Becoming is a pervasive theme of Deleuze’s work. See Constantin Boundas, *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, p.124-125 ‘In the becoming-wolf of the Wolf-Man’ Freud hears only ‘I am transforming myself into a wolf;’ ‘I am in the process of becoming a wolf’ But Deleuze and Guattari show that the becoming-animal does not amount to becoming an animal; real becoming does not correspond to the traditional definition, namely a mediation on the way to an end or predetermined production. Becoming does not come to an end in the being that has become: ‘the human being does not “really” become an animal any more than the animal “really” becomes something else ... What is real is the becoming itself, not the supposedly fixed terms through which that which becomes passes.’ (*A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 238).


29 Jones, *Chuck Amuck*, p. 263.


31 Chuck Jones, back cover dedication to Norman Klein, *Seven Minutes*.

32 Hans Richter Easel-Scroll-Film 53: on his Rhythm 21 and Eggeling’s Diagonal Symphony (first experiments in film, 1921)

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**Deleuze’s Kiss: The Sensory Pause of Screen**

**Affect**

**FELICITY J. COLEMAN**

“When you kiss me, the world grows so large that the horizon itself disappears.”

(Luce Irigaray, *This Sex Which Is Not One*)

Imagine, if you will, that screening on the wall in front of you is American artist Andy Warhol’s 1963 film *Kiss*. Warhol’s anthropological documentary-style fifty minute film is of fixed camera head-shots of same and opposite sex couples french-kissing passionately. The duration of the kiss on screen is dependent upon the length of 16mm film that Warhol had in his silent Bolex camera at the time, usually 100 feet - enough to make four minutes of screen kiss time. *Kiss* invokes the screen issues for the reading of this essay: desire, gender, duration, spectatorship, and aesthetic.

The **realms** of desire in operation form the broader context for responding to any screen experience. Watching a kiss, reading about a kiss, and experiencing a kiss are not equivalent experiences, but all three contain the potential of a breadth of experiential mechanisms of affect. Irigaray’s observation on the affective spatial mechanism of the kiss provides an embodied frame for this essay’s comments on specific elements of a cinematic or any screen space, as spatial configurations that enable an affective modification of the whole screen experience. This essay sets out to describe Gilles Deleuze’s concept of the oipsign and sconsign, as specific screen mechanisms that rhythmically and irregularly punctuate and parse screen affect; what I will term Deleuze’s kiss.

In his book *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (*L’ Image Temps* 1985, translated into English 1989), Deleuze's description of screen experience is through the cinema's spatial configuration. Screen space is a fourth dimensional, perceptual space invoked by optical and sonic breaks. More than a simple fracture to the screen space, Deleuze describes these interruptions as the opsign and the sounsign - screen fissures that provide vital and affective passages within the whole.

Deleuze posits ideas that are concerned with the spatial and temporal dimensions of affective and emotive outcomes of the cinema. Following French philosopher Henri Bergson, Deleuze explores the “differences in kind” between the terms of affection and perception. Deleuze addresses affectivity in terms of the crystal-image's expressive ability - expressive, not emotive. However, I believe that the expression of a belief system is a passionate activity, in the sense of the concept of the 'passions' as expressive of lived and embodied emotions. It is with this subtext in mind that I am addressing Deleuze's framework behind his concept of the opsign and sounsign, which Deleuze described as a “new breed of signs” - neither indexical, nor syntagmatic. As I perceive it, the opsign and sounsigns are the points where the smooth space of the screen makes its “intensive” (often emotive / historical) breaks, enabling the turning points in narrative equilibriums, catalytic events, that knife in the heart, the point of death, the kiss.

The sounsign and opsign are asymmetrical splinter components of the cinematic crystalline structure. In his glossary to *The Time-Image*, Deleuze defines the opsign as: “an image which breaks the sensory-motor schema, and where the seen is no longer extended into action.” Deleuze realises the force behind the opsign and the sounsign in cinema from the 1940s neo-realist period, where the sound and image alone is revelatory of the cognition of thought and the perception of ideas; histories, ideologies, aesthetic preferences, and the affective ranges of these signs. As Richard Smith noted, Deleuze's “politics of location” does indeed affect the "aesthetic trajectory" of Deleuze's consideration of certain types of cinema produced after World War II in *The Time-Image.*

Deleuze utilised the opsign and sounsign to describe effectively the physical alteration of space. Simply put, the op/sounsins are the temporal modalities (keys) that reconfigure (unlock, and expand or condense) the existing spatial milieu and topographical affectivity of a viewed and audited field. Describing these signs and their functions using a range of allegorical and scientific language, Deleuze's op/sounsins function to interpret meaning symptomatically in the cinematic texts of distinctive and innovative eras of filmmaking: Italian neo-realism; cinema verite of the 1960s; experimental American cinema of the 1960s; the neo-realism of Alain Resnais; the period of post World War II to cinema of the mid 1970s.

The cinema is a screen medium capable of manipulating the viewer / auditor's actual and virtual, habitual and experiential epistemologies and memories. The screen creates a temporal topology of event-vectors of variable durational forces that Deleuze describes as capable of affecting the spectator’s “belief in the world.” That belief system may be founded upon narrative constructions ranging from the fantastic to the false, cultural trivia and market forms of leisure, socially determined power structures, and socially and politically specific periods within cultures. It is the sensory apprehension of these affective, extrinsic abstract realms that appeal to Deleuze's Artaudian sensitivities: “the power of modern cinema” he writes, is that it provides “reasons to believe in this world… to believe in [the flesh of] the body.” So, how does the cinema achieve this?

The restrictions imposed through the technological, economic, and aesthetic organization of a screen medium's contents produces a representation of events (including emotions) that are necessarily bound to their mode of production. Significant for film theory is Deleuze's observation of the spatial relationships of bodies both onscreen and in the field of the spectatorial, and how such ongoing affective relationships provide a registration of the passage of the affection-image. In other

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7 *TI*, p. 172.
8 *TI*, pp. 172-173.
9 *TI*, pp. 2-3. For discussion of Deleuze's use of affection-image, see his work on Bergson and Spinoza.
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things, “a touching which is specific to the gaze”. The body of the spectator as viewer and auditor, and the bodies onscreen are positioned by the screen medium’s editing of this haptic; the sensorial and cognitive response time to the “tautistign” (as Deleuze names it) of an embodied image. As such, screen and spectatorial bodies are subjected to spatially determined visual and sonic boundaries and possibilities. Deleuze begins to describe what regulates these moments on screen, and how the edit, or fissure, is what manages affect.

Sound provides an agency to Deleuze’s account of the channel between the screen space and the world. In mathematical terms, sound can be described as the n-dimension of the surface of the screen; sound reaches beyond the two-dimensional surface and accesses the auditor’s perceptual knowledge, experience, and memories. In his essay “Ritornellos and Existential Affairs” (1979), Guattari developed the Proustian concept of “ritornellos of times past”. In musical parlance, a ritornello is a term that refers to the musical refrain, an orchestral passage between verses of a song, or it can be a passage for a full orchestra in a concerto, during which the soloist is silent. Using the term ritornello as a marker for the range of “catalytic” functions of an “existential effect” upon “reiterative discursive sequences”, Guattari outlined the temporal relations and expression of

words, the screen space is organised before the formation and relations of bodies and events on screen take place; space “precedes realization [of events]”.

Deleuze names Japanese director Yasujirō Ozu as “the inventor of opsins and sonsigns” for the use of specific filmic moments that enable the spectator and those onscreen to perceive the change that has occurred within the whole, within the spectator’s understanding of screen-events and the histories and memories invoked. In Ozu’s oeuvre, spare and restrictive mise en scène are reflective of both Japanese filmmaking production costs of the 1950s, wherein a small budget restricted location and limited the range of settings, and the aesthetic desire of Japanese filmmakers to adhere to a set of strict technical rules. Ozu’s films focus on the relations between things and people, under the regulation of durationally contingent social and political change. In Ozu’s films, daughters grow up, arranged marriages are discussed, wives mourn for the loss of the intense familial experiences generated by the privations of war, fathers and husbands lament the subtle shifts in patriarchal authority.

Ozu’s aesthetic style is emulated in American director Jim Jarmusch’s 1987 film Stranger Than Paradise, where a silence around the kitchen table dilates the relationship between the protagonists and the spectators’ recognition of the communication of things; communication between entities. In Ozu and Jarmusch, silence performs a crystalline moment, describing modification of the screen image neither through movement, nor action, a moment that appeals to thought that Deleuze will define as a sonsigne. The moment of this screen form has a durational modality that evinces what Deleuze described as a “haptic” (translation: a grabbing); a representation of the sensory and temporal apprehension of objects and

11 Tt, p. 13.
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In their essay-plateau 11, “1837: Of the Refrain” in A Thousand Plateaus, Guattari and Deleuze’s ideas on the importance of sound are described as not just territorial markers of ‘forces’ and ‘functions’, but sound performing as a topological divisive structure. It is precisely this spatial apportion that Deleuze will describe as the ‘sonsign’ in The Time-Image. Ronald Bogue notes that Deleuze and Guattari’s use of the refrain [ritornelle] is expanded by them to refer to “any kind of rhythmic pattern that stakes out a territory”.

Bogue lists these ‘territories of the refrain’ that Deleuze and Guattari describe in “Of the Refrain”. To briefly reiterate, I will list them here: stability (for example, sing to yourself in a spooky place and the singing renders the unknown space familiar), property (singing a national anthem will quickly demarcate territorial ownership), opening (that rooster greeting the dawn, altering the configuration of space according to the demands of time). I think, however, that the refrain is more than just a borderline marker, as Bogue refers to it. Like an envol, or ballad, the ritornello is a musical sound-space that is more than a semiotic bracketing. Rather, it acts as a conceptual messenger and passageway to the thought/experience of a spatial whole of a specific event or affect. Throughout The Time-Image, Deleuze plays with the ideas of transit and exchange of the virtual and actual, naming the crystal-image’s dual circuitry of “internal limit”, and “outer-most envelope”. Deleuze describes the opsign/sconsign as the points of spatial transition: “passages and conversions, tending toward a point of indiscernibility”. However, the ritornello is not just a divisive space, or a boundary marker, or even the edge of an outside; it becomes, in Deleuze and Guattari’s usage, the inside of a division. The ritornello provides Deleuze with a way to think through Bergson’s barely visible, and barely audible (indiscernible) line of the coalescence of actual and virtual. Deleuze’s development of Bergson’s thesis of movement and change, as the latter described in Creative Evolution, is in the application of this theory to the affective cinematic screen. The screen space is ritornellized through the “vibration, radiation” of virtual and actual elements, and Deleuze invents the pause-passageway of the opsign and sconsign to describe this perceptual movement.

The literary, plastic, theatrical and screen based arts of post World War II drew a prosenceum of mortality around their forms, actors, and events. Yet as outlined in Deleuze’s concept of the crystal-image, within this determinate circumstance, there are infinite topographical configurations of what he described as “living thought”. In The Time-Image Deleuze adopts Vittorio de Sica’s durational motif of a man’s bicycle from de Sica’s 1948 film The Bicycle Thief, where modalities of ontology are tested. The protagonist of de Sica’s film must engage with the forces of his screen world, engage in a mode of “combat” to reckon with his existence in the world of post war Italy. The bicycle is emblematic of existence for Deleuze; discussing Alfred Jarry’s paraphysics of the bicycle in an essay in 1965, Deleuze noted how Jarry’s “essence” of the bike is technology. In taking the trip around the streets of Rome in 1948, de Sica provides a view into the patchwork of Europe at the time: the opsign of the American Marshall Plan, and its effect on the Italian National cinema industry is indicated through the Rita Hayworth posters bill-boarded onto the brick street walls by the protagonist, just as his bicycle is being stolen: Hollywood had arrived / the sociopolitical despair now has another face to its name.

We could further separate these dimensions of the son/opsign into their specific types of expression, for example the instance of words-language as a phonic sconsign, different from instrumental or aleatory expression of

24 T7, p. 70; p. 81.
26 T7, p. 177.
27 Deleuze describes how ‘combat’ is a modality of becoming, that implies no judgment in his essay “To Have Done with Judgment” in Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 135.
28 G. Deleuze, “An Unrecognized Precursor to Heidegger: Alfred Jarry” (1965) in Essays Critical and Clinical, p. 93, “The bicycle is the frame, like Heidegger’s ‘fourfold’.”
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19 Deleuze acknowledges Guattari’s production of the idea of the “crystals of time” and analysis of the ritornello in *Tt*, p. 295, nt. 25: p. 296, nt. 34.
22 *Tt*, pp. 80-81.
23 *Tt*, p. 9.
24 *Tt*, p. 70; p. 81.
26 *Tt*, p. 177.
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Deleuze describes the united exchange of virtual and actual as the crystal-image, and describes its specificities through the medium of cinema, which he regarded as a coalescent vector of temporal and spatial cognisance. The elements of the crystal-image are the relations between the actual and the virtual image. These relations consist of the associations generated by the ever mutating consolidation and dissolution of the exchange of a real image and its implication — that is, its virtuality, within the circuit of established meanings of recollection, not movement. Under crystalline descriptions, the "object" or image, is continually replaced, displaced, multiplied. Bergson described this process in his diagram of the circuit of 'reflective perception' which emulates an image of the spreading ripples in a disturbed body of water, or cut in half, as in a mirrored image. 34 Just as you would throw a stone into the centre of a still body of water and watch the resultant disturbance/alteration of that body of water, the implication for the insertion of a son/opsign into the screen body means that the perceptual field's circuit is dilated, becoming more specifically focussed through the magnification and multiplication of the son/opsign, as the layers enfold each other and return to an enlarged whole: engorged by virtualities.

In The Time-Image, Deleuze adopts a three-fold structure for the crystal-image. His logic of Augustine's "threefold present" contains the present of present things, the present of past things, and the present of future things. 35 The present of experience has Deleuze describing how the crystal-image can be conceived through a mirror; however, this arena merely enfames the quintessence of the virtual and real's nature of proxy. Within this stage, a theatrical play of contextual differences enables the crystal-image to shift and generate other meanings through its opacity and/or clarity of form, hence generating memory and a present-past. In addition to this exaggerated expression of exchange (frequently made obvious in the cinema's inflationary tendencies, as Deleuze describes it), the crystal-image, and crystalline structure are by nature self-generating, the invention of the future by the present. It is the genesis and the whole at once, or as Deleuze describes in The Time-Image, "the theorem and the problem". 36

30 77, p. 3.
31 Deleuze discusses this in his chapter on "Thought and Cinema" in The Time-Image.
32 77, p. 12, p. 9.
33 Deleuze's discussion in his chapter "Beyond the movement-image" in The Time-Image insinuates discussion on divergent character archetypes, acting modalities, and the awareness of the divergent uses of topographies as territories of behaviour.
36 77, p. 174.
a sonorous sounsign, and so on. One of many sounsigns is in the actor’s use of language in The Bicycle Thief: “mangia, mangia” (eat, eat), urges the desperate father to his fearful son in a heartbreaking scene of familial anguish over the space of the dinner table. To give another of Deleuze’s examples, the sounsign of “mangia” appears in another form, as “Rosebud” in Orson Welles’s 1940 film Citizen Kane, again another “bu(s)lad” to ontology, as Deleuze comments on the noir plot’s quest to discern the “sounding”, or “sound image” of what is said. Kane is a dying man, who, like the child of de Sica’s film, has a certain motor-sensory “helplessness”, as Deleuze described, or fragility that makes them more “capable of seeing and hearing”. In addition to operating as mise en scène, plot and structural devices, sounsigns and sounsigns add affective passion into the whole. In The Time-Image, Deleuze continually stresses the importance of grasping the fundamental shift that occurs with the cognitive apprehension of movement of sensory-motor conditions. Questioning why this collapse of sensory-motor schemata gave rise to the sounsign and sounsign as the now connected poles of infinite cinematic exchange of the virtual (or imaginary) and actual (or real). Deleuze provides examples that defer to spatial examples of passageways, or transitional states. In turn, these associations (for example, a conversation as transitional place) create the thought of possible physical and virtual worlds and behaviours of objects therein, as evidenced in screen media. The style of the sounsigns’ and/or sounsigns’ passage-as-pause of the discrete screen movements produces a range of modalities of temporal relations, generating the screen-space as an affective place. Movement in itself is replaced by an awareness of the affective power of screen-space.

Deleuze describes the unified exchange of virtual and actual as the crystal-image, and describes its specificities through the medium of cinema, which he regarded as a coalescent vector of temporal and spatial cognisance. The elements of the crystal-image are the relations between the actual and the virtual image. These relations consist of the associations generated by the ever mutating consolidation and dissolution of the exchange of a real image and its implication—that is, its virtuality, within the circuit of established meanings of recollection, not movement. Under crystalline descriptions, the “object” or image, is continually replaced, displaced, multiplied. Bergson described this process in his diagram of the circuit of “reflective perception” which emulates an image of the spreading ripples in a disturbed body of water, or cut in half, as in a mirrored image. Just as you would throw a stone into the centre of a still body of water and watch the resultant disturbance/alteration of that body of water, the implication for the insertion of a son/sounsign into the screen body means that the perceptual field’s circuit is dilated, becoming more specifically focussed through the magnification and multiplication of the son/sounsign, as the layers enfold each other and return to an enlarged whole: enfolded by virtualities.

In The Time-Image, Deleuze adopts a three-fold structure for the crystal-image. His logic of Augustine’s “threefold present” contains the present of present things, the present of past things, and the present of future things. The present of experience has Deleuze describing how the crystal-image can be conceived through a mirror; however, this arena merely enframes the quintessence of the virtual and real’s nature of proxy. Within this stage, a theatrical play of contextual differences enables the crystal-image to shift and generate other meanings through its opacity and/or clarity of form, hence generating memory and a present-past. In addition to this exaggerated expression of exchange (frequently made obvious in the cinema’s inflationary tendencies, as Deleuze describes it), the crystal-image, and crystalline structure are by nature self-generating, the invention of the future by the present. It is the genesis and the whole at once, or as Deleuze describes in The Time-Image, “the theorem and the problem”.

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29 Tt, p. 105, p. 13.
30 Tt, p. 3.
31 Deleuze discusses this in his chapter on “Thought and Cinema” in The Time-Image.
32 Tt, p. 12, p. 9.
33 Deleuze’s discussion in his chapter “Beyond the movement-image” in The Time-Image institutes discussion on divergent character archetypes, acting modalities, and the awareness of the divergent uses of topographies as territories of behaviour.

36 Tt, p. 174.
Deleuze's crystal-image is descriptive of Bergson's relational circuit of "constant creation or reconstruction," a salient point in contemporary cinema's economic use of the auto-poetic nature of genre.\textsuperscript{37}

Through these three variations of the crystal-image, Deleuze describes the cognitive and physical apprehension of time as an affectation and modification for the perceiver. The topographic milieu, produced by the crystal-image and generated from the circuit between virtual and actual, causes affective emotion. For the viewer/auditor of the screen, this affect may or may not be instantaneous (for example the affect produced by pornography/violence/ the news may operate as a delayed neurological/cognitive/corporeal registration). The enfolded ritornelle ripples of virtuality and actuality may not always be symmetrical; crystals can also form as enantiomorphic structures.\textsuperscript{39}

The cinemas of Chantal Akerman and Alain Resnais utilize this non-symmetrical vision of things and solicit Deleuze's attention for their range of affective power and the possible scales of temporal indicators of the op/sonsign. How duration moves, Deleuze's question to the cinematic medium, requires tabulation through the range of spatial modalities of affective expression available to the digital medium, in addition to an account of spectators' bio-cognitive reception, and response.

Analysis of any experience within capitalism, and of any market produced medium is determined by an ethically produced aesthetic. Recognition of that pinpointing of it within a specific location has been the project of many theorists. The links between architecture, geography and affective experience have been extensively noted, for example, by Frances Yates, and Guiliana Bruno.\textsuperscript{40} What makes Deleuze's crystal-image and crystalline structures different then from the infinitive (yet emotively determinate) aesthetic cartographies of, for example, Benjamin's \textit{aura}, Sartre's \textit{nausea}, de Beauvoir's \textit{instants of creative responsibility}, Barthes' \textit{punctum}, or Irigaray's \textit{kiss}?

In his discussion of the cinematic form as a temporal crystalline structure in \textit{The Time-Image}, Deleuze applies a spatio-musical logic explored in the Deleuze-Guattari essay-plateau 14. “1440: The Smooth and the Striated.”\textsuperscript{45} Deleuze's \textit{kiss}, or form of a 'punctum', appears as the crystal-image of cinema's "pure optical or sound situations", which operate as a crystalline-continuum of opsigns and sonsigns.\textsuperscript{46} Throughout \textit{The Time-Image}, Deleuze discussed how such “situations” are evoked by their apprehension, or structural insertion, via moments that effect a “loosening of the sensory-motor link (the stroll or wandering, the ballad, the events which concern no one) to the rise of optical and sound situations”. With this expression of “loosening”, Deleuze invokes one of his many descriptions of the movement of power and forces, of pathways to existence and experience, and how that involves a play of the dynamism of affective forces.

Deleuze's crystal-image describes the cinematic process of creating a narrative circuit. An aporetic sense of complicity is maintained through the perceptual process played and preyed upon by the cinema's suggestive nature through the op/sonsign's play with reality as abstraction and criticism of affective vision. Meaning is clarified with the recognition of component elements once the whole has been delineated for an instant within successive instants. What gives the illusion of a sense of spatial and temporal continuity for the spectator, is the sonsign as linkage point within the series of moments on screen. When Deleuze writes “The visual image will thus never show what the sound image utters”, he is referring to his belief in the construction of spatial forms through Riemannian, non-

\textsuperscript{37} H. Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, p. 103.

\textsuperscript{38} For a discussion of the nature of genre on screen, see John Fiske \textit{Television Culture} (London and New York: Routledge, 1987), and Steve Neale \textit{Genre and Hollywood} (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).


\textsuperscript{45} A Thousand Plateaux, pp. 474-500.

\textsuperscript{46} 47, p. 9.
Deleuze's crystal-image is descriptive of Bergson's relational circuit of “constant creation or reconstruction”, a salient point in contemporary cinema's economic use of the autopoietic nature of genre. Through these three variations of the crystal-image, Deleuze describes the cognitive and physical apprehension of time as an affectation and modification for the perceiver. The topographic milieu, produced by the crystal-image and generated from the circuit between virtual and actual, causes affective emotion. For the viewer/auditor of the screen, this affect may or may not be instantaneous (for example the affect produced by pornography/vi-olence/the news may operate as a delayed neurological/cognitive/corporeal registration). The enfolded ritornellic ripples of virtuality and actuality may not always be symmetrical; crystals can also form as enantionorphic structures. The cinemas of Chantal Akerman and Alain Resnais utilize this non-symmetrical vision of things and solicit Deleuze's attention for their range of affective power and the possible scales of temporal indicators of the op/song. How duration moves, Deleuze's question to the cinematic medium, requires tabulation through the range of spatial modalities of affective expression available to the digital medium, in addition to an account of spectators' bio-cognitive reception, and response.

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37 H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 103.
determinate components.\textsuperscript{48} These spatial forms are not referring to physically determined or measured Euclidean dimensions; they are “non-localizable.”\textsuperscript{49} For example, the spaces implied by sound may be of a virtual, fourth, or of a durationally contextual dimension (a memory space, recollective, premonitory, \textit{déjà-vu}, and so on, as Bergson described in \textit{Matter and Memory}). It is possible to think of examples of op/signs as intensifiers of the time-image produced by the screen as Deleuze describes them as having “dimensions or powers that go beyond space.”\textsuperscript{50} Deleuze’s “beyond” refers to any virtual intensity experienced, as a false montage, part of the affective illusory power of the self-reflective screen of post-Classical cinema. Op/signs are not action or movement, they are vector points in space that are out of “daily”, regular sequence, and as such frame the vital linkage components of screen wholes.\textsuperscript{51} Despite Deleuze’s insistence on the “beyond of space”, the op/sign’s position in the sequence of imagery means an alteration of the configuration of the spatial whole of the screen text and haptic apprehension of events occurs. Deleuze regards space as perceptually scaled thought chains, and describes it as a vectored series of information, to be accessed through the iconic, the genetic, the semiotic, and the cliché language of the screen medium’s internal variation and adaptation of temporal relations.\textsuperscript{52} Deleuze describes opsigns and onsigns as “direct presentation[s] of time”, but what makes their specificity in cinema is the concept of a body as an anchor for the relative point on the smooth, mutable screen space.\textsuperscript{53}

In virtual and actual realms, we generally experience space through a remembered, imagined, and experiential sensory interface (the threefold kiss) - audition, hapticity, olfactory means, visual perception, emotional direction, psychological organization, simulation of gravitational laws, and so on, all of which stimulate and direct motor perception. As Bergson argued in \textit{Matter and Memory}, there is no perception without some form of corporeal affection taking place.\textsuperscript{54} The op/sign is a temporal point, a moment of (affective) recognition for the spectator / actor within the continuum of the whole. As Deleuze notes, the activity of pure optical or pure sound apprehension produces temporal moments that shift the “direction” of the whole spatial field of the screen. Continuity of relations occurs not because the op/sign function as semiotic indexical points, but because there are anchorage points for the screen surfaces, and these are the bodies of the spectators. Deleuze’s use of Riemann’s problematisation of space, and Bergson’s concept of the “in kind” mutability of space enables a connection to be established between the multiple spatial zones and the materiality of a specific body (animate or object). As spectators of the op/signs of the crystal image, we perceive and describe the same screen representation in terms of a heterogeneously configured space of “differential relations”.\textsuperscript{55} Every little space has a different sound resonance that provides access to our ethic of believing in the body. The opsign and/or onsing provides for the screen medium a topographical pause - the pause before the affect effects its durationally contingent vectorial or scalar sign upon the body of the spectator.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{48} Tt, p. 279.
\textsuperscript{49} Tt, p. 22; p. 41.
\textsuperscript{50} Tt, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{52} Tt, pp. 22-23; p. 34.
\textsuperscript{53} Tt, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{54} H. Bergson, \textit{Matter and Memory}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{55} G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, pp. 485; 9-11; Deleuze, Tt, p. 175.
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