquest of the other six kingdoms of China as necessary due to the bellicosity and immorality of the other rulers, forcing his intervention in order to protect the ‘black-haired people’. In the Mt. Langxie Stele, the First Emperor describes his military actions thus: ‘he punishes rebellion and eliminates calamities’.\textsuperscript{311} In the Stele on the Eastern Vista, the capture and destruction of the six other kingdoms is unambiguously accredited to his 武威 (wu wei).\textsuperscript{312} The successful conquest of these kingdoms is immediately followed by a proclamation of peace: ‘far and wide He unified All under Heaven, disaster and harm

\textsuperscript{308} In the Shiji, Sima Qian questions: ‘When the Qin unified all within the seas (...) and declared himself Emperor, why is it that All under Heaven submitted to him as grass to the wind? I believe that it is because of this (...) [that] the various kings used force to rule, used their strength to oppress the weak and their numbers to bully the few. Wars did not cease and the people suffered. When the First Emperor declared himself Emperor, All under Heaven had gained a new Son of Heaven. As such, all the good peoples hoped that they could finally live a peaceful life, and all submitted to him with a willing heart’ (Shiji 6.283). In Jia Yi’s ‘Discourse on the Faults of the Qin’ from his Xinshu, he admits that the reason why the people submitted so quickly to the Qin was ‘due to the peace it brought’.

\textsuperscript{309} Sanft, Communication and Cooperation, 91; Lewis, Warring States, 587, 611.

\textsuperscript{310} Di Cosmo, The Northern Frontier, 964.

\textsuperscript{311} Mt. Langxie Stele, 52: ‘誅亂除害’.

\textsuperscript{312} 武威 (wu wei) literally means ‘martial power’ or ‘martial might’. Kern translates this word as ‘military awesome influence’.
were cut off and stopped, forever halted were clashes of arms’. This concept of peace gained through the righteous use of warfare is most clearly captured in the Stele on Mt. Zhifu:

‘The six kingdoms had been restive and perverse, greedy and criminal, insatiable – atrociously slaughtering endlessly. The August Thearch felt pity for the multitudes, and consequently sent out His punitive troops, vehemently displaying His martial power (...) He boiled alive and exterminated the violent and cruel, succoured and saved the black-haired people, and all around consolidated the four extremities’ (Mt. Zhifu Stele, 16 – 27).

The First Emperor very carefully manoeuvred his persona of peace firmly within the context of his military might. With this claim, the First Emperor was further able to justify his military actions with the attainment or the preservation of peace as his purpose.

After the unification of China and his pronouncement that he was now ‘Huangdi’, Qin Shi Huang, for the reasons outlined previously, still could not relinquish his control of the army and truly cease all military activity. Unfortunately, unlike the in-depth records of Qin Shi Huang’s wars of unification (and their portrayals within Qin propaganda) from ancient writers, the First Emperor’s external wars were given only the most minimal attention. In the Shiji, only a single paragraph is devoted to his campaign against the northern nomads (Shiji 110.2886) and a single line mentions his invasion of the south (Shiji 113.2967). In the Hanshu, Qin Shi Huang’s interactions with the northern nomads, southern kingdoms, western frontiers, and the Korean peninsula are only given a cursory

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314 Mt Zhifu Stele, 16 – 27: ‘六國回辟，貪戾無厭，虐殺不已。皇帝哀眾，遂發討師，奮揚武德（…）烹滅強暴，振救黔首，周定四極’.
315 This is completely attuned with Qin Legalist thought as well. Chapter 11 of the Book of Lord Shang explicitly states that ‘是以強者必治，治者必強 (a powerful nation will surely become peaceful, and a peaceful nation will surely become powerful)’. 治 (zhi) normally means ‘to be managed’; however, it also has the sense of ‘to be well-managed’, and from that gained the sense of ‘to be at peace, to be without troubles’. See the Kangxi Dictionary (an imperial dictionary compiled during the reign of Emperor Kangxi around 1716 CE) for more details. Likewise, in the Yuanluan Chapter of the Lüshichunqiu, Lu Büwei claims that ‘亂必有弟，大亂五，小亂三，討亂三’. This sentence is difficult to translate. It literally means: ‘chaos always has a sequence. After five large rebellions, there will be three small rebellions, then three wars against rebellions’. In Lu’s commentary of the Lüshichunqiu, he provides a smoother translation into Modern Chinese which means: ‘chaos always has a sequence. Even after numerous large rebellions, small rebellions will still follow. Only by war can these rebellions be finally quelled’.
316 See Gong Xian, 秦汉管理思想 (Qinhan Guanli Sixiang), Beijing: Jingji Quanli Press, 2017, p. 6 for his argument that Qin Shi Huang did not want to devolve military command to his vassals and risk a return to the Warring States.
examination, and no explanation on how Qin Shi Huang justified his wars in the context of his persona of ‘peace’ is provided. Interestingly, the First Emperor’s conquests during the imperial era also received far less attention in the steles compared to his war of unification. However, his claim to have conquered ‘All under Heaven’ is still nevertheless glorified:

‘Within the six combined [directions], this is the land of the August Thearch: to the west it ranges to the flowing sands, to the south it completely takes where the doors face north. To the east it enfolds the eastern sea, to the north, it goes beyond Ta-hsia. Wherever human traces reach, there is none who does not declare himself [the Thearch’s] subject’ (Mt. Langxie Stele, 61 – 68).

Thus, with a lack of explicit analyses provided by ancient writers on this aspect of Qin Shi Huang’s rule, a close reading across numerous texts is required to examine how the First Emperor involved his foreign conquests in his persona of peace.

Several sources on the emperor’s northern campaign claim that Qin Shi Huang attempted to portray himself as waging a war of defence, despite the fact that there was little evidence to suggest that the Xiongnu were undertaking or even contemplating any immediate hostilities against the Qin. In fact, the casus belli cited was that it was a response to a prophecy that the Xiongnu would destroy

317 For the descriptions of the interactions between the Qin and the northern nomads, see Hanshu 94.3748. For Qin, the south-western and southern ‘barbarians’, and the southern kingdom of Min, see Hanshu 95.3838, 3847 and 3859 respectively. For Qin and Korea, see 95.3863. For Qin’s interaction with its western neighbours, see 96.3872. Barring the passage on the northern nomads, which lasts a paragraph, all other mentions of Qin’s interactions with foreign states and peoples are given no more than a single sentence. It must also be noted that the Hanshu quotes these sections from the Shiji almost word for word. See Shiji chapters 110, 113 – 116.

318 Jiang notes that the Qin Shi Huang’s northern and southern campaigns were often presented very ‘matter-of-factly’, with little to no justifications offered. See Jiang, Zhongguo Gudai Shi, 107. Qian claims that the campaigns were ‘driven by the necessity of the times’, but offers no further explanation. See Qian, Qin Han Shi, 17.

319 Kern translates 北戶 (bei hu) literally as those whose ‘doors face north’. Indeed, that is what Bei Hu literally means. However, as defined in the Erya (爾雅, a dictionary compiled and published by an unknown author/s around ~3rd century BCE), the earliest known Chinese dictionary, Bei Hu was not used literally but as reference to the name of a tribe who lived to the south of China. By the Late Warring States and the Early Imperial period, Bei Hu ceased to be used even as the name for the tribe but now became a term that just meant ‘the far south’. As such, this sentence means more that the First Emperor’s empire stretched south as far as possible, rather than a reference to a particular place.

320 There have been some arguments as to what 大夏 (Da Xia, or Ta-hsia in Wade-Giles) refers. It might be similar to Bei Hu as a catchall term for everything considered the ‘far north/west’. There have been also some arguments that Da Xia is Bactria, although this lacks hard evidence.

321 Stele at Mt. Langxie, 61 – 68: 六合之內，皇帝之土。西涉流沙，南盡北戶。東有東海，北過大夏。人跡所至，無不臣者’.

322 Di Cosmo, The Northern Frontier, 964. Di Cosmo argues that there was no ‘belligerence or immediate provocation’ which triggered Qin Shi Huang’s war against the northern nomads.
the ‘Great Peace’ of Qin.\textsuperscript{323} The Di and Rong tribes to the north and west of Qin, who were precursors to the Xiongnu threat, are unambiguously portrayed as enemies of the Central States: ‘they invade, pillage, and slaughter those of the Central States, and the Central States suffered’ (Shiji 110.2282).\textsuperscript{324} The ability of the First Emperor (and his generals) to sustain the peace of his new empire is deeply connected with his martial abilities. Meng Tian, the Qin general commanding Qin Shi Huang’s invasion of the north, is described as keeping the nomads at bay with his ability to ‘\textit{wei zhen}’ (威振; literally: to astound with force) (Shiji 88.2566). In the Xinshu, Jia Yi compliments the general and states that, after his invasion, ‘the Xiongnu were pushed back more than 700 li, and do not dare approach the south even for pasturing’ (Xinshu, Guo Qin Lun 1).\textsuperscript{325} Following his successful invasion of the northern regions, the First Emperor erected the Great Wall, not only as a projection of power to the nomads dwelling beyond the Great Wall but also as a physical manifestation of his ability to bring peace and security to all living south of the Wall.\textsuperscript{326} Qin Shi Huang’s invasion of the south was portrayed in a likewise fashion. His invasion of the southern Yue peoples is described as ‘\textit{ding}’ (定; to pacify, to bring into a state of tranquillity) (Shiji 113.2967).\textsuperscript{327}

While the First Emperor justified his wars of unification as attaining peace, he still could not truly dismiss his army and settle the empire into a genuine state of peace. Rather, Qin Shi Huang

\textsuperscript{323} See Shiji 6.252 and Huainanzi, \textit{Renjianxun}, 25. \textit{Huainanzi} argues that Qin Shi Huang did not genuinely believe this prophecy, but used it purely as a justification for war: ‘秦皇挾錄圖 (The Qin Emperor used the prophecy as an excuse)’. The word 拈 (xie) can mean ‘to threaten with’, ‘to rely on’, or ‘to use as an excuse’. Based on the subsequent lines, I am inclined to translate it as ‘use as an excuse’. For an analysis of this passage and how Qin Shi Huang used it as a pretext for war, see Di Cosmo, \textit{The Northern Frontier}, 964 and Arthur Cotterell, \textit{The First Emperor of China: The Greatest Archaeological Find of our Time}, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{324} Shiji 110.2282: ‘侵盜暴虐中國。中國疾之’.

\textsuperscript{325} Xinshu, \textit{Guo Qin Lun} 1: ‘卻匈奴七百餘里。胡人不敢南下而牧馬’. This was then quoted verbatim in Shiji 6.280, 48.1963, and in Hanshu 31.1823.


\textsuperscript{327} Sima Qian does not give a clear analysis of Qin Shi Huang’s reasons for his southern campaign, so his opinion on the matter can only be gleaned through this choice of vocabulary. Other Han dynasty texts also provide little help. While both the Xinshu and the Discourses on Salt and Iron discuss the First Emperor’s southern campaign, they are both very much anti-Qin and portray the invasion as nothing more than a product of greed. This is rather hypocritical especially for the Discourses on Salt and Iron, where in the preceding paragraph, Emperor Wu of Han is complimented for his southern campaigns for the exact same reasons. See the Discourses on Salt and Iron 8.43.
designated any ‘enemy’ as a threat to this peace. Thus, Qin Shi Huang was able to maintain his image as a peace bringer while still embarking on military conquests. The subsequent subjugation of such enemies further cemented his abilities to safeguard this new peace. Even after his death, the Xinshu states that the Emperor’s martial valour still kept those beyond the empire at bay: ‘after the death of the First Emperor, the remainder of his ‘wei zhen’ (威振) was still felt by those of alien customs’ (Xinshu, Guo Qin Lun 1).328

In a clever appropriation of Warring State thought on the ideal ruler, Qin Shi Huang firmly placed his use of force within the context of a ‘just war’. When, or so he claimed, the cruelty and avarice of the other rulers brought suffering to the people, the First Emperor delivered ‘All under Heaven’ into a state of peace through his superior morality and military prowess; it was by him and him alone that this peace was gained and would be maintained. Intricately linking war and peace, Qin Shi Huang simultaneously glorified his status as a peace bringer and a military leader. It was with this dual image that the First Emperor justified his continued conquests to his new empire of ‘Great Peace’.

Augustus

It must be noted that there is currently an overwhelming academic consensus on the method and purpose of Augustus’ inclusion of his wars against foreign peoples in his propaganda: peace through warfare.329 Gruen offers one of the rare counterarguments against this interpretation, suggesting that pax was never a major aspect of Augustan propaganda compared to war.330 Rich also agrees, declaring that ‘peace is less prominent in Augustan propaganda than victory’.331 This, however, is disputable. In the Res Gestae, Augustus reminds the readers how it was he who established the Altar of Peace (Ara Pacis), before boasting that the Temple of Janus was closed thrice during his reign, but only twice prior (Aug. RG. 12 – 13). Much like Julius Caesar in the Bellum Gallicum, Augustus is also

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330 Gruen, Imperial Policy, 411.
331 Rich, Augustus, War and Peace, 333.
inclined to use derivatives of ‘pacare’ to describe his conquests, rather than a more overt word for conquest.\textsuperscript{332} In other Augustan literature as well, which will be discussed later in this chapter, peace remains a pervasive theme.\textsuperscript{333} If pax truly was not a major aspect of Augustan propaganda, then it makes little sense why Augustus would feature it so heavily in a piece of imperial propaganda penned by his own hand. Moreover, if war or conquest is glorious in and of itself and the subjugation of foreign peoples warrants no explanation, then there would be little reason why Augustus would bother justifying any of his wars; yet he, along with many Augustan writers, defends all of his wars as justly waged (Aug. RG. 26). Thus, both peace and war must have shared prominent positions in Augustan self-portrayal and propaganda.\textsuperscript{334}

Despite this general consensus, what this ‘peace through warfare’ actually entailed has divided scholarship. Galinsky argues that pax was targeted internally and was purely for the Roman people, with no expectations that pax should be available for those outside of Rome.\textsuperscript{335} Rosenstein similarly claims that pax was an act of force to be imposed upon foreigners, while concordia was internally reserved for Romans.\textsuperscript{336} Ando, too, asserts that Augustan propaganda means peace at home and victory abroad.\textsuperscript{337} However, there are numerous passages from Augustan literature for which such a reading does not hold. The god Janus, in Ovid’s Fasti, declares that ‘in death-bringing blood will the whole world be embroiled [in war], if my rigid bars do not keep it in check’ (Ov. Fast. 1.123 – 124).\textsuperscript{338} Horace, in his Carmen Saeculare, bases the return of pax upon the subjugation of all other nations, rather than something to be enjoyed by Romans while wars were still being waged against foreign

\textsuperscript{332} Gruen, Augustus, 54.
\textsuperscript{334} Dunstan, Ancient Rome, 247.
\textsuperscript{335} Galinsky, Augustus, 85 – 86.
\textsuperscript{336} Rosenstein, War and Peace, 232.
\textsuperscript{337} Clifford Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000, p. 324.
\textsuperscript{338} Ov. Fast. 1.123 – 124: ‘sanguine letifero totus miscebitur orbis, ni teneant rigidae condita bella serae’.
foes (Hor. Carm. Saec. 50ff.). Virgil, too, portrays war as something that affects the entire world: ‘impious War rages across the whole world’ (Verg. G. 1.511). Then, Jupiter declares in the Aeneid that during the reign of Augustus, ‘with wars set aside, this harsh age will then soften (…) [and] the gates of War will close’ (Verg. Aen. 1.291, 294). Again, this cessation of war is established only after Augustus returns ‘laden with Oriental spoils’ (Verg. Aen. 1.289), implying that pax was the defeat of Rome’s enemies, rather than just the end to Rome’s civil wars.  

Certainly, there is also evidence supporting the opposing view. There are indeed passages in Augustan literature that suggest peace was largely internal. However, as shown above, there are still notable passages in contemporary literature that suggest pax was ideally a cessation of arms everywhere, not just within Rome. Thus, simply dichotomising the recipients of pax and bellum cannot sufficiently explain this aspect of Augustan propaganda. Instead, this thesis will argue that, much like Qin Shi Huang’s portrayal of his ‘Great Peace’ in his steles, the Pax Augusta was indeed intended to be available to all. Of course, due to myriad reasons – control over the army and provinces, consolidation of supply lines, and seizing control of trade routes, among others — Augustus could not genuinely lay down his arms, regardless of how much he attempted to portray

342 To give one example, Hor. Carm. 1.21 sings that Augustus will drive ‘hic bellum lacrimosum, hic miseram famem pestemque’ away from Rome and ‘in Persas atque Britannos’.
343 Indeed, if one would also turn to material objects, one of the best illustrations of this is the Boscoreale Cups. There is a scene where a ‘barbarian’ leader happily hands over his smiling children to Augustus. ‘Barbarians’ were shown to be willing to be ‘subjugated’ and benefited equally from pax alongside Romans. For further analyses of this point, see Kuttner, Dynasty and Empire, 87; Koortbojian, The Bringer of Victory, 196; Zanker, Power of Images, 229 (where Zanker describes this scene as ‘the children look[ing] up to him [Augustus] as if to an epiphany’) and Ferris, Enemies of Rome, 51 – 52.
himself as wanting to do so. Thus, ‘enemies’ of Rome were not portrayed as excluded from the *pax*. Rather, they were a threat to it, ‘forcing’ Augustus to respond in a military fashion to secure a peace under threat. Moreover, as Qin Shi Huang portrays the bringing and sustaining of peace as only achievable through himself, Augustus also concentrates this ability to bring *pax* on his own merits. By centring this ‘peace through warfare’ aspect upon themselves, the two emperors could craft an image where all peoples depended on them as the ultimate guardians of peace and prosperity.

It was established in the previous chapter that, by the Late Republic, Roman perceptions of war and peace shifted due to changing circumstances. Wars between Romans were considered impious, and *pax* was lauded by almost all strata of Roman society. From the onset of Octavian’s career, having returned to Rome after the assassination of Julius Caesar, the troops urged him and Marc Antony to reconcile (App. *B Civ.* 3.29, 3.39). When Octavian revealed that he was still hostile towards Marc Antony after the reconciliation upon the Capitol, his troops openly deserted (App. *B Civ.* 3.42). It would have been clear to Octavian, both after Brundisium, where neither his nor Marc Antony’s troops were willing to fight another civil war (App. *B Civ.* 5.59, 5.64), and after the ‘peace’ of Puteoli with Sextus Pompeius at the demands of the people (App. *B Civ.* 5.67 – 68, 5.72), that he needed to adjust his representation of his conflicts with Sextus Pompeius and Marc Antony in a way that the very unreceptive soldiery and Roman populace would be willing to support. Indeed, Octavian would have surely recognised the importance of *pax* politically.

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346 Gurval, *Actium and Augustus*, 181. See also Hor. *Carm.* 2.1 and 3.24 where Horace repeatedly implies that civil strife is impious.
350 At the demands of the people, Octavian and Marc Antony were forced to make peace with Sextus Pompeius, the son of Pompeius Magnus. According to Appian, the people went as far as to pelt Octavian with stones when he initially refused to make peace with Sextus. See App. *B Civ.* 5.67 – 72.
Appian, ‘shouts arose from the army and unending praise was [offered] to each of the two (Octavian and Marc Antony) throughout the entire day and night’ after the Treaty of Brundisium was struck (App. B Civ. 5.64), and when the populace heard that peace had been signed with Sextus Pompeius, ‘everyone immediately burst into joyous song on account of peace’ (App. B Civ. 5.74).

After the defeat of Sextus Pompeius at Naulochus, Octavian played into the expectations and hopes of the people and ‘proclaimed peace, tranquillity and an end to the civil war’, before having a statue erected with an inscription stating that ‘the peace, which had been thrown into discord for so long, he re-established on both land and sea’ (App. B Civ. 5.130). At this point, Octavian had clearly begun to establish his image as a ‘bringer of peace’. However, owing to his upcoming conflict against Marc Antony, Octavian could not genuinely dismiss the army. Indeed, during this period the first instance arises where Octavian manipulates the portrayal of foreign peoples as a way of justifying warfare.

Immediately after Naulochus, Octavian needed to continue a war of some kind in order to justify his continued control of the army, to keep his forces well-trained, and to increase his own military prestige relative to Marc Antony. Promising his troops no more civil wars, Octavian attempted to stir them up by turning their attention to the Illyrians, proclaiming that they needed to go to war against ‘the Illyrians and other barbaric tribes, who are disturbing a peace only so recently obtained’ (App. B Civ. 5.128). Then, although now challenged by current scholarship, almost all Augustan era

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353 App. B Civ. 5.74: ‘ἐπαιάνιζον αὐτίκα ἅπαντες ὡς ἐπὶ εἰρήνη’.
356 Rich, Making the Emergency Permanent, 58; Gurval, Actium and Augustus, 27; Pelling, Triumviral Period, 46; Lange, Res Publica Constituta, 52.
sources confirm that Octavian manoeuvred his imminent war against Marc Antony into one against a foreign, barbaric queen threatening the safety and peace of Rome instead.\(^{358}\) Virgil portrays Marc Antony as coming to Actium ‘with barbaric aid and varied arms’ (Verg. Aen. 8.685).\(^{359}\) Cassius Dio records a speech delivered by Octavian to the Senate, where Cleopatra is described as ‘a woman who is laying designs upon everything that is yours’ (Cass. Dio 50.28.5).\(^{360}\)

This method of portraying himself as the ‘bringer’ or ‘guardian’ of peace and justifying his control of the army and military activity by depicting foreign peoples as the aggressors threatening this new peace not only continued but was expanded upon during the imperial era. In turn, it was by the subjugation of such enemies that peace was able to be maintained. Near the opening of the Res Gestae, Augustus proudly proclaims: ‘I waged wars on land and sea both civil and external across the whole world’ (Aug. RG. 3.1).\(^{361}\) While this proclamation seemingly contradicts the persona of peace Augustus had constructed for himself, the intricate link Augustus establishes between his wars, victories and peace soon becomes clear. The Ara Pacis Augustae was established as a result of Augustus’ subjugation of Spain and Gaul: ‘rebus in his provincis’ [Spain and Gaul] prospere gestis’ (Aug. RG. 12).\(^{362}\) The link between war and peace is most clearly illustrated in section 13: ‘Janus Quirinus (i.e. Temple of Janus), which our ancestors wished to be closed whenever there was peace through victories (victoriis pax) throughout the whole of the empire of the Roman people on both land and sea (…)’ (Aug. RG. 13).\(^{364}\)

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\(^{358}\) This is now challenged in current scholarship. Lange argues that Augustus never tried to hide the fact Actium was civil in nature. See Lange, Res Publica Constituta, 73, 81. This is also supported by the fact that post-Augustan portrayals of Actium all unambiguously name Marc Antony as the primary antagonist, not Cleopatra. See Suet. Aug. 9, Cass. Dio 50.4, and App. B Civ. 1.6.

\(^{359}\) Verg. Aen. 8.685: ‘ope barbarica varisque (…) armis’.

\(^{360}\) Cass. Dio 50.28.5: ‘γυναῖκα πᾶσι τοῖς ὑμετέροις ἐπιβουλεύουσα’.

\(^{361}\) Aug. RG. 3.1: ‘bella terra et mari civilia externaque toto in orbe terrarum suscepit’.

\(^{362}\) The Loeb edition has an alternate spelling of ‘provincis’ rather than the standard ‘provinciis’.

\(^{363}\) Even after the establishment of the Ara Pacis in 13 BCE, Augustus could not genuinely disband the army. So, predictably, he began a new series of military campaigns in 12 BCE against ‘aggressive barbarians’ to maintain his hold over the army. See Rich, Augustus, War, and Peace, 159.

\(^{364}\) Aug. RG. 13.1: ‘Ianum Quirinum, quen claussum esse maiores nostri voluerunt, cum per totum imperium populi Romani terra marique esset parta victoriis pax’. See Galinsky, Augustan Culture, 149 for Galinsky’s argument that in Augustan propaganda, peace must be preceded by military victory. Hölscher, too, states that in Augustan propaganda, ‘victories have to be fixed, defined, secured, and perpetuated against external
While the *Res Gestae* does not unambiguously denote how the portrayal of foreign peoples is connected to this image of war and peace, other Augustan writers elaborate on this aspect of the Augustan regime further. Horace declares that Persian daggers are incompatible with wine and lamplights: ‘*vino et lucernis Medus acinaces immane quantum discrepat*’ (Hor. *Carm.* 1.27). He also lauds the closing of Janus, which is prefaced by Augustus re-obtaining the lost standards from Parthia (Hor. *Carm.* 4.15). Further on in the same poem, Horace rejoices that ‘no (...) violence will drive away our peace, nor the rage that forges the blade and propels our wretched cities into strife. None who drinks from the deep Danube will violate the Julian edict, nor the Getae, nor the Seres and treacherous Persians, nor those born by the river Tana’ (Hor. *Carm.* 4.15). This connection is further displayed in his *Carmen Saeculare*, which was commissioned by Augustus, in which Horace rejoices in the defeat of foreign peoples as it acts as a prerequisite to the return of faith, peace, honour and modesty.

‘The Mede now fears our armies, powerful on land and sea, and our Alban dominion.
Now the Scythians seek a response, Indians, too, so recently proud.
At last Faith, Peace, Honour, Ancient Modesty and forgotten Virtue dare to return, and Blessed Plenty appears with a full horn’
(Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 54 – 61).

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enemies’. See Tonio Hölscher, ‘The Transformation of Victory into Power: From Event to Structure’, in *Representation of War in Ancient Rome*, ed. Sheila Dillon, Katherine E. Welch, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 29. What is interesting, however, is that the Greek version of this passage does not mention victory at all: ‘Πύλην Ἐνυάλιον, ἣν κεκλῖσθαι οἱ πατέρες ἡμῶν ἠθέ λησαν εἰρηνευομένης τῆς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίοις πάσης γῆς καὶ θάλασσης (…)’. For a discussion on the implications of this, see Cornwall, *Pax*, 19. 365 Hor. *Carm.* 4.15: ‘non (...) vis exiget otium, non ira, quae procedit ensis et miseras inimicat urbis, non qui profundum Danuvium bibunt edicta rumpent Iulia, non Getae, non Seres infidique Persae, non Tanain prope flumen orti’.


368 Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 54 – 61:

iam mari terraque manus potentis
Medus Albanasque timet securis,
iam Scythae responsa petunt superbi
nuper, et Indi.

iam Fides et Pax et Honos Pudorque
priscus et neglecta redire Virtus
audet, apparete beata pleno
In the Eclogues, the character Meliboeus expresses fear that an ‘impius miles’ or a ‘barbarus’ will seize his farms (Verg. Ecl. 1.70 – 71). In the Georgics, Virgil describes one as ‘happy’ and ‘blessed’ if he is untroubled by ‘a Dacian descending from the conspiring Danube’ (Verg. G. 2.490, 495 – 496). At the very end of the Georgics, Virgil implies that he is able to sing about the cares of field and cattle because of Octavian’s victories (Verg. G. 4.559ff). In the Aeneid, the golden age of Augustus is intimately linked to the conquest of foreign peoples: ‘Augustus Caesar, offspring of a god, will found a golden age and will extend his empire once again through the fields formerly ruled by Latin Saturn, [even] over the Garmanians and the Indians’ (Verg. Aen. 6.792 – 795). Ovid, in the Fasti, has Janus note that ‘I will be long closed under the divine power of Caesar (i.e. the closing of the Temple of Janus)’ and further declare that ‘peace was the reason for the triumph’ over the Rhine (Ov. Fast. 1.282 – 285). For Mars, too, Ovid has the god claim that he is invoked in ‘the pursuit of peace’ (studiis pacis) (Ov. Fast. 3.173). Then, speaking of the Parthians, Ovid finds solace that the Romans are ‘protected by the mighty arms of Caesar’ (Ov. Fast. 5.587 – 588). At the closing of his Metamorphoses, Ovid has Jupiter declare: ‘in vain will she (Cleopatra, whom Ovid refers to as “barbariem” two lines later) threaten [us], [that] our Capitol will serve her Canopus,’ and: ‘whatsoever the habitable earth sustains will be his [Augustus], the sea too will serve him!’ (Ov. Met. 15.827 – 828, 830 – 831). Immediately following this line in which the ‘barbarians’ are repulsed and all peoples are conquered by Augustus, Jupiter discusses what the emperor might then do when peace had returned to the world (Ov. Met. 15.832). Propertius, too, asks his readers to pray for a copia cornu.

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369 See Verg. G. 2.490, 495 – 496. Virgil describes one as ‘felix’ and ‘fortunatus’ if one does not have to bend before a ‘coniurato descendens Dacus ab Histro’. ‘coniurato (...) ab Histro’ literally means ‘from the conspiring Danube’, which sounds rather odd in English. This could be a case of a transferred epithet and the sentence means ‘a conspiring Dacian descending from the Danube’. Otherwise, it could be emphasising that the very land from which the Dacians descend is treacherous (especially since the Dacians sided with Marc Antony against Octavian). See T. E. Page, Bucolia et Georgica, London: Macmillan, 1931, p. 285 and E. de Saint-Denis, Géorgiques: Texte Établi et Traduit, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1963, p. 102 for commentaries on this passage.


373 Ov. Met. 15.827 – 828, 830 – 831: ‘frustraque erit illa minata, servitura suo Capitolia nostra Canopo (...) quodcunque habitabile tellus sustinet, huius erit: pontus quoque serviet lili!’
long age for Augustus, since he had saved Rome: ‘Roma (...) longum Augusto salva precare diem!’ (Prop. 3.11.49 – 50).

In prose, too, this sentiment was echoed. Velleius Paterculus describes Octavian and Marc Antony at Actium as ‘[one] fighting for the safety of the world, the other fighting for its ruin’ (Vell. Pat. 2.85.1). After Actium, Velleius Paterculus continues by showing gratitude to Augustus since ‘peace has been regained, [and] everywhere the madness of arms is lullèd’, which was accomplished by ‘the pacification of the world through victories’ (Vell. Pat. 2.89.3, 6). Rebellious Dalmatia is ‘pacata’, one which entailed a submission to Rome: ‘confessionem (...) [Roman] imperii’ (Vell. Pat. 2.90.1). Spain and Africa, ‘tam feras’, which often threatened the safety of Rome, are now pacified: ‘Caesar Augustus led them to peace’ (Vell. Pat. 2.90.4). Livy records the Temple of Janus as closing only when Rome was at peace with all its enemies ‘pacified’: ‘[the Temple] closed when all peoples nearby are pacified’ (Liv. 1.19.2).

This was even present in post-Augustan sources. Augustus, in a speech to the senate as recorded by Cassius Dio, immediately after declaring himself to be in control of the entire land and sea, states that there are no more enemies waging war on Rome and as such the senate and the people can be at peace (Cass. Dio 53.8.1 – 2). Indeed, in almost every instance of Augustan expansion, Cassius Dio presents the foreign state as the aggressor and the threat to peace. In Tiberius’ funeral oration for Augustus, the late emperor was commended for the benefits his foreign wars brought for Rome (Cass. Dio 56.37.4). Tiberius then unambiguously compliments Augustus:

374 Vell. Pat. 2.85.1: ‘pro salute alter, in ruinam alter terrarum orbis dimicaveret’.
375 Vell. Pat. 2.89.3: ‘revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furo’_. Vell. Pat. 2.89.6: ‘pacatusque victoriis terrarum orbis’.
376 Vell. Pat. 2.90.4: ‘ad eam pacem (...) perduxit Caesar Augustus’.
378 Cass. Dio 53.8.1 – 2: ‘πάσης μὲν τῆς ἐντὸς τῆς Ἡρακλείως στηλῆς τῆς θαλάσσης πλὴν ὀλίγων κρατῶν, ἐν πάσαις δὲ τὰς ἱππείρας καὶ πόλεις καὶ θυσία κεκτημένοις, καὶ μήτ’ ἄλλου ἐπί τινος ἐτί προσπαθεῖ στατιζόντας μοι μήτ’ οἰκεῖου στασιάζοντος, ἀλλὰ πάντων ὑμῶν ἦμιν καὶ εἰρηνοῦστων καὶ ὁμονοοῦστων καὶ εὐθενοῦστων καὶ τὸ μέγιστον εὐθελοντῆδον πειθαρχοῦστων (...)’.
379 For the Alps and Spain, see 53.27. For the Germans, see 54.20. For the Rhetians, see 54.22.
‘He it was who took up [the task of] guarding and preserving those troublesome and warlike provinces, delivering [them] to you pacified and freed from danger (…) [and made the soldiers] the most formidable guardians against foreigners’ (Cass. Dio 56.40.2).

Thus, it is clear that Augustus manipulated his portrayals of his interactions with foreign states and peoples as a way of maintaining power. In order to reconcile the oppositional images of war and peace, Augustus portrayed himself predominantly as the guardian of peace – a peace which was under constant threat by external forces – who was ‘reluctant’ to retain supreme command of the army and state. However, as shown in the analysis of Qin Shi Huang, this ‘peace through warfare’ image was only one aspect of his image as a peace bringer. Qin Shi Huang also went to great lengths to show that sustaining peace could only be achieved through him. Likewise, Augustus, in both the Res Gestae and as reflected in Augustan literature, rooted this ability to keep the peace in himself, and perhaps his immediate heirs, as a way of securing his new regime.

At the very opening of the Res Gestae, Augustus immediately draws the reader’s attention to his personal role in ‘saving’ the republic: ‘privato consilio et privata impensa’ (Aug. RG. 1). When discussing his wars both ‘civilia externaque’, again Augustus uses the first person to stress his achievements: ‘suscepi’ (Aug. RG. 3). The possessive adjective ‘meis’ is used in conjunction with ‘triumphis’ so that the readers would have no doubt that it was in Augustus’ triumphs that foreign kings were led (Aug. RG. 4). In later sections, Augustus again states that he was the one who extended all the boundaries of the Roman Empire: ‘fines auxi’ (Aug. RG. 26). He stresses that it was his fleet – ‘mea classis’ (Aug. RG. 26) – which sailed further than any other Roman. Even when wars were fought without Augustus’ direct input, he still interposes himself as the supreme commander,

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380 Cass. Dio 56.40.2: ὅστις τὰ μὲν ἐπίπονα καὶ ἐμπολέμια ἐθνείς αὐτός καὶ φρουρήσειν καὶ σώσειν ὑπεδέξατο, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τὰ εἰρηνικὰ καὶ ἀκίνδυνα υἱὸν ἀπέδωκεν (...) ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ θυντήρων φύλακας φοβερωτάτους’.

381 See Susan P. Mattern, Rome and the Enemy: Imperial Strategy in the Principate, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 118ff. for her broader analysis on how the Principate portrayed peace as only sustainable via aggression towards hostile ‘barbarians’. See also Borgies, Le Conflit Propagandiste, 289, where Borgies argues that Octavian/Augustus’ propaganda against foreigners was presented as ‘une lutte nécessaire pour la sauvegarde de Rome et de ses valeurs face à un ennemi étranger’.

382 Mackay, Breakdown of the Roman Republic, 395.

by declaring that it was ‘by my command and auspices’ (meo iussu et auspicio) that the Ethiopian and Arabian campaigns were undertaken (Aug. RG. 26). Ramage also notes that even when not discussing wars, Augustus still stresses his personal agency in any diplomatic relations with foreign peoples. The Parthians did not simply restore the Roman standards but restored them ‘mihi’ (Aug. RG. 29). Foreign embassies were not simply described as ‘sent to Rome’ but ‘ad me’ (Aug. RG. 31). Similarly, when the Parthians and the Medes were receiving kings, they received them ‘a me’ (Aug. RG. 33). Augustus not only established his image by portraying himself as one who keeps the peace through war but further consolidated his self-portrayal by stressing his position as the only one who could achieve the victories upon which the Pax Romana was based. In Augustan self-portrayal, the Pax Romana was very much the Pax Augusta.

This, too, was reflected in the rest of Augustan literature. Horace praises the Pax Augusta: ‘this day, truly a joyful day for me, will drive away my worries; neither war nor a violent death will I fear with Caesar in possession of the world’ (Hor. Carm. 3.14). Further, Horace says that ‘with Caesar in charge of affairs’ (custode rerum Caesare) he fears neither ‘furor’ nor ‘vis’ nor the barbarians (Hor. Carm. 4.15). Virgil, in the Georgics, begs the gods not to prevent Octavian from ‘aiding this age [which is] in ruins’ then later lists a range of nations driven into submission by him (Verg. G. 1.500, 509ff). Ovid, in the Fasti, declares the ‘domus’ of Augustus to be the one guaranteeing peace: ‘and

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384 For another example of Augustus maintaining his absolute control of the army, see Vervaet’s analysis of Augustus denying Crassus the Spolia Opima in Frederik J. Vervaet, The High Command in the Roman Republic: The Principle of the summum imperium auspiciumque from 509 to 19 BCE, Stuttgart: Fraz Steiner Verlag, 2014 p. 253. See also Alston, Rome’s Revolution, 232 and Clark, Augustus, 91 for other analyses on the denying of the Spolia Opima. For an analysis on Augustus – and the imperial family in general – monopolising the triumph, see Havener, Imperator Augustus, 280 – 281.
385 Ramage, Res Gestae, 23 – 24.
387 Hor. Carm. 3.14: ‘hic dies vere mihi festus atras eximet curas; ego nec tumultum nec mori per vim metuam tenente Caesare terras’.
with the Augustan line will the guardianship of the State remain (...) [and may] that house, which preserves the peace, with peace last forever’ (Ov. Fast. 1.531, 721).  

**Conclusion**

By analysing Qin Shi Huang’s steles, it is clear that the First Emperor centred a significant portion of his self-portrayal on his ability to bring and sustain peace. However, as he derived a substantial amount of his power from his command of the army, the First Emperor could not simply dismiss his military forces, nor genuinely cease all military activity. Yet, as can be seen in Late Warring State texts, neither the populace nor even the soldiery were happy to continue fighting wars, particularly those viewed as ‘civil’. Thus, the First Emperor simultaneously had to give the people the perception of the peace they so longed for and to continue the military activities upon which his power was dependent.

The manner by which the First Emperor reconciled these two seemingly irreconcilable aspects of his self-portrayal was by staking the achievement and sustaining of peace firmly on victory in war. Then, in a further attempt to consolidate power, the First Emperor, in his propaganda, stressed his personal agency in these victories; he emphasised that it was by him and him alone that peace was achieved and maintained, as only he had sufficient 武威 (wu wei; martial valour) to bring the victories upon which peace was based. Taking this reading as a hypothesis for Augustan propaganda, one finds that this interpretation applies to Augustus perfectly. Both emperors portrayed themselves as the sole bringers of peace for their respective empires, in which they were repeatedly and ‘reluctantly’ dragged into one war after another to protect their people. They proclaimed themselves as the guarantors of peace, which was firmly founded on military victories, especially over foreign peoples or states which were subsequently portrayed as a threat to such a peace.  

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389 Ov. Fast. 1.531, 721: ‘et penes Augustos patriae tutela manebit (...) utque domus, quae praestat eam, cum pace perennet’.

doing so, the two emperors were able to laud their military prowess without diminishing their roles as protectors of peace.

Moreover, as a further attempt to consolidate their power, the two emperors meticulously crafted their images so that the victories upon which this peace relied were sustainable only by the emperors themselves. Both emperors, in their propaganda, portrayed the era before them as chaotic and full of warfare, with the peaceful ‘golden age’ after their ascension as emperor being exclusively attributable to their personal abilities. By prefacing peace as possible only through warfare, in which Rome and China could only be victorious through the emperors themselves, Augustus and Qin Shi Huang not only consolidated these contrasting aspects of their rule but also portrayed themselves as almost ‘messianic’ to be able to achieve both.

However, to suggest ‘peace through warfare’ as the only way the emperors presented their interactions with foreign peoples would be too narrow in scope, as there were numerous portrayals of foreign peoples that did not involve warfare. As mentioned before, there is a plethora of examples of ‘barbarians’ submitting willingly or being accepted as part of the Pax Romana and not being presented as outright enemies of peace; thus, their portrayals do not easily fit into the ‘peace through warfare’ framework. Therefore, even in the context of war and peace, there are many more layers to the emperors’ self-portrayals than simply ‘peace-bringer’. This thesis will hence explore how the two emperors manipulated the presentation of their continued interactions (military and diplomatic) with foreign peoples to promote their ‘perfect’ morality and divine patronage.
CHAPTER FOUR
MORALITY, JUST WAR, AND UNIVERSAL CONSENSUS

In the previous chapter, it was shown that one of the ways by which Qin Shi Huang and Augustus reconciled their military activities with their personae of peace was by associating one with the other: peace was obtained through warfare. Indeed, this is also the general academic view of the dual nature of Augustan self-portrayal. However, while such an interpretation is certainly not inaccurate, it does not fully capture the complexity of Augustan self-portrayal and its interaction with foreigners. There are numerous sections in the Res Gestae where interactions with foreign peoples or states do not mention war and, in the case of the King of the Parthians, explicitly state that he came in ‘submission’ despite that ‘he was overcome in no war’ (non bello superatus) and thus must be interpreted in another fashion (Aug. RG. 32). Continuing with a comparative reading, this chapter will first argue that, in ancient Chinese thought, warfare, even when used defensively, was viewed as an absolute last resort. The ruler was obliged to ‘pacify’ ‘All under Heaven’ with his virtue first and rely on military might only when he had no other options. Thus, the First Emperor’s steles also had to glorify his personal virtues and how such virtues sustained peace. Even when the emperor was forced to resort to violence, the stele inscriptions were structured to safeguard the emperor’s moral character. This chapter will then advance a similar reading in relation to Augustus: the princeps also stressed his personal virtues as a reason why he could rule through ‘consensus universus’. Thus, his interactions with foreign states and peoples were presented in a similar light to those of Qin Shi Huang: to glorify the personal virtues of the emperor.

Qin Shi Huang

As shown in Chapter One, the rise of anti-war sentiments in the Late Warring States period resulted in a widespread detestation of warfare. Across multiple philosophical and political schools, warfare was intended as an absolute last resort while the sage-king was expected to unify ‘All under Heaven’
through his virtue. In addition to the passages already analysed in previous chapters, the Zuo Zhuan further records a Duke being urged to ‘pacify the people with morality, not through war’, as ‘to rule via warfare is like fraying a thread (i.e. to make things worse)’. In a later passage, it is said that ‘it is by filial piety that one pacifies the people’, and further: ‘[if one] lacks virtue yet still contends with the other feudal lords, how can he unite the people?’ Mencius declares: ‘[if one] has these virtues (as listed earlier in the passage) (...) [he] is surely an agent of Heaven. In all of history, there has never been such a man who has failed to obtain kingship’. In the Wangzhi chapter of Xunzi, the philosopher argues that ‘in the ancient times, all those who gained All under Heaven did thus: [that is] to rule in an enlightened fashion so that there were none who were not willing [to submit]. By doing so all violence and cruelty could be halted’. Lü Buwei, whilst not dismissing the use of warfare, nevertheless believed that ‘when ruling All under Heaven, nothing is greater than virtue, nothing is greater than righteousness’. Thus, it can clearly be seen that in the immediate political context prior to the unification of the Chinese states, there was a tremendous expectation – in both Chinese thought in general and Qin ideology in particular – that the ruler ought only to use warfare as a last resort and that a true sage-king should rule via virtue, not force. Indeed, there was a consensus among almost all the


394 Zuo Zhuan, 12th Year of Duke Xuan: ‘無德而強爭諸侯，何以和眾’.

395 Mencius 2A5: ‘信能行此五者，則鄰國之民仰之若父母矣。率其子弟，攻其父母，自生民以來, 未有能濟者也。如此，則無敵於天下。無敵於天下者, 天吏也。然而不王者, 未之有也 (If one has these five virtues, then all the peoples of the neighbouring states will look towards him as if to their parents. I have never heard of one who would rally their sons and brothers to wage war on their parents. Thus, this man has no enemies under Heaven. He who is without a single enemy in All under Heaven is truly an agent of Heaven. In all of history, there has never been such a man who has failed to obtain kingship)’.

396 Xunzi, Wangzhi: ‘故古之人，有以一國取天下者，非往行之也，修政其所，莫不願，如是而可以誅暴禁悍矣’.

397 Lüshi Chunqiu, Shang De: ‘為天下及國，莫如以德，莫如行義’.

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philosophical and political schools that the ideal sage-king ought to be surpassing in virtue.\textsuperscript{398} Thus, simply being able to obtain military victories – even if they were for the purpose of preserving peace – was insufficient to justify the emperor’s status as a sage-ruler to the rest of the empire. As argued in the previous chapter, Qin Shi Huang was anxious to cultivate public support for his new regime.\textsuperscript{399} In his self-portrayal, the First Emperor recognised the absolute necessity to present his ‘moral worth’.

Indeed, Qin Shi Huang, in his steles, depicted himself as the foretold sage-king, perfect in his morality.\textsuperscript{400} In the Stele on Mt. Tai, the Emperor ‘embodies sagehood’ and ‘pacified All under Heaven’.\textsuperscript{401} This is echoed in the Stele on Mt. Langxie: ‘the August Thearch, He has virtuous power, He secures and consolidates the four extremities. He punishes rebellion and eliminates calamities, He causes benefits to flourish and attracts blessings’.\textsuperscript{402} Whilst Kern has the ‘First Emperor’ remain as the subject for these lines, this thesis argues that it is the ‘virtue’ of the Emperor that protects and pacifies. ‘皇帝之德’ can probably be more simply translated as ‘the virtue of the August Thearch’: 皇帝 (\textit{huangdi}) means ‘emperor’ or ‘August Thearch’, 德 (\textit{de}) means ‘virtue’, and 之 (\textit{zhi}) is a possessive article. Thus, this line ought to read: ‘the virtue of the August Thearch secures and consolidates (…)’. Likewise, in the Stele on the Eastern Vista, it is the ‘shining virtuous power [of the August Thearch]’ which ‘regulates and orders all within the universe’.\textsuperscript{403}

When his enemies are named, not only is their threat to peace pronounced, but a clear juxtaposition is made between the virtue of the First Emperor and his rivals. In the Stele on Mt. Zhifu, the line asserting that ‘abroad He instructs the feudal lords; Brilliantly He spreads culture and grace,
enlightening them through rightness and principle’ is immediately followed by a less-than-flattering
description of his rival kings: ‘the six kingdoms had been restive and perverse, greedy and criminal,
insatiable — atrociously slaughtering endlessly’.404 Similarly, on the Stele at Mt. Kuaiji, the First
Emperor, here named as the Sage of Qin, is recorded as establishing laws and social norms, which is
promptly followed by another invective against the six kings: ‘the six kings were despotic and
rebellious, greedy and criminal, arrogant and wild’.405 It is thus clear that Qin Shi Huang not only
manipulated the representation of his acts of warfare against other states in order to justify his
military actions and control of the army, but also to highlight his morality. This is unambiguously
stated in the Stele at Jieshi: ‘the August Thearch displayed His awesome influence — His virtuous
power brought the feudal lords together’.406 This is further supported by the vocabulary used in the
steles when recording his wars. In the Stele on Mt. Zhifu, the armies that the First Emperor sent
against his foes are described as 讨师 (tao shi), or ‘punitive troops’, thus assuming a morally
superior position where he ‘punishes’ other nations for ‘transgressions’.407 His enemies are
exterminated ‘with rightness and awesome might’.408 This moral juxtaposition perfectly
complements Qin Shi Huang’s portrayal of his foes as ‘enemies of peace’ and of himself as a ‘peace-
bringer’, as discussed in the previous chapter.

As can be seen, to justify further his self-proclaimed position as a sage-king, who was expected to be
perfectly virtuous as the new ruler of ‘All under Heaven’, Qin Shi Huang not only had to structure his
military activities within the framework of a ‘peace-bringer’ but also had to be ‘perfect’ in his
morality. In almost all the recorded instances of his military interactions with other states, the
passages were constructed in a way that heightened his virtue. Therefore, it is implied that it was

404 Mt. Zhifu Stele, 13 – 18: ‘外教諸侯，光施文惠，明以義理。六國回闢，貪戾無厭，虐殺不已’.
407 Mt. Zhifu Stele, 19 – 21: ‘皇帝哀眾，遂發討師，奮揚武德 (The August Thearch felt pity for the
multitudes, and consequently sent out His punitive troops, vehemently displaying His martial power)’.
408 Mt. Kuaiji Stele, 31: ‘義威誅之’.
through virtue – and explicitly the virtue of the First Emperor – that his new empire could be sustained.\textsuperscript{409}

However, the virtue of the First Emperor was not merely lauded in a military context. There are numerous passages where his virtue is praised when no war is mentioned. In fact, passages where his virtue is lauded (without reference to military conquests) significantly outweigh any other form of praise. To give a few examples, the Mt. Langxie Stele declares that he ‘united and led to concord father and son. [He is] sage, wise, humane and right’.\textsuperscript{410} In a later passage of the same stele, the Emperor ‘looks down on and inspects the four quarters’, with the result that ‘evil and depravity are not tolerated, all are committed to honesty and goodness’.\textsuperscript{411} In the Mt. Zhifu Stele, ‘just was He in his punishment, trustworthy was He in acting’.\textsuperscript{412} In the Mt. Yi Stele, immediately after ‘He presents the lofty designation to those above (i.e. adopting the title Emperor)’, the Emperor’s piety is described as ‘brilliant manifest and shining!’\textsuperscript{413} The Mt. Tai, Jieshi, and Mt. Kuaiji steles all discuss sexual and marital morality, with the Mt. Jieshi Stele stating how ‘every task [of men and women] has its proper order’ and the Mt. Kuaiji stele giving an extended passage on punishments for adultery.\textsuperscript{414}

\textsuperscript{409} Pines, \textit{Everlasting Empire}, 54; Pines, \textit{The First Emperor}, 269.
\textsuperscript{410} Mt. Langxie Stele, 6 – 7: ‘合同父子。聖智仁義’.
\textsuperscript{411} Mt. Langxie Stele, 38 – 42: ‘臨察四方（…）奸邪不容，皆務貞良’.
\textsuperscript{412} Mt. Zhifu Stele, 22: ‘義誅信行’.
\textsuperscript{413} Mt. Yi Stele, 11 – 12: ‘上薦高號，孝道顯明’.
\textsuperscript{414} Mt. Tai Stele, 28 – 33: ‘貴賤分明，男女禮順，慎遵職事。昭隔內外，靡不清淨，施於昆嗣 (The noble and the mean are distinguished and made clear, men and women embody compliance, cautious and respectful to their professions and duties. Distinctly demarcated are the inner and outer spheres, nothing that is not clear and pure, extending down to the later generations)’; Jieshi Stele, 28 – 30: ‘男樂其疇，女修其業，事各有序 (Men find joy in their fields, women cultivate their work: every task has its proper order)’; Mt. Kuaiji Stele, 46 – 60: ‘飾省宣義，有子而嫁，倍死不貞。防隔內外，禁止淫泆，男女絜誠。夫為寄豭，殺之無罪，男秉義程。妻為逃嫁，子不得母，咸化廉清。大治濯俗，天下承風，蒙被休經 (He rectifies faults, promulgates rightness to those [widows] who have children and marry [again] while turning their back on the dead and being unfaithful. He demarcares and separates the inner and outer spheres, prohibits and stops the lewd and licentious – men and women are pure and sincere. If a husband becomes a hog put out to stud (i.e. to commit adultery), to kill him is not a crime, and thus men adhere to the rules of rightness. If a wife runs away to remarrry, the children no longer take her as their mother, and then all are transformed to become honest and pure. His great rulership cleanses the customs, All under Heaven receive imperial influence, are covered and clothed with superb guidelines)’.
Such passages, however, serve a greater purpose than simple praise. In numerous schools of Chinese philosophical and political thought, it was considered an absolute necessity for the ruler to be ‘supreme’ in his morality, one central aspect of which was the ‘willing’ submission of ‘All under Heaven’.\footnote{Poo, *Enemies of Civilization*, 124; Ma, *Qinshi Huangdi Zhuan*, 110, 443, 447; Creel, *The Birth of China*, 368.} Indeed, if there was excessive resistance from those being subjugated, that was a sign that the ruler was not virtuous enough to be the sage-king.\footnote{Pines, *Everlasting Empire*, pp. 32 – 33.} For example, the *Zuo Zhuan* states: ‘if your virtue is not sung about, who would submit to you?’\footnote{Zuo Zhuan, 7th Year of Duke Wen: ‘若吾子之德，莫可歌也，其誰來之’} In a later passage, a learned official criticises an over-reliance on laws, instead arguing that the ruler ought to be virtuous and have his people imitate him willingly.\footnote{Zuo Zhuan, 6th Year of Duke Zhao.} The *Zuo Zhuan* also announces that ‘if a ruler does not shun virtue, then all the vassal states will come [in submission]’\footnote{Zuo Zhuan, 26th Year of Duke Zhao: ‘君無違德，方國將至’ Yan Zi, a rough contemporary to the author of the *Zuo Zhuan*, also reflected this thought in his work with a near identically-worded passage. See Yanzi Chunqiu, Wai Pian 1, 6.1.} Mencius maintains that a virtuous ruler will have the people submit to him ‘like water flowing downhill’\footnote{Mencius 1A6: ‘民歸之，由水之就下’},\footnote{Mencius 2A3: ‘以德服人者，中心悅而誠服也’} and that by ‘using virtue to subdue others, [he] will make them submit from the bottom of their hearts’.\footnote{Mencius 2A3: ‘以德服人者，中心悅而誠服也’} This thought echoes that of Confucius, who states that ‘all peoples from the four corners [of the world] will come carrying their children in submission’ to a virtuous ruler.\footnote{Confucius, *Analects*, Zi Lu: ‘上好禮，则民莫敢不敬；上好義，則民莫敢不服；上好信，則民莫敢不用情。夫如是，則四方之民襁負其子而至矣 (If he [a ruler] loves ritual, then the people dare not disrespect him; if he loves righteousness, then the people dare not be unsubmissive; if he loves trustworthiness, then the people dare not be unaffectionate. If a man embodies these things, then all peoples from the four corners will come carrying their children in submission)’.} Xunzi links the idea of a limitless empire with virtue, for when the virtuous early kings of Zhou united the empire and set aside warfare, ‘the gates of the empire did not shut and [the empire] encompassed All under Heaven without end’.\footnote{Xunzi, *Ruxiao*: ‘反而定三革，偃五兵，合天下 (…) 四海之內，莫不變心易慮以化順之。故外闔不閉，跨天下而無蘄 (But they [the Zhou] set aside their arms and armour, laid to rest the army and unified All under Heaven (...) within the four seas, all changed their minds and willingly submitted to the Zhou. Thus, the gates of the empire did not shut and it encompassed All under Heaven without end)’.} He then continues by defining the rule of a sage-king as when ‘enemy nations submit without conquest and
all peoples within the four seas are unified without command’, and in a later passage: ‘their [the sage king’s armies] weapons are not be stained by blood yet all those from near and far come in submission’. For Lü Buwei, the willing submission of ‘barbarians’ was again a sign of virtue: ‘one who is good at rulership will surely have the barbarians, despite their foreign cultures and tongues, come in submission. This is due to the virtue of the ruler’.

With willing submission being an unmistakable sign of sagely virtue, the First Emperor ensured that the submission of all nations and peoples under Heaven was depicted as ‘willing’. The word 服 (fu), meaning ‘to submit’, appears three times in the steles – Mt. Tai, Mt. Zhifu, and Jieshi. In the Mt. Tai and Mt. Zhifu steles, ‘fu’ is immediately preceded by the adjective 宾 (bin), which Kern translates as ‘respectful’ but which this thesis argues ought to be translated as ‘willing’. While there are no further unambiguous mentions of ‘willing submission’, the sense of it is nevertheless visible throughout the steles. In the closing lines of the Mt. Langxie Stele, after describing the limitless nature of Qin Shi Huang’s empire, it is said that ‘there is none who does not receive His virtuous power, everyone finds peace in his own abode’. The Jieshi Stele declares: ‘His favour covers all the professions, [newly] divides and integrates the barley fields: there is none who does not find peace

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424 Xunzi, Jundao: ‘敵國不待服而詘, 四海之民不待令而一, 夫是之謂至平 (when enemy nations submit without conquest and all peoples within the four seas are unified without command, this is called the ‘Great Peace’).’

425 Xunzi, Yibing: ‘兵不血刃, 远邇來服’.

426 Lüshi Chunqiu, Gongming: ‘善為君者, 蠻夷反舌殊俗異習皆服之, 德厚也’.

427 Mt. Tai Stele, 6: 罔不賓服 (there were none who were not respectful and submissive); Mt. Zhifu Stele, 24: 莫不賓服 (and there were none who were not respectful and submissive); Jieshi Stele, 15: 庶心咸服 (and the hearts of the multitudes all became submissive).

428 Indeed, Kern’s translation is literally accurate, but bin incorporates significantly more complex connotations that simple ‘respect’. The Kangxi Dictionary and Shuowen Jiezi (說文解字, literally ‘Explaining Glyphs and Analysing Characters’, a dictionary compiled by Xu Shen and published around 121 CE) both list ‘respectful’ as a possible meaning. However, the Erya records 服 as ‘賓, 服也 (bin: to submit)’. Even when it gained the meaning of ‘respectful’, the Kangxi Dictionary elaborates that it is a respect shown to a host, master, or ruler, often in a willing fashion: ‘懷德而服 (to submit with their beneficence in your heart)’. Shuowen Jiezi also states that it is a form of submission one shows to someone one respects: ‘賓謂所敬之人 (bin refers to those whom one respects)’.

429 Mt. Langxie Stele, 71 – 72: ‘莫不受德, 各安其宇’.
in his own place’. In the Mt. Kuaiji Stele, the emperor’s virtue is described as ‘vast and dense:
within the six combined directions, all are covered by grace without limit’, and that ‘All under
Heaven receive imperial influence (...) all respect measure and rules, calm and peaceful, honest and
hard-working, there is none who does not obey orders’. From this, one can see that the theme of virtue permeated all of the First Emperor’s interactions
with ‘All under Heaven’, as recorded in his steles. If the Emperor embarked on military activities, his
wars were worded in such a fashion as to highlight their justness. When no wars were under
discussion, his virtue was still lauded via the portrayal of the willing submission of ‘All under
Heaven’. Therefore, in every aspect of his actions as described in the steles, the Emperor is
portrayed as a superhuman sage-king perfect in his morality, through which the empire continued to
be pacified and sustained. Qin Shi Huang’s propagandistic use of ‘willing submission’ was so
successful that even Han dynasty writers who loathed the Qin still begrudgingly admitted the willing
submission of ‘All under Heaven’. In the Shiji, Sima Qian wonders why the Qin was able to unify
China and concludes that, as the First Emperor was able to end the cycle of warfare, ‘all submitted to
him with a willing heart’ (Shiji 6.283).

Thus, it is clear that ‘virtue’ or ‘morality’ represented a considerable part of Qin Shi Huang’s self-
portrayal, particularly in his interactions with his enemies. This portrayal was two-fold: moral
superiority derived from war and moral superiority in the ‘willing submission’ of ‘All under Heaven’.

430 Jieshi Stele, 31 – 33: ‘惠被諸產，分並來田， 莫不安所’. Kern’s version has this word as 分 (fen; to
separate), rather than 久 (jiu; a long time), as with Han Zhaoqi’s edition of the Shiji. If this character is jiu, then
Han argues that it may be a reference to those long displaced in war, now finally free to return to their farms.
Kern’s version is more linguistically probable, as the steles tend to employ poetic opposites: 分並 (fen bing;
divides and integrates). However, Han’s version is more thematically probable, particularly considering the rest
of the line.

。皆遵軌度， 和安敦勉， 莫不順令’. Shiji 6.283: ‘既元元之民冀得安其性命，莫不虛心而仰上
(As such, all the good peoples hoped that they
could finally live a peaceful life, and all submitted to him with a willing heart)’. For a further analysis on this
passage, see Ma, Qin Shi Huangdi Zhuan, 110 and Jonathan Markley, Peace and Peril: Sima Qian’s Portrayal of
Han-Xiongnu Relations, Turnhout: Brepols, 2016, p. 110.

432 Pines, Everlasting Empire, 50 – 54.
The wars he embarked on were portrayed within this established framework. Not only were the First Emperor’s enemies, as discussed in the previous chapter, shown to be threats to peace, but they were also clearly and unambiguously designated as ‘immoral’, often in an explicit moral comparison to the First Emperor. Co-opting the people’s expectations of a ‘sage-ruler’, the First Emperor manipulated his interactions with his foes as a moral struggle to uphold his image of perfect, sagely morality. This justified any military actions, however seemingly ‘reluctant’ the Emperor was to ‘punish’ his enemies. Moreover, the concept of people or states coming to him in *bin fu* (willing submission) demonstrated further the First Emperor’s virtue: he embodied the ‘sage’ and all came in willing submission, as was ‘foretold’ by Warring States literature. This interpretation deepens our understanding of his self-portrayal and helps to elucidate passages where no war is mentioned.

**Augustus**

This chapter will now take the conclusions reached above and test whether they can also serve as an interpretation for Augustan propaganda. This chapter will firstly, in line with its methodology, ensure that it will not force an incorrect interpretation of Augustan propaganda by arbitrarily rendering the evidence to agree with this hypothesis. Thus, it will first examine Augustan propaganda and literature in general to see if ‘virtue’ or being a ‘moral ruler’ was indeed a part of Augustan self-portrayal. In doing so, this chapter will argue that Augustus strongly emphasised his morality and it was, he claims, through his near ‘superhuman’ morality that he was able to ‘guide’ Rome by means of his ‘moral suasion’ (*auctoritas*) rather than his ‘coercive force’ (*potestas*). Then, with regard to the portrayals of interactions with foreign nations and peoples, one finds that Augustus manipulated them in a fashion surprisingly similar to Qin Shi Huang. Both emperors portrayed their actions in war not only as a struggle for peace but also for morality, with numerous instances where Augustus explicitly claimed to be fighting a *bellum iustum*. Then, when foreign nations either came in submission or sent embassies, such an act was comparably used to highlight Augustus’ morality.

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Rome did not have a formalised concept of a morally perfect ‘sage-king’. Nevertheless, the idea that a ruler/leader ought to be moral still existed in Roman thought. Cicero describes a ‘summo imperatore’ as having, amongst other qualities, ‘virtutem’ and ‘auctoritatem’ (Cic. Leg. Man. 10.28). Livy, too, portrays an ideal leader as one who inspires through his deeds (Liv. 7.32.12). Woolf suggests that during the Republic, it was common to associate successes (or losses) with the virtue of the commanders or leaders. Examining Augustan-era literature, there is undoubtedly a theme of praise for Augustus’ morality. Horace stresses that ‘whoever wanting to take away this impious slaughter and civil madness’ must be one who is able ‘to curb licentiousness’ (Hor. Carm. 3.24.25 – 26, 29). This concept is echoed in the Carmen Saeculare, where Horace rejoices that ‘Fides et Pax et Honos Pudorque priscus et neglecta (...) Virtus’ can finally return under the Augustan regime (Hor. Carm. Saec. 57 – 58). Virtue is then unambiguously connected to Augustus in one of Horace’s letters dedicated to the princeps, where the poet praises him for adorning Italy with morals and correcting it with laws: ‘res Italas (...) moribus ornes, legibus emendes’ (Hor. Epist. 2.1.2 – 3). Ovid, in the Fasti, compliments Augustus for leading as a moral example against luxury (Ov. Fast. 6.643ff.). Then, in the Metamorphoses, the poet commends Augustus for re-establishing the laws in righteous ways and Augustus is declared to be ‘the most righteous maker [of laws]’ (iustissimus auctor), who leads ‘by his own example’ (exemploque suo) (Ov. Met. 15.832ff.). Praise for Augustus’ virtue persisted even in post-Augustan literature. Suetonius mentions that Augustus would distribute justice ‘not only with diligence but with the highest of leniency’ and was able to correct ‘many of the most ill practices’ (Suet. Aug. 32 – 33). Similarly, Cassius Dio records how Augustus’

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436 Kapust, Republicanism, 102.
438 Hor. Carm. 3.24.25 – 26, 29: ‘quisquis volet inpias caedis et rabiem tollere civicam (...) refrenare licentiam’.
440 See also Zanker, Power of Images, 159 – 160, where Zanker notes how Augustus tries to portray his self-control and rejection of luxury by having even his toga be allegedly woven by his wife and granddaughter.
vote in the appeals court echoed that of Athena’s and highlighted the princeps’ mercy (Cass. Dio 51.19.7).\textsuperscript{442} Furthermore, the historian states that Augustus’ acceptance of the Censorship allowed him to investigate ‘our lives and morals’ (Cass. Dio 53.17.7).\textsuperscript{443} Later, after the death of Agrippa, he became the overseer for laws and morals: ‘ὁ Αὔγουστος [became] ἐπιμελητής τε καὶ ἐπανορθωτής τῶν τρόπων’ (Cass. Dio 54.30.1). Levick further argues that Augustus’ assumption of the title ‘\textit{Pater Patriae}’ gave him ‘the moral authority of a father’ and implied a ‘supreme auctoritas’.\textsuperscript{444}

In the \textit{Res Gestae} too, there is a clear emphasis on morality. Augustus recalls how he was chosen ‘unanimously by the senate and the people of Rome to become the overseer of laws and morals’ (Aug. \textit{RG}. 6).\textsuperscript{445} He then states how he ‘recalled many ancestral precedents which had now fallen out of use and I myself have handed down precedents in numerous matters to be imitated into posterity’ (Aug. \textit{RG}. 8),\textsuperscript{446} which is very similar to passages in Qin Shi Huang’s steles. In the closing of the Mt. Tai Stele, the First Emperor claims to have cleansed all the customs and morals for future generations.\textsuperscript{447} In the closing line of the Mt. Zhifu Stele, the First Emperor is said to have established a ‘norm’ to be passed down to future generations.\textsuperscript{448} Qin Shi Huang’s legal reforms on adultery, which highlighted his control over morality, were echoed by Augustus with the \textit{Leges Iuliae}.\textsuperscript{449}

Finally, the stress upon the morality of the princeps was most clearly seen in Augustus’ proud


\textsuperscript{443} Cass. Dio 53.17.7: ‘τούς τε βίους καὶ τοὺς τρόπους ἧμων’.  


\textsuperscript{445} Aug. \textit{RG}. 6: ‘\textit{senatu populoque Romano consentientibus} ἵνα ἐπιμελητής τῶν τε νόμων καὶ τῶν τρόπων’. Note that the Latin inscription is missing after consentientibus, so I continued with the Greek version.


\textsuperscript{447} Mt. Tai Stele, 36 – 38: ‘化及無窮，遵奉遺詔，永承重戒’.

\textsuperscript{448} Mt. Zhifu Stele, 38: ‘表垂常式’.

\textsuperscript{449} Woolf, \textit{Rome}, 116; Zanker, \textit{Power of Images}, 3. See also Galinsky, \textit{Augustus}, 96 for his argument that Augustus’ moral legislations presented Rome as morally and ethically ‘worthy’ for a world empire. See Anthony Everitt, \textit{Augustus: The Life of Rome’s First Emperor}, New York: Random House, 2006, p. 238, where Everitt argues that the idea of needing to be morally ‘worthy’ of a world empire was also present throughout Virgil’s works.
recollection of his receiving of the *clupeus virtutis*, where his *virtus*, *clementia*, *iustitia*, and *pietas* were celebrated (Aug. *RG*. 34). Therefore, it can be concluded that Augustus, in both his self-portrayal and in Augustan literature in general, was depicted as an idealised ruler surpassing all others in morality, just like Qin Shi Huang in his steles. It has also been argued by scholars such as Eder that Augustus went to great lengths to affirm what honours, titles, and powers he refused if they were seen to be against the *mos maiorum*, which further ‘profiles Augustus as the incorruptible guardian of tradition’. As such, it would not be a stretch to suggest that Augustus’ interactions with foreign peoples and states might also have helped to illustrate this ‘exemplary’ moral character. As argued in the previous section, Qin Shi Huang’s approach can be largely divided into two sections: morality in war and morality in diplomacy. Thus, the same approach shall be advanced for Augustus; this chapter will examine how Augustus portrayed his *bella as iusta*, then how the ‘willing’ submission of foreign peoples elevated his morality.

Similar to Qin Shi Huang’s methods, one can clearly see a moral juxtaposition between Augustus and his foes in both the *Res Gestae* and Augustan literature in general. In Velleius Paterculus’ account of the civil wars, Sextus Pompeius is crude, ‘barbaric’ and almost entirely lacking in virtue: ‘this was a youth unlearned in his studies, barbarous in his speech (...) most dissimilar to the loyalty of his father, a freedman to his own freedmen and a slave to his own slaves’ (Vell. Pat. 2.73.1). Lepidus is portrayed as immoral and weak (Vell. Pat. 2.80.1). Marc Antony’s infatuation with Cleopatra and subsequent decision to attack his own state are similarly attributed to his immorality (Vell. Pat.

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450 The *clupeus virtutis* (Shield of Virtue) was a golden shield bestowed upon Augustus by the Senate in 27 BCE celebrating the *princeps*’ valour, clemency, justice and piety. For further analyses of the *clupeus virtutis*, see Güvan, *Displaying the Res Gestae*, 31; Clark, *Augustus*, 93; and Christian Witschel, ‘The *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* and the Roman Empire’, in *Conceiving the Empire: China and Rome Compared*, ed. Fritz-Heiner Mutschler and Achim Mittag, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 245, where Witschel argues that Augustus mentioned his shield as a way of suggesting that ‘he had lived up to moral expectations’.


454 Vell. Pat. 2.73.1: ‘*hic adulenescens erat studiis rudis, sermone barbarus (...) fide patri dissimilimus, libertorum surorum libertus servorumque servus*’.
In descriptions of the princeps’ foreign enemies, the Pannonians are said to have revolted as they became ‘insolent due to the benefits of a long peace’ (insolens longae pacis bonis) (Vell. Pat. 2.110.2). Germans were described as ‘a race born in deceit’ (natum (...) mendacio genus) (Vell. Pat. 2.118.1). Horace mentions that he does not wish to be found ‘more deceitful than the Parthians’ (Parthis mendacior) (Hor. Epist. 2.112). Even in post-Augustan sources, the immorality of Augustus’ enemies remains as a clear counterpart to the ‘morality’ of the princeps. The princeps’ Ethiopian campaign was initiated due to the aggression of the Ethiopian queen (Cass. Dio 54.5.4). His war against the Germanic tribes was due to unprovoked Germanic incursions (Cass. Dio 54.20.4 – 5). The war against Rhaetians again placed the foreign enemy in the wrong, with Cassius Dio stressing their barbarity in killing even pregnant women (Cass. Dio 54.22.1 – 2). The historian also has Octavian deliver a most likely fictitious speech that is nevertheless consistent with Augustan sentiments where the future princeps openly condemns Marc Antony for no longer holding virtues such as ‘piety’ (τὴν εὐσέβειαν), ‘honesty’ (τὴν πιστότητα) or ‘fairness’ (τὴν ἐπιείκειαν) (Cass. Dio 50.27.7).

On the other hand, the morality of Augustus in his military activities was highlighted in both the Res Gestae and Augustan literature. Ovid compliments Augustus’ taking up of arms against the assassins of Julius Caesar as ‘just’: ‘this task [and] this duty were the first steps of Caesar, to avenge his father through righteous arms’ (Ov. Fast. 3.709 – 710). Later in the same work, the poet describes Augustus being furnished with ‘pia arma’ and standing with his ‘milite iusto’ (Ov. Fast. 5.569, 571). Velleius Paterculus declares Augustus to be ‘the founder and preserver of the Roman name’, who

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455 By attacking Marc Antony’s morality, as Borgies contends, Octavian ‘prépare le terrain à un bellum iustum’ and ‘l’ultime lutte qui rétablira la paix universelle’. See Borgies, Le Conflit Propagandiste, 285 – 288.
456 This is also a clear continuation of pre-imperial ideas of bellum iustum, as discussed in Chapter 2.
457 See Lily Ross Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor, New York: Arno Press, 1975, p. 157, where Taylor declares that this speech ‘is so much in line with Augustus’ point of view as we see it in his Res Gestae and in the reports of contemporary writers’.
458 Ov. Fast. 3.709 – 710: ‘hoc opus, haec pietas, haec prima elementa fuerunt Caesaris, ulcisci iusta per arma patrem’.
459 Newlands, Playing with Time, 88.
fought ‘for the safety of the world’ at Actium (Vell. Pat. 2.60.1, 2.85.1).\textsuperscript{460} This is rendered unambiguous in the \textit{Res Gestae}, with Augustus stating that he never waged an unjust war (Aug. RG. 26).\textsuperscript{461} This is echoed in Suetonius, where the historian records that Augustus ‘did not wage war on any tribe without just and necessary cause’ (Suet. Aug. 21.2).\textsuperscript{462} In a similar manner to Qin Shi Huang, Augustus overtly portrayed his enemies in a negative moral light and manoeuvred himself into a position of moral superiority via his \textit{bella iusta}.\textsuperscript{463}

This extends to after Augustus had proclaimed victory. The \textit{princeps} utilised his victories as a chance to exemplify his moral character by displaying \textit{clementia}.\textsuperscript{464} Velleius Paterculus lists all of Augustus’ enemies post-Actium and trumpets the \textit{princeps’ clementia} by affirming that none of his enemies died by his hands (Vell. Pat. 2.87.2). Cassius Dio, too, records Octavian’s leniency in sparing the Alexandrians after the defeat and deaths of Marc Antony and Cleopatra (Cass. Dio. 51.16.3). Augustus’ \textit{clementia} is also visible in the \textit{Res Gestae}, with Augustus proclaiming that ‘as the victor I spared all citizens who sought pardon. The foreign tribes, for those whom it was safe to forgive, I preferred to spare rather than exterminate’ (Aug. RG. 3).\textsuperscript{465} This theme of \textit{clementia} served the dual purpose of confirming both Augustus’ self-aggrandisation of his morality and his supreme position as one who was sufficiently powerful to distribute \textit{clementia}.\textsuperscript{466} This simultaneously accentuated

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\textsuperscript{460} Vell. Pat. 2.60.1: ‘conditorem conservatoremque Romani nominis’. Vell. Pat. 2.85.1: ‘pro salute (...) terrarum orbis’.


\textsuperscript{464} See Seut. Aug 31, 51. See also John Scheid, \textit{Res Gestae Divi Augusti: Hauts Faits du Divin Auguste}, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007, p. 31. There have also been some arguments that Julius Caesar’s and Augustus’ \textit{clementia} would have been considered tyrannical, as it was a ‘mercy’ shown by one in power to one without and one which places the latter in the debt of the former. Konstan offers a counterargument. See David Konstan, ‘Clemency as Virtue’, \textit{Classical Philology}, vol. 100, no. 4, Oct. 2005, p. 339. A comparable idea is also present in the steles of the First Emperor, although it appears far more as ‘pity’ rather than strict ‘\textit{clementia}’, further raising the First Emperor above his subjects. See particularly Mt. Zhifu Stele, 19.

\textsuperscript{465} Aug, RG. 3: ‘victorque omnibus veniam petentibus civibus peperci. externas gentes, quibus tuto ignosci potuit, conservare quam excidere malu’.\textsuperscript{466} Levick, \textit{Augustus}, 227; Galinsky, \textit{Augustan Culture}, 85.
Augustus’ morality as an extension of Late Republican views on humanitas, clementia and the treatment of defeated subjects, as well as ‘softened’ his Triumviral image of a harsh ruler, as some scholars have argued.

Despite this concept of bellum iustum explaining parts of Augustan self-portrayal within the context of foreign peoples, there are still numerous passages in the Res Gestae where Augustus proudly proclaims the ‘submission’ of foreign nations despite not recording any wars. The Res Gestae recalls how the Germanic tribes sent envoys to seek the friendship of Augustus and the Roman people (Aug. RG. 26). Indians, Bastarnae, Scythians, Sarmatians, Albanians, Hiberians and Medes also sent envoys to seek ‘our friendship’ (nostram amicitiam), many of whom Augustus emphasises that ‘there existed no exchange of embassies or friendship’ beforehand (Aug. RG. 31 – 32), with the Indians being singled out for their novelty: ‘nunquam antea visae apud quemquam Romanorum ducem’ (Aug. RG. 31). In these sections, wars are not mentioned explicitly or implicitly. In fact, when discussing the ‘submission’ of Phraates, King of the Parthians, Augustus unambiguously calls attention to the fact that the king came with his children as hostages despite ‘non bello superatus’ (Aug. RG. 32).

Before an analysis of such passages and their impact on Augustan self-portrayal of morality can be made, a slight digression must be undertaken to explore the concept of auctoritas and amicitia, and their implications for the morality of a ruler. Augustus, at the end of the Res Gestae, stresses

467 To give one example, see Cic. QFr. 1.1 where Cicero urges his brother to rule with humanitas (and various other virtues). For a further analysis of this, see Woolf, Roman Peace, 178, 189 and Benjamin Isaac, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004, p. 413.
468 Yakobson, The First Emperors, 298; Yavetz, Augustus’ Image, 3; Noreña, Imperial Ideals, 54; Zanker, Power of Images, 31. See also Havener, Emperor Augustus, 187 for his argument on how Augustus shifted himself from the ‘vengeful Octavian’ to the ‘virtuous Augustus’.
that ‘I surpassed all in my auctoritas,’ but in potestas I possessed no more than those who were my colleagues in magistracy’ (Aug. RG. 34). Indeed, in analysing how the Romans viewed auctoritas, one sees an unmistakable moral factor: the ability to sway others without the need for coercive force, or potestas. Developing an all-encompassing definition of auctoritas is far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in relation to an ‘ideal’ ruler, one can infer what auctoritas implies through the works of Cicero. When discussing Pompeius Magnus, Cicero portrays his auctoritas as characterised in two ways. First is the willing decision by ‘universus populus Romanus’ to select Pompeius Magnus as their leader (Cic. Leg. Man. 15). Second, auctoritas is clearly distinguished from imperium and exercitus while not diminished in its abilities to achieve its goals: ‘and will anyone doubt what he will be able to achieve with his valour when he had accomplished so much with his auctoritas?’ (Cic. Leg. Man. 15). From Cicero, one can deduce that the key feature of auctoritas was universal consensus without coercion. Augustus’ emphasis on his ability to accomplish and its link to his morality is almost universally accepted by scholars. Ramage states that Augustus presented himself as able to rule through auctoritas ‘due to his fine qualities’. Galinsky, too, stresses that auctoritas is voluntary, complementing Augustus’ claim that he achieved his status

470 There has been some debate as to whether this word ought to be dignitate or auctoritate, since this part of the Latin inscription is missing (the Greek inscription records this word as ‘ἀξιώματι’). However, numerous editions of the Res Gestae (such as Cooley’s) uses auctoritate here, and newer discoveries of fragments have shown that auctoritate is far more likely. See Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor, 159 – 160; Rich, Making the Emergency Permanent, 40; and R. Heinze, ‘Auctoritas’, Hermes 60, vol. 3, Jul. 1925, p. 348.
471 Aug. RG. 34: ‘praestiti omnibus auctoritate, potestatis autem nihilo amplius habui quam qui fuerunt mihi quoque in magistrate conlegae’.
473 For a linguistic analysis of the development of the word auctoritas, see Heinze, Auctoritas, 350 – 351.
474 See particularly Heinze, Auctoritas, 357 – 358, where Heinze argues that ‘willing submission’ is a large part of what auctoritas entails: ‘Und gleich wichtig ist dies: sie [auctoritas] wirkt nur da, wo man sich ihr freiwillig unterordnet’.
475 Cic. Leg. Man. 15: ‘et quisquam dubitabit quid virtute perfecturus sit qui tantum auctoritate perfecerit’.
476 There are some exceptions. Rowe analyses every instance where auctoritas is mentioned in connection with Augustus but, unlike other scholars in this field, argues that this is not in connection with ‘transcendental moral powers’. See Rowe, Auctoritas of Augustus, 12, 15. Crook, too, contends that Augustus never stressed or raised his auctoritas above his potestas, but portrayed them hand in hand. See John A. Crook, ‘Some Remarks on the Augustan Constitution’, The Classical Review, vol. 30, no. 1, Mar. 1953, p. 12.
'via universal consent'. A central part of Augustan ideology, Galinsky further argues, 'is the supremacy of mores over leges', with which both Auyang and Damon agree. Rosenstein defines auctoritas as a 'moral suasion', to which Mineo concurs, stating that Augustus' auctoritas is derived from his morality. Grebe even views Augustus as portraying his auctoritas as divine in origin.

Considering the idea of 'amicitia' or 'friendship', there is almost no disagreement that, by the Late Republic and Early Empire, amicitia with Rome was unbalanced from a power perspective – although precisely how an 'amicus populi Romani' might differ from a client kingdom is still under debate. Regardless, it has been argued that this relationship was based on mutual moral obligations. Often, the inferior party was shown to be placing itself in the fides of Rome. Fides, it has been argued, implies a moral obligation from Rome to act as protector to its amici, and an obligation by amici to show loyalty to Rome. It was an unequal concept which is sometimes even translated as 'protection', one that was often used in connection with amicitia. To give one example, Cicero complains that Verres did not treat those cities 'in amicitia fideque populi Romani' correctly (Cic. Ver.

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478 Galinsky, Augustan Culture, 10 – 12, 14.
479 Galinsky, Augustan Culture, 51.
480 Damon, Res Gestae, 1; Auyang, Dragon and Eagle, 36.
481 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 13.
485 Snowdon, Beyond Clientela, 213.
486 Rich, Patronage, 130; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 49 – 50.
487 Rich, Patronage, 128, 130 – 131; Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 53.
488 See definition II.B.2 in Lewis and Short (1879) for a long list of instances where fides is translated as ‘protection’ or similar.
Thus, the seeking of amicitia was a sign of submission, which gave rise to a moral obligation for Rome to protect the submitter.

Therefore, this thesis posits an interpretation that the ‘willing submission’ of foreign peoples in the sending of embassies – particularly the seeking of amicitia from Augustus – was utilised by the princeps to highlight his personal auctoritas further and, through it, his ‘superior’ morality. Qin Shi Huang also stressed the willing submission of ‘All under Heaven’ as a sign of his superior, if not perfect, morality. This interpretation can also help elucidate Augustus’ portrayal of the willing submission of foreign peoples in the Res Gestae. Indeed, the portrayal of Augustus’ diplomatic victories, particularly against Parthia, has created significant debate in academia, with one of the most common interpretations being that Augustus portrayed this diplomatic victory as a military one. While this interpretation certainly is not unsubstantiated – Cassius Dio records Augustus celebrating the diplomatic victory over Parthia as a military one: ‘and [Augustus] received [the Roman standards and captives from Parthia] as if he had conquered Parthia in some war’ (Cass. Dio 54.8.2) – there are numerous instances in Augustan literature and material culture where this reading is not tenable. Setting aside Augustus’ own claim that the King of the Parthians was ‘non bello superatus’, numerous ancient authors viewed the Parthian affair as diplomatic, not military. Pompeius Trogus, as quoted by Justin, lauds Augustus for the fact that ‘he accomplished more with the magnitude of his name than what another general could have done with force of arms’ in regard to the Parthian affair (Just. Epit. 42.5). Velleius Paterculus, too, being personally present at the meeting between Gaius Caesar and the Parthian king, praises the diplomatic meeting, describing it


491 Just. Epit. 42.5: ‘magnitudine nominis sui fecit, quam armis alius imperator facere potuisse’.

Indeed, Augustus must have had a particular reason for highlighting the warless nature of these embassies. In particular, many ancient and modern scholars noted that he did not hesitate to inflate his military successes or to portray other diplomatic victories (and sometimes no victories at all) as military victories.\footnote{For Germania, see Gruen, Imperial Policy, 406 – 407; Ridley, Emperor’s Retrospect, 196; and Richardson, Augustan Rome, 143. For Ethiopia and Arabia, see Ridley, Emperor’s Retrospect, 203 – 204; Richardson, Augustan Rome, 95; and Rich, Deception, 173. See Ridley, Emperor’s Retrospect, 213 – 214 for Armenia and 217 – 218 for Dacia. For Spain and Illyria, see Richardson, Augustan Rome, 93, 103. See also Rich, Augustus, War and Peace, 337ff. for Rich’s analysis on the exaggerations of success in Augustan propaganda.} Moreover, as Ridley notes, Augustus also blatantly omitted details or even entire military encounters – the loss at Teutoberg Forest, for one – to maintain his victorious military persona.\footnote{Ridley further notes that Augustus fails to mention the Pannonian Revolt, see Ridley, Emperor’s Retrospect, 85 – 86.} Thus, it would be remiss to ignore passages in the Res Gestae where Augustus was obviously attempting to construct another layer to his persona which was not military in nature.

One analysis by Gruen makes the argument that the seeking of amicitia by foreign peoples was a sign of Augustan dominance and that its martial valour had subdued even the furthest states, construing the submission of foreign peoples as an extension of his military persona where they submitted almost out of fear.\footnote{See Gruen, Augustus, 55, 72, where Gruen portrays Augustan world order as one almost entirely dependent on force and might (and seemingly nothing else). See also A. N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East: 168 B. C. to A. D. 1, London: Duckworth, 1984, p. 323. Sherwin-White argues that both Cassius Dio and Justin portrayed Parthia as handing back the standards due to fear.} Of course, this is also not a baseless conclusion. In Horace’s letter to Augustus, he hopes that the Parthians learn to fear Augustus and his Principate: ‘formidatam Parthis te principe Romam’ (Hor. Epist. 2.1.256). The Res Gestae also does use vocabulary such as ‘coegi’ and ‘supplicesque’ when discussing the ‘surrender’ of Parthia (Aug. RG. 29). However, accepting this as the only layer to Augustan self-portrayal does not hold when one considers the entire range of Augustan literature and material evidence.
In a similar vein to Qin Shi Huang, the theme of ‘universal consensus’ is strong in Augustan self-portrayal.\textsuperscript{496} The dictatorship, which he refused, was offered to Augustus ‘a populo et senatu Romano’ (Aug. RG. 5). The senate and the people, wanting to grant Augustus the position as overseer of laws and morals, were described as ‘unanimous’ (consentientibus) (Aug. RG. 6). Sacrifices to the health of Augustus were done by the citizens ‘with one mind’ (uno animo) (Aug. RG. 9). The amount of people who attended the princeps’ election to Pontifex Maximus was on a scale hitherto unseen in Rome: ‘quanta Romae nunquam antea fuisse narratur’ (Aug. RG. 10).\textsuperscript{497} The naming of Gaius and Lucius as the principes iuventutis was done by the ‘equites (...) Romani universi’ (Aug. RG. 14). ‘tota Italia’ was described to have given Augustus an oath of allegiance ‘of their own accord’ (sponte sua) (Aug. RG. 25). He received the title Pater Patriae from the ‘senatus et equester ordo populusque Romanus universus’ (Aug. RG. 35). Thus, the stress on ‘universal consent’ for his rule is undeniable. Galinsky argues that ‘universal consent’ was highlighted by Augustus to stress his auctoritas.\textsuperscript{498} Levick asserts that a princeps ideally ought to work through his auctoritas rather than potestas, which was a sign of his moral superiority and was made visible by ‘universal consensus’,\textsuperscript{499} with which Labate and Rosati concur wholeheartedly.\textsuperscript{500}

However, this ‘universal consensus’ was not simply limited to Rome. As argued previously, the seeking of amicitia was a sign that the receiver of such a ‘friendship’ was both in a position to protect and of a moral character to fulfil this duty of protection. The ‘willing’ nature of seeking amicitia, or perhaps more broadly the sending of emissaries, was also important, as it also highlighted Augustus’ auctoritas and his ability to complete his goals – the submission and pacification of the ‘whole’ world – through moral suasion, in addition to military force.\textsuperscript{501}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[496] Ridley, \textit{The Emperor’s Retrospect}, 54; Galinsky, \textit{Augustan Culture}, 14.
\item[497] Galinsky, \textit{Augustan Culture}, 300.
\item[498] Galinsky, \textit{Augustan Culture}, 10 – 12.
\item[499] Levick, \textit{Augustus}, 74. See also Mineo, \textit{Livy’s Political and Moral Values}, 134 and Ramage, \textit{Res Gestae}, 19 – 20, who both agree.
\end{itemize}
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closing of Virgil’s *Georgics*, the poet describes the peoples upon which Augustus will impart laws as ‘willing’ (*volentis*) (Verg. *G*. 4.561 – 562).\(^{502}\) Horace states how all the warlike peoples of the world will lay down their arms not out of military defeat or fear, but out of reverence for Augustus (Hor. *Carm*. 4.14). The idea of foreign states and peoples willingly and happily submitting to the Augustan regime is also visible in the material evidence. Kuttner astutely notes that the parade of personified nations Mars leads in front of Augustus on the Boscoreale Cups shows ‘deference’, but not grief or humiliation, as would be expected in those militarily defeated.\(^{503}\) The non-military nature of this scene is highlighted too by the fact Augustus is in a magistrate’s robe, rather than military gear.\(^{504}\) In the second cup where ‘barbarian’ leaders hand over their children to Augustus, neither the children nor the foreign leaders are presented as ‘conquered’ or ‘ill-treated’, as Kuttner describes.\(^{505}\) Rather, the children are smiling and stretch out their hands willingly towards Augustus. The *Ara Pacis Augustae*, as Ferris shows, has two ‘barbarian’ children appearing in a ‘family setting’ with the rest of the Augustan dynasty and they exhibit no signs that they are unhappy or forced to be present.\(^{506}\) As argued in the Chinese section of this chapter, Qin Shi Huang utilised the portrayal of the ‘willing submission’ of ‘All under Heaven’ as a way of illustrating his ‘perfect’ morality, which was a criterion for his claim of being the prophesied ‘sage-king’ destined to unite the world. As shown in this section, there was also an undeniable part of Augustan self-portrayal that rested upon the ‘universal consensus’ of the Roman people and the apparent ‘willing submission’ of foreign nations and


\(^{503}\) Kuttner, *Dynasty and Empire*, 16.

\(^{504}\) Kuttner, *Dynasty and Empire*, 13, 35.


\(^{506}\) B. Buxton, ‘A New Reading of the Prima Porta of Augustus: The Return of the Eagle of Legio V Alaudae’, in *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History XVI*, Bruxelles: Latomus, 2012 and Alice Landskron, *Partner und Sassaniden: das Bild der Orientalen in der römischen Kaiserzeit*, Wien: Phoibos, 2005, pp. 111 – 113, 133. It has also been noted by Ferris that the two children might have been Roman children (perhaps even Gaius and Lucius) dressed as foreigners; see Ferris, *Enemies of Rome*, 27 – 30. However, regardless of whether they are foreign hostages, or Roman children, or even infantilised personifications of East and West, the interpretation largely does not change. These are still two children in Gallic and Parthian dress appearing in a family setting with the Augustan dynasty appearing in a paternalistic manner. The message of an Augustan paternalistic world empire is still present.
peoples. This chapter will now examine whether a similar reading to Qin Shi Huang can help illuminate the reasons behind Augustus’ usage of this self-portrayal. Indeed, the concept of foreign peoples submitting to Rome due to Rome’s morality (or the morality of a single leader) was not exceptional. Livy records that the Falerii were so in awe of Camillus and ‘Roman fidelity and the righteousness of their leaders’ that they, ‘with the consent of all’, went to Rome and surrendered themselves, declaring: ‘we will be better off under your rule than under our own laws’ (Liv. 5.27.11 – 12). On the matter of individual rulers, Numa, the second king of Rome, was presented as so pious and moral that his enemies felt that it was ‘sacred to attack Rome: ‘in eam verecundiam adducti sunt ut civitatem totam in cultum versam deorum violare ducerent nefas’ (Liv. 1.21.2).

This idea of foreigners ‘willingly’ submitting to Augustus is clearly displayed in the fragments of the Augustan writer Nicolaus of Damascus and the post-Augustan writings of Suetonius. Nicolaus of Damascus states: ‘for (...) the man [Augustus] (...) not only settled most securely the tribes of the Greeks and barbarians, but even their minds; at first with arms, but later even without arms; freely [ἐθελουσίους] he drew them to him due to him becoming more well-known in his benevolence’ (Nic. Dam. 1). Then, more succinctly in a passage of Suetonius: ‘by the fame of his virtue and moderation he enticed even the Indians and Scythians – previously only heard of in reports – to voluntarily [ultro] seek his friendship and the friendship of the Roman people through embassies’

507 Liv. 5.27.11 – 12: ‘fides Romana, iustitia imperatoris in foro et curia celebrantur; consensuque omnium legati ad Camillum in castra, atque inde permisso Camilli Romam ad senatum, qui dererent Falerios proficiscuntur. introducti ad senatum ita locuti traduntur: ‘patres conscripti, victoria cui nec deus nec homo quisquam inuideat uicti a uobis et imperatore uestro, dedimus nos uobis, rati, quo nihil uictori pulchrius est, melius nos sub imperio uestro quam legibus nostris uicturos’.


509 These two sources are invaluable for understanding Augustan propaganda. It is important to note that both authors certainly had access to Augustus’ now-lost memoirs. See Mark Toher, Nicolaus of Damascus: The Life of Augustus and the Autobiography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 19 – 20 and D. Wardle, Suetonius: Life of Augustus, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 22 – 23. Nicolaus of Damascus, in particular, was a close personal friend of Augustus and his Life of Augustus was ‘the product of a personal relationship between N. and Augustus’, as Toher has argued. See Toher, Nicolaus of Damascu, 20. This suggests that the pair would have most likely reflected Augustus’ views accurately. See Clark, Augustus, 44 and Havener, Imperator Augustus, 154.

510 Nic. Dam. 1: ‘γὰρ (...) ὁ ἀνὴρ (...) εἰς τὸ βεβαιότατον ὅτι τὰ φῦλα μόνον καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς διανοίας κατεστήσατο τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὅπως ὄντως, μετὰ δὲ ταύτα καὶ ἄνευ ὃπλων, ἑθελουσίους τε προσαγόμενος διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον τι ἐνδήλος γίνεσθαι τῇ φιλανθρωπίᾳ’.
Nicolaus of Damascus unambiguously specifies that foreign peoples came ‘έθελουσίους’ and they did so as they were persuaded by Augustus’ ‘φιλανθρωπίᾳ’. Suetonius, too, stresses the fact that Indians and Scythians tried to obtain the friendship of Augustus ‘ultro’, which is, again, attributed to the princeps’ ‘uirtutis moderationisque’. The moral nature of Rome and Augustus’ friendship can be further evidenced in the Res Gestae, where Augustus intimately links the concepts of ‘fidelis’ and ‘me principe’ together by placing them side by side. For Augustus, the portrayal of foreign peoples did not take place purely in a military context, but, by stressing their unforced seeking of amicitia and sending of embassies, highlighted the fact that he was so moral and so strong in his auctoritas that foreign nations came in submission without the need for arms.

**Conclusion**

With this comparative analysis, one can continue to see parallels between Qin Shi Huang and Augustus. In addition to the ‘peace-bringer’ persona constructed in their works, both emperors were ‘exemplary’ in their moral characteristics. A clear juxtaposition was made between the emperors’ enemies and themselves, with their enemies being portrayed as immoral while they themselves were perfectly moral and engaged only in just wars. Certainly, Augustus’ bella iusta are a point well-examined by current scholars in conjunction with his ‘peace through warfare’ persona. However, far fewer scholars have analysed how the portrayal of the princeps’ diplomatic actions also helped to formulate his imperial image. Looking first at Qin Shi Huang, one can see that the First Emperor laid heavy stress on the willing nature of the people’s and his enemies’ submission to him. In Chinese thought, the willing submission of ‘All under Heaven’ was a sign of the perfect morality of the ruler, which was a requirement to be the sage-king destined to unify the world.

One finds that interpreting Augustus’ portrayal of diplomatic successes couched in the form of embassies and the seeking of amicitia as Augustus manipulating the depiction of foreigners to

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511 Suet. Aug. 21.3: ‘qua uirtutis moderationisque fama Indos etiam ac Scythas auditu modo cognitos pellexit ad amicitiam suam populique Romani ultro per legatos petendam’.
512 Aug. RG. 32: ‘plurimaque aliae gentes expertae sunt fidelis me principe (...).’
uphold the image of his morality is also quite feasible. The concept of amicitia was based on reciprocal moral obligation. The emphasis that foreigners did so without coercion or having been defeated in war highlighted Augustus’ morally compelling auctoritas. Both emperors became so ‘perfect’ in their morality that they could complete their goals – the subjugation of the known world – without a constant need for arms. From this comparative reading, it can be concluded that both emperors manipulated their interactions with foreign peoples and nations in both war and diplomacy to cement further their position by elevating their own personal morality above others.513

Moreover, fighting ‘just wars’ or having foreign peoples come in willing submission reinforced Chinese perception of their own cultural and moral superiority which, in Chinese thought, was the correct state of the world.514 China was ‘tasked’ by Heaven and divinely ordained to pursue its domination of foreign peoples. By the Late Republic and certainly the Augustan era, this was a thought shared by Rome.515 This idea of a divinely sanctioned mission to subjugate the world – by arms or otherwise – and how it interacted with the two emperors’ portrayals of their own relationship with the divine, will be explored in the following chapter.

513 Of course, differences must also be noted. China had a far more formalised idea of morality in rulership in the form of a ‘sage-king’. whereas Rome, despite still stressing the need for morality in their leaders, never had so formalised a structure as China.


515 Isaac, Invention of Racism, 84; Dunstan, Ancient Rome, 266; Kuttner, Dynasty and Empire, 88 – 89; Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 59 – 60.
CHAPTER FIVE

VICTORY AND DIVINE SUPPORT

As we have seen, ‘peace through warfare’ and the emperors’ ‘superhuman morality’ explained parts of their portrayals of foreigners and foreign wars. However, there were still aspects of their self-image which remained enigmatic. Both Augustus and Qin Shi Huang were steadfast in claiming that they had conquered the whole world (the tianxia and an imperium sine fine). The success of the First Emperor in pacifying ‘All under Heaven’ permeated his steles, and the very preface of the Res Gestae declares that Augustus had conquered the whole world: ‘orbem terrarum imperio populi Romani subiecit’.516 Moreover, the two emperors also concealed all military losses while aggrandising their military successes, no matter how untrue. Qin Shi Huang never acknowledged the arduousness of his conquest of the South,517 while Augustus concealed no military setbacks and portrayed numerous relatively futile military campaigns, such as those in Germania and Arabia, as indubitable successes (Aug. RG. 26).

This is particularly perplexing when examining Augustus. As Rosenstein insightfully notes, military loss in the Late Republic rarely hindered, let alone destroyed, one’s political power or career progression.518 Even in self-portrayals, losses were perhaps diminished or excused, but rarely ignored outright. Caesar, in the Bellum Gallico, while laying the blame of the loss at Gergovia on the lack of discipline of his soldiers, still nevertheless records this loss (Caes. BGall. 7.52).519 In his Bellum Civile, Caesar’s loss at Dyrrachium is recounted in a fashion so as to portray him as the hero,

517 Ma, Qin Shi Huangdi Zhuan, 434. Qin Shi Huang’s campaign against the southern Yue peoples in modern day Guangdong is recorded in the Renjianxun chapter of Huainanzi, where the Qin suffered atrociously in the campaign due to the Yue people’s guerrilla tactics. The Qin allegedly took three years and hundreds of thousands of casualties to ‘pacify’ the South.
518 Nathan Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, pp. 13 – 27, 41. Rosenstein analyses a full list of all Republican generals who suffered military losses and found little correlation between military loss and political progression. Even L. Gellius Poplicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, who shamefully lost against Spartacus, would go on to become Censors two years later.
but is still recounted in vivid detail regardless (Caes. B Civ. 3.69ff).\textsuperscript{520} Augustus, on the other hand, deliberately omitted any mentions of losses from the \textit{Res Gestae}, even those that could easily be blamed on others, such as on Varus at Teutoburg Forest. Moreover, revolts against Augustus’ rule, such as in Spain, Gaul and Pannonia, were never unambiguously recognised; for example, Augustus merely ‘settled affairs’ in Spain and Gaul (Aug. R G. 30). Of course, it must be taken into consideration that the \textit{Res Gestae} is a monumental inscription, while works such as Caesar’s are literary pieces. Nevertheless, the sheer length of the \textit{Res Gestae} – longer than all of Qin Shi Huang’s steles combined – renders it unlikely that Augustus failed to declare any losses because the inscription was ‘pressed for space’, especially considering that Augustus still notes relatively minor ‘achievements’, such as his Arabian campaign.\textsuperscript{521} Therefore, it is prudent to examine what part of Augustan ideology necessitated the obfuscation of all military setbacks – including revolts against his position – while simultaneously lauding his conquest of the entire \textit{orbis terrarum}.\textsuperscript{522}

Of course, this was multi-layered. Augustus pragmatically justified his command over ‘dangerous’ provinces by the promise that he would pacify them;\textsuperscript{523} therefore, repeated or egregious failures to do so would have also called into question his position. Moreover, Augustus, unlike Julius Caesar, had a poor military record and this may have contributed to his insistence on a persona of permanent victoriousness, whereas Caesar could more confidently reveal losses knowing that they did not diminish his real and tangible military successes. This thesis, however, will argue that there were also ideological reasons for this self-portrayal as a ‘perpetual victor’.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[520] Havener, \textit{Imperator Augustus}, 41.
\item[521] Of course, it must be noted that Augustus’ memoirs unfortunately do not survive, so we cannot ascertain whether Augustus expunged any and all mentions of his military losses throughout the entirety of his reign, rather than just from the \textit{Res Gestae}. Nevertheless, the \textit{Res Gestae} was the ‘image’ that Augustus wished to leave behind. Thus, why Augustus chose to portray himself as never having suffered a military loss is still worthy of investigation.
\item[522] This is despite many ancient authors denying Augustus ever had designs for a world empire. See Suet. Aug. 21.2 and Cass. Dio 56.33.6.
\end{footnotes}
Again, a comparative approach will be undertaken. This chapter will first show that Qin Shi Huang’s reason for stressing his divine connections was his need to portray himself as the ‘Son of Heaven’, for which he was qualified as the sage-king. As will be shown later in this chapter, an absolute criterion for the Son of Heaven was the complete subjugation of ‘All under Heaven’, with a failure to do so being a sign that he did not have Heaven’s favour. By adopting the position of ‘Son of Heaven’, the First Emperor manoeuvred himself into the status of the sole intermediary between Heaven and Earth, further consolidating his position in his new regime by accentuating his divine guidance and favour. This chapter will then argue that Augustus’ tactic was very similar. While Rome certainly did not have as intricate a concept as the Son of Heaven, Augustus still wished to concentrate power on himself, by presenting his ‘exceptional’ morality and martial prowess as a special connection to the gods. Through the princeps, the gods granted Rome victory and an imperium sine fine.\(^{524}\) Thus, Augustus also had to stress his conquest of the world as successfully manifesting Rome’s divine destiny while concealing all his military losses, as they would undermine his position as the gods’ favourite.

Qin Shi Huang

While scholars have noted Qin Shi Huang’s claim that he is the ‘Son of Heaven’ and his self-elevation to the status of a quasi-divine, only a few works analyse how the First Emperor’s conquests and interactions with foreigners intersected with his ‘divine’ image.\(^{525}\) As argued in the previous chapter, Qin Shi Huang strove to display his ‘superhuman’ morality as a sign of his worthiness as the prophesised sage-king destined to conquer ‘All under Heaven’. By doing so, Qin Shi Huang could claim the long-lost position of ‘Son of Heaven’.\(^{526}\) The ‘messianic’ First Emperor did not portray himself as merely moral, but divinely supported due to his morality, and

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\(^{524}\) Eck, The Age of Augustus, 125.

\(^{525}\) See scholars such as Kern, The Stele Inscriptions; Pines, The Messianic Emperor; and Puett, To Become a God, for a few examples of such works that do analyse this topic.

endeavoured to display his piety and divine favour.\textsuperscript{527} Various scholars, as commented on in previous chapters, have noted that the steles were erected on holy mountains and their creation often took place within a ritual context.\textsuperscript{528} While this thesis has argued against the idea that these steles were purely intended to be ‘viewed’ by the divine and not the common people, that does not imply that ‘Heaven’ was not also part of the intended audience. Examining the wording of the steles themselves, Sanft and Kern have noted that the vocabulary is often religious or ritualistic in nature, and implicitly, if not explicitly, draws attention to the First Emperor’s divine connection, or even his own personal divine powers.\textsuperscript{529}

As stated in earlier texts prior to Qin unification, being moral was a prerequisite for divine favour.\textsuperscript{530} Zuo Zhuan records that if a ruler remains pious and virtuous, then the divinities will bring their blessings.\textsuperscript{531} In a later passage, an advisor elaborates that ‘the divinities do not simply favour anyone, but only those with virtue’.\textsuperscript{532} The philosopher Xunzi explicitly connects virtue with being a ‘Son of Heaven’: ‘to cultivate one’s thoughts and aspirations, to render one’s actions most moral, to be enlightened in one’s wisdom, this is the manner by which a Son of Heaven can win All under Heaven’.\textsuperscript{533} In his propaganda, the First Emperor strove to magnify his own virtue, piety, and thus divine support.

The First Emperor, however, was not simply content with being supported by the divine but raised himself into the divine sphere as well. The Shiji records numerous speeches from the Qin court


\textsuperscript{528} Wood, First Emperor of China, 29; Sanft, Communication and Cooperation, 91; Kern, The Stele Inscriptions, 112; Kern, Announcement of the Mountains, 217.

\textsuperscript{529} Sanft, Communication and Cooperation, 91; Kern, Announcement of the Mountains, 226 – 227.

\textsuperscript{530} Nivison, The Classical Philosophical Writings, 750.

\textsuperscript{531} See Zuo Zhuan, 6th Year of Duke Heng.

\textsuperscript{532} Zuo Zhuan, 5th Year of Duke Xi: ‘臣聞之，鬼神非人實親，惟德是依’.

\textsuperscript{533} Xunzi, Rongru 8: ‘志意致修，德行至厚，智慮致明，是天子之所以取天下也’.
where the divine nature of the First Emperor is affirmed. Indeed, the very title adopted by the First Emperor, 皇帝 (Huangdi), while often translated as ‘Emperor’ in English, has unmistakable divine connotations.\textsuperscript{534} According to the Shiji, The word 皇 (huang) came from the term 泰皇 (Tai Huang).\textsuperscript{535} The First Emperor removed the word ‘tai’, replacing it instead with 帝 (Di), the name of the chief deity of the Shang and Zhou dynasties (Shiji 6.236).\textsuperscript{536} Puett translates his title more literally as ‘August God’, while Kern provides a similar translation of ‘August Thearch’.\textsuperscript{537} Qin courtier Zhou Qingchen flatters the First Emperor by declaring that ‘thanks to the 神靈 (shenling; literally: ‘divine soul’ or ‘divine spirit’) of your majesty, all within the seas are pacified and the barbarians are driven away. Wherever the sun and the moon shine, there is none who does not submit willingly’ (Shiji 6.254).\textsuperscript{538}

Both his divine support and his own divine nature served to elevate the First Emperor to the prophesised position of the ‘Son of Heaven’, destined to rule all humanity. Even Han dynasty texts delegitimising the First Emperor as the ‘Son of Heaven’ suggest that the First Emperor must have claimed this title, otherwise such texts would have no need to destroy the Emperor’s ‘credibility’ as the ‘Son of Heaven’. For example, at the end of Sima Qian’s chapter on the First Emperor, the historian analyses the reasons why the Qin Empire fell. Despite formulating an overwhelmingly negative conclusion, Sima Qian still refers to the First Emperor as ‘Son of Heaven’ (Shiji 6.277, 283 – 284). In all instances, Qin Shi Huang’s self-aggrandisation and his emphasis on his connections to the divine, if not his own divinity, are undeniable. Thus, it is prudent to analyse why Qin Shi Huang regarded his divine connection as so critical that he continually reinforced it in his imperial ideology. Indeed, this may help elucidate two aspects of Qin Shi Huang’s steles not fully explained by the

\textsuperscript{534} Kern, The Stele Inscriptions, 50; Kern, Announcement of the Mountains, 225.
\textsuperscript{535} As recorded in the book Shiji Suoyin (史記索隱), a Tang dynasty commentary on the Shiji, Tai Huang is also known as 人皇 (Ren Huang, or Lord of Mankind) – Tai Huang itself literally means ‘Supreme Lord’.
\textsuperscript{536} Cotterell, The First Emperor of China, 139.
\textsuperscript{537} See Puett, To Become a God, 240. See also Kern’s use of ‘August Thearch’ in his translation of the steles. Pines also describes the title Huangdi as ‘superhuman’. See Pines, The Everlasting Empire, 54.
\textsuperscript{538} Shiji 6.254: ‘賴陛下神靈明聖，平定海內，放逐蠻夷，日月所照，莫不賓服’.
previous chapters: why did the First Emperor stress that he has conquered ‘All under Heaven’, and why did he never mention any military setbacks or revolts against his rule?

The reasons for the First Emperor’s claim to be the ‘Son of Heaven’ are multi-layered, and can only be fully understood by tracking the evolution of the idea of ‘Son of Heaven’ in earlier Chinese literature. As shown in Spring and Autumn era and Warring States literature, there can only be one legitimate Son of Heaven at any given time, who acts as the primary, if not sole, intermediary to Heaven. The Zuo Zhuan exclaims: ‘who can suffer a nation with two rulers?’ Xunzi concludes that ‘if there is only one ruler, the world is at peace; if there are two, then there will be chaos’. The Shijing and Shujing contain numerous poems and speeches where the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ is torn away from the Shang and given to the royal house of Zhou, with never an instance where the Mandate is suggested to be shared. This is best represented in the Duofang chapter of the Shujing, where the Xia and Shang dynasties are attacked for having ‘committed many sins and failed to obey Heaven’, thus, ‘Heaven has given us [the Zhou dynasty] the Mandate (…) so that we might rule over those near and far’. This idea that a sole ruler ought to rule ‘All under Heaven’ was echoed in almost every philosophical and political school of thought. By claiming divine support and his position as the new ‘Son of Heaven’, the First Emperor could ‘monopolise’ divine favour. He became the supreme, divinely-backed ruler of all humanity, a position that was not, and could not

539 Bodde, The State and Empire of Ch’ in, 30; Loewe, Religious and Intellectual Background, 662; Pines, The Everlasting Empire, 12; Pines, The Messianic Emperor, 276.
540 Zou Zhuan, 7th Year of Duke Zhao: ‘一國兩君，其誰堪之’.
541 Xunzi, Jishi: ‘隆一而治，二而亂。自古及今，未有二隆爭重，而能長久者 (If there is only one ruler, the world is at peace; if there are two, then there will be chaos. From the ancient times to today, a competition between two rulers has never lasted long).’
542 Shujing, Zhou Shu, Duofang: ‘王若曰：「誥告爾多方，非天庸釋有夏，非天庸釋有殷。乃惟爾辟以爾多方大淫，圖天之命屑有辭 (…) 天惟降時喪。(…) 天惟式教我用休，簡畀殷命，尹爾多方 (And King [Cheng] said thus: ‘Go tell the those near and far that it was not Heaven abandoning the Xia or the royal house of Shang, but that your kings and vassals have committed many sins and failed to obey Heaven (…) thus Heaven has ended your dynasties (…) Now Heaven has given us guidance and the Mandate which used to belong to the Shang, so that we might rule over those near and far’).
543 Pines, Everlasting Empire, 17.
be, shared with others.\textsuperscript{545} Indeed, a clear juxtaposition is made between the First Emperor and his foes. The First Emperor credits his success in unifying China to the help of his ‘ancestral spirits’.\textsuperscript{546} By ‘illuminating his ancestral spirits and setting forth the path of morality’, Qin Shi Huang ‘unified all within the seas (...) and brought peace to All under Heaven’; his opponents, on the other hand, ‘falsely pretended to have the powers of the divinities to deceive those from afar’ (Shiji 6.246 – 247).\textsuperscript{547}

However, the most important aspect of the Son of Heaven, which so heavily impacted on Qin Shi Huang’s self-portrayal, was the requirements for this holy position. It is crucial to stress that the ‘Son of Heaven’ was, at least from an ideological perspective, never meant to be restricted to ‘China’, but was meant to rule over all humanity.\textsuperscript{548} In the Zuo Zhuan, it is said that ‘if a ruler does not disobey the virtues [of Heaven], then all nations will come in submission’.\textsuperscript{549} The Huangyi poem in the Shijing unambiguously forges a connection between divine support and unfailing military success, as the triumphant conquest of foreign foes is explicitly due to the Zhou’s piety and sacrifices to Heaven.\textsuperscript{550}

\textsuperscript{545} Pines, The Everlasting Empire, 12 – 13.
\textsuperscript{546} Shiji 6.235 – 236: ‘[After listing the ‘crimes’ of his enemies, the First Emperor says thus]: 寡人以眇眇之身, 興兵誅暴亂, 賴宗廟之靈, 六王咸伏其辜, 天下大定 (Relying on the ancestral spirits, insignificant I exterminated the violent and the rebellious. The Six Kings have all submitted and confessed to their crimes, and All under Heaven is thus pacified)’.
\textsuperscript{547} Shiji 6.246 – 247: ‘古之五帝三王, 知教不同, 法度不明, 假威鬼神, 以欺遠方, 實不稱名, 故不久長。其身未歿, 諸侯倍叛, 法令不行。今皇帝并一海內, 以為郡縣, 天下和平。昭明宗廟, 體道行德, 尊號大成 (Since the [mythical] Five Emperors and Three Kings, the teachings have been heterodox and the laws dubious. They falsified the authority of spirits and gods to deceive those from afar. Their words and deeds did not match, and thus they did not last. Even when they were alive, the vassals rebelled and the laws could not be propagated. Today the Emperor has unified all within the seas, established the counties and provinces, and thus brought peace to All under Heaven. Illuminating his ancestral spirits, he embodied and set forth the path of morality. He has affirmed his name [i.e. Emperor]).’ The term ‘假威 (jia wei)’ requires some explanation. As a verb, 假 (jia) can mean ‘to use; to utilise’, while as an adjective it means ‘fake’, ‘false’, or ‘lying’. I am inclined to interpret ‘jio’ in this case as a verb. However, especially since the next sentence has the meaning ‘to deceive those from afar’, this sentence cannot have been suggesting that Six Kings and the First Emperor all had backing of the divine. The use of ‘鬼神 (guishen)’, while it does mean ‘divinities’, also has the sense of ‘ghosts and demons’ (See Kangxi Dictionary’s entry on this). This renders the ‘divinities’ the Six Kings relied on as more a superstition, while the First Emperor, with the ‘ancestral spirits’, stood in the place of religious orthodoxy. Even as a verb, I believe that ‘jio’ still captures the sense of deception. As such, I have translated this sentence as above.
\textsuperscript{548} Fairbank, A Preliminary Framework, 5 – 8; Rossabi, A History of China, 77; Creel, The Birth of China, 367.
\textsuperscript{549} Zuo Zhuan, 26\textsuperscript{th} Year of Duke Zhao: ‘君無違德，方國將至’.
\textsuperscript{550} Shijing, Daya, Huangyi:
Referring to King Wen, the *Jiale* poem says that ‘he receives blessings from Heaven without limit’, and thus becomes the ‘rule and law of all four directions’.\(^{551}\) Mencius believes that a ‘messenger of Heaven’ is destined to become ruler of the world.\(^{552}\)

As analysed in previous chapters, pacifying ‘All under Heaven’ and obtaining universal consent to his rule are the two most central themes of the First Emperor’s steles. Certainly, such themes elevated his military prowess and morality to a superhuman level; but, considering the requirements of ‘Son of Heaven’, one can see that the First Emperor also foregrounded these two themes to provide legitimacy for his claim to be the new ‘Son of Heaven’. Any foreign (or internal) foes who dare to revolt against a Son of Heaven are not merely threatening the peace, or showing immorality, but committing a sacrilegious act by revolting against Heaven’s agent on earth.\(^{553}\) When discussing supporting the then Son of Heaven of the Zhou dynasty, the Zhou vassals declared that anyone who disobeyed him would have ‘the divinities punish him, causing his armies to fail and his nation to be

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551 *Shijing, Daya, Jiale*: ‘受福無疆、四方之綱’.

552 Mencius 2A5: ‘無敵於天下者，天吏也。然而不王者，未之有也’ (He who is without a single enemy in All under Heaven [because he is so moral] is truly the agent of Heaven. In all of history, there has never been such a man who has failed to obtain kingship).

553 See Mencius 4A7: ‘順天者存，逆天者亡 (He who accords with Heaven is preserved, he who opposes Heaven is destroyed)’. For an analysis of this passage, see Puett, *To Become a God*, 134. See also Pines, *The Messianic Emperor*, 266.
lost’. When Duke Wen of Zhao was criticised, it is said that ‘he has betrayed the divine (...) [thus] he will not survive the end of the year’. In the context of foreign foes, this is most clearly illustrated by a quote in the Zuo Zhuan attributed to Confucius: ‘those from afar cannot scheme against the Central States, and the barbarians cannot disturb the Chinese! (...) to do so is an affront to the divine!’ Thus, the First Emperor did not portray himself as conducting warfare that was detested by the populace, but rather as enacting divine will and upholding the divine order, and thus further justified his conquests.

However, ‘peace’ and the ‘submission’ of ‘All under Heaven’ as a sign of Heaven’s favour is a doubled-edged sword. A ruler who suffered military losses against foreign foes, or failed to secure their submission, was thought either to have lost the Mandate of Heaven or to have never received it in the first place. The Yi poem in Shijing declares that if one were to lose his virtue, then Heaven will not come to his aid. Zuo Zhuan records an advisor stating: ‘if a ruler does not disobey the virtues [of Heaven], then all nations will come in submission (...) if he did disobey heavenly virtue, then the people will be thrown into chaos’. Mencius elaborates on this idea, commenting that when ‘the Son of Heaven is not compassionate, the four seas cannot be held (...) [and] the polity cannot be sustained’. This idea is best represented in Xunzi, where the eponymous philosopher states that ‘if All under Heaven is not unified, and the vassals are prone to revolt, then the Son of
Heaven this man is not’. Therefore, if the First Emperor’s military successes or moral character came into question, the implication would be that he must not truly be the Son of Heaven, which would have delegitimised his entire regime. Thus, it was important for the First Emperor constantly to portray military or diplomatic successes over foreign foes, lest his sovereignty be called into question.

Analysing the steles, one sees that the First Emperor portrays ‘All under Heaven’ as having been successfully pacified and willingly submissive, with a repeated use of vocabulary that implies the victorious subjugation of the known world. In all instances where warfare is mentioned, the portrayals of such are brutally swift. No depictions of battles or wars last for more than a couple of lines at most, with nothing in the vocabulary betraying even a sense of impediment, let alone military loss. Any and all of the First Emperor’s enemies are defeated swiftly and thoroughly. In the Mt. Yi Stele, it is explicitly stated that the extermination of ‘the six cruel and violent ones’ took place over ‘a passage of time not long’ when, in reality, Qin Shi Huang spent almost a decade unifying China. In the Mt. Zhifu Stele, the defeat of the six kings was skimmed over in a single line:

‘His military awesome influence radiated to all directions, shook and moved the four extremities, seized and extinguished the six kings. Far and wide He unified All under Heaven, disaster and harm were cut off and stopped, forever halted were the clashes of arms’ (Stele on the Eastern Vista, 13 – 18).

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562 Xunzi, *Fuguo*: ‘天下不一，諸侯俗反，則天王非其人也’.
563 *Creel, Origin of Statecraft*, 207, 240.
564 *Pines, The Everlasting Empire*, 33.
565 To stress the fact the First Emperor conquered ‘All under Heaven’, vocabulary implying such are rife in the stele inscriptions. 天下 (tianxia, All under Heaven) appears in every stele. 四極 (siji, FourExtremes) appears in four of the steles, while 四方 (sifang, Four Directions) appears in the Mt. Langxie Stele. This theme is particularly strong in the Mt. Langxie Stele, where the empire of Qin Shi Huang is described to reach ‘日月所照舟輿所載（…）人跡所至（wherever the sun and moon may shine, wherever boats and carts may reach (…) wherever human tracks may tread)’. The word 宇 (yu), when used to imply ‘universe’, instead of its other meaning, ‘roof’, appears twice in the Stele at Mt. Kuaiji. Another word meaning ‘universe’,六合 (liuhe) appears in both the Mt. Langxie and Mt. Kuaiji steles.六合 (liuhe) literally means the ‘six combined [directions]’, north, south, east, west, up (heaven), and down (earth). It is a poetic way of saying ‘everything’.
566 Mt. Yi Stele, 8 – 9: ‘武義直方（…）經時不久，滅六暴強 (Martial order and rightness stood upright and straight (…) through a passage of time not long, they exterminated the six cruel and violent ones)’.
In his self-portrayal, Qin Shi Huang effortlessly overcame all his foes, internal and external, thus legitimising his position as ‘Son of Heaven’.

As such, in his interactions with foreigners, the First Emperor was careful never to mention military losses, nor any revolts or even disagreements/dissents to his rule. People either submitted willingly, or they were obstinate and needed to be conquered, in which endeavour he had to be successful, as any military setbacks against foreign foes implied that he did not truly have the support of Heaven.\footnote{As Kern argues, the First Emperor’s sovereignty is grounded in a combination of politics and cosmology. See Kern, \textit{Imperial Tours}, 106.} Through these measures, Qin Shi Huang was able to portray himself as a ruler with unparalleled and monopolised divine support. This further solidified his position and consolidated his power.

\textit{Augustus}

This analysis of Qin Shi Huang’s conjoining of divine support and interactions with foreign peoples can help elucidate similar aspects of Augustan propaganda. Certainly, there are obvious differences – as previously mentioned, Rome never developed so elaborate an idea as the ‘Son of Heaven’ – but the notion that Rome had a divine mission to create an \textit{imperium sine fine} was similarly shared with China.\footnote{Eck, \textit{Age of Augustus}, 125; Isaac, \textit{Invention of Racism}, 304; Lintott, \textit{Imperium Romanum}, 64.}

While Augustus’ persona of victory is well analysed by current academia, the fact that his failure to record a single military loss or revolt in the \textit{Res Gestae} was a departure from Republican norms is something not often discussed. Moreover, Augustus’ personal connection to the divine – and perhaps his own future divinity – is analysed in far greater depth than how this divine patronage was manifested in his portrayals of ‘barbarians’ and foreigners. Even so, the \textit{princeps’} connection to the divine is still debated. Certain scholars argue that Augustus, eager not to offend existing sensibilities, avoided portraying himself as anything more than just the ‘First Citizen’, while other scholars have
contended that Augustus behaved as if he had a special connection to the divine. In the previous chapters, this thesis has disagreed with the assessment that Augustus portrayed himself as nothing more than the ‘First Citizen’ and argued that Augustus clearly tried to portray himself as near ‘superhuman’ both in his military prowess and in his morality. Thus, in accordance with the methodology of this thesis, it is now necessary to determine whether Augustus also portrayed himself as being extraordinarily pious or having a special connection to the divine (if not ‘divine’ himself).

With criticisms of impiety – particularly against Neptune – levelled against Octavian in the early days of the Triumvirate (Suet. Aug. 16.2), the future princeps in response constantly tried to portray himself as pious and by extension supported by the divine. To commemorate his victory at Naulochus, Octavian built a temple dedicated to Apollo adjoining the part of his house on the Palatine ‘which, having been struck by lightning, the soothsayers had announced as desired by the god [Apollo]’ (Suet. Aug. 29.3). After Actium, Octavian dedicated a shrine to Apollo at the location where his tent had been set up at Actium (Cass. Dio 51.1.3). Immediately after the capture of Alexandria, Octavian enlarged the temple of Apollo and dedicated temples to Mars and Neptune (Suet. Aug. 18.2).

Pines, in a short comparison, argued that the main difference between Augustus and Qin Shi Huang lies in the fact that the First Emperor portrayed himself as superior to the rest of mankind, while Augustus portrayed himself solely as the restorer and protector of Rome. See Pines, The First Emperor, 237 – 238. Yakobson, in another comparative study, concludes that both Augustus and Qin Shi Huang portrayed themselves as the ‘semi-divine ruler of a world empire’. See Yakobson, The First Emperors, 285.

Suet. Aug. 29.3: ‘quam fulmine ictam desiderari a deo haruspices pronuntiarant’. Lange, Res Publica Constituta, 40, 166 – 167; Galinsky, Augustan Culture, 313. See also Alston, Rome’s Revolution, 182, 230, where Alston notes that after Naulochus, Octavian began experimenting with his public image by having golden statues – normally reserved for divinities – erected for himself.

In the *Res Gestae*, there are numerous passages that could be interpreted as a ‘flaunting’ of his piety. This is compounded by his repeated claims to various religious offices (Aug. *RG*. 7, 10). After his election, Augustus declared his own house to be public property and adjacent to the Vestal Virgins (Cass. Dio 54.27.3; Ov. *Fast*. 6.455). To further exemplify his piety, Augustus boasts of his construction of numerous temples in the *Res Gestae*, such as the Temple to Mars Ultor (Aug. *RG*. 21), mirroring Hor. *Carm*. 3.6. The *Ara Pacis* connects Augustus with the *Pax Romana*, and, being an ‘ara’, has unmistakable religious connotations. The continued building of temples was lauded by Suetonius as ‘praecipua’ (Suet. *Aug*. 29.1) and praised by Ovid to the point that he considers the temples ‘Caesaris aras’, upon which Mars descends and sees all the cumulated glory that is Augustus (Ov. *Fast*. 1.13). In the *Tristia*, Ovid twice calls the house of Augustus ‘Iovis (...) domus’, one that is ‘Leucadio (i.e. Apollo) semper amata deo est’ (Ov. *Tr*. 3.1.35 – 42). Yavetz notes that almost all surviving statues of Augustus show him as either offering sacrifice

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578 See the opening of Hor. *Carm*. 3.6, where Horace claims that Romans will continue to pay for ‘delicta maiorum’, until ‘templar refeceris aedesque labentis deorum et foeda nigro simulacra fumo’.
582 Taylor, *Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, 161.
or acting in some religious or ritual capacity. Augustus’ *pietas* was constantly placed in the foreground of his propaganda.

This piety, however, did not cease at simply aggrandising the *princeps’* moral character, but served as the basis for divine favour and support. Rumours were created that, upon his return to Rome after the assassination of Caesar, the Sun allegedly crowned him with a halo (Vell. Pat. 2.59.6). In a most likely fictitious speech, Appian has Pansa, dying of his wounds at Mutina, inform Octavian that he ‘had been born to a divine fate, as his deeds testify’ (App. *B Civ.* 3.76). Moreover, an extensive number of Augustan authors connect the *princeps’* victory at Actium with the divine. Actian Apollo defending Rome and Octavian against the ‘barbarians’ of the East appears in *Aeneid* 8.678–679, 8.704–706, and extensively in Propertius 4.6, which Gurval argues serves to exhibit Augustus as having won a divinely sanctioned victory. A statue of the goddess Victoria was established in the Curia, which Cassius Dio states was to show ‘that it was from her that he received his empire’ (Cass. Dio 51.22.2). As Gurval further elaborates, there have been numerous instances of civil wars

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583 Yavetz, *Res Gestae*, 7. Even when the statue itself does not present Augustus in the role of a priest or in a similar capacity, there are often still religious connotations. On the famous statue at Prima Porta, Augustus is shown with Cupid (and thus Venus) as well as Mars, confirming his divine connection. See Galinsky, *Augustan Culture*, 160 for an analysis of this. For further analyses on the Augustus at Prima Porta statue and its connections to the divine, see Taylor, *Divinity of the Roman Emperor*, 180; Cornwell, *Pax*, 150 – 151; and Zanker, *Power of Images*, 189, 192. For a broader discussion of Augustus presenting himself as the ‘priest par excellence’, see Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Augustan Rome*, London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993, pp. 81 – 85.

584 It must be said that *pietas* in Latin has additional meanings such as ‘duty’, ‘loyalty’ and even ‘affection’. For the purpose of this thesis, only the sense of ‘piety’ or ‘religiosity’ will be discussed.


591 See also Prop. 3.11.41, where instead of Apollo, Propertius describes Actium in terms of Jupiter: ‘ausa lovi nostro latranem opponere Anubim’.


being presented as ‘impius’ while foreign conquests are divinely supported.\(^{594}\) Indeed, much like Confucius’ quote in the Zuo Zhuan,\(^{595}\) Propertius, after a lengthy diatribe against Cleopatra, declares that Rome ‘presides over the entire world and stands not to be destroyed by human hands. These walls the gods have founded, [and] these walls the gods also protect’ (Prop. 3.11.57 – 59),\(^{596}\) presenting a worldview where it is almost sacrilegiously wrong for Rome to be threatened by foreign powers.\(^{597}\) Thus, Augustus ending the civil wars and returning to more ‘pious’ foreign conquest can also be viewed as the princeps connecting piety, the divine and foreign conquest.\(^{598}\)

In addition to being portrayed as pious and ‘favoured’ by the divine, the princeps’ own divinity was advanced in order to illustrate further his unique and superhuman connection to the gods.\(^{599}\) Stories were created that Octavian was the son of Apollo (Suet. Aug. 94.4; Cass. Dio 45.1.2),\(^{600}\) while Ovid’s Ars Amatoria calls Augustus ‘puer Veneris’ (Ov. Ars Am. 1.165). Domitius Marsus, in the Epigrammata Bobiensia, describes the birth of Octavian as Atia giving birth to a god.\(^{601}\) Velleius Paterculus praises Octavian as having a ‘caelestis animus’ (Vell. Pat. 2.60.2), similar to Vitruvius, who also celebrates Augustus’ ‘mens et numen’ as ‘divina’ (Vitr. De Arch. 1.1).\(^{602}\) Ov. Fast, 2.635 – 638,

\(^{594}\) Gurval, Actium and Augustus, 148 – 149, 180 – 181; Zanker, Power of Images, 2. See also Woolf, Roman World, 176, where Woolf argues that the Romans viewed civil wars as a breach of the Pax Deorum. For some examples of ‘impius’ civil war, see Hor. Epod. 7.19 -20 – where Roman blood is described as ‘sacer’ – Carm. 1.2, 1.14, 1.21, 1.35, 2.1, 3.6 and Prop. 2.15.41ff., where Propertius speaks of Rome’s civil wars and is comforted in knowing that at least his ‘battles’ offended no gods: ‘laeserunt nullos proelia nostra deos’. This is very similar to China, where Chinese authors viewed Heaven withdrawing its Mandate completely during the chaotic Warring States and China was left without a Son of Heaven for many centuries. See Kuan, Zhanguo Shi, 383.

\(^{595}\) Zuo Zhuan, 10\(^{\text{th}}\) Year of Duke Ding: ‘裔不謀夏, 夷不亂華 (…) 於神為不祥’.

\(^{596}\) Prop. 3.11.57 – 59: ‘toti quae praesidet orbi, stat non humana deicienda manu. Haec di condiderunt, haec di quoque moenia servant’.

\(^{597}\) Gurval, Actium and Augustus, 203 – 204.

\(^{598}\) See particularly Hor. Carm. 1.2.21 – 24, where the poet laments about civil wars and how Romans blades ought to be turned towards the Persians, not against themselves: ‘audiet civis acuisse ferrum quo graves Persae melius perirent, audiet pugnas vitio parentum rara iuventus’.

\(^{599}\) This would not have been entirely alien in Roman thought. Quoting Ennius, Cicero draws a connection between morality and ‘divinity’: ‘non eros nec dominos appellabant eos, quibus iuste paruerunt, denique ne reges quidem, sed patriae custodes, sed patres, sed deos; nec sine causa’ (Cic. Rep. 1.41).

\(^{600}\) Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor, 154.

\(^{601}\) Epigrammata Bobiensia 39: ‘sive hominum peperi femina sive deum’. For the fragment of Bobiensia 39, see A. S. Hollis, Fragments of Roman Poetry c. 60 BC – AD 20, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 304. For a further analysis on this, see Lange, Res Publica Constituta, 45.

\(^{602}\) Galinsky, Augustan Culture, 295; Dench, Romulus’ Asylum, 59 – 60; Campbell, Romans and Their World, 100; Rich, Making the Emergency Permanent, 38.
along with Hor. *Carm. 4.5.31* and Petron. *Sat. 60*, record that libations are poured for Augustus.  

Augustus himself boasts how the senate voted prayers for his health, and sacrifices were dedicated to him on the altar to Fortuna Redux (*Aug. RG. 11*). His *genius* or *numen* could be called upon in oaths (*Hor. Carm. 4.5.31; Cass. Dio 51.19.7*), and hymns were sung of the *princeps* ‘on equal terms with the gods’ (*ἐξ ἴσου τοῖς θεοῖς*) (*Cass. Dio 51.20.1*). The *princeps* was openly worshipped as a god in provinces where this was permitted. Furthermore, as Yakobson has noted, Augustus rejecting being worshipped as a god in the city of Rome implied that such an offer must have been emphatically made in the first place. The very title of Augustus is ‘more than human’, as numerous scholars, ancient and modern alike, have noted. This is compounded by Octavian’s acceptance of

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604 In addition to Fortuna, Spes and Salus were also worshipped in connection to Augustus. See Mark Edward Clark, ‘Spes in the Early Imperial Cult: ‘The Hope of Augustus’’, *Numen*, vol. 30, Jul. 1983, pp. 80 – 83.


608 Yakobson, *The First Emperors*, 286 – 287. On the other hand, Gradel argues that worship of Augustus while the *princeps* was alive did in fact exist in Rome and Italy, albeit just not part of the state cult. See Gradel, *Emperor Worship*. See also Aurelius Victor 1.1, where he records that ‘templum, sacerdotes et collegia’ were indeed dedicated to Augustus ‘uti deo Romae provinciisque omnibus per urbes celeberrimas vivo mortuoque’.

his title ‘divi filius’. \(^6\)\(^{10}\) Even setting the *Res Gestae* into stele form harkens back to ancient religious artefacts, as Luke has argued.\(^6\)\(^{11}\)

Moreover, there are myriad examples of Augustus’ future divinity being praised while the *princeps* was still alive. In the opening of Virgil’s *Eclogues*, numerous scholars have interpreted the god being prayed to as Octavian.\(^6\)\(^{12}\) The poet’s *Georgics* unambiguously portrays Octavian as a future god (Verg. G. 1.24 – 42).\(^6\)\(^{13}\) Ovid, in both the *Ars Amatoria* and the *Metamorphoses*, portrays Augustus as a future god.\(^6\)\(^{14}\) Manilius’ *Astronomica* says of Augustus: ‘he descended from heaven and will [one day] refill it’ (Man. Ast. 1.799).\(^6\)\(^{15}\) His future divinity is also unequivocally stated in an earlier verse: ‘he is the greatest mover [*auctor*], now on earth, later in Heaven’. (Man. Ast. 1.386).\(^6\)\(^{16}\) Undoubtedly, Augustus firmly connects himself with the divine sphere. All this portrayal of the divine serves to show that Augustus had divine sanction in his battles and victories, and his position was guaranteed by the gods. Some scholars, such as Grebe, argue that Augustus’ entire regime was legitimised by the divine.\(^6\)\(^{17}\)


\(^6\)\(^{12}\) Nappa, *Reading after Actium*, 31.

\(^6\)\(^{13}\) Mendell, *Latin Poetry*, 93.


\(^6\)\(^{15}\) Man. Ast. 1.799: ‘*descendit caelo caelumque replebit*’.

\(^6\)\(^{16}\) Man. Ast. 1.386: ‘*nunc terris post caelo maximus auctor*’.

\(^6\)\(^{17}\) Grebe, *Augustus*’ *Divine Authority*, 49; Ramage, *Res Gestae*, 109 – 110. See also Ando, *Imperial Ideology*, 141, where Ando contends that a divine connection also pacified the populace, as the people should be thankful to have a *princeps* so supported by the divine. But see S.R.F. Price, *Ritual and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984 for a counterargument, as he argues that the imperial cult did not in fact legitimise political power and was not ‘part of the ideological superstructure’. He contends that ‘no one imagines that an ideology can so dominate everyone’s consciousness that all forms of political opposition to the ruler are literally unthinkable’. However, this argument is a bit extreme. This thesis certainly does not argue that Augustus drew all his power from his ideology; merely that his ideology served the purpose of strengthening the security of his position.
As many have noted, Augustus (then Octavian) began formulating this divine connection openly during his early years in the Second Triumvirate, perhaps as a strategy to equate himself with (or even surpass) Marc Antony and Sextus Pompeius. And as just shown, Augustus did not at all diminish his insistence on divine support following the defeat of Marc Antony. Whilst this aspect of Augustus is well studied, how this ‘divine connection’ influenced the portrayal of foreign peoples is not extensively researched by scholars; particularly, why, like Qin Shi Huang, did Augustus never mention any military setbacks and repeatedly declare his success in the subjugation of the orbis terrarum and in creating an imperium sine fine?

Thus, this thesis will now examine whether the methods deployed by Qin Shi Huang to utilise the divine as part of his imperial image can also adequately elucidate Augustan propaganda. Surveying Augustan literature once again, one finds that the reasons for Qin Shi Huang’s utilisation of the divine are also visible in Augustan imperial image. Focusing on the portrayal of his divine patronage, it is clear that Augustus’ connection to the divine was unique. His claim to divinity was not shared with anyone except Julius Caesar and Augustus’ own imperial family.

Furthermore, in a move away from standard Republican mores, Augustus chose to align himself with as many gods and divinities as possible, rather than just one. During the Triumviral period, many of the leaders, Octavian included, aligned themselves with a patron god: Marc Antony with Hercules, then Dionysus (Plu. Ant. 24.3), Sextus Pompeius with Neptune (Suet. Aug. 16; App. B Civ. 5.100), and Octavian with Apollo. While most scholarship continues to argue that Augustus kept his relationship almost ‘solely’ with Apollo, Gurval makes a convincing argument that this was not the

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622 Indeed, this is still the general viewpoint of academia and naming all such scholars would be excessive. For a few examples, see Pelling, *Augustus*, 43 – 44; Luke, *Ushering in a New Republic*, 151; Lange, *Res Publica*
Indeed, Augustus aligned himself with many divinities, and Augustan authors equated him, or prayed on the princeps’ behalf, to a plethora of gods. In addition to Actian Apollo, Augustus, after his victories at Actium and Alexandria, dedicated temples to Mars and Neptune (Suet. Aug. 18).

In Carm. 1.2, Horace mentions Divine Julius alongside Jupiter, Apollo, Venus, Mars, and Mercury as patron gods of Augustus. In Carm. 1.12, Horace prays to Saturn to reign alongside Caesar while also associating him with Mercury, while at the end of Carm. 4.14 Horace even calls the gods, plural, as ‘tuos (...) divos’. His Carmen Saeculare opens with a prayer not only to Apollo but also Diana.

In Epist. 2.1, Horace compares Augustus to the deified Romulus, alongside other gods such as Liber, Pollux, and Castor, while also giving prominence to Apollo and Janus. In the Eclogues, Virgil describes the new golden age of Augustus as the reign of Saturn returning (Verg. Ecl. 4.6). In the Aeneid, setting aside the famous quotation of Jupiter granting Rome its empire, the Shield of Aeneas, which foretells the subjugation of the world under Augustan Rome, is made by the god Vulcan and presented to Aeneas by Venus. Moreover, rather than the warring factions of gods as present in Homer, Virgil has Jupiter declare that all the gods, even ‘saeva Iuno’, will come together in concord and with one mind aid the greatness of Rome (culminating in Augustus), a prediction which comes true by the end of the work. Propertius has Actian Apollo fight alongside Octavian, but also prays to Mars and Venus to continue to bring Augustus victories (Prop. 3.4, 4.6). Ovid’s Fasti connects Augustus to Vesta and Apollo, before having Mars, rather than Jupiter, reaffirm the famous

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Constituta, 2, 4, 46, 166 – 167; Zanker, Power of Images, 50, 52 – 53; Darcos, Auguste, 26; and Rossi, Ab Urbe Condita, 22. See also Fishwick, The Imperial Cult, 87, where Fishwick, while arguing that Augustus did associate himself with multiple gods, still believes that Augustus only associated himself ‘with a select group of state deities’: Divus Julius, Mars Ultor, Jupiter and Apollo.

623 See Gurval, Actium and Augustus.


624 Santirocco, The Two Voices of Horace, 18; Gurval, Actium and Augustus, 104 – 105.


626 See Verg. Aen. 8.729f.

627 Gottlieb, Religion in the Politics of Augustus, 23.
proclamation of Rome’s imperium sine fine (Ov. Fast. 6.359ff.). In the Amores, Ovid connects Augustus to Venus and Cupid (Ov. Am. 1.2.51, 2.14.17 – 18).632 His Metamorphoses, while drawing parallels between Jupiter and Augustus (Ov. Met. 15.858ff.), has Aeneas and Romulus aid Augustus in his apotheosis (Ov. Met. 15.850ff.).633 So, unlike Rome’s earlier military leaders, Augustan literature portrayed the princeps as being supported by the entire pantheon.634

In the Res Gestae, Augustus mentions a multitude of divinities without giving any unambiguous preferential treatment to a single god. The divinities mentioned in the Res Gestae include Fortuna, Honor, Virtus, Pax, Janus, Apollo, Divus Julius, Jupiter, Minerva, Juno, the Lares and Penates of Rome, Juventas, Mater Magna, Castor, Saturn, Mars and Vesta. None of these divinities take a particular precedence. Some of the major gods are mentioned more than once – Mars four times, Jupiter and Apollo each thrice, and Janus and Divus Julius each twice – but none dominate the text. This thesis argues that Augustus may have been implementing a method very similar to Qin Shi Huang. By portraying a concord of gods, all of whom supported Augustus, the princeps monopolised divine support, further consolidated his position, and prevented rivals from also claiming divine aid as during the Triumviral period.635

Augustus returned Rome to the ‘task’ ancient Romans viewed as the ‘proper’ state of affairs: fulfilling a divine mission to conquer the world.636 Much like in Qin Shi Huang’s case, bellicose foreigners refusing to come in submission were now committing hubris by contending against a

632 Harrison, Time, Place, and Political Background, 142.
634 Lacey, Augustus and the Principate, 68.
635 See particularly Taylor, Divinity of the Roman Emperor, 145, where Taylor argues that Cornelius Gallus, Egypt’s first Prefect under the Augustan regime, fell from favour because divine favours were offered to Gallus, which led him to ‘become in a sense a rival to Octavian and was recalled under circumstances that led him to take his own life’.
636 See particularly Vitr. De Arch. 6.1.11, Rome is described as having a ‘divina mens’ which gives them the right of orbis terrarum imperii’. For a further analysis on Rome’s task to rule to the world, see Gurval, Actium and Augustus, 203; Isaac, Invention of Racism, 84; and Andreola Rossi, ‘Ab Urbe Condita: Roman History on the Shield of Aeneas’, in Citizens of Discord: Rome and its Civil Wars, ed. Brian W. Breed, Cynthia Damon and Andreola Rossi, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 145.
divine plan, in which Rome was destined to conquer the known world and create an *imperium sine fine*.637 This further justified Augustus’ control of the army and his military activities, as well as restoring Roman confidence in their perceived superiority.

Similar to Qin Shi Huang, this would adequately explain why, in the *Res Gestae*, Augustus does not mention any military losses or revolts, as failure to subjugate foreigners and create the divinely ordained *imperium sine fine* would be a sign that he did not have a monopoly on divine favour. As previously noted, Rosenstein observes that military losses rarely set back a Roman aristocrat’s public career. However, whenever a general did suffer a backlash for his loss, it was almost always accredited to a failure of piety or an affront to the divine.638 Livy places the blame for the sack of Rome by the Gauls on the Romans for losing their piety.639 Claudius Pulcher’s loss against the Carthaginians was caused by a significant act of impiety: his kicking of the sacred chickens into the sea.640 Flaminius lost at Trasimene due to his refusal to attend religious rituals, thus causing his *imperium* to be defective, which Livy described as him ‘waging a war not only against the senate but even against the immortal gods’ (Liv. 21.63.6).641 Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus imputes the loss of Crassus against the Parthians to the Roman commander going to war ‘having set himself against the divine’ (ἐναντιουμένου τοῦ δαιμονίου) (Dion. Hal. 2.6.4). Varro, too, lost against Hannibal at Cannae due to his choice of fighting on an *ater dies*.642 Ovid even warns Augustus not to

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638 See Liv. 5.38.1, where the Romans lost against the invading Gauls because ‘*non deorum saltem si non hominum memores, nec auspicato nec litato, intruunt aciem*’. For a further analysis of this passage, see Mineo, *Livy’s Political and Moral Values*, 132. Then, Camillus’ successful repelling of the Gauls was accredited to his piety. See Burck, *Das Geschichtswerk des Titus Livius*, 171.

639 For the records of this event, see Cic. *Nat. D*. 2.7 and Suet. *Tib*. 2. See also Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi*, 79.

640 For the records of this event, see Cic. *Nat. D*. 2.8 where Flaminius is said to have proceeded at Trasimene with ‘*religione neglecta*’. Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi*, 78; Gottlieb, *Religion in the Politics of Augustus*, 22.

641 Liv. 21.63.6: ‘*non cum senatu modo, sed iam cum dis immortaliibus (...) bellum gerere*’. See also Cic. *Nat. D*. 2.8 where Flaminius is said to have proceeded at Trasimene with ‘*religione neglecta*’. Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi*, 78; Gottlieb, *Religion in the Politics of Augustus*, 22.

fight against portents: ‘nor would I wish for you, Caesar, although you hasten to conquer, to move
your standards if the auspices forbid it’ (Ov. Fast. 6.763 – 764).643

As can be seen, military losses were often attributed to a failure of religious ritual or an act of
impiety by the commander, causing the gods to withdraw their support.644 If the gods were truly on
Rome’s side, then they should be victorious in every battle, particularly if the gods were of one mind,
as was presented in the Augustan imperial self-image.645 This is again confirmed by Augustan
literature, with numerous examples of Augustus’ divine nature or divine support leading to military
victories, with passages directly connecting the divinity of Augustus and his conquests.646 Ovid has
Jupiter explain to Venus that Augustus ‘will have us in his battles’ and that ‘whatsoever the habitable
earth sustains will be his, the sea too will serve him!’ (Ov. Met. 15.821, 830 – 831).647 Propertius
yearns that the Parthians would ‘grow accustomed to Latian Jove’, and for Mars to bring on the day
when ‘I would see the chariots of Caesar laden with spoils, and for captured chiefs to sit under arms’
(Prop. 3.4.6, 13 – 14).648 Propertius, speaking of Actium, further declares that ‘Rome conquers by the
faith of Phoebus’ (vincit Roma fide Phoebi) (Prop. 4.6.57).649 While he had earlier, quoting Ennius,
claimed that it was by piety and the gods that Rome repelled Hannibal: ‘(...) the gods turned towards
the pious prayers, and the Lares (the protective gods of Rome) put Hannibal to flight from the
Roman seat’ (Prop. 3.3.9 – 11).650

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644 Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi, 55.
645 Ando, Imperial Ideology, 285; Woolf, Rome, 117; Forsythe, Early Rome, 285; Rosenstein, Rome and the
Mediterranean, 208; Erskine, Roman Imperialism, 35 – 36; Rosenstein, Imperatores Victi, 56; Koortbojian, The
Bringer of Victory, 190 – 194; Gottlieb, Religion in the Politics of Augustus, 21 – 23; Levick, Augustus, 150;
Grebe, Augustus’ Divine Authority, 5; Iiro Kajanto, God and Fate in Livy, Turku: Turun Ylipiston Kustantama,
1957, p. 11.
646 Richardson, Augustan Rome, 81.
sustinet, huius erit: pontus quoque serviet illi!’
648 Prop. 3.4.6: ‘assuescent Latio (...) lovi’. Prop. 3.4.13 – 14: ‘qua videam spoliis oneratos Caesaris axes, et
subter captos arma sedere duces’.
649 Gurval, Actium and Augustus, 269.
650 Prop. 3.3.9 – 11: ‘versos ad pia vota deos, Hannibalemque Lares Romana sede fugantis’.
The very concept of an imperium sine fine is pronounced by the gods, with Jupiter doing so in the *Aeneid* and Mars in the *Fasti*. Further on in the *Aeneid*, Virgil has Augustus enter Rome in triumph and immediately dedicate some three hundred temples (Verg. *Aen*. 8.714 – 716). The opening of *Georgics* has Virgil praise Augustus as divine and call for the ‘maximus orbis’ to accept him as sole ruler (Verg. *G*. 1.25ff.). Horace calls Augustus a god to whom the Britons and the Persians will bow: ‘(...) praesens divus habebitur Augustus adiectis Britannis imperio gravibusque Persis’ (Hor. *Carm*. 3.5.2 – 4). The Boscoreale Cups, too, connect the divine and the conquest of foreign peoples, with Venus handing Victoria to Augustus with the world on her hands, while Mars leads the conquered peoples in front of Augustus. Turning to the *Res Gestae* itself, Augustus stresses that the temple of Mars Ultor and the Augustan forum were built both ‘in privato solo’ and ‘ex manibiis’ (Aug. *RG*. 21). Even Augustus connecting victory at Actium to Apollo was a sign that he was victorious over ‘foreign’ enemies due to divine aid.

From this, one can see that Augustus’ decision to create a unified pantheon wholly supporting his regime also created a ‘double-edge sword’, comparable to Qin Shi Huang’s predicament. Thus, this thesis posits that a similar interpretation can be applied to the cases of both emperors; the princeps, too, eschewed any mention of military setbacks or revolts against his ‘universal rule’ to avoid destabilising his tenuous position. Much like the First Emperor, Augustus could not afford to show any failures in subjugating foreigners and creating his divinely-ordained imperium sine fine: to

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657 Of course, this thesis does not argue that Augustus had an overarching masterplan to take over Rome from the very beginning of his political career. Rather, Augustus’ image involved over time, through much trial-and-error; the *Res Gestae* captures the ‘final’ or ‘completed’ product of Augustan self-image, accumulated from all the developments during his principate. See Gradel, *Emperor Worship*, 109 and Alston, *Rome’s Revolution*, 2. See also Grant, *From Imperium to Auctoritas*, 38 – 39, on how Octavian was testing how to portray his image during the Triumvirate, as visible in the coinage.
do so would be to ‘admit’ that he did not truly possess the gods’ unwavering support.\textsuperscript{659} As shown earlier, there were already sentiments that Crassus’ loss against the Parthians was due to a lack of divine support, which may also help explain why Augustus never went to war against Parthia; had he lost, his position as the divinely-ordained one would have been open to challenge.\textsuperscript{660} This would also adequately explain why Augustus never mentioned the revolts (such as Pannonia) or Varus’ defeat at Teutoburg forest. The latter, in particular, was viewed by Augustus as a sign of divine wrath and, as such, certainly not to be advertised (Cass. Dio 56.24.2).\textsuperscript{661} Moreover, as argued in the previous chapters, Augustus centralised military command and glory by having all military campaigns be undertaken under his auspices.\textsuperscript{662} Thus, Augustus could not easily lay the blame for military setbacks on another general, since these men were acting as legates under his command.\textsuperscript{663} If he publicly blamed someone such as Varus, then he could have simultaneously incriminated himself of impiety.\textsuperscript{664}

Whenever a loss is implied in the \textit{Res Gestae}, such as Augustus mentioning his restoring of military standards from Spain, Gaul, and the Dalmatians, the \textit{princeps} stresses that they were ‘lost by other generals’ – ‘\textit{alios duces amissa}’ – while he was able to regain the standards when he defeated the enemies (Aug. RG. 29).\textsuperscript{665} Thus, even when a loss is mentioned, Augustus ensures that the audience

\textsuperscript{659} As Gottlieb words this, ‘defeats were incompatible with the \textit{salva publica} or the \textit{salva res Romana’}. See Gottlieb, \textit{Religion in the Politics of Augustus}, 29.

\textsuperscript{660} Rich, \textit{Augustus, War and Peace}, 157; Sherwin-White, \textit{Roman Foreign Policy}, 335.

\textsuperscript{661} Cassius Dio, before listing all the terrible omens which preceded and followed Varus’ loss, claims that Augustus viewed the loss as due to ‘δαμονιοῦ τυνὸς ὀργῆς’.

\textsuperscript{662} It is argued by Belloni that having legates under his ‘auspices’ equated the \textit{princeps} with the gods to some degree. See Belloni, \textit{Res Gestae}, 67. For a further discussion on Augustus and his \textit{sumnum imperium auspiciunque} in all provinces, see Vervaet, \textit{The High Command in the Roman Republic}, 275 – 285.

\textsuperscript{663} Havener, \textit{Imperator Augustus}, 27.

\textsuperscript{664} Of course, one must note that Augustus seemed to have acknowledged Varus’ loss at Teutoburg while he was alive. Its omission from the \textit{Res Gestae} could be explained by the fact that the text was a posthumous inscription meant for future generations, one which could not allow the basis of his reign – and the reign of his successors – to be challenged.

\textsuperscript{665} The Spanish standards are suggested by Shipley to have been lost by Pompey’s sons after their defeat by Julius Caesar, most likely at the Battle of Munda, 45 BCE. Although, Cae. \textit{BHis}. 31 records that Julius Caesar was able to capture all thirteen of the standards (while Appian and Cassius Dio do not mention the standards at all), which leaves the identity of the ones recovered by Augustus still mysterious. The Dalmatian standards were lost by Gabinius and Vatinius in the 40s BCE. The identity of Gallic standards was ‘unknown’, according to Shipley.
knew that it occurred due to failures not associated with Augustus, while he himself was able to ‘correct’ the mistakes of other generals, further distinguishing his divine support in military affairs by juxtaposing it others’ losses. Additionally, comparable to Qin Shi Huang’s portrayal of the celerity and ease in his conquest of the world, Augustus also never mentions the arduousness of his campaigns in Spain, Illyria, and Germania. He then spoke of the conquest (and re-conquest) of Pannonia in a single sentence (Aug. RG 30: ‘devictas per Ti. Neronem’), betraying none of the struggle described by Suetonius as ‘the most serious of all external wars since the ones against Carthage’ (Suet. Tib. 16). Augustus’ subjugation of the world, thanks to his divine aid, was swift and complete.

Therefore, not only did Augustus present himself as having superhuman military prowess and morality, which already made him ‘worthier’ than anyone else to rule Rome if not the world, his sole and unparalleled connection to the divine further consolidated this position, a position that he could not afford to have undermined by any recognition of military losses or revolts, as they would have represented a ‘failure’ to secure his ‘divine mandate’. This might then have called into question his (and his future heir’s) still novel position as princeps. Augustus, much like Qin Shi Huang, was required constantly to present a persona of victory over foreign foes in order to validate his claims to divine support and favour.

Conclusion

Once again, by utilising Qin Shi Huang’s propaganda in a comparative fashion, one is able to unravel Augustan propaganda further. The First Emperor sought to legitimise his rule by depicting his position as the divinely supported ‘Son of Heaven’, a position which monopolised divine favour.

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666 Scheid, Res Gestae, 76.
667 See Zanker, Power of Images, 187: ‘there are no references to the difficult and protracted campaigns in Spain, Illyria and Germany. Indeed, the emphasis on scenes of peace and security helped wipe out the memory of these wars’.
668 Suet. Tib. 16: ‘gravissimum omnium externorum bellorum post Punica’.
669 Wallace-Hadrill, The Emperor and his Virtues, 316.
However, since military losses or a failure to subjugate by force or morality ‘All under Heaven’ was a sign that the gods had withdrawn their support and that the ruler was not truly the Son of Heaven, the First Emperor could not afford to display any military setbacks in his self-portrayal and propaganda. In a regime whose legitimacy was heavily dependent on divine favour, military losses, or a failure to conquer the ‘known world’, would have shaken the foundations of his rule. Turning then to Augustus, one finds that a similar interpretation can elucidate aspects of Augustan self-portrayal and propaganda not yet fully analysed by scholarship.

The *princeps*, too, monopolised divine support by portraying a concord of gods for his reign, rather than a single patron god as seemed to be more common during preceding times. Moreover, in order to re-establish the Roman sense of superiority and what was considered the ‘natural order’ – Roman supremacy over the known world – Augustan propaganda also flaunted the idea that the gods had granted Rome an *imperium sine fine*, which Augustus had undertaken to bring about. However, since there were no more adverse divinities, any failure to complete this divinely-mandated task would imply that Augustus had lost the divine support which he needed as a legitimising factor for his regime. Thus, in a similar way to Qin Shi Huang, the *princeps* also avoided mentioning any losses or setbacks against foreign foes while asserting that he had indeed completed his divinely-mandated task of conquering the *orbis terrarum*. This was a measure designed to prevent anyone from questioning his and his successors’ right to rule.

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670 See Belloni, *Res Gestae*, 62, who described the Augustan world empire as ‘nell’ambito della volontà divina’.

CONCLUSION

This study of Augustus and Qin Shi Huang has demonstrated that comparative research on the two emperors can effectively complement and supplement the findings of current academic research, especially in regard to certain aspects of the emperors’ self-image and propaganda in the context of their portrayals of foreigners and ‘barbarians’. Roman historians have gravitated towards interpreting Augustus’ portrayal of foreigners almost exclusively through his ‘military’ persona and his image of ‘victoriousness’. Works that have explored Augustus’ moral character or his relationship with the divine often do so with only a casual consideration of his portrayal of foreigners. This meant that the conclusions drawn from such analyses were rather restrictive. This thesis has instead argued that, even in the context of conquest, Augustan portrayals of foreigners served not only to advance his military persona but also to promote non-military aspects of his rule, such as his morality or divine support. This has been done through a close comparative reading of similar themes in the stele inscriptions of Qin Shi Huang.

In ascertaining the appropriateness of this comparative study, this thesis first explored pre-imperial attitudes and perceptions of warfare and foreigners in Rome and China. Looking at China, Chapter One concluded that the gradual development of the idea of ‘foreigners’ or ‘barbarians’ took place over several centuries and was intimately connected to a military framework. In the early Spring and Autumn period (770 – 476 BCE), there was very little in the description, vocabulary or themes of the literature to suggest a radical divide between ‘Chinese’ and ‘foreigners’ in any respect other than political (i.e. whether they were ruled by the King of Zhou or not). By the late Spring and Autumn period, and most certainly the Warring States period (476 – 221 BCE), a ‘civilised – barbaric’ divide became visible. This thesis posited that this was due to two factors: escalating competition between the Chinese states for land and manpower which led to an increasing need to conquer, and a rise in

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672 See the introduction of the thesis for a discussion on the current state of scholarship on this matter.
anti-war sentiments in the populace. Pressed by the demands of an increasingly war-weary populace (educated elites and commoners alike) to justify their continued conquests, the literature of the ruling class began to differentiate their enemies morally and culturally. In tandem with the development of the ideas of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and the ‘Son of Heaven’, through which a ruler was deemed fit-to-rule on moral grounds, Chinese elites increasingly began to portray themselves as ‘moral’, fighting against ‘immoral’ and ‘culturally-inferior’ ‘barbarians’. This intensified by the late Warring States period when foreigners ceased to be portrayed positively in any fashion and became entirely barbarised on the grounds of their perceived cultural and moral inferiority. The Chinese states, on the other hand, were ‘justified’ in their conquest due to their moral superiority and divine support.

Chapter Two showed that in Early Republican Rome, the fragments of surviving treaties reveal very little ‘barbarisation’ of foreigners, nor do they present an unambiguous sense of Roman superiority. The earliest concrete evidence of the barbarisation of foreign peoples came from Rome’s increasing contact with the Hellenic world during and after the Illyrian Wars. Forced to contemplate the idea of ‘Roman-ness’ in the face of increasing Hellenisation – one which barbarised the Romans – as well as Rome’s rising confidence due to their military successes, the Roman elites began to formulate a Roman-barbarian divide. This divide sought to justify Roman success and to cement their sense of superiority by accentuating the moral and cultural ‘inferiority’ of other peoples. Much like China, the idea of ‘bellum iustum’ began to develop as a justification for continued conquest without diminishing Rome’s sense of moral superiority. With the continued development of Roman philosophy, the concept of ‘bellum iustum’ became more established – a concept particularly visible in the works of Cicero.

As the common people of Rome became increasingly war-weary, particularly towards wars viewed as ‘civil’ in nature, the perceptions and presentations of foreigners began to adapt to this new ideal

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673 Pines, *The Messianic Emperor*, 259, 266.
of ‘peace’. Enemies were regularly represented as a threat to the peace which Rome, through just conquest, would be able to sustain. A more euphemistic vocabulary was adopted, with writers, such as Caesar and Cicero, tending to use ‘pacare’ (or its derived terms) to describe conquest. Foreigners, due to their perceived moral and cultural deficiencies, were shown as requiring to be ‘pacified’ and ruled by the ‘morally superior’ Romans, as that was the only way to ensure peace throughout the world.

Thus, Chapter Three proceeded to argue that Qin Shi Huang, careful to manufacture an image palatable to a war-weary populace yet simultaneously needing further conquests to control his army, construed his portrayal of warfare against his enemies as the protection and sustaining of peace. The First Emperor constantly presented himself as attempting to preserve the peace against aggressors, ‘forcing’ him to go to war time and time again to protect the people. Taking this reading as a hypothesis for Augustus, one finds that the princeps also implemented a similar method to reconcile his seemingly disparate images of an emperor of ‘peace’ and of ‘war’.

Current scholarship, however, has not elaborated fully on the next stage of this analysis. By viewing Augustus’ propagandistic portrayal of foreigners purely through a military lens, even in the context of war and peace, scholarship has left several aspects of his self-portrayal under-investigated. While Chapters One to Three did reveal how pre-imperial Rome and China presented foreigners in this military context, it also showed that this reading was too restrictive. Rome and China were depicted as superior to foreigners not simply due to their military supremacy, but also due to their culture, morality, and unique position as the manifestation of divine will. When examining Qin Shi Huang, it is clear that the First Emperor also accentuated his morality in his dealings with his enemies (foreign or internal). Indeed, the very concept that the Qin Shi Huang only fought ‘just wars’ illustrated his moral superiority. Moreover, the First Emperor’s conquest of ‘All under Heaven’ through not only

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674 Kelly, *The Roman Empire*, 19.
military means but also through ‘willing submission’ highlighted his morality as well; the First Emperor was so moral that ‘All under Heaven’ came in submission without the need for war. Turning to Augustus, one finds this also explains aspects of Augustan propaganda. Not only did Augustus’ similar use of *bellum iustum* help elevate his morality, but Augustus also stressed that he gained his position via *consensus universus*, not only from the Romans themselves but even foreign states, who sent embassies to seek his *amicitia*. Just like the First Emperor, the *princeps* also portrayed himself as so moral that foreign peoples came to him in submission without the need for arms.

Furthermore, Qin Shi Huang presented his morality as ‘impeccable’ so that he could claim the position of ‘Son of Heaven’. This ‘Divine Mandate’ provided the First Emperor with a crucial benefit: the sole right to rule ‘All under Heaven’. However, this ‘Divine Mandate’ also had its drawbacks. A ruler who failed to subjugate ‘All under Heaven’ – by arms or diplomacy – was seen to have lost the Mandate (or perhaps never to have had it in the first place). As such, Qin Shi Huang was forced to present a constant image of ‘victory’ in his interactions with foreigners. Any setbacks could potentially be used as a challenge to his rule. One also finds that this reading is quite feasible for Augustus. While he was in command, the *princeps* also never recorded any military losses, revolts, or even setbacks in his dealings with foreign states, even ones which could easily have been imputed to another. As Augustus presented a unified pantheon all assenting to and supporting his rule, he could no longer afford to show any military losses, as in Roman thought they were normally attributed to a loss of piety or a religious error. Augustus, just like the First Emperor, would be open to challenge if he could not present an image of victoriousness consistent with the idea that he was supported by the entire pantheon. He had to show that he was consistently successful in his divinely-mandated mission to conquer the known world.

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By turning a comparative lens on Augustan propaganda and self-image, this thesis hopefully illuminated certain aspects of his portrayal of foreigners not yet studied in-depth. Even when portraying foreigners or hostile enemies in a military context, both emperors were able to manipulate expertly such portrayals so as to embellish certain aspects of their image not limited to their martial prowess. Certainly, their ability to be victorious was lauded. However, the two emperors, in their propaganda, also manipulated the representation of foreigners in order to highlight their morality and their special connection to the divine.

Nonetheless, this thesis is under no pretence that it represents at all a comprehensive survey of Augustan and Qin propaganda, and its limitations must be recognised. The confines of its word limit led to the unfortunate exclusion of most non-literary sources. Moreover, an investigation of how Augustan and Qin dynasty propaganda influenced subsequent emperors can also provide deeper insights by placing such propaganda in a wider historical context with their immediate successors. A future study of a wider scope will certainly be able to provide even deeper analyses with such inclusions. Nevertheless, this preliminary study hopes to have shown the value of comparative studies and how future Rome-China comparative studies can advance our understanding in both Classics and Sinology.
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