Towards a critical geography of resettlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal:</th>
<th>Progress in Human Geography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manuscript ID</td>
<td>PiHG-2017-0133.R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuscript Type:</td>
<td>Submitted Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keywords:</td>
<td>governmentality, forced migration, development-induced displacement, subjectification, territorial practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abstract: Resettlement is a governmental program with inherent spatial effects in that it drives the rearrangement of capital, labour, and land, and seeks to render people and space more governable. This article examines the extent to which this disruptive phenomenon has been theorised. We first review the existing literature, finding a distinct polarisation between mainstream studies and more critical scholarship. We then propose a critical geography of resettlement centred on its multiple logics, agents and expertise, and subject-making and spatial practices. An invigorated critical geography of resettlement is needed to challenge the legitimisation of an expanding resettlement industry.

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pihg
Towards a critical geography of resettlement

Abstract

Resettlement is a governmental program with inherent spatial effects in that it drives the rearrangement of capital, labour, and land, and seeks to render people and space more governable. This article examines the extent to which this disruptive phenomenon has been theorised. We first review the existing literature, finding a distinct polarisation between mainstream studies and more critical scholarship. We then propose a critical geography of resettlement centred on its multiple logics, agents and expertise, and subject-making and spatial practices. An invigorated critical geography of resettlement is needed to challenge the legitimisation of an expanding resettlement industry.

I Introduction

The World Bank describes resettlement as “the process by which those adversely affected [by development projects] are assisted in their efforts to improve, or at least restore, their incomes and living standards” (World Bank, 2015). Resettlement is a distinctive form of mobility in that why, where, and how people move are determined by authorities ahead of displacement. The degree of external planning, preparation, and investment distinguishes resettlement from reactive movements in response to disasters or conflict, or more self-directed forms of mobility in response to slow onset economic and environmental change.

While a near-universal phenomenon, resettlement is more prevalent in the Global South, and has occurred most often as a result of large dams and other infrastructure projects. Indeed, it is large dam projects like Ghana’s Akosombo Dam, Egypt’s Aswan Dam and China’s Three Gorges Dam that have shaped enduring images and understandings of resettlement. And it is in response to such hydropower projects that the World Bank developed the first guidelines and standards for involuntary resettlement. No reliable figures exist to indicate the scale of
global resettlements: the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre is currently collating figures to provide an up-to-date estimate of global resettlements, but until released, one estimate is about 20 million people annually (Cernea and Maldonado, 2018). We posit that one of the reasons for this lack of clarity is that the practice of resettlement has expanded well beyond dams and well beyond World Bank-related projects; and as such, a re-evaluation of the nature of contemporary resettlement is timely.

Resettlement now occurs for conservation purposes, for poverty alleviation, to facilitate urban expansion, and in response to climate change impacts. China, for instance, is resettling 2.4 million people in just one province (Shaanxi) under a poverty and environmental protection project between 2011 and 2020 (SNWTP Construction Committee Office, 2015). Unlike other forms of internal displacement, therefore, resettlement is not only an unfortunate by-product of an event or project, but has become a development project in its own right. The question of how resettlement has come to be normalised in this way provides much of the motivation for this article.

For decades the World Bank has shaped resettlement praxis in various donor and recipient countries. Its first resettlement policy was released in 1980, recognising the disastrous impacts of projects it had funded on those displaced (for instance the violence of Guatemala’s Chixoy Dam resettlements - (Clark, 1997)). This policy and subsequent iterations have been hugely influential in defining social and environmental safeguards for resettlement projects with the aim of better protecting those displaced (Cernea, 1993; Cernea, 2016; Vandergeest et al., 2007). However, the first principle of the original policy – that involuntary resettlement should be avoided wherever feasible – does not seem to have had the effect of curtailing resettlement. In recent decades resettlement projects and the justifications for them have only proliferated. In what follows we argue that a central driver is the extensive use of resettlement in China as a development project in its own right, and the growing prominence of China as a
source of resettlement knowledge and expertise. Another driver is the accelerating impacts of climate change, and the ongoing legitimisation of resettlement in academic and policy discourse as an adaptation strategy for certain places in the Global South (see for example de Sherbinin et al. 2011; Hino et al. 2017).

On this shifting ground, there is a need to revisit the conceptual roots of resettlement to understand the ideas and practices on which its expansion and legitimisation rest. The considerable body of literature that examines resettlement is yet to be systematically reviewed to consider its theoretical reach. In this article we address this gap and advance critical scholarship on resettlement through two key contributions. Firstly, we review the literature and outline three primary approaches to understanding resettlement: a state planning or mainstream approach, and two critical approaches – political-economic and Foucauldian. We argue that a mainstream lens has extensively documented the impacts of resettlement and led to better policies and practice, but is less able to explain the normalisation of resettlement as a development project in its own right. Critical scholarship, on the other hand, which delves into questions of resettlement’s temporal and spatial complexity, its subjectivities, and the actors, interests or technologies of government that coalesce around resettlement projects, provides a foundation for a critical geography of resettlement that can both document and challenge this normalisation. While we broadly categorise this scholarship into either (Marxist) political-economic or Foucauldian approaches based on the main focus of the particular studies in question, we recognise that these are not mutually exclusive categories, and further, that many studies are also informed by political ecology.

Secondly, we provide a synthesis of this critical scholarship with the aim of constructing a critical geography of resettlement that will drive forward our understanding of this disruptive phenomenon. Within the two strands of critical literature, the multiple sites where they
intersect, and their omissions, we find the building blocks for a critical geography of resettlement, one that explains not just how resettlement happens, but also why it happens. Expanding on these building blocks we outline a critical geography of resettlement that centres on the multiple logics of resettlement, its agents and expertise, and its subject-making and spatial practices. We argue that a distinct critical geography of resettlement is needed because 1) the logics of resettlement continue to multiply and have been inadequately interrogated; 2) the production of knowledge and expertise about resettlement is in flux, which critical development literature is yet to account for; and 3) the spatial practices of resettlement have been insufficiently theorised. To advance such a critical geography we redefine resettlement as a governmental program with multiple logics, one that seeks to render people and space more governable.

II Review

Before delving into key studies in mainstream approaches, it is important to give a sense of the breadth of the resettlement literature and its current concerns. To very briefly summarise its reach, this scholarship has centred on specific projects in India (Parasuraman, 1999; Jain and Bala, 2006; Mathur, 2013), Southeast Asia, particularly upland resettlements in Laos (Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Blake and Barney, 2018; Sims, 2017; Baird and Shoemaker, 2008), Latin America (Escobar, 2003; Hanna et al., 2016), and China (see below). There is a smaller subset of literature on resettlement in the Global North, beginning with an early account of rural communities relocated off marginal land in the United States (Wehrwein, 1937), but more commonly focused on the dispossession and forced removal of Indigenous people in settler states (see for instance Billson, 1990; Marcus, 1995; van Meijl, 2012; Windsor and McVey, 2005).
It must be said that case studies of Chinese resettlement projects and their impacts have proliferated, catalysed by the high-profile Three Gorges Dam resettlements but now extending across the country (see Heggelund, 2003; Tan et al., 2005; Tan, 2008; Wilmsen, 2016; Brown and Xu, 2010; Habich, 2016; Li et al., 2017; Rogers and Wang, 2006; Webber and McDonald, 2004; Yan et al., 2016; Bauer, 2015; Du, 2012; Ptackova, 2012; Tan et al., 2013; Wu, 2015; Xue et al., 2013). A number of overviews of China’s resettlement practice can be found in Li et al (2001), Shi et al (2012) and Wang and Lo (2015). What our reading of these studies highlights is the expanding set of justifications for resettlement, including land degradation and deforestation, the sedentarisation of herding communities, water pollution control, climate change impacts, and entrenched poverty, and the sheer scale at which resettlement occurs, including millions of people in this decade for poverty reduction. This literature details how over time, China has developed a particular set of institutions, policies, finance instruments, and networks of expertise, that allow resettlement projects to be implemented at scale and for shifting justifications.

While much of the resettlement literature has focused on dams and to a lesser extent conservation and poverty-related resettlement, in recent years a body of work has begun to coalesce around using planned resettlement as adaptation to climate change, typically proposed for small-island states and large deltas in the Global South, or marginal (often Indigenous) communities in the Global North (Johnson and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Johnson, 2012; McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; Arnall, 2018; Maldonado and Peterson, 2018). A number of studies attempt to draw out principles or lessons from past experience for climate-related resettlement (de Sherbinin et al., 2011; Mathur, 2015; Tadgell et al., 2017), but critiques of past resettlement practice that raise concerns about maladaptation are also emerging (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015b; Rogers and Xue, 2015).

1 State planning and mainstream approaches
Within this expansive literature, there is a dominant approach which we describe as a state planning approach. Developing from early case studies of dam resettlements and their effects, this approach is focused on understanding and proposing solutions to the problems caused by resettlement (Adu-Aryee, 1993; Bartolomé, 1993; Guggenheim, 1993; Guggenheim and Cernea, 1993; McDowell, 1996). In Guggenheim’s (1993: 227) words: “Even the best planned programs carry with them risks for the people who must move. But adequate research, planning and resources can help relocated communities reconstruct and develop”.

While there is recognition that resettlement involves basic political choices about who gains and suffers from development and that it will always remain a “traumatic process” (Cernea, 1993: 34), the focus of these studies is on reforming policy, legal, and evaluation frameworks for better outcomes.

A number of prescriptive resettlement frameworks have been proposed in this vein, the most influential being Cernea’s Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model (see Cernea, 1996; Cernea, 1997). IRR is described as a tool for guiding action as it “anticipates displacement’s major risks, explains the behavioural responses of displaced people, and can guide the reconstruction of resettlers’ livelihoods” (Cernea, 1997: 1570). There is an assumption here that resettlement can be controlled by planners to achieve favourable and relatively predictable outcomes. IRR continues to be an influential model, and has been used in a number of studies to frame the impacts of resettlement (see for instance Tan et al., 2005; Rogers and Wang, 2006; Tan et al., 2013). But it has been less useful in explaining the uneven nature of these impacts, and, by positioning a homogenous state as in conflict with development “victims” (Cernea, 1997: 1576), IRR does not provide a framework for understanding the workings of power in resettlement projects (see also Wilmsen et al., 2018).
Besides IRR two temporal models have been developed (Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2009; Scudder and Colson, 1982) that account for the socio-cultural responses of resettled people to specific phases of the relocation process. We also identify two further mainstream approaches: a sustainable livelihoods framing of the impacts of resettlement (see McDowell, 2002; Tan et al., 2009; Rogers and Xue, 2015; Wilmsen, 2016; Chen et al., 2017; Owen et al., 2018), and a focus on protecting the human rights of resettled people (Barutciski, 2006; McDowell and Morell, 2007; Modi, 2009; WCD, 2000).

While many of these studies are critical of resettlement and its impacts, they position the resettlement process as knowable, predictable, and manageable as long as there is better research, planning, participation, and evaluation through the project cycle. For instance, some attribute failure to a lack of an “orderly and uncorrupted passage from policy to implementation” (de Wet, 2006: 4), while others argue that better results can be achieved through greater inclusion and dialogue or strengthened institutional capacity (Gongbo Tashi and Foggin, 2012: , 149; Singer et al., 2014; Mathur, 2013). To some extent then, by focusing on individual projects and how they can be improved, and not addressing the circumstances that result in dispossession and displacement in the first place, mainstream approaches help to normalise resettlement as a necessary cost of development. Ever more elaborate models are developed for accomplishing “good resettlement” (Vandergeest et al., 2007: 25), rather than understanding it as a process of coercive redistribution (Dwivedi, 2002; Aiken and Leigh, 2015; Levien, 2017).

2 Political-economic approaches

Resettlement facilitates land dispossession, enables capital accumulation, increases the availability of cheap labour, and produces new forms of commodification and consumption. The true costs of mega-projects are externalised and unfairly borne by local populations.
These are the conclusions of the studies outlined below and others that take a political-economic approach to resettlement such as Chakrabarti and Dhar (2010), Chatterjee (2008), Chung (2017), and Sanyal (2007). This is not simply a repurposing of primitive accumulation to understand the proliferation of land dispossession through resettlement projects: by being attuned to place, to specific arrangements of class, gender, ethnicity, and power, and to specific technical practices such as compensation, these studies develop a nuanced understanding of the capitalist logic driving contemporary resettlement.

In China, for instance, Yeh observes how the urbanisation of Tibetans “fuels capital accumulation for coalitions of real estate development companies and local governments” (Yeh, 2013: 212). Also in China, Webber (2012) views land dispossession as one of three principle means of accumulation in rural areas (the other two being the transformation of state and collective enterprises into capital and the voluntary migration of farmers from agricultural to industrial pursuits), while Chuang (2015) notes the uneven impacts of accumulation by dispossession, with some villagers profiting and others losing out. The need to drive higher household consumption through resettlement is quite explicit in China: according to Premier Li Keqiang, every rural resident who moves to the city will consume an additional 10,000 RMB per year (Wilmsen, 2017). In Laos, Barney (2009) examines the state’s upland resettlements that achieve coercive enclosures and attempt to engineer the transition of upland Lao communities from swidden to commodified production. In short, through resettlement, people and places are made more amenable to incorporation within the capitalist economy (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015a).

Political-economic studies also highlight the key role of compensation in furthering the capitalist logic of resettlement. Compensation may be a package of cash or in-kind provisions and increasingly includes post-resettlement infrastructure and livelihood restoration. The terms of exchange are based on inventoried and commodified land (and sometimes crop)
assets. Nielsen and Nilsen (2015: 203) describe such negotiations as a “compromise equilibrium” between dominant groups with an interest in exploiting spaces of accumulation, and subaltern groups whose consent is needed. In Laos, Green and Baird (2016) show how compensation facilitates the expansion of capitalist social relations by producing new commodified relationships to land, assets, and some natural resources, while simultaneously decommodifying other resources. Rather than protecting the rights of the displaced, these arrangements favour the interests of elites by keeping costs to a minimum, whilst ensuring that resettlement is done just well enough so as not to impede construction (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015a).

Political-economic approaches also highlight the precursor to dispossession: exclusionary politics. In cases of resource extraction resettlements, a resource frontier is produced where it did not exist before (Barney, 2009). In developmental resettlements those to be resettled might first be cast as “backwards” or “lacking”, in need of development intervention. For instance, Sargeson (2013: 1063) observes the characterisation of China’s rural residents as “institutionally insecure, disorderly, economically under-productive and incompatible with modernity”. This production of marginality (of people or of space) might begin long before displacement is even conceived. Examples of politically-produced difference preceding resettlement can be seen in Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008), Ptakova (2012), Feldman and Geisler (2012), Xun and Bao (2008) and Chatterjee (2014). While the main thread of such political-economic studies is how the production of marginal people and peripheral places facilitates the expansion of capital, the social and cultural dynamics underlying this production are also explored, just not in the same terms as the Foucauldian studies outlined below.
What a political economy lens does is expand the gaze beyond a narrow, prescriptive focus on resettlement as a spatially and temporally bounded event, drawing attention to the key drivers and modalities of land dispossession and resettlement. For example, private capital—both foreign and domestic—and a reconfigured neoliberal state are identified as the key drivers of the Maheshwar hydropower project that displaced some 35,000 people in India (Nilsen, 2008). In this case, resettlement was induced by processes of privatisation of public utilities and liberalisation of the financial sector; resettlement did not begin and end with a project. Levien (2017) goes further by tracing changing ‘regimes of dispossession’ in India, from state-led projects for industrial and agricultural transformation, to private and increasingly productive investments. He argues that these changing regimes draw variously on coercion, material compensation, and normative persuasion to achieve compliance, and can no longer be adequately explained as primitive accumulation.

We offer two key reflections on this body of work. First, subsumed within categories of class, peasant, and marginality, people and the ways in which they respond to resettlement projects by forging different futures do not always feature prominently. This is not simply about local agency in compensation negotiations (see Green and Baird, 2016; Habich, 2016), but about how resettled people experience and challenge the rearrangements of labour and the commodification of local resources facilitated by resettlement projects. Second, there could be deeper engagement with the production of space and uneven development through resettlement, be that through spatial integration or capital mobility/immobility (Smith, 1984). For instance, is resettlement in China’s western provinces a spatial fix for surplus capital, and if it is, what kinds of geographical landscapes are being created and what kinds are being rendered obsolete (Arrighi, 2007)? If at some point labour becomes surplus to capital’s requirements, what happens to these people and where do they go (Li, 2010)? In what follows we consider the extent to which Foucauldian approaches take up such questions, and return to
them again in the second section of the paper in our discussion of the multiple logics of resettlement and its spatial practices.

3 Technologies of government and subject-making

The body of work outlined in this section draws on Foucauldian notions of the art of government and capillary power to highlight the ways in which resettlement is used as a technique to produce particular kinds of subjects and spaces, and the role of discourse in this subject-making. These studies are significant in that they draw attention to a number of elements of resettlement practice that are largely ignored by mainstream studies, and not necessarily centred in political-economic studies: how a problem is defined for which resettlement is the solution (and by whom), and the means through which governable subjects and spaces are produced. Similar to political-economic studies, resettlement is not conceived of as bounded by a project in time and space. Rather, resettlement is one of many overlapping and ongoing governmental programs that seek to manage a population, to “arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved” (Foucault, 1991: 95).

An early example is Gellert and Lynch (2003) who consider the epistemic communities – elite groups or groups from state agencies, international lending and donor institutions, and the private sector – that shape mega-projects in ways that foster displacement. Central to these epistemic communities are ideas of the public good, progress, rationality, and long held racial biases, which play a central role in producing displacement. Another key study is from Yeh (2005), who examines Chinese government grazing bans in western regions as an emergent form of green governmentality. These practices are part of a broader definition of western China as “a coherent territory characterised by degraded landscapes and impoverished people” and of the people of western China as “underdeveloped, impoverished
and a potential threat to social stability” (Yeh, 2005: 12-13). While there is conflicting data on the extent and causes of such degradation (see for instance Webber, 2012: on the role of the household responsibility system), discourses linking herding communities with environmental degradation are used by the Chinese state to justify the large-scale resettlement of ethnic minorities. There are also environmental resettlement projects in Han Chinese areas (see for instance Rogers and Wang, 2006) that similarly attribute environmental degradation to the practices of herders and farmers. In these cases, environmental sustainability becomes a new technology of government, within which resettlement is one tactic used to shape the conduct of marginalised farmers and herders.

The formation of more governable citizens is explored further by Gaerrang (2015: 267), who argues that resettlement projects for Tibetan herders in Sichuan produce “new forms of subjectivity shaped by market forces, the state’s development agenda and the transformation of cultural landscapes”. By living settled lives in new houses, shifting from herding to wage labour or small business, and becoming consumers, this process of subjectification also lays the groundwork for further interventions by the state. Through resettlement, Tibetans become objects of the state’s efforts to modernise, educate and raise their “quality” (Huatse Gyal, 2015). In Tibetan areas a distinct concern for social stability is also bound up in this discourse of modernity (Nyima, 2010). Thus an economic imperative (accumulation by dispossession) and subject-making work hand in hand.

It is this small sub-set of studies that has begun to highlight how resettlement produces space. Yeh (2013), for instance, describes the urbanisation of Tibetans through resettlement and reflects on the spatial techniques and implications of such interventions. This is a process that “through concentration and spatial rearrangement reshapes the embodied experiences and social-spatial practices of everyday life” (Yeh, 2013: 211). The orderliness of the new living arrangements “lays down a new grid of legibility and discipline” (Yeh, 2013: 211).
Resettlement is therefore a process of deterritorialisation tied to a separation from a set of relations between villagers and their land (such as local deities), and reterritorialisation in that newly urban villagers are rendered more governable by the Chinese state. In a Tibetan context, it enables an extension of state control over territory (Yeh, 2005). This deterritorialisation has also been recognised in Han majority areas: Hsing (2010) argues that relocation projects deterritorialise by prompting economic deterioration, accelerating social disintegration, and opening rifts among villagers. The Foucauldian-inspired literature takes up the question of how resettlement produces space to a greater degree than the political economy literature, but as we discuss below, there is more work to be done.

Beyond China, Katus and others (2016), while not drawing explicitly on a Foucauldian framework, nonetheless view hydropower development in Laos as a technology of power, examining local power geometry in the resettlement process, including local elites and more or less powerful actors within villages. Gransow (2015) also frames social assessment as a governmental technology, one that aims to make the social risks of resettlement identifiable, predictable and calculable. These authors do not necessarily delve into how these technologies work, but at least one study does look more intently at the tools and techniques that are used to shape the conduct of resettlers: Serje (2015) describes the practices of resettlement in Colombia as an initial social diagnosis (classificatory devices used in the design of resettlement projects), bureaucratic procedures (norms and regulations, validation of asset and entitlements etc), and the physical design of new settlements. These practices identify, classify, and regulate the everyday lives of people pre- and post-resettlement. Again, while this critical scholarship gives us a far greater understanding of how resettlement works as a technology of government, its somewhat disparate threads need to be drawn together and further developed.

4 Review summary
Our reading of the resettlement literature leads us to two conclusions. The first is that there is, unsurprisingly, a strong polarisation between mainstream studies and more critical scholarship. The former is concerned with what happens in the resettlement process (losses, compensation, and reconstruction of livelihoods) and on changes to policy and practice that will make resettlement projects better. The latter concentrates on the why (logics) and how (techniques) of resettlement, and in doing so, begins to make sense of the normalisation of resettlement. The scale and timeframes also vary. While mainstream scholarship is defined by the project boundary and construction timelines, critical scholarship considers multiple scales and extended timeframes. The second conclusion is that while overall, two broad and sometimes contradictory theoretical traditions frame the critical literature, there are important sites of convergence which we expand on below. If we read these two strands as complementary, in general (recognising that there is great complexity in this empirical and theoretical work), the political economy work describes the logic(s) of resettlement (the why of resettlement), while the Foucauldian work delves into discourse, subject-making, practices, and the production of space (the how of resettlement).

III Toward a critical geography of resettlement

Having reviewed the existing resettlement literature, both mainstream and critical, this section discusses what we consider to be the most important sites where the critical literatures converge and should be developed further: the multiple logics of resettlement; agents and expertise; and subject-making and spatial practices. Through a discussion of these three sites, their interconnections, their relevance to key debates among geographers, and some examples from China, we begin to construct a critical geography of resettlement that challenges the normalisation and expansion of resettlement practice that has to some degree been facilitated by the steady build-up of mainstream “knowledge about” resettlement. Like Li (2007), we
tolerate the tension introduced by different theoretical traditions because of the tools they offer to guide a more explicitly geographical research agenda to challenge this legitimisation. And while the theoretical traditions that have most shaped the resettlement literature are centred, we certainly do not wish to preclude other perspectives. Indeed, it is hoped that the three sites – the multiple logics of resettlement, agents and expertise, and subject-making and spatial practices – open up space for greater dialogue with for instance, feminist political ecology, feminist economic geography, mobilities, and postcolonial perspectives.

1 The multiple logics of resettlement

Ferguson’s (1994) classic analysis of Lesotho reminds us that while development projects routinely fail, they do have important effects, political or otherwise, which may reveal a logic that goes beyond the project’s stated intentions. These side effects “are at one and the same time instruments of what “turns out” to be an exercise of power” (Ferguson, 1994: 255). The resettlement literaturecatalogues how resettlement projects routinely fail: they do not properly compensate those affected; they are unable to engineer the successful re-establishment of livelihoods; and they are unable to protect against impoverishment.

Resettlement is rarely, if ever, a development opportunity: even minimal livelihood restoration is not usually achieved several years after displacement (Cernea and Mathur, 2008). So, looking beyond the immediate goals of a particular project, what does resettlement actually achieve?

Political economy provides an entry point into a critical geography of resettlement by laying bare the underlying capitalist logic of resettlement. While couched in terms of development and progress, resettlement has been used to facilitate the enclosure of forests, farmland, and pastures, to almost completely eliminate herding as a viable livelihood in western China, and to proletarianise smallholder farmers. But, as the critical literature clearly shows, it is not
enough to simply say “capitalist exploitation”. Resettlement as climate change adaptation introduces new tropes of security and resilience (Artur and Hilhorst, 2014), extending earlier uses of resettlement to protect environments in “crisis”. And dam resettlements do not just displace, they also create: as well as hydroelectricity, the role of big dams in building nation and modernity has long been recognised (Kaika, 2006). Tropes of social stability, cultural transformation, environmental fragility, and the modern subject are often overlaid onto and complement the logic of capital. In central China, the massive push to end absolute poverty by 2020 relies heavily on resettlement, and is rationalised through a discourse of progress, and the need to eliminate “backward” thinking and make space for new “professional” farmers (a rationalisation by no means unique to China – see Li (2011)). In Laos, clientilist, neoliberal, bureaucratic and extractive-accumulation rationalities overlap in upland resettlements (Barney, 2009). That resettlement often takes place within authoritarian states suggests that more attention needs to be paid to how projects can be inflected with socialist (or other) mentalities such as mass campaigns, model villages, and Party supervision.

What a focus on the multiple logics of resettlement would do is open up analysis of the many things that resettlement as a governmental program seeks to achieve, and of the broader social, political, and economic processes that shape these objectives. By countering mainstream approaches that are bounded by a project, such analyses would help make sense of the expansion and normalisation of resettlement and bring resettlement studies into closer dialogue with key debates in geography. Building on existing work, a critical geography of resettlement as a governmental program will amplify questions of capital, uneven development, power, and the state in particular places. For instance, China’s extensive use of resettlement for all manner of social and environmental ills provides fertile ground for exploring the (re)production of uneven economic geographies through “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. If, as Lim (2014) argues, China pursues neoliberal logics but also
employs massive redistributive mechanisms to ameliorate uneven economic development, does the practice of resettlement reflect only one or both of these, or perhaps something else? In other words, what can resettlement tell us about the nature of Chinese capitalism amid enduring socialist logics?

Well outside political economy, another line of inquiry is the effects of the multiple logics of resettlement on non-human actors. While some of the critical scholarship we have reviewed is informed by political ecology and asks questions about environmental practices that are marginalised or disallowed by resettlement, non-human actors do not typically feature. Poverty resettlement in China, for instance, often takes the form of manufactured urbanisation – what Gomersall (2018) calls “the urban ideal” - breaking links between people, land, plants, animals, and ecological knowledge, and producing new urban environments in which there is limited space made for non-human life. Further, when resettlement happens in tandem with sedentarisation or agricultural scaling-up, diversified smallholder livestock production and seasonal herding are marginalised in favour of industrialised meat production. A critical geography of resettlement should encompass how logics of conservation and poverty alleviation remake human/non-human relations and wellbeing.

2 Agents and expertise

Multiple logics are possible because the practice of resettlement relies not just on the state, but on a complex network of agents who engage in knowledge production and whose goals become intertwined with those of the state. Building on Levien (2017), these networks are regimes of dispossession, but much else besides: they develop new resettlement communities, they train and provide jobs for resettlers, they mobilise an army of consultants, they produce new knowledge on resettlement practice and technologies, and they render this knowledge
mobile. To account for the logics of resettlement, these networks and their objectives need to be understood. Beyond an acknowledgement that non- or semi-state agents such as property developers, construction firms, agribusinesses, and hydropower companies play a role in resettlement, the existing literature has not adequately described these agents, their reach, their interconnections or the flows of finance between them.

We suggest that what is needed is both description of resettlement networks and analysis of how resettlement expertise is reproduced through such networks. The agents and networks that coalesce around a particular resettlement project will differ depending on the country and on the stated goals of the project (dam construction, poverty alleviation, climate adaptation, environmental protection). Much like Webber and Han (2017) have done recently for China’s “Water Machine”, a description of these networks that money, resources, people, and ideas would include their composition, their emergence, their maintenance, their links to other networks, and their effects. Emphasis should be given to the collection of organisations, individuals, and indeed practices that move in and out of these networks to produce expertise about resettlement. These are the associations that train and socialise consultants and academics, that then become a community of resettlement practitioners, who shape individual projects and the broader norms and tools (models, impact assessment, regulations, monitoring and evaluation) that coalesce around resettlement; all of which provide impetus to what is in effect a resettlement industry. Emerging geographical work on how experts in other fields such as climate change adaptation cultivate agendas, authority, projects, and new markets (see Keele (2017)) can provide further theoretical and methodological guidance.

While traditionally this industry has been largely housed in and perpetuated by the World Bank and to a lesser extent the Asian Development Bank, China is playing an increasingly influential role. Its National Research Center for Resettlement is an intellectual apparatus that produces new knowledge, theories, models, and strategies for resettlement, and trains
graduate students and scholars in resettlement “science”. As a consulting organisation, it is regularly appointed by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to design, monitor, and evaluate Chinese resettlements (Shi, 2018). Based on China’s extensive practice of resettlement, this apparatus promotes “best practice” for resettlement, thus rendering resettlement “naturalized, legitimate and durable” (Goldman, 2005: 5). It plays a very active role in problematisation (how a problem is defined for which resettlement is the solution); helping to render alternatives unworkable, undesirable, or just off the map (Li, 2016). As the Director of the National Research Center recently wrote:

The PRC must regard the need to displace people as the propitious opportunity to create the conditions for the overall advancement of the uprooted population as well, since lifting people from poverty is the ultimate objective of the country’s policies (Shi, 2018: 148) [emphasis added]

By rendering resettlement natural and legitimate it can be more easily taken up in new arenas and combined with other forms of expertise, most obviously in depoliticising discourses of climate change and migration (Kothari, 2005; Barnett and O’Neill, 2012).

By mapping these Chinese networks, the knowledge production they engage in, and the ways in which they intersect with and perhaps challenge well documented networks from the Global North, resettlement scholarship will intersect with a discussion about the production of distinctly Chinese models of “big-D” development (Mol, 2011; Yeh and Wharton, 2016; Harlan, 2017). As Mawsdley (2017) argues, in the past decade there has been a rupture in the North-South axis of international development, which can be traced through material, ideational, and ontological flows. We might consider that critiques of norms and practices within an earlier North-South hierarchy, including of pro-poor politics, participatory development, and micro-finance (Hickey, 2009; Green, 2010; Roy, 2010) can be extended to this new landscape. But we might also argue that quite different questions need to be asked about how illiberal, non-Western norms and practices travel. China does resettlement in
particular ways, shaped by Party supervision, collective ownership of farmland, campaign-
style programs, a constricted civil society, and powerful discourses perpetuated by state-
owned media. The extent to which these norms and practices are made mobile by Chinese
networks (particularly as China rolls out its infrastructure-heavy Belt and Road Initiative) is
yet to be documented.

3 Subject-making and spatial practices

In the face of a resettlement industry that has a ready solution for so many problems, how do
those impacted by these projects fare? There are a plethora of case studies detailing the costs
of resettlement and the long-term process of regaining security over one’s livelihood post-
resettlement. There are also examples of outright resistance to resettlement projects,
particularly in India where farmers have mobilised to defeat imposed projects (Oliver-Smith,
2010; Nilsen, 2010), and in China’s many stubborn “nail” households (Hess, 2010). And of
course, people desire a better life, so their objectives may overlap considerably with the
material compensation and normative persuasion offered through particular projects. While
not wishing to diminish these effects and responses, we argue that a critical geography of
resettlement must be attuned to how people’s lives become entangled in the transformations
of self and community sought through resettlement as a governmental program. It is through
resettlement that certain types of subjects are made: small-island inhabitants become climate
resettlers, herders become sedentarised agriculturalists or urban labourers, smallholder
farmers become wage labourers, people become “project-affected”, and existing communities
become “host” communities. However, the existing literature does not adequately explain the
extent to which these transformations are actually achieved: do people come to experience
themselves through these qualities and statuses? What counter expertise – what messiness –
can be identified? We might turn to existing geographical approaches to green
governmentality and other critical scholarship on subject-making as guides to how these
subjectivities manifest in local places in partial, varied ways, with not all people being
incorporated into systems of rule in the same way (Cruikshank, 1999; Rutherford, 2007;
Dressler, 2014; Forsyth and Walker, 2014; Li, 2016).

In understanding these transformations to be attempts to render subjects and space more
governable, we might ask two further questions: how does resettlement attempt to normalise
a particular temporality, and how does it attempt to impose a particular spatiality? We
consider these questions to be at the heart of how governmental practices create and maintain
disciplinary or prescribed spaces for capitalism’s further extension into people’s everyday
lives (Prince and Dufty, 2009; Jones and Murphy, 2011; Lasslett, 2015). In China, dispersed
smallholder farmers are being extensively resettled into high-rise communities and rendered
landless, and therefore solely reliant on urban wage labour. Resettlement is not necessarily a
transition from subsistence to capitalist modes of production – most smallholders already
work as temporary labourers in the urban economy – but it does accelerate a transition to the
rhythms and tasks of wage labour and consumption, removes farmland as a social safety net
and a source of food, and rearranges labour and capital in space. “Inefficient” smallholders
are expected to become low-saving, high-spending and often highly indebted urban
consumers, as large-scale farms or agribusinesses appropriate their land. In reality, they
(particular the elderly) are more likely to become urban residents reliant on transfer payments
to survive (Li, 2010; Wilmsen, 2017). As Marsden (1999) argues, it is through disciplinary
power (training, establishing rhythms, imposing tasks), that labour is organised into a
productive force in the interests of capital accumulation. We consider the kind of
ethnographic work done by Chuang (2015) with dispossessed farmers and their new bosses in
the construction industry to be critical to detailing the temporal changes to labour,
consumption, and reproduction that occur through resettlement. Training programs offered by
local governments with the aim of preparing resettled farmers for new urban jobs would be a particularly productive site for delving into such questions of labour and subjectivity.

Vandergeest (2003: 47) argues that “all development projects involve reorganising the meaning and control of space”, while Blake and Barney (2018) show how hydropower resettlements in Laos discipline and territorialise populations on party-state-defined logics. Resettlement is a fundamentally spatial project, and yet the literature only incidentally examines the spatial practices that enable these interventions and the modalities of power that these reflect. We argue that a critical geography of resettlement should be attuned to land as a political-economic relation (linked to the changing temporalities and spatialities discussed above), but also territory as a political technology (Elden, 2010). In this vein, how does resettlement as a governmental program enable territory to be represented, appropriated and controlled; how does it enable boundary-making?

This is where the physicality of resettlement villages matters: the orderliness identified by Yeh (2013) as laying down new grids of legibility, the spatial reordering briefly discussed by Blake and Barney (2018), and the logic of site selection. Architecture is not built simply to be seen, “but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control – to render visible those who are inside it” (Foucault, 1977: 172). Compared to a nomad camp, or a dispersed farming village, resettlement villages enable a far greater degree of surveillance and control through the circumscription and enclosure of space. Of course people modify or abandon these spaces, a further rich line of inquiry, and one that must recognise that “resistance” may take the form of evasion, subversion, containment, or modification (Oakes, 2016). Nonetheless, scaled up to the hundreds (possibly thousands) of such villages China has constructed over the past decades throughout its inland territories, resettlement can be understood as a central tool in mapping, knowing, and controlling the (rural) periphery, and remaking the boundaries between rural and urban, and Han majority and ethnic minority space. The selection of sites
that bring labour closer to centres of industrial production and the consolidation of farmland for industrialised agriculture following resettlement might also be seen as part of a broader project to “optimise” the use of space (Braun, 2000). Resettlement can be understood therefore, as a governmental program that rests on territorialising ideas and practices. Future scholarship should delve into the different modalities of power (not just coercion, but seduction, negotiation, persuasion etc) reflected in these territorial practices and the ways in which these might be differently constituted in space (Allen, 2004).

IV Conclusion

In reviewing the literature on resettlement we have found it to be an understandably quite polarised body of work. On the one hand there are mainstream, state planning approaches that have sought to improve the process of resettlement by tracing its implementation, documenting and modelling its impacts, and reforming policy. Our intention is not to diminish this work, which we ourselves have at times contributed to, but to draw attention to its blind spots, namely, why and how the practice of resettlement has expanded and resettlement has gained legitimacy as a development project in its own right. On the other hand is a disparate collection of studies that critique resettlement largely through political-economic and/or Foucauldian lenses. The purpose of this article has been to synthesise and amplify the contributions of this work in order to provide a way forward for a critical geography of resettlement.

There is a sense of urgency to this intellectual project. The detrimental impacts of resettlement have been documented time and time again. The efforts of those in the academy, in governments, in development banks, and in consultancy firms to better design and implement resettlement so that these impacts are not endlessly reproduced have been productive – at least most resettlements now include impact assessment, participatory
mechanisms, and ongoing monitoring. But these efforts have important unintended effects. They reduce a profoundly political phenomenon to teleological models and the logic of state planning. Further, attempts to render resettlement predictable and a belief (particularly in China) that it can be perfected have engendered a resettlement industry that no longer positions resettlement as a last resort. The proliferation of training in best practice, the rise of resettlement “science”, and hasty and possibly maladaptive proposals to resettle communities affected by climate change impacts are all providing momentum to an apparatus that facilitates land dispossession, impoverishment, and socio-cultural marginalisation. Chinese capital is breathing new life into the kinds of mega infrastructure projects that drive large-scale resettlement and that traditional donors had begun to step away from. The just-announced Mambilla dam project in Nigeria, for instance, to be built by a Chinese consortium and funded by China’s Export-Import Bank, will require the resettlement of 100,000 people (Monks, 2017). We suggest that best-practice resettlement might be one of the ways in which China is remaking the global Development landscape.

Drawing on existing critical scholarship we understand resettlement to be a governmental program with multiple logics, one that seeks to render people and space more governable. Resettlement projects cannot be perfected because, much like Ferguson’s (1994) anti-politics machine, resettlement is an exercise of power that relies on a broad apparatus, reproduces power relations, and has multiple intended and unintended effects. A critical geography that further examines resettlement’s multiple logics, its networks of agents and expertise, and its subject-making and spatial practices is needed to both document and contest the expansion of this industry. An understanding of why resettlement happens, and how it happens is central to this undertaking and emerges at the messy intersections of different theoretical traditions.

Notes
Another commonly used term is ‘development-induced displacement and resettlement’ (DIDR), but throughout this article we use the broader term ‘resettlement’ to highlight that it is not only large development projects that induce this particular kind of mobility, and that ‘displacement’ is an assumed precursor to resettlement. Displacement is always a feature of resettlement even if resettlement does not always follow displacement.

OP 4.30 (1990), OP 4.12 (2001) and most recently the Social and Environmental Framework (Standard 5).

The scope of this review is limited to English-language studies of planned, state-driven resettlements (hydroelectric, environmental, poverty-related etc): we do not consider reactive resettlements (conflict- or disaster-induced); nor do we consider other forms of displacement such as temporary internal displacement or the resettlement of refugees.

The IFC’s performance standards and the Equator Principles might also be considered here as extending the reach of the World Bank’s policies to the private sector.
References


First, I find this sentence on page 1 quite strange:

“What now distinguishes resettlement from other forms of forced mobility, therefore, is that it increasingly takes place explicitly for the benefit of affected people. In other words, resettlement can no longer be understood as an unfortunate by-product of development projects, it is a development project.”

As is, this sentence makes it sound as though the authors adopt a strong pro-resettlement stance in this manuscript, as they see it to the benefit of affected people. I do not think the statement is supported by evidence and it also contradicts claims made later in the manuscript, such as “Resettlement is rarely, if ever, a development opportunity” (page 9). I wonder of the authors mean to say is that resettlement is not just/only an unfortunate by-product of development projects, but also a development project in its own right?

We have amended these sentences on Page 2 to clarify our meaning, which is as the reviewer states, about resettlement as a development project in its own right.

Second, I think the authors have done a better job at justifying why a critical geography of resettlement is needed, as well as why they elect to focus on China, in this version of the manuscript. However, I am left wondering what “the growing prominence of China as a source of resettlement knowledge and expertise” (page 2) means for the resettlement industry and resettlement practices as a whole? Does the changing geography of resettlement and of resettlement expertise matter for how resettlement is practiced globally?

This is an open question that future research will need to address. While the consolidation of resettlement expertise within China is clear, as we say on page 20, the extent to which these norms and practices are being made mobile is yet to be documented. As the Belt and Road Initiative and other south-south cooperation mechanisms progress, this seems a critical question.

Finally, I really like the authors’ statement (borrowed from Li) about tolerating the tensions created by using diverse critical theoretical traditions to guide a renewed research agenda on resettlement (page 8). Yet, in reality, the research agenda that is being proposed is shaped by certain critical theoretical traditions but not others. For example, a noticeable absence of feminist or postcolonial perspectives in existing literature on resettlement. as well as the research agenda being proposed, is evident. The authors might consider speculating on why this is the case – particularly giving that certain aspects of resettlement (such as the remaking of ‘home’ or dealing with the fallout when social safety nets or food sources are removed) are certainly gendered and would benefit from feminist analysis.

This is a really important point, and something we will continue to reflect on. The paper’s intention is to move resettlement theory and practice in a more critical direction and ultimately to advocate for greater engagement by geographers. Because we have built on the strands of exiting literature, there is a focus on certain theoretical traditions, but we certainly do not want to foreclose on feminist and postcolonial perspectives. Any or all of the multiple logics of resettlement, agents and expertise, and subject-making and spatial practices could be further pursued from these perspectives – and in some cases, it is essential that they are.
To better reflect our position, we have added the following sentences to Page 15:

“And while the theoretical traditions that have most shaped the resettlement literature are centred, we certainly do not wish to preclude other perspectives. Indeed, it is hoped that the three sites—the multiple logics of resettlement, agents and expertise, and subject-making and spatial practices—open up space for greater dialogue with feminist political ecology, feminist economic geography, mobilities, and postcolonial perspectives in particular.”

REVIEWER 3

General comments

The first section of the paper requires some tightening up of the logical development of the arguments and coherent paragraph structure. I am also somewhat concerned with the very broad brush in which some of the literature is summarised. Assertions tend to be made in different places that require some textual evidence to convince the reader. And the authors need to be careful of constructing straw-person arguments (painting the arguments of a scholar in a narrow light in order to construct an alternative position which you then contribute to). I think Cernea’s work in particular is more nuanced than is portrayed in the paper. Although he worked for the World Bank, he was also an early and influential pioneer in this field who participated in debates with academics and conferences on resettlement.

We have rewritten the introduction to ensure that our logic and intention is absolutely clear.

In terms of our characterisation of the literature we have amended this sentence on page 3 to clarify our intent: “While we broadly categorise this scholarship into either (Marxist) political-economic or Foucauldian approaches based on the main focus of the particular studies in question, we recognise that these are not mutually exclusive categories, and further, that many studies are also informed by political ecology.”

In this revised version we have taken particular care with our characterisations of the literature, particularly in the section on mainstream literature. We have also focussed the argument on the normalisation of resettlement as a development project in its own right, which the different strands of literature make very different contributions to. On Cernea, our focus is on the IRR model, what it does and does not do; not on Cernea’s entire oeuvre. IRR seeks to manage the detrimental impacts of resettlement and has been dominant in the mainstream literature. See also response below re explaining power, discourse, and uneven impacts.
That said, we would also argue that the comment about straw people is a little unwarranted. This co-authored manuscript draws on a decade of engagement with the resettlement literature, with specific resettlement projects, experience working as resettlement consultants, engagement with international resettlement networks, and participation in numerous industry and academic conferences. Our reading of the literature is based on this embedded, long-term perspective.

The paper tends to get stronger through the second half. I wonder if the identified "instrumental" tradition could simply be called the "state planning" approach? A state planning approach could also be aligned with/connect to the "Corporate Social Responsibility" approach to governing resettlement. Not much is actually said about CSR but in many countries the CSR standards carry an equal or stronger weight than national legislation. Probably something should also be said about global governance standards such as the Equator Principles and IFC Performance Standards. This also fits with "good governance" standards adopted by major development banks and so forth. There is a significant amount of scholarship that examines development-induced displacement and resettlement according to these standards and mechanisms. The authors may wish to pay more attention to the geography-related literature on mining-induced resettlement as well. See for example the work out of the University of Queensland Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, e.g. Owen et al. "Livelihoods, Food Security and Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement".

We agree that ‘instrumentalist’ is not the right word and misrepresents our reading of the literature. As such, we have referred to mainstream literature or state planning approaches. Whether the main actor in a resettlement project is private or state though, the models and approaches for understanding resettlement and its impacts remain the same (and remain distinct from the critical literature).

Thank you for referring us to the latest work by Owen et al. 2018. We have included this reference in our discussion of livelihood approaches which is the focus of this report (see page 7).

---

### Comments on manuscript

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you need to delineate between migration and displacement this early in the paper?</td>
<td>Yes, in defining ‘what is resettlement’, this is an important distinction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m not sure it makes sense to start listing countries in which large-scale resettlement has taken place. It is a near-universal phenomenon</td>
<td>This paragraph has been amended - see pages 1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why less and less? A numerical figure for people affected by resettlement policies is not supposed to provide an insight into the nature or effects of that resettlement. It’s just a number. I think you need to provide a brief insight into</td>
<td>This paragraph has been amended for clarification – see page 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line</td>
<td>Text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>your argument in this sentence, even though it will be expanded further in the main section. Otherwise, the reader really doesn’t know why you think the 20 million figure, the World Bank definition, or the ‘spectre’ of dam displacement provides little insight in the nature of contemporary resettlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>This paragraph has been amended – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Resettlement still occurs in relation to all sorts of objectives and sectors. There is still a lot of resettlement for dam projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>This paragraph has been amended – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Which one? [just one province]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Shaanxi – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>You have not defined this term [forced mobility]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>This paragraph has been amended – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>This is not new, resettlement was always ostensible for the ‘benefit’ of the targeted population. Which government claims that their resettlement policies are specifically aimed at harming their citizens?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>These sentences have been amended as per Reviewer 1’s comments (see page 2-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I’m not sure of your meaning here. You are arguing that resettlement is now completely its own driver, and is not in response to some other issue or logic? If so, I would disagree. Resettlement is always forwarded in relation to another “driver”. No government simply goes around randomly resettling people without some sort of justification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>This paragraph has been amended to clarify our meaning – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>There has always been a dearth of precise numbers on resettlement, which is also partly due to its scope and how to define it. If resettlement is being normalised, who is doing the normalisation and why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>This paragraph has been changed – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>In response to what?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>This sentence has been changed – see page 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>You should develop this idea in relation to the scholarly literature on ‘governable spaces’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>We do develop this idea later in the paper; here it is simply a marker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Logical flow issue between paragraphs here</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>The introduction has been significantly rewritten.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Cite “disastrous” – did the World Bank use that term?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>This is not the World Bank’s term. See new reference to Chixoy Dam resettlements on page 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>True, but logically that just might be because resettlement could not be ‘avoided’. Adjust the logical structure of this sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>The introduction has been significantly rewritten.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Are you suggesting that China engages heavily in resettlement without justification, and resettlement that could have been avoided? Clarify</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>This sentence has been modified for clarity – see page 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>You need to first logically develop this idea first, before using it as part of your argument. Right now, this sentence also does not fit with your paragraph topic sentence, which started with the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>These introductory paragraphs have been significantly rewritten.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>I think you need to provide evidence that this principle has been effectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>This sentence has been modified for clarity – see page 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pihg
| Lost, not just assert it | We have rewritten these sentences so that they explain why this is a problem/limitation (see page 3): “We argue that a mainstream lens has extensively documented the impacts of resettlement and led to better policies and practice, but is less able to explain the normalisation of resettlement as a development project in its own right. Critical scholarship, on the other hand, which delves into questions of resettlement’s temporal and spatial complexity, its subjectivities, and the actors, interests or technologies of government that coalesce around resettlement projects, provides a foundation for a critical geography of resettlement that can document and challenge this normalisation”.

It can be more or less assumed that an instrumentalist, managerialist approach would not engage with Foucauldian conceptions such as “technologies of government”. More important is to explain why that is a problem or limitation. |
| But political ecology itself has its Marxist and Foucauldian traditions, so you should still be able to cluster much of the critical literature into these two broad streams. |
| But how would that differ from a critical anthropology of resettlement or a critical sociology of resettlement? |
| Needs to be upfronted earlier? [production of knowledge and expertise] |
| It strikes me that this could also be called the “state planning” model? Also what about CSR and global governance mechanisms such as Equator Principles and IFC Performance Standards? There is a lot of scholarly analysis on this angle. |
| Who uses that term [solving]? Provide citation and page # |
| [it is assumed] by who? It would be good to cite the specific phrasing that demonstrates that Guggenheim assumed that “adequate research, policy, planning and resources would help resettled communities to reconstruct and develop” |
| I do not think that is an accurate portrayal of Cernea’s perspective. He deals very closely with issues of power, discourse and uneven impacts. If you want to assert this point you will need to show where and how Cernea avoids issues of |

http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pihg
power, discourse and uneven impacts.

One might also call some people working in this area “pragmatists”? i.e. people working to improve outcomes while still realising that development-induced displacement is in most cases harmful and damaging?

We agree that ‘instrumentalist’ is not the right word and misrepresents our reading of the literature. Throughout this section we have used the terms mainstream or state planning approaches, and have also tried to emphasise that such approaches have achieved certain things, but are limited in their capacity to explain resettlement’s expansion and normalisation.

Why in quotes [“problems”] if you are using this term in an ironic fashion, be explicit about your reasoning

This sentence has been amended to “the expanding set of justifications for resettlement” (page 5)

This variety of drivers does not seem unique to China. Can you say anything more substantive about how DID is conceived and handled in China?

We have expanded on this discussion of China’s resettlement practice (see page 5).

You are missing a lot from here, including the work of Baird and Shoemaker for example in Laos.

See new citation on page 4 – but these paragraphs are a broad delineation of the literature.

Also this section is entitled “instrumental approaches”. Do you consider all these approaches as in the instrumentalist camp? These papers [Southeast Asia] do not adopt an instrumentalist approach.

We have reorganised these paragraphs so that they better reflect our assessment of the literature – first considering its overall characteristics, and then delving into mainstream approaches (see page 4-7)

This paragraph lacks a topic sentence that would tie it together into a coherent idea. Also, it’s not very useful just to list studies. There are thousands of studies so you need to focus on key analytical traditions or streams, and explain who were the key scholars and why they were influential.

These paragraphs have been rewritten for logical flow of argument.

You will need to support this very broad claim in some way i.e. that the IRR model does not engage with “power”. I note that you do not cite Cernea 2003 “For a new economics of resettlement”

We have clarified our meaning here – that IRR is not a framework for understanding the workings of power in resettlement projects.

How do these models differ from the IRR approach?

These models account for “the socio-cultural responses of resettled people to specific phases of the relocation process” (see page 7)

Are you suggesting that SL approach is also instrumentalist?

SLA is described as a mainstream approach

I disagree that all scholar who use a sustainable livelihoods approach seek to create a perfect resettlement policy

This term has been removed

So anyone who argues for inclusion and dialogue is being instrumentalist?

The language in this section has been modified

The problem with your very wide brush stroke is that many scholars who you lump in with the instrumentalist camp would no doubt agree that it is also
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>important to de-normalise resettlement. I think more nuance and care</td>
<td>Agreed, we have added ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to more accurately reflect people’s ideas and arguments needs to be</td>
<td>The language in this paragraph has been modified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>be taken in the above section. You also need to provide more textual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>evidence for your line of argument.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>What about ethnicity and identity? A big factor displacement in many</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>contexts?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I’m not sure it is the strongest analytical move to develop a focus</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on particular countries here. It makes more sense to understand how</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>scholars using political economy have conceptualised DID in different</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ways...as opposed to what has happened in say China or India. At</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>least I would not start the discussion using a methodological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nationalism.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I don’t think Barney 2009 develops a linear perspective. The paper</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>is called “Laos and the making of a relational resource frontier”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>which suggests a dialectical, relationship, hybrid perspective not a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>linear one</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>One can note that fieldwork for this paper is from a remote island</td>
<td>The reference to Li’s study has been removed from this section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Indonesia, outside of the main Asian manufacturing production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>networks. Also, were Li’s informants resettled? Remember the focus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for your paper is on resettlement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>If it is accumulation without dispossession how does that fit into</td>
<td>This is an important point – we have moved the Chuang reference into</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>this paper’s focus on geographies of resettlement?</td>
<td>the previous paragraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>They [Green &amp; Baird] also introduce the idea of de-commodification</td>
<td>This sentence has been modified (see page 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>I think the literature is more nuanced than that. In Laos, scholars</td>
<td>This is a good point. We have modified the final sentences in this</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>have focused on ethnic relations and upland-lowland relations, and</td>
<td>paragraph (see page 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>biases against (minority) upland agricultural practices as a key</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>driver of resettlement. This does not always map onto a neat political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>economic logic. See Goudineau 2004, Baird and Shoemaker 2007…</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hardy “Red Hills” for Vietnam.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Very broad assertion that does not apply to many of the papers cited</td>
<td>The word ‘limitation’ has led to some misunderstanding here – we</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in this section [production fo space/uneven development]</td>
<td>offer two reflections using more nuanced language (see page 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interesting that you place Gellert and Lynch in the Foucauldian box,</td>
<td>As we have noted in the introduction, individual papers are broadly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>since Gellert works mostly in political economy and world systems</td>
<td>categorised based on their main thrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>theory.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>How do authoritarian practices and institutions in China fit with</td>
<td>It is not within the scope of this paper to properly explain this –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>their conception of green governmentality?</td>
<td>there is an extensive literature on Chinese governmentalities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>[Katus and others] Note they do not apply an explicitly Foucauldian</td>
<td>This has been noted on page 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approach</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>I think to some extent you have created this polarisation?</td>
<td>See modified sentences on page 14: “The former is concerned with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>That’s a straw argument [perfecting resettlement]</td>
<td>what happens in the resettlement process (losses, compensation, and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 41 of 43</td>
<td>Progress in Human Geography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I’m not convinced. Political economy also engages in how questions and Foucauldian analysis also engages in why questions</th>
<th>reconstruction of livelihoods) and on changes to policy and practice that will make resettlement projects better. The latter concentrates on the why (logics) and how (techniques) of resettlement, and in doing so, begins to make sense of the normalisation of resettlement”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This sentence now reads “if we read these two strands as complementary, in general (recognising that there is great complexity in this empirical and theoretical work)...the political economy work describes the logic(s) of resettlement (the why of resettlement), while the Foucauldian work delves into discourse, subject-making, practices, and the production of space (the how of resettlement).” (see page 14)</td>
<td>Of course there are subtleties in each study, but a review article must necessarily categorise and summarise, and overall, this remains our reading of the literature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In what way? [more explicitly geographical]</td>
<td>In the ways outlined throughout the second section of the paper - in the sites we identify and the debates we link to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is also the case throughout South and Southeast Asia... how does resettlement integrate with authoritarian state making and state power in China?</td>
<td>This has been changed to “in often marginal places”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have included the following sentence on page 16: “That resettlement often takes place within authoritarian states suggests that more attention needs to be paid to how projects can be inflected with socialist (or other) mentalities such as mass campaigns, model villages, and Party supervision.”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is a sweeping generalisation, there is a huge literature which politicises resettlement</td>
<td>This paragraph on page 16 now reads: “What a focus on the multiple logics of resettlement would do is open up analysis of the many things that resettlement as a governmental program seeks to achieve, and of the broader social, political, and economic processes that shape these objectives. By countering mainstream approaches that are bounded by a project, such analyses would help make sense of the expansion and normalisation of resettlement and bring resettlement studies into productive dialogue with key debates in geography.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| So do you think any research has accomplished this? [a window into questions | This sentence now reads: “Building on existing work, a critical
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>of capital, uneven development, power, and the state in particular places]</th>
<th>geography of resettlement as a governmental program will amplify questions of capital, uneven development, power, and the state in particular places.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What about authoritarian logics and the role of the CCP? Seems rather important for the Chinese case?</td>
<td>Yes, we have mentioned this on page 16 and again on page 17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This invokes actor-network approaches or post-humanist approaches, but you have not introduced this theme yet.</td>
<td>This is in line with our call to bring resettlement studies into closer dialogue with key debates in geography and earlier statement about not precluding other theoretical traditions. We have not identified a more-than-human approach in the existing literature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is a weak criticism. Levien was not studying resettlement...</td>
<td>Sentence on page 17 modified to “Building on Levien (2017), these networks are regimes of dispossession, but much else besides...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mapped in what sense</td>
<td>This sentence now reads: “The existing literature has not adequately described these agents, their reach, or the interconnections and flows of finance between them” (see page 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You will need to explain what mapping the “water machine” entails</td>
<td>This sentence on page 18 now reads: “Much like Webber and Han (2017) have done recently for China’s “Water Machine”, a description of these networks that money, resources, people, and ideas would include their composition, their emergence, their maintenance, their links to other networks, and their effects.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I’m not sure what this means [these networks of agents will determine how capital circulates through resettlement projects]</td>
<td>This sentence has been removed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And what sort of insights does Keele provide?</td>
<td>This sentence on page 18 now reads: “Emerging geographical work on how experts in other fields such as climate change adaptation cultivate agendas, authority, projects, and new markets (Keele (2017) can provide further theoretical and methodological guidance.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It seems to me that in China this issue is inseparable from authoritarian surveillance and political control through the Party apparatus. Yet you do not explore these dimensions.</td>
<td>This section on page 19 now reads: “But we might also argue that quite different questions need to be asked about how illiberal, non-Western norms and practices travel. China does resettlement in particular ways, shaped by Party supervision, collective ownership of farmland, campaign-style programs, a constricted civil society, and powerful discourses perpetuated by state-owned media. The extent to which these norms and practices are made mobile by Chinese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
networks (particularly as China rolls out its infrastructure-heavy Belt and Road Initiative) is yet to be documented.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Why are they called that? [nail households]</th>
<th>The Chinese term reflects stubborn nails that are difficult to remove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You need to introduce this term and concept [bodies]</td>
<td>‘Bodies’ has been changed to ‘people’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In much of SE Asia debt dynamics are also critical</td>
<td>Yes - we have added a reference to indebtedness, also important in the Chinese context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do they argue? Chuang 2015</td>
<td>This sentence on page 21, which is a comment on methodology, now reads: “We consider the kind of ethnographic work done by Chuang (2015) with dispossessed farmers and their new bosses in the construction industry to be critical to detailing the temporal changes to labour, consumption, and reproduction that occur through resettlement”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start what? [particularly productive site from which to start]</td>
<td>This sentence on page 21 now reads: “Training programs offered by local governments with the aim of preparing resettled farmers for new urban jobs would be a particularly productive site for delving into such questions of labour and subjectivity.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suggest to tighten up phrasing [resettlement starts to look like..]</td>
<td>This now reads “resettlement can be understood as”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes but you could provide a more of a generous reading in my view [our intention is not to dismiss this work...]</td>
<td>We have addressed this concern in earlier sections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or the logic of state planning? [teleological models and plans]</td>
<td>Sentence changed (page 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You have staked your claim to this mast. But does that mean that planning approaches and political economy approaches are not also potentially useful? Do we all need to become Foucauldians?</td>
<td>The critical geography of resettlement we propose is shaped by the achievements and limitations of all three. Within the framework of a ‘governmental program’, amongst other things, we seek to catalyse new research on flows of capital, labour practices, and uneven development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i.e. it also reproduces power relations? [has multiple intended and unintended effects]</td>
<td>Sentence changed (page 24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Author/s: Rogers, S; Wilmsen, B

Title: Towards a critical geography of resettlement

Date: 2019

Citation: Rogers, S; Wilmsen, B, Towards a critical geography of resettlement, Progress in Human Geography, 2019

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/222006

File Description: Submitted version