Education Policy and Social Inclusion

Education policy in Australia is circumscribed by Australia's system of federalist government. Federalism has a direct impact upon policy through its division of responsibilities for different elements of education between the levels of government. It has a less direct but significant impact through the relationships between governments and constituencies within the education policy. Policies for social inclusion in education have struggled within this environment. As a consequence there is a need to understand the historical background to this policy environment if socially inclusive policy strategies are to be devised for the future.

The historical legacy

Education policy in Australia has been influenced by two settlements that were each reached over a century ago. The first was in the form of the series of education Acts that were passed by the six colonial parliaments in the 1870s. These Acts restricted public funding of schooling to state-owned and -administered schools and left the church schools to their own devices (Gregory 1973). The second settlement was that of Federation. The Australian Constitution of 1901 located the responsibility for education with the Australian states. Both settlements proved to be an enduring arrangement and had two sets of impacts upon education in Australia. The first was their formative effect upon schooling. The second was their breakdown and intersection under the weight of a set of pressures that culminated in the 1970s.

The decoupling of church- or faith-based education from the state in the 1870s intensified a state centralist form of public or 'state' schooling,
The absence of a role for the churches in public schooling meant that there were no alternative agencies to the state education departments, and this weakened the capacity for community identity with and ownership of the 'local schools', as existed in the USA for example (Katz 1976). Centralist tendencies already existed because of demographics of the colonial states, and the relatively weak form of local government. In Australia the developmental drive for schooling came mainly from the states. This drive was muted in the area of secondary education. Post-elementary education was largely the preserve of the private sector, with the state sector playing at best a supplementary role through a limited and meritocratic post-elementary provision. In each of the states post-elementary schooling was linked to the single university located in the capital cities. The formative drive for post-elementary education in Australia was largely through relationships between the mainly private secondary schools and the universities.

By the 1970s the two settlements were under significant pressure. The Catholic schools faced severe resource problems with the decline of their teaching orders and increased expectations of parents for improved quality in provision. Changes in taxation share between the levels of government led the states to become increasingly dependent upon Commonwealth payments for their expenditure in high-costs services such as education. These pressures converged with the catalyst of the election of a Labor government in 1972. The subsequent reformulation of the historical settlements saw the establishment of Commonwealth payments to non-government schools (Karmel 1973), which would increase over the next three decades and be supplemented with state government payments, and an increasingly active role of the Commonwealth in education, including school education. There are several legacies from these settlements and their collapses in the 1970s that set the framework for social inclusion in school education in Australia.

This historical legacy is reflected in two key features of Australian schooling: the highly centralised nature of the government school sector and the strength of private schooling. While state centralism has been exacerbated by the absence of non-government schools within 'public education', this characteristic has strengthened the resistance of the church schools to their integration into a more broadly defined public sector, as occurred in New Zealand in the 1970s (Futardo 2001). Centralism has been expressed in institutional forms such as school staffing and industrial cultures, and in the characteristics of the polity of government schooling, which has been a type of semi-corporatist institutionalism.

Australia has a large percentage of its school enrolments in non-government schools. A small number of countries have higher percentages; for example, Belgium, Ireland and the Netherlands (Eurydice 2000). However, in these countries most of the church schools are fully or almost fully state funded and are part of a
wider public sector. Since the advent of Commonwealth funding there has been an annual average enrolment drift from government to the non-government schools of approximately 0.4 per cent. This enrolment drift has been socially skewed, with a disproportionate percentage of the students coming from higher-income households. The results are reflected in Figure 12.1, which shows different patterns of senior secondary enrolments in the state of Victoria for the three school sectors: government, Catholic and independent. The relationship between these sectors and the roles of the Commonwealth and state governments has preoccupied much of the education policy community in Australia over the past three decades.

**Figure 12.1** Student socio-economic status (SES) background (quartiles of SES), by school sector: Year 11 VCE students, Victoria, 2005 (%)

A further legacy of the Australian education settlements has been what might be called institutional separation. This historical mission of the state education departments was to establish and maintain access to elementary education in every location across each of the states. For example, Ling (1984) estimates that in Victoria in 1907 public spending on secondary education represented 1 per cent of the state education budget, compared with 2.3 per cent for technical education and 2.6 per cent for universities.
In this context the other elements of education moved towards different constituencies, built different funding bases, and so formed different polities. Technical and vocational education moved towards industry and an industrial training model. Higher education maintained essentially private relationships with social groups. Pre-school education developed separately from schooling predominantly as a community-based model with a fee base and elements of private provision. Only recently have state governments begun to move pre-school education from community development to education portfolios.

Institutional separation may be one of the factors that explain the school-centric nature of educational provision for youth in Australia. Most upper-secondary students in full-time education are in schools (Table 12.1) and the vast majority are undertaking generalist academic programs. Secondary education in Australia is strongly oriented towards the university pathway, which in turn is influenced operationally and symbolically by the aggregate assessment scores (tertiary education ranks) that are calculated from Year 12 examinations.

\textbf{Table 12.1} Percentage of full-time enrolments by provider type, 15–17 year-olds, Australia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>15 years All</th>
<th>15 years Full-time</th>
<th>16 years All</th>
<th>16 years Full-time</th>
<th>17 years All</th>
<th>17 years Full-time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAFE</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Social inclusion in and from education

Schooling and early childhood education

Measures of the degree of social inclusion in Australian education are variable and disputed. The OECD Programme for International Assessment (PISA) mostly placed Australia as a country that performs significantly higher than the ‘all country’ mean in its tests in scientific literacy, reading and mathematics. In regards to the distribution of results Australia has been classified as either medium or weak equity (Thompson & De Bortoli 2006). The PISA studies have had a significant influence
upon school education policy discourses in Australia, and have been a driver for the
human capital agenda that underpins Commonwealth and Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) education policies (Rudd & Smith 2007; COAG 2008).

PISA is only a set of tests of levels of capacity in three learning areas for samples of
15-year-olds. There are domestic assessment programs and real outcomes in the form
of school completion and non-completion. Year 12 examination results and post-
school transition patterns that should be taken into account for education policy and
the social inclusion question. Several of these measures and outcomes indicate less
socially inclusive patterns than those interpreted from the PISA results.

State and national testing programs of all students indicate strong relationships
between achievement levels and social background (Teesie 2008). Australia's levels
of participation in education are behind those for most of the advanced countries
(OECD 2008b). The potential impact of early school leaving is increased risk of
social and economic exclusion (FYA 2008) and patterns of school leaving are
influenced by social background, as indicated in Table 12.2.

**Table 12.2** Year 12 completion rates by SES status, 2001 (%)

| Socio-economic Status       | Rate (%)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Productivity Commission (2004), Tables 33.3 and 33.4.

These patterns are compounded by geography, gender and Indigenous status
such that 34.3 per cent of 19- and 20-year-olds from the lowest socio-economic
status quartile in remote areas had completed Year 12 in 2001, compared with 85.5
per cent from the highest quartile in urban areas (Keating & Lamb 2004). Despite
strong labour market conditions over the past decade, the rate of unemployment
and underemployment among teenagers and young adults has remained relatively
high in Australia, particularly among early school leavers (FYA 2008).

At the other end of schooling there is variation in the estimates of levels of
participation in pre-school education across Australia. The Report on Government
Services (Productivity Commission 2008a) states that 87.2 per cent of all four-
year-old children attended state and territory government funded and/or provided
pre-school in the year immediately before they commenced school. However, the
2001 Census showed that 56 per cent of four-year-olds attended pre-school (AIHW
2005), as compared with the Report on Government Services estimates for that
year of 85 per cent. The variation may be due to a percentage of short-term and
dual enrolment data in the higher estimates compared with the point in time data from the census. Patterns of participation in pre-school education reflect location, Indigenous status and household income (AIHW 2005), and are similar to patterns of early school leaving.

Most pre-school education is fee based, with fees ranging from $13 to $25 per day and average annual public spending levels per student of $2179. This is about a quarter of the average cost of public spending on school students (MCEETYA 2006). In 2007 public spending on pre-primary education was 0.1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product compared with an OECD average of 0.5 per cent (OECD 2008b). Pre-school education in Australia therefore is characterised by low levels of public investment, relatively high levels of fee costs for parents and significant patterns of non-participation, especially among low-income, non-metropolitan and Indigenous households.

Pre-school education needs to be considered in conjunction with childcare provision and the parental role in their children's education under the umbrella of early childhood education. In 2004, 48.7 per cent of three-year-olds in Australia used long day care or family day care services, with another 21.9 per cent using some other form of childcare (ABS 2005). The OECD (2006) has located Australia in a group of countries where 'early childhood education and care systems tend to be more fragmented under governments that see early care as a private responsibility for parents, and not a public responsibility' (p. 46).

The importance of early childhood education and development has been endorsed by both international (for example, Heckman 2006) and Australian (for example, Thorpe et al. 2004) research. Early learning success is the best predictor of success in formal education, including school completion. The second-strongest predictor is social background. Therefore, the combination of early childhood education and social background has strong implications for social inclusion in the subsequent years of education. The Australian 'system' is a mixture of community and private provision (mostly fee based), weak parental leave provision and non-universal participation, with the weakest patterns of participation in formal provision among the most socially and economically vulnerable groups. This does not constitute a 'strong start' for social inclusion in education.

Transition

Participation in tertiary education, as in all countries, is linked with social background. There are features of post-school transition (apart from the transition to tertiary education in Australia) that have implications for social inclusion. Although females and non-English-speaking background (NESB) students are more likely to
enter university, those who do not face a greater risk of economic exclusion than male and English-speaking background students. The Australian labour market segregates strongly on the basis of gender and disadvantages NESB students.\(^1\) Isolated students also face disadvantages, and the disadvantages faced by Indigenous students are often compounded by isolation and weaker labour market networks.

Australia has second-highest levels of part-time employment and the highest levels of involuntary part-time employment among OECD countries, with 6.3 per cent of all workers in Australia in involuntary part-time work in 2007.\(^1\) Part-time employment is highly concentrated among young females. In 2005 45.6 per cent of 20–24-year-old females were in part-time work or looking for work.\(^1\) Furthermore, a significant percentage of females enter low-level vocational education and training courses (FYA 2008) that appear to have poor private rates of return (Long & Shar 2008).

The recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a weakening of the full-time youth labour market, and especially the female labour market. The 2009 economic climate suggests high risks of social and economic exclusion for early school leavers and some school completers, especially young women, isolated youth and Indigenous youth who do not enter tertiary education or gain a full-time job.

**Education policy: systems and government**

Education policy in Australia needs to be considered within the characteristics of the sectoral structure of Australian schooling, federalism and institutional separation, as outlined above. These structural characteristics have established patterns of relationships between the sectors and the levels of government within which policy trends can be identified.

The first set of relationships is between levels of government. Here, one trend is that of the Commonwealth setting the broad policy narratives. These have travelled from the social justice vision of the Whitlam government and its Schools Commission (Karmel 1973), the decline of this vision under the Fraser and Hawke governments, and the educational consumption agenda under the Howard government (Lingard 2000), through to the Rudd government's concentration upon human capital objectives, coupled with the principle of social inclusion.

Another trend is that of contestation between the two levels of government: the Commonwealth with unequal financial power has no operational capacity and state governments have operational policy capacities but a dependence upon Commonwealth finances (McMorrow 2008). The policy outcomes of these arrangements at
the intergovernmental level are patterns of negotiation, agreement and monitoring as the Commonwealth endeavours to exert its influence and the states seek to gain the resources with minimal trade-off of their policy autonomy. The Catholic sector is most exposed to Commonwealth policy interventions, given its high dependence upon Commonwealth funding (Croke 2007). On occasions, the Commonwealth has gone over the heads of the states and has directly funded programs in government schools.

The differences in financial power and administrative responsibilities between the levels of government lead to different policy agendas. There has been an observable trend over the past three decades for the Commonwealth to take the lead in areas such as migrant education, rural and remote education, Indigenous education, and vocational and career education. Because the Commonwealth has few operational responsibilities its policy initiatives can be more ideologically driven, as in the case of the Howard government’s requirements for schools to install flagpoles.

The second set of relationships is those between the government and non-government sectors. Despite the fact that both sectors are largely publicly funded, their policy regimes are mostly separate. This separateness, which is largely an historical artefact, has been reinforced by the enrolment drift to non-government schools. This drift has provoked defensive policy positions from state governments that are responsible for government schools.

A third set of relationships is those within a changing education policy community. In the past a privately funded non-government sector and relatively closed government systems funded and administered by state governments restricted policy to relatively closed policy communities. The advent of public funding for non-government schools and the entry of the Commonwealth into school education have forced a widening of the policy actors and agendas. The Commonwealth government has brought new agendas of employment policies and the needs of the economy, and in so doing has brought new constituents into education. The key employer groups now have extensive education policy statements (for example, ACCI 2007) that extend into primary and early childhood education. These new constituents have widened the education policy frames, with the economic and skilling agendas being the most obvious extensions. This has provided a platform for these actors to engage in discourses about such matters as teacher policy (BCA 2008b) on at least an equal footing with professional organisations.

Education policy impacts

The impact of education policy upon social inclusion in Australia needs to be seen within two sets of dynamics: the sets of relationships that are outlined above and
the changing environment for school education in Australia and internationally. The wider environment has been one of increased expectations of, and demands upon, schooling. Over the past decade, a period when public investment in tertiary education and vocational education and training in Australia declined in real terms, the levels of public investment in schooling increased in real terms and levels of private investment increased at a higher rate (Productivity Commission 2008a). An expression of growing parental expectations is the decline in levels of parental satisfaction with schooling (DESE 2007), despite the increased public investment and falling student–teacher ratios (ABS 2008c) and the lack of evidence of a decline in quality. The overall consequence of these two sets of dynamics is greater intensity in educational policy activity. Over the past two decades, four sets of policy outcomes have resulted.

The first and perhaps the most tangible of these was that of the devolution of management responsibilities to schools, mainly within the government sector. The growing sense of crisis of the government school sectors after a decade and a half of enrolment drifts to the non-government sector was the original driver of this policy. This allowed the state systems to remain relatively centralised in their governance, and especially their industrial governance, but looked towards management principles as a means of enhancing school quality. The management of government schooling in Australia in the relatively short period of the mid 1980s to mid 1990s advanced from one of the most centralised to one of the most devolved across OECD countries (OECD 2001b). Yet, the state school systems maintained their state-centric and closed governance characteristics.

This policy had a natural coupling with a second policy outcome of the principle of educational choice. Educational choice has a basis in social philosophy and market principles of quality improvement. The highly autonomous and large non-government sector provided a strong foundation for a school market in Australia (Marginson 1997) and changes in patterns of enrolments are indicators of its impact. As school enrolments plateaued, an oversupply of schools emerged in the 1990s. This was exacerbated through the transfer of students to the non-government sector and demographic changes that required state governments to establish new schools but be hesitant to close schools because of the potential electoral backlash.

The third policy outcome is sectoral competition for enrolments. Its most tangible expressions are the actions taken by state governments to increase the number of selective secondary schools and programs in order to attract the more scholastic and middle-class students. These supply-side interventions appear to contradict the ‘devolution’ and ‘choice’ policy themes. The contradiction is an outcome of the structural relationships within Australian schools that have been established through federalism, and federalism’s relationship with the government and non-government school sectors.
The government school sectors are essentially competing with the low-cost non-government schools, which are mostly Catholic schools. Yet the Catholic school enrolment share has been relatively stable over the past decade, with the independent sector effectively gaining the 0.4 per cent share that the government sector has lost on an annual basis (ABS 2008d). Catholic schools are gaining more middle-income students from the government sector and losing higher-income students to the independent sector (Smith 2008). Consequently, if the government sector policies are successful they will threaten the Catholic sector enrolments, and in all likelihood will provoke similar selective tactics on the part of Catholic schools and systems. In this situation the two sectors that have historically championed education for the poor will be implementing policies that undermine this legacy.

A final policy outcome has been that of the patterns of school funding. The Whitlam government negotiated its intervention in the school system upon the principle of need. This principle has seemed to diminish in rhetorical terms through the subsequent decades. Over this period the level of public funding to nongovernment schools has increased at a faster rate than for government schools, and the needs-based principle has been compromised within the Commonwealth funding program for non-government schools (Dowling 2007). Both the Commonwealth and state governments provide some needs or equity-based funding. However, since the Whitlam government the regime of voluntary school fees within government schools has grown, with obvious implications for poorer communities and their schools. Schools in these communities also tend to have low and often falling enrolments (Lamb 2007). The net result is that, on the whole, schools serving the poorest communities in Australia have the lowest or near the lowest levels of per student resources and the weakest economies of scale.

Resourcing patterns across Australian schooling are complex and lack transparency. However, two broad observations can be advanced. First, over the three decades since the Karmel Report (1973) and its needs-based principle there has been a relative transfer of the share of both public and private funding from high- to low-need schools and students. Apart from ideological and political drivers, this has been caused by the nature of the federalist framework of Australian school funding, and the centralist and quasi-corporatist nature of the government school systems. The latter point relates to the link between funding formula and centrally established industrial modes for schools, including class sizes and teaching hours.

The second observation is that Australia delivers a disproportionate amount of its public and private funding to secondary education by OECD standards (OECD 2008b; Angus 2008). The causes of this imbalance include the strong culture of positional competition within Australian secondary education (Marginson 1997) and the associated competition between schools and school systems, which have acted as drivers of resource increases.
Policy responses

The four broad policy outcomes sit alongside other economic and social environmental changes for school education policy that have raised private and public expectations of schooling across most countries. In Australia they have combined to produce an intense pressure for school and system improvement, especially across government sectors.

The policy strategies used by governments and departments have been informed by literature that locates the quality of teachers as the main variable in educational outcomes. This is a mantra that has been accepted by all governments across Australia and is expressed in the form of programs for school improvement and to strengthen the practice of teaching, often informed by North American researchers. They also have been expressed in proposals and some nascent programs for recruiting and developing better-quality teachers, and for locating better-quality teachers in high-need schools. Selection processes for teacher training, the quality of teacher training courses, performance-based pay, incentive payments, teaching standards, appraisal systems and school-based leadership and mentoring strategies abound in the policy lexicon of school systems, as well as the now-widened education policy community (see, for example, ACCI 2007).

Despite the considerable difficulties in their formulation and implementation, these policies have intuitive appeal. There has been a discernable and welcome shift in the policy discourse over the past decade from educational management to educational and now pedagogical leadership. There also is appeal in the arguments by people such as Elmore (2002) and Levin (2005) that teaching has been a profession without a practice and that those practices for which effectiveness have been validated need to be codified and adopted by teachers. There are, however, some consequences of this current education policy frame. A tangible effect has been the increase in student testing and school performance measures. Australia now has national assessments in literacy and numeracy for Years 3, 5, 7 and 9, and most students take exams at the end of Year 12. Schools in the government sectors are also monitored more closely against a range of performance measures. These measures provide greater diagnostic capacities for school, teacher and student improvement. However, schools with high concentrations of educational need typically get weaker results against these measures. This can have the effect of weakening their reputations and morale, and precipitating or exacerbating the flight of better-performing students—and teachers.

At a more complex level, the policy response frame of school and teacher improvement begs the question of the purpose of a school system. Within this frame the performance of the school system is the sum of individual school performances.
This is consistent with public choice principles that diminish the relevance of the patterns of outcomes of the collective school system (Buchanan & Tullock 1962). A more socially inclusive position would take account of distribution of outcomes (Rawls 1973) and the environmental factors that impact on the relative performance of schools and on ways in which parents are able to exercise choice. Here, education policy-makers in Australia have been reluctant to face up to an elephant at their table.

The social principle of choice in schooling does have justification. John Stuart Mill's (1865) argument on the limits of the state role in education still has relevance, and the parental right to not have a designated school imposed as the only option for their children is widely accepted. However, educational choice has significant limitations because of lack of variability in price and product type, which are conditions required of pure markets. Schooling for most students is free or almost free and the product is essentially the same, as moves towards a national curriculum demonstrate. The key variable is in the quality of schooling, or perceptions of it. Under these circumstances parents and schools need to use other means of differentiation for choice to work.

On the demand side parents use residence, networks, educational and cultural capital, and fees as means of accessing the higher-quality schools. On the supply side schools and systems use scholarships, selective programs and fee barriers as means of attracting the more scholastically capable students. Cultural capital and other assets that are needed to exercise choice are not distributed evenly across populations (Bourdieu & Passeron 1979). Market power is not evenly distributed across schools. Selection is zero sum, as for each selected student there is a further concentration of non-selected students. There are consequences for the principle of social inclusion for education systems that become more selective. The elephant at the table is the evidence of the growth of selectivity in Australian schooling and of the links between the patterns of selection and social geography. At a cross-sectoral level, the government school sector is losing students from middle-income households and gaining students from low-income households (CECV 2004). The sector accommodates a disproportionate share of Indigenous students and students with disabilities (Productivity Commission 2008a). Within systems there has been a household income polarisation of students.

There is a visible trend within Australian schooling of a concentration of students with high levels of educational needs within schools that are least equipped to meet these needs. These schools typically have higher levels of staff absence, lower levels of staff morale and a lack of staff renewal. As most of these schools have weaker scholastic results, their students suffer from the disadvantage of peer effects on their learning (Hanushek et al. 2003). The schools lack the economies of scale
to provide the range and intensity of programs that their students need. As well, the job of teaching is mostly more difficult in these schools.

Carniey (2008) has argued somewhat crudely, but accurately that, "The debate about choice has been had, and choice won" (p. 13). However, there is a debate to be had about its consequences and what should be done about them. A first step is to recognise this elephant. This involves recognition of the impact of the institutional settings in both a contemporary and a historical sense, and not confine the analysis of patterns of educational participation and outcomes to the practices of schools and their personnel.

Social inclusion in education: the future of policy

So what of the future for social inclusion in schooling in Australia? There are more promising signs at the level of the Commonwealth government and within the federalist activities in schooling. The Commonwealth (Gillard 2008) and the states and territories through COAG have revived the principle of educational equity. The National Education Agreement is to deliver extra funds for primary schooling and for disadvantaged schools (COAG 2008). The Commonwealth also has promised to universalise pre-school education in Australia. Arguably, the cultural or ideological shift is more important than the funding measures. Most of the extra monies provided by the Commonwealth will be distributed to most schools across the government and non-government sectors. Students who enter high-performing schools with strong scholastic cultures will have significant advantages over students in schools with weaker scholastic records and declining enrolments, but some extra needs funding.

While choice is embedded as a principle, the institutional factors that exacerbated its impact and restrict policy scope can be addressed. Measures to weaken the sectoral division in schooling would reduce the pressure for formal selective practices. Funding systems can encourage and reward schools to work together, including schools across sectors, and to accept their responsibilities towards all students. Changed administrative and industrial modes, together with funding systems, can allow the concentration of resources for early and other interventions that have been critical in highly inclusive school systems, such as Finland (Grubb et al. 2007; OECD 2007a). Area-based and full-service funding and governance can link parental and adult education with school education and broaden the frame of inclusion.
The recognition of the existence of educational disadvantage in Australia in the 1970s did not fully mature into a framework of educational and social inclusion. The sets of sectoral and governmental relations in Australian schooling have acted to prevent this maturation, and continue to do so. This has hampered the location of social inclusion within education policy and has helped to direct and isolate educational ‘equity’ policy to the area of the practices and competence of educational professionals.

Notes
1. There are similar patterns of larger calculations of enrolments in Vocational Education and Training administrative data compared with the Census data.
2. For example, NESB students have low rates of entry into apprenticeships (Polesel 2007; DETFA 2008), which are strongly network based.
3. OECD online database: www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3343,en_2649_33927_4091715_1_1_1_100.html.
5. This is based upon analysis of Victorian government schools funding data (2005) and discussions with officials in NSW and Western Australia. Also see Teese and Lamb (2005) and Angus (2008).
6. This is evidenced from administrative and survey data from Victorian government schools (2004).
Author/s: KEATING, J

Title: Education policy and social inclusion

Date: 2010

Citation: KEATING, J, Education policy and social inclusion, Social Policy in Australia: Understanding for Action, 2010, 2, pp. 210 - 223

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/30612

File Description: Education policy and social inclusion