The Social History of British Diplomats in North Africa and How it Affected Diplomatic Policy

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In the winter of 1844 the son of the Spanish vice-consul in Bizerte in Tunisia was walking through Tunis when he found a friend, the Neapolitan vice-consul, running to assist another Neapolitan who was being beaten up by 'Moors'. The vice-consul sent his servant back for his uniform, and the two ran on together and persuaded the mob to give up their victim. But then a group of agitators stirred up the crowd, saying that they should not let the Christian escape. Stones were thrown and a knife was drawn. A dragoman from the Dutch consulate came to help, and got the young Neapolitan into his consulate. The Spaniard took refuge with the French consulate, partly to save himself and partly to tell the consul of the danger that threatened the Christians. The French vice-consul sent armed dragomans to help restore order. The next day the Spaniard went to his own consul and made a formal deposition about these events.¹

This minor incident had no long-term repercussions. Yet because the European participants brought their official positions briefly into play it was emblematic of early nineteenth-century consular life in North Africa. This is the subject of this essay, which focuses on three British consuls: Edward Drummond-Hay in Tangier; Sir Thomas Reade in Tunis; and Colonel Hamner Warrington in Tripoli. This essay seeks to link form, the institutional history of the diplomatic service, and content, the economic, strategic, and geopolitical motivations underlying diplomatic negotiations. It argues that in order to understand

¹ 'Declaración judicial relativa a Manuel Allegro', Archivo General de la Administración (Spain), Exteriores, Fondo (10) 65 54/5082, Consulado de Túnez, 44/5082, 1844, carpeta no. 9.
how and why policy was made, we should look at the men who developed that policy, their backgrounds, and the constraints upon them. The North African consulates were different from the British embassies and missions to the great chancelleries of Europe. The policy that the consuls followed was formulated within the overarching policies of the government in London, but much of it was made locally—diplomatic policy on the hoof. There were three main reasons for this. First, the North African consuls were a long way from London and communications were slow, although the problems were immediate. Secondly, the consuls remained in post for a very long time and had an extremely detailed local knowledge and involvement in local policies. Thirdly, they often felt themselves exposed to physical danger in unruly and politically volatile cities.

I. The Origins of Consular Autonomy

The sense of danger was not new, nor were the very wide powers that the consuls enjoyed. In the seventeenth century the capitulations had allowed consuls a large measure of freedom and protection for their own nationals. But in the 1820s and 1830s a new breed of consuls took over in North Africa. Merchants were replaced by retired army officers as the military was wound down at the end of the Napoleonic wars. For some reason, which would repay further research, either they or their families seem to have had a connection with the duke of York. In any event they shared a similar background, and a restricted social life among an extended group of other consuls and the odd technician, the sort of person who in modern terms might be described as an expatriate.

In the 1830s political conditions in North Africa also began to change. After the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, the Ottoman empire reimposed direct rule over Tripoli and the British government committed itself to maintain the independence or autonomy of Morocco and Tunisia. Economic and social conditions changed too: in many North African port cities the arrival of large numbers of Maltese and Ionian Greeks, who were British subjects, tested the system of capitulations to the point of collapse. Yet there was no real change in the consuls' roles until the 1840s, when communications with London improved dramatically. Their duties became more clearly defined and they were subjected to much closer supervision. They had less latitude in making policy, although they did not lose it entirely in the second half of the century.

It will be obvious that—relationships with the duke of York aside—other consuls, European and American, operated under similar constraints. The consular corps was united by circumstance and common experience. These isolated consuls, who worked and lived together and sometimes married into each other's families, formed a closed elite with its own rules of behaviour. Not all had the same opportunities for making ad hoc policy, for only the British and French acted in the name of powerful home governments. The overarching policy concerns of London and Paris underpinned how much authority and influence their local representatives could wield. National rivalries meant that personal competition mirrored the tensions between states, but questions of grand strategy are not the subject of this essay. It focuses on the situation in North Africa and suggests that these consuls, interlocking with the elites of North African society, influenced long-term political developments locally. They drove diplomatic policy rather than simply reacted to orders. The mentality and behaviour of members of local consular corps affected the course of diplomatic relations.

Were the Consuls Diplomats?

Like the assorted consuls who struggled in the streets of Tunis in 1844, none of the British consuls discussed here were, properly speaking, diplomats. European and American representatives in nineteenth-century North Africa were consuls. Until 1823, a chartered trading company, the Levant Company, not the British government, appointed British consuls there, although they were supervised by the Department of War and Colonies, through the governor of Malta. Most were merchants because payment was so insignificant that no one else would apply. In 1825 the government placed the Levant Consular Service under the Colonial Office and only in 1836 was it transferred to the

Foreign Office. Even then the consuls’ main task was to collect data and oversee trade. They had other functions, such as preventing the slave trade, acting against smugglers, and even spying, but the Foreign Office did not want them to assume regular political duties. The one exception was John Drummond-Hay, Edward’s son, who was appointed chargé d’affaires in 1847, which did formally make him a diplomat. The other consuls-general, his father included, were only de facto diplomats, but the role was real enough.

The North African consuls had always performed political duties. In the late seventeenth century, the Divan (council) in Tripoli so incensed Thomas Baker, the English consul, over the ransom of a British captive, that he warned them that ‘Should they persist in their such dishonorable Proceedings I would immediately on the appearance here of Three of His Majesties men of War . . . which I daily expected from Ligorne Declare a War with them and Leave the Place Which, I believe put them into contrary Sentiments.’

Such behaviour grew out of Baker’s main task. British trade in Tripoli was sparse, and his job was to protect British commerce in the wider Mediterranean. He had to ensure that the Divan respected the treaties that immunized English shipping against their corsairs. When one of the biggest Tripolitan ships was driven aground and destroyed, he wryly commented: ‘Heaven Grant that the rest may run that the same Fortune speedily I wish were tomorrow, when His Majesty would not have any occasion of maintaining A Consul in this Blessed Country—Amen.’

It is hard to imagine a more political act than threatening to declare war, and force often underlay the treaties. In 1655, an English squadron burned the Tunisian fleet at Ghar el Melh (Porto Farina) before making a treaty. The Dutch Admiral de

5 Platt, *Cinderella Service*, 130–1.
7 Ibid. 156.

Ruyter took eighteen ships to get treaties with Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli in 1661. In 1682 and 1689, the French bombarded Algiers, and in 1681 a French naval squadron imposed a treaty on Tripoli. Finally, Dutch–British bombardment of Algiers in 1816 was justified by reference to the Congress of Vienna, the diplomatic act of settlement of the Napoleonic wars.

Aside from corsairing, the treaties often dealt vaguely with other matters. In 1791 the British consul in Tunis, Perkins Magra, wrote: ‘As to our miserable treaties, they are so very improvident, ill-explained, and badly translated, that they are only calculated to mislead a consul, and govern more by the customs they have produced, than by their literal import.’

One example was the extent to which consuls exercised legal jurisdiction. The treaty of 1675 between Britain and Turkey established a system (called ‘the Capitulations’), giving foreigners extraterritorial rights in the Ottoman empire. In the North African provinces, which made their own treaties, the same system applied, with local variations. Treaties generally allowed consuls to deal with minor affrays and quarrels between Europeans, but reserved to the local authorities cases of violence resulting in the death of a local subject. Usually, the consul could assist at the trial.

Practice was different. Because there were no firm guidelines, custom and precedent provided the norms. The consular corps built up a common memory of usage, based on repeated practice, which underwrote the rules of conduct. Consequently, anything that went against custom subverted those rules, and even came to have precedence over the text of the treaties. In 1844, the consular corps in Tunis, led by the French consul-general, objected when Sir Thomas Reade, the British consul-general, handed over a Maltese to be tried for the murder of a Tunisian. Although they admitted that the boy had the right to

9 Ibid. 22.
10 Ibid. 21.
try him, they argued that no Christian had been subjected to Tunisian law for many years; Reade should not break with this precedent. Yet Reade ignored them, partly out of disdain for the French consul and partly because the heightened political tension in Tunis prevented him from protecting the murderer of a Muslim from the consequences of his crime.

Living in Tense Societies

The Spanish account of the street fighting in 1844 does not explain why the ‘Moors’ wanted to beat up the Neapolitan, nor why a group of ‘agitators’ could stir up the crowd. In fact, Tunisian popular passions were already edgy. A poor harvest had sharply increased the price of grain, but despite impending hunger, the Sardinian consul demanded that his nation’s merchants should buy and export grain according to their existing contracts. He puffed the issue into a crisis when the bey refused, struck his flag, and went home. The bey mobilized his army and prepared to fight. These factors: the highly risky local economy, the vulnerability of local rulers to popular pressure, and the need to maintain commercial and diplomatic relations with European states were the common features of all three North African states in the first part of the nineteenth century, even though their formal political structures were quite different.

Morocco was ruled by a sultan who claimed to be the head of the Islamic community, the Commander of the Faithful. Mawlay ‘Abd al-Rahman (1822–59) belonged to the ‘Alawi dynasty that had come to power in the mid-seventeenth century and which still provides the modern kings of Morocco. They had rebuilt the country roughly within its modern borders after half a century of civil war caused by the collapse of the previous dynasty. The principal of dynastic rule was well established in Morocco, based on religious legitimacy derived from descent from the Prophet Muhammad.

Since the mid-sixteenth century Tunisia and Tripoli had been provinces of the Ottoman empire, whose sultan also claimed the allegiance of his subjects as head of the Islamic community. In the early stages of Ottoman control, pashas appointed from Istanbul governed these outlying provinces, but by the end of the sixteenth century both had developed their own political structures and were becoming virtually autonomous, with economies that relied heavily on corsairing. As the functions of government were taken over by a council made up of Turkish soldiers, corsair captains, and Ottoman representatives, Tripoli and Tunis evolved towards a system of dynastic rule. At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Husaynid family ruled Tunisia as beys, the old title of the local military commander, and the Qaramanlis governed Tripoli as pashas, the title of the former Ottoman governor. Thus the formal link with Istanbul was maintained and provided the local rulers with legitimacy while they behaved in virtually every other way as independent monarchs. They had a dynastic succession, made treaties with European powers, and maintained their own naval forces for corsairing, a system of privateering regulated by rules of war, moderated by diplomatic agreements, and undertaken largely for commercial gain.

During the eighteenth century the three states found that corsairing was decreasingly viable, and it became virtually impossible after the end of the Napoleonic wars—though it was maintained to a limited extent. Agriculture was risky. Morocco’s irregular rainfall, coupled with plagues of locusts, led to regular famines despite the wide fertile coastal plains along the Atlantic coast. Tripoli was even more barren. There were no permanent rivers, although the plains around the city might just supply its inhabitants, along with the produce of Jebel Nafusa, the mountain range to the south. A seventeenth-century pasha was not wide of the mark when he described his province as a ‘steril country’. Tunis was more fertile—the coastal strip north and south of the city was productive farming land, although even there when the rains failed, the crops did not grow and economic crisis followed.

When the harvest was good, Tunis and Morocco were well positioned to supply grain to the hungry European market. But this carried political risks: if the harvests failed the local population rioted when grain was sold abroad, starving the local market. In 1820 riots in Fez over this issue nearly brought the

14 Foreign Consuls to Reade (English trans.), Tunis, 6 Mar. 1844, TNA, FO 335/86/5.
sultan of Morocco down. In the first thirty years of the nineteenth century there were only two really good harvests in Tunisia and in the early 1830s the bey had to import grain to feed his subjects. The potential for riot was easily realized there as well. Tripoli, with no agriculture to speak of anyway, relied for its commerce on the trans-Saharan trade in gold and slaves. That drove the rulers of Tripoli to try to control as many of the desert routes and, in particular, the oases, as they could, but it was not always easy with long distances and inadequate money with which to buy or impose obedience.

The economic environment made political control very difficult. With a few exceptions, the Alawi sultans found it hard to maintain detailed obedience, and there were internece civil wars in the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Tunis was smaller and more prosperous for most of the eighteenth century and only slightly troubled by political upheaval; the economic difficulties began around the turn of the century.

Mawlay 'Abd al-Rahman, and Ahmad Bey of Tunis tried in the first half of the nineteenth century to rebuild their authority on the basis of a modernized army and administration and expanded trade with Europe, though Ahmad was the most successful. The last Qaramani pasha of Tripoli expanded his navy in the hope of rebuilding his wealth through corsairing, but it drove him into bankruptcy and civil war before the Ottoman sultan reasserted direct control.

Partly because economic difficulties were most severe in the interior, the coastal capitals grew in the early nineteenth century. Many of the migrants were poor people from the interior. Tangier was largely inhabited by Rifis who had fled from poverty and feuding in their own mountains, and migrants from the Sahel and southern Tunisia poured into hovels that ringed the capital. They were joined by foreigners, particularly from Malta and the Ionian islands, whose impoverished inhabitants spread through the central and eastern Mediterranean.

The biggest Maltese community was in Tunis. Figures are hard to find, but it was estimated at 2,000 in 1837 and 5,000–6,000 in 1844. Some were quite respectable merchants, but most Maltese were poor; in Tripoli they ran wineshops, or were manual tradesmen, carpenters, and tailors. They were all Catholics. There were also Orthodox Greeks from the Ionian islands. Since Malta was a British colony, and the Ionian islands a British protected state, they were the responsibility of the British consuls. There was also a host of other refugees from poverty-stricken islands such as Sicily and the even smaller rocks of Pantellaria, Favignana, Carloforte, and Procida. The Italian community in Tunis grew from around 8,000 in 1834 to more than 10,000 in 1856. In 1848 an Italian visitor remarked that ‘some places are already more Italian than Arab’. Tripoli had a small colony of Spaniards, artisans who had come to work in Yusuf Qaramani’s navy, their families, and a handful of deserter soldiers.

This was part of a Mediterranean-wide population movement of the poor. The bulk of Gibraltar’s inhabitants were Portuguese, Genoese, and Minorcans, with smaller numbers of Moroccan Jews and Spaniards. Commercial links with Tangier led some Gibraltararians to move there, but the European population was quite small. The various estimates cluster between 175 and 200 in the first part of the nineteenth century, out of a total population of 8,000–9,000. Yet Tangier was not homogeneous: about 20 per cent of the population was Jewish.

22 Foreign Office (Great Britain), ‘Correspondence arising out of the Trial in the Bey’s Court at Tunis of Paolo Xierie, a Maltese, for the Murder of a Moor’ (1843–45); Hankey to Reade, Malta, 4 Jan. 1897, Malta State Archives (hereafter MSA), CS/Gol, 1/36; Tripoli letter book, Register of legal cases 1844, TNA, FO 101/10; Thomas W. Gallant, Experiencing Domination: Culture, Identity and Power in the British Mediterranean (Notre Dame, Ind., 2002), 6–7.


24 Dalenda Larquetche, Territoire sans frontières: La contrebande et ses réseaux dans la Régence de Tunis au XIXème siècle (Tunis, 2001), 135.

25 Estado de los Españoles residentes en Tripoli (1836), Archivo General de la Administración, Exteriores, 34/5066, Consulado de Tripoli.


Tripoli also had a large Jewish community. In the early 1850s a Jewish visitor reckoned there were around a thousand Jewish families, about a third of the total. They came from Europe, the countryside surrounding Tripoli, and other North African states. In Tunisia the Jewish community was 2-4 per cent of the population, mainly in Tunis and the southern island of Jerba. Most were poor and originated locally. Only a few who originated in Livorno were prosperous: silversmiths, medium-scale merchants, and money changers, for instance.

This multiplicity of social, religious, and national groups fragmented the political structures and made government yet more difficult. Almost every group had a support base outside the city, so that it could evade government control. Smuggling was an important part of the economy. The Rifis in Tangier had a thriving contraband trade along the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, parts of which were so far beyond the sultan's control that he specifically excluded it from the treaty with Spain in 1799 because he could not prevent its inhabitants from attacking Spanish shipping. The inhabitants of the Tunisian Sahel, who provided many of the poor in the capital, were notorious smugglers of olive oil (which they exported) and those of Cape Bon, northwards along the coast, imported contraband tobacco. But the Maltese and Italians were involved as well.

The internal tensions were magnified by external pressures that were reflected in a feeling of increased insecurity, particularly for European residents. The French invasion of Algeria in 1830 heightened fears across North Africa that other places would follow. In Morocco that fear was centuries old because of the Spanish enclaves (Ceuta, Melilla, and smaller islets) on the northern coast. In 1829 a brief Austrian attack on Larache prompted a widely believed rumour that in 'four years' time the Christians will conquer their country'. The events of 1830 could only confirm that. There was wide popular support in Morocco for the Algerian leader 'Abd al-Qadir Muhyi al-Din, and calls for jihad against the French. During the religious festival of 'Id al-Adha in 1840 tribesmen from the Rif and other parts of northern Morocco poured into Tangier and fired their guns at many of the consulates in the city to express their hatred of Christians in general.

The feeling of insecurity in Tangier led the British consul-general in Tangier to get things out of proportion. Edward Drummond-Hay kept a commonplace book in which he noted events in Tangier, and in July 1837 he recorded that the lieutenant-governor, Ahmad al-Timsamani, had banned everyone from digging up the roots of trees to burn as fuel. The purpose was to conserve a resource, but because his servants were not exempted from the ban, Drummond-Hay interpreted it as an attack on him, encouraged by a bigoted Doctor of Mohamedan Law, a red bearded fellow and intemperate Christian named Al Khalil or al Haleel who . . . had counselled Temsamany to essay with the X on this piece of absurd and impudent legislation.

Drummond-Hay became quite irrational in his dislike of Islam. He headed some pages of his commonplace books with such titles as 'Bigotry—enmity to Xians &c', and 'Hypocrisy—Bigotry—Mulai Solyman—Flattery'. In 1839 George Borrow, the English traveller, visited Tangier. When he said that he found some of the inhabitants pleasing, the consul responded with a diatribe:

He said that we were to live amongst them ten years, as he had done, he believed I should entertain a very different opinion; that no people in the world were more false and cruel; that their government was one of the vilest description . . . that British property and interests were every day subjected to unheard-of vexations, without the slightest hope of redress being afforded.
While this sort of prejudice was irrational, the dangers were real enough and even the sultan was conscious of the force of popular feeling against the French. His failure to provide effective help for ‘Abd al-Qadir eventually caused a rebellion. Finally, when the Algerian leader took refuge with his Moroccan supporters, the French army retaliated. In 1844 it occupied the frontier town of Oujda and the fleet bombarded Tangier and Essaouira. The short war ended with the collapse of a Moroccan army of 30,000 men at Wadi Isly near Oujda. The defeat traumatized the Moroccan government and society.

At the other end of the Maghrib, ‘Christian’ pressure helped to bring down the Qaramani dynasty, although the internal disintegration of the regime was unavoidable. In 1805 the United States declared war on Tripoli in response to corsairing attacks on American ships, and American troops briefly invaded Qaramani territory. In 1828 the Neapolitan fleet bombarded the city. Finally Yusuf Pasha Qaramani ran out of money. In 1832 his grandson, Muhammad, rebelled in alliance with ‘Abd al-Jalil Sayf al-Nasr, leader of the Awlad Sulayman tribe that controlled the Fezzan. ‘Abd al-Jalil had support from Colonel Carrington, the British consul. When Yusuf resigned in favour of his son ‘Ali, there was a civil war, until the Ottoman troops reoccupied the province in 1835.

Behind the Ottoman invasion was the perception that Tripoli might suffer Algeria’s fate, but it greatly perturbed the Tunisian elite. They saw that the empire was being restructured and centralized and worried lest Tunisia, too, might be brought under direct control. Over the other frontier, the French army was extending control over eastern Algeria. By the early 1840s it was building influence in western Tunisia, where many local notables welcomed the economic opportunities the French provided. Faced with the danger of being caught in the Great Power game, Ahmad might have hoped for help from the British government to keep the French out of Tunis. Yet Ahmad wanted to win yet more autonomy, and London was committed to support the integrity of the Ottoman empire. No one would even help him in his troubles with the Sardinians in 1844 and the threat of a war over wheat contracts. The British and French consuls, Sir Thomas Read and Charles de Lagau, immersed themselves in a series of plots and counterplots. The Ottoman government tried to negotiate an end to the crisis, but sent no troops, and so had little influence. The only support for resisting the Sardinian threat came from the Tunisian Muslim population. The American consul, John Howard Payne, described how a religious leader paraded through the streets with armed followers: ‘At every few steps he made the Soldiers halt, and turning on all sides, cried out at each turn in a loud voice, “May God give victory to the arms of Ahmed Pacha Bey over the throngs of Infidels!”’

The Sardinian threat came to nothing, but it was clear that the bey’s legitimacy depended upon him standing up to Christians, like the Moroccan sultan. In the mid-1840s, just as much as in the first decade of the twentieth century, the popular perception across the Muslim regions of the Middle East and North Africa was that Islam was under a general threat from the Christian powers. European or American consuls in such places would feel very vulnerable. This was compounded by isolation from home and their very restricted social contacts.

**Lonely Consuls?**

Isolation was an old problem of the North African consuls. In 1682 Thomas Baker in Tripoli had complained that ‘during the whole of my Ministration here, I have not been countenanced in the discharge of my duty by any of his Majesties ships, amidst the high flown Ruffles of an Overbearing People throughout the whole Mediterranea’. A hundred years later, Davison, the consul in Algiers, agonized that he had not had an answer to any of the dispatches he had sent since 1779, when he arrived at his post, despite writing ‘in a most pressing manner for instructions on matters of very serious importance to the public service’. He

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may have thought this a burden, but one of his successors, Hugh McDonnell, rejoiced in the independence and power it gave him: between 1816 and 1824 he even refused to send the consular accounts to Malta for auditing. The first steps in changing this were administrative, as supervision was transferred directly to the Colonial Office in 1824 and then to the Foreign Office in 1835, but the isolation was finally broken down only by improvements in communications in mid-century.

At the beginning of the century communications were slow. In 1832, Drummond-Hay's son John left England to visit his father. It took him a week to reach Tangier from Plymouth and that was a fast trip, speeded up because the captain thought he was being chased by pirates off Cape St Vincent and piled on all the canvas he could manage. It was not until the mid-1840s that fast steamships became common in North Africa and even then they passed Tripoli by. In November 1843 Warrington proposed setting up a steamship service himself so that official papers could be dispatched quickly. Things improved in 1857 when Malta, the central Mediterranean's clearing house, got its cable link; then Tripoli (1861) and Tunis (1866) got their own. But Gibraltar had to wait for a cable until 1870, and Tangier even longer: it was not linked to Gibraltar until 1877.

Although the isolation did not change in the first part of the century, the sort of men who were sent out as consul certainly did. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when European trade was expanding, corsairing threatened commerce and the English consuls were merchants, linked by patronage and family. Thomas Baker served in Algiers after his stint in Tripoli; his brother Francis was agent-general for redeeming captives in Algiers, then consul in Tunis. Another kinsman, John Erlisman, was consul in Algiers. All three were linked to English merchant communities in Spain and Italy and were protégés of a London trading consortium that included three lord mayors, several aldermen, and a future director of the Bank of England.

In the early nineteenth century patronage came not from commerce but the aristocracy. The consuls appointed after the Napoleonic wars were all former army officers. Hamner Warrington, who became consul-general in Tripoli in 1814, was a former lieutenant-colonel in a yeomanry regiment and served in Spain until 1812. Thomas Reade retired as lieutenant-colonel in a foot regiment; he went to Tunis in 1825. James Sholto Douglas, a retired major, served for a decade in Morocco (1818–29) and was replaced by Edward William Auriol Drummond-Hay, a former major in the 73rd Perthshire Regiment and staff officer of the British army of occupation in France. But there were plenty of former officers: it was patronage that secured positions for these men.

Douglas's daughter Sarah married the seventh marquess of Queensberry, and Drummond-Hay belonged to another Scottish noble family, the Kinnouls. His father was a chaplain to George IV, younger brother of Robert, tenth earl of Kinnoule, the Lord Lyon King of Arms in Scotland, and uncle of Robert Hay-Drummond, under-secretary of state for the Colonial Office. Warrington, the son of a less exalted clergyman, claimed the patronage of the duke of York; gossip hinted at an underhand relationship with the Prince Regent. There was certainly a connection with the duke of York's official household. When his son Herbert was christened in Tripoli in 1816, the (absent) godfather was Major General Sir Herbert Taylor, the duke of York's private secretary and aide-de-camp until 1805, and afterwards private secretary to the king. Read was of Staffordshire yeoman stock.

55. Wright, 'Warrington, Hamner George'.
that had risen in society. His relatives included Thomas Mellard Reade, an architect and geologist, and Joseph Bancroft Reade, a microscopist and photographer. At the end of the war, in 1816, Reade’s first appointment was deputy adjutant-general of St Helena. That made him Napoleon’s jailer until the emperor died in 1821.

Once appointed, the consuls stayed in post practically for life. Warrington retired in 1846, after a scandal, but died the following year in Greece, aged 70. Drummond-Hay and Reade both died in office, the first in 1844 at 59, the second in 1849 aged 64. Edward Drummond-Hay was succeeded by his son John, who eventually retired in 1886. Father and son represented Britain in Morocco for fifty-seven years. Sir John’s length of service was remarkable, but succession was not unusual. Reade was followed by Sir Edward Baynes (1849–55), then by the impressive figure of Richard Wood (1855–79), and then by his (Reade’s) son Thomas Fellowes Reade (1879–85). Warrington’s son, Osman, carried on as vice-consul in the small coastal town of Misurata until at least 1863.

This was not exclusive to British consuls. When Count Johan Mathias D’ Ehrenhoff, the Swedish consul in Tangier since 1823, died in 1854, his son replaced him until 1869 when he became Swedish envoy to Istanbul. The Golaço family ran the Portuguese consulate in Tangier from at least the 1830s to the 1870s. Antonio de Beramendi was Spanish consul in Tangier from 1828 to 1831. Pedro Ortiz de Zugasti left his post as Spanish consul-general in Tripoli in 1862 and Vicente Ortiz de Zugasti quit his post (consular agent and then consul-general) in Algeria two years later. Both were appointed before 1838. These were families of ‘old North African hands’.


58 Wright, ‘Warrington, Hamner George’.

59 Bertil Bodius, Bengt Hildebrand, and Johan Axel Almqvist, Svenskt biografiskt lexikon (Stockholm, 1949), xii, Ehrstein–Eskilsson, 289–4.


61 Kalendarz dobroj rocznik w Madrid (Madrid, various years).

62 Ibid.; volumes covering the period before 1838 were not available to me when writing this essay.

British Diplomats in North Africa

Consuls spent a long time together and lived in a tightly knit, introverted society. They developed not just working relationships but personal ones. The marriage of Warrington’s daughter Louisa was witnessed by the French, Spanish, and Swedish consuls, and that of her sister Emma by the Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch consuls; the Danish and American consuls stood in as proxy godfathers at the christening of their brother Henry. Another of Warrington’s daughters married the son of Warrington’s friend, Dr. John Dickson, a former naval surgeon who was Yusuf Pasha’s personal physician and for thirty-three years superintendent of health in Tripoli, until he died in 1847.

In Tangier, Edward Drummond-Hay became close to the family of the Danish consul Peter Schousboe, who had been in Tangier since 1800. On his first trip to Marrakesh in the winter of 1829–30 he met up with two of Schousboe’s sons. With no other European society, they dined, worshipped, and hunted together in the surrounding countryside. When Schousboe died in 1832, his successor was Johan Arnold Carstensen, formerly consul in Tripoli, and the proxy godfather of Herbert Warrington. In October 1845 Annette Carstensen, his daughter, married John Drummond-Hay, the new British consul. Another Carstensen daughter married the son of Marcus Marcusen, who became Danish consul-general in 1846 after serving as consul secretary to Carstensen and Schousboe.

Hamner Warrington in Tripoli was a little different. Despite his apparent respectability in this small consular world, he kept a long-time mistress as well. Perhaps his wife, Jane, was hard to live with: the memorandum of last wishes that she made during her fatal illness in 1841 ended by begging ‘forgiveness of my beloved husband for any pain or vexation I have at different times caused


67 Information supplied by K. Kjolshen, Head of the Archives and Library, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asialiv Princess 2, DK-1488, Kobenhavn K, Denmark.
Mixing with the Locals

Most consuls were not on such intimate terms with Maltese people. The generally poor Catholic Maltese, like the Orthodox Ionians, were separated from their consular overseers by a chasm of religion and class. The British controllers of the Ionian islands thought of their charges as clever children, sometimes charming, but mendacious, violent, and lacking in self-control, rather like the Irish, Hottentots, or some Indians. They ascribed these characteristics to the Maltese too, though they did not generally consider them charming. Sir Thomas Reade called them ‘desperate vagabonds,’ and complained of ‘the infamous conduct of the Maltese’. Sir Stratford Canning, the ambassador in Constantinople, told the governor of Malta that ‘among the Maltese residing here under British Protection, there are some very bad and troublesome characters’ and complained about ‘their disorderly or criminal conduct’. John Howard Payne, the US consul in Tunis, informed the State Department that ‘the continually increasing Maltese population of Tunis [being] so troublesome . . . every one felt the necessity of their being brought in some way to their senses’.

While the consuls could hardly mix socially with poor Europeans, they could find social equals of a sort among the local elite. Writing of the British empire, David Cannadine described a ‘vast interconnected world’, in which the familiar and domestic

and the different and exotic were comprehended and reordered in ‘parallel, analogous, equivalent, resemblant terms’.

Cannadine’s book, *Ornamentalism*, describes how imperialism before and after the First World War, but his explanation of how people thought within that hegemonic system refers back to an earlier, individualistic analogical way of thinking, based on the observation of status similarities and the cultivation of affinities, that projected domestically originated perceptions of the social order overseas.

If later British colonial authorities co-opted local elites in order to rule, British consuls in precolonial North Africa adapted themselves to the local social framework in order to negotiate.

They had to adapt if they were to influence powerful local figures. During his embassy to China in 1793, Lord Macartney was told by the emperor’s chief minister that he would have to kowtow on being presented to the emperor, or he would be ‘the laughingstock of all the envoys of the vassal countries, who will regard you as boors’. He did not do so and the mission was not a success. Edward Drummond-Hay did not have to abase himself when he presented his credentials in 1829, but the meeting was highly formalized. A member of his party, William Mein Smith, described it:

We dismounted at the gates and entered between two files of soldiers and slowly walked to the centre of the Court of Audience, which was about 100 yards wide and 400 yards long. A double rank of soldiers reached the whole way round close to the walls. In front of the consul stood his body guard on his left was his interpreter and behind him his staff. In a few minutes exactly at 1 o’clock the folding door of a pavilion in our front opened and forth came His Imperial Majesty mounted on a splendid chestnut charger surrounded by his ministers and attendants on foot, one of whom held a large crimson silk umbrella over his head (the umbrella is one of the insignia of royalty in this Empire), others kept off the flies with white handkerchiefs. His Majesty advanced towards us, saying to his troops on each side . . . ‘God bless you’ to which they replied with a deafening shout which made the walls echo . . . ‘God bless the life of our master’. He then halted and beckoned us forward. When M’ Hay advanced and said in a loud and manly tone of voice that he came as Ambassador from the King of

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68 Memorandum of Madm. Jane Eliza Warrington’s last wishes, 17 July 1841, TNA, FO 161/13, 1159–61, quotation from 1161.
69 Ibid. 1171–2; will of Hanner George Warrington, 14 Nov. 1843.
71 Reade to Bidwell, Tunis, 23 Mar. 1844, Foreign Office, Correspondence arising out of the Trial, 54–5; Hankey to Reade, Malta, 2 Jan. 1827, MSA, GSG 08/1, 926.
72 Canning to Stewart, Constantinople, 17 June 1844, MSA, GSG 03/392.
73 Payne to Uphur, Tunis, 25 Mar. 1844, USNA.
75 Ibid. p. xix.
76 Ibid. 8.
Great Britain &c &c and presented His Majesty’s letter, to which the Emperor was graciously pleased to reply, by saying the English always had been his best friends and he trusted always would be. The Consul then said he was proud to have an opportunity of informing His Imperial Majesty in person that he was appointed Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at his Court. An interchange of civilities then took place, after which his majesty wheeled his horse round and rode slowly away.78

None of this belittled Drummond-Hay; the sultan was a monarch, the consul was the servant of his own king, and in Marrakesh he embraced his place in the system. The court of the Tunisian bey, who was not a sultan, was far less ceremonious and he was more accessible, both to his own subjects and to the foreign consuls. Still, in the eighteenth century, he expected consuls to show the signs of respect that his subjects used, and required them to kiss his hand when they greeted him. When the American and French representatives refused to do this in 1836, the bey simply abolished this requirement for everyone, maintaining their equality with his subjects.79

Day-to-day contacts were less restricted. Yusuf Pasha Qaramani gave Warrington the site of his grandfather’s former summer residence, outside the city walls of Tripoli. Warrington constructed a mansion,80 from where he built up close relationships with notables of the hinterland. He was fascinated by trans-Saharan exploration and anxious to comply with his government’s policy of ending the slave trade. To this end, he cultivated the most prominent figure in the Libyan desert, ‘Abd al-Jalil Sayf al-Nasr, leader of the Awlad Sulayman tribe that from 1831 onwards controlled the Fezzan. As Yusuf Pasha’s regime got weaker, Warrington came to favour ‘Abd al-Jalil,81 and for many months in 1831 he extended hospitality and protection to his wife and family.82

Tunis was bigger than Tripoli, with a larger European population including many French and Italian merchants. The Tunisian elite was the most cosmopolitan in North Africa. Many, including the bey, spoke Italian, the usual language of diplomatic correspondence, and had an everyday command of the lingua franca although the working language at court was Arabic and the official language was Ottoman Turkish. Diplomatic correspondence was usually conducted in Italian.83 In the early nineteenth century a Sicilian, Giuseppe Raffo, headed the bey’s diplomatic staff. He was born in Tunis in 1795 and his sister had married Mustafa Bey. Raffo began by handling Mustafa Bey’s Italian correspondence and when Ahmad Bey (1837–55) organized a foreign affairs department, Raffo took charge of it.84 The bey, his ministers, and important members of the Tunisian elite kept country houses at La Marsa on the coast north of Tunis. There, unfettered by the public ceremonial of the Bardo Palace in Tunis, they could meet the consuls who also resided there, often on land provided by the bey himself.85 Sir Thomas Reade spent most of his time at his house at La Marsa, and was well embedded in local society. According to John Payne, the US consul, having known the bey ‘familiarly from childhood he could communicate with him unreservedly’.86

Although the Moroccan court was more rigid, Drummond-Hay easily formed gentlemanly relations with members of the elite. During his first trip to Marrakesh he developed a bond with his guard commander, Sidi Muhammad bin ‘Abbou. Both men enjoyed hunting and their leisurely progress gave them plenty of time to hunt the local birds, foxes, and, particularly, the wild boar.87 The friendship was increasingly productive as bin ‘Abbou rose in rank. By the mid-1830s, bin ‘Abbou, a Rifian by origin, was governor of the region. After Edward died, bin ‘Abbou continued the relationship with John. In December 1837, when he realized that he was about to be dismissed and arrested, bin ‘Abbou went alone to the consulate, deep in the night, and asked the consul to keep safe from confiscation a large quantity of gold which he


79 Windler, ‘Diplomatic History’, 94.
82 Wright, ‘Warrington’s Garden’.

84 Ibid. 89.
85 Ibid. 99–103.
86 Payne to Upshur, Tunis, 1 Mar. 1843, USNA.
87 Pennell, *Morocco since 1850*, 3.
wanted to pass to his son. Drummond-Hay agreed out of his respect for the man.89

Drummond-Hay also linked into the Jewish trading community in Tangier, which had very close links with the Moroccan government. Edward’s commonplace books rely for much of their information on Isaac Abensur, his Jewish principal interpreter.89 Drummond-Hay was well aware that Abensur translated in two directions. He became convinced, during his journey to Marrakesh in 1829, that Abensur was the sultan’s spy.90

II. The Consequences of Autonomy

It was these personal relationships that enabled the consuls to function. Isolation and long service, and a sense of threat, made these resourceful and self-confident men into political players on the local scene. Because they became expert in the societies in which they lived and had a great latitude of action, they often made policy on the spot. That is not to say that their policy was always good, or their actions always sensible. Minor incidents could easily create a tornado of diplomatic crises. In the context of an essay of this length it is obviously impossible to examine the full range of consuls’ activities. Instead, a single case study from each place will be used to illustrate how their autonomy, the social environment in which they lived, and their background interacted to produce the policies that they followed. The cases examined here are all legal ones, because they are discrete cases with a clear story, and because they posed questions of social, cultural, and political relationships very starkly.

Drummond-Hay and Murder in Morocco

Edward Drummond-Hay’s contempt for Moroccan law led him down a path that took him well beyond what the British government would tolerate in his efforts to secure what he saw as justice and to protect his own position. One night in December 1838 an elderly couple and their 12-year-old god-daughter were murdered in their house. Their throats were cut, their bodies mutilated, and their property stolen. The family was of Genoese origin but had become British subjects through long years of residence in Gibraltar, so the consul-general took it upon himself to investigate the murder. He measured the bloody footprints of the two perpetrators and concluded that they ‘had never had their feet confined within the shoes of Christian countries’ and that while one was very big, powerful and ‘fleshy’, the second man was smaller. Drummond-Hay passed on these insights to the lieutenant-governor of the town, Ahmad al-Timsamani, along with information about two unidentified Rifis whom an official courier had met on the night of the murder, carrying bundles hidden under their clothes, heavily armed, and acting suspiciously. He also pointed a finger of suspicion at the man who supplied the family with water, although he could not find out his name. Timsamani was equally unable to discover it, and having questioned the courier, decided there was nothing in that story either.91

At the end of January, Timsamani arrested a suspect and put out a search for a second man. He held his captive in irons in Tangier jail, but could not prove his case. The prisoner refused to confess because that would have led to his immediate execution. A Jew who was held as a material witness also refused to testify, apparently because he was frightened of the consequences should the man get off.92

In early February the pasha of Larache, the overall governor of Tangier, told Drummond-Hay that although there was no legal proof, the suspicions against the accused were so great that he would remain in prison. He said the sultan had instructed him to find the other suspect and execute both men if the case could be proven, but this was hard to do. He rejected Drummond-Hay’s idea of offering a reward for information leading to a conviction because it is against our Law to give evidence for money’. Yet he had ordered his deputy, Timsamani, ‘to be very

88 Brooks and Drummond-Hay (eds.), A Memoir of Sir John Drummond, 184.
vigorous with Asekhal [the accused] and Benzaquin [the Jewish witness] by scourging or any other punishment they may deserve, until the truth may appear.93

Timsamani went ahead. The Jewish witness was lashed 100 times before Drummond-Hay arrived at the prison to stop the flogging. He afterwards told the pasha that since Benzaquin was being held as a witness, not because he was guilty, it was unjust to treat him in this way. The British government would not, he said, be satisfied by scourging an innocent man; 'I knowing its [British government's] principles, was bound to protest in the strongest terms against further punishment being inflicted now upon anyone of those persons.' Nevertheless, he continued, there was an exception: 'except the notorious Tayeb Asekhal, whom I abandoned to any severities Seedy Hamed [Timsamani] held himself authorized by your Excellency's instructions to inflict upon him'. Since Asekhal was clearly guilty, it was legitimate to beat him until he confessed.94 In his reply, the pasha explained that it was he who had ordered the flogging and it was done to secure a confession: 'Our desire and will in seeking for the murderers is assuredly to cut off their heads and fix them over the gates of the town, so that men of their character may, by God's help, have cause to tremble.95

Although the consul and the pasha were agreed that it was legitimate to beat a confession out of the accused, Lord Palmerston was unimpressed with the idea that his consular general might have been party to torture, and wrote and told him so.96 Drummond-Hay puffed up his dignity and economized with the truth:

with reference to the hope, your Lordship is pleased to express to be that of Her Majesty's government, that, I 'have in no way whatever sanctioned or been a party to the infliction of torture upon an untried and unconvicted person for the purpose of extorting confession of a crime of which he was suspected of being guilty,' I beg to state with all

In short, the British community in Tangier demanded summary justice, and Drummond-Hay connived at it. The actions of the consul-general were, in this case, quite foreign to the policies of the government that employed him, so he fudged the issue with Palmerston to cover himself. This was truly locally made policy, driven by the consul-general’s impatience with Moroccan systems of law, and his own need, isolated as he was in a small community of Britons, to keep their good feelings.

Warrington and Negotiated Punishment in Tripoli

Warrington was so impetuous that he worried his superiors. The ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Stratford Canning, thought of him as a loose cannon because of the way he behaved after the Ottoman government put an end to the Qaramanlis in 1835. Warrington continued to support ‘Abd al-Jalil, his ally in the interior, until 1842 when the Ottoman pasha captured and executed the rebel. This was extraordinary conduct for a consul but he did so because he believed that ‘Abd al-Jalil’s apparently modern opinions provided the best hope of ending the Saharan slave trade, a vital policy of the British government. Warrington believed that with ‘Abd al-Jalil’s help he could extend British influence far into Africa. It was very much his own policy, patriotic and impulsive, but his local knowledge convinced Lord Palmerston that it was right. Sir Stratford Canning resented this high-handed and illegal behaviour because it caused bad relations with the Porte.101

Sir Stratford was therefore suspicious of Warrington’s behaviour, even when he was acting within the very letter of the law. He was unappreciative of his course of action over a murder in December 1843. It was a simple case: a Maltese tough named Giovanni Battista Caruana Lanzon, who was pursuing a Jewish woman through the streets with his knife drawn, stabbed a Jewish bystander who tried to intervene.102

Warrington interpreted the treaties to mean that a British subject who killed an Ottoman should be tried by the pasha. Caruana Lanzon was found guilty and sentenced to death. His only chance of reprieve was if the victim’s family agreed to accept compensation. Lord Aberdeen, the foreign secretary, instructed Warrington to let the law run its course, but Sir Stratford Canning was less sure. His reaction letter to Warrington about the affair was icily correct, but cutting: ‘The course which you have thought it right to pursue renders any expression of my opinion superfluous except with reference to future cases of a similar description and therefore I think it my obvious duty to leave the question entirely to the consideration of Her Majesty’s Government.’ Canning believed the case looked more like manslaughter than murder and an alternative interpretation of different treaties would have allowed Warrington to participate in the court process rather than just witnessing it.103 He rightly believed that Warrington was driving the case forward.

The eventual outcome was also determined by Warrington. He negotiated compensation for the victim’s widow and Caruana Lanzon was expelled to Malta. Warrington had no sympathy for Maltese hoodlums, particularly this one. After the money had been raised for his release, he told Caruana:

Feelings of humanity towards the poor woman you deprived of a husband and four infant children you have deprived of a father—induced numerous benevolent persons to contribute a sum of money for their future support; and, although you will probably indirectly derive a great advantage, still it is my duty to tell you, you are undeserving of any favor.104

When he received Aberdeen’s approbation of his conduct, Warrington expressed his satisfaction to Lord Canning, the Foreign Office minister who normally dealt with the Tripoli file, and explained his own motivations:

Permit me my Lord to say that the rigid justice shewn by the Earl of Aberdeen will have the most beneficial effects through the Ottoman Territory as it plainly indicates that the just Rights, and Privileges of Her Majesty’s Subjects shall be most scrupulously supported; at the same time should they violate the Laws of God, or Man, his Lordship will never screen them from just Punishment; and that they will look in vain to their own Government to rescue them from crime.105

101 Wright, ‘Warrington, Hamner George’; id., ‘Diplomacy and Tribalism’.
103 Sir Stratford Canning to Warrington, Buýukdere, 27 Dec. 1843, enclosure 1 in Warrington to Bidwell, Tripoli, 16 Jan. 1844, TNA, FO 101/10 [copy in FO 78/573].
105 Warrington to Lord Canning, Tripoli, 30 Jan. 1844, TNA, FO 101/10.
This was not simply a belief in abstract justice. Political conditions in Tripoli exposed him to immediate dangers. The large Jewish community was edgy because the day before Caruana Lanzon’s murder, two Jews had been executed for cutting the throat of a Turkish officer. Warrington told Sir Stratford Canning ‘the prevailing question was—will this murderer be saved because he is English?’. The Muslim population was equally touchy: ‘Had I not met this case in a fair and honourable way, according to our treaty,—I should have sanctioned Murder, and no British subject would have been safe here.’

Warrington’s interpretation of the treaty was supported by the French consul, with whom he was on very good terms. Edmonde de Chastneau had been acting as consul since the middle of 1843, when the previous consul retired aged over 80, according to the Maltese newspaper, *Il Portafoglio Maltese*. *Il Portafoglio’s* short but rude farewell report ended by saying that he left behind no friends in Tripoli. Warrington quickly replied, as ‘the senior Christian representative here’, that ‘M. de Bouboulon is a perfect Gentleman, good natured, polite, affable, but with the dignity to sustain his high character and official rank . . . M. de Chastneau his successor and Chargé [sic] des Affaires appears to have every amiable and good feeling of his predecessor and is an ornament to this society.’

De Chastneau refused Caruana Lanzon sanctuary in the French consulate, and handed him over directly to Warrington, who passed him on to the pasha. He also gave the damning information that while Caruana was in the consulate he remarked of his victim: ‘after all it is of no consequence as he is only a Jew.’

In this case, Warrington’s policy received the approval of the government in London, despite the misgivings from Constantinople. But once again, what drove his policy was his isolated position in Tripoli, and his opinions about the need for condign punishment for murder. His involvement in the case secured an outcome that satisfied all these objectives once he had arranged for compensation. Warrington, with his years of experience in

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106 Warrington to Aberdeen, Tripoli, 3 Dec. 1843, TNA, FO 101/10.
108 Warrington to Aberdeen, Tripoli, 5 Dec. 1843, TNA, FO 101/10.
109 Reade to Aberdeen, Tunis, 26 Dec. 1843, Foreign Office, Correspondence arising out of the Trial, 1-9; Payne to Uphur, Tunis, 25 Nov. 1843, USNA.
110 Foreign Office, Correspondence arising out of the Trial, 1-9; Payne to Aberdeen, Tunis, 26 Dec. 1843, 5; J. Dodson to Aberdeen, 17 Jan. 1844, 6; Aberdeen to Reade, 6 Feb. 1844, 67; Reade to Bidwell, 8 June 1844, 37; Payne to Uphur, Tunis, 25 Mar. 1844, USNA.
monetary compensation and demanded his life in revenge. Xuereb was judicially strangled in June 1844.

The whole case was repeatedly delayed because of the opposition of most of the diplomatic corps in Tunis, led by the French consul. The courteous relationship between the British and French representatives in Tripoli was not to be found in Tunis. Charles de Lagau loathed Sir Thomas Reade for both patriotic and personal reasons. John Howard Payne, the US consul, explained: 'the two countries are represented by active and wary functionaries, seeking distinction and predominance, and whose daring passion it is to circumvent each other, through personal as well as national jealousy'. He gave an unflattering portrait of both men:

Mr Lagaud, the French Consul, is shrewd, subtle and enterprising; rasping after personal and official éclat; but too irritable, too fond of showing off, too apt to be noisy, and too incapable of repressing a propensity to make sparkling jokes without considering consequences, to give him every advantage that a superior talent for intrigue might otherwise secure him in diplomacy... [Reade is] an Englishman of the old school; who believes in nothing but the church establishment and the Queen, and looks on 'all foreigners as fools.' He is impetuous, brave, zealous and determined, but apt to show the blood of the wrongheads. He was the principal guard, under Sir Hudson Lowe, of Napoleon at St Helena, and the French [sic] hate him the more thoroughly on that account.111

Payne's description of Reade's arrogance echoed the opinion of English acquaintances in St Helena.112

De Lagau had felt that Reade was outflanking him over the Sardinian issue, and seized the opportunity to bolster his own popularity and the reputation of France by springing to Xuereb's aid. The Maltese community listened. Honour and a sense of vulnerability bound it together: in a Muslim society they felt marginalized politically, economically, socially, and culturally.113

As the Xuereb trial began, placards and leaflets appeared, calling for the Maltese to rise up and shake off the rule of Sir Thomas Reade by rescuing Xuereb and his companions, who were victims not criminals. One placard signed by 'Il Filantropo Popolo di Tunis' was addressed to the 'Vili Maltesi' (Cowardly Maltese). It asked where was their patriotism, and announced the moment had come to liberate themselves from the hands of 'vostro Tirano di Console'. They should rescue their unhappy compatriots who were to be condemned by a 'Despot' without trial.114 The Muslim population, stirred by their own agitators, demonstrated too, for the threat of war with Sardinia exacerbated their feelings.

Of course, De Lagau refrained from public name-calling, and represented himself as acting out of anxiety for the safety of his British colleague, who was risking himself with the Maltese mob. 'I own... that it is a case of extreme delicacy,' he told consul Payne, 'but I have the blood of chivalry in my veins, and if I saw my greatest enemy blindly rushing towards the edge of a precipice, whatever the consequences to myself, I would spring forward to grasp his arm, and avert, if possible, his destruction.'115 Since the two had not been on visiting terms for some years, Reade was unmoved.

Next, de Lagau tried to manipulate consular esprit de corps. He admitted the boy had the right to try Christians accused of crimes against Muslims, but it had not been done for ages. Reade should follow local practice and hear the case himself. He added some quasi-legal reasons: that Xuereb had also killed a European and since the two cases should not be tried separately, they should both be heard in an English court; also, Yusuf was dragoon in the British consulate, which gave the British jurisdiction.116 All the consuls except the American, John Howard Payne, agreed to sign a letter to this effect, but Reade did not change his policy. Instead, he called upon British naval support from Malta and two warships (one of them, the inappropriately named Devastation) arrived, to protect Reade against his rebellious charges.117

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111 Payne to Upshur, Tunis, 1 Mar. 1844, USNA.
113 Mario Vassalo, From Lordship to Stewardship: Religion and Social Change in Malta (The Hague, 1999), 31.
114 Transcript of leavelet in Italian directed to Maltese community, TNA, FO 335/66/1, P100021, 1 page included in Ahmad Pasha Bey to Consuls (trans. into French), 20 Safr 1260/9 Mar. 1844, directed to Maltese by Il Filantropo Popolo di Tunis, TNA, FO 335/66/2; Payne to Upshur, Tunis, 25 Mar. 1844, USNA.
115 Payne to Upshur, Tunis, 5 Mar. 1844, USNA.
116 Foreign Consuls to Reade, 6 Mar. 1844, enclosure in Reade to Aberdeen, Tunis, 8 Mar. 1844, Foreign Office, 'Correspondence arising out of the Trial', 30.
117 De Lagau to [Ministre], Tunis, 27 Mar. 1844, Archives diplomatiques de Nantes.
De Lagau persuaded the consuls (except Payne) again to ask for a delay while the matter was referred to London and Paris. The bey agreed, but Aberdeen did not back down and on 5 June, Xuereb was judicially strangled.\textsuperscript{119} There were no riots: de Lagau’s campaign was a lost cause and Guizot, the French foreign minister told him to give up.\textsuperscript{119}

At the end of the affair Guizot congratulated de Lagau on his conduct and on getting the death-sentence delayed.\textsuperscript{120} and Aberdeen repeated his support of Reade’s conduct.\textsuperscript{121} But although both foreign ministers endorsed their consuls’ behaviour publicly and privately, it was post facto. The two consuls’ local concerns and their personal rivalries drove the making of policy. The management of the affair lay in their hands, even when it raised controversy in the British and French parliaments and the press. Although neither consul moved outside his government’s diplomatic policy, the chain of command was hard to discern.

III. Conclusion

Reade and de Lagau, Drummond-Hay and Warrington behaved as they did because their positions allowed them to do so and they saw it as advantageous to manipulate the local legal system. Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli were weak states, even in their cities, and the consuls sought to exert their influence through the local authorities and through local interest groups. The consuls did not only negotiate with local notables, they interacted with them and collaborated with them and how they dealt with matters of public policy was often as much the expression of private frustrations as government instructions. The social history of the local diplomats fed into the policies they pursued.

In the first part of the nineteenth century the autonomy of the consuls coincided with the growth of European power and the rivalry between Britain, France, and other powers for hegemony in the Mediterranean. This distinguished it from earlier periods when consuls also acted with great latitude, but were not backed by hegemonic power. The Sardinian consul who brought Tunis and Sardinia to the brink of war in 1844 worked under the same assumptions as Thomas Baker in the seventeenth century when he threatened war on Tripoli. In this case, mid-nineteenth-century diplomatic practice was indeed similar to that of the mid-seventeenth century. Yet Baker’s was an individual threat, designed to produce a specific result, namely, the enforcement of the treaties. The Sardinian consul’s threat was part of a far wider play for power in the Mediterranean.

It may seem hard to imagine a modern European consul in North Africa making the same threats or acting with the same authority, but autonomy in the style of the nineteenth century has not necessarily broken down in abnormal situations. Modern diplomatic representatives in states where government has collapsed—Lebanon in the 1980s, Somalia in the 1990s, or Iraq in 2005—might very well act in highly informal ways, making ad hoc relationships with local men of power, just as the consuls did in the 1840s and 1850s. If they are the representatives of powerful states, they may even be able to call upon military forces for support. In any event, they would have no difficulty recognizing the description of the ideal consul in the Middle East laid down by the Select Committee on Consular Service and Appointments that reported to Parliament in July 1858:

The present anxious condition of the Mohammedan peoples, of which, within the few last weeks, we have had a deplorable example in the murder of the British and French consuls at Jedda, requires that every agent of British authority, from Tangiers to Bagdad, should be not only fitted to perform with probity and accuracy the ordinary routine of consular duty, but should be able on any sudden emergency to act with the vigour and decision which can only be expected from men who have some familiarity with political affairs, and who, above all, thoroughly understand the nature, both of the officials with whom they have to deal, and of the population among whom they are placed.\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{119} Payne to Upchurch, 20 Apr. 1844, USNA; Gaspar to Reade, La Goulette, 5 June 1844, TNA, FO 355/86/5.
\textsuperscript{120} Guizot to de Lagau, Paris, 6 May 1844, ADN, ‘Correspondance Officielle et Ministerielle’, Liasses 6—Direction Politique 1844.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. Guizot to de Lagau, Paris, 6 May 1844.
\textsuperscript{122} Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Thomas Reade, Foreign Office, 15 May 1844, no. 9, Foreign Office, ‘Correspondence arising out of the Trial’, 42.

\textsuperscript{122} Report from the Select Committee on Consular Service and Appointments, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix and Index, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 27 July 1858, p. vi. I am grateful to Markus Möslang for this quotation.
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