

# 1 **Is too much personal dread stifling alternative pathways to** 2 **improving urban water security?**

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## 8 **Abstract**

9 Despite an ongoing dire prognosis of the state of water resources, water practitioners maintain their  
10 traditional approaches to water planning. Alternative water projects to those that are considered  
11 ‘business-as-usual’ are not contemplated despite the threats posed by increasing urbanisation and  
12 climate change. Previous studies in psychological perceptions of risk in other fields have found that  
13 the personal feelings of risk practitioners, particularly feelings of dread, have had a significant impact  
14 on risk perceptions, an element known to be affecting decision-making of an individual. Could a  
15 similar trend exist in the water sector? We consider the decision-making process of 77 water  
16 practitioners in Melbourne Australia, to determine their personal biases and attitudes towards these  
17 alternative water pathways. In particular, this study assesses the impact of cognitive bias on reported  
18 risk scores in the water sector. Utilising pre-validated risk psychology survey methodology (Slovic et  
19 al, 1985), psychometric testing was conducted to determine the influences that guide their personal  
20 risk perceptions, and in turn, their decision-making processes. It was concluded that ‘Dread’ plays a  
21 key role in the variation of risk scores between the participants that were evaluated. Furthermore,  
22 variables such as ‘Fear of the Unknown’ and ‘Dread related to perceived fatal risk’ were also found  
23 to be statistically significant factors in the link between risk scores and cognitive bias. These findings  
24 are critical in water planning, as a feeling of dread may be driving up risk scores, thus reducing the  
25 chances of establishing alternative water projects.

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27

28 **1. Introduction**

29 Cities are increasingly dealing with the effects of anthropogenic climate change and rising  
30 urbanisation; the former reduces the supply of water resources, the latter results in an increase in  
31 water demand in urban areas. In Australia, despite a distinct divide between rural and urban water  
32 systems, environmental water use, farming and city demands all vie for a share of the declining water  
33 resource pool. Looking globally, with water resources constrained, and demand peaking, calls are  
34 being made to find and evaluate alternative options to solve the problem of water security (Romano  
35 and Akhmouch, 2019). As new or unfamiliar projects and innovations in the water sector are not  
36 being established some concerns have been raised regarding the way water resources are being  
37 managed.

38 In this paper, we consider the way in which decisions are being evaluated in a water-strained  
39 environment, focusing on the role that personal risk perceptions of decision-makers play in the  
40 allocation of public funds. Risk aversion has previously been mentioned in the context of water  
41 planning and yet has not been explored via psychometric testing detail (West et al., 2017, Gober et al.,  
42 2013, Dobbie and Brown, 2014). Within this research, we seek to address this gap, and in doing so,  
43 provide an insight into the psychological theory of risk and how the underlying personal biases of  
44 those who evaluate water sector projects seep into public-sector decision-making.

45 Those who assess the risks of water infrastructure from four different authorities in Melbourne,  
46 Australia, were selected as a case study for this research. Water security in Melbourne has remained  
47 of high public interest, due to the long periods of drought that have had an impact upon the water  
48 management of the region, a discussion that has been at the forefront again in mid-2019 (Davis and  
49 Doyle, 2019, Barbour, 2019). Stream flows in Victoria, Australia are projected to decrease between  
50 by 24 and 87%, with the worst-case scenario reporting stream flows to be 78% worse than the  
51 Millennium Drought, which occurred in South Eastern Australia between 1997 and 2009 (Fiddes and  
52 Timbal, 2017). A further pressing issue in Melbourne is the increase in urbanization, a phenomenon  
53 that has ultimately resulted in the most striking impact upon water shortages increasing the strain on

54 infrastructure (Short et al., 2010). And this is not an issue that will subside in the near future.  
55 Urbanisation is expected to intensify, with Melbourne projected to increase from 77% of Victoria's  
56 population to 79% by 2027 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018), and become the largest city in  
57 Australia. This trend of increasing population is not unusual for water strained cities globally  
58 (Domene and Saurí, 2006, Mustafa et al., 2016). In 1900, only ten percent of the world's people lived  
59 in cities, by 2000, this was over 50 percent (Luke, 2006). It is predicted that by 2050, 67 percent of  
60 the projected ten billion global population will be living in cities (Luke, 2006). This will place a large  
61 strain on public infrastructure and in particular, on water resources. As water issues become ever-  
62 more concerning, the need for new approaches to dealing with supply and demand issues will  
63 increase. Innovative projects exist, such as stormwater harvesting schemes, sponge cities, and  
64 decentralised water recycling plants, all promoted heavily by private industry. However, the take-up  
65 of these alternative approaches is relatively low within the water utilities themselves, which some  
66 authors posit could be due to risk aversion (West et al., 2016, Gober et al., 2013). This begs the  
67 question of why risk aversion is present.

68 In our previous paper, (Kosovac et al., 2019) we argued that in providing quantified justification for  
69 options through formal 'objective' assessments of risk assessments, water practitioners could not be  
70 devoid of subjective bias. In this paper an attempt is made to understand this dynamic further. We ask  
71 whether the psychological affiliations of a risk assessor could affect these scores. Furthermore, could  
72 the underlying personal psychological biases behind environmental decision-making in water  
73 planning determine the scores assessors provided? To evaluate these questions psychometric  
74 paradigm testing was conducted on 77 risk assessors drawn from the four water authorities that  
75 govern the supply of water in Melbourne Australia. A Principal Component Analysis was undertaken  
76 on these results to reduce the factors when regressing against the risk scores provided through original  
77 risk assessments.

## 78 **2. Risk, risk perceptions and the psychology of risk**

## 79 **2.1 Why Risk?**

80 Public infrastructure, including water and sewage services, is essential to the efficient functioning of  
81 urban areas. This infrastructure provides the resources necessary to support urban economies,  
82 environments and societies. Decisions surrounding their design and maintenance involve the formal  
83 assessment of risk by experts<sup>1</sup>. Risk assessments form a required and important part of decision-  
84 making in the public sector, playing a key role in business processes for the past 50 years with little to  
85 no overhauling of practices during this period (Council of Standards Australia, 2009, International  
86 Organization for Standardization, 2009). Furthermore, risk assessments are trusted and seen as a  
87 source of truth by practitioners making decisions using public funds. When discussing risk, especially  
88 in a business setting, it is not unusual that it is seen as an objective and measurable value (Kosovac et  
89 al., 2019), a theme on which existing risk processes and standards have been predicated. Risk is often  
90 seen as the combination of the likelihood and corresponding consequence of a particular hazard, and  
91 in its simplicity ignores much of the broad study in risk that also considers cultural and psychological  
92 elements (Kosovac et al., 2017, Kosovac et al., 2019). Many analysts have turned a critical eye to risk  
93 assessments in the literature, but as yet have not considered the water sector in depth. This is  
94 surprising, especially since water is a politically contentious global issue.

## 95 **2.2 The Psychology of Risk Perceptions**

96 Slovic (1993), a key proponent of the psychological risk approach, recognised that ‘danger is real, but  
97 risk is socially constructed’ (Slovic, 1993). The Psychological theory of risk, also called Cognitive  
98 Bias theory, takes a micro-level approach to understanding risk through focusing on the individual  
99 decision-maker and how they form their judgments, a theory heavily based on their underlying beliefs  
100 and experiences. Risk perception is considered to be closely tied to an individual’s personal

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<sup>1</sup> The word ‘expert’ is used in this paper to refer to a person with specialised knowledge in a particular area, in particular those who have mastered certain skills they utilise in their careers. It is used interchangeably with ‘professional’.

101 perspective through linking risk choices to their own values and psychology (Fischhoff et al., 1978).  
102 These experiences create a personal prism through which the individual assesses risks, ultimately  
103 forming their perceptions (Slovic et al., 1985, Slovic, 1993). Through these personal perceptions, the  
104 focus is predominantly on decision-making biases with a strong emphasis on the intuitive processing  
105 of uncertainty. In this way, the Psychological theory promotes the importance of personal and  
106 contextual variables in the individual assignment of risk to certain factors over others.

107 The Psychological theory of risk takes into account the role of emotions in decision making, an area  
108 that has only recently been seriously considered by sociologists analysing risk, and largely ignored by  
109 other areas of the field (Zinn, 2008). The impact of past emotional experiences is used to form  
110 judgments based on anticipated emotion, and has been shown to be important in making reasonable  
111 and sound decisions (Baumeister et al., 2007), an idea that is not congruent with the sentiment felt by  
112 rationalists. If a strong negative emotional connection to a risk exists, it can affect an individual's  
113 capacity to identify the probabilities of the scenarios, focusing instead on the outcomes that evoke a  
114 sense of dread (the affect heuristic). An emotional feeling of dread is an important factor in propelling  
115 an individual to act on a risk, risks that are often being associated with outcomes that affect one  
116 personally, have a detrimental effect on future generations or present a catastrophic widespread threat  
117 to a large number of people (Baumeister et al., 2007, Gigerenzer, 2004, Slovic et al., 1985). Like most  
118 theories, the psychological paradigm is not without its critics. Lupton (2013) argues that there are still  
119 inconsistent epistemological underpinnings to the psychological concept of risk, with some scholars  
120 viewing risk as 'real' and 'actual', while others contend that human cannot possibly see the 'real' risk,  
121 but only their 'perception' of it. This is blurred even further by the consistent notion of studies  
122 comparing expert views (seen as 'accurate') to that of laypeople. Douglas (2010) also asserts that the  
123 psychometric paradigm ignores many elements of meaning and behaviours in social systems. Despite  
124 these shortcomings and criticisms, the psychometric paradigm is still arguably the most influential  
125 model in risk analysis, and as such is utilised further in this study (Siegrist et al., 2005).

### 126 **2.3 Risk Perception in Democracy: Experts vs laypeople**

127 The importance of understanding public perception of risk associated with urban infrastructure  
128 projects has gained prominence over the past three decades. This is, in part, due to public and political  
129 opposition to project proposals, which ultimately led to the abandonment of plans in some cases. A  
130 good example of this was the opposition to the proposed potable recycled water systems in  
131 Toowoomba, Australia (Hurlimann and Dolnicar, 2010) and San Diego, USA in the 1990s (Mills et  
132 al., 2004). A more recent example is the case of the chlorination of water in the Cook Islands  
133 (Aualiitia, 2019).

134 Extensive research has been undertaken on the differences in risk perceptions between laypeople and  
135 experts (Shrader-Frechette, 1991), a field of study which expanded in the 1980s and continues to  
136 provide insights into understanding risk perceptions, a particularly pertinent consideration in an  
137 environment in which participatory democracy is encouraged and the gap between experts and  
138 laypeople is arguably wider than ever (Nichols, 2017). When comparing public risk perceptions to  
139 that of experts, Slovic et al (1983) showed that laypeople surveyed generally ranked nuclear energy  
140 high in risk because of the sense of dread associated with the effects of a negative radioactive fallout.  
141 In comparison, laypeople ranked the risk of driving a car very low, despite the statistical chance of  
142 being involved in a car accident being far higher than being caught up in a nuclear one (Slovic et al.,  
143 1985). Experts conversely ranked driving a car as significantly higher risk than that surrounding  
144 nuclear power, which the authors suggest is based on an objective understanding of the safety of  
145 nuclear energy. Thus, they conclude that the dread or familiarity factor (among others) for experts is  
146 dissimilar to that of the layperson.

147 A reflection of this is shown in a study by Schlosberg et al (2017) in Melbourne, Australia, drawing a  
148 clear distinction between climate change discourses undertaken by government authorities and the  
149 public. In considering climate change adaptation, local government bodies used words like 'risk',  
150 'water', 'control', 'event' and 'management'. In contrast, the authors found that community groups  
151 used language that focused more on the impacts of basic needs, such as 'food', 'community',  
152 'people', 'energy', 'water' and 'local' (Schlosberg et al., 2017). Guy et al. (2014) instead questions  
153 whether a distinction between the knowledge-based of two groups causes a problem; that the experts

154 rely on their extensive understanding of the subject matter to form their risk perceptions, whereas  
155 laypeople must rely on their limited knowledge and the risk perceptions of those they trust (Siegrist  
156 and Cvetkovich, 2000), the result of which are alternative risk perceptions.

157 This difference in risk perceptions evident between laypeople and experts becomes a challenge when  
158 the questions of public policy and public spending is discussed. Prior to the 1960s, expert assessments  
159 were generally accepted by the public, with far less scrutiny than they are today (Nichols, 2017). As  
160 such, public consultations and public opinion polling did not carry the relevance it currently does, and  
161 consequently, forms an integral part of project planning. Schon (1995) argues that the loss of faith in  
162 professional judgement occurred between 1963 and 1981, due in part to the unintended side effects of  
163 new technologies and the conflicting recommendations within professional fields itself. The  
164 consistent debunking of professional advice and theories proved to be a large factor in the increasing  
165 distrust of professional experts (Schon, 1995) (Nichols, 2017) which ultimately provided an  
166 unexpected side effect: the increase in public distrust has been transposed to now affect the public  
167 acceptance of risk assessments conducted by these experts (Slovic, 1993, Siegrist et al., 2000,  
168 Siegrist, 2019). Nevertheless, with the authority afforded them, experts make decisions on behalf of  
169 many. Therefore, these decisions, especially in a participatory democracy, should be (and often are)  
170 understood and scrutinised.

### 171        **3.            Research Design**

172 In seeking to understand the underlying decision-making of water practitioners, we undertook a risk  
173 psychometric survey on this cohort, in order to compare against risk assessment scores they used to  
174 justify spending across differing water projects. Regression techniques can be used to evaluate the  
175 association between an individual's risk score and a range of the psychological factors that are posited  
176 to affect it.

177 These cognitive biases were tested through a set of questions addressed to 77 participants, drawn from  
178 the four water authorities in Melbourne, Australia. The majority (38%) of the participants were aged  
179 between 36 and 45 years, with 27% between 26 to 35 years, and 23% between 46 and 55 years of age.  
180 The majority of respondents had identified as male (74%) which is broadly representative of the

181 highly-male dominated field. Of the respondents, 42% identified that they were either at team  
182 manager level or divisional manager level of authority within their organisation. Each participant was  
183 provided with descriptions of three fictional water projects:

- 184 • Using recycled water for potable water uses (Project A);
- 185 • a new radiation-based treatment approach (Project B); and
- 186 • the removal of fluoride dosing from the water treatment process (Project C).

187 Participants were asked to use their own organisational risk-matrix tool, an approach utilised widely  
188 throughout the water industry, in assigning risk scores. The risk matrix quantifies a ‘risk likelihood’  
189 and ‘risk consequence’ score for assessment both quantifications were assessed between 1 and 5  
190 (Kosovac, Davidson and Malano, 2019). The product of these two scores provides the final risk score  
191 which is reported in internal business cases, ranging from 1 to 25. This final score was used to capture  
192 and quantify risks in the proposed water projects. It should be acknowledged that limitations exist in  
193 the use of organisational risk matrices, as they may produce variance that is not controlled. The  
194 approaches between the organisations were extremely similar, but there were minor variations.

195 Participants were provided with a number of psychological affiliation questions related to each  
196 project’s perceived risks. The pre-validated survey questions were derived from a similar study by  
197 Slovic et al (1985). These questions can be interpreted to describe the attitudes participants have to  
198 risk. The questions include:

- 199 • Voluntariness of Risk – whether people who are faced with this risk, do so voluntarily;
- 200 • Immediacy of Effect – whether death occurs immediately, or whether it is delayed (for  
201 example, radiation);
- 202 • Knowledge about Risk (to those exposed) – to what extent people who are exposed to risk,  
203 know about the risk;
- 204 • Knowledge about Risk (to Scientists) – to what extent does the assessor believe that experts  
205 understand the risks;
- 206 • Control over Risk – whether those exposed to the risk can effectively avoid death or injury  
207 through choice, and personal skill;
- 208 • Newness – determines how new the assessor feels this risk is (as opposed to old and familiar);
- 209 • Chronic-Catastrophic – whether the risk kills people one at a time or all at once (assuming  
210 that death is an outcome);
- 211 • Common – Dread – assesses how much dread is associated with the risk;
- 212 • Severity of Consequence – the likelihood of a risk being fatal; and
- 213 • Unfairness – assessing how fair the risk seems to the assessor (does it affect all people fairly).  
214 (This was not assessed in the original 1985 study, and was introduced at a later date.)



215

216 Participants were prompted to highlight their responses to these questions on a 7-point Likert scale.  
217 The responses to these questions are compared against the individual's respective risk scores for the  
218 three pre-defined fictional alternative water projects.

219 The key difference in this study to others (such as Slovic (1992) and Fischhoff et al. (1978)) is the  
220 direct comparison made between the psychological risk perception determinants and the quantitative  
221 risk scores of each individual. In particular, the aim is to determine whether there is a risk attribute  
222 that is linked to higher risk scores. This could result in the one overarching risk attribute, or a  
223 combination of risk attributes, that tends to indicate higher or lower risk scores, providing an  
224 explanatory and predictive tool in the understanding of risk. Thus, the aim is to determine to what  
225 extent a particular psychological affiliation produces a higher risk score in the water industry. The  
226 scores were recorded and analysed using IBM SPSS.

227 There is a need to determine whether there is any correlation between the responses to the ten  
228 psychological attributes and the risk scores provided by each respondent for each project. Two forms  
229 of regression analysis can be undertaken: the individual risk attributes on corresponding risk scores,  
230 and a grouped variable (combination of a number of variables using a Principal Component Analysis)  
231 on risk scores. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used to determine whether a combination of  
232 variables may better describe psychological affiliations of participants than the individual attributes  
233 themselves. It applies a vector space transformation to lower the number of variables to those that are  
234 possibly correlated, thus creating a new factor variable out of individual attributes. The aim of the  
235 analysis is to find a principal component (a combination of the tested variables) that explains the  
236 highest amount of variation in risk scores

## 237 **4. Results**

### 238 **4.1 Reducing the number of variables: Principal Component Analysis**

239 As the individual attributes themselves did not provide overly promising results, it must be asked  
240 whether a *combination* of the variables could instead provide a better model fit.

241 Each principal component highlights the extent to which it explains the variation in the data, followed  
 242 by other principal components, until the majority of the data is explained. The total variance  
 243 explained by the first five factors for Principal Component 1 is shown in Table 2, for projects A, B  
 244 and C.

245

246 **Table 1 Principal Component Analysis, Total Variance Explained**

<b>Component</b>	<b>Project A</b>		<b>Project B</b>		<b>Project C</b>	
	<b>% of Variance</b>	<b>Cumulative %</b>	<b>% of Variance</b>	<b>Cumulative %</b>	<b>% of Variance</b>	<b>Cumulative %</b>
<b>1</b>	18.0	18.0	27.9	27.9	27.4	27.4
<b>2</b>	14.4	32.4	15.4	43.3	15.1	42.6
<b>3</b>	13.7	46.1	12.1	55.4	13.6	56.2
<b>4</b>	12.6	58.7	10.6	66.0	11.7	67.9
<b>5</b>	10.6	69.3	9.3	75.2	8.1	76.0

247

248


249 It should be noted that similar results from Projects B and C were obtained, approximately three-  
 250 quarters of the variation in results being explained by the first five principal components. Project A,  
 251 although a lower cumulative explanation (at 46% for the first three attributes), should still be included  
 252 in further analysis, as it does reflect a sizable proportion of the explanation. The first three attributes  
 253 are taken for each new Principal Component Analysis variable, thus explaining approximately 50% of  
 254 the variation in risk scores. Knowing this provides the opportunity to understand whether there are  
 255 meaningful results that can be gleaned from the grouping of the attributes.

256 **4.2 Principal Component Analysis 1: Dread Related to Perceived Fatal Risk**

257 Through conducting the Principal Component Analysis, the three highest acting attributes are  
258 incorporated and used for a further regression analysis with risk scores. In Figure 1 the attributes that  
259 have been combined to create the first new variable are shown. Does it provide a meaningful measure  
260 that will help to explain the variation in risk scores? Principal Component number 2 (not shown in  
261 Table 1) is not included in any further analysis as the explanation of variation falls drastically to only  
262 approximately 15% for all projects, cumulatively across the five attributes. It would also result in six  
263 new variables, two for each project, which is too many to meaningfully conduct an analysis, thus  
264 rendering the variable reducing exercise redundant.

265

266 **Figure 1 Principal Component 1 Project A ‘Dread-related to Perceived Fatal Risk’**



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269 It is vital that this analysis ensures that the Principal Component Analysis grouping of the attributes  
270 provides meaningful explanation of the data and therefore whether the attributes can be linked in  
271 some way to encompass an overarching theme can be questioned. The highest acting attributes for  
272 Project A (using recycled water for potable system) were ‘likely to be fatal’, ‘risk not controllable’  
273 and ‘high dread associated with the risk’ (refer to Figure 1). In considering how these elements can

274 meaningfully be captured by the new variable, can be described as the high sense of dread likely to  
275 result from a risk that is perceived to be fatal and uncontrollable.

276

### 277 4.3 Principle Component Analysis 2: Fear of the Unknown

278 Project B, related to the use of radiation in the treatment of water, provided a principal component  
279 variable that included the risk attributes: Risk Known by those Exposed, Risk Known by Science, and  
280 Newness of Risk. This grouping exhibits a key theme in the ‘knowledge’ based element of risk  
281 perceptions. These factors were grouped into one new variable, titled ‘Fear of the unknown’ (refer to  
282 Figure 2) as it captures the knowledge of the risk by those who are exposed to it, while also  
283 highlighting whether the risk is known to experts at all. Interestingly, the third highest acting attribute  
284 is the ‘newness’ of the risk. If the risk is unknown to both science as well as to those exposed, it  
285 makes sense that it could also be considered ‘new’ or ‘novel’.

286 **Figure 2 Principal Component 1 Project B ‘Fear of Unknown’:**

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288

289

290 In describing this attribute grouping, the knowledge-based elements are captured, as well as the  
291 unacquainted relationship between risk assessor and risk. When testing this new variable against the

292 entire risk project scores, the  $R^2$  score was 0.05, ( $P=0.00$ ). This indicates a low-level explanation of  
 293 the variation in the risk scores across the three projects, and across respondents.

294

295 **4.4 What does the Principal Component Analysis tell us?**

296 Project A describes a scenario where recycled water is provided in the potable supply. Therefore, it is  
 297 not surprising that elements such as ‘risk known to those exposed is high’, as well as perceived  
 298 ‘fairness of the risk’ and ‘risk control’ feature in this analysis. All of these factors relate to the person  
 299 who is drinking the recycled water, perhaps referring to a low knowledge of the risks personally  
 300 experienced, and the lack of choice regarding whether they are provided with recycled water in their  
 301 potable water mains. In this scenario, then, it is not surprising\* that these factors are grouped together.  
 302 Projects B and C have very similar principal attributes acting on their first principal component. The  
 303 risk is known to persons exposed, science, as is the level of control of the risk and how new or  
 304 unfamiliar the risk is to those exposed. The factors of feeling of dread toward risk and risk of fatality  
 305 also feature highly. Project B involves the use of a new radiation process in the treatment of water.  
 306 The findings, using psychometric testing on radiation treatments, are similar to those found by others  
 307 (Fischhoff et al., 1983). A linear regression analysis was performed on the two new risk variables:  
 308 “Dread Related to Perceived Fatal Risk”, and “Fear of the Unknown”, (see Table 2). The regression  
 309 was undertaken across all projects, as well as in each project separately.

310

311 **Table 2 Regression Analysis using new PCA Variables**

312

<b>New Risk Variables</b>	<b>All Projects Combined</b>	<b>Project A (Recycled Water to Potable Water)</b>	<b>Project B (Use of radiation in the treatment of potable water)</b>	<b>Project C (Removing Fluoride from potable water supply)</b>
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<b>Dread related to</b>	$R^2=0.10^*$	$R^2=0.02$	$R^2=0.24^*$	$R^2=0.01$
<b>Perceived Fatal Risk</b>				
<b>Fear of the Unknown</b>	$R^2=0.05^*$	$R^2=0.02$	$R^2=0.16^*$	$R^2=0.01$

313 Dependent variable: Risk Scores. \*Significant at P= 0.01 level

314

315 Testing Projects A and C resulted in a  $p$  value that was higher than 0.05, indicating that the null  
316 hypothesis cannot be rejected: it cannot be stated that the ‘fear of the unknown’ variable is statistically  
317 significant in predicting the variation of risk scores between respondents. However, interestingly,  
318 running a regression against project B ‘fear of the unknown’ variable and its corresponding risk score,  
319 resulted in  $R^2=0.16$ . This result could be rather telling and is not statistically insignificant. Thus, the  
320 variable could explain an element of how risk is perceived psychologically by risk assessors in the  
321 water sector. Furthermore, the dread related to the perceived fatal risk variable explained 24% of the  
322 variation in the scores for Project B, a reasonably high goodness-of-fit coefficient.

## 323 5. Discussion

### 324 5.1 Dread a factor across all projects tested

325 ‘Perceived dread due to fatal risk’ considers the effect of the risk assessor imagining a scenario within  
326 the project that results in a fatality, and therefore conjures up feelings of dread. Unsurprisingly, with  
327 this feeling also comes a heightened sense of perceived risk, and higher risk scores. However, this  
328 only had a significant effect when tested on Project B: the use of radiation in the treatment of water.  
329 Explaining 24% of the variation in the risk score, this variable explains a sizable aspect of the  
330 psychological affiliations to the risk score. It should be noted that this result needs to be interpreted  
331 this in the context of the radiation theme of the tested project, which is notably different to the intent  
332 of projects A and C. This difference has been noted by a number of studies in this area, highlighting  
333 that risk perceptions of radiation and nuclear-technology are high compared to other activities such as  
334 driving a car, or smoking, which tend to carry far higher mortality rates (Shrader-Frechette, 1991).  
335 Radiation carries many negative connotations in the minds of a layperson who does not often deal

336 with this type of technology (Pahner, 1976). Evoking affect (and availability) heuristics, the  
337 devastation from nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl and Three Mile Island still carry vividly in the  
338 minds of people, especially in the context of Australia, where only one nuclear reactor currently  
339 exists. This cultural aversion to nuclear technology could account for the higher uncertainty, and a  
340 higher perceived probability of fatalities mentally evoked, suggesting the availability heuristic in  
341 deeming this risk of higher calibre than otherwise.

342 Project B proposes a process that is unfamiliar to water professionals, a factor highlighted by  
343 Principal Component Analysis variable 'fear of the unknown'. Projects A and C are based on altering  
344 the water supply in a way that is not unusual or unimaginable in the water sector, despite having never  
345 been undertaken. Whereas, the lack of knowledge and awareness of new technologies in radiation  
346 treatment could be said to provide a level of healthy scepticism in rating its riskiness. This is  
347 suggested by the exhibited influence that 'fear of the unknown', a knowledge-based factor, has on the  
348 risk assessor's score.

349 'Fear of the unknown' is made up of knowledge-based attributes such as the 'newness' and  
350 'unfamiliarity' of the project, in combination with a clear understanding of the risk by both those  
351 exposed and science. This amalgamation of psychological attributes provides an insight into  
352 explaining approximately 5% of the variation in the risk scores across all projects. This rises to 16%  
353 in the case of Project B, the use of radiation in the treatment of water suggesting that the risk score  
354 could be then guided by a perceived lack of knowledge by both science and those exposed. Although  
355 other projects have been rated as 'extreme' by respondents in their risk ratings, none were as clearly  
356 linked to the psychological attribute of 'fear of the unknown' quite so starkly as Project B.

357 Observing the qualitative responses provided in project B provides some insight into the issue  
358 (authors, 2017). Compared to Projects A and C, distrust or questioning of current research seems to  
359 feature highly in Project B. Previous research in heuristics sheds some light on these findings.  
360 Heuristics states the importance of relying on trust in expert knowledge in decision-making (Siegrist  
361 and Cvetkovich, 2000). As individuals cannot possibly know all there is to know about all levels of  
362

363 technology, it is therefore important to rely on others trusted sources to provide guidance in areas  
364 individuals have inadequate knowledge (Slovic, 1993). Therefore, when new technologies arise, as in  
365 the case of innovations such as what is proposed in Project B, the importance of trust in the  
366 researchers that have undertaken the studies is pertinent in guiding the risk perception of water  
367 practitioners in this study (Siegrist and Cvetkovich, 2000). The importance of trusting those who  
368 provide that knowledge is very high in areas of uncertainty. When exploring new or innovative  
369 projects the impact of trust or reliance upon other experts cannot be understated, as is shown in this  
370 work.

371 While projects A and C did not highlight a significant link to the Principal Component Analysis  
372 variables, they were nevertheless found to have a significant link to one of the risk attributes: the  
373 ‘feeling of dread’. The higher the sense of dread surrounding the risk, the higher the risk score given.  
374 This explained approximately 9% of the variation in the risk scores, which, although not high, is still  
375 notable for a psychometric study (Slovic et al., 1985). None of the other risk attributes were found to  
376 be statistically significant in explaining the risk scores. In considering previous studies in the  
377 psychology of risk perceptions, dread would appear frequently as a significant risk attribute in risk  
378 perceptions (Gigerenzer, 2004, Slovic et al., 1981). The difference is that within these studies risk  
379 matrix scores were not compared to psychological risk attributes. Rather, these attributes were  
380 measured on a dimensionless scale to compare them to other activities. It is helpful to know that in  
381 this study we provide an insight into the risk scores themselves, which has practical and tangible  
382 outcomes in a business process.

383 What are the implications of a feeling of dread on scoring of future projects? It can be concluded from  
384 the findings of this research that the more the individual visualizes a scenario that evokes a feeling of  
385 dread (and therefore the affect heuristic), the higher the risk score. This is particularly helpful when  
386 considering that one of the two inputs into determining the risk score or rating is the ‘consequence’ of  
387 the project. The determination of ‘consequence’ heavily relies upon the risk assessor imagining  
388 scenarios on which to base their rating. The consequence may well be heavily weighted towards  
389 images enacted and created within the individual’s mind. The worse the perceived imagery, the worse



390 the consequence, thus the higher feeling of dread attached to it. In addition to this, the lower the  
391 consequence, the less likely that one would experience a high feeling of dread. Unsurprisingly, the  
392 worse the perceived consequence, the higher the feeling of dread. In this way, it can be posited that  
393 the internal imaginings of the risk assessor, in particular whether they believe a project will result in a  
394 catastrophic outcome, points to whether project attracts a high-risk rating. The dread factor could then  
395 highlight a key element in understanding how consequence is scored in the risk matrix, affecting and  
396 influencing the feeling of dread in assigning this score. A limitation exists in this study through not  
397 collecting separate consequence and likelihood scores on which to conduct separate regression  
398 analysis. We nevertheless posit that as dread is ‘imagined’ in these contexts, water professionals carry  
399 through their imagined fears into the assessment of the risk.

#### 400 **6. Conclusion: Is personal dread suppressing sustainable water planning?**

401 The impact of a perceived sense of dread in higher risk scores carries ominous implications for the  
402 future of water planning. It was found that those that may internally catastrophize an outcome of a  
403 project, thus evoking a sense of dread, may result in developing higher risk ratings than the average  
404 risk assessor. The effect of ‘dread’ and to some extent, ‘fear of the unknown’ leads to personal  
405 discrimination against original approaches to solving future water issues, instead opting for tried and  
406 true options. These questions lead back to the original sentiment that the water sector is slow to take  
407 on innovative projects and methods, and even stifles them. As urbanization and general increases in  
408 population strain current water infrastructure, the personal risk perceptions of the assessors  
409 themselves highlight an important aspect in understanding funding allocations for future water  
410 solutions. This also leads to questions surrounding of the current ‘objectivity’ of public fund  
411 allocations in delivering and planning for the future city.

412 These types of evidence-based changes can have a substantial impact upon water decisions in the  
413 future and may allow for a greater rate of uptake of projects that are unusual and innovative in nature,  
414 even though they are designed to counter the predicted increased water demand of users. Adaptation  
415 measures in the face of a changing climate are openly discussed, however alternatives to business-as-  
416 usual face the risk perceptions of current assessors. Ultimately, as Frank Fischer succinctly puts it,

417 some risk-taking should "... be seen as necessary for successful technological change... as well as the  
418 overall resiliency and health of modern society" (Fischer, 1991). Through increasing awareness of  
419 biases, effective planning approaches can be enacted without the impact of personal affiliations  
420 curbing uptake of technological developments that can aid future water shortage issues.

421 Acknowledgements: Thank you to Professor Hector Malano for providing feedback and comment on the study.  
422 Funding: This work was supported by Yarra Valley Water and the University of Melbourne

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**Title:**

Is too much personal dread stifling alternative pathways to improving urban water security?

**Date:**

2020-07-01

**Citation:**

Kosovac, A. & Davidson, B. (2020). Is too much personal dread stifling alternative pathways to improving urban water security?. JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, 265, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2020.110496>.

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