Little Johnny’s Foaming Lip: The Culture Wars, Cultural Studies and the Ten-Point Plan

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The late 1990s mark an interesting moment in both Australian and global, postcolonial history. In 1992, in a case brought by Eddie Mabo, a Torres Strait islander, the doctrine of *terra nullius*, by which European occupation of Australia had ratified itself on the grounds that the land was empty and belonged to no-one before white settlement, was ruled invalid by the High Court. The Mabo case set an historical precedent in Australian postcolonial history, opening up non-freehold land to claims by traditional Aboriginal owners. A subsequent High Court judgement on a case brought by the Wik people also allowed Aboriginal people to negotiate for dual occupancy of the huge pastoral leases that take up many traditional tribal lands. Both judgements have, however, been savagely resisted by the conservative government elected in 1996. This government has accused the High Court of meddling in race politics and of judicial activism. In early 1998 the government legislated a ‘ten-point plan’ on Wik which, among other things, denied Aborigines the right to negotiate on native title under the Wik judgement. On the surface, these judgements and the controversy that surrounds them might seem like isolated instances of merely colonial race politics. Their context is, however, explicitly global.

The ‘culture wars’ were and are a series of controversies that gathered momentum in the United States in the mid-1980s, partly as a product of Reagan government policy-making. Republican Party advisers, seeking to ensure Reagan’s re-election, identified a possible rift between the soft and relatively affluent liberal Left and the working-class sections of the Democrat vote. They then set out to split that vote by using ‘wedge issues’ to alienate blue-collar voters from the Democrats and by portraying the party as having been hijacked by liberals. Blue-collar voters had seen their standards of living fall since the mid-1970s. Reagan’s strategists figured that they could be made to think that they had suffered, not as a result of the economic downturn and restructuring, but as a result of the liberal left’s successful promotion of identity politics and its lobbying for affirmative
action over race, gender, gay and lesbian, and disabilities issues, against the interests of ‘ordinary people’.

At the same time, Republicans and their supporters began using pro-working-class rhetoric, giving it voice through syndicated radio talk-back hosts with powerful party connections. Rush Limbaugh, for example, never tired of bashing the ‘bleeding-heart left’ while at the same time lamenting the marginalisation of the working-class American male painting a vivid picture of how the former had benefited at the cost of the decline of the latter. In addition to Limbaugh’s top-rating radio show, the late 1980s and early 1990s also produced a number of best-selling books that helped Reagan’s cause. Allan Bloom’s *The Closing of the American Mind*, Dinesh D’Souza’s *Illiberal Education* which popularised the term ‘political correctness’, and Roger Kimball’s *Tenured Radicals* all looked for the elites that the likes of Rush Limbaugh and Pat Buchanan spoke of, and found them in the academy. These books put arts faculties at the centre of their arguments, and questioned the viability of popular culture and of race and gender politics as a focus for curricula. What these texts advocated, in line with much of the culture wars’ rhetoric, was a winding back of affirmative action programmes, an abandonment of politically inflected curriculums which, they argued, debased the true mission of the liberal arts, and a return to notions of self-evidence and excellence as selection criteria for staff, students and set texts.

A major crime of the universities, so far as the key texts of the culture wars are concerned, was their embrace of popular culture as a subject for legitimate study. It was argued that arts faculties had at the same time waged war on the classical Western tradition. ‘Hey ho, hey ho, Western culture’s got to go’ was, according to D’Souza and Kimball, the rousing chant of 500 students as they marched from one end of Stanford to the other; an ominous death knell for everything the university stood for. But, as it turns out, both D’Souza and Kimball misconstrued their facts. This now-famous anecdote, as John K. Wilson has demonstrated, turns out to be largely mythical – a story cooked up by culture wars warriors for their own propagandist ends.2

Like most culture wars’ books, D’Souza’s and Kimball’s are written in code. Popular culture is a metonym for race. What Bloom, D’Souza and Kimball are really arguing for when they pledge their support for high culture is a return to the old days of higher education in America before affirmative action. The lowbrow and the popular, in so far as they ever actually infiltrated the academy, also signal another alleged infiltration, that is, an influx of non-white students into both the universities and a wider range of cultural institutions as a result of affirmative action programmes. The effort to re-naturalise the highbrow, by rallying around the old-fashioned literary canon, served as a way to validate classical white Western
values and to reinforce the idea that elitism was OK. This is a theme common to all the culture wars’ books, and it is one which operates alongside the idea that democracy, in so far as it makes special concessions to the disadvantaged, can go too far.

If this information about the culture wars no longer seems novel, it is because the culture wars have been institutionalised. They circulate now as a certain kind of truth. A truth currently scripted in the media-vernacular. Mention of the words ‘postmodernism’, ‘cultural studies’, ‘literary theory’ or even ‘multiculturalism’ in the media now signifies not so much a range of practices as a range of counter-discourses. At the same time, it evokes a range of figures and speaking positions to articulate these discourses. In Australia the figures who have, to some degree or other, come to personify those counter-discourses include the likes of Robert Dessaix, Morag Fraser, Robert Manne, Luke Slattery, Peter Craven and Don Anderson. To the extent that it is, by voicing a certain aesthetic nostalgia, currently possible to carve out a minor media career as such a figure, this is what all the above have done. The culture wars have made these speaking positions available, inventing them as a product of a certain kind of institutionality, maintained by a certain kind of surveillance of what those strange academic theoreticians are up to. They operate from the opinion and review pages of the daily newspapers, through radio talk-back and televised current affairs, and they range from poet Les Murray’s sideswipes at the ‘literary totalitarianism’ of theoreticians to current affairs host Kerry O’Brien’s raised eyebrow at the mention of a university course on Grunge.3

These are the forms of culture wars’ discourse that most people recognise. Sometimes, however, the script is less obvious, even as it is more clearly palpable. The title of this article ‘Little Johnny’s Foaming Lip’ refers to the wedge of very real foam that accumulated on the Prime Minister’s lower lip as he addressed a group of unhappy Queensland pastoralists during his early 1997 tour of Far North Queensland. The foam, I take it, was not scripted. Nevertheless it provides a synecdoche for the highly scripted strategies put in place to institutionalise the rhetoric used both during this tour and subsequently in John Howard’s ten-point plan on Wik. Even if the foam was not scripted, the discursive strategies tended to normalise it. They obviated the possibility that the Prime Minister was literally foaming at the mouth, and raised the alternate possibility that, given the mood of the pastoralists, this foam was itself a reasonable expression of decency and fairness.

A central strategy of the US Right in the wake of the culture wars has been to de-legitimate the notion of corrective justice at the institutional levels of everyday discourse and the law. The outlawing of affirmative programmes in California in 1996 with the ratification of the anonymously
named Proposition 209 is one example of this. The main discursive mechanism used to this end has been the language of sameness. It is more difficult now to talk about difference than it was a few years ago; to talk about difference is to risk being labelled ‘politically correct’. It is, however, a little easier to talk about integration, assimilation and sameness. This reveals the extent to which the culture wars flow, at least partially, from classical liberal criticism. Leading figures in the culture wars in America, such as Allan Bloom, look to this type of criticism as a naturalised founding moment of English studies. In Australia, meanwhile, Robert Dessaix argues against multiculturalism in critical theory, and seeks to assimilate ethnic difference into his own nationalist ideal of Oz-lit, with an emphasis on making same. This comes complete with advice to non-English-speaking-background writers about the importance both of learning proper English (‘as good as a native’s’) and of acknowledging the virtues of local culture before ‘attempting to join in’ the local conversation. One consequence of the ‘culture wars’ then is that assimilation has again learned how to masquerade as liberal tolerance, and in doing so has made use of contemporary popular critical orthodoxy. The language of sameness runs through Australian literary-critical culture, articulated through popular middlebrow figures such as Dessaix. From there it has been projected into the public mainstream.

The workings of this sort of liberal critical machine could once pretend to be more or less silent. They involved teaching certain books, having a certain kind of tolerance and conscience, taking up a certain patronising position on race matters, even as a more insidious race politics was enacted. It is under the auspices of this sort of liberalism that, as Toni Morrison has observed, ‘the habit of ignoring race is understood to be a graceful, even generous, liberal gesture’. ‘To notice is to recognise an already discredited difference...to allow the black body a shadowless participation in the dominant cultural body’; to acquiesce, that is, to the logic of the same. In her famous review of David Malouf’s Remembering Babylon, his novel of the European settlement of Australia, Germaine Greer reveals related assumptions in Malouf’s work. As Greer points out, the book was graciously received and Malouf described as ‘Australia’s greatest living writer’ by ‘such sensitive people as Antonia Byatt, Malcolm Bradbury, Victoria Glendinning and Tom Paulin’ in the Year of The World’s Indigenous Peoples. Yet ‘the only black [in the book] who is allowed to speak is the fake black’.

There was a silence, too, in Morag Fraser’s recent collection of essays Seams of Light. Fraser promoted this as a positive contribution to the race debate in Australia, yet not one of its contributors is Aboriginal. Similar silences run through Peter Craven’s The Best Australian Essays 1998.
In the wake of the culture wars, the language of post-liberalism has become a lot noisier. It is, as Richard Dyer formulates it, increasingly difficult to pretend that whiteness is a condition of ethnic invisibility and universality. Post-liberal neo-conservatism is differentiated from earlier versions of liberalism by its aggressive attempt to reinstate the logic of the same, and, against the odds, to render liberalism, and whiteness, once again ideologically silent. The classical pluralist liberal model tended to privilege sameness as a condition for unreflexive notions of equity and justice. After the culture wars what proliferates is a souped-up, turbo-charged model of the same thing. Instead of unreflexive longing for sameness, sameness is now articulated through a powerfully integrationalist, assimilationist language that specifically attempts to silence other voices at the same time as it relentlessly attempts to rearticulate white privilege.

This same emphasis on sameness and integration is evident in John Howard’s 1997 ten-point plan. As with much rhetoric coming from the Right over the past few years, the plan paid careful attention to the idea that all parties to the proposed legislation are already equal, and that therefore none of them require concessions with respect to their different cultural backgrounds. The proposed plan was audacious, plainly assuming that the framing epistemological terms of any agreement be white. It provides a good example of the institutionalisation of the culture wars and represents an attempt to write into the law that version of ‘common-sense’ which has become readily available following a decade of conservative attacks on affirmative action and the claims of minorities for compensatory justice.

The ten-point plan followed the general strategy of the Howard government on race, both before and after the 1996 election. Perhaps the most telling example of the way the Liberal Party has imported the logic of the US culture wars is in its use of race as a political tool. By so doing it has broken with the bipartisan tradition in Australian politics of not campaigning on race issues. Pushing race to the forefront of the 1996 election, John Howard, after first seeking Republican advice, recycled the anti-political correctness of George Bush’s 1992 campaign. At the same time Howard introduced a rhetoric of class, consciously courting the ‘Aussie battler’, against whose interests the previous government, having been hijacked by minority interest groups, was deemed to have acted. Here Howard was searching for a nostalgic national unity: the sort of unity that is impossible if the postcolonial claims of Aboriginal leaders, and other emerging non-white voices, are listened to. As Ken Gelder notes, ‘John Howard, Tim Fischer and Pauline Hanson’s yearning for an Aboriginal population without a bureaucracy (i.e. without the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and the various Land Councils) gives us an idea of how white Australians still remain nostalgic for colonial conditions’.
The new ‘common-sense’ can be clearly heard in John Howard’s remark in late 1997 that the Native Title Act had been a disaster for reconciliation in Australia.\textsuperscript{12} This remark is an example of the new Right’s post-culture wars’ gambit whereby the attempts of various minorities to attain equity in society are deemed to have damaged their own cause because they lower their standing in the esteem of the broader community. The implication of this argument is that, had the claims not been made, the broader community might have felt more charitable towards these disenfranchised minorities. The effect of this linguistic imperative has been to cleverly disguise a refusal to hand over real power, on the assumption that everybody occupies the same level playing field at the outset. Even to begin to acknowledge that this is not the case is, perversely, to be guilty of bias. To acknowledge difference, therefore, is, in this argument, always to be discriminatory. John Howard’s more recent accusation that the ABC has a preoccupation with minority issues that do not interest the general community makes use of a similar ploy.\textsuperscript{13} Note, again, the culture wars’ tropes: the division of culture into minorities and mainstream, with a subtle attack on the classic democratic ideal that the mainstream exists in order to serve the disenfranchised.

A common-sense notion of pluralism and justice, aggressively predicated upon a logic of sameness, underpins recent conservative thinking on race more generally. Thus conservatives such as Geoffrey Blainey and Hugh Morgan consider the Mabo judgement divisive in so far as it breaches a principle of sameness because only Aborigines can claim native title.\textsuperscript{14} In line with the neo-conservative principle that all parties in society are always already equal and that therefore corrective legislation is itself discriminatory, there is no attempt to think through the ways in which the various communities to which such legislation addresses itself might be always already divided.

The High Court’s Mabo judgment was notable in that it instituted a system of justice that acknowledged cultural difference. As Paul Patton points out, the Mabo cases suggest that sameness need not be a precondition for justice. In fact, the equal treatment of indigenous and non-indigenous people, so far as Patton is concerned, clearly results in injustice because it fails to acknowledge the acts of violence by which Aborigines were dispossessed of their lands: forcible acts which indeed inaugurated the white Australian common law system. The Mabo judgement is thus notable for its attempt to look for justice in the period before the inauguration of the legal system in which it is itself predicated. In short, the Mabo judgement acknowledges a difference, and establishes it as a necessary basis for a just outcome, even if, finally, the judgement nevertheless assumes the pre-eminence of the common law system.
By contrast, the ten-point plan represented a return to flattened sameness. Rather than attempt to resolve a war between cultures, so to speak, through a mutual acknowledgment of difference, the ten-point plan tried to pretend, by wiping out Aboriginal agency, that there is no difference and therefore no legitimate claim to be made on the basis of difference. The removal of the right to negotiate, the imposition of white standards of self-evident physical rather than spiritual connection to the land as a criterion for claims under the proposed bill, and the demand that claims take place within a limited timeframe underlined an assumption that identity claims should generally be made on common-sense white terms. This amounted to a cleverly negotiated set of silencings and debasings of Aboriginal agency, again, in the name of sameness. They resulted, yet again then, in the removal of the Aboriginal right to speak. These silencings have since been repeated in a series of parallel events. Examples of this include the short amount of time that Aboriginal activists were given to look at the original government response to Wik, compared to the time allocated to pastoralists, and the recent attempts made by the Prime Minister to censor Aboriginal leader Pat Dodson’s eulogy at the 1997 funeral of the prominent intellectual and Aboriginal advocate, Nugget Coombs. That wedge of foam on John Howard’s lip stands for a lot.

Conservatives, however, have not had everything their own way. Indeed, it is possible to argue, as Richard Goldstein did in 1996 in a Village Voice feature article, that the right has lost the culture war and that popular culture will out. Michael Jackson and Madonna not only have little respect for Jesse Helms or Pat Buchanan, but they also produce a popular hegemony that, if nothing else, shows that there are powerful cross-currents at work here. Liberal Hollywood, music video makers and the various practitioners of piercings, porn and crucifixes immersed in urine have, in the United States, outstripped every effort of conservatives to silence them, while celebrity, as P. David Marshall argues, has itself provided forms of social critique. Citing the celebrations of interracial love and gender equity, the critiques of ableism and proliferation of ‘alternative families’ in Disney productions such as Pocahontas, Beauty and the Beast, The Hunchback of Notre Dame and The Lion King, Goldstein argues that conservatives are convinced that ‘despite their ascendance to the highest realms of power and prestige, culture remains beyond their grasp’.

Nevertheless the successes of the right are such that, as Lawrence Grossberg argues, the struggle to ‘remake the map of everyday life’ in the United States ‘is as much a struggle between various factions of the right, or of Capitalist interests’ as a struggle between Left and Right. As Goldstein ruefully concedes, ‘the left has won the culture war, but only because there are big bucks to be made from their victory. And the right has
lost because there is less profit in a single, sanctioned set of “family values” than in a limitless assortment of lifestyles and identities’. Grossberg, pushing this take on popular culture further, argues that conservatives have grown adept at using affective structures similar to those at the centre of rock culture (and it might be added Hollywood culture), ‘reorganised and redeployed in the service of a specific political agenda’. He identifies an ‘organised and specific form of apathy’ which prevails in a climate of depoliticisation, and argues that this is symptomatic of a certain ironic cynicism in which what matters is the fact that something matters, in which what you have to invest in is just the fact that you have to invest in something. This is ‘pessimism with a happy face’, in which ‘nothing matters and what if it did’. It defines a politics that, on the surface, appears selfish but is actually something else: ‘If you’re sailing on the Titanic, go first class’. What matters is that you care, not what you care about or even how. This may help us understand why the key moments in the Bush-Dukakis race were the two moments that reversed the public’s opinion of the relative affect of each candidate: When Bush stood up to a network anchor-person he demonstrated he had passion; when Dukakis answered a question about rape in a bureaucratic tone, he demonstrated that he had none.

And Grossberg adds; ‘Reagan’s popularity depended in part on the simple fact that he seemed to care about something ... what he cared about was less important’, pointing out that the prevailing mood in neo-conservative times is one of disinvestment in politics. Grossberg might have added that this can be seen in regular conservative jeremiads against ideology and ‘big government’: tirades that are themselves largely affective.

In Australia this affective logic is not only evidenced by the wedge of foam on the Prime Minister’s lip, but also plays its part in a struggle that produces complex subjectivities, which are also versed in the eco-speak of Total Quality Management, Just in Time Delivery, or anti-PC rhetoric, at the same time as we indulge in the mildly iconoclastic kitsch-fem pleasures of the Spice Girls, or take up more clearly oppositional stances against the government’s position on Wik. The successes of the Right, then, are not measurable in the topology of these struggles, so much as in the ways we have learned to recognise ourselves and speak ourselves, manifested at the various levels of register, tone, affect and in the very partitioning of our constitutive discourses. One of the ways we have learnt to recognise ourselves, perhaps with a view to reconciling all this, is as certain kinds of cultural agents. As Grossberg argues, ‘there is a struggle going on in which culture is not only the site of struggle, and not only even the stake to be won, but also the weapon in that struggle’. Or as US neo-conservative William
Bennett, campaigning against teenage marijuana use, puts it, ‘culture is more important than politics’. 24

Given that the culture wars preoccupy themselves with the academy, that wedge of foam also suggests an imperative to speak, at least in passing, about the role of cultural studies. A persistent theme within cultural studies is a discussion of the extent to which its practitioners are keeping up with social change. To question, in other words, ‘how effective ... Cultural Studies (is) as a form of academic and political practice’. 25 What I offer here is the impatient voice of Cultural Studies. I am with Meaghan Morris when she says of cultural studies, ‘it is high time for more Australian practitioners to put our heads down, ignore the flak, and start producing the substantive accounts of cultural life, past and present, that we claim that our field can generate and that would clarify our project’. 26 In the wake of the culture wars, there are, I believe, particular opportunities to do this.

Cultural studies offers an alternative to the dominant conservative discourses of the culture wars. It does so in the form of an apparatus for productively negotiating difference. Cultural studies’ practitioners from Derrida to Foucault to Judith Butler, Donna Haraway, Rey Chow, Grossberg, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Slavoj Zizek, have, in variously inflected ways, never stopped talking about difference. Recent attacks on ‘theory’ and cultural studies underscore this. The academic hegemonies of critical theory and cultural studies have a basis in feminism, the imperatives of queer communities, postcolonialism and the growth of the global popular. It is therefore no accident that the conservative backlash against the academy targets the ways in which academics either speak about difference or display an understanding of, and a self-consciousness about, the limits of their own positionality. It is also no accident that such critics aggressively lampoon the endless caveats, qualifications and self-explanations that an awareness of difference and positionality entails, labelling them obscurant while simultaneously seeking to disavow any threat to the naturalised status of their own positionality.

At the same time as being an impatient practitioner of cultural studies, I also speak as an impure practitioner. I work in the media, and have done so for over ten years; I have written an unashamedly popular, best-selling book; and I am a doctoral student in English literature, not cultural studies. Perhaps then it is not surprising that I seek an impure cultural studies, one that finds no shame in adopting firm positions when necessary, or in taking the risk of adopting a dogmatic, unequivocal stand on things. This would also be a discipline which could be shamelessly populist when necessary, and from within which it would be possible to strategically deploy discourses replete with humanisms, essentialisms and universals. It might even be one that seeks out opportunities to use a politics of sameness.
There is, I believe, a political imperative to do all these things from within cultural studies. Rey Chow, describing the work of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Slavoj Zizek, suggests that for all the differences between their work, both exhibit ‘ruthlessness’; in the Marxist sense that a ruthless criticism must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conflict with the powers that be. Chow refers here to the willingness of both Spivak and Zizek to take the risk of essentialism, and a ‘fearlessness vis-à-vis speaking “the universal”’. As Chow concludes; ‘in no way can we absolutely avoid making “essentialist” or “universalist” statements’. In no way, either, is it possible to avoid speaking sameness. ‘Universalisation, finalisation’, as Spivak writes, ‘is an irreducible moment in any discourse’. In other words, you have to take the risk of essentialism to engage in meaningful political practice. Those who seek to avoid the risk, the ‘great custodians of the anti-universal’ as Spivak calls them, serve ‘a great narrative, the narrative of exploitation, while they keep themselves clean by not committing themselves to anything’.

Some of the criticism which I have attracted from within the academy in the wake of my book’s success interests me. In particular a comment from someone who found things I have said at public fora since the book came out ‘humanistic’. I am less interested in whether such a criticism is justified as I am in the framework in which the criticism is made. It seems to me that the framework is ‘pure-seeking’; one that can speak of specificity, strategic discourses, audiences, hybridity, hypertextuality and the postmodern media, and of the popular, but which, on the whole, has no real idea about how to manifest its discourses in the popular or how to make its objects of desire real in the media.

One of the paradoxes of the culture wars is that, for all the opposition to postmodernity and self-referentiality articulated by figures such as Bloom or Kimball, Dessaix or Manne, their practices are deeply postmodern. They might not spend much time talking about difference, but they occupy speaking positions made available as the result of pure discursivity. Much as these figures pretend to be highbrow, all their strategies are classically populist. For all their advocacy of high moral and cultural values, their speaking position is fundamentally, gloriously tabloid. Almost everything they have to say is hyperbolic, inflammatory and privileges affect. At the same time, they set themselves up as cultural heroes, as literally the personification of debates. This can be seen, for example, in Robert Manne’s repeated utterances about the shocks of deep feeling he felt when confronted both with the Demidenko case and by Jenna Mead’s recent book on sexual harassment, Bodyjamming. Whether or not Manne is sincere, his speaking position, through which he presents his own body as a kind of moral index almost in spite of itself, is a reference back to a Leavisite
register of criticism as ‘felt experience’. It is also a reference to a populist discourse of the commentator as a sort of cartoon superhero, a popular moral proxy, tackling the big issues and going where no-one else dare go, all the while displaying, most crucially of all, an emotional response that seems to matter.

In short, these conservatives are in the business of deploying discourses, and of doing so through contemporary public critical orthodoxy. This is especially the case for the explicitly neo-conservative American chapter; Dessai and Manne, by comparison, are moderates. The successes of US neo-conservatives are such that it is not possible to talk about a history of the recent present which is not, at the same time, a history of economic rationalism, of the culture wars, and the rise of the far Right, especially since we all now to some degree speak the language they speak. If the success of the Right in the wake of the culture wars is such that they have set dominant political and cultural agendas over the past fifteen years, then what remains to be seen is if cultural studies can do the same, or at least provide some meaningful opposition.

I take it, when I raise this possibility, that cultural studies is a project of the Left, and that I am but one of the ‘deconstructionists, new historicists, people in gender studies, ethnic studies, media studies, a few left-over Marxists and so on’ that Richard Rorty speaks of as comprising a ‘new ... cultural left’, much to Roger Kimball’s consternation. If so, then perhaps cultural studies can learn something from the culture wars, and from the right, about how to reinvest its objects of desire with popular meaning. Thus far the widespread negative reaction to the Government’s approach to the Aboriginal land rights ten-point plan has achieved little. In mid-1998 the Howard Government was able to get a modified version of it through the Senate, still in a form that specifically denied Aborigines the right to negotiate. This sort of legislation, it seems to me, emphasises again the need for cultural studies professionals, and critical theorists in general, to make their critiques of speaking position heard more widely, and for their critiques of the hidden colonialism of liberal discourses on race to have more impact. What the Australian government’s Wik legislation reminds us is that global discourses are always received with respect to the local, and that the culture wars are not over yet. What the original Mabo and Wik judgements reminds us is that justice can be predicated in difference.

Critical theory has been taught in Australian Universities for twenty years now. It is time for new ways of speaking about difference and justice and the possibilities of a postcolonial realpolitik to be heard in wider contexts and to take their place in popular consciousness. I hope that disciplines such as cultural studies might provide an opportunity to do that, especially at this crucial time in the history of the understanding of difference.
NOTES


6. Ibid., p.10.


17. Goldstein, p.52.


19. Ibid., p.54.


21. Ibid., p.259.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., p.255.

24. William Bennett cited in Goldstein, p.52.


28. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p.12.


32. For further discussion of the influence of US neo-conservatism on Australian liberal-moderates, see Mark Davis, Gangland: Cultural Elites and the New Generationalism (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1997).

33. Rorty cited in Kimball, p.xii.
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