Sick Wicked Cult

The global politics of regional youth

I grew up in a country town: Shepparton, in central Victoria. We lived in the Ministry of Housing estate on the northern edge of town. Every now and then my friends and I used to skip school and go down to the river and throw stones at things. These days we'd probably be called a gang, but we weren't. We were just a bunch of kids skipping school.

The languages used to describe youth now, and by "youth", I mean people between the ages of 15 and 24, are much more complex than they once were. The word "gang", then, in the 1970s, used in the context of young people, primarily referred to a group of friends and in particular to the fraternal relations between them, as in: "will you be in my gang".

Whereas the word "gang", now, refers to a particular relation between such groups and the rest of society; a malevolent, dangerous relationship. "Youth gangs" are destructive groups of people. They wander down outer-suburban streets late at night, looking for homes to invade and trains to graffiti. They run rampages in country towns, stoning the roofs of disagreeable shopkeepers. This shift in the definition of the word "gang" reflects a much broader shift in the way young people are talked about now. Youth has become a radically overdetermined category. That is, so many different and contradictory meanings are overlaid on the question of what it means to be young that no clear definition of youth seems possible, to the point where this unavailability of a definition is itself a source of anxiety. Once, being a youth, according to the popular definition of the word, simply meant being of a certain age, and being subject to the jurisdictions appropriate to that age. It meant being parented, being a student, and perhaps belonging to certain youth-oriented organisations such as the girl guides or boy scouts.

Now young people find themselves amidst a much more complex network of definitions and archetypal narratives. At best, youth are simply difficult. They speak a range of languages their parents simply don't understand, using words like "sick" and "wicked" in unusual ways which need to be documented in books such as journalist Susan Kurosawa's Teenspeak. At worst they are potential members of youth gangs. They are vulnerable to getting involved with drugs. They are liable to become members of the growing number of youth unemployed. They are prone to homelessness. They are at risk of joining the growing number of youth suicide victims. They are perceived as disenchanted and at the defining nexus of a number of social problems.

Perhaps there's nothing new here. After all, young people have always been objects of suspicion. Yet recently there have been a number of important shifts in the way youth are regarded that indicate that what's happening in the present era isn't simply another round of inter-generational friction.

What's new is the viciousness with which youth have been demonised. Never have young people been more carefully scrutinised, and made the
object of newspaper reports on youth culture, from so-called "graffiti gangs" to "grunge" fiction to youth lingo, as they currently are, even if, paradoxically, the effect of much of this talk has been to proclaim youth culture indecipherable. Seen through the eyes of a range of popular opinion-makers working in the media, on radio programmes such as John Law's radio talkback show, and television shows such as Channel Nine's A Current Affair and 60 Minutes, and in best-selling books like Helen Garner's The First Stone or Robert Manne's Culture of Forgetting, or top-grossing plays such as David Williamson's Brilliant Lies and Dead White Mules, the social and cultural practices of young people have been figured as worryingly outside the cultural mainstream. The youth depicted here is the youth of ideological extremism, criminality, rave parties, dolse bludgers, hoax novelists and vengeful young feminists. It is a youth with little in the way of social conscience or compassion; a youth with no sense of history or civic duty – the youth of Helen Demidenko and Shane Paxton: a youth immersed in the criminality of teen gangs and bashings. Young people, so the dominant media narratives go, are not simply disenfranchised or different – they are somehow dangerous.

It'd be easy to simply blame the media for all this. Take, for example, a recent segment about elderly people living in fear of youth home invasions on 60 Minutes (Channel 9, July 28, 1998). Even as the segment played up sensationalist stereotypes of helpless old people falling prey to vicious young thugs dressed in the obligatory baseball caps, no mention was made of the fact that elderly people are generally less likely to be victims of crime than any other section of the community, or that young people are themselves overwhelmingly the largest group among victims of crime, especially violent crime. There was no mention of the social factors that contribute to crime, and as is often the case in current affairs television, the show ultimately failed to provide any real analysis whatsoever of the very phenomenon it claimed to be investigating.

But to simply blame the media for the demonisation of young people would be to fall into the same trap by failing to provide any kind of real analysis.

Working out why young people have become such an object of anxiety involves looking at the deeper structural reasons for the demonisation of youth, to understand where the sorts of stories I've just mentioned come from. It needs to be understood that the term "youth" no longer simply describes a life stage. Rather, it is increasingly defined by its place in a complex geo-politics to do with the interlinking of conservative political strategies, changes in the global distribution of wealth and power, changing patterns of media ownership, fashions in journalism, and the wider range of mechanisms currently being put in place to protect what is becoming an increasingly conservative economic and social status quo.

If the term "youth" has arguably become an enabling mechanism in such a complex geo-politics, then perhaps it's no coincidence that young people have tended to find themselves cast aside from mainstream culture and treated as outsiders. Over the past decade the public sphere has been increasingly constructed to the detriment of young people, even to the extent that what constitutes right and proper moral and intellectual conduct has been articulated as a specific aversion to youth culture. Sometimes the reasons for this are ideological. As I argued in Gangland, many Australian public figures maintain their hegemony by using a logic of generationalism whereby the particular ideas and social practices of young people are excluded from the public sphere as the very condition for the way the public sphere is constructed. This, I take it, isn't just a simple matter of selfishness, or baby-boomer self-indulgence, which is the way the book was reported, mainly by these same people. Rather, it's a matter of a particular kind of 1970s liberalism being both unwilling and unable to come to terms with the sorts of aesthetics and knowledges that younger people are using to produce both art and critique.
whether it be in the fields of multimedia production, post-feminism, or critical theory. In particular, it’s to do with the ways in which younger people, on the whole, take the increasing diversity and heterogeneity of society for granted, against a cultural establishment dedicated to preserving an assimilatory status quo.

At the same time, Australian youth increasingly find themselves in a situation where all the dominant forms of politically influential media – from radio talkback, to the broadsheet press, to television current affairs – are aimed at a 35-pls demographic, and tend to construct Australia as an ideally homogenous place under threat from cultural difference, whether it be the sort of cultural difference brought by immigrants, Aboriginals, feminists or young people. Treated largely as a kind of novelty, young people are on the whole denied a serious voice in the media, except in separately designated ‘youth’ areas such as JJJ FM, outside the dominant circuits of opinion- and policy-making. JJJ provides a vital service, notably in regional areas, but it is interesting to look at the rise of JJJ as a specialty “youth broadcaster” against the fact that so many of today’s media perennials, such as Mike Willesee, George Negus or Kerry O’Brien, were taken seriously as commentators when they were in their early twenties. It is interesting to compare this programmes like ABC television’s *Race Around the World*. While that programme is both great fun and important television – notwithstanding the tendency of its judges to treat everything as an audition for either Sixty Minutes or Healthy, Wealthy and Wise – 30 years ago young journalists like Peter Luck weren’t just given a video camera, a plane ticket and entry into a competition to produce a series of short documentaries on a shoestring to be shown on a late night programme. They were given an office, a crew, and a job as a foreign correspondent, producing segments for the prime-time news – and his was by no means an exceptional case.

At the same time as they have been both demonised and broadly excluded from making the kinds of mainstream commentary policy-makers listen to, never have young people been so much the victims of policy neglect, even aggressive neglect, in the form of higher education fees, work for the dole schemes, a youth unemployment rate that approaches 40 percent and worse in many regional areas [Jenny Macklin, *ABC Radio, Countrywide*, July 1, 1998], proposed curfews and punitive anti-youth crime legislation, much of which is in contravention of international conventions on human rights. Globalisation, economic rationalism, new-right inspired “law and order” policies such as “truth in sentencing”, “mandatory sentencing” and “zero-tolerance” policing, and privatisation have all worked to the material detriment of young people, and have often specifically targeted young people, especially non-white young people.

Looking at the exclusion of young people from mainstream commentary alongside the portrayals of youth as amoral alongside the draconian nature of much recent anti-youth legislation, it is difficult to imagine a way of describing recent trends that doesn’t lead to the conclusion that young people, at a number of levels, have increasingly been denied full social agency and citizenship, and a full range of democratic rights and entitlements.

Regional youth, in this picture, are in some senses “doubly disenfranchised”. Not only have they been included in a widespread ambivalence towards youth, they have also borne the brunt of the marginalisation of regional areas and privileging of metropolitan centres that has been a hallmark of the last 20 years of economic and cultural globalisation.

There is a disquieting symmetry here given that many of the problems currently facing young people, especially regional young people, are a direct product of globalisation, especially economic rationalism. Obviously this is a factor in high rates of youth unemployment, given that government policy has tended away from interventionist programmes and towards the idea that the market itself will solve youth unemployment.
ment problems. If this last proposition might seem delightfully naïve, then the present government’s response to its policy failure – youth unemployment levels are at the same now as they were three years ago – tends not to involve any reconsideration of the policies themselves. Rather, such policies are deemed to have failed because there is still too much regulation, and markets are not pure enough, both because the level of the minimum youth wage is too high, and needs to be reduced, or because the regulations regarding working conditions are too strict.

The politics of global economics is an underlying factor at the level of perceptions of young people. Economic rationalist societies are based on competition rather than on co-operation. Social cohesion in such societies is no longer maintained by the possibility that individuals share in a common community, or have common goals. In such societies many institutions that once served as a focus for community-oriented aspirations have been privatised or closed down. In regional areas the local hospital has gone the way of the local school and the local bank. Another effect of privatisation has been that what were once public parks or public sporting facilities, are now privately run; what were once public shopping precincts are now privately owned shopping plazas, subject to different types of fee-paying and security arrangements. These sorts of arrangements often restrict access compared to their properly public predecessors.

Societies built on competition also tend to be societies built on insecurity and fear. No longer able to gesture to such public institutions in order to instil a notion of community, governments instead attempt to foster unity by creating shared enemies. The Howard Government, for example, has played off immigrant and indigenous communities against the idea of the “mainstream”, characterising Aborigines as a drain on the taxpayer dollar and as potential claimants of freehold land title. Young people, in so far as they have been demonised as “gang” members, or as drug bludgers, or as drug dealers, or as welfare-cheating single mothers are a persistent cipher in such scare campaigns. The irony is that such campaigns tend to mitigate against people who have never enjoyed economic privilege. This is particularly the case for indigenous youth, who figure as members of two demonised groups. So far as the media are concerned, it’s a two for the price of one deal.

One way of sharpening competitiveness in economic rationalist societies is to emphasise inequality of incomes, and to create a pool of low or no income earners; an underclass who provide a spectacle of what failure means, and who can be scapegoated for their failure on the grounds that they, not government policy, are the real problem, which use of “wedge politics” to electoral ends was only turned into an art form by the US Republican party in the mid-1980s. Seeking to ensure Reagan’s re-election in 1984, Republican party strategists identified a possible rift between the soft and relatively affluent Liberal left and the working class sections of the Democrat vote. Their idea was that they could split that vote by portraying the Democrats as having been hijacked by liberals in order to alienate blue-collar voters from the party. The blue-collar vote, Reagan’s strategists figured, had seen its standards of living fall since the mid 1970s and makes their poverty acceptable. One goal of such spectacles of poverty is to encourage migration of workers from places of high unemployment and low economic efficiency to places of lower unemployment and higher economic efficiency – from regional areas to the city.

The kinds of governments that have sponsored purist competition-based societies tend to be adept at the politics of division. In contemporary political parlance, the strategy of playing a core community of potential voters off against demonised, minority groups, goes by the name of “wedge politics”. There’s nothing new in the idea that communities can be divided for political ends. As the US anti-Communist crusader Joe McCarthy said: “To divide a polity you must have scapegoats and hate objects – human caricatures that dramatise the difference between Them and Us.” But the could be made think they had suffered not as a result of the economic downturn and restructuring, but as a result of the liberal left’s successful lobbying on affirmative action and identity politics to do with race, gender, gay and lesbian, and disabilities issues, against the interests of “ordinary people”. As the notorious US conservative Pat Buchanan said “If we tear the country in half, we can pick up the bigger half”.

The federal Liberal party reportedly conducted its 1996 electoral campaign with the help of Republican advisors. You might recognise “wedge politics” in the attacks on Aboriginal bodies such as ATSIC, and in the hysteria about Aboriginal land rights that has ensued since then, just as you can recognise “wedge politics” in the way many state governments have exploited the issue of youth crime.

The media, obviously, have a part to
play here, too. As media ownership has concentrated, the media has increasingly served the interests of economic globalisation and become increasingly conservative at the same time. Managerialism has meant that analysis has been given the board, to be replaced by opinion and an increased reliance on the spectacle of the us versus them stock story, both of which are cheaper to produce. So Aboriginal Australia is played off against white Australia, migrant Australia is played off against local-born Australia, young Australians are played off against older Australians, all through the marketing of folk-demons based on cultural stereotypes. The over-subsidised Aborigine, the Asian crime-boss, the young Aboriginal stone thrower, the joy-riding teenager with a baseball cap on backwards, have all become stock characters in a series of cheap-to-produce narratives that most of us find instantly recognisable. So much have stereotypes about young people taken hold that when one newspaper came across a survey which found that teenagers were by and large not depressed, self-indulgent, confused, miserable drug addicts who didn’t want to work and who lacked any sense of social responsibility, they were so surprised they made it a front-page headline (Weekend Australian, 6–7.9.97).

If the media is so full of its own populist spectacle that newspapers are surprised to discover things are different, then this is a sick, wicked culture in both the contemporary and more conventional sense of the words “sick” and “wicked”. That is, it is a cultural cycle, full of compelling stories which in some sense we are all infected by. That is at the same time a culture where something is deeply wrong.

Clearly, when particular groups in society are demonised and presented as the cause of social problems, it covers over the possibility that the real problems are to do with the uneven way wealth and privilege are distributed through the community. If newspaper front pages are full of headlines about groups of young Aborigines robbing New South Wales outback country towns at night, or stealing cars for high-speed chases through the streets of Perth, then they also tend to lack any analysis of the decades of policy neglect suffered by those people. If economic rationalist societies tend to foster the ideal of self-interest over and above the ideal of shared community responsibility, then the editorials in those same newspapers are less likely to be about ways wealth, privilege and opportunity might be redistributed in any given place, and more likely to be about law and order campaigns designed to protect property and to serve the interests of those who already own it.

Governments have by and large abandoned their traditional role of taking responsibility for the equitable redistribution of wealth and privilege in a democratic society, and have increasingly left that job up to the markets, a policy which has been complicit with the sort of inequity the politics of division are designed to cover. The outcomes of such strategies deserve to be more highly publicised. When it comes to Australian young people a few statistics are worth mentioning. Australia has one of the largest gaps between rich and poor of all OECD countries, with higher levels of poverty in regional areas. It also has one of the highest rates of child poverty. It has historically high rates of youth unemployment, and one of the world’s highest rates of youth suicide, especially in regional areas.

One of the items on most conservative agendas in Western countries in the 1990s has been an attack on the idea that democracy should be radically inclusive, and should reach across the broad spectrum of social difference. Instead, democracy is being re-imagined as an assimulatory mechanism that excludes those not willing to enter a fairly narrow, often backwards-looking, social contract – as opposed to the traditional idea that democracies exist precisely to ensure that minorities don’t suffer and marginalised groups have access to the same range of educational, health and welfare resources as the wider polity. The idea that democracy is always already a level playing field where no adjustments need to be made, that everyone is the already the same because they have the same rights and freedoms (and therefore the same privileges), and that no intervention at concessions should be made to disadvantaged groups, are popular in Australia at the moment. Again, these are ideas that come almost directly out of Reagan Republican anti-affirmative-action rhetoric of the mid-1980s which formed the basis of an ongoing and increasingly successful campaign to abolish special entitlements targeting black Americans, on the grounds that such entitlements were themselves “racist”, even though black Americans have less access to education and opportunity, and are, on average, poorer than most Americans.

These sorts of philosophies have enabled conservatives to question the role of governments in providing basic services, facilitating the shrinking or elimination of programmes designed to help chronically disadvantaged groups. An example of welfare shrinkage is the introduction of the recent Common Youth Allowance, which is structured in such a way that around 25,000 16- and 17-year-olds will no longer be eligible for benefits. The introduction of parental means testing for people aged 18-21 who apply for the Common Youth Allowance, will mean that many lose existing benefits. This will have a particular impact on regional young people, many of whom will be forced to return to places of low employment opportunity upon loss of benefits. Because the income threshold for the means test is low, many regional young people will lose their benefits to find that if they return home, not only will there be less chance of getting a job, but their parents won’t be able to afford to support them.

Another example of this is the government’s announcement in June this year of a Youth Roundtable, involving a twice-yearly meeting of 50 members at a cost of
$200,000. What the headlines of this carefully orchestrated policy launch failed to mention was that in the same week the nations peak body for young people, The Australian Youth Policy and Action Coalition (AYPAC), lost $330,000 in federal government funding. AYPAC represented 750,600 young people, had a Canberra-based policy-analysis staff of six people, and held a biennial youth conference for 500 young people, as well as annual policy forums and four national board meetings a year. It represented a range of groups including Australian Rural Youth, making representations on the government's apprenticeship and trainee programme and its youth suicide prevention strategy. It has also been a critic of the government's youth policy, especially the Common Youth Allowance, the work-for-the-dole scheme, and the introduction of the Jobs Network (Sydney Morning Herald, 20 June 1998).

Another example is the withdrawal of federal funding from the Beat, Bridging Education and Training Service set up by the Salvation Army and the federal government as a joint program to help troubled teenagers expelled from school find jobs, and to deal with problems of homelessness, crime and drug use. The main reason for the funding withdrawal would seem to be that Beat might compete with the interests of contractors in the private employment service which began on the first of May, the same day Beat funding was terminated. (The Sunday Age, 8 June 1998)

There have been recent concerted and widespread attempts by both politicians and the media to discredit those statutory and semi-government organisations that have anything to do with redistributing social justice. Wedge politics and attacks on minority groups have tended to translate into attacks on legal aid funds, the independence of the judiciary and the work done by bodies such as The Equal Rights and Opportunity Commission, as well as undermining the commitment of governments to international charters, especially human rights charters. This, too, is a function of a conservative, anti-welfarist turn in politics. It's also a function of an increasingly competition- and efficiency- driven society that tends to see individual interest as paramount, to the point where the measure of good government has become an ability to encourage citizens to ruthlessness.

If ruthless citizens license governments to turn a blind eye to injustice, then one of the most blatant recent examples of that is the relative failure of governments to act on the 1991 Report into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Another report that hasn't been acted on is the 1989 National Homeless Children's Report. In 1996 the Human Rights Commissioner, Chris Sidoti, claimed that youth homelessness had actually risen since the report was released. Sidoti highlighted the poor standard of housing and infrastructure in rural areas as a major contributor to the poor health of indigenous people, especially children. (Age, 5 June 1996) Then there is the 1997 joint report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity and Australian Law Reform Commissions, which found that 66 per cent of young respondents to a survey felt that they were never or only sometimes treated fairly by the police, and that many young people complained of feeling harassed by police, security guards and shopkeepers. According to one legal aid commission solicitor, one Queensland police officer estimated he stopped 200 young people over the course of several nights. The report overwhelmingly found that Australia isn't fulfilling its commitments under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Its recommendations include a call for realistic bail conditions, especially for Aboriginals who live in remote areas and are often remanded in detention centres hundreds of kilometres from their homes. The report also stresses the importance of providing a legal advice line, and police training in youth affairs, and recommends a national summit on children, to be attended by heads of government, focusing on youth homelessness and suicide. (Age 20 November 1997)

The various political strategies and social contingencies that go with free market economics don't only divide communities up according to a logic of "us and them", they also make divisions according to a logic of place. Global economics tends to privilege global centres - capital cities - at the expense of regional areas. So to the logic of "us" and "them", you might add the logic of "centre" and "periphery". It's no secret that regional Australia has been especially disenfranchised by the logic of economic globalisation. Twenty years ago interventionist governments sought to redistribute wealth to regional areas through decentralisation policies. Lately government anti-interventionism has seen wealth concentrate in metropolitan areas. On top of that, global agricultural over-production has seen prices fall, and primary producers have suffered years of drought.

Young people in rural centres have found themselves both demonised and outside the dominant economic circuit. The upshot of this has been diminishing job opportunities for regional youth. School leaving ages and rates of higher education take-up also tend to be lower in regional areas. Abandoned by the education system, regional young people often find themselves living in a situation with little in the way of employment opportunities, few locally-based government services, limited access to doctors, and next to no mental health infrastructure. The suicide rate among young people living in regional areas has multiplied by 12 in the past 20 years, compared to having doubled in urban Australia. Most of the regional increase has been among young men.

Making pariahs of young people tends to deny them any sense of social agency, or a sense that they might have a productive role to play. Denying them jobs and opportunity tends to reinforce that impression. People in systematically marginalised groups are less inclined to think of themselves as being in any kind of social contract with the rest of society. They are inclined to suffer problems of self-esteem, and to think of themselves as having no future. It seems unsurprising to me that the more vulnerable members of any group that has been marginalised in this way might suffer from drug and alcohol problems or depression, or a high suicide rate, or that they might find themselves engaging in habitual acts of petty crime, or high levels of risk-taking behaviour.

So what's to be done?

It is customary, near the end of a piece such as this, to call for a winding back of economic rationalism and a return to civil society. But I'm not planning to do either of those things. Instead I want to outline
some practical strategies. If the logic of economic globalisation might seem insurmountable, then I want to suggest that isn’t quite the case. All the things I’ve spoken about are things that can be overcome because they are things “we” as a wider community have in some way consented to. We’ve consented to them because of the political parties we’ve voted for. We’ve consented to them because we haven’t joined political parties. We’ve consented to them because of the way we’ve let ourselves be seduced by certain media narratives, and because we haven’t found out what other narratives are available. We’ve consented to them because we’ve grasped at quick, populist solutions. We’ve been obsessed by the holy grails of lower taxation and smaller government, without wondering what the cost might be. We haven’t bothered to educate ourselves about how contemporary political strategies work, and who their victims might be. We’ve failed to write to newspapers and other media outlets when negative stereotypes are perpetuated. We’ve failed to make our presence felt.

In other words, I think the present situation is one in which we have agency. The question is one of how to best exercise that agency.

If reports such as the 1997 National Homeless Children’s Report or the 1997 joint report by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity and Australian Law Reform Commissions, have put certain conceptual frameworks in place, then it is a matter of convincing governments to act on them. That means continuing to write about those reports, to constantly remind people that they exist, and to remind governments that people notice when they aren’t acted on.

It’s not possible, or necessarily desirable, to simply turn the clock back to some mythical pre-economic rationalist past. Or any mythical rural past. In fact one of the problems is that this has become a backwards-looking culture that idealises what it was like to be young in the ‘50s and ‘60s. Instead, I broadly agree with Mark Latham when he says that it’s possible to civilise global capital. It is possible, I think, to put forward programmes for the sensible interventionist reallocation of resources in the community— the traditional task of democratic governments— without entirely withdrawing from the idea that governments need to demonstrate efficiency, and without denying that the free market can sometimes provide good solutions. Economic restructuring in Australia, as practiced by both the previous Labor and present Liberal governments, has been driven by ideological Puritanism. What is needed, instead, is an understanding that in many cases intervention is a more appropriate solution, and that good government involves applying a hybrid of policy.

It is a fact of modern political life, however, that governments are overloaded. That is, the post-war welfare state has assumed more and more responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, to the point where it no longer has the resources to cope. At the same time, governments are afraid of markets. One of the defining characteristics of post-modernity, as outlined by the philosopher Jean Francois Lyotard, is that government priorities are no longer defined by interests of state, but by the demands of global markets. In other words, people will increasingly have to solve problems for themselves.

From where I stand that means people working together, outside government, to increase the stock of social capital available to the community. By “social capital”, I mean working together in such a way as to reinvigorate the ideas of collectivity, mutuality and trust, by pooling resources and expertise and developing strong social networks, in order to show that collaboration brings benefits. In the present circumstances that also means producing and finding forums for a range of counter-discourses to undermine those dominant narratives of divisiveness and mistrust that circulate so powerfully through the community, especially to undermine those narratives that seek to position young people so strongly outside the general community interest.

I don’t think broad-based change can happen though, until people learn to stop rewarding themselves for their own ruthlessness. In other words, there will be no change while there is political populism, easy scapegoats and a lack of real analysis, or until there is some kind of broader denaturalisation of the global politics of division, with its tendency to progressively disenfranchise and demonise people on the basis of how far they are from the notion of ethnic, cultural, economic and political centres. Which is, of course, the very recipe for the global politics of regional youth.

Mark Davis is the author of Gangland: Cultural Elites and the New Generationalism. This is a transcript of a paper given at the recent “Issues of Regional Youth” conference at Central Queensland University, Mackay. This and other papers from the conference will shortly be published as a book by the CQU Press, and on the CQU Mackay web site at http://mackay.cqu.edu.au.