The Security Council recognizes that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men...[and] that the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

—Ambassador Anwarul Karim Chowdury (2000)

President, UN-Security Council

Recent feminist efforts to engage with the United Nations (UN) Security Council could be dismissed as a futile attempt to employ the “master’s tools” to dismantle the “master’s house.” There is a long history of lip service by international institutions to the antimilitaristic ways of thinking that have been at the heart of women’s peace movements for centuries. However unlikely it was, these efforts have borne fruit as evidenced by the Statement of the Council’s President, Bangladeshi Ambassador Chowdury, on International Women’s Day in 2000, linking gender equality “inextricably”


with peace, the core project of the UN. The Statement was followed several months later, on October 31, by the Council's unanimous adoption of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security. The resolution calls for inter alia the increased participation of women in decision making related to the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflict. Although it is nonbinding, the resolution has been enormously productive. Not only has it provided the basis for strengthening institutional commitment to gender mainstreaming and continuing annual dialogue between women's peace advocates and the Security Council in New York, it has also supplied leverage for many grassroots women's groups to claim a role in peace negotiations and postconflict decision making.

The Security Council's endorsement of women's formal participation in decision making, aimed at preventing and resolving disputes that threaten international peace and security, potentially takes its work into uncharted waters. Equally, the aspiration that the Security Council might act as a conduit for feminist ideas introduces, for women's peace advocacy, a new strategy of engagement with power from within rather than from outside the military and diplomatic establishment – an opportunity that Virginia Woolf so famously declined many years ago. In this chapter, I explore these developments as an “alliance of gender legitimacy” between the Security Council and international women's peace advocates as represented by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's Office in New York (WILPF-UN). The WILPF-UN has taken a leading role in the Non-governmental Organization Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (NGO Working Group), which formed in the wake of Chowdury's Statement, initially to convince the Security Council to adopt such a resolution and, since its adoption, to promote its implementation. On the one hand, I suggest that Resolution 1325 formed a plank in the Council's efforts to enhance its flagging legitimacy at the end of the twentieth century. On the other hand, from

4 Chowdury (2000), see n. 1.
6 Ibid., paragraph 1.
8 Five NGOs were initially involved in the NGO Working Group: the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), International Alert, Amnesty International, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, and the Hague Appeal for Peace. Some of the founding NGOs have since left the working group and others have joined it. In April 2008, there were thirteen member NGOs. Available at www.womenpeacesecurity.org/about/.
the point of view of women's peace activists, engagement with the Security Council was an effort to enhance the legitimacy of their own agenda through association with the Council. I examine the fault lines produced by this seemingly unlikely alliance to expose the tensions and the synchronicities of the struggle over gender legitimacy.

As I argue in the next section, the Security Council's legitimacy problems mounted precipitously during the 1990s, as it adopted an expanded mandate that took its work into new and often controversial areas. I describe the increasingly insistent calls for reform of the Security Council and the convergence of many feminist concerns with these reform efforts. Building on Ian Hurd's compelling analysis of legitimacy and power in the context of the Council,¹⁰ I draw parallels between the issues raised in the recent debates and those that were of concern to smaller states in San Francisco in 1945, when they were consulted about the shape of the new institutions to be created by the UN Charter. The Security Council responded by seeking to "manage" the recent reform proposals in a way that is similar to the reaction of the Great Powers to the anxieties expressed in 1945, which was to represent the Council as committed to "procedural correctness" and produce a "discourse of assurance" to mitigate fears that it would be driven by self-interest rather than act in the collective good.¹¹ I suggest that the Security Council's response to its waning legitimacy has been to rebuild its "symbolic capital"¹² by employing similar techniques. In the process, the Council has developed a new means of assurance in the form of thematic resolutions, which demonstrate its concern for the well-being of civilians, including children and refugees, who may be affected by its interventions.

In the second section, I suggest that the Security Council's emerging discourse of gender remained deeply troubling for feminists, leading to the adoption of a bold new strategy for women's peace advocates. Despite having traditionally worked from "outside" institutions of power, it was decided to appropriate one of the Security Council's new techniques of assurance for feminist ends by seeking the adoption of a thematic resolution on women, peace, and security. I examine the contests over the text of Resolution 1325 in the processes that led to its adoption, highlighting the concessions made by WILPF-UN and other members of the NGO Working Group in their efforts to be "taken seriously" by Security Council members. I suggest that it was also a concession by the Security Council to add so-called women's issues to its agenda. I go on to examine the final text of Resolution 1325 as constituting

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 98–105.
¹² Ibid., p. 59.
the Council's means of managing doubts about its gender legitimacy. My textual analysis highlights the precariousness of the alliance that has been struck between the Security Council and its newfound allies and suggests that the reliance of the resolution on the Council's legitimacy presents a conundrum for feminists.

In the final section, I examine some of the purposes to which Resolution 1325 — as symbolic capital of the Security Council — has since been put in order to explore the production of gender legitimacy that is emerging from its implementation. To this end, I draw on the examples of Afghanistan, East Timor, and Iraq. In particular, I am interested in whether Resolution 1325 is providing a means of increasing the gender legitimacy of the Security Council in a feminist sense, which must involve delegitimizing at least some of the aspects of the Council's modus operandi that are inconsistent with feminist ideas. I also question whether this new engagement, and the compromises it necessitates, has enhanced the institutional legitimacy of feminist peace activism at the price of its popular legitimacy. My goal is to examine the extent to which the alliance of gender legitimacy between the Security Council and women's peace advocates provides yet another lesson in the futility of engaging the master's tools and the extent to which it may have opened new possibilities for feminist peace activism as it "comes to power."13

In critically examining Resolution 1325, my intention is not to undermine any of the efforts to work for peace that are associated with it. The issues are urgent: every day, many women's lives, families, neighborhoods, and communities are being destroyed by the brutalities and humiliations of armed conflict.14 There is no doubt that the expanding mandate of the Security Council, which continues to expand in the "war on terror" and an impending "environmental crisis," presents new challenges for women's peace advocates to creatively utilize opportunities to influence those who make the decisions that have such far-reaching consequences. My goal is not to generate "tensions between activist and academic approaches to thinking about 1325"15 but rather to make a contribution to the activist endeavor in a climate of spreading militarization and the hostility to women's equality that accompanies it.16

15 Cohn et al. (2004), see n. 9, p. 139.
16 Centre for Women's Global Leadership (2003). No CSW Agreed Conclusions on Women's Human Rights and Elimination of All Forms of Violence Against Women and Girls blames the
The Security Council’s “Management” of Its Legitimacy Quotient

The Security Council relies on ideas to legitimate its decisions and practices. It needs to discursively persuade states — and, increasingly, civil society — that it can be trusted to identify threats to international peace and security and respond in a way that ultimately serves the collective interests of the international community, despite being dominated by the Great Powers. This persuasive power relies on social processes, producing (and contesting) shared beliefs and stories about the Security Council, in order to establish and maintain its legitimacy. In the context of international institutions like the Council, which rely on “soft power” to persuade, Hurd provided a definition of the concept of legitimacy that I have found useful in thinking through the fault lines produced by the adoption of Resolution 1325. He described legitimacy as follows:

... the subjective condition in which actors internalize rules given by institutions...[which then] changes the relationship between the rule and the actor, redefining the actor’s sense of its own interests, and gives the actor an internal orientation that is biased towards following rules.17

Hurd’s reference to “rules” includes the expansive discursive tools utilized by international institutions in the process of governing, in their efforts to influence the decision-making calculus of states and other actors in the international community. In the interaction between “internalization” of rules and the changed behavior of international actors that results, “symbolic resources” are generated, which are empowered by association with the legitimized institution.

The Security Council, as Hurd argued, has many such symbolic resources that are often highly sought after not only by small states but also by the Great Powers. For example, many states devote great energy to having an issue of importance to them placed on the agenda of the Security Council, even when they expect no substantive response from the Council. If not acted on, the issue is listed, by default, in the Security Council’s Summary Statement, from where it is unlikely to be raised again; yet, states have vociferously resisted attempts to prune the list.18 In Hurd’s view, holding a place on the list has become a kind of “prestige resource” — quite independent from any concrete action taken on the matter — whereby the formal recognition of problems

17 Hurd (2007), see n. 10, pp. 64-65.
18 Ibid., pp. 113-116.
by the international community has become a resource that derives its value from the legitimacy of the Security Council. Powerful states also have sought to use the symbolic capital of the Council to enhance the legitimacy of their actions. For example, the United States sought Security Council authorization for both of its armed interventions in Iraq in 1990 and 2003, and Russia appropriated the “blue helmets and white trucks” associated with UN peacekeeping missions to legitimize its interventions in Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan during the 1990s – despite adhering to none of the basic principles that characterize the Security Council’s peacekeeping efforts. These examples illustrate the power that association with the Security Council has “by virtue of beliefs in its legitimacy” and help to explain why feminist peace advocates might also see some advantage in association with the Council. This analysis also accounts for the widespread concern about the Security Council’s waning legitimacy during the 1990s, which was presenting a threat to the usefulness of its symbols for other actors.

Because the processes by which international actors internalize and act on such rules are subjective, the Security Council cannot exert complete control over its symbolic capital. Therefore, although the internalization of its rules putatively strengthens the legitimacy of the Council – and, thus, the power of the strong states within it – it also leaves the rules open to contestation and reinterpretation, which can in turn place constraints on the states that produced the rules in the first place. In this sense, the use of the Security Council’s symbols is not limited to maintaining power relationships that benefit the Council but also can be utilized to transform them. Drawing from the work of French linguistic theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, Hurd argued that “once constituted, a symbol is a form of power . . . which allows a person or object to do things that could not be done before.” The flexibility of symbols makes it possible for the legitimacy of the Security Council to be contested by redefining whose interests it serves, such as when Libya challenged the Council’s sanctions imposed pursuant to the Lockerbie bombing. By questioning the Security Council’s procedural fairness and accusing the United States and the United Kingdom of using the Council to serve their individual interests, Libya was effective in impugning the Council’s own sanctions as presenting a threat to international peace and security, instead of Libya’s refusal to hand over the

19 Ibid., pp. 125–129.
20 Ibid., p. 112.
21 Ibid., p. 52.
bombing suspects for trial.\textsuperscript{24} I am interested in examining how Resolution 1325 – as part of the Security Council’s store of symbols – in a similar way might be used to serve feminist interests by challenging the Council’s exclusionary procedures and its well-worn militarist assumptions that depend on women’s inequality for their efficacy.

The legitimacy of the Security Council has always provided a ready point of contention,\textsuperscript{25} and it is not difficult to understand why. The “serious” power of the UN – to authorize and mandate enforcement measures including the collective use of force – is located within the Security Council, which was designed by the United States, United Kingdom, and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, later joined by China and eventually also France, to ensure their “legalized hegemony” in the realm of international security.\textsuperscript{26} To this end, the design awarded the five “great” powers permanent membership in the Security Council and the power to veto any nonprocedural “decisions” of the Council, which was to have “primary responsibility” for international peace and security.\textsuperscript{27} Nonpermanent rotating membership was to be enjoyed by six states, which was later increased to ten.\textsuperscript{28}

The design of the Security Council was the subject of great controversy at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. The Great Powers that had drafted the UN Charter invited other states to participate in its finalization, thereby creating an opportunity for the UN Charter – including the design of the Security Council – to be accepted and internalized as serving the collective interests of all states. The major points of contention were the voting privileges of the Great Powers, especially the wide range of matters over which the veto could be exercised, the criteria for both permanent and rotating membership, and the absence of limits to the Council’s powers.\textsuperscript{29} Hurd described how the opposition of the smaller states was “managed” procedurally by the Great Powers through a deliberative process that allowed all participants to express their views and, substantively, through reassurances that the veto would not be used capriciously.\textsuperscript{30} These legitimizing strategies resulted in smaller states

\textsuperscript{24} Hurd (2007), see n. 10, p. 156.  
\textsuperscript{25} Hurd (2007), see n. 10, p. 83.  
\textsuperscript{27} See \textit{Charter of the United Nations} (1945), Articles 23–27.  
\textsuperscript{29} Simpson (2003), see n. 26, pp. 180–188.  
\textsuperscript{30} Hurd (2007), see n. 10, pp. 95–105.
eventually embracing the proposed structure of the Security Council without change. Having voiced their concerns and exhausted the available avenues to oppose the veto, small states were won over by the sense of “procedural correctness” and the “discourse of reassurance” that the Security Council would act only in the collective welfare,\textsuperscript{31} internalizing a commitment to the Council that turned their relationship with the new institution from contestation to cooperation. It was these same two “rules” that Libya used in its attempts to delegitimize the Security Council five decades later.

Indeed, opportunities to test these rules took a long time to emerge. Misuse of the veto, in the way that was feared by small states in San Francisco, did not materialize for many years because of the Cold War. During this period, the Security Council suffered a paralysis that, although assisted by the veto, was not an abuse of power in the sense that had been anticipated in San Francisco. However, the end of the Cold War brought an immediate change to the Security Council’s state of inaction. Commencing in 1991 with its united response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, there was a period of unprecedented cooperation among the Great Powers. The apparent success of the collective enforcement action in Kuwait saw a sharp upturn in the Security Council’s legitimacy quotient, and many commentators happily predicted that the Council was finally poised to assume fully its UN Charter responsibilities by acting decisively in the event of threats to the peace.\textsuperscript{32}

However, as the Security Council’s confidence grew, its interpretation of its Chapter VII powers of enforcement became rapidly more expansive,\textsuperscript{33} and concerns about its legitimacy – similar to those that had been expressed in San Francisco – started to emerge. The Council’s expansiveness included interventions into what were essentially domestic disputes in Somalia,\textsuperscript{34} Haiti,\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 109–110.
\textsuperscript{33} Security Council Summit Meeting at the level of Heads of State adopted a Statement, S/23500, January 31, 1992, which declared that the absence of military conflict does not of itself ensure international peace and security, and that problems of an economic, social, or ecological kind also may become threats to international peace and security.
and Angola; the adoption of quasijudicial powers in delineating the border between Kuwait and Iraq; and the assumption of unprecedented legislative powers in the establishment of the Iraqi Compensation Commission and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Before long, the Security Council's measure of legitimacy "took a dive" as the enthusiasm for the revitalized Council gave way to growing concern, creating an environment that made many international actors more responsive to the Libyan strategy to delegitimize the Council than might otherwise have been possible.

The post-Cold War concerns about the legitimacy of the Security Council fueled a burgeoning of proposals for its reform, coming from two main camps: (1) those who focused on the "democratic deficit" of the Council's procedural arrangements, and (2) those who were concerned about the substantive injustice that was resulting from its operations in peacekeeping and, increasingly, enforcement. The proposals were generally sympathetic to the Security Council rather than presenting a fundamental challenge to its increased activism. Whereas the calls for reform are a measure of unease about the Council's assumption of expanded powers, they also indicate a widespread desire for reassurance in the form of new "rules," which can be internalized.

July 31, authorizing a multinational force "to use all necessary means" to ensure the return of democratically elected President Aristide.

38 Ibid.
“Democratizing” the Security Council by addressing perceptions of procedural unfairness has been urged primarily by states. As in San Francisco, the “un-representativeness” of the Council’s permanent and nonpermanent membership has emerged as a central issue but with a heightened awareness of the northern bias of its veto arrangements and a concern that its membership should reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. Anxieties about the lack of transparency of the Security Council’s decision making have also mounted. Since the end of the Cold War, the Council has become considerably more secretive, to the point that its public sessions are little more than a “rubber-stamping” of decisions negotiated earlier in private, including decisions under Chapter VII. Combined with the absence of institutional checks on the Security Council’s powers, this secrecy has made transparency a pressing concern. As Michael Reisman observed, “[d]ecisions that appear to go further than at any time in the history of the United Nations are now ultimately being taken, it seems, by a small group of states separately meeting in secret.” Nonstate actors also have raised concerns about the Council’s lack of openness to international civil society. All these proposals are aimed at rebuilding confidence in the Council’s “procedural correctness.”

42 Working Group on Security Council Reform, see n. 40.
44 Working Group on Security Council Reform, see n. 42. See also Russett, Bruce (ed.) (1997). The Once and Future Security Council (New York: St. Martin’s Press).
Addressing perceptions that the Security Council may be abusing its power in a substantive sense has been urged primarily by NGOs, bringing this constituency more into the purview of the Council. Reform proposals from this camp are concerned with the impact of the Council’s decision making on the ground in terms of economic justice, human rights, and sustainable peace. Proponents of “human security,” for instance, have challenged the Security Council’s state-centered approach, especially in light of its expanding mandate. Whereas Thomas Franck argued that issues of justice or fairness are separate from the notion of legitimacy – at least, in the international community of states where order must receive priority over justice – I believe that the legitimacy of international institutions is increasingly measured by the extent to which outcomes are consistent with contemporary notions of justice and human rights. These reforms highlight the need for a new discourse of assurance, which will allay concerns about the Security Council’s apparent lack of concern for the effects of its actions on ordinary people.

During the same period as the Security Council’s renaissance, women’s international peace movements also were enjoying resurgence. One impetus was widespread awareness of the brutalities directed at women during the


conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which was generating a "sea change" in the way that such violence had previously been understood.\textsuperscript{53} Military institutions were finding it less tenable to dismiss sexual violence as an unavoidable side effect of war\textsuperscript{54} as people came to understand that it served, in many instances, as an organized tool of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{55} At about the same time, women who had been forced into sexual servitude by the Japanese army during World War II were coming forward to speak of their experiences, despite the humiliation and shame that had kept them silent for so long.\textsuperscript{56} In light of these revelations, an increasingly confident international women's peace lobby was calling for action that would bring an end to the impunity that attended these crimes.\textsuperscript{57}

It did not take long for the feminist agenda to overlap with that of Security Council reform as reports alleging rape and sexual exploitation by peacekeepers in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Bosnia— as well as by forces involved in the Council's apparently successful enforcement action in Kuwait—suggested that militaries acting under the imprimatur of the UN were no different.\textsuperscript{58} Anne Orford noted that these and other negative consequences for women that have flowed from the Security Council's operations, including its sanctions regimes, have been totally ignored by mainstream analyses of these events. In her view, the apparent efficacy of the international security system relies on the silences of women and other marginalized groups, whose security and social status deteriorate as a result of Council interventions.\textsuperscript{59} Thus, feminist proposals for reform of the Security Council emerged, seeking to enhance its gender legitimacy through both procedural and substantive innovation.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 386.
Procedurally, feminists drew attention to the male-dominated membership of the Security Council, linking this to its militaristic approach and poor record of addressing "women's issues."\(^6^0\) They insisted that democratization must also include women's participation in decision making, within the Security Council as well as in peace negotiations and peacebuilding processes.\(^6^1\) Feminists were also concerned about the Council's lack of transparency, urging the establishment of mechanisms for it to consult with local communities whose "security" is directly affected by its actions and to allow people to seek redress for Council actions that adversely impact them. The creation of bodies to monitor complaints of sexual abuse by peacekeepers\(^6^2\) and investigate allegations of trafficking by UN peacekeeping personnel\(^6^3\) was among the proposals.

Substantively, feminists questioned the Security Council's "impoverished" understanding of international peace and security that "focuses on militarism and power supported by force"\(^6^4\) rather than on the substance or "justice" of its determinations and actions.\(^6^5\) They argued that the Council's militaristic and state-centered notions of peace and collective security reproduce hierarchical ideas about gender, which explains why many of its actions lead to an increase in the insecurity of women and other nonelite groups.\(^6^6\) They criticized the Security Council for not including women's security in its official calculus of military security,\(^6^7\) for failing to take into account the impact that Council-sponsored sanctions might have on civilian women,\(^6^8\) and for not factoring women's security and rights into the design and


\(^{61}\) Orford (1996), see n. 58, p. 392.

\(^{62}\) Ibid., pp. 393–394. Orford suggests that the World Bank Inspection Panel may provide a useful model.


\(^{66}\) Orford (1996), see n. 58, pp. 383, 395.


implementation of postconflict reconstruction. They argued the corollary to Ambassador Chowdury’s recognition that peace is “inextricably linked” with gender equality, that military solutions to international disputes cannot bring peace until they no longer rely fundamentally on gender inequality for their effectiveness.

In response, the Security Council followed the same course of management that was successful in San Francisco. Procedurally, although agreement about altering its composition remains elusive, some members of the Council have taken the initiative and sponsored several new practices designed to improve its democratic credentials. In 1992, during the crisis in the Balkans, Venezuelan Ambassador Diego Arria invited Security Council members to an informal gathering to hear the testimony of a Bosnian priest. The practice was continued and Arria Formula Meetings now take place nearly every month and are organized as part of the regular Security Council schedule. Another informal dialogue, between Council members and the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, was initiated in 1996 by the Global Policy Forum, involving about thirty NGOs. These briefings now occur almost every week with at least one of the ambassadors on the Security Council. Field visits by Council members to areas of conflict is another new practice, which has had the effect of sensitizing individual members to many of the realities of everyday civilian experiences of armed conflict. Although all of these exchanges are informal, they are tightly controlled by the Security Council, which issues invitations, approves the agenda, and requires the exchanges to be largely scripted. Even so, the innovations send positive signals about the Security Council’s amenability to more open procedures. That the Council is acutely aware of the need to maintain perceptions of “procedural correctness” was evident in the President’s 2000–2001 Annual Report to the General Assembly, when he reported the many public meetings

69 Charlesworth & Chinkin (2000), see n. 67, p. 262.
70 Chowdury (2000), see n. 1.
72 Ibid.
75 Interview with Felicity Hill, former Executive Officer of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), working at the time of the interview for UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), New York, May 3, 2002, p. 6.
76 Ibid., p. 30.
that had been held to improve the Council’s transparency and facilitate the participation of a wider group of UN members.\(^{77}\)

The Security Council also has made efforts to address some of the substantive issues raised by reformers. Significantly, it has departed from its usual practice of discussing international peace and security only in a specific context by holding open thematic debates about what might be defined broadly as “human-security” issues. Initiated by Canada during its presidency in 1999, with an Open Debate on the subject of civilians caught in armed conflict\(^{78}\) (followed soon after by another on the protection, rights, and welfare of war-affected children), thematic Open Debates have become a regular feature of the Security Council’s work. The debates have led to the adoption of a number of thematic resolutions that set out a type of social agenda for the Council. The resolutions seek to address some of the problems faced by civilians,\(^{79}\) especially children,\(^{80}\) in the context of armed conflict and its aftermath.\(^{81}\) These efforts have produced a new discourse of reassurance for the Security Council, expressing its concern to protect the most vulnerable victims of war.

In summary, the Security Council responded to anxieties about its legitimacy – precipitated by its rapid assumption of expanded powers following the end of the Cold War – by producing new rules that would rebuild its symbolic capital. To this end, it adopted procedural innovations aimed at resuscitating confidence in its procedural correctness and a new discourse of reassurance designed to rebuild trust in the Council’s commitment to acting for the common good. However, from a feminist perspective, these new developments did not come close to addressing the problem that the Security Council’s enlarged mandate presented the prospect that militarism will be extended into even more aspects of our everyday lives.\(^{82}\) Yet, as philosopher


\(^{78}\) Malone (2000), see n. 41, p. 28.


Michel Foucault once observed, whereas certain ways of thinking can have hegemonic effects, they also have within them the possibility of resistance and transformation.\footnote{Foucault, Michel (1986). "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in Paul Rabinow (ed.), \textit{The Foucault Reader}, p. 245, cited in Gordon, Colin (1991). "Governmental Rationality: An Introduction," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, \& Peter Miller (eds.), \textit{The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 1, 46.} Foucault’s observation links with Hurd’s view that the Security Council can never fully control the purposes to which its rules might be put. The challenge that faced feminists was to forge links between the Council’s expanded agenda and their own antimilitary, transformative ideas about international peace and security.\footnote{Feminist conceptions of international peace and security are diverse but generally involve a comprehensive approach that is concerned with addressing the many insecurities experienced by women and other marginalized groups, not only those associated directly with armed conflict but also the connected insecurities, in private and public life, that result from structural inequalities. Further, feminist conceptions are usually antimilitarist, drawing on the pacifist strategies, often developed by grassroots women, to organize against violence and conflict in their communities. See also Pettman, Jan Jindy (1996). \textit{Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics} (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen \& Unwin), pp. 105–106; Enloe, Cynthia (2000). \textit{Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives} (Berkley: University of California Press), pp. 3–4; Petersen, V. Spike, \& Runyan, Anne Sisson (1999). \textit{Global Gender Issues} (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp. 115–116.}

**Creating the Security Council’s Symbolic Capital in Gender Legitimacy**

Although the Security Council was responsive to many of the proposals aimed at improving its legitimacy, its emerging discourse on gender remained untouched by feminism, at least until Chowdury’s International Women’s Day Statement in 2000. The Council’s thematic resolutions on civilians were couched in language that conflated women and children into an undifferentiated “vulnerable group.”\footnote{United Nations (1999). S/RES/1265 (New York: Security Council), September 17, preamble paragraph 4; United Nations (2000). S/RES/1296 (New York: Security Council), April 19, preamble paragraph 4 and paragraphs 9 and 10; United Nations (2001). S/RES/1379 (New York: Security Council), November 20, paragraph 4. These provisions refer to “women, children and other vulnerable groups.” See also United Nations (1999). S/RES/1265 (New York: Security Council), September 17, paragraph 13.} Although the resolutions break the silence about sexual violence during armed conflict, the lack of references to women’s rights and equality confirms traditional gender stereotypes. Women are represented as dependent and defenseless victims needing military protection rather than as equal partners in dispute resolution, which exposes the gender conservatism of the Security Council’s emerging social agenda. Together with the rare references to women in previous resolutions, which were all concerned...
with their suffering as victims of sexual violence, \(^86\) the possibility that the Council might also recognize women’s agency in their own “protection” and in the resolution of armed conflicts would seem to be foreclosed—that is, until the adoption of Resolution 1325. In this section, I examine how Resolution 1325 emerged from a new strategy adopted by WILPF-UN and the coalition of NGOs that it facilitated, which was to engage directly with the Security Council by seeking a thematic resolution on women, peace, and security. I outline the contours of the alliance between the Council and feminist peace activists, suggesting that the engagement poses dilemmas for both parties, particularly for feminists.

In deciding to seek a Security Council thematic resolution, WILPF-UN faced some immediate problems. The organization has a long history of antimilitarism that dates back to World War I, when the first international women’s committee devoted exclusively to advocacy for peace was established (renamed WILPF in 1919). \(^87\) Since then, WILPF has tirelessly promoted a reduction in military expenditure, ending the arms trade, and bringing about general disarmament. Yet, not all members of the NGO Working Group agreed with these aims, and WILPF-UN was also aware that its antimilitarist goals were not taken seriously in the UN system. \(^88\) Therefore, WILPF-UN made the strategic decision to repackage its approach to make it more palatable to its NGO partners and to those it wanted to persuade within the UN. \(^89\) The decision was to promote the gender mainstreaming of the work of the Security Council, given that this policy already enjoyed systemwide support. \(^90\) As Sherri Gibbings suggested, “[t]he route to peace and ending war in this approach was no longer a reduction in military spending but the integration of women and a gender perspective.” \(^91\) By making this decision, WILPF-UN chose to pay a high price to gain access to the Security Council’s symbols, conceding substantial power to the Council before the real negotiations had even begun.

Although the idea of persuading the Security Council to adopt a resolution had been discussed informally by NGOs two years earlier at the 1998

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\(^86\) See, for example, United Nations (1993). S/RES/827 (New York: Security Council), May 25 (expressing concern about “massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women” in the former Yugoslavia).

\(^87\) Rupp (1997), see n. 3, p. 29. The Committee was originally called the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace.


\(^89\) Ibid., p. 59.

\(^90\) Ibid.

\(^91\) Ibid., p. 60.
Commission on the Status of Women (CSW),\textsuperscript{92} it was Chowdury’s Statement that served to mobilize them. Their resolve stiffened with the release of the Brahimi Report in June 2000, which made only two references to gender in its “comprehensive” review of the Security Council’s peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{93} Incensed, the NGO Working Group drafted the initial version of the resolution,\textsuperscript{94} which gave them the power to shape its core content. The NGOs agreed that their primary aspiration was to focus attention on women’s positive contributions to peace, aiming to shift the Council’s gender discourse from casting women exclusively as victims of armed conflict to also recognizing their role as peacemakers.\textsuperscript{95} The NGOs took the course of devoting “equal time” to issues associated with women as victims of armed conflict and as agents in peacebuilding. More specifically, the NGOs had three goals in mind: (1) to have gender issues routinely considered in the Security Council’s work; (2) to reinforce protections provided by existing international instruments and extend them into new areas such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs; and (3) to raise the profile of women’s local and national peacebuilding activities.\textsuperscript{96} After drafting the resolution, the NGO Working Group produced “talking points” and lists of “ideas and arguments” that they used to lobby UN agencies, Security Council members, other NGOs, and anyone else they thought could help.\textsuperscript{97} It is a testament to their remarkable lobbying efforts that the final text still reflected their general goals.

After the NGO Working Group had persuaded the Namibian Mission to take the lead in bringing the issue to the Security Council during its turn in the rotating presidency,\textsuperscript{98} others within the UN—including the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and some key individuals—provided substantial support.\textsuperscript{99} It fell to the Namibian Mission to undertake the hard work of persuading other Security Council members that the resolution was worth supporting. As the Mission’s responsible desk officer observed later in an interview with Gibbings, this process was often more about diplomatic

\textsuperscript{92} Cohn et al. (2004), see n. 9, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{94} Cohn et al. (2004), see n. 9, p. 130; Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, p. 51.
\textsuperscript{95} Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, p. 52.
\textsuperscript{96} Cohn et al. (2004), see n. 9, pp. 131–132.
\textsuperscript{97} Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{98} Namibia had supported gender mainstreaming in peace-support operations in the past, hosting a UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) seminar on “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations” in Windhoek, May 2000, which produced the \textit{Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action}, UN Doc. S/2000/693, A/55/138, July 14, 2000.
\textsuperscript{99} Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, p. 53.
socializing and bartering than support for the content of the resolution.\textsuperscript{100} Another of Gibbings’s interviewees described the process as “politics over gin and cigars.”\textsuperscript{101} Despite this performance, many Security Council members had strong views on the issue. Some were firmly of the opinion that the Council was not the place for discussion of women’s issues. As Gibbings argued, they were afraid that the Council’s association with women would weaken its symbolic power as a “masculine” institution, concerned with the “muscular” issues of military diplomacy and not with “soft” humanitarian issues, which belonged elsewhere.\textsuperscript{102} Fortunately for the NGO Working Group, there was a coincidence of supportive Security Council members who formed a critical mass and helped to persuade those who were reluctant.\textsuperscript{103} In the view of Felicity Hill, who was Executive Director of WILPF-UN at the time, the Security Council’s new practice of field visits also helped to make members more sympathetic to the concerns of the NGO Working Group.\textsuperscript{104}

Other new procedures adopted by the Security Council also came to the rescue of Resolution 1325. On October 23, 2000, an Arria Formula Meeting was convened, bringing Council members together with NGO representatives and women’s peace activists from several areas of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{105} At this meeting, the NGO Working Group urged the Security Council “to draw, to the utmost, on the insights, experience, indeed expertise, of women and civil society in matters of daily human security, conflict prevention, resolution, reconciliation, and reconstruction.”\textsuperscript{106} Having secured agreement from the other NGOs, WILPF-UN made an organizational statement that implored the Security Council to address the root causes of war, including regulating and reducing armaments, although this point was not linked to women’s

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., pp. 54–55.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., p. 56.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., pp. 40–42.
\textsuperscript{103} Hill (2002) interview, seen. 75, p. 3. In addition to Ambassador Chowdury, Patricia Durrant, the Jamaican Ambassador and a tireless supporter of women’s human rights, played a key role, as did Theo-Ben Gurirab from Namibia, who held the rotating presidency when the Open Session was held. The delegations from Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands were also supportive from the start.
\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{105} Statements were made by Isha Dyfan (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, Sierra Leone), Luz Mendez (Union National de Mujeres Guatemaltecas), Faiza Jama Mohamed (Equality Now), Ininge Mbikusita Mohamed (Federation of African Women’s Peace Movements), and the NGO Working Group on Women and International Peace and Security. Available at www.international-alert.org/women/.
equality. Anticipation was palpable. The next day, the Council held an Open Debate on Women, Peace, and Security at which more than forty governments made statements in support of a resolution promoting the incorporation of a gender perspective into much of the work of the Council. Although every statement referred to women’s suffering as victims of war, the emerging consensus was that women’s contributions to peace also needed recognition, as evident in Canada’s statement:

We must also ensure that our focus is not restricted to issues of the victimization of women — vital as it is to grapple with them. We must also address ourselves to the positive contribution that women ... can and do make to conflict prevention and postconflict peacebuilding.

Namibia’s official statement, undeterred by qualms about emasculation, proclaimed that the “mindset, especially of men, must change and give way to new thinking and a new beginning for the UN in the field of conflict resolution and peacekeeping.” Also bringing new life to the Security Council was the applause from the spectators in the Council’s gallery when Resolution 1325 was unanimously adopted a week later. It would seem that feminist activism had indeed moved from the margins of military diplomacy to its internal chambers.

Resolution 1325 not only responds to some of the concerns about the Security Council’s legitimacy raised earlier by feminists but also bears many marks of the long-standing objectives of women’s peace movements. Its starting point is the need for the increased participation of women in decision making related to the prevention, management, and resolution of disputes — in international negotiations as well as in field-based operations — reflecting the primary aspiration of the NGO Working Group. Attributing political agency to women in the realm of military affairs had received rhetorical

107 Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, p. 62.
111 Rupp (1997), see n. 3, p. 207. The “first wave” of women’s international opposition to war was strongly influenced by the suffragettes, many of whom hoped that women’s political participation would make armed conflict impossible.
endorsement in earlier soft-law instruments\textsuperscript{113} but was yet to be realized in UN practice.\textsuperscript{114} By embracing women as political actors, the Security Council marks a break in its previous tradition of treating “women and children” as an object of protection in the context of armed conflict. For the first time, the Security Council formally recognizes women not merely as participants but also as \textit{indispensable} participants in conflict resolution and peace negotiations, opening new opportunities for women’s entry into these traditionally “male” spaces.

In a limited way, Resolution 1325 also responds to some of the substantive concerns raised by feminists by acknowledging the need for the Security Council to be attentive to the gender-differentiated consequences of its decisions. To this end, under Article 41, the Council affirms its “readiness” to “consider” the potential impact on the civilian population, “especially women and girls,” of measures taken short of the use of force.\textsuperscript{115} Significantly, however, there is no expression of “readiness” to extend such considerations to the adoption of forceful measures taken under Article 42. This silence preserves well-worn gendered assumptions about what is considered in the calculus of military decision making\textsuperscript{116} and in official assessments of military “success.”\textsuperscript{117} The only reference to “disarmament” is in the limited context of postconflict reintegration of former combatants.\textsuperscript{118} With the Security Council’s military enforcement powers located firmly outside the Resolution 1325 sphere of influence, the Council is insulated from feminist critiques of militarism.

Would the outcome have been different if WILPF-UN had taken a different course and insisted on drawing links between gender inequality and militarism in the first draft of Resolution 1325? It is telling that even the Security Council’s own responsibilities under Article 26 of the UN


\textsuperscript{114} Otto (2006), see n. 3.

\textsuperscript{115} United Nations (2000), see n. 5, paragraph 14. Measures employed under Article 41, to give effect to Security Council decisions, are those that do not involve the use of armed force, including economic sanctions, the curtailment of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.


\textsuperscript{117} Orford (1996), see n. 58, p. 385.

\textsuperscript{118} United Nations (2000), see n. 5, paragraph 13.
Charter to establish systems to “regulate” armaments do not rate a mention in Resolution 1325. This omission is conspicuous when compared with the commitments made by states in Beijing at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women to reduce excessive military expenditure and control the availability of arms.\textsuperscript{119} Neither does the resolution give any indication that the Security Council might be ready to rethink its approach to security in other ways that were endorsed in Beijing – for example, by highlighting the importance of nonviolent forms of conflict resolution and fostering a culture of peace.\textsuperscript{120} The preemptive WILPF-UN concession may have given away more than was necessary.

Even so, Resolution 1325 opens important new opportunities for exposing the Security Council to alternative conceptions of security by acknowledging its “willingness” to ensure that its missions consider gender issues, including through “consultation” with local and international women’s groups,\textsuperscript{121} and to urge that peace agreements adopt a “gender perspective,”\textsuperscript{122} including measures that “support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution.”\textsuperscript{123} These commitments provide leverage for local and national women’s peace advocates to claim a role in mainstream political processes concerned with negotiating and implementing peace agreements and facilitating peacebuilding. If successful, the inclusion of women produces multigendered spaces that are likely to be more hospitable to perspectives that are normally excluded from the calculus of military decision making because they are marked as “feminine” or “wimpish.”\textsuperscript{124} Valuing women’s political participation at the local level may help communities to embrace alternative forms of dispute resolution that, in turn, may destabilize the foundational assumptions that have informed the Security Council’s approach to international peace and security. The diverse representations of women in Resolution 1325 – as leaders, combatants, and human-rights defenders – also unsettle the gender dualities that sustain militarism, challenging the “bright line” between the public world of military and political affairs and the private world of home and family, where “feminine” values are said to belong. Disturbing the sense of permanency that is attached to dichotomous

\textsuperscript{119} Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995), see n. 113, Strategic Objective E.2. See also paragraph 143(f)(i), in which governments undertake to “work actively towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., Strategic Objective E.4.
\textsuperscript{121} United Nations (2000), see n. 5, paragraph 15.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., paragraph 8.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., paragraph 8(b).
\textsuperscript{124} See also Gardam, Judith G., & Jarvis, Michelle J. (2001). Women, Armed Conflict, and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer), ch. 2; Cohn (1993), see n. 116.
conceptions of gender is a necessary precondition for the "new thinking" and "new beginning" anticipated by the Namibian Ambassador in the Open Debate.

From the viewpoint of the NGO Working Group, Resolution 1325 promotes a gender-mainstreaming agenda, as it had hoped. In addition to urging the participation of women in decision making at all levels, the resolution expresses the Security Council's "willingness" to incorporate a "gender perspective" into peacekeeping operations¹²⁵ and urges "gender-sensitive" training for peacekeeping personnel.¹²⁶ The Secretary-General is requested "where appropriate" to include information about progress toward gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions in his reports to the Security Council.¹²⁷ Also in keeping with the strategy of the NGO Working Group, Resolution 1325 gives "equal time" to women's protection as victims of armed conflict and their contributions as active participants in peacemaking. The language of "protection"¹²⁸ is offset by the language of "women's rights."¹²⁹ However, although women's "equality" may be implicit in the notion of women's rights, it is significant that there is only one explicit reference to "equality," which is in the resolution's preamble.¹³⁰ Chowdury's recognition that women's equality is "inextricably linked" to peace is absent.

Accountability mechanisms that could monitor its overall implementation are absent from Resolution 1325, as are bodies that could address complaints by civilians who are adversely impacted by the Security Council's operations. Although the NGO Working Group's draft envisaged that the Secretary-General would set up an expert panel to work with UN agencies and departments to implement the resolution, this was missing from the final text.¹³¹ Also lost was a recommendation that the Security Council commit itself to further discussions with NGOs over the course of the resolution's implementation.¹³² In place of the missing proposals, the Secretary-General is requested to carry out a study on "the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peacebuilding and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution."¹³³ Formal responsibility for follow-up was to be an internal matter, ignoring the need for independent monitoring.

¹²⁵ United Nations (2000), see n. 5, paragraph 4. See also preamble paragraph 8.
¹²⁶ Ibid., paragraphs 6–7.
¹²⁷ Ibid., paragraph 17.
¹²⁸ Ibid., paragraphs 9–11. See also preamble paragraphs 4, 9, and 10.
¹²⁹ Ibid., paragraphs 6, 8, 9, and 15. See also preamble paragraphs 6 and 9.
¹³⁰ Ibid., preamble paragraph 5.
¹³¹ Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, pp. 57–58.
¹³² Ibid., p. 58.
¹³³ United Nations (2000), see n. 5, para. 16.
From the viewpoint of the Security Council, Resolution 1325 was designed to “manage” the concerns that had been expressed about its gender legitimacy, using the same techniques that had been successful in San Francisco. Having accepted an initial draft – conveniently drawn up by a group of international NGOs who had modified their views so they would be more palatable to the Council – and consulted widely about its content, the Council could be assured that the resolution would be well received by states, UN agencies and departments, and civil society. By expressing the Security Council’s desire to ensure women’s inclusion in decision making related to international peace and security, Resolution 1325 enhances perceptions of its procedural correctness. By communicating the Council’s appreciation of the contributions made by women as peacemakers and its concern about the many ways that women may be adversely affected by armed conflict, the resolution strengthens the Council’s discourse of reassurance. The Security Council’s control over the final wording of Resolution 1325 ensured the erasure of text that might disrupt its modus operandi and dampened expectations that the Council might internalize its own new “rule” by failing to establish a means of accountability. Gender mainstreaming was something that the Security Council – as part of the UN system – was expected to implement, and Resolution 1325 provided a means for the Council to engage with women on its own terms. Although it was a risk that a resolution on “women’s” issues would be perceived as a “sign of weakness,” thereby delegitimizing the Council’s standing as the guardian of international peace and security, members were persuaded that the risk was outweighed by the benefits that would flow from the symbolic enhancement of its gender legitimacy.

Still, the alliance between the Security Council and the NGO Working Group, brought into being by Resolution 1325, is not totally within the Council’s control. There is no doubt that WILPF-UN paid a substantial price for access to the Council’s symbols, as did many of the other NGOs involved. Also, the Council has significant power as gatekeeper of the resolution because it can set the formal conditions under which it is used. However, as I have argued, the resolution also creates leverage that can be utilized by women’s peace activists to insist on their participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and it opens new opportunities for promoting women’s equality and challenging militarist orchestrations of international

134 Another member of the NGO Working Group, The Hague Appeal for Peace, wanted the resolution to promote a “culture of peace” and “peace education” and, like WILPF-UN, also wanted to press its critique of militarism. Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, p. 61.
135 Hurd (2007), see n. 10, p. 59.
peace and security. Resolution 1325 has this power because on becoming part of the Security Council’s store of symbolic capital, it attained special political significance, even without the Council acting on it. Simply being coupled with the Council gives the resolution power, which opens the potential that it will be internalized by other international actors, enabling new practices in the name of gender mainstreaming. As a valuable resource—a “currency of power”—it may be possible for the NGO Working Group to use Resolution 1325 to challenge hierarchical gender relations and perhaps even militarism. Although this power creates some risks for the Security Council, the greater risk has been assumed by WILPF-UN and other members of the NGO Working Group who face the prospect that Resolution 1325 will help to legitimize the Council’s military projects rather than their own transformative feminist agendas. Crucial to understanding this struggle, and how it might unfold, is appreciating that Resolution 1325 is reliant on the legitimacy of the Security Council for its credibility. Therefore, the power of the resolution depends on its being used “within the boundaries of meaning” set by the Council. This produces a puzzle for the NGO Working Group: how to utilize this new power for feminist ends without undermining the Council’s legitimacy.

Negotiating the Alliance of Gender Legitimacy between the Security Council and Feminists

Once adopted, the value of Resolution 1325 as symbolic capital—for the Security Council on the one hand and the NGO Working Group on the other—remained heavily dependent on the political struggle between them over its meaning and application. Unlike resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1325 is not binding. Without formal mechanisms for monitoring and implementation, it is likely that many Council members expected it to simply gather dust in the UN archives. However, having succeeded in creating a new and potentially powerful symbol of women’s agency in the cause of peace, the NGO Working Group was not about to allow that to happen. In this final section, using the examples of Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Iraq, I explore some of the struggles that have taken place in the implementation of the resolution and the challenges they have presented for the NGO Working Group.

Immediately following its adoption, Resolution 1325 became a site of concerted feminist activity with far-reaching effects within the UN system and

136 Ibid., p. 52.
137 Ibid., p. 54.
138 Ibid., p. 57.
outside it in peace negotiations and postconflict reconstruction. The NGO Working Group worked tirelessly to publicize the resolution, presenting it as a women’s manifesto that was “binding” on the Security Council. It made a particular effort to ensure that women in conflict zones were aware of the resolution by translating it into dozens of languages and distributing thousands of print copies. The WILPF-UN divided its operations into two projects, marking a separation that would enable it to continue its work with the Council as well as move forward with its antimilitarist agenda. Fostering the implementation of Resolution 1325 became the task of its “PeaceWomen” project, whereas “Reaching Critical Will” was aimed at enhancing NGO participation in UN disarmament forums. PeaceWomen focused on raising awareness and exchanging information about Resolution 1325 by launching a Web site and producing a regular e-mail newsletter. To foster innovative thinking about how the resolution could be used, many consultations and workshops with women’s peace advocates were organized. Local women’s groups, in the midst of conflicts and postconflict reconstruction, proved more than eager to embrace the resolution and exploit the possibilities it offered. The PeaceWomen portal records use of the resolution by women’s groups in more than fifty-eight situations of conflict. Many creative projects have based their rationale on Resolution 1325, such as building a women’s support network spanning Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania and establishing women’s community media in Melanesia. Transnational women’s peace and human-rights networks have been strengthened, often serving to bolster local efforts to promote feminist approaches to peace and security. As


140 Cohn et al. (2004), see n. 9, p. 132.

141 The resolution was available online in eighty-four languages, with a further eight translations pending, April 28, 2008, available at www.peacewomen.org/1325inTranslation/index.html.


observed by the authors of an independent study commissioned by UNIFEM to complement the Secretary-General’s study requested by Resolution 1325, the resolution has given a new “political legitimacy” to the long history of women’s peace activism.147

Within the UN, the Inter-agency Network on Women and Gender Equality established a Task Force on Women, Peace, and Security—including nearly all UN agencies—to promote the integration of gender perspectives into all the peace and security work of the UN bureaucracy.148 Supportive states organized into an intergovernmental group—called the Friends of Women, Peace, and Security—to support the resolution’s implementation. As a result of an intensive lobbying campaign by NGOs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations finally created the position of Gender Advisor in 2003, whose role is to support gender initiatives in peacekeeping missions. These and many other developments meant that pressure continued to build for a mechanism that would review and evaluate implementation of Resolution 1325. Finally, following a request from the Security Council, a UN Systemwide Action Plan was adopted in 2005.149 The work of the Inter-agency Task Force, the ambitious plan is organized into twelve areas of action and identifies objectives, strategies, timelines, and resources for each area. However, although the Secretary-General’s 2006 review of the plan’s implementation confirmed that significant institutional activity had been generated by the resolution, there was little evidence of overall coordination or coherence.150 The review concluded that the role of women in peace processes generally is still considered a “side issue” rather than fundamental to sustainable peace.151

Two years after Resolution 1325 was adopted, the Secretary-General’s study was presented to the Security Council152 along with the study commissioned by UNIFEM.153 Affirming the approach of the resolution, both studies found

147 Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), see n. 14, p. 3.
151 Ibid., paragraph 47.
153 Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), see n. 14.
that armed conflict was having devastating consequences for women and that UN peacemaking and peacebuilding practices needed to be more inclusive of women and more responsive to their needs and concerns. However, striking differences between the two studies emerge because of their different methodologies. Whereas the Secretary-General’s report – which reviews the activities of the UN and its specialized agencies in light of Resolution 1325 – conveys a strong message about the urgent need for substantial change in the UN’s peacekeeping work, its diplomatic language mutes feminist analysis and points to technical solutions to the problems identified. In contrast, the UNIFEM study bases its analysis on interviews with women victims and survivors of armed conflict,\textsuperscript{154} which results in forthright criticism of present practices and concreteness in describing their harmful consequences for women. Its conclusions are informed by a feminist awareness of the entrenched nature of gender inequality and the need for careful strategizing if change is to occur.

Follow-up efforts by the Security Council have been erratic, at best, despite the store of information provided by these studies, which could inform its implementation of Resolution 1325. In contrast to the increased activism of women’s peace movements and the impressive array of institutional developments, actions by the Security Council in the spirit of the resolution have been rare. Increased women’s participation in formal decision-making processes has been uneven, as the case studies of Afghanistan and East Timor demonstrate, despite the resolution’s clear injunction that it is a priority. Indeed, NGOs have had to work hard just to keep Resolution 1325 on the Council’s agenda. Largely as a result of their perseverance, the resolution has been reaffirmed by the Security Council in annual activities, including follow-up Arria Formula Meetings,\textsuperscript{155} Open Debates,\textsuperscript{156} and Presidential


\textsuperscript{155} The second Arria Formula Meeting was held on October 30, 2001, at which Security Council members heard testimonies from women from East Timor, Kosovo, and Afghanistan and a statement from the NGO Working Group. At the third Arria Formula Meeting, October 23, 2002, it was planned that women from Uganda, Burundi, India, and Israel would make presentations. In the end, only Angelina Atyam from Uganda was able to officially address the Security Council because two of the other women were unable to get to New York for the occasion. Gila Svirsky, from Women in Black in Israel, was only allowed to say a few words due to the “sensitivity of Middle East politics.” See “Statements by Women from War-Torn Countries,” \textit{1325 PeaceWomen E-News}, Vol. 12, November 1, 2002, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{156} Security Council Open Debates on Women, Peace, and Security were held on October 28–29, 2002, October 29, 2003, and annually since then.
Statements.\textsuperscript{157} Although, as Hill observed, input to the Security Council by these means primarily has been in the form of individual testimonies from women affected by armed conflict rather than critical debates about strategy and implementation.\textsuperscript{158} Many of the official statements at the Open Debate marking the resolution's third anniversary in October 2003 expressed deep dissatisfaction with the pace of implementation.\textsuperscript{159} In 2006, the Secretary-General reported that since the adoption of Resolution 1325, only 55 of the Security Council's 211 country-specific resolutions (i.e., 26.07 percent) made any reference to "women" or "gender."\textsuperscript{160} The dismal record of the Council's substantive engagement with gender mainstreaming demonstrates that it has not internalized its own new "rule."

Lack of internalization is also evident in the Secretary-General's work. In the study prepared for the Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1325, he observed that "[o]ne of the greatest challenges is harnessing the energy and activism that many women exhibit in informal activities and translating that into their participation and influence in formal activities."\textsuperscript{161} However, the insight that women have a crucial contribution to make to conflict resolution and peacebuilding was nowhere apparent in his detailed proposals for major UN reform in March 2005.\textsuperscript{162} Only five months earlier, in a follow-up report on the resolution to the Security Council, he had expressed his intention to "analyze the obstacles and missed opportunities for women's full participation in peace negotiations and develop strategies accordingly."\textsuperscript{163} To the extent that women's informal peacemaking activities have translated into direct participation in formal processes of postconflict decision making, it


\textsuperscript{158} Cohn et al. (2004), above n. 9, p. 133 (comment by Hill).

\textsuperscript{159} A summary of the debate is available at www.peacewomen.org/un/SCOpenDebate2003/OpenDebate2003index.html.

\textsuperscript{160} Report of the Secretary-General (2006), see n. 150, para. 28. The PeaceWomen Project continues to monitor Council resolutions. Updated to June 29, 2007, they report that 77 of 272 country-specific resolutions (28.31 percent) passed since the adoption of Resolution 1325 contained language on women or gender.

\textsuperscript{161} Secretary-General (2002), see n. 152, para. 212.


has been due more to the new political legitimacy of women's peace activism than to the efforts of the Security Council or the Secretary-General.

Afghanistan, the first major testing ground for Resolution 1325, provides a good example. Although the Security Council made no reference to Resolution 1325 in any of its resolutions on rebuilding Afghanistan following the U.S. occupation in November 2001, it was used to rally a coalition of women—including Hollywood celebrities, women's-rights activists, politicians, and UN ambassadors—to demand that women be included in political negotiations following the occupation. As a direct result, four women were included in the Bonn Conference held in December 2001, where the first stage of these negotiations took place, despite the initial plan to include women only at a later stage. The Bonn Agreement included a commitment to the eventual establishment of a "broad-based, gender-sensitive, multiethnic, and fully representative government," and two women were appointed to the thirty-member Interim Administration. The Bonn Agreement also called for women's participation in the Emergency Loya Jirga (i.e., Tribal Council) to elect the transitional government, which led to the involvement of about two hundred women from all regions in this crucial meeting.

Yet, at the same time as women's increased participation in formal decision-making processes was being celebrated, the majority of women in Afghanistan continued to feel powerless and insecure. As the Secretary-General's study observes, women's inequality can persist and even deepen in postconflict societies. In Afghanistan, particularly outside Kabul, warlords were

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166 Secretary-General (2002), see n. 152, paragraph 195, noting that two of the women were delegates and two were observers. *Contra* Neuwirth, ibid., p. 256, who claims that six women attended, three of them as delegates and three as observers.


169 Ibid., Annex IV. They were Dr. Sima Samar (Vice-Chair and Minister for Women's Affairs) and Dr. Suhaila Seddiqi (Minister for Public Health).

170 United Nations (2002), see n. 152, paragraph 195.

171 Rehn & Sirleaf (2002), see n. 14, p. 2.

172 Secretary-General (2002), see n. 152, paragraph 338; Gardam & Jarvis (2001), see n. 124, p. 21.
reentrenching themselves\textsuperscript{173} and violence against women was increasing at a dramatic rate\textsuperscript{174} – not only violating women’s and girls’ rights to bodily integrity but also denying them access to education, political participation, health care, and employment.\textsuperscript{175} In March 2004, two and a half years after the U.S. occupation, the \textit{New York Times} reported that increasing numbers of young Afghan women were committing suicide in order to escape the cruelties of traditional family practices and conservative Islamic beliefs, which countenance forced marriages and domestic violence.\textsuperscript{176} Nearly seven years after the initial U.S. occupation, there are reports that Afghanistan’s Parliament, at the behest of fundamentalist religious elites, is considering laws that will formally reimpose many of the Taliban-era restrictions on women’s freedom.\textsuperscript{177} The measured increase in women’s participation in formal politics was not stemming the tide of militarism or improving women’s status more generally as the NGO Working Group had hoped; on the contrary, in some respects, life was worse for women.

A similar picture emerged in Timor-Leste. Although the Security Council established the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) twelve months before the adoption of Resolution 1325, it was the first Council mandate to refer to the importance of including personnel who had “training” in the gender-related provisions of international law.\textsuperscript{178} At the first National Congress of Women in June 2000,\textsuperscript{179} a statement was adopted that called for UNTAET to “fulfill the United Nations commitment to gender equity.”\textsuperscript{180} The women’s lobby succeeded in having thirteen women included in the thirty-three-member National Council, which was established in July 2000 to advise the Transitional Administrator on legislative


\textsuperscript{179} Charlesworth & Wood (2002), ibid.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., p. 333.

The experiences in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste suggest that the presence of women in decision making is not in itself enough to bring about substantive change in the “mindset” of postconflict reconstruction, heavily influenced by military and diplomatic agendas focused on state-building. In the rush to establish transitional governance, adopt new constitutions, and hold elections, the worsening security of women was ignored, despite “gender mainstreaming.” In interviews with women in Timor-Leste, Hilary Charlesworth and Mary Wood found many who felt frustrated by the
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preoccupation with counting the number of women in the various UNTAET bodies because this conceived of women’s empowerment in “excessively narrow terms.” Such frustrations highlight the dangers of mainstreaming a feminist agenda, which can lose its substantive political content in the conversion to bureaucratic goals. Sally Baden and Anne-Marie Goetz described this process in the context of development programs, showing how gender analysis can be reinterpreted as an “interesting statistical variable” to suit institutional needs, stripping it of feminist goals like realizing human rights and social justice. In the same way, the statistics showing an increase in women’s political participation, pursuant to Resolution 1325, may serve institutional needs by enhancing the gender legitimacy of the UN’s efforts at postconflict state-building in a procedural sense while failing to address women’s daily insecurities in the postconflict period.

The use of Resolution 1325 in Iraq, following the invasion in March 2003 by the United States, the United Kingdom, and their “coalition of the willing,” presented further dilemmas for the NGOs in alliance with the Security Council. In contrast to Afghanistan and Timor-Leste, where the Council’s missions were widely supported, the war in Iraq was intensely controversial, and WILPF-UN and others in the NGO Working Group had lobbied in an effort to prevent it. Even so, they pressed the Security Council to ensure that gender mainstreaming took place in Iraq’s reconstruction. In this case, it suited the United States and the United Kingdom to be seen as supporting women’s participation in Iraq, to bolster the claim that they were bringing “freedom” and “democracy” to an Islamic population. When Paula Dobriansky, U.S. Under-secretary of State for Global Affairs, addressed women participating in a day of workshops in Baghdad, she conveyed a “personal message” from President Bush commending them on their commitment to creating a free and inclusive Iraq. The Security Council’s resolution on Iraq, which “permitted” the ongoing occupation and gave the UN a role in providing humanitarian assistance, recalled Resolution 1325 in its preamble in the

189 Gibbings (2004), see n. 88, pp. 84–85.
context of encouraging the establishment of a representative government. This move implicated the NGO Working Group in the Council’s legitimation of the Iraqi occupation, clearly compromising many of its constituents and the broader antiwar efforts of women’s peace advocates. Furthermore, as Gibbings pointed out, the advocacy of the NGO Working Group assumed that Iraqi women, who had suffered for many years under the Security Council’s sanctions regime, would welcome the Council’s endorsement of their participation in reconstruction. Here, as in Afghanistan, where women had been heralded by the U.S. State Department as the “new democracy leaders,” the invocation of Resolution 1325 was used to justify military occupation in the name of “liberating” women.

The political struggle between the Security Council and the NGO Working Group over the interpretation and application of Resolution 1325 has had mixed results for both members of the alliance. On the NGO Working Group’s side of the ledger, the symbol of the resolution has legitimated one of the long-standing demands of feminist peace advocates: women must be included in decision making about international peace and security. There is no doubt that Resolution 1325 provides powerful leverage toward this goal and, in the process, it has helped to focus and strengthen local and international networks of women’s peace activists. However, women’s new political inclusion is not translating into the paradigm shift in thinking about security and postconflict reconstruction that was the hope of many in the NGO Working Group. Instead, the increased presence of women is being harnessed to facilitate the existing projects of the Security Council by legitimating military intervention and occupation in the name of women’s rights and supporting “business-as-usual” state-building in postconflict reconstruction. In this way, the resolution poses a threat to the legitimacy of the international women’s peace movement to the extent that it provides a smokescreen for the Council’s military and imperial projects.

On the Security Council’s side of the ledger, its legitimacy is also enhanced by the increased participation of women in postconflict decision making, which strengthens perceptions of its commitment to procedural correctness – one of the cornerstones of its store of symbolic capital. In addition,
Resolution 1325 has boosted the Council’s substantive legitimacy by providing a ready store of gender capital that can be used to reassure skeptics about its commitment to gender mainstreaming. The extensive institutional support systems that have been established to “implement” the resolution provide ample evidence of this commitment, even if the Security Council’s own practice is wanting. However, it must be of concern to the Council that women’s informal participation in peacebuilding processes has drawn great sustenance from the resolution and is flourishing in its wake. Women are continuing to explore how Resolution 1325, as a form of power, might be used to transform the relationship between the Council and feminist ideas so that the paradigm shift in security thinking might yet occur. This development potentially poses a great threat to the legitimacy of the Security Council’s military mindset if— as Audre Lorde, Virginia Woolf, and so many others might have counseled— the best position to push international actors toward internalization of the resolution is from “outside” the “master’s house.”

Indeed, many nonstate actors have employed the symbolic capital of international institutions to legitimize their local struggles for change by infusing those symbols with new meaning. Hurd used as one example the strategic choice by Chiapas protesters in Mexico to launch their rebellion on January 1, 1994, the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement came into operation.\(^{195}\) Two other examples are the use of UN General Assembly Declarations by movements of indigenous peoples to promote their rights\(^ {196}\) and the use of symbols from international conferences by feminists to advance women’s rights.\(^ {197}\) Clearly, a resolution of the Security Council lends itself to similar appropriation. Hurd’s concept of “legitimacy” does not consider the potential for nonstate actors to take the “rules” given to them by international institutions and promote their internalization from “outside” those institutions, forcing the institutions and their member states to act consistently with their own rules in ways that they never intended. Yet this is the hope of PeaceWomen and others in the NGO Working Group.

**Conclusion**

The product of a new alliance between the Security Council and feminists, Resolution 1325 is a new “rule” of the Council that opens a space for struggle

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195 Hurd (2007), see n. 10, p. 57.
over women’s equality and the gender relations that attend militarism. For the Council, the resolution symbolizes its commitment to including women in decision making and addressing the gendered effects of armed conflict, designed to manage post–Cold War concerns about its gender legitimacy. For the feminists in the NGO Working Group, Resolution 1325 provides a conduit for feminist ideas to enter the “master’s house” of the military and diplomatic establishment, intended to enhance the legitimacy of women’s peace advocacy by association with the Security Council.

Many fault lines have emerged from this new alliance. Resolution 1325 has leveraged small increases in women’s political participation in postconflict decision making, which both allies have claimed to their advantage. However, the inclusion of women does not necessarily challenge militarism, as the women’s peace activists of the early twentieth century found when women’s suffrage did not make armed conflict impossible, as they had hoped. Although the resolution opens important new opportunities for feminists to promote women’s equality in ways that delegitimize militarism, it also presents them with the conundrum that women’s increased participation may be used to advance military and institutional agendas that maintain the marginality of women and other disenfranchised groups, while enacting the formal performance of inclusivity. Such a result would engage women as “peacemakers” in yet another disciplinary project that increases the Security Council’s store of gender legitimacy, while diminishing the legitimacy of feminist critiques of militarism.

At the heart of the struggle over the interpretation and application of Resolution 1325 is the question of its internalization by other international actors, which leads to conduct that is biased toward following the new rule. The struggle over the implementation of Resolution 1325 shows that its power to change the conduct of other actors is not solely dependent on the meaning attributed to it by the Security Council, despite being the institution that produced it. Instead, the experience of implementing the resolution – which has been driven largely by the NGO Working Group and local women in their peacebuilding efforts – demonstrates that nonstate actors can play a significant role in encouraging internalization of the rules of an international institution – in this case, even in the absence of internalization by the institution. Despite the decision of WILPF-UN and the NGO Working Group to embark on a bold new strategy of engagement with the Security Council from within, on the Council’s own terms, the result has been to reconfirm the importance of outside movements for change. Indeed, the experience

198 Rupp (1997), see n. 3, p. 207.
of the resolution suggests that feminist movements that escape institutional capture are in the best position to use the symbolic capital of Resolution 1325 to transform the gendered moorings of the Security Council, opening the real possibility of achieving a world in which succeeding generations will be saved from the scourge of war.

As “coalitions of the willing” threaten the newfound activism of the Security Council, I have a lingering concern that the small advances toward gender legitimacy, represented by the adoption of Resolution 1325 and the struggle over its implementation, already may have rendered the Council too feminized for militarism’s devotees. Francis Fukuyama’s provocative warning that the feminization of the West endangers its survival in a world of “undemocratic” (i.e., non-European) states seems to have resonated with the world’s superpower and its coalition allies, who seem intent on pursuing an even more intensely militarized global order outside the auspices of the Security Council. These events portend a more dangerous time for women and for nonmilitary narratives of international peace and security. Despite this, Resolution 1325 continues to create bridges between countless women’s groups and peace advocates, who remain focused on reminding the Council that its deficit in gender legitimacy remains.

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Title: The Security Council's alliance of gender legitimacy: The symbolic capital of Resolution 1325

Date: 2010

Citation: OTTO, D, The Security Council's alliance of gender legitimacy: The symbolic capital of Resolution 1325, Fault Lines of International Legitimacy, 2010, 1, pp. 239 - 275

Persistent Link: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/31659

File Description: The Security Council's alliance of gender legitimacy: The symbolic capital of Resolution 1325