Does Curriculum Matter?

Revisiting women’s access and rights to education in the context of UN Millenium Targets

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Abstract:
This article discusses the relevance of curriculum to current UN Millenium targets to extend access to education and equality in education for women. It argues firstly, that it is contradictory to be concerned about women’s access to education but leave curriculum out of the discussion; secondly, that curriculum is not adequately seen as a choice between imposing new universal values or leaving cultural traditions untouched, but is about choices within a situation where cultural traditions are neither untouched nor monolithic; and thirdly that attention to who speaks and who is heard in developing and assessing new practices remains important in any initiatives to extend education rights for women.

Keywords:
Curriculum, women, rights, difference, culture

Bibliographic Note
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**Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education:**

**Target 3:** Ensure that by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

- **Indicator 6** Net enrolment ratio in primary education
- **Indicator 7** Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5

**Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women:**

**Target 4:** Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015

- **Indicator 9** Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

UN Millennium Project

The focus on hardware - funding and schools - stifles the asking of key questions: what should be taught, who should do the teaching, how should this be done; in sum, what is education for?

Katarina Tomasevski, Special Rapporteur on the right to education of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (Tomasevski 2003:1)

In 2003 I was asked to address a conference of people from many countries concerned with policies, practices and projects to improve the education of women and girls. A series of meetings in different countries was planned, to share experiences, and to consider the adequacy of the agendas and strategies being adopted in the UN-related Millenium Project initiatives. But there was, I was told, some question among the funding bodies, as to whether
curriculum warranted specific attention in relation to the targets for extending access and
gender equality. I was asked to speak on the question ‘does curriculum matter?’ In this
article I set out to explore both that question and the context in which it is being raised as a
question. In part this is to revisit some of the broader evidence from national governments as
well as education theorists, that curriculum does matter, and also, more specifically, to
revisit why curriculum has been such a central concern of so much writing and reform
concerned with girls and women. And in part it is to consider the related question, why
should there be a move in the current initiative to bracket curriculum out of the debates.

In this article I discuss two prominent concerns that thread through attempts to deal with
curriculum or to avoid it as part of addressing rights to education. One of these is the debates
about difference (or ‘cultural relativism’) in relation to prescriptions about certain universals
and targets. The other is the concern about politics, power, and the question of who is
deciding on a particular form of education: a belief that where decisions are made (inside the
country compared with international agency or foreign power; national, regional and local
decision-making) and who is involved in those decisions are both intrinsic to the meaning
and effects that education and curriculum has for students and teachers.

My argument in this paper is firstly, that it is contradictory to be concerned about women’s
access to education but leave curriculum out of the discussion; secondly, that, in the context
we are considering here the curriculum issue is not adequately seen as a choice between
imposing new universal values or leaving cultural traditions untouched, but is about choices
within a situation where cultural traditions are neither untouched nor monolithic; and thirdly
that attention to contexts and processes of decision-making and to women’s and local voices
in the assessment of progress remain important in initiatives to extend education for women.
I Does Curriculum Matter?

How a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educational knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and the principles of social control.

(Bernstein, 1977)

In one sense to ask the question ‘does curriculum matter?’ seems ridiculous: what is this thing ‘education’ if we remove curriculum from it? Of course, I want to say, what we teach girls and boys matters – what knowledge and skills we give them access to or fail to give them access to; what we teach them about themselves and their potential, whether we appreciate their ways of knowing, their relationships, their place in their society – of course this matters. In support of my case, I could draw on many different types of evidence. In OECD countries, governments seem to think it matters, because they keep on commissioning inquiries about the adequacy of what is being taught: is education adequately preparing young people for new types of work, for example; or are values of citizenship being adequately developed? The press and the public in these countries also seem to think it matters. Each time there is a major change to a core subject (such as English in English speaking countries), the papers are full of articles and letters debating whether important values and skills are being lost. In the USA, local communities mount legal challenges to curriculum content in areas such as evolution; and make serious decisions about the acceptability of textbooks; and in Asia, neighbouring countries to Japan contest that country’s decision about what story of history is to be taught. In the academic study of education, books, journals, staffing appointments to education faculties all seem to attest to
the idea that curriculum does matter, is not something to be taken for granted, is something about which there can and should be serious scrutiny.

And the question ‘does curriculum matter?’ seems particularly misjudged and confronting when it is asked in the context of a campaign to extend gender equality in education, given that the history of post gender reforms in the second half of the twentieth century, particularly those following the first UN International Women’s Year in 1975, took curriculum as a central agenda of their reforms, and a key explanation of unequal outcomes that education delivered to women. In the USA, publishers drew up guidelines to avoid non-sexist language and ‘sex role stereotyping’ was targeted as a key source that limited girls’ future lives to a narrow range of work (Biklen and Pollard, 1993); in the UK and Canada, a large number of studies examined how particular school subjects distorted girls’ and boys’ views of women’s history and their potential (for example Whyld, 1983, Kelly, 1981, Gaskell, 1992, Gaskell and Willensky, 1995). In Australia, the point at which the government mounted an inquiry into girls’ inequality in education was a time when the participation rates of girls and boys overall was only minimally different (Yates, 1993). Instead, the report in this area targeted the content of the education experience girls received:

Sexism is a process through which females and males not only progressively learn that different things are required and expected of them because of their sex, but learn those things in an unexamined way.

(Australia Commonwealth Schools Commission, 1975:17)

In the late 1980s, an International Handbook of Women’s Education (Kelly, 1989) commissioned articles from twenty-three countries across all parts of the world as to the state of progress in relation to women and education. The editor concluded from these different independent reports that mere participation did not seem to bring major progress: that what
girls and women were being taught was a key issue in relation to extending equality to women:

This handbook, as well as the cross-national and individual country research listed in the Bibliography [...] shows that differences in the proportion of women educated and the amount of education they receive have resulted in few changes in their rate of entry into the workforce for a wage, the degree of gender segregation in the workforce, women’s income relative to men’s (although education does appear to relate to women’s income relative to other women), and women’s access to political power.

[and]

few countries have even begun to deal with education processes – more specifically, what schools teach to whom and with what effect. [...] Texts in countries as diverse as France, Togo, Chile, the United States, and India still ignore women or portray them primarily as wives and mothers. [...] An exclusive focus on access may have guaranteed inequality in educational outcomes simply because educational processes have been left relatively untouched.

(Kelly, 1989: 560, 566)

The attempts to come to grips with just how the curriculum of schools, formal and non-formal, was holding girls back, the hopes and projects about what it might do better, have been a theme and a focus that stayed salient in academic work, at least among gender researchers in OECD countries, as researchers concerned with gender worked through difficult issues about explicit and hidden curricula; rational messages versus desire and emotion; differences among girls and problems of universal solutions (Yates, 1998).

Curriculum cannot be bracketed out of ‘education’; like ‘development’ the form ‘education’ (that is, its curriculum) takes is never neutral. This point is strongly made by those who review the UN agendas on equal rights (Spring 2000), or whose task it is to review progress
and achievements regarding education and rights (Tomasevski 2003). ‘Education’ is not a thing like water; if anything, it is a thing like language. At one point in Australia’s history, immigration policy formally set as an entry requirement a certain level of literacy. However, to ensure that only people of certain races would qualify as having that level of literacy there evolved an infamous ‘dictation’ test, where an intending migrant who was Chinese could be tested in Greek, or Sanskrit rather than English (far less Mandarin or Cantonese). ‘Literacy’ has different meanings in different contexts in terms of what it enables for individuals, for groups, and what social and political purposes it serves, and so does education.

The background paper for the Millenium Target relating to women’s equality in basic education (Levine, 2003) slightly blurs the issue here. It acknowledges that education may be “poor quality” and not deliver expected effects

> Pritchett (2001) demonstrates that, looking cross-nationally, there is no association between increases in educational attainment of the labor force and the rate of growth in productivity (output per worker). This may be due, in part, to the poor quality of education in many low-income countries.

(Levine, 2003:19)

but this phrase, ‘poor quality’ implies that the outcomes of education is a straightforward or technical issue of whether something is done well or poorly, rather than, as the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights, Tomasevski, makes clear, that there is a curriculum issue, a ‘what’ to how education is being done, not just a scale of quantity or quality. The Background Paper discusses curriculum as if it has no relation to this issue of outcomes (overall, and for particular groups), as if the issue of deciding what to teach is simply a national choice and has no bearing on effects.

> The content of much of what is taught is country-specific in nature, determined by national values and the priorities for shaping the views of younger generations.

(Levine, 2003:18)
There is a large body of academic work illustrating curriculum effects: in relation to gender, in relation to race and ethnicity, in relation to class (Bourdieu, 1986; Collins, 2000; Teese, 2000; Tomasevski, 2003). In many countries, the decision about what will be the language of instruction is highly contested – it not only affects who learns most easily, but whose ways will be given status, both domestically and in international relations. So even in ‘basic education’, and even in terms of that deceptively neutral term ‘literacy’ – the ability to read or decode text – what is being done is not a content-free skill, or one with no effects on outcomes and benefits. And usually even ‘basic’ education involves things that are obviously not simply content-free skills, but selections about what ‘things that should be known’ – particularly messages about hygiene and health and reproduction; messages about what vocational tracks are available, and to whom; often messages about the political ideology of a country.

In other words, in terms of millennial targets regarding access and rights to education it does not make sense to say that education must be extended to all, yet say that curriculum – what will be taught and what this will do to people’s existing forms of knowledge and association – is not part of the question. Curriculum choices and practices affect what dignity and possibilities are given to males and females. They affect whether particular groups successfully acquire skills or levels of education, as well as more directly promoting ideas about how groups should see themselves and each other; what dignity pertains to women and men.
II Gender equality and the right to talk about rights

From the perspective of that widespread body of opinion and evidence that the content of education, curriculum, is not irrelevant to what education achieves and produces for individuals and groups and indeed countries, it does seem strange to want to bracket curriculum out of the target agendas and monitoring. But in another sense the question ‘Does curriculum matter?’ is not ridiculous. The questions we ask and the questions that are put to us always matter.

The contemporary conjunction of a new target to enact something combined with a new reluctance to interfere in relation to one aspect of it points to some important issues and a particular problematic of this specific time in history. On the one hand, this is an era of escalating globalization: of trade, of communication, and of attempted UN-endorsed baseline standards for health, poverty, and certain other rights (to not be subject to arbitrary imprisonment, or violence, not to be barred from education) (OECD, 1997, 2000; Brine, 1999; Canclini, 2000; Spring, 2000; Levine, 2003; Tomasevski, 2003). And it is an era where increasingly economic and auditing standards dominate globally, as if they are a neutral standard and means of exchange, in contrast to things like politics, religion and culture (Brine 1999; Canclini 2000). That is, it is acceptable to produce numbers about who is in and out of school; and it is acceptable to measure what people are learning in school provided it appears in the neutral, apparently content-less guise of being a ‘score’ on a ‘literacy’ scale. Attempts to produce agreements on discursive and substantive agendas are more troubled, and, where possible, avoided. Joel Spring noted in his review of the history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

no universal justification for "the right to education" was provided when this idea was proclaimed in 1948 in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Indeed, no one had even bothered to define
the meaning of education in the 'right to education', except to say that everyone was entitled to elementary schooling.
(Spring, 2000: ix)

This is an era of ‘globalization’, but at the same time, it is a period when movements concerned with difference and ‘recognition’ are prominent (Fraser, 1997), especially within debates about women’s equality (Davis, 1981; hooks, 1981; Dill, 1994; Tsolidis, 2001). It is a ‘post-colonial’ era in which concerns about cultural imperialism, about who is speaking, who is directing the terms of a particular polity or argument or set of policies, both in political engagements, and in academic discourse is a feature of both national and global politics (Spivak, 1990; Mohanty, Russo and Torres, 1991; Canclini, 2000). Questions about what values are being imposed, and who is imposing them are caught up with experiences of wars and invasions; and with the experiences and agendas of social movements, including the women’s movement, and highly charged debates within that movement, that have objected to various forms of universal discourse to which they are ‘other’. If gender equality is to be taken as an imperative that extends into the specifics of the curriculum itself, isn’t that an act of imperialism, imposing one set of particular cultural traditions on communities whose values are framed differently?

One effect then of bracketing curriculum out of the discussion of education is to avoid entering difficult discussions about different values and politics, just as the earlier avoidance of defining ‘education’ in the 1948 ‘right to education’ enabled the Declaration to be ratified in a Cold War period of very opposing views about what education should entail. Putting curriculum into discussions of education targets and agendas does make more obvious the presence of values and politics. But not discussing this is not to take a neutral line but simply to leave certain things about what is being done to or for girls and women unexamined. Not
to consider curriculum is to accept that using economic auditing standards, and the method of confining attention to what can be counted, entails working with a neutral tool of analysis and change rather than one that involves substantive values; and is to wrongly construct dealing with issues of content as entering a categorically different discussion. That perspective is one that I have argued against in the previous section, as have writers such as Tovasevski (2003), Brine (1999) and Unterhalter (2005).

However, to say that curriculum is never neutral is not to solve the problem about difference and cultural relativism, and how this might be addressed within concerns about rights to education, and concerns about extending and promoting women’s equality in education. What ‘gender equality’ implies in relation to education is a highly contentious issue, both inside and outside feminism. There are debates both about the starting points and principles for thinking about issues of equality and also about who has the right to engage in debates about women’s rights in a particular country (Hirsch and Fox Keller, 1990). Feminist philosophers, social scientists and theorists do not agree on such matters as individualist versus communitarian models of equality (Young, 1990; Benhabib, 1992); the significance of ‘recognition’ and ‘distribution’ approaches (Fraser, 1997; Gewirtz, 1998); the appropriateness of capabilities or cultural-based models of respect (Spivak, 1988; Nussbaum, 1998; Okin, 1998; Nussbaum, 1999; Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2001; Quillen, 2001); what weight is to be given to public politics and to the reproductive domestic sphere in approaching citizenship (Benhabib, 1995), and many more. And there is a particularly sharp debate which, on one side, is critical of attempts to define universal core principles (such as in Nussbaum’s and Sen’s work on capabilities) as acts of cultural imperialism; and, on the side worries about the implications for women of accepting a culturally relativist model that emphasizes continuation of tradition, given histories in which women have had less right to
speak, less power, even less basic sustenance. What I would like to do here is not take on this argument directly (although I will draw on some of the arguments in these debates) and not mount a foundational argument about the rights issue, but will discuss it in the context of education and development as situated practices. The issue, I will try to show, is not change or non-change; imperialism or tradition. Change is happening in the world; change makes the meaning and consequences of doing things the same not the same. The issue is about ongoing attention to changes and what they are doing to worsen or improve women’s equality; it is about which aspects of tradition are being drawn on and for whose purpose, and which aspects are being quietly changed, often in quite drastic ways, without appearing to be tampering with ‘culture’.

For example, let us begin with the question of the target itself and ask ‘why does basic education matter?’ (or, as Tomasevski says, ‘what is education for?’).

\begin{quote}
Educating girls is key to a nation’s development [...] Sustainable development and the eradication of poverty will only be achieved with quality education for all - girls and boys alike. [...] If girls remain uneducated, they are likely to become women who are illiterate, impoverished and less likely to raise healthy and educated families. Society cannot afford to allow another generation to forego its potential. That's why the Millennium Development Goals, as well as the goals of Education for All (EFA), call for gender parity and equality in education.
\end{quote}

The United Nations Girls Education Initiative website

\begin{quote}
education is a fundamental human right, set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Human Rights
\end{quote}
Covenants, which have force of international law. [...] It occupies a central place in Human Rights and is essential and indispensable for the exercise of all other human rights and for development. "As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty, and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities." None of the civil, political, economic and social rights can be exercised by individuals unless they have received a certain minimum education.

UNESCO Right to Education website

Whether the arguments for extending education have been couched in instrumental terms, as they are on the UN ‘Girls’ education initiative’ website, or whether they have been cast in terms of human rights, as they are in UNESCO’s ‘Education for All’ commitment, they presume something about the type of world we are now in and what is needed to have an adequate life in that world. Economists may like to see education as a black-box producing certain potential patterns of ‘good’ for the whole, but the black box only works if it produces new skills, knowledge, abilities, dispositions in individuals. In deeming that people need ‘education’, the declaration or commitment is saying that, in this world today, you (and your community) cannot lead an adequate life by simply doing what your parents did and following their example. Change has impinged on the ability to reproduce life: change in the nature of global movements of trade and trade policy; of health; of communication and interconnection. Whatever particular meaning it has, ‘literacy’ is about giving some access to a world beyond the family or the local: to a world in which significant changes, even in relation to matters of basic physical subsistence, are happening. Concerns to extend
education, to extend literacy, are concerned with what individuals need to function, about their being able to deal with incursions on the family and local conditions of life relating to trade or health or government administration; and about allowing forms of communication and reflection that are different from those available in purely oral and locally contained cultures. ‘Numeracy’ too implies that a particular way of operating in the world is now important: one that involves calculation of a certain form that is different from many traditional forms (for example, it detaches quantity from the particulars or the value of the entity being calculated). Today, in a more globalized and technologically changing world, not having education has particular effects in ways that can differ from previous times. That is, doing the same thing (for example, highly limiting the scope of what children are taught) does not have the same meanings and outcomes for those children as it did in previous times. Cultures are not unchanging because the world in which they operate and interact with is not unchanging.

A second point, one at the heart of specifically gendered concerns about cultures and difference, is that cultures are not monolithic. In the 1970s, for example, those who began looking at textbooks and early children’s readers in schools commonly discovered that these did not merely reflect the actual work and positions that women and girls were occupying in their society, but a much more ‘idealized’, anachronistic, monolithic and gender-stereotyped version of this (Children’s Rights Workshop, 1976; Anderson and Yip, 1987; Kelly, 1989). Women have traditionally, in all cultures, not had as much opportunity to speak: to say what is core to their culture, what is to be preserved, what might be changed. The commitment to treating women as ‘equally human’ or as having ‘equal rights’ in relation to education, needs to include attention to their ability to be heard on these matters.
In relation to my earlier question ‘why does basic education matter?’ I argued that education (that is formalized education) has become an issue now because of the type of world we are now in, including effects of global trade and communication that affect even people’s subsistence activities. Given that cultures are neither static nor monolithic, the question of what is selected as important knowledge and how this is developed in the institutional forms of teaching does need to be part of the agenda for girls and women. And the choice is not simply between importing colonial values or leaving cultural self-determination and practices in place.

Consider the case often referred to in discussions about universalism versus culturalism, the UN camps in Afghanistan. This is often discussed as an unhelpful binary: that the choice was to educate girls and import an alien cultural imposition, or to respect tradition and deny them education. As I see it, the situation in that country had changed and the question was which changes were being accepted and which were being denied, and by whom (that is, who were being taken as the definers of the cultural rights of women and girls?). Treating universalism and tradition as a binary is as problematic as the case about equality versus difference discussed some time ago by Joan Scott (Scott, 1990). In that case, Scott showed that the way lawyers were mounting a binary in relation to legal provision for women in employment, one that said the provision must either be about difference or about equality, would harm women whichever side of the binary was taken up. A focus on difference would be used to justify restricted opportunities and outcomes for women; and yet a focus on ‘equality’ would say if they did not take up opportunities in the same way as men, that was simply their own choice, rather than a result of their different relation to children and other conditions of their lives. Scott’s point was that to think adequately about ‘equality’ for women involves taking up and
taking on difference. It is not a formulaic or foundational answer but an unpicking of how arguments are being used and with what consequences to women.

In this sense I agree with Nussbaum’s (Nussbaum, 1998) argument, that a simple defence of ‘tradition’ mis-represents where the debate should be, since the traditions of a culture (and of groups within the culture) are not normally singular; and the meaning and effects of traditions change as that culture takes part in a world that gives some traditional practices new consequences. Of course, taking into account what is being effected by practices raises equally difficult issues for new education provision, about the grounds on which girls’ and women’s treatment are to be assessed as equally human. Any attempt to define specifically the rights involved is likely to draw some critique, and I agree with some issues raised by Nussbaum’s critics, such as Quillen (Quillen, 2001) about certain particularly American values being imported in what is done (for example, Nussbaum’s emphasis on choice as the foundational core of human equality, and the difficulty of dealing with religious beliefs). However, I am not attempting in this article to myself answer that question. The points I am making are rather that to the extent ‘rights and access’ to education are being targeted, curriculum is a relevant arena for attention; and that attention to this issue is not a matter of simply coming up with a template. Broad commitments need to be in ongoing dialogue with the experiences of the women and girls who are involved.

In regard to the need for dialogue and situated answers and assessments, both Nussbaum and Quillen seem to be in accord, in that, on my reading, Nussbaum does make clear the need to attend to the ‘how’ (or the situation and process) very much in conjunction with the ‘what’:

\[\textit{Nussbaum brackets the political question: how? I would argue that ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions impinge on each other.}\]

(Quillen, 2001: 94)
For women and girls, as Nancy Fraser has argued (Fraser, 1997), issues of ‘recognition’ and issues of ‘access’ or ‘distribution’ are tightly intertwined, especially in education. As I outlined earlier, one starting point of concerns about girls and education in the 1970s was that in many countries girls were ostensibly participating reasonably equally in education: they were required to go to school, they were not formally disbarred, yet in the course of that education they were learning a view of themselves, their own history and society that presented girls and women as secondary, and they were ending up with quite different outcomes from education than boys. The content of the experience fed patterns of retention and outcomes. I would argue that it is almost impossible to disentangle principles about rights (for example a list of ‘capabilities’), from more specific and grounded substantive discussions about these kinds of issues of representation, of what particular practices add up to in particular contexts. The history of the past three decades of gender reform in countries such as Australia, is that while the content of the education experience is highly relevant to its outcomes, treating girls and boys as ‘equally human’ is not simply something that can be read off the curriculum in its textual form – it involves attention to how girls and teachers respond to, interpret, engage with, or dismiss what is being done (Yates, 1999, 2000).

**Gender, curriculum and targets for basic education**

In this article, I have been considering the question of whether curriculum matters in the context of the campaigns to extend basic education more equally to women. In doing this, I have been making an argument about substance (what counts as ‘education’ does matter) and an argument about process (that assessments of what is being done need to consider whose
voices are being heard in reporting as well as assessing the value of what is being done; and that both rights and gender equality are not simple templates but are ongoing agendas for dialogue and debate).

I have argued first, that whatever form it takes, formal or public education is an intervention in young people’s identity and ways of relating to each other, to their family and local world, and to the wider world. In this sense it does parallel a lot of the issues that those working on women and development have shown. When interventions are made, whether from national or cross-national sources, they can reinforce, disrupt, or undermine women’s existing abilities to sustain themselves and their family. Education has the potential to diminish as well as extend people’s potency in their world, so what is being delivered is intrinsically relevant to the rationale for having a commitment and having targets.

In terms of strategy, hard targets can be useful, to produce change that is more than lip-service; but targets such as participation can also be manipulated, be complied with in token ways, or even in counter-productive ways. It is important that the process of working towards the targets involves the grass-roots participation of women. Key issues around curriculum relevant to the issue of girls’ and women’s rights are:

- What are girls being taught about who they are in their education? Are they being taught that they are equally human, or not?
- Who (which groups) are defining what is to be taught and how it is to be delivered, and how much are women part of this? What support do teachers and education workers need?
Do the processes in which education is institutionalized and delivered allow girls' effective participation? Do they enhance or diminish girls' and women’s existing situation?

Curriculum for gender equality is both important and difficult. There is no single model of what needs to be done – this changes in place and time - and targets have a place. But questions about ‘what’ and ‘how’ things are being done in the name of education are important issues which should explicitly be part of any processes of education reform.

References:


Acknowledgement

An earlier version of this paper was first developed for a seminar of the inter-agency *Beyond Access: Gender, Education and Development* project which is co-sponsored by the Institute of Education of the University of London, Oxfam, and the Department for International Development. I am particularly appreciative of the assistance given to me in preparing the paper by the Project Co-Ordinator, Elaine Unterhalter.

End-Notes


2 The Second Seminar of the Beyond Access Project, a joint initiative of the Institute of Education of the University of London, Oxfam, and the UK Department for International Development, whose website is [http://www.ioe.ac.uk/efps/beyondaccess](http://www.ioe.ac.uk/efps/beyondaccess).


6 Nussbaum’s interest in grounded experience here contrasts with other arguments against ‘cultural relativism’, such as Okin (1998). I see Okin’s argument as offering a more abstract rejection of the cultural relativist position – one that does not, I think, attend sufficiently to the voices and concerns (for example about racism) which feed the positions she criticizes.
Author/s: 
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Title: 
Does curriculum matter?: revisiting access and women's rights to education in the context of the UN Millenium Development Targets

Date: 
2006-03

Citation: 

Publication Status: 
Published

Persistent Link: 
http://hdl.handle.net/11343/34166

File Description: 
Does curriculum matter? Revisiting access and women's rights to education in the context of the UN Millenium Development Targets

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