structures of stance in interaction

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Degree       Master of Arts in Linguistics

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May 2009

Submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Arts (by research) (by Thesis only)
Abstract

Stance and stance-taking are fundamental to the achievement of social interaction. Through stance and stance-taking, speakers position themselves relative to objects, and to other speakers. Stance is conceptualized as a social action whereby both positioning of the self and evaluation of an object are achieved through language in social interaction. The central contention is that stances are complex and interrelated social relationships established by speakers in conversation; stance(s) are established not only relative to stance, subject and object, but also to other stances, other objects, other subjects, and context. This relativity of stance acts to the multiplex vectors of other stance(s) is the basis for the proposal of the stance matrix as a framework for conceptualizing stance in conversation. Through micro-qualitative analysis of conversational data, speakers are shown to orient to the stance matrix in the everyday achievement of complex structures and sequences of stance acts. In addition, the communicative means by which stance is achieved in conversation is examined, and the heterodox nature of stance-taking expressions is shown to be critically dependent on an expanded and flexible model of indexicality, relating linguistically enabled stance-taking acts to the stance acts that are thereby achieved. The role of subjects in the stance matrix is considered in terms of achieving stance acts towards people. Subjects are shown to be deployed as objects through the intervention of membership categorization to foreground the social roles and/or categories in which people can be categorized. In conclusion, the stance matrix is proposed as a critical framework for conceptualizing and examining how speakers can be seen to orient to, in conversation, the multiple vectors of stance connecting subjects, objects and other stances.

This is to certify that the thesis comprises only my original work except where indicated in the preface; due acknowledgment has been made in the text to all other material used; the thesis is 30,000 words in length, inclusive of footnotes, but exclusive of tables, maps, appendices and bibliography

Guy J. Edwards
Preface

The data underpinning this research project is sourced from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English, a fully-transcribed corpus available from the Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC). The authors of each part of the corpus have been appropriately acknowledged in the text when first introducing the data; thereafter, each extract is accompanied by a caption referring to the appropriate index number in the Santa Barbara Corpus. Extended excerpts of each transcript, truncated to include only the segments and connecting context considered in this research, are included in Appendix 2, and transcription conventions in Appendix 1. My sincere thanks to Associate Professor Stephen Bird at The University of Melbourne for his invaluable assistance in accessing the SBCSAE data for the purposes of this thesis.

Acknowledgements

There are many people to acknowledge – including the staff and students of the School of Languages & Linguistics at The University of Melbourne – but in particular:
Barb Kelly – for support, advice, and always pointing me in the right directions
Catrin Norrby – for helping across a crucial and difficult time
Tim McNamara – for introducing me to the work of Harvey Sacks, which indirectly started everything
The attendees and reviewers for ALS 2007, HCSNet Summerfest 2008 (and forthcoming IPrA 2009) – for the opportunity to present aspects of this work, and for insightful comments when I did so
Many academics and scholars of stance – in particular John Du Bois, Elise Kärkkäinen and Robert Englebretson – who answered emails and provided much-needed input
Michael Ewing – for reviewing the early stages and his insightful comments
Lars Andersson – for reading the penultimate stages

And finally, Katharine Parton – for never letting me let go.

Supervisors

Dr Barbara F. Kelly
Associate Professor Catrin Norrby
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Chapter 1 Introduction

One of the key achievements of taking part in an interaction is positioning yourself on some issue, idea or object, relative to other people; to be able to agree or disagree with someone about politics, or art, or something as mundane as food preferences. A key question for a person in an interaction is to know ‘Where do I stand? And where do the people that I’m talking to stand, relative to me?’ And then, perhaps as a corollary or extension of these, ‘What do people think about where I stand on a particular question? What do I think about the responses of others to my stance, and about where they stand?’ The exchanging and co-creating of evaluations and attitudes - the practice of stance-taking - is a critical component of social interactions. The analysis of stance – of the specific ways in which people exchange opinions and attitudes, have disagreements and share viewpoints – is of critical importance not only to extending an understanding of the linguistic actions of speakers, but also of examining how moment-to-moment behavior can shape and be shaped by the broader social structures and order to which we are subject.

Stance-taking is an everyday practice, an act by which we establish our own attitudes, and understand the attitudes and opinions of others in a sensible and comprehensible fashion. Speakers do certain things with language; they do things with words which index a social action, that positions themselves relative to an object. Concurrently, a speaker’s position relative both to that object and to other speakers is established, and a multifaceted relationship involving speakers, objects and stances comes in to being. Stance is a fundamental component of interaction; it is both constitutive of interactions, in that stance-taking forms part of an interaction (and other actions / utterances are dependent upon it), and is co-constructed by participants through ongoing interactional means.

This thesis is explicitly oriented to stance as a social achievement, in the sense of adopting a model for examining the linguistic achievement of a particular stance within
conversational interactions. The theoretical orientation of this thesis is to the achievement of social interaction, and therefore to how language is constituted by and is constitutive of the social context in which it occurs, and the social spaces that the users of language inhabit. This is examined through the microanalysis of natural conversational data. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I establish the theoretical background to the study. This includes a detailed discussion of stance, and an explanation of the particular approach to stance in terms of social action and interaction that will inform this thesis. I also outline how this thesis conceptualizes social action and social interaction, and how people (as stance-takers) are conceptualized. In Chapter 3, I set out the methodological approach to the analysis, and discuss the data used for the study. I also give concise definitions of the critical concepts arising from the theoretical background.

The main contention of this thesis is that stances are complex and interrelated social relationships established by speakers in conversation. Stance is established not only in terms of the stance, subject, and object, but also in terms of other stances, other objects, other subjects, and context. Stances are examined as an explicitly social achievement, done by social actors in social context and this will be shown to be critical to the operation of stance-taking in conversation. In addition, I argue that stances taken in conversation are inter-related; i.e. that a stance taken by a subject in conversation will have some meaningful relationship with other stances taken by that speaker-subject in that conversation, and to other stances taken by other speaker-subjects in that conversation. This interrelationship can be seen to be the basis for a ‘structure’ of stances (including subjects and objects), which is understood and utilised by speakers in conversation for the ‘doing’ of stance. I will argue that speakers orient to this structure in the ways in which they take stances, and the ways in which those stances are realized into spoken discourse.

This contention then forms the principal research goal of this thesis; to explore how structures of multiple stances in conversation – when speakers take stances on more than one object – can be seen in conversational data. As a corollary to this, the relationship between the utterances and the stance itself will be explored, in terms of
how speakers deploy particular communicative means to achieve stance and the relationship between such utterances and the evaluative content of stance.

These research aims inform the analysis and discussion chapters, in which a close analysis of spoken conversational data is undertaken to support the findings of the thesis. In Chapter 4, the linguistic mechanisms for achieving stance are analyzed in terms of the theoretical orientation of this study to the meaning-relations between spoken language and social actions. This Chapter also begins to argue for the *stance matrix*, understood as the structural framework for conceptualizing stance which is the main contention of this thesis. In Chapter 5, this framework is further explored, and some of the implications of the *stance matrix* are discussed. Following this discussion, Chapter 6 considers *subjects*, or stance-takers, and the stances that they direct towards other people.

I turn now to a discussion of stance, and a discussion of how this, the central theme of this thesis, is to be operationalized and understood.
Chapter 2 Background

The background engages with the critical concepts and literature which inform this research. Initially, stance as a broad concept is discussed and an understanding of stance is proposed that will be operationalized in this study. Secondly, social action is discussed in relation to stance. Following this discussion of social action, I situate both stance and social action within the broader concept of social interaction. I then discuss issues of speakers and subjects, with particular reference to how speakers deploy everyday cultural knowledge in social interaction through categorization. In concluding the background, I discuss how social action is achieved in conversation, including the notion of ‘stance-taking in conversation’.

2.1 Stance

The purpose of the following section is to answer a deceptively simple question: what is stance? Stance research occurs at the intersection of widely divergent sub-disciplines of linguistic, socio-linguistic, sociological, anthropological and psychological inquiry (Englebretson, 2007a), and ‘stance’ invokes subtly different implications and understandings in each emerging tradition of research. The question that this section will address, therefore, is not the general and superordinate question of ‘what is stance?’, in an absolute sense, but to situate my research within a particular tradition of stance research, and to establish clearly how I approach the notion of ‘stance’ in conversation. Stance is of course not the only name under which such a phenomenon has been studied. Terms such as *positioning* (Bamberg, 2004), *footing* or *voice* (Ribeiro, 2006) have been used for similar, although not necessarily identical phenomena to the conceptualization of stance for the purposes of this thesis. As with the broad spectrum of stance research, these traditions will not be specifically discussed, as this thesis is fundamentally oriented to *stance*, and to the achievement of specific stances in conversation, rather than the more general conceptualization of positioning (in Bamberg’s terms), footing or voice.
Put simply, stance encompasses the attitudes, evaluations and opinions of an individual speaker – the linguistic expression of the internal mental state of the individual (Kärkkäinen, 2006). A stance is the particular attitude, thought or opinion held by an individual, and the projection of that attitude, thought or opinion – that internal mental / psychological state – into the world, generally through the deployment of some communicative means which the individual has at their disposal. A stance can be generally conceptualized as the relationship that an individual has with other individuals and various aspects of the world (and/or context) in which those individuals exist. That is to say, that a stance is the relationship between an individual and some aspect of the world that they inhabit, and that this has some implications for that individual and their relationship with other individuals, in that both have ‘stance’, and that individuals are potentially aware or able to become aware of the stance of others. This is not an unproblematic concept, and will be further explored in relation to the model of stance that will be operationalized for the purposes of this thesis.

As discussed by Englebretson (2007a), a substantial variety of linguistic phenomena have been studied under the aegis of research into ‘stance’. It is possible to see some broad patterns within the literature on ‘stance’ (leaving aside a further discussion of what I mean by ‘stance’ for the moment). The predominant unit of analysis for linguistic research on stance is, unsurprisingly, the linguistic realization – that is to say, the lexical, syntactic, prosodic, phonetic and non-verbal (including gestural, tool-based and other embodied) resources that are used by speakers in conversation (or can be identified within a text corpus or a reference grammar) to communicate stance. Studies have examined the historical development of the linguistic resources used to ‘encode’ stance in English (Fitzmaurice, 2004; Nordlinger & Traugott, 1997). Corpus-based studies have examined the distributional characteristics of ‘stance’ markers (Berman, Ragnarsdóttir, & Strömqvist, 2002; Hunston, 2007; Precht, 2003, 2008; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008), as well as qualitative aspects of lexemes identified as ‘encoding’

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1 It should be noted that although Kärkkäinen provides an excellent overview of this perspective, her study argues for an intersubjective understanding of stance. This is further discussed on pp. 11-12 of this section.
stance (Verhagen, 2005; White, 2003). The ‘poetics’ of stance in conversation has been proposed by Lempert (2008), a notion which has some resonance with the dialogic and interactional studies of stance, particularly in emphasizing the dialogic ‘resonance’ of linguistic resources for stance-taking used between speakers. Studies of the interactional aspects of stance in English and other languages (Englebretson, 2007b; Haddington, 2006, 2007; Kärkkäinen, 2003, 2006, 2007; Keisanen, 2007; Kockelman, 2004; Shoaps, 2007; Wu, 2004) examine stance as a collaborative and intersubjective achievement of speakers in conversation. These studies further establish the linguistic resources – at the intersection between grammar and interaction – that can be seen to be used in stance-taking.

Stance has been discussed as falling into broad categories. Ochs (1996) draws a distinction between affective and epistemic stance, where:

Affective stance refers to a mood, attitude, feeling, and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern …
Epistemic stance refers to knowledge or belief vis-à-vis some focus of concern, including degrees of certainty of knowledge, degrees of commitment to truth of propositions, and sources of knowledge, among other epistemic qualities (Ochs, 1996, p. 410)[emphasis in original].

Stance is categorized by Precht (2003, 2008) as affect (opinion, attitude, lexical backchannels, expletives, exclamations, boulomaic expressions), evidentiality (certainty, doubt, factuality, mental verbs) or quantifier (emphatics, hedges). Berman, Ragnarsdóttir and Strömquist (2002) identify ‘evaluation’, ‘involvement’, ‘perspective’ and ‘distancing devices’ as categories of stance in written and spoken discourse. Du Bois (2007) characterises stance(s) as ‘evaluative’; similarly Kockelman (2004) states that stances are usually framed in terms of evaluation or intentionality. Assessment (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1992) is another category of stance discussed in the literature (Kärkkäinen, 2006). Affective stance is also used to describe an individual’s engagement with and orientation to the ongoing construal of embodied interaction with the world (Goodwin, 2007). Such categorising of stance is useful, from one perspective, in that it allows a systematic approach to defining the relationship between the individual taking the stance and the ‘focus of concern’ – i.e. what the stance is about. Such categories are not, essentially, different ‘types’ of stance – the broad
conceptualisation of stance as the internal mental/psychological state of the individual is true for all the categories listed above. The distinction between, for example, an epistemic stance and an affective stance is the quality of the stance.\(^2\)

For the purposes of this thesis, I am approaching stance from a standpoint grounded in the theoretical framework developed by Du Bois (2007), who proposes that:

> Stance has the power to assign value to objects of interest, to position social actors with respect to those objects, to calibrate alignment between stancetakers, and to invoke presupposed systems of sociocultural value … Stance can be approached as a linguistically articulated form of social action whose meaning is to be construed within the broader scope of language, interaction, and sociocultural value. (Du Bois, 2007, p. 139)

Stance is a form of social action that is achieved through linguistic means; stance is an action undertaken or performed by a social actor, in some form of social context that minimally contains the social actor and the ‘object(s) of interest’. More formally, Du Bois defines the stance act thus:

> [Stance is] a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means … of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field (Du Bois, 2007, p. 169).

This explicitly defines stance in terms of the literal actions (‘overt communicative means’) that a speaker ‘does’ (or performs, or speaks, or uses – how stance is achieved in conversation will be returned to in a subsequent section) in order to achieve that stance in conversation. Du Bois reiterates that stance in a ‘public act’ by a social actor; fundamentally this is taken to be a recapitulation of his statement that stance is a linguistically articulated form of social action (Du Bois, 2007).

The stance act – referring to a particular instance of stance – minimally involves who is taking the stance, what the stance is being taken about, and the stance. That is to say, that a stance act involves a subject (who takes a stance), a stance, and an object (on

\(^2\) This will be further discussed in the Methodology section, in terms of what particular qualities of stance are emphasized in this thesis.
which the stance is taken). The stance is the attitude or opinion relative to the object; the evaluation of the object. Du Bois (2007) distinguishes between evaluation as a kind of affective stance, and distinguishes evaluation from epistemic stance; both are ‘grouped together’ under ‘positioning’. The stance act not only evaluates an object, but also positions the subject taking the stance; in Du Bois’ (2007) terms, the stance act is a “bringing together of an object-centered act of evaluation and a subject-centered act of positioning” (Du Bois, 2007, p. 158). Evaluation is the act of characterizing the object of stance as having a specific quality or value, as in the example³:

(a) Apples are good

Where ‘apples’ are the stance object, and ‘are good’ evaluates those apples against some relative mutually understood standard. Considered in terms of stance, by uttering something like (a), a speaker orients to apples as the object and the stance (the relationship between the subject and the object) is understood in terms of the evaluation of the object. Similarly, a stance act can be seen through the following:

(b) I like apples

In (b), the stance is expressed via the predicate ‘like’, and the subject (the self) is made explicit⁴. The object is evaluated – it has some shared notional sociocultural value assigned to it (i.e. being liked) – but importantly, ‘like’ explicitly relates the subject (‘I’) and the object (‘apples’). ‘Like’ positions the subject relative to ‘apples’ as the object

³ The examples (denoted by a parenthesized letter) used in this section are entirely hypothetical, rather than using actual data, in order to clearly illustrate the theoretical concepts under consideration, and to not pre-suppose the methodological considerations outlined in section 3.

⁴ It should be noted that at this stage, ‘subject’ and ‘speaker’ are being used more-or-less interchangeably; whilst this suggests that they are conflated, and this is in many cases true, the intersection of subjects and speakers is a critical dimension of stance for this thesis, and will be discussed in section 2.3
of stance; or more accurately, the stance-taking achieved by uttering ‘I like apples’ achieves such positioning of the subject vis-à-vis the object.

Ochs (1996) argues for stance as a component of social acts/actions and of social identity. The linguistic means used to achieve stance are viewed as the basic (linguistic) resources that is used by speakers in “constructing/realizing social acts and social identities” (Ochs, 1996, p. 412). That is to say, that for Ochs the category of social act is superordinate to (a particular) stance, whereas Du Bois’ model equates stance with social action (where a stance act is a particular form of social action). In both, stance is essentially performative; it is something done, or displayed, by a social actor within a social context. Furthermore, considering stance as a social action does not presuppose that it cannot be, in turn, constitutive of other actions. The action-emphasis of Du Bois’ model orients to locating stance in terms of stance-taking (the active engagement of a social actor in performing a stance act) and presumes that the act performed is instantiated by and through the linguistic means used to achieve it. Ochs’ (1996) model infers that stance is predominantly conceptualized as being ‘held’ by the social actor, and therefore is expressed as part of the achievement of a social action in conversation (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989; Ochs, 1996). Similarly, Marjorie H. Goodwin (2006) and Charles Goodwin (2007) consider stance as constitutive of the ongoing (social) organization of talk and activity. In Marjorie H. Goodwin’s (2006) study of girls’ social talk, evaluation and assessment (stance) is shown to be used by speakers to accomplish ‘tasks’ in order to maintain and achieve social organization. Charles Goodwin (2007) shows how, in embodied interaction, affective stance is co-constructed by speakers in the orientation to shared activity. In addition, both studies demonstrate that by achieving particular stances, social actors construct particular discourses of social identity – in Goodwin’s (2007) words, “constitute themselves as particular kinds of social and moral actors in the midst of … activities that constitute daily … life” (Goodwin, 2007, p. 53). This is not, however, incompatible with the notion of stance as a social action; indeed, Ochs, C. Goodwin and M. H. Goodwin clearly demonstrate and argue for the importance of stance to the ongoing construction of social interaction. The emphasis in Du Bois’ theoretical model for stance is on the achievement of the stance act as a unit
itself, rather than the effect of stance; that stance-as-social-action is constitutive of other social actions.

The stance act is of particular importance to Du Bois’s theory of stance because it is argued to be, in his words, a “unified act encompassing three subsidiary acts … a triune act” (Du Bois, 2007, p. 169). This introduces not only the evaluative and positioning functions of stance, but the intersubjective nature of stance and stance-taking. In other words, Du Bois’ *stance act* serves to create a particular structure of stance relationships that involve not only the speaker (the subject) and the object, but *other* subjects. In this way, stance is seen to be an intersubjective (Kärkkäinen, 2006) achievement in conversation. This is conceptualised by Du Bois as the ‘stance triangle’, as follows:

*Figure 1 - The stance triangle (adapted from Du Bois, 2007, p. 163)*

The stance triangle highlights that the stance act not only evaluates an object and positions the self relative to that object, but also positions the self relative to others. This is called *alignment*; the extent to which the evaluative / positional stance relationship between two subjects are similar or divergent. In relation to examples (a) and (b), above, an aligning stance act could be achieved by uttering:

(c) I like apples too

Where the self is positioned relative to *apples* (the stance object) and the sequential and responsive nature of the stance-taking so performed is located in the inclusion of ‘too’. This highlights the sequential and interactional embeddedness of stance acts; they are
achieved in relation to other stances and to other speakers. Du Bois’ model implicitly acknowledges this in the structure of the stance act. Alignment is the ‘vector’ of a stance act which specifically relates to the stance of others; the extent to which two subjects align is part of the intersubjective nature of stance-taking, as is the sequentiality of stance-taking in conversation. Alignment is inherently scalar; ‘alignment’ means that the subjects are ‘closer’ to sharing a similar stance on the object, whereas ‘disalignment’ means the reverse. The sequentiality of stance – the dialogic achievement of stance between participants in an interaction – is critical to the notion of the stance triangle. The stance triangle is dependent on more than one subject taking a stance on a given object for its very existence. Stance is enacted collaboratively by participants (Du Bois, 2007) with other participants. This will be returned to following further discussion of stance and (inter)subjectivity.

In the above, I have introduced the notion of stance as an intersubjective achievement. This is a critical point, and requires some further elaboration. In order to do so, it is necessary to return for a moment to the fundamental question of what stance actually is. I have hitherto discussed Du Bois’ conceptualization of stance as a social action, and previously stated that stance expresses the internal mental states of speakers. It is this second dimension which requires further discussion; stance is conceptualized as social action, but this still leaves a certain ambiguity about the nature of stance. I have suggested above that stance is the evaluative or positional relationship between the subject and an object of interest. Stance is, simply put, subjectivity; a stance is the instantiated construal of subjectivity into language, in a particular moment in an interactional context (Kockelman, 2004). Subjectivity is used here to refer to the private and psychological (Kockelman, 2004); to, referring back to the initial definition offered for stance, the internal attitude and mental state of the person (subject). This notion of subjectivity is not unproblematic, and how subjectivity is conceived of in the context of this research is discussed in section 2.3 below. At this point, it is sufficient to state that, principally, stance is considered to be the linguistic and instantiated transformation of subjectivity into a social action.
Alignment and the sequential exchange of stance acts between speakers in conversation, therefore, following Du Bois (2007) and Kärkkäinen (2006) necessarily involves the intersection of the subjectivity of both subjects. The linguistic expression of stance – stance-taking – expresses subjectivity, but the interactional embeddedness of stance-taking in dialogic interactional conversation means that intersubjectivity is a quality inherent to the process of stance-taking (Kärkkäinen, 2006). The stance act – the triune act by which a speaker evaluates the object, positions the self and aligns with others – is achieved relative to the stances of others. This can be seen in the sequential organization of stance-taking, in particular the arrangement of turn-taking in conversation to deploy stances that ‘challenge’ the prior speakers’ stance or the projected course of action in a conversation (Keisanen, 2007). Stance is conceptualized as ‘emerging’ from conversational sequences across participants; sequential stance acts co-construct ‘shared stances’ (Kärkkäinen, 2007). Stance sequences occur as speakers deploy stance-taking in response to the stance(s) of other subjects, thereby aligning and disaligning with the stance of prior speakers (Haddington, 2006; Kärkkäinen, 2006; Keisanen, 2007). Du Bois (2007) refers to this as the ‘multiplex consequences’ of stance, in that a stance act must be considered within the context of other stance acts. In particular, Du Bois emphasizes the pair-wise arrangement of stance-taking, such as (in the hypothetical example discussed above):

(b) I like apples
(c) I like apples too

In this, (b) is considered a ‘stance lead’, and (c) a ‘stance follow’ (Du Bois, 2007). The stance-taking achieved in (c) is explicitly linked to the prior stance; (c) explicitly aligns with (b) in forming the stance triangle, and the intersubjective stances taken by the theoretical speakers of (b) and (c). Such pair-wise arrangement is not the only sequential ordering of stance, although Du Bois does not specifically address how, in particular, the stance triangle is theorized in longer sequences of stance-taking. Haddington (2006, 2007) and Keisanen (2007) both show the sequential organization of stance-taking in conversation, and equate this with the sequential deployment of stances.
by speakers to collaboratively construct shared, intersubjective stances. Intersubjectivity, from this perspective, is produced through the dialogic engagement with the subjectivity of others through the achievement of stance acts in interaction. It is critical to clearly state that intersubjectivity is part of the achievement of stance acts (in terms of the ‘triune’ act of positioning, alignment and evaluation, discussed above). Stance acts are understood to be intersubjective insofar as they are achieved sequentially and relative to the stance of other speakers. Alignment is part of intersubjectivity, and is the vector of the stance triangle through which subjects are related. Alignment – the extent to which the stances of two subjects are similar or divergent – is, in some senses, the product of intersubjectivity.

Goodwin (2007) demonstrates that multiple stances can be taken within the bounds of an interaction and that such stances are taken by speakers relative to the participation framework relevant to the interaction; this is similar to the deployment of stances relative to a broader ‘situated activity’ (Goffman, 1997a), as shown by Goodwin (2006). Predominantly, studies have focused on intersubjective, sequential and collaborative stance-taking relative to a shared stance object, or the situatedness of stance within a broader activity or established sequences of talk. In addition, the orientation is to stance-taking as the focus of the analysis. This is a critical distinction that must be clearly made for the purposes of this thesis. I am principally orienting to two key conceptualizations of stance – firstly, that stance is a social action, and secondly, that stance is instantiated subjectivity. Furthermore, stance is deployed by speakers as a stance act, by which the speaker evaluates (positions relative to) an object. This vector of the stance act is what I will term stance – the (inter)subjective social relationship established by the stance act between the subject and the object in question. This can be seen to be compatible with the theoretical framework of the stance triangle proposed above.

The stance act is, following Du Bois (2007), a social action. This is achieved through some communicated means in interaction, and it is this which is stance-taking. The stance act is a purely social action that relates subjects and objects within a relevant social context, whereas stance-taking encompasses the linguistic and communicative
practices that are used by speakers in relation to the stance act. More precisely, the principle is that social actions cannot be conflated with the linguistic means used to achieve such social actions in conversation; the social action is a distinct achievement of a social actor (the subject, in this case) relative to objects (of stance) and other subjects. The communicative means deployed by speakers to achieve stance serve to index the stance act (Du Bois, 2007). Stance-taking utterances are indexically related to stance acts. Stance-taking – utterances and acts by which stance can be seen to be done in conversation – is not, essentially, the same as stance, as stance is conceptualized as the explicitly social relationship of subjectivity, projected outward from the subject toward an object of interest, intersecting intersubjectively with the stances of other subjects.

In summary, stance has been proposed to be subjectivity, enacted and instantiated as a social action (the stance act) in interaction, through the communicative achievement indexes of stance / stance acts (stance-taking). The following sections further explore some of the critical dimensions of this proposition – namely, social interaction and social actions, the notion of subjectivity, and the operation of indexicality in relation to stance. I turn now to a discussion of how this study is oriented to the study of social interaction and the implications of this for the analysis of stance.

2.2 Social interaction and social actions

The fundamental orientation of this research is to the achievement of social interaction; stance and stance-taking occurs within the bounds of social interaction, which occurs between social actors, within social context. In addition, the conceptualization of stance as a social action has particular implications for how it is approached within the context of this thesis. The purpose of the following section is to operationalize ‘social interaction’ and ‘social action’ for the purposes of this thesis.

This study is oriented to the study of interaction as it is achieved through human communicative behavior, with an explicit understanding that communicative behavior refers to a virtually limitless possible array of behaviors. This study is however limited in scope in that it examines interaction, thus following Luckmann (1995), human
communicative behavior becomes that which is “directed by one individual … at other(s) … which has consequences for such behavior of the other individual” (Luckmann, 1995, p. 175). This suggests a situational aspect to the general focus of this study. For Goffman (1997a; 1997b) this situation is the social situation, understood as “an environment of mutual management possibilities” (Goffman, 1997b, p. 231); i.e. one in which the (communicative) behavior of an individual is observable by (at least) another (and vice versa). Interaction within the social situation is “socially organized … as a little system of mutually ratified and ritually governed face-to-face action” (Goffman, 1997b, p. 232). Social interaction is therefore that which occurs when two (or more) participants are within such an environment of mutual management possibilities – most primordially face-to-face interaction, but social interaction is possible in any situation in which such mutual management is possible – such as through computer-mediated communication (CMC). The assumption, therefore, is that any communicative behavior in such a situation constitutes a social interaction, and that the individuals displaying such behavior are (nominally) engaged in such an interaction.\(^5\)

Ochs (1996) argues that language is integral to engaging in social life, and that it is through socialization into such linguistic practices that we (as individuals) learn or acquire knowledge of social phenomena requisite to (through language) engage with such phenomena. This socialization perspective entails that linguistic praxis – the transformation by a speaker of abstract knowledge about how to speak, or what to say in a given situation, into a communicative action – is the medium by which cultural and social knowledge is shared / transmitted and displayed / enacted (Ochs, 1996; Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986). The importance of parole, of utterances produced by speakers in context, is emphasized, rather than the structural determinacy of langue. Language practices are understood to be entwined with the social practices that they are instrumental in achieving. This is not to say that this is to take an entirely subjectivist

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\(^5\) This is of course disregarding any pathological or clinically abnormal possibilities that might disrupt such an assumption (i.e. situations in which co-presence and co-action might not constitute social interaction per se) – see Habermas (2001).
position, in that social interactions are not wholly to fabricate a shared world locally between participants in interaction (i.e. that individual *praxis* is the entire goal or aim of an interaction). Rather, following Habermas (2001), “communicative action presupposes the normative reality of a society as much as an objectifiable reality and the subjectivity of the agent [speaker]”. I take normative, in this instance, to refer to the agent’s (to adopt Habermas’ terminology momentarily) individual understanding of the social context of the action, and their understanding of the extent to which such understanding is shared with other participants in the interaction. It may be possible to argue that such understanding – and hence normative social reality – is the product of socialization, and it can be usefully regarded as being more-or-less stable for a particular utterance. This would, however, neglect the importance of the context in which an utterance – or a series of utterances – occurs.

Talk – encompassing utterances and series of utterances – is seen to contain and embody the products of the endogenous interpretations (Schegloff, 1997) of the oriented-to context. Context is understood as that which is actively made relevant by the participants in an interaction. This is a point of some contention, but predominantly can be resolved by the broad definition of human communicative behavior which I have discussed above. This allows for communicative behavior (or some behavior which can be seen to have some impact on the other speaker) which is non-verbal to play an integral part in the establishment of such oriented-to context (as in, in the mutual and collaborative orientation to a context ongoingly throughout an interaction). Social context is understood to include the immediately relevant context (such as the physical situatedness of the interaction), and the ‘social space’ (Bourdieu, 1992) in which the interaction occurs. This will be returned to in relation to social action, below.

Language (*parole*) is therefore understood to occur within a social interaction. Furthermore, utterances (and sequences of utterances forming interactions) are situated within a context which is jointly produced and made relevant to the interaction by the participants themselves. Social interaction is understood in terms of the achievement of actions with a socially structured space. Language within a social interaction can be characterised as a communicative action, in which communicative behavior (properly
structured into an interpretable signal by the speaker) is interpreted within a presupposition of a normative social reality, the objectifiable reality, and the subjectivity of the agent (speaker). Language is intrinsic to social interaction in that it is a particularly effective example of communicative behavior; talk (speech) is a “primordial site of sociality” (Schegloff, 2000, p. 1). This is not to claim that language is equivalent to social interaction; it is merely a mechanism by which a communicative action can be achieved.

Within social interaction, the speaker (the social actor or agent) is engaged in particular behaviours, directed at other social actors. Ochs (1996) defines a social act as a “socially recognized goal-directed behavior” (Ochs, 1996, p. 410). Holtgraves (2002) defines language as social action in that it is an action within a “web of many interpersonal determinants and consequences” (Holtgraves, 2002, p. 177). Principally, Holtgraves conceptualisation of ‘action’ is more-or-less consistent with the idea of a speech act (Austin, 1980; Recanati, 1987; Searle, 1968, 1962); that is to say, that by using language in a particular way the speaker seeks to alter the world (declaratives & directives), or to commit to a particular view / depiction of the world (assertives), or to describe the speaker’s ‘inner state’ (expressives) (Holtgraves, 2002). So for Ochs (1996), a social action is a behavior unit, recognised as such by the in-situ use to which it is put by speaker(s). Holtgraves (2002) essentially defines language as social action as being a speech act with social ramifications, due to it being used in a social context. For the purposes of this thesis, the understanding of social action as a ‘goal-oriented behaviour’ will be emphasised. Social actions are co-constituted between participants in interactions – their meaning and force (the extent to which they are recognised as goal-oriented and achieve such goals) is dependent upon the contextualised interpretive activity of social actors in understanding the actions of others, and construing their actions in ways that will be understood (Luckmann, 2008). As it is operationalised in this instance, social action is understood in terms of goals that are related to the social lifeworld (Habermas, 2001) and/or social space (Bourdieu, 1992) relevant to the participants in the interaction. This is rather than emphasising the understanding of action as constitutive of discourse and talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1995a). The goals of social action are related to other participants, and, importantly, embedded within the
physical and sociocultural context which construes the objects to which such actions may be directed (Duranti, 1997). This notion is implicit in the operationalisation of stance for this thesis, based on the conceptualisation of stance as social action proposed by Du Bois (2007). Social actions are understood to be a mutually understood (for a given normative social reality and context) behavior which has some more-or-less recognisable and interpretable purpose (a goal), constituted by the context in which the social action occurs; action is understood within a structure and participation framework (Schiffrin, 2006) which enables (and is enacted and enabled by) interaction between participants.

Stance is a social action that relates a social actor (a subject) to an object. The aim of the previous section is to establish some of the key background concepts to approaching how stance as a social action is achieved through social interaction, and through the contextualized language used in social interaction. The notion of ‘social space’ and ‘social life’ has been raised in the above, and this is an important consideration. The construction of the space – the field – in which this occurs is critical to understanding how stance operates in conversation. Social actions are performed by social actors; the conceptualisation of social actors as (stance-taking) subjects is considered in the following section.

2.3 Subjectivity and stance

In defining and discussing stance, the central notion of the ‘stance-taker’ – referred to as the subject, the speaker, or the social actor – has been raised, but not explicitly resolved. Similarly, stance has been explicitly proposed to be subjectivity, but the notion of subjectivity has not been critically examined. These central concerns will be addressed in the following section, in addition to the notion of the ‘sociocultural field’ and ‘social space’ in which stance occurs. In other words, the topic of the following section is the stance itself – the social relationship of subjectivity between the subject and the object.
Subjectivity – and hence stance – has been predominantly aligned with an understanding of subjectivity as a linguistic formation, in that the focus is on how the speaker’s internal mental state, attitudes and beliefs is ‘present’ in her utterances (Kärkkäinen, 2006). Subjectivity is understood as being ‘expressed’ and ‘encoded’ in language, in terms of ‘affect’ and ‘perspective’ (see, for instance, Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989). In this sense, the progression to ‘stance’ as the instantiated locus of subjectivity is entirely logical; subjectivity, from this viewpoint, has a cognitive emphasis (Verhagen, 2005), whereas stance emphasizes interactional deployment by speakers. The notion of subjectivity is, essentially, consonant with the commonsense understanding of ‘subjectivity’ as personal perspective, and the dominant theoretical orientation is toward the linguistic encoding and representation of stance.

This conceptualization of subjectivity, however, does not explicitly address the formation of subjectivity and the construction of the subject. Kockelman (2004) suggests an understanding of stance-as-subjectivity which is conceptualized in terms of reflexivity, understood through the ways in which such subjectivity, and the subject herself, are formed by and through particular socio-cultural processes. Subjectivity is not, therefore, the internal mental state or cognitive orientation of a ‘speaking subject’. Subjectivity is understood as the reflexive selfhood by which the self is made real by and through interaction with other reflexive subjects and the exchange and mutual management of loci of subjectivity (in other words, stance) (Kockelman, 2004). It is important to emphasize the fundamental compatibility between this conceptualization of subjectivity and the treatment of subjectivity in linguistically-oriented studies (such as those collected in Englebretson 2007a). I am orienting to subjectivity both as being held

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6 It should be acknowledged that Kockelman also problematises the investigation of stance without acknowledging reflexivity in conceptual frameworks for stance. This is a complex question; although this thesis investigates stance as social action and instantiated subjectivity, I do not propose that I will adequately resolve the question of the extent to which my own subjectivity is projected into the analysis. It is herein included to emphasise that this is, at least from a theoretical standpoint, a critical aspect of any socio-linguistic account, and that it will be (at least partially) addressed through the methodological approach of this thesis and the orientation to speaker behavior in naturally occurring data.
by a subject, and also as being the product of the social construction of the subject and the social space in which such subjectivity is enacted.

Fundamental to establishing ‘subjectivity’ is the operationalization of the ‘subject’. The subject is understood initially as a person who exists socially and culturally (Turner, 1995), and functions as an actor both socially and culturally through the simultaneous presupposition and reproduction of social practices (Duranti, 1997). The subject is a social being formed by and through practice (habitus) (Bourdieu, 1990); fundamentally, this is to claim that the subject exists in terms of the social life in which she engages and the ways in which she has been socialized to engage with it. Habitus is the practical knowledge – produced through the mutual exchange of practice with other subjects – of the world and the ways that the subject can act within it (Bourdieu, 1990). Importantly, this means that subjects are not transcendental (Foucault, 1972; Habermas, 2001) but are construed within cultural practices that exist both as internal representations (presuppositions) and external practices (reproduction). Individual subjects, although formed by practice (habitus) still retain the freedom to act in individual ways and are not completely predictable producers of socialized practice (Duranti, 1997). Becoming a subject is an inevitable consequence of being human; subjects are socially situated (Goffman, 1997c) human actors. Additionally, a subject can be seen to be subject to the constraints and social order of the society and culture in which she is a subject, and subjectified by self-knowledge of identity (Foucault, 1982). The critical point for the current research is that the subject is the stance-taker – i.e. that subjectivity is a property of a subject.

Subjectivity, therefore, can be understood in terms of the social practices which shape it; that is to say, that subjectivity is both achieved and determined by social practice. Subjectivity and selfhood are understood as being simultaneously phenomena of the person and phenomena of the social (Holland & Leander, 2004). This reframes the understanding of stance as subjectivity to emphasize that subjectivity is not only the internal mental state of the subject (the stance-taker), but also simultaneously an inherently social product, created and maintained by the ongoing process of socialization through interaction with other subjects (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989; Ochs,
Subjectivity is the collection of the subject’s individual response(s) to the world, but this is mediated by the structure (*habitus*) through which she has been socialized to encounter, understand and respond to the world.

Stance acts – the *locus* of subjectivity in interaction – are achieved relative to the ‘sociocultural field’ (Du Bois, 2007). This field is minimally composed of subjects and objects (Johnstone, 2007). The sociocultural field, for the purposes of this research, is understood in terms of Bourdieu’s ‘social field’ (Bourdieu, 1992) and ‘social space’ (Bourdieu, 1989). This is subtly different to the notion of social context, explored in the previous section; social context is immediately relevant to the *in situ* social interaction at hand; the social field, however, is more explicitly constructed relative to macro-social structures. Bourdieu defines the social field as “a multi-dimensional space of positions … [in which] … agents are thus distributed … according to the overall volume of the capital they possess and … the composition of that capital” (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 230-1). Capital is understood to include cultural and social capital, as well as ‘economic’ capital; furthermore, the social field includes the agents and the assets that they possess, and the capital value of those assets (Bourdieu, 1989; Bourdieu, 1992). For the purposes of this thesis, subjects are proposed to be understood as equated to agents, and objects are, minimally, related to the capital and assets that those agents possess. The latter proposition, in particular, will be considered further in the analytical Chapters of this thesis, in relation to the capacity of stance to assign ‘value’ to objects (Du Bois, 2007). The critical point is that stance acts are achieved both as social actions in social context and relative to the social field in everyday life. Indeed, in Bourdieu’s terms, evaluation can “express, in a more or less transformed form, the state of symbolic relations of power” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 234).

Although I have established the subject as a socially constructed socially situated actor, I have not considered the question of (social) identity. Social identity and stance-taking are importantly connected; see, for instance, Johnstone (2007), who shows that social identity is a *resource* for stance-taking, and Ochs (1996), who argues for stance as a component of the establishment of social identity. Social structures – the social organization of subjects – are importantly linked to the distribution of subjects into
social roles or categories. The theoretical orientation to social categories or roles that I am adopting is Sacks’ (1995) *membership categorization device*. This is defined by Sacks (1995) as:

Any collection of membership categories, containing at least a category, which may be applied to some population containing at least a member, so as to provide, by the use of some rules of application for the pairing of at least a population member and a categorization device member. A device is then a collection plus rules of application. (Sacks, 1995, p. 246)

Membership categorization refers to the everyday sociological work done by participants in interaction (by subjects) to apply mutually understood categories (i.e. a social role or category-based identity) to a person who can be understood to be a member of that category (satisfies the rules of application). The membership categories into which members are categorized are understood as being locally produced and relevant to the social context in which they are produced, but also importantly enabling the mobilization of shared macro-social and cultural knowledge into social interactions (Schegloff, 2007). Examples of such membership categories include professions (such as doctor, lawyer, or teacher), or paired and otherwise related categories (such as parent/child, such as in Sacks’ famous example, the child’s story⁷).

Membership categorization is not simply the common-sense labeling of people performing certain work, or the application of particular title or labels to people through conversational interaction. Membership categorization infers the active deployment by subjects of the social structures by which they organize their shared understanding of themselves and other subjects in terms of social category based identity. That is to say, that the membership categories are ‘inference-rich’ (Sacks, 1995); what is ‘known’ about a category (i.e. the speakers’ understanding of the category relevant to the particular interaction in which it is deployed) is presumed to be so about the persons thus categorized (Schegloff, 2007). Furthermore, the rules of application of membership categorization are not limited to the discursive construction of others through social interaction; membership categorization holds that members may be categorized on the

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bases of ‘category-bound activities’, the performance of which is sufficient to constitute the categorization of the member performing them by others having knowledge of such performance (Sacks, 1995; Schegloff, 2007).

Critically, the subject and her consequent subjectivity, stance and social identity (or social identities) are conceptualized as being socially constructed and contingent upon the ongoing process(es) of socialization and the reflexive creation of habitus. In addition, the notion of the ‘sociocultural field’ has been suggested to be connected to the ‘social field’. Social identity is operationalized as membership categorization, through which shared social and cultural knowledge – and potentially categories relevant to the social field – is mobilized in conversation. The model proposed for the subject and subjectivity has hitherto neglected intersubjectivity, which is central to the conceptualization of stance as a social action advanced by Du Bois (Du Bois, 2007), and fundamentally adopted for this thesis. At this stage, intersubjectivity is understood according to the prior discussion – i.e. that (subjective) stance acts involve intersubjective alignment with other subjects. The implications for intersubjectivity are, in essence, similar to those discussed for subjectivity; namely, that it is understood as simultaneously personal and social.

The following section moves from this discussion of social phenomena, to how such phenomena is achieved by language use in conversation.

2.4 Indexicality and stance acts in conversation

Earlier, I proposed a triadic collection of terminology for stance; the stance-taking act, the stance act, and stance. In the following, the connection between the stance-taking act and the stance act will be further clarified, in terms of Du Bois’ stance triangle (Du Bois, 2007). The focus therefore is on how specific communicative actions – the specific utterances and expressions – can be deployed to perform stance acts. Returning to the fundamental conceptualization of stance and the stance act, the stance act is understood as a linguistically enabled act; a social action achieved through overt
communicative means. The stance-taking act – the label I am deploying to distinguish such linguistic means from the social action – is indexically related to the stance act. It is to this notion – *indexicality* – that I turn my attention in the subsequent section.

Indexicality is a particular meaning-relationship, a semiotic relationship between the signified (the meaning) and the sign-vehicle by which such meaning is achieved. Silverstein proposes the following:

> In a topological image, indexicality is by definition what I call a radial or polar-coordinate concept of semiotic relationship: indexical sign-vehicles point from an origin that is established in, by and “at” their occurring as the here-and-now “center” or tail, as it were, of a semiotic arrow. At the terminus of the radial path, or arrowpoint, is their indexical object, no matter what the perceptual and conceptual dimensions or properties of things indexed. Strictly by virtue of indexical semiosis, the “space” that surrounds the indexical sign-vehicle is unboundedly large (or small), characterizable in unboundedly many different ways, and its indexical establishment (as having-been-brought-into-being) almost limitlessly defeasible. (Silverstein, 1992, p. 55)

This infers a number of important characteristics of indexical expressions – or indexes – that are relevant for stance. As a conceptualization of how a particular sign-vehicle (which will be considered momentarily) has ‘meaning’, indexicality is distinguished from the notion of ‘encoded’ meaning. Peirce explains this as:

> … a sign, or representation, which refers to its object … because it is in dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on the one hand, and with sense or memory of the person for whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand. (Peirce, 1955)

That is to say, that the index has a dynamic connection between some object and the sign. This connection is, as proposed by Silverstein (1992), limitless, in that the indexical relationship is defined and understood by the situation in which it is deployed, and therefore any sign can function as an index of any object, with the sole restriction
being that the connection, as suggested by Peirce, must be sensible to the person for whom the index is relevant.

A brief comment should be made about the general concept of ‘meaning’. For the purposes of the task at hand – the examination of stance as an explicitly social relationship – the componentiality and complexity of linguistic meaning are more-or-less excluded from the analysis, with the exception of examining the meaning-relation between stance acts and the linguistic means used to achieve them. In general, therefore, the term ‘meaning’ is deployed to refer to what might be referred to as the ‘communicative meaning’; meaning as it is understood and oriented to by speakers. Naturally, the encoding and conventionalization of meaning in language is of critical importance to the analysis and understanding of such communicative meaning; the point is not to suggest that communicative meaning is non-componential and superordinate to the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic norms of language, but to highlight that it is not substantively examined in the current project, and to clarify the use of the term ‘meaning’. Simply put, in ‘meaning’, I am orienting to communicative content – to ‘what is understood by this?’ and ‘what did the speaker want to communicate by this?’.

Notwithstanding this orientation to meaning in conversation, stance-taking acts are indexes of stance act. The stance-taking act is a particular linguistic form which ‘points’ to the social action that it achieves. Therefore, the operation of the stance act is thus the achievement of a social action through language mediated by the locally relevant and contingent indexical relations between sign-vehicle and indexical object (Ochs, 1996). Stance-taking indexes the stances taken by subjects, the subjects themselves, their alignment, positions and the objects on which stance is taken (Du Bois, 2007). This does not preclude the regularization or conventionality of linguistic expressions to index stance; indeed, indexicality is dependent upon shared (i.e. socialized) understanding of indexical meaning-relations between index and indexical object (Ochs, 1996). Such

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8 In the literature, index is used more-or-less interchangeably with indexical sign, a convention that I follow here. In addition, the plural form is, in general, ‘indexes’, rather than ‘indices’, which I also adopt.
conventionalized expressions could be referred to ‘stance markers’ or ‘discourse markers’ (see, for example, Kärkkäinen, 2003), although this is not the particular focus of this thesis. The critical point is to establish that stance is achieved by stance-taking acts which are understood as indexically related to the stance act.

Further, it must be emphasised that although the possibility of conventionalised linguistic expressions of stance is not discounted, the interdiscursive complexity of indexicality (Silverstein, 2005) should be recognised in relation to indexes of stance. Indexicality is the mechanism by which the macrosocial is encountered in the everyday microsociality of conversation (Silverstein, 2003). Indexical meaning-relations are boundless; referring back to both Silverstein’s (1992) and Peirce’s (1955) definitions quoted earlier, the sole necessary condition for indexicality is that it is understood by the persons for whom it serves to achieve meaning. Language use is always inherently indexical, in that the reflexive construction of the social world is achieved through the indexical dialogic engagement with such a world in the ‘cut and thrust’ of everyday conversational interaction (Silverstein, 2003). Indexicality has both pragmatic – i.e. limitlessly referential – and metapragmatic functions. That is to say, that by deploying an index, a speaker not only indexically refers to some mutually understood object, but indexes in addition an awareness of the index itself. By using a particular index, this itself indexes something about how the speaker uses indexes, and this in turn may have some implications for the ongoing construction of the social context – in simple terms, the metapragmatic function of the index is to index some social understanding by virtue of having been used by the speaker, in addition to the pragmatic function of (limitless) referentiality (Silverstein, 2006).

The critical point for the relation between stance-taking and stance acts is to problematise the indexical meaning-relation as a single radial meaning-relation between sign and signified, and to foreground that indexicality is fundamentally socially contingent (i.e. dependent upon macrosocial and immediate social contexts), and also constitutive in the ongoing construction of the social context. Indexicality both refers to objects in the social context and metapragmatically shapes the understanding of who the speaker is in social context through the indexes that they employ (Silverstein, 2003,
For stance, this foregrounding of this relation of constitutive reflexivity and the boundless meaning-relation between sign-vehicle and meaning suggests an expansion of the linguistic resources that can be seen to be used by speakers for stance-taking. This will be further discussed in the analysis and discussion Chapters of this thesis.

2.5 Summary

For the purposes of this thesis, ‘stance’ is understood to be a social action. By performing a stance act, the subject simultaneously positions the self relative to the object, aligns with other subjects, and evaluates the object. Social actions are understood to occur through language use in social interaction; in turn, social interaction occurs within a social context that is co-constructed by speakers in interaction. The stance act is used to denote this social action. The ‘stance triangle’, incorporating the axes of evaluation / positioning and alignment between subjects and object, is adopted as a model for the stance act.

Stance is used to denote the social relation between the subject and the object; stance is held to be subjectivity instantiated in interaction. The subject is established as socially constructed; the socialized human actor. Subjectivity is therefore similarly socially constructed. The subject, objects and stance are considered to be within the social field which is the relative positioning of subjects according to the volume and nature of their (social) capital.

Stance acts are achieved in social interaction through the use of linguistic expressions, denoted by stance-taking acts. Such linguistic expressions are indexes of stance and stance acts. Indexicality is understood to be theoretically limitless, in that the meaning-relation between the stance-taking and the stance is dependent only on it being understandable by speakers in interaction.

This, then, concludes the theoretical background and orientation of this study in terms of stance as a social action, and the social interaction and social space in which stance is
done by speakers / subjects. In the Methodology, I establish the analytical framework for the study, including some further discussion of the terminology necessary to this analysis of stance and stance-taking.
Chapter 3 Methodology

In the following Chapter, section 3.1 outlines the data on which this study is based. In Section 3.2, I discuss the analytical approach used to examine stance and stance-taking in the selected corpus of data. Following this discussion, I outline the key concepts, drawn from the Background, which are of particular importance to the analysis. The Chapter then concludes with a statement of the research aims of the thesis.

3.1 Data

As stated in the Introduction, this study is focused on the examination of stance as it is achieved in natural, spoken conversation. Although the theoretical orientation of this study does not preclude non-verbal behavior, this study is limited in scope to spoken data only. The data used for this study is sourced from the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English (SBCSAE) Part 2 (Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, Thompson, & Martey, 2003) and Part 3 (Du Bois & Englebretson, 2004). The Santa Barbara Corpus in total consists of audio recordings of a variety of speech situations; lectures, sermons, workplace interactions, and casual or familial conversation. For the purposes of controlling scope, this study includes only casual or familial conversation. This is herein defined as being conversational interaction that occur outside a workplace or educational environment, and are not explicitly task-related. The conversations therefore record the natural and spontaneous conversational behavior of the participants, without intervening variables of work or task focus that might condition or otherwise impact on the interaction.

Each SBCSAE recording is provided accompanied by a transcript; transcription conventions are included in Appendix 1. Conventional US English orthography is used throughout. The data is arranged by speaker, with each speaker’s utterances separated as ‘intonation units’. The intonation unit (IU) separates the speech signal into lines on the basis of the intonation contour of the utterance, with a new line indicating the beginning
of an intonation unit. IU boundaries are determined by marked rising or falling intonation or by pausing. Generally, IUs can be seen to occur in similar distributional patterns to sentences (or utterances that constitute partial or ungrammatical sentences), but are determined solely by the analysis of contour and pausing. Turns are indicated by the speaker’s name at the beginning of a line; overlap and latching are represented according to the transcription conventions in Appendix 1. Excerpts from the data included in the main body of the text are indicated in **bold** type. Where necessary, braces {} have been used to indicate paraphrase or glosses of utterances in the data.

In the analysis, each case study drawn from the SBCSAE data is preceded by the details included in the corpus for the data. Each extract – each line or set of lines included in the analysis - is then numbered sequentially, and the three-digit number assigned to the sample in the corpus (preceded by ‘SBC’) noted for each extract. Lines are numbered according to the timing in seconds recorded in the original transcripts. Appendix 2 includes extended extracts of the complete transcripts, including all analyzed data and the context in which it occurs. Line numbers are consistent within each sample. Each SBSCAE sample is assigned a title in publication and these are used to refer to the sample, alongside the SBC index number. In addition, each example is numbered sequentially, as it appears in the text. A table of the examples and the pages on which they appear is included as part of the front material of the thesis.

### 3.2 Analytical approach

The analytical approach taken for this thesis is the qualitative micro-analysis of naturally occurring spoken data. The object of analysis for this thesis is the social interaction achieved through conversation; specifically, the achievement of stance acts across a conversation. The approach, therefore, is to orient to how the exchange of communicative action – spoken language – can be seen to reveal the social interaction achieved through such conversation. This is done through identifying *stance-taking acts*, and examining how other speakers respond to the proposed stance-taking acts, in terms of the spoken utterances that they produce. That is to say, that the discourse
The analysis approach employed is to orient to the endogenous features of the conversational data at hand. This encompasses predominantly the lexico-syntactic choices made by speakers in producing utterances, and also the sequential deployment of those utterances in conversation. That said, the arrangement of the data, by intonation unit, rather than by turn or phrase, as well as the inclusion of intonation and some phonetic / voice manner information in the transcripts, allows the inclusion of this limited auditory / phonetic data in the analysis in cases where it can be shown to be of particular relevance.

Meaning, as I have briefly sketched in the Background, is approached in terms of the communicative content of utterances. That is to say, that the emphasis for this thesis is on how participants in the interaction can be seen to understand a particular utterance, rather than on a particular formal model for meaning in conversation. That said, the approach taken to meaning-relations is indexicality, in terms of the meaning-relation between social action and utterances which can be argued to be used by speakers in the achievement of such social actions.

In approaching this thesis from the perspective of discourse analysis, it is important to recognize the potential for the subjectivity of the analyst to impose itself on the linguistic data presented for analysis. The explicit intention of this thesis is to examine the underlying social relationships that subjects establish between themselves, other subjects and objects, in terms of stance acts. This necessarily entails seeking evidence for the achievement of specific social actions, which is, implicitly, an interpretive activity. The obvious danger is that the analytical process imposes interpretations of utterances that were not made by the participants themselves. Similarly, it is possible that important interpretive work which was in fact done by participants can be ignored in analysis. There is little in the way of a completely satisfactory resolution to this fundamental problem of sociological and sociolinguistic (in terms of discourse analysis) research. However, in terms of the approach to analysis taken for this thesis, the orientation is to sequentially arranged behaviors, and therefore the endogenous understandings of the participants themselves is oriented to through the examination of how a particular utterance was responded to, or deployed in relation to other utterances.
This is, at best, a partial solution; the analysis will inevitably be defeasible in terms of only having the capacity to suggest the most likely interpretation of the linguistic actions performed by participants. The intention, therefore, is not to claim certainty, but to suggest that the linguistic behavior of participants in natural conversation can be seen to be both suggestive of particular conclusions, and to support the central proposal of this thesis.

3.3 Key concepts

3.3.1 Stance

Stance is operationalized as the specific expression of subjectivity towards some object of interest. Stance is conceptualized as being the social relationship between the subject and object – social relationship here meaning a relationship which is construed within a social context. Stance has particular qualities – such as epistemicity and affectivity (or evaluation). The stance act is the social action of taking a stance, and simultaneously positioning the self relation to the object and aligning with other subjects. Alignment is understood as the intersubjective relationship between subjects, in terms of how similar or divergent the subjects’ stance toward the object is. Stance-taking – specifically the stance-taking act – is the linguistic means by which stance acts are achieved in conversation. The meaning-relation between the stance-taking act and the stance act is indexical.

3.3.2 Subject

The subject is the ‘stance-taker’; the person who achieves a stance act, and thereby positions the self, relative to others, and relates subjectively to objects. Subjects are socially constructed, and exist socially and culturally via the socially constructed mechanisms and practices into which they have been socialized. Importantly, there is no a priori conflation of ‘subject’ and ‘speaker’. The label ‘speaker’, for the purposes of this thesis, will be applied in the sense of a participant in the interaction at hand, and is intended to carry no particular weight other than to label literal contributors to the
conversation at hand. Speakers are considered to be a subset of the general population of subjects; i.e. that to be considered a speaker, the production of spoken / communicative action (active presence) within the conversation at hand is required, whereas no such precondition is proposed for a subject.

3.3.3 Membership categorization

Membership categorization is the process of assigning particular category labels (categorizing) to people (members). Membership categorization can be applied to others, or can be applied to the self. Categories are social roles (or identities) that are produced by the operation of everyday sociocultural knowledge in interaction. For the purposes of this thesis, membership categorization is understood as being applied to subjects.

3.3.4 Indexicality

Indexicality is understood as the capacity for an indexical sign-vehicle to index some shared meaning relevant to the participants in the interaction in which it is deployed. As a meaning-relation, indexicality is understood to be boundless, in terms of the capacity for any sign-vehicle to be deployed to index any particular object. Indexicality is conceptualized as having both referential import (i.e. the capacity for a particular utterance to index an object) and metapragmatic implications. The metapragmatics of indexicality are understood in terms of the meaning of the selection, by a speaker, of a particular indexical expression and in terms of the reflexive and mutual construction, through indexicality, between the microsocial of everyday interaction and the macrosocial of broad, shared socio-cultural norms and understandings.

3.4 Aim

In the following analysis, the intention is to explore and examine the contention that stances are complex social relationships, formed through stance-taking, and that such complexity arises from the relative positioning of stance(s) with respect to other stances,
subjects, and to other objects upon which stances may (or may not) have been taken. Principally, therefore, the aim is to argue that speakers deploy stance (as a social action), and orient to their own and others’ stance(s), as a structure of stance relationships between subjects, objects and stances. This structure will be shown to be constructed by speakers dialogically in conversation, working from the foundation of the stance triangle as the critical conceptualization of how particular stance acts operate in social interaction. As a corollary to this aim, I propose the stance matrix as a theoretical framework by which these structures can be conceptualized.

The second aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the critical importance of the principle of indexicality to the achievement of stance in conversation, following the conceptualization of indexicality that I have proposed in the Background, and in the immediately preceding section (Key Concepts). Thirdly, I examine the subject, and how other subjects are positioned within the stance matrix. My aim is to show that social roles are deployed (as membership categories) to allow subjects (with whom an intersubjective relationship within the stance matrix is possible) to be deployed (by other speakers) as stance objects.
Chapter 4 Indexes of stance and building a stance matrix

4.1 Introduction

The central research aim of this thesis is to propose a theoretical framework for the understanding and analysis of stance in conversation, based on the ways in which speaking subjects achieve stance acts and orient to the stance acts of others in social interactions. The following Chapter fulfils this research aim through a close analysis of examples drawn from SBC019 Doesn’t work in this household (Du Bois, Chafe, Meyer, Thompson, & Martey, 2003), a family conversation, including a visiting relative from out of town, in a suburban living room. The speakers are Frank and Jan, parents of Melissa and Brett, who are also speakers, and Ron, the visiting relative. The initial analysis explores the indexical relation between the stance-taking act (the communicative means deployed to achieve stance in conversation), demonstrating the importance of indexicality to understanding how social actions (such as stance) are achieved in conversation. This leads to a discussion of how multiple related stances from multiple subjects are constructed across a conversation, forming a structured set of relationships of intersubjectivity, alignment and stance. This structure of relationships – involving multiple subjects, and multiple objects, as well as multiple vectors of stance – is the stance matrix. This, therefore, is the theoretical claim of this thesis; to propose the stance matrix as a framework for understanding stance.

4.2 The stance matrix

In order to contextualize the following analysis, it is necessary to briefly outline the key features and characteristics of the stance matrix, prior to moving to an analysis of the data. Firstly, the stance matrix is based on, and conceptualized as, an extension of the stance triangle (Du Bois, 2007). That is to say, that the fundamental understanding of the stance act, and the relationship between stance and subjectivity, is as it has been
established in the Background, above. The *stance matrix* is a conceptualization of how multiple stances, involving multiple subjects and multiple objects, are oriented to by speakers. That is to say, that the stance matrix is the product of multiple stance triangles deployed through stance-taking acts in conversation. The vectors of intersubjectivity / alignment, and positioning / evaluation, are seen to be construed relative to other such relationships that are relevant to the interaction at hand. The stance matrix, as a proposal, is not simply that stances are, or can become, relevant to subsequent speakers as part of the context of a conversation, but that the explicitly and importantly social relationships (between subjects and between subjects and objects) that stance acts enact are relevant as such relationships. The sequential and interrelated achievement of stance acts (by subjects through stance-taking) establishes a structure of stances, linking multiple subjects and objects in a complex and interdependent web, by which the specific and locally instantiated subjectivity of speakers (subjects) can be understood and oriented to by other subjects. The critical features of the stance matrix therefore are a) that it is established through the interactional achievement of stance acts, b) that it is oriented to by speakers in terms of stance acts, and c) that it is fundamentally composed of multiple triangles, and that this therefore implies that the structural members (the vectors of the matrix linking subjects and objects) are those already discussed as forming the triangle.

The starting point for this analysis is a stance-taking act produced by Melissa, in Extract 1, below.

*Extract 1 SBC 019*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Melissa:</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>125.435</td>
<td>.. Okay,</td>
<td>.. I= retract .. all my arguing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125.947</td>
<td>I totally agree.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127.391</td>
<td>I totally agree.</td>
<td>I should go downstairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128.183</td>
<td>I should go downstairs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129.138</td>
<td>Now can I stay up here?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus in the following discussion is on line 127.391 **I totally agree.** This can be seen to be a stance-taking act; by saying **agree** Melissa is indexing some degree of alignment with some other subject. More precisely, what I propose is that **agree** is understood in terms of having a conventionalized meaning (**{agreement}** or **{alignment}**), and that this suggests that it is being deployed in order to index a stance
act. Melissa’s stance act is performed in response to an earlier stance act; her stance act is a stance follow, which is achieved relative to a stance lead. That is to say, that the underlying assertion is that in order to align, or agree, Melissa must have something with which to align / agree. This is an argument advanced by Du Bois (2007) in relation to this specific utterance, and will be returned to in subsequent discussion.

Exactly locating a stance-taking act – i.e. a single index of a stance act – is complex. Jan, Melissa’s mother, produces several utterances which Melissa can be seen to be responding to in saying I totally agree I should go downstairs, as follows:

Extract 2 SBC 019
69.681 JAN: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

Extract 3 SBC 019
83.794 JAN: No,
83.957 you ge- take that downstairs.
85.564 [right now].

Extract 4 SBC 019
98.652 JAN: Take it downstairs.

Jan’s stance, although not indexed through a clearly identifiable predicate relating the self to an object or positioning the self (such as ‘I predicate object’ or ‘object is evaluation’), is clearly present in the conversation. Jan has a particular stance on an object. Jan’s stance-taking can be identified by a broader analysis of her utterances in relation to the actions and utterances of others; in particular, Jan’s stance on Melissa’s continued presence upstairs can be identified by considering her instructions to Melissa in terms of their potential to index stance. In this sense, her action(s) (i.e. to tell Melissa to go downstairs) constitute a stance-taking act, in which stance is indexed over a number of utterances. The ‘awareness’ of Jan having this stance ‘accretes’ as she repeats her instruction - repetition which also establishes and reinforces the ‘strength’ of Jan’s stance. The object on which Jan is taking a stance can be glossed, therefore, in terms of the action-orientation of directives; Jan has a positive stance on the action of {Melissa going downstairs}.

This suggests, therefore, that Melissa’s utterance agree constitutes alignment with Jan’s stance, as indexed through her repeated directives; agree refers anaphorically to Jan’s
directive in line 98.652, 28 lines prior to Melissa’s utterance. Melissa’s stance is thereby suggested by the conventionalized parse of I totally agree. From this perspective, despite the apparent complexity of Jan’s stance-taking, Melissa’s agree indexes a stance follow. The stance act indexed by Melissa’s stance-taking is congruent with the conventional meaning of the indexical sign-vehicle.

The simplest, and most critical, point that must be made in relation to this example is that Melissa does not agree with her mother. The transcript of SBC019 is roughly 20 minutes in duration; Melissa’s ‘agreement’ is during the second minute of this conversation, and Melissa does not leave the conversation and is a participating speaker throughout. Melissa utters the words I totally agree. I should go downstairs and does not do so. Furthermore, the immediately following line 129.138 Now can I stay up here? contradicts immediately the ‘alignment’ of agree. Furthermore, we can see from subsequent talk that Jan’s stance (her position on whether Melissa should go downstairs) does not change; Melissa’s persistence of presence in the same room as the adult members of the conversation is still a topic in line 1255.500. This therefore suggests that agree in this case, as produced by Melissa, does not index a stance that is positively aligned with that taken by her mother – or minimally, that the stance with which it aligns is not {go downstairs}, as suggested above. Melissa’s stance is logically not that she should go downstairs, otherwise her physical action would support this. Instead, she chooses to continue to defy her mother and remain in the room, and in the conversation, for at least the transcribed period and potentially beyond. What does this apparent contradiction mean for the analysis of this conversation? Can we say that Melissa is taking a stance at all, given that agree appears to have little or no effect on Melissa’s actions? That is to say, that as Melissa’s physical actions appear to contradict the linguistic action(s), does that render linguistic action (and therefore social action indexed by such actions) null and/or irrelevant and/or not intended to convey meaning?

9 The original recording duration of SBC019 is given as 1:35:15
It would be both naïve and disingenuous to go so far as to suggest that a speaker would deliberately produce a complex utterance that was null in meaning and intended effect. It should also be clarified that although I have indicated that it is my position that Melissa’s use of agree in this utterance does not constitute taking a stance conventionally indexed as agree(ment), I am not arguing that this variation is produced through locally deployed variations to the meaning of the word itself. The relationship between the predicate (in any stance act) and the stance itself is not a conventional relationship between word and meaning (in the sense of being the normally understood manner in which this occurs); the utterance(s) used in a stance-taking act index a stance which is locally-produced and contextually created by the subject taking the stance. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of stances are indexed by words that are at least resonant and/or consistent (rather than contradictory) in meaning to the stance which they are intended to index and thereby co-construct in conversation. This does not preclude, however, recognizing the inherent illimitability of indexicality; the relationship between the indexical sign-vehicle and the stance act so indexed is fundamentally limitless and reflexively constituted by / constitutive of the social context in which it is deployed (Silverstein, 2003). It is therefore necessary to examine how Melissa’s agree is deployed relative to other stance-taking in conversation, and thus suggest examine Melissa’s stance relative to other stances.

Jan’s proposition, in lines 69.681, 83.957 and 98.652, is not {Melissa should go downstairs}, but a direct instruction to do so. Melissa’s should in line 128.183 is a significant alteration of her mother’s proposition (which is, as shown above, take and need). This is not only further evidence that Melissa does not have the same stance as her mother, but suggests another possibility – that, in fact, Melissa’s agree does not constitute a stance act relative to Jan’s directive. This is not to say that the two utterances are not connected (for the speakers, in terms of Melissa’s should being in response to Jan), but to problematise the connection(s) of stance which the utterance may or may not index.

Extract 5 SBC 019
83.794 JAN: No,
83.957 you ge- take that downstairs.
85.564 [right now].
85.564 FRANK: [Ho- ho- honey],
You need to be able to concentrate and get it done, [and don't argue].
You've visited with ~Ron, and you'll also see him on the weekend.
.. <MRC So what MRC>.
... [well],
[(SNORT)]
<> That was rude >.
[@@@@] [2(H)2]
[(Hx)]
[2(H) (Hx)2]
[2You know] --
[SNIFF] [SNIFF]
She knows it too,
she did it on purpose.
Take it downstairs.
Or,
... [<X are you listening X>]? [Are you gonna add like] the little lines that jut out of
[2these2]?
[2Get your pen] back from that.
.. Yeah.
[?] --
[It's] erasable,
and I am not marking on it.
... I don't care if it's erasable.
Don't touch it.
... <HI I didn't HI>.
... I know.
.. [don't].
[That's] actually very good lettering sir.
[H] ... [2I know2].
[2(H)2] This is your fi[3nal3] &
[3(H)3] <F<VOX> Mo=m VOX>,
(4you gave me F>4] another ten minutes.
& [4warning4].
No I [5didn't,]
[5No,
no longer5].
I have retracted5] it.
(TSK) [6(H)6]
[6You argued6] with me long enough,
I changed my mind.
.. Okay,
.. I= retract .. all my arguing.
I totally agree.
I should go downstairs.
Now can I stay up here?
.. No.
...(SNIFF .. (Hx) (Hx)=)
I have suggested above that Jan’s stance (in, for example, line 98.652) is towards the object \{Melissa going downstairs\}. The object is the abstract or possible future action of Melissa going downstairs; furthermore, Jan’s stance towards this object is achieved through directives. It should be clearly noted that the suggested object gloss \{Melissa going downstairs\} is an approximation of the object; that is to say, that the participants have a locally relevant endogenous understanding of the stance object, and this can be seen by the stance acts that are performed relative to this object, but the object is not explicitly indexed. This suggests that stances are achieved – that stance-taking acts are possible – through a heterogeneous and locally-relevant collection of communicative means which are not immediately apparent from the ‘commonsense’ meaning(s) of utterances; in this instance, the stance object is indexed by directives which establish a shared understanding of a future action.

Similarly, the local deployment of heterogeneous indexical expressions as stance-taking acts can be seen in Melissa’s utterances. Melissa’s stance on whether or not she should go downstairs is indexed earlier than her \textbf{I totally agree}; it is in fact earlier than the above extract - we can first discern it at line 71.730.

\textit{Extract 6 SBC 019}

\begin{verbatim}
69.681  JAN:  .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.
71.73   MELISSA:  (H) I’m fine.
73.989  FRANK:  ... ~Melissa,
74.711  MELISSA:  [it’s nine o’clock].
74.804  MELISSA:  [I’m not gonna do any better] downstairs.
\end{verbatim}

It is clear to the casual observer that Melissa does \textit{not} want to go downstairs. There is a clear relationship between Jan’s and Melissa’s stance acts; Melissa’s stance is a follow from Jan’s lead, and forms a triangle as follows:

\textit{Figure 2 – Melissa and Jan}
The stance triangle is established by the speakers through the use of communicative means – through stance-taking acts – that do not explicitly encode the stance through their conventional ‘meaning’ (used here to refer to the commonsense semantic meaning of a lexical item). The stance act – a social action performed by a social actor – is indexed through the use of locally relevant and contextualized indexical expressions. The inferential meaning and intent of such expressions to index stance is clear from the ways in which they are responded to by other speakers; i.e. that we can observe, as I have argued above, that the speakers are engaging in the collaborative establishment of an intersubjective understanding of stance(s) – a stance triangle.

This suggests that I totally agree indexes either a shift in this stance, or a different stance act altogether. Given the interactional context (i.e. that Melissa remains upstairs), the former can be more-or-less disregarded. This suggests that I totally agree may be indexing stance in relation to some other stance act, or is being deployed to index the opposite of agree. In the data, it is possible to see that immediately preceding the agree, Melissa, her mother (Jan) and her father (Frank) are arguing; Melissa explicitly references this in line 125.497. Melissa’s I totally agree does not alter her position in the stance triangle (above); she still does not wish to go downstairs. Her preexisting stance informs the manner in which these utterances are interpreted; combined with her immediately appended question in line 129.138 there can be no doubt that her stance on whether she should stay up here is consistent throughout the interaction.

Line 127.391 I totally agree indexes Melissa’s stance, not on the content of her mother’s proposition, but on the validity of making the proposition itself. By saying I totally agree, and then by modifying the original proposition to I should, Melissa creates two new, intersecting sets of stance relationships. Firstly, there is ‘agreement’; Melissa is taking a stance on the stance(s) of her parents (as indexed in the proposition that she go downstairs) and acknowledging their validity and appropriateness (i.e. that her parents are allowed to direct her actions, etc.) This does not entail a shift in her position in the triangle above; Melissa’s use of should introduces an intersecting set of relationships that places her and her parents in alignment in their stance towards the object that Melissa should (in the sense of {should-in-an-ideal-world}) go downstairs.
This second stance (line 128.183) is different from the notion of a possible future action by Melissa, or from the notion of her parents being able (in the sense of being enabled by the relationship between parents and children in this context) to direct her actions; Melissa’s notion of **should** is a third proposition - that of the ideal, but unreal, in which Melissa would in fact go downstairs.

Lines 127.391 and 128.183 (Melissa’s **I totally agree / I should go downstairs**) are immediately followed by 129.138 **Now can I stay up here?** The first two, as I have argued above, are indexes of stance – stance-taking acts - by which Melissa positions herself in two additional stance triangles involving herself, her parents and several objects (her future action, her parents’ directive and her ideal action). The meaning of **Now can I stay up here?** is intrinsically linked to the stances that Melissa has established; indeed, not only the meaning of the line, but the interactional intention and purpose that Melissa has in producing this utterance are exposed by the stances that she has taken previously. The apparent contradiction – agreeing and then immediately seeking permission to remain – is only true for the extent to which Melissa’s utterances are interpreted solely on the basis of the lexical choices that she has made, rather than situating these utterances within the social interaction and the context in which they are produced. Melissa’s linguistic behavior – the utterances that she produces – is communicative action intended to index the social actions which she performs to achieve particular social goals; i.e. to position herself relative to her parents in terms of particular stance objects.

It is not merely the fact that Melissa establishes more than one distinct stance in conversation; I am not proposing that this situation is interesting merely for the fact that there are multiple stances involving the same conversational participants, although that is indeed interesting in and of itself. What I am proposing is that these stances are not only multiple and sequentially arranged, but that they are linked. That is to say, that the stance act is connected to those stance acts which precede it, and is in turn part of the stance acts following, and furthermore is part of a sequential ‘chain’ of stance acts that are enacted by interlocutors in the interaction. The stances taken by the participants
(above) are not only sequentially ordered in conversation but are meaningfully interconnected by the participants in the conversation.

The stance(s) in operation in the extract of conversation above can be, individually, analyzed as triangles. Primarily, the object is the idea of Melissa doing her homework downstairs. As I have suggested above, Jan and Frank have aligned and therefore similar stances. This is one triangle. In addition to this, there is a stance triangle between Melissa and both her parents, as in the figure above (with Jan) and also with Frank, in which Melissa is clearly disaligned from her parents. Thus, already, there are three simultaneous triangles in operation in one segment of conversation. In the following diagram, {Melissa going downstairs} is denoted by $O_1$, Melissa by $S_1$, Jan by $S_2$ and Frank by $S_3$

*Figure 3 - Multiple stance triangles*

![Diagram showing multiple stance triangles](image)

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Arguably, this could be graphically represented as only two triangles (i.e. between Jan and Frank, and then between Jan-and-Frank as one point, and Melissa as another). However, the point of the stance triangle is not that it is the graphical representation, but that it describes the social relationships between social actors, and as such graphical convenience is irrelevant. There exists a stance-relevant relationship between Melissa and Frank, between Jan and Frank, and between Melissa and Jan, and therefore there are, involving this one object, three stance triangles. This is consistent with Du Bois (2007), although more explicitly stated.
This infers that stances are durative and persistent; a stance act, once performed, is available to other subjects. Indeed, the stance triangle (Du Bois, 2007) and sequential studies of stance-taking in conversation (Keisanen, 2007) establish that stance-taking is intrinsically reliant on stance being available to other speakers beyond the locus of stance-taking in a particular utterance. The stance(s) held or taken by a particular subject continue – i.e. persist in the social context – insofar as those stances can be seen to continue to be relevant to the social interaction. The duration and persistence of a stance is determined solely by the participants themselves, and can be determined therefore through the ways in which subsequent stance acts (and, in theory, although not in this analysis, other actions) orient to the prior stance.\textsuperscript{11}

Jan and Frank’s stances are indexed by multiple stance-taking acts. The object of stance (Melissa going downstairs) does not change, and their fundamental stance (which might be glossed as positive, i.e. that this should occur) does not alter. This is seen in the following examples:

\textit{Extract 7 SBC 019}

\begin{verbatim}
83.794 JAN: No,
83.957 you ge- take that downstairs.
85.564 [right now].
\end{verbatim}

\textit{Extract 8 SBC 019}

\begin{verbatim}
121.289 FRANK: [5No,
121.499 no longer5].
121.499 JAN: I have retracted5 it.
\end{verbatim}

I do not claim that these utterances are the same in meaning; clearly they are not. What I claim is that the stance that they index is, in this context, the same continuous stance. Jan and Frank’s stance has not changed (at this point), and this is clearly understood not only by an observer, but by Melissa, as she disaligns and engages with her parents’

\textsuperscript{11} This is of course to defeasible, in that it is reliant on a positivist model of sequentially ordered social actions, in which omission or an unmarked response is rendered opaque for the purposes of analysis. The assumption, however, is not that a stance is non-relevant unless it is responded to by other speakers, but that this response may be used to determine continued relevance. A stance that is not responded to in a way which is susceptible to analysis may or may not have continued relevance to the speakers themselves, and is therefore indeterminate in duration and persistence.
respective stances. Jan’s stance-taking act in line 83.794 indexes the same stance that is indexed in line 69.681; Jan’s subsequent ‘re-taking’ serves to enhance and maximize the relevance of that stance.

It could be argued that these are entirely separate stance-taking acts; that each ‘pair’ of stance acts constitutes the establishment of a stance triangle, or, in more complex examples, that a sequence of stance-taking acts (i.e. multiple indexical expressions across two participants) constitute a collaborative building of intersubjective stance. This is problematic because it implies a conflation of the stance act and the stance-taking act. The point of this distinction now becomes clear. The stance act is, as claimed earlier, the underlying social action. The stance act is the act by which the speaker-subject evaluates an object and aligns with other subjects in conversation. The stance-taking act is the communicative act (utterance\textsuperscript{12}) which indexes that stance act. Furthermore, the stance is the vector between the subject and the object; the positional/evaluative social relationship, established through performing a stance act. Stance, stance acts and stance-taking are considered as separate phenomena. This distinction enables a sensible account for the multiple stance-taking that can be seen to be done by Jan and Frank, as in the above utterances. Each utterance constitutes a stance-taking act; a linguistically enabled communicative action. This communicative action indexically achieves a stance act, whereby each speaker positions the self as a subject relative to other subjects and objects of interest. By repeated stance-taking, stance acts are reindexed, and achieved successively; the effect of this is to reposition the subject in the same relational position as the prior stance act. The vectors of alignment and evaluation are unchanged in terms of what could be termed the ‘quality’ of the stance, or the degree of alignment with other subjects. Each utterance is indexically achieving a stance act which leaves the subject unmoved, in terms of that subjects relationship to other subjects and objects. The achievement of such a stance act

\textsuperscript{12} In this case, the equation of communicative act and utterance is unproblematic, as the data examined in this thesis is restricted to spoken language only. Notwithstanding this limitation, communicative act should also be understood as including non-verbal behaviour, in the general case.
serves therefore to reposition the stance act in terms of the sequential relationships between stance acts in social interaction, and thereby maximizes the relevance of that stance act (and arguably the prior stance acts which achieve more-or-less identical stances) for other speakers.

Jan and Frank do, in addition to multiple stance-taking indexing a particular stance, achieve multiple stance acts. Jan and Frank’s utterances can be seen to index related attitudinal stances alongside the central stance on {Melissa going downstairs}, which is locally specific to the conversation in which it is enacted. Jan (line 69.681 **Then you need to go downstairs and finish it**), and Frank (line 86.053 **You [need to .. be able to concentrate] and get it done,**) position themselves specifically in relation not only to the object {Melissa going downstairs}, but also a proposition that {Melissa needs to finish her homework}. Similarly to the indexical stance-taking discussed above, Jan and Frank’s utterances index stance acts and make available to other speakers (perhaps with maximal relevance for Melissa) their position relative to an ‘account’ for {Melissa going downstairs}.

Jan, Frank and Melissa’s stance-taking acts reveal another, perhaps more fundamental development in my analysis of stance. Stance-taking acts index stances, which are in turn the result or product of stance acts. The critical notion here is **indexicality**; the capacity of speakers to use a sign to index a social action. The model that I have advanced accounts for the stance relationships between Melissa and her parents in terms of an object and stances which are never literally described by the speakers themselves. Instead, the stances and the object of those stances are established by the speakers through the use of indexical expressions. These indexical expressions may encode other, additional meanings, and I will explore how there are potentially multiple stances or stance-relevant social actions indexed by a particular expression. For the moment, however, the critical importance of indexicality to this model for stance in complex conversation can be seen in how Melissa, Jan and Frank engage in stance-taking.

In this analysis, stance is only obliquely indexed in the various stance-taking acts. Jan’s first act is a directive. Does this, in this case, truly constitute stance-taking? There may
be an argument that in other cases, a directive might not particularly operate as an index of stance. However, Frank and Melissa’s responses to Jan’s directive show that it is received as a statement of Jan’s stance (i.e. that Melissa should go downstairs for the purposes of doing her homework) and is responded to as such. It is clear that speakers (subjects) in conversation engage in stance-taking work as *stance*; i.e. that although stance-taking is achieved through communicative means, the social action is responded to by other social actions, in turn indexed by particular communicative means. Particularly in terms of Melissa’s response to the directive (lines 83.794 – 85.564, and Melissa’s response in line 128.183), there may be a tendency to argue that Melissa’s *should*, rather than, as I have argued, indexing a stance on a possible-world outcome (i.e. a different object to Jan’s stance act), instead is a conventionalized symmetrical response to a directive. It is, however, through the principle of indexicality that we can understand that it is in fact *both*; speakers choose particular lexical items both for internal (speaker-internal) reasons, and because of the utterances of others (dialogic motivations). The fact that Jan’s directive may be considered a speech act directing Melissa to go downstairs, or that *should* is a conventionalized / grammaticalized response-token to directives in English does not diminish the capacity for those expressions to index stance acts – instantiated subjectivity in conversation.

This conversation is important not only because it shows the (in Peircean terms) ‘unlimited semiosis’ achieved by speakers in the indexing of stance acts in conversation; it also shows how speakers engage in sequences of stance and establish what I have termed the stance matrix. Jan and Frank align on one stance – a positive evaluation of Melissa going downstairs. Melissa’s response is to introduce a new object. However, that object is not entirely independent – accepting that Melissa’s stance is (in broad terms) {In some ideal world it would be better/good/appropriate for me to go downstairs, but I don’t want to and I’m not going to} – this is clearly related in a sensible and ordered fashion to her parent’s prior stance. The link is not solely between

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13 It is also important to note the potential subconscious conditioning of syntactic structure (dialogic syntax) that might also be an intervening variable in a speaker’s particular construction use.
the stances (the relationship between the subject and the object), but is a multilayered connection between all aspects of the stance act. In other words, a sequentially connected stance act – such as a stance act that can be seen to be in response to a prior stance act – is connected to other stances in that conversation in terms of the relationship between the subjects and the objects in those stance relationships. There are also connections between the subjects, objects, and the alignments between subjects in subsequent stance triangles. That is to say that each aspect of the stance act – the triune act of positioning, evaluating and aligning, and the subjects and objects involved – is relevant to the unfolding of sequentially occurring stance acts in conversation.

Melissa’s I totally agree (line 127.391) is a significant and powerful moment in the formation of her stance act in response to her parents. By saying I totally agree, Melissa positions not herself (as she is not, as I have argued, ‘agreeing’ with her parents, but taking a new responding stance on an entirely separate object), but her parents. I totally agree is, in some respects, {you totally agree (with me)} in terms of the upcoming stance. Melissa’s utterance indexes her presupposition of her parents’ relative positioning in the new stance triangle. Melissa’s agreement is attempting to index her understanding of her parent’s likely evaluation the new object – the stance that they would take (or would have taken) on that object. Melissa is able to do this for (from the perspective of the speaker) very simple reasons – her understanding (or at least, her habituated belief equivalent to an understanding) of her parents and their past actions and how those actions are likely to translate into future actions. In other words, although the stance that Melissa takes is entirely unique to the circumstance in which it occurs (i.e. it is unique because it is a unique combination of the current localized object and the particular subject involved at that point in time), Melissa has be capacity to presuppose her parents’ stance because of an understanding of their stance on past like objects – her (intersubjective) understanding of each of her parent’s subjectivity. From one perspective, this is an entirely obvious claim – that a speaker’s knowledge or experience of another speakers actions in past interactions (and as this is a family situation it is reasonable to assume an extensive history of past interaction) has some bearing on the stances that a speaker might expect another to take. It is, however, the specificity of Melissa’s stance act that forms the basis for claiming that this is a stance
act logically structured by the speaker to be a response to a prior act and an act that sits within a broader intersubjective structure. This structure is a matrix of subjects, objects, and stances, in which any relevant aspect of the stance act can be understood by participants to be sensibly related to other stance acts. The structure that I propose is the stance matrix. The stance matrix, as briefly outlined at the opening of this Chapter, is intended to describe this durative and sensibly ordered structure of stances understood and used by speakers in conversation.

Such presupposed vectors of alignment and evaluation undoubtedly are not completely equal to alignment and evaluation arising from stance acts; I am not suggesting that, for example, Melissa is imposing her view of her parents’ subjectivity upon them, and this constitutes Jan and Frank’s respective stances. What it is possible to claim, however, is that speakers create nodes of possibility within the stance matrix which can be occupied by others – they can suggest and predict another’s instantiated subjectivity and engage with that in their stance acts. Similarly, a stance on one object may be seen to suggest the likely vectors of a particular subjects stance on similar or related objects – in Brett’s case his stance on Melissa’s action (and the sequential relationship to his mother’s response) suggests his position with respect to the prior stances and stance objects (Melissa going downstairs and Melissa should go downstairs).

Melissa’s sequence of utterances (Extract 1) establishes a possible alignment with Jan and Frank with respect to an object. Melissa creates, in effect, a new (and complete) stance triangle that is related to prior stances, and is an act done in response to such prior stances. This sequential creation of structures of stance can be seen not only because of proximity (although there is substantial intervening talk between, for instance, Jan’s initial directive and Melissa’s eventual responding stance act), but due to manifestly related objects. Melissa’s should go downstairs is clearly related to Jan’s go downstairs, differing only in a modal verb to modify the likelihood and finality of the object (from imperative/reality to suggestion/possibility). Indeed, Melissa’s object is in some respects reliant upon Jan’s for sensible interpretation; Melissa’s stance act depends upon the existing prior stance of her parents’ in the achievement of this positioning. This is claiming that we can argue that Melissa’s stance acts are in response
to her parents due to both sequential and proximal features in the ordering of such acts in conversation, and due to Melissa mirroring Jan’s construction (go downstairs). Furthermore, this sequence suggests that new ‘branches’ of the stance matrix can be constructed by any subject. Melissa’s I totally agree infers

This is not to claim that the alignment is inferential in the sense of meaning-relations. I use ‘infer’ here more in the lay sense; viz., that Melissa’s utterance is not simply stating her parents’ alignment.

The stance matrix is composed critically of subjects and objects, and the vectors that connect each subject and object. The matrix is inherently a spatial representation of the relavities between subjects and objects that are established through stance acts. That is to say, that the stance matrix is the product of the sequential ordering of stance acts by speakers in response to other stance acts (cf. Haddington 2006, Keisanen 2007). The sequential proximity of stances, however, is not sufficient to argue that they are sensibly and logically connected by the speakers in an interaction to form a structure such as that described above. Subsequent stances taken by Jan, Frank and Melissa do not show the same connectedness as those above. This is not to say that there are no other stance sequences present in the data, although these predominantly follow a model of stance lead and follow, in the formation of single triangles. The claim in this analysis is that stances constructed as interrelated social actions, forming relevant structures connecting subjects, objects and stances, by the speakers taking those stances themselves. The stance matrix is an abstraction of how multiple stances involving related objects and the same subjects are constructed and understood by the participants in conversation, based on the idea of the stance triangle as proposed by Du Bois (2007). The vectors that connect subjects and objects are intersubjective alignment and stance, respectively. The stance matrix is formed by a subject having multiple relevant stances to which a speaker may orient, and by multiple objects, and by multiple subjects.

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14 This is not to claim that the alignment is inferential in the sense of meaning-relations. I use ‘infer’ here more in the lay sense; viz., that Melissa’s utterance is not simply stating her parents’ alignment.
Other subjects can also interject stance acts into the stance matrix. This can be seen in line 133.376 ...**Doesn’t work in this household.**

Extract 9 SBC 019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Utterance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>133.376</td>
<td>BRETT</td>
<td>... Doesn’t work in this household.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138.617</td>
<td>FRANK</td>
<td>... You may use my desk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141.059</td>
<td></td>
<td>... Well wait a minute,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141.944</td>
<td></td>
<td>it’s a royal mess,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142.649</td>
<td></td>
<td>isn’t it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143.311</td>
<td>MELISSA</td>
<td>... Yes it is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144.467</td>
<td>FRANK</td>
<td>You’ll just have to carefully set things aside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146.778</td>
<td>BRETT</td>
<td>(H) &lt;SING Sym[phony=].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147.279</td>
<td>FRANK</td>
<td>[And I’ll go through the] [2piles2],</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147.331</td>
<td>RON</td>
<td>[@@@][2(H)[2][3@3]a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147.58</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>[3we3][4can go down there and4]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148.58</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>[5si=t.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148.867</td>
<td>BRETT</td>
<td>[4&lt;SING dun= da-da-dum=4],</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150.728</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>.. You wanna go down there and si=t5]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152.026</td>
<td>BRETT</td>
<td>Dun-dun-dun-dun dun da-da- SING&gt; --</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153.572</td>
<td>MELISSA</td>
<td>.. (H) [&lt;VOX No&gt;=.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154.065</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>[XXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154.648</td>
<td>MELISSA</td>
<td>you] guys,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155.221</td>
<td>JAN</td>
<td>.. I wanna be able to be with you VOX&gt;.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brett’s interjection is evaluative – and it is, because of its (indexical) stance act content, and its sequential ordering within the conversation, a stance act that positions Brett within the stance matrix along with Jan, Frank and Melissa. Brett follows his mother (Jan, line 130.093, No). The object of Brett’s stance is, fundamentally, the stance taken by Melissa – and arguably the motivations or the desired outcomes that Melissa had in performing these actions\(^\text{15}\). In addition to this, however, the sequential ordering of

\(^\text{15}\) As in, Brett is evaluating the likelihood of Melissa’s behaviour resulting in a favourable outcome for Melissa, viz. that she remains upstairs. This interpretation relies on the contextualized meaning of Brett’s utterance, which is, aside from the extent to which the utterance functions to index Brett’s stance and is part of stance-taking in conversation, not particularly relevant for this study.
Brett’s stance-taking indicate his alignment with Jan; after a gap of roughly 2 seconds\(^{16}\), Brett makes his statement. The floor has been left open, and through his choice of utterance for this turn (i.e. that he chooses to evaluate Melissa’s actions), Brett engages with the stance matrix (the structure of prior stances established between his sister and his parents). The stance that he takes creates a vectoral relationship between himself as the subject and Melissa’s stance act(s) as the object of stance, and thereby positions Brett relative to this object. By positioning relative to an object, this suggests how Brett may be positioned relative to other objects and subjects that are also positioned relative to this object; positioning within the framework of the stance matrix emphasizes the relevance of Brett’s stance act for all subjects. This is broadly similar to the intersubjective achievement of stance on a single object dialogically between subjects (Kärkkäinen, 2006), and, as discussed above, the sequential ordering of stance. The critical proposition of the stance matrix is what could be referred to as the omnirelevance of a matrix-oriented stance act. Brett’s stance-taking is achieved in terms of a single object, but this stance is relative to Melissa, and to Frank, and to Jan.

The notion of a stance or stance act being available as an object for subsequent stance acts is critical to the stance matrix. Haddington (2006, 2007), Keisanen (2007), Kockelman (2004) and Du Bois (2007) include the availability of stance acts as objects of successive stance acts in their analyses. Particularly for Kockelman (2004), such stances are ‘second-order stances’, or stances that are taken about stance-taking. Du Bois (2007) acknowledges the ‘multiplex’ implications of stance and the complexities of stance acts when considered within even limited conversational context. The proposition of the stance matrix as a conceptualization of how speakers orient to stance encompasses these notions. The multiplex relativities of vectors of the matrix highlight that the positioning of a subject is relative to other subjects, and other objects, and the subjective stance relationships between those subjects and objects. The stance matrix,

\(^{16}\) Disregarding Ron’s intervening utterance – line 131.117 \ldots (SNIFF .. (Hx) (Hx)= – as incidental non-word vocalisation transcribed in this instance as speech, but not constituting a contribution to the dialogue. Aside from any internal features of the utterance, it is not responded to or engaged with by other speakers, supporting this conclusion.
by being composed of *vectors* of relationship, is a limitlessly complex set of relationships which are nonetheless each separately and distinct; each the single product of a particular stance act which is reducible not only to the triangle, but to the particular linguistic action which is used to achieve it.

The proposal and emphasis on indexicality in relation to linguistic action which is used to achieve stance – the stance-taking act, as I have termed it for the purposes of this analysis (in order to differentiate between communicative action and social action) – requires some further discussion and consideration. The importance of indexicality is not to say that any indexical sign-vehicle can mean any stance *per se* (although there is no *a priori* conflation of conventional meaning and the quality of the stance so indexed), but that the achievement of the stance act by such an expression is not conventionally encoded within such an expression. Indexicality suggests the defeasibility of the notion of stance expressions or markers (the latter as examined by Berman, Ragnarsdóttir, & Strömqvist, 2002; Hunston 2007; Precht, 2003, 2008; Simon-Vandenbergen, 2008); whilst a particular word or expression might be suggestive of stance (or, *inter alia*, epistemicity, voicing, positionality, intersubjectivity), such an indexical meaning-relation is contingent upon the specific context in which it is deployed. Stance-taking is not simply an ‘utterance that means stance’ but the specifically situated production by a speaker of an utterance which is understood to be deployed in order to achieve a particular social action, which is in turn reflexively constituted by / constitutive of the social context in which it is achieved. Stance acts are achieved through language – through utterances – and the indexical relationship between the sign-vehicle and the object (the stance act) is understood to be mutually constitutive. Thus, whilst the specific *locus* of subjectivity in the stance act is locally contingent on the here-and-now of a particular action, it must be acknowledged that there is an ongoing process by which speakers exchange *ways* of achieving stance. That is to say, that speakers are socialized into understanding how other speakers might deploy particular utterances so as to achieve stance. This could be termed the metapragmatics (Silverstein 2003) of stance-taking. In relation to the analysis presented above, the notion of *agree*, as an index of a particular stance taken by Melissa, is constructed by the index that is used in the interactional here-and-now (i.e. the
immediate context of her interaction). **Agree** is constitutive of the stance, and the mechanism by which the stance act is achieved; but this is not to claim that agree ‘means’ such a stance act in each instance in which it is uttered – or that the specific quality of alignment Melissa achieves between herself and her parents is encoded within the general conventional meaning of ‘agree’.

### 4.3 Summary

In summary, the critical proposition advanced through the analysis and discussion Chapter, above, are that the deployment of stance acts in conversation by speakers can be seen to co-construct a complex structure of interrelated subjective stances, and subjects. This structure is the stance matrix. In addition, we can see that the structure of the stance matrix is reducible to the specific vectors of particular stance acts in conversation. The analysis has suggested the stance acts performed by speakers orient to such multiple vectors in conversation. This is the critical point which will be further explored in the following Chapter; how the stance matrix can be seen to be oriented to by speakers.

**Chapter 5 Multiple objects and non-present subjects**

#### 5.1 Introduction

In the following analysis, I examine the stance-taking performed by subjects in order to construct a stance matrix that orients themselves as subjects relative to a complex array of related objects, which are constructed as being related in terms of the subjective stance relationships that the subjects have with those objects. The intention of this analysis is to examine the operationalization of related stances in a sensible and ordered structure – the stance matrix – by speakers. The conversation - SBC 044 *He knows* (Du Bois & Englebreton, 2004) – occurs between two friends, recorded in a private home in Mulwaukee, Wisconsin. Cam is a 30-year old white male, and Lajuan is a 35-year old
African-American male. Both are tertiary-educated and homosexual; sexual orientation is included in the background information for this conversation, as the speakers’ experiences as gay men form much of the subject matter of their conversation. The conversation is approximately 29 minutes in duration. It should be clearly stated that there is no intention to claim that this analysis is an exhaustive catalogue of all stance-taking that occurs within this data – rather, it is restricted to a relatively small scope of related stances, and thus, in effect, the discussion is of a partial, rather than complete, stance matrix.

5.2 Related objects and multiple stances

The segment that is analyzed in this Chapter involves a relatively long stretch of talk, including embedded narratives, the exchange of detailed information about topics and so on. Throughout this segment, Cam and Lajuan display a number of stances, and establish a collection of related stances towards a number of objects. In these stance acts, Cam and Lajuan are generally (as will be shown below) aligned, whereas other subjects that are spoken of in the conversation are shown to be dis-aligned with Cam and Lajuan. The conversational segment begins with the topic of hugging practices within Cam and Lajuan’s respective families. Each speaker describes his own family practices. Lajuan then produces a clear stance-taking act, in the following:

Extract 10 SBC 044

227.67 LAJUAN: .. (H)= I always said,
229.401 ... that if I had children,
231.196 ... I would always --
233.637 Especially if I had a son,
234.765 I would hug him,
235.539 just so he knew that I loved him.

Lajuan’s utterance uses the concept of potential future actions, of what he would do in a

A contiguous extract of the complete transcript, including all extracts in the body of the text, is included in Appendix 2.
given situation, to show his stance towards that action. It is clear, from the conversation, that Lajuan and Cam have a shared concept – {hugging within families} - and that Lajuan has a particular attitude to this concept, i.e. that hugging is positive, and is something that he would do. Cam’s response to Lajuan’s stance lead is a follow in which he aligns with Lajuan’s stance:

Extract 11 SBC 044

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>LAJUAN</th>
<th>CAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>227.67</td>
<td>.. (H)= I always sai=d,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229.401</td>
<td>... that if I had children,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.196</td>
<td>... I would always --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.637</td>
<td>Especially if I had a son,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234.765</td>
<td>I would hug him,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235.539</td>
<td>just so he knew that I loved him.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237.031</td>
<td>CAM: Right.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237.656</td>
<td>I think it’s important,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238.535</td>
<td>I think it’s [good],</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>238.977</td>
<td>LAJUAN: [(THROAT)]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>239.452</td>
<td>CAM: .. I don’t think you can overly hug,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241.382</td>
<td>(H) .. um,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242.609</td>
<td>.. with family and stuff like that.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cam’s evaluative response to Lajuan’s utterance (lines 227.670 - 235.539) provides evidence that Lajuan’s description of future actions is interactionally understood (by the participants) to be a stance act. Cam understands that Lajuan has performed a stance lead act, and responds with a follow. Cam’s stance act as a follow is clear from the object-index it; this indexes an object which is in some way already clear from the context of the utterance\(^{18}\). That is to say, that Cam understands that a stance object has been indexed, along with a stance, and is, through a stance (follow) act, is aligning with the stance taken by Lajuan.

\(^{18}\) This is a complex question - whether it refers anaphorically to the indexical expression, or to the indexed object, or is an index in and of itself. However, for the purposes of this analysis, it is not necessary to take a particular position on the referential mechanism in operation in such an utterance. The critical point is that it indexes or refers in some way to an object which has already been or is in some other way indexed within the conversational interaction, in order for it to be understood to index the stance object.
Cam’s stance follow begins with a single word, right, which is conventionally and commonsensically held to indicate agreement. However, Cam does not merely index alignment with Lajuan’s stance - his act is more complex and achieves more in terms of positioning Cam relative to the stance object. Cam’s stance follow is indexed by a marker of epistemic stance; I think. There is a tension here in terms of how the use of I think should be interpreted. Kärkkäinen (2003) proposes that I think can “often only really frame a stance” (emphasis in original), and that the stance / evaluation occurs within the frame of I think. Certainly, in terms of how the stance follow is indexed, this argument is supported in Cam’s utterance. I think frames the evaluative phrase it {hugging} is good {stance}. Kärkkäinen’s analysis of I think understates its importance when used in stance acts; there is an important difference between it’s good and I think it’s good. The assertion of the individual, as in Cam’s utterance above, grounds the stance act within the purview of the speaker; by encoding himself into the stance act, Cam explicitly claims ownership of that stance. Although Kärkkäinen argues that I think may be considered a discourse marker (and hence reducing I think as a meaningful component of the stance-taking act), there is no clear evidence to suggest that I think in this example is used as such a discourse marker; indeed, the repetition of I think and restating of the evaluation, reindexed using another word, suggests that Cam’s I think is crucially important in his indexing of that stance. Cam is explicitly indexing that this stance is taken as an individual - rather than a passive statement of stance which is implicitly that taken by Cam, I think explicitly frames the evaluation in terms of the personal and individual. More precisely, I think indexes this frame in relation to the subsequent indexes of stance; the personal is, in Silverstein’s (2003) terms, the ‘micro-realt ime dialectic’ (of the personal). In other words, I think has an indexical relationship to a shared cultural understanding that frames the stance in terms of that shared cultural understanding.

Cam’s stance act, in comparison to Lajuan’s stance lead which it follows, is relatively straightforward. Although, as shown, there are particular complexities in how Cam’s stance is indexed, there is a clearly evaluative phrase, framed within an explicit marker of epistemic stance. It is clear from the interactional context - i.e. how this utterance is understood by Cam - that Lajuan’s stance act is understood. Locating the components
of the stance act, however, is more problematic. Lajuan’s lead act is, in this utterance, indexed through an explanation of possible future actions. By saying I would followed by an action, Lajuan shows explicitly that he views such actions as positive; in this instance, the I would could be said to frame the object index, and the stance (the relationship between the subject - Lajuan - and the object) is not explicitly indexed, in terms of an evaluative phrase, as in Cam’s utterance. Moreover, the stance object is indexed through an entirely hypothetical future action. The object could be argued to be that practice exemplified by the future action; not the precise action itself, but the general social conditions which give rise to such an action. This is consistent with the preceding talk, in which the speakers exchange accounts of multiple practices of hugging within families. Therefore, Lajuan’s utterance frames the stance object in terms of positive future action (that the action would / will be undertaken), and this object, understood as the practice of hugging, rather than a single instantiated hug (i.e. {I would hug on this occasion} vs. {I would hug him}), by virtue of the positive action frame, has a positive stance taken upon it. In the absence of an evaluative phrase, it becomes problematic to gloss the stance taken by Lajuan; however, further examination of the interaction shows that it is problematic also for the speakers, and that they collaborate in order to manage this, and to clarify Lajuan’s stance (see line 239 on, below).

Cam’s stance-taking act also follows Lajuan’s stance-taking in that it is indexed in terms of the individual - both Lajuan and Cam index their stances as I (STANCE + OBJECT), rather than leaving the I to be implied from the fact that they are indexing the stance (i.e. by through being the speaker). This can be interpreted in a number of ways; firstly, that Cam’s use of I think, aside from explicitly claiming the individuality and personal ownership of his stance act, also constitutes an epistemic stance on the evaluative stance follow act; to adopt Kärkkäinen’s (2003) terminology, the evaluation is framed by the epistemic marker. This implies, according to Kärkkäinen (2003), that Cam is marking his evaluation for a degree of uncertainty. A second interpretation, and one which, due to the repetition of I think, is more likely, is , as I have argued above, Cam is explicitly grounding his stance in terms of himself as a subject, as is Lajuan.
This is not inconsistent with Kärkkäinen’s (2003) analysis, which suggests that *I think* can, in certain sequential contexts, retain the function suggested here\(^\text{19}\). Lajuan’s *I would* contrasts with the practices that he has recounted in the preceding talk; the stance that he takes, being indexed in subject-oriented terms, is not only evaluating an object, but position himself relative to that object and to others that are implied through their relevance to the stance object. That is to say, that by explicitly indexing himself as an individual, Lajuan infers that other subjects do not share his stance; the corollary to *I would* in this context is {but others wouldn’t}.

Cam and Lajuan’s stance(s) are not entirely resolved by the utterances discussed above. This can be seen by the following:

*Extract 12 SBC 044*

\begin{verbatim}
239.452 CAM: .. I don't think you can overly hug,
241.382 (H) .. um,
242.609 .. with family and stuff like that.
244.245 LAJUAN: Yeah.
244.796 See and that's how I feel,
245.934 is that,
246.345 (H) I want to hug him,
247.384 because I want him to know that I do love him.
249.15 CAM: Mhm.
249.638 LAJUAN: And that,
250.366 .. I I want my children,
251.919 .. if I if I ever ha=d children,
253.403 (H) to know=,
254.369 (H) ... that=,
255.592 there is nothing wro=ng with showing physical affection between
two men.
258.607 It doesn't make you gay.
259.866 CAM: .. Right.
\end{verbatim}

This extract overlaps and follows Cam’s stance follow act. We have seen that Cam and Lajuan have collaboratively engaged with stance-taking. The object that Lajuan indexes is, as I have shown above, practices of hugging within families. The above lines show the participants collaborating to further develop their stance, to further develop the

\(^{19}\) It should be further noted that Kärkkäinen suggests certain prosodic features which are typical of this indexical usage. Generally, prosody is out of the scope of this study, and this has therefore not been considered in this analysis.
specificity of the relationship between them and an object within the sociocultural context. The above exchange contains another stance lead and follow pair; Lajuan: **there is nothing wrong with showing physical affection between two men** and Cam: **right**. Lajuan’s statement positions himself relative to another practice, showing physical affection between men, and Cam’s response indexes his alignment with Lajuan’s stance.

In isolation, each set of intersubjective stance acts can be seen to be following the lead / follow structure proposed by Du Bois (2007) and followed by others in the field (Haddington, 2006; 2007; Keisanen, 2007). However, there is a connection between the two stances; the object of the second stance act is understood to be not only **showing physical affection** but {showing physical affection through / by hugging}. This duality is also seen in the complexity of Lajuan’s stance – **I want my children to know that there is nothing wrong with showing physical affection between two men.** Indeed, Lajuan’s utterance is a multiplex stance-taking act; there are discernible and distinct objects which Lajuan indexes, and upon which he takes a stance.

The multiplexity of Lajuan’s stance-taking act is that he follows an evaluative expression – the expression by which he indexes his (in this case positive) stance – with not one but two distinct object-indexes. First, **there is nothing wrong with showing physical affection between two men** (line 255.592), indexes one object, related to the prior stance activity, as outlined above, and obtaining from that (through its proximal sequential relationship with the prior stances) further details, viz. that physical affection is strongly related to hugging. Second, Lajuan’s final line (258.607) **it doesn’t make you gay** indexes a further object – in combination with the prior object indices.

The objects upon which Lajuan takes a stance (as they are relevant to the current discussion, rather than an exhaustive catalogue of all stances in this conversation) are:

1. Hugging as a practice within families
2. Hugging his (hypothetical) son
3. Physical affection between two men
4. Consequences of physical affection
These stance objects require some further explanation. It should be noted that the glosses presented above are intended to be glosses to enable analysis and reference within the analytical context only – I am not suggesting that this is an accurate representation of the objects on which Lajuan takes a stance. The intention is to examine the practices of doing stance acts and stance-taking, and therefore the stance objects above are intended to suggest the objects which are indexed by the speakers, rather than to accurately depict them. The first – {hugging as a practice within families} – can be seen to be indexed through the utterances produced by Cam and Lajuan, in the following:

Extract 13 SBC 044

199.297 LAJUAN: .. (H)= No.
200.056 CAM: My family's not very much h-ugging.
201.58 LAJUAN: .. Oh.
201.894 LAJUAN: I mean,
202.149 .. my whole life,
203.115 .. we've never been very,
204.471 you greet someone,
205.436 you don't s- hug them.
206.226 You're just like <VOX hi VOX>,
206.897 how are you,
207.638 ... and even like male female.
209.833 (H) You don't do it.
210.862 CAM: ... See uh my .. [my] mother was like that more so.
212.541 LAJUAN: [(THROAT)]
214.661 CAM: (H) And then my f=ather was .. d=ifferent.

Lajuan and Cam sequentially co-construct the object of their stance; in line 200.056, Lajuan specifically grounds hugging in relation to family, following prior utterances (see Appendix 2) in which specific hugging practices are described. Cam then responds to this by describing the hugging of both his mother and his father (lines 210.862 and 214.661, respectively).

The second is indexed through the description of the literal actions that it would involve – Lajuan says in line 246.345 I want to hug him. This is undoubtedly distinct from the

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20 See the Methodology Chapter Section 3.2 (p. 30) for a discussion of my analytical approach.
more abstract notion of showing physical affection between two men, and there is no logical reason to conflate them, aside from of course a need to resolve how Lajuan’s stance work on hugging a hypothetical son is related to physical affection between two men. It might be possible to argue that both these expressions index a ‘larger’ stance object, one that is broad enough to encompass both concepts; indeed this would seem to be a ‘neat’ solution to how this segment of conversation ‘works’. And yet this is somewhat illogical – Lajuan, by taking a stance on showing physical affection between two men (with the afore-mentioned proximally-derived assumption that this is predominantly or even solely hugging) certainly does not invalidate or retract his previous stance that he would want to hug his son. If anything, this stance is reinforced by the subsequent utterance. Despite such reinforcement, however, it is of course still entirely possible to clearly identify that Lajuan would have (in the broadest and simplest terms) distinct attitudes about a) hugging his son (should he have one) and b) showing physical affection between two men. Not in the least because of the critical difference between the two in that the first (hugging his son) is a possible physical action and the second is an abstract judgment strongly embedded within a socio-cultural / historical context. Therefore, both must remain as they are expressed and deployed by the speaker in conversation – as separate and distinct (although clearly related, which will be further explored in this analysis) stance objects.

The third object (glossed as \{consequences of physical affection\}) is indexed by line 258.607 It doesn’t make you gay. Whilst this may seem to be something of a codicil or addendum to the prior IU, rather than intrinsically indexing some stance object, it is precisely because it is a broad and significant concept (given the content of the conversation, in which sexual identity and orientation features heavily) that is seemingly ‘tagged’ onto another object that it is interesting. The logical connection between lines 255.592 and 258.607 is somewhat unclear, in terms of precisely what Lajuan intends by showing physical affection and It doesn’t make you gay. The assumption is that the sequential relationship between these utterances constitutes an implied meaningful relation between these utterances – meaningful used here to denote that the relationship between showing physical affection in line 255.592 and It doesn’t make you gay is important for the speaker. This can also be seen in the anaphoric
relationship between the It and the prior line; It is assumed to refer to the prior line. The second utterance is assumed to be added to the first it a positivist sense, and that the connection between the stance objects indexed by each is indexed by the linguistic coordination between the utterances (the indexical expressions) themselves. Effectively, this is to argue that the pragmatic resolution of utterance meaning is itself indexically relevant in terms of stance-taking; moreover, that the anaphoric connection between utterances also entails a symmetrical connection between the objects of indexicality. This is not only pragmatic, but metapragmatic (Silverstein 2003); the first utterance is argued to index a stance object, and the coordination with the second is taken to be evidence for that utterance also indexing a stance object. Specifically, I am arguing that as it doesn’t make you gay is connected to an object index (showing physical affection), then it can be understood as an object index itself.

An alternative analysis of this utterance is possible: that it doesn’t make you gay serves to add detail to the overall stance act. This would result in an understanding of Lajuan’s stance as {showing physical affection is ok (because) it doesn’t make you gay}. The second utterance serves as an account of the stance taken in the previous utterance; Lajuan’s purpose therefore in line 258.607 is to further specify the nature of his stance and account for the motivation behind it. This argument is, however, inherently defeasible in that it relies on the external suggestion of a particular intentionality within Lajuan’s utterances. By contrast, the sequential ordering of object indexes that I have identified above in Lajuan’s turns implicitly connects them into an extended stance act, by which Lajuan positions himself relative to and evaluates multiple objects. Each object ‘inherits’ its stance relationship (Lajuan’s stance on that object) from that indexed prior (or, alternatively, its relative position within the stance matrix with respect to Lajuan and the evaluative vector connecting subject and object).

This is an example of Lajuan, as a speaking subject, doing stance work through the sequential ordering of utterances in conversation. That is to say, that Lajuan indexes related and connected objects, and they are understood to be connected both in terms of speech (as in, through the features of the utterances) and this connectedness in speech is precisely mirrored by connectedness in the stance acts in which they are involved (as indexical expressions). Proposing that lines 255.592 and 258.607 are connected in such
a manner is supported, in addition, by the tone occurring between the two intonation units; line 255.592 concludes with a terminative, rather than continuative, tone, which suggests that they are separate concepts (as I have argued), but are connected by colocation and sequentiality.

Lajuan’s series of stance acts quickly establish a multiplex array of stances, on a variety of objects (as outlined above). These stances and objects are related, not only through the predominantly spoken language features that I have analyzed above, but in terms of how they operationalize and express Lajuan’s subjectivity in conversational interaction. In other words, Lajuan positions himself as a subject with stances on several objects, and those stances are understood to be, in some sense, caused by or strongly associated with other stances that he also has, and (by extension) with unspoken aspects of his subjectivity. That is, that the collection of stances taken by a subject are subordinate to the total subjectivity of that subject; a subject has a (more or less) theoretically limitless range of possible stances that he or she might take, and furthermore the sum total of the stances taken by subject may not be equivalent to that subject’s subjectivity. Subjectivity, however, is limited in practice by the extent to which it is relevant to the interaction at hand, and such relevance is interactionally achieved as stance. The process of stance-taking, therefore, is the realization of subjectivity into the here-and-now of everyday social interaction; the transformation of the macro-social constructed self into the micro-social, and by doing so continually reflexively constituting the subject (the macro-social constructed self).

The conversation continues, moving to a new topic. The following transcript, immediately following the above segment, shows Lajuan recounting a prior conversation with a third person – Scott – and Scott’s experience with his (Scott’s) nephew.

*Extract 14 SBC 044*

260.483 LAJUAN: .. You know,  
260.981 and that is one of the things that ~Scott was saying yesterday,  
262.986 it really bothered ~Scott a lot,  
264.096 because his nephew,  
265.189 (H) .. uh,  
266.529 .. kept calling him Aunt ~Sco=tt.  
268.26 ... Because,
and his nephew was just being rude and obnoxious about every
gift,
(H) .. he he unwrapped,
and his brother said,
(H) oh that's just the way kids are today,
and I'm like,
(H) no that's the way you train your kids.
.. (H) If you don't train your kids to be any better,
... then they are,
and see and in ~Scott's family,
like his brother,
his older brother'll say,
oh ~Scott's my best friend.
(H) But he'll tease ~Scott about-

.. (H) If you don't train your kids to be any better,

CAM: .. He doesn't know that he's gay?
LAJUAN: .. (THROAT) Hm-mm.

Lajuan overtly and explicitly creates a connection between his extended turn (lines 26.483 to 292.648) and the content of previous discourse, by commencing with **You know and that is one of the things that Scott was saying yesterday** (lines 260.483 and 260.981). Critically, it is **You know and that** which particularly indexes this connection to preceding talk. This is perhaps, in some respects, to compensate or repair for the pause prior to Lajuan beginning to speak – that is to say, that as Lajuan’s turn does not latch to the previous turn (nor overlap) there is a need (for Lajuan) to overtly index the connection between the content of Lajuan’s turn and the preceding discourse as relative position of Lajuan’s utterance (in terms of turn-taking and sequential ordering of talk) does not immediately index such a connection. In addition to this, however, the connection between these stretches of dialogue is focused on a particular object – or rather, on two particular objects. In line 260.981, **that** refers to the preceding dialogue (the precise referent of **that** I shall return to in a moment) and the remainder of the utterance contains a person (Scott), an action performed by that person (saying) and then the remainder of **that – one of the things**. This utterance, aside from clearly establishing for the other speaker in the interaction (Cam) the connection between
subsequent and preceding discourse, contains information about this connection, and specifically identifies what concept or idea or shared understanding links Cam and Lajuan’s conversation and the following discourse.

By claiming that **that is one of the things that Scott was saying**, Lajuan is, in effect, recounting the stance act (and stance-taking) of another subject; literally claiming that Scott took a stance on the same object in alignment with Lajuan. The object in question being, looking back at the immediately preceding talk, at least arguably part of Lajaun’s preceding stance-taking act; line 258.670 **It doesn’t make you gay**. According to Lajuan, therefore, Scott is a subject – Scott can say and by saying can achieve a linguistically articulated social action equivalent to that which Lajuan has just performed. It should be emphasized that this is not to argue that Scott is a subject *per se* (or, alternatively, a subject *qua* subject) but that Lajuan’s utterance constructs the notion that Scott exists as a subject who has previously taken a stance in alignment with Lajuan. This argument therefore proposes that Lajuan’s proposition – his utterance by which he proposes the existence (as a subject) of Scott – whilst not literally creating a subject, nevertheless creates for the participants in the interaction Scott-as-subject, and simultaneously proposes the past positioning of self that Scott has performed. Lajuan, in terms of stance, does not reposition himself for the purposes of making this claim regarding Scott – the recounted stance act places the stance act as pre-existent within the emerging structures of stance. In other words, although the stance-taking act is, in this case, entirely absent\(^21\), the stance act (the social act by which a subject evaluates, aligns and positions) is understood to have occurred (or at least we can see that it is proposed by one speaker in these terms to be understood by the other) and the subject (Scotty) is thereby positioned and aligned with respect to Lajuan’s prior stance. In addition to this, as we can argue that Lajuan’s prior stance act(s) are multiplex – i.e. that there are connected and sensibly structured arrangements of stances achieved by speakers in the conversation – it is possible to suggest that Scott’s proposed positioning

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\(^{21}\) Given that the stance-taking act is defined, in this analysis, as the linguistic means by which a subject does or performs a stance act in conversation.
Lajuan’s utterance thus adopts a new significance within the context of the unfolding discourse. This utterance signals and constructs a new dimension to the stance relationships that Cam and Lajuan have previously co-constructed. Lajuan’s utterance not only connects his turn with the preceding discourse, but situates it as a part of the ongoing construction of the shared structure of stance intersubjectively and collaboratively established by Cam and Lajuan, by adding new potential vectors of alignment and intersubjectivity to the nascent stance matrix. This can be seen not only in how Scott’s position (relative to one stance object) can be understood therefore as relative to other objects that have already been positioned within the stance matrix, but in how such a stance act (and the alignment which it entails) projects forward into ensuing utterances. Lajuan’s extended turn (lines 260.483 to 292.648) constitutes (aside from the critical initial utterances) a recount of the conversation between Lajuan and Scott. In this past conversation, Lajuan and Scott discuss Scott’s brother (unnamed) and Scott’s nephew (Larry, 12 years old), and Lajuan gives examples of actions that Scott’s brother has performed in the past.

From one perspective, it might be argued that this turn contains relatively little stance-related content. It does not, for example, contain the kind of clear subject-predicate-object constructions which clearly index the stance-taker, the evaluative / positioning stance and the object. It is not my intention to argue that it does – or that it contains some substitute construction for such a stance-taking construction. As argued in the previous Chapter, speakers’ stances are not indexed solely through such clear and conventionalized constructions. In addition to this, as I have argued above, a speakers’ (to some degree) conscious conceptualization of structures of stances in conversation allows stance-taking (and by extension stance acts) without an immediately present stance-taking act. This segment of conversation shows an example of this latter phenomenon, as well as stance-taking in the sense of stance (social) acts achieved through communicative means. What this turn contains in obvious linguistic form are indexes of subjects (other speaker / people, as in the introduction of Scott, above), and
Lajuan’s self-reported speech. The latter is seen in lines 275.999 and 276.356, reproduced below.

*Extract 15 SBC 044*

275.999 and I’m like,  
276.356 (H) no that’s the way you train your kids.

This utterance achieves several objectives simultaneously. Firstly, it is reported speech – Lajuan quoting his own past conversation. In doing so, Lajuan is reporting not only the communicative form of that speech, but showing to some degree the past milieu of social actions and interactional moves that characterized that prior interaction. Thus, Lajuan not only reports that he said, using the relatively commonplace I’m like to introduce reported speech (Dailey-O’Cain, 2000), *No that’s the way you train your kids…*; this utterance is understood to have occurred within an interactional context, and hence can be seen to have (in that context) indexed Lajuan’s stance. Specifically, Lajuan disaligns with the prior speaker; by disagreeing, he positions himself in opposition to the stance taken by the previous speaker. In addition to this, however, Lajuan’s reported speech also makes relevant to the current conversation (between himself and Cam) the stance(s) previously taken in the reported speech. This is achieved by explicitly reporting the prior stance-taking that he undertook. The previous stance act constitutes a stance act in the current social context; by telling Cam that he said something (which is understood to be a stance-taking act), Lajuan takes a stance through that action. This does not, however, diminish the reported stance; Lajuan is understood to have held and to hold currently that stance. Moreover, Lajuan’s utterance is not merely ‘using’ prior stance acts to take stance in conversation; by explicitly talking of past stances, Lajuan broadens the temporal locus of stance taken in conversation; his stance is not simply here-and-now, but is clearly durable beyond the immediate context. In other words, Lajuan’s stance-taking shows that a speaking subject takes a stance, and that they may have taken a similar stance at some past time, and that stances (i.e. relative positioning of self, other and some object) are temporally

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22 It is perhaps worth noting that although I have taken ‘like’ to be quotative, it may also have a figurative use, and be used to report Lajuan’s past thought or possible response, rather than reported speech *per se*. The critical point, however, is more-or-less the same; Lajuan is reporting a past stance act.
connected with other (inter)subjective stances. Through contemporaneous stance-taking acts (such as Lajuan’s line 276.356 no that's the way you raise your kids), past stances are made relevant to the social interaction at hand.

Subjectivity – in terms of being held by the socially constructed self-as-subject – can be understood in terms of the durative and ongoing social structures and understandings by which it is constituted (cf. Bourdieu, 1990; Duranti, 1997). The intention here is to demonstrate that speakers are actively and consciously utilizing this understanding in the intersubjective constituting of stance in conversation; past stances, involving other subjects and objects, are sensibly and intentionally indexed in conversation for the purposes of the ongoing shaping and formation of structures of stance. More than just past stance-taking, but all past stances – and the implications of past stances as they are understood to interrelate through the consequential connection and ordering of objects, stances and subjects – are constitutive elements of the unfolding stance matrix as it is actively employed by speakers in conversation to co-construct their own and others’ subjectivity. This is effectively suggesting that the stance matrix, and the specific locally produced stance acts which construct it, is a micro-social mechanism by which subjectivity is encountered and understood. The ongoing work of co-constructing multiplex stance acts is therefore the local mechanism through which the subject is constituted, in terms of self-knowledge as such a subject (Foucault, 1982). This is perhaps also suggested by intersubjectivity as being constitutive of subjectivity; a subject’s subjectivity is understood in terms of the intersubjective difference between herself and others (Kärkkäinen, 2006).

5.3 Summary

Cam and Lajuan are positioned relative to multiple objects, and have stances that relate to those objects. Furthermore, Cam and Lajuan can be seen to dialogically construct intersubjective alignment. These vectors of the stance acts produce the stance matrix. This can be represented as follows:
This is not entirely a satisfactory representation of the stance matrix. Intersubjective alignment between subjects is relative to each stance, rather than as a single alignment between subjects. As I emphasized in the previous Chapter, the foundation of the stance matrix is the speaker’s understanding of each specific stance act, and this means that the relative position of other subjects is in terms of each of those stances. That is to say, that the matrix is the structure within which a subject may align on one stance, but not on the other. This is somewhat of an aside. The aim is to examine stance objects, and the relationship between objects (or, in other words, the relative positioning of those objects) in terms of stance. Similarly to the constitutive and reflexive relationship between stance-taking and stance, the stance object and the stance taken on that object should be understood in terms of being mutually constitutive. That is, by taking a particular stance – by extending subjectivity towards an object – a subject contributes to the dialectic of that object. The stance object is not simply the actual object (irrespective of that object being abstract, rather than a physical thing), but the object that has been constructed through the context in which it is deployed. This could be termed, in some sense, the metapragmatics of stance, in that by taking a particular stance on an object, the speaker implicitly contests that the stance is relevant to that object, and thereby constructs a shared understanding of that object in terms of the stance that has been taken upon it. Thus, by taking a stance on **showing physical affection**, Lajuan constructs this as a stance object. The stance and stance object are relative to one another. This suggests that the microsocial and everyday achievement of stance acts is the mechanism by which the macrosocial dialectic construction of objects (Foucault, 1972) is achieved.

Furthermore, the stance matrix has important ramifications for objects. As suggested in the prior analysis, subjects (such as Melissa and Brett) can understand the likely stance
of a subject on a particular object. Cam and Lajuan’s talk suggests that this can be accounted for by the sequential arrangement of stance-taking, in terms of connecting stance objects through the utterances which indexically construct them as objects. This implies that objects can be understood by speakers as being related to one another. This is not saying that, other than by this mechanism, speakers do not understand things that they talk about as being related to one another. What I am claiming is that objects can be seen to be related for the purposes of stance. This implies an additional layer of complexity to the stance matrix; that objects can be related to one another. Most clearly, objects can be seen to be related in terms of having the same or similar quality of stance taken on them by particular subjects, and this tendency is exploited by speakers in order to form new vectors within the emergent stance matrix – as I have argued Lajuan does in terms of showing physical affection and It doesn’t make you gay.

There is an important question raised by this analysis. I have suggested above, specifically in relation to Scott, that Lajuan introduces an additional subject into the conversation, by speaking of him and ascribing stances to him. In addition, I have argued that the stance matrix – an understandable and sensible structure of subjects, objects and stances – is actively constructed and employed by speakers in conversational interactions. The implication being that non-present (and therefore non-speaking subjects) can be understood to be part of this stance matrix, in a fashion more or less analogous to speaking subjects. This is a crucial part of the argument of this thesis; that subjects are critically different from objects, and that this difference can be observed in the achievement of stance acts in conversation. The following Chapter takes up this argument, and explores how subjects and stance are interrelated, and how subjects manage the presence and absence of other subjects in constituting the stance matrix.
Chapter 6 Subjects as objects and stance

6.1 Introduction

The following analysis is focused predominantly on SBC 045 *The Classic Hooker* (Du Bois & Englebretson, 2004), a face-to-face conversation, recorded in a living room while the speakers watch TV and consume alcohol. The speakers are Patrick, a 25 year old male and Corinna, a 26 year old female. Both speakers are from Wisconsin, USA. The transcript begins with a conversation about a mutual friend, and then moves to discussing the classic hooker. Later parts of the transcript discuss the television show that they are watching. It is the opening segment of this conversation which will be focused on in detail, during which the two friends discuss a mutual friend (and other mutual acquaintances), and the eponymous prostitute. As foreshadowed in the previous Chapter, this analysis will concern itself with how stance acts are done by speakers when talking about other people, and the introduction of subjects as part of conversation topic.

6.2 Membership categorization and stance-taking

Talking about people – about subjects – is critically different from talking about objects. Speakers engage intersubjectively with other speakers (given that speakers are also subjects). The normative vector of the stance act which relates subjects is alignment; and yet ‘evaluative’ or ‘evaluation-like’ talk about other people and individuals can occur. There are, indeed, countless examples where an apparent ‘stance’ may be taken towards another person. A stance act evaluates and positions an object relative to other subjects and their (inter)subjectivity / stance. If it is possible to argue that speakers take stances on other speakers – on other subjects – then one must logically conclude that either a stance object can encompass a subject (and that ostensibly no distinction is made between potential subjects on one hand, and objects that are not potential subjects on the other) or there are particular practices of stance-taking which show a distinction
between subjects and objects, and how an evaluation (in some stance-like manner) may occur between a subject and another subject. This is of particular importance when considering stance as instantiated subjectivity; as the means by which subjectivity is achieved in interaction. To suggest that stance is taken on a subject is inherently to suggest that that subject’s subjectivity is unimportant in that instance – the intersubjectivity of stance is mutual co-construction of a shared stance, rather than the imposition of a subject’s subjectivity onto the other. Alternatively, a subject upon whom a stance is taken could be said to be an object – that a person can be either an object or a subject (and perhaps simultaneously both, in some hypothetical circumstance). This analysis will explore how evaluation and stance are achieved with respect to other subjects in conversation, and how the notion of the subject can be seen to be, at least to some degree, irreducible and conceptualized of by speakers as distinct from objects in the stance matrix.

*The Classic Hooker* begins with Corinna asking Patrick about a mutual friend, Tom.

*Extract 16 SBC 045*

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0  PATRICK: ... (SNIFF)= .. (Hx)= Ow.
    2.471 CORINNA: .. Is he still a virgin?
    3.59  PATRICK: ... [Uh],
    4.771 CORINNA: [Just] out of cu[2riosity],
    5.457  PATRICK: [he bought a hook2]er.
    6.405 CORINNA: ... @
    7.109  PATRICK: ... But,
    7.877  PATRICK: w=as he .. a .. virgin when you knew him?
    9.735 CORINNA: (H) .. (COUGH)
   11.089  PATRICK: ... I meant,
   13.317 CORINNA: has he ever had a .. girl where he didn’t have to p=ay her.
   15.702  PATRICK: .. @Oh @oh,
   16.43  PATRICK: ... he got,
   17.747  PATRICK: .. like,
   18.047  PATRICK: .. I told you about the time he got like .. a blowjob .. at the
   22.003 CORINNA: ... No,
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This is followed by a substantial narrative (114 seconds) concerning Tom, related by Patrick. The narrative concludes with the following:

*Extract 17 SBC 045*

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111.618  PATRICK: (H) so,
112.564  PATRICK: ... I’m like,
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... <@ I know they're not @> doing what I think they're doing,
(H) and we're looking around the corner,
I couldn't see anything.
.. (H) And then all of a sudden,
I saw=,
... Tom I don't know,
took a step back or something,
and I could see Tom.
.. (H) Or something,
I don't n- know,
on= this side of the tree,
and then I saw ... a head.
Or a movement .. lower ... than what I saw Tom.
So then the picture became clear that,
(H) he's getting % head from this chick he didn't even know,
[And] that was kinda cool.
So,
... I don't know= if [he],
[S]o did he do her,
or did he just get the blowj[2ob2].
[2J2]ust the blowjob.
It's like,
.. it was getting late and she had to work in the morn[ing].
[.@]=@@@@@@@@
... But,
and that's the first chick I ever saw him with here in the United
States otherwise.
... He's only paid for it.
You know.
... Did he pay for it back home?
Or,
Yeah,
fifty bucks,
for hookers,
... <X well X>,
.. it's kind of a good price,
I mean,
(Hx)

The focus here is on Patrick’s utterance it’s kind of a good price (line 158.003, above). This is a positive evaluative stance-taking act that relates to the actions of Tom, the friend spoken of in the narrative. In addition, the entire narrative frame has a positive frame; Patrick and Corinna are amused by their friend’s (mis)adventures. The characterization of this narrative as humorous can be seen in Corinna’s laughter in response to the narrative (lines 135.674 and 145.545), as well as the interleaved laugh-quality of Patrick’s utterance in line 113.297 (although this is not intended to be an
exhaustive or at all complete account for how this narrative is constituted as amusing, but merely to demonstrate clearly how this can be seen in the conversational data itself.

Patrick’s **good price** coda (itself an introductory frame for a further sequence comparing the cost of a typical ‘date’ with **fifty bucks for hookers**) can be considered as a stance-taking act; Patrick proposes an object (the price paid for sex), and evaluates that object (**good**). He then continues:

**Extract 18 SBC 045**

159.856 PATRICK: ... nowadays here,
161.111 you’d have to like,
162.106 ... you know,
162.921 .. pay fifty bucks to go out to dinner and a movie,
164.87 and then= you have to be % real nice,
166.401 ... and then maybe just may=be,
168.203 something mi=ght happen,
169.332 i=if she likes you and,
170.675 (H) if the wind’s blowing in the right directio=n and,
174.12 (H) <WH just WH> no one tripped over anything earlier in that day,
176.78 and well,
177.165 (H) ... take fifty bucks,
179.056 go get a hooker,
179.811 and then,
180.155 .. go out <@ with your friends @> and have some fun.

This contrasts with how sex workers are talked about in the ensuing conversation.

**Extract 19 SBC 045**

182.204 CORINNA: .. Or you could always go down to= that one strip in Chicago.
185.431 PATRICK: ... What strip.
186.333 CORINNA: ... The one over %,
187.78 % .. by Crowbar?
188.828 PATRICK: ... No?
189.98 CORINNA: ... It’s like .. by the bridge?
191.816 PATRICK: ... Okay what,
193.106 .. what’s,
193.651 .. what [ah-] --
194.05 CORINNA: [There’s like] a whole strip.
195.132 That’s like that whole strip right there.
196.476 There’s all the --
196.91 % the classic <MRC type of prostitutes[= MRC]>.
199.685 PATRICK: [R]eally?
200.33 CORINNA: Yeah.
200.863 PATRICK: Hunh.
201.105 CORINNA: It’s like,
201.442 if you go in the summertime,
202.633 I m= mean it’s just l=ined with em.
204.582 PATRICK: Wow=,
205.361 .. thanks for [telling me].

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In the above extract, the critical point is the collectivization of sex workers, variously referred to as em, they and all these … these hookers. This minimizes the individuality of the sex workers; as a group, the recognition of each as an individual subject is minimized, and their categorization is foregrounded (in comparison to their existence as subjects). The term (and the pronouns referring to that term) indexes predominantly not the individuals themselves, but the category of hookers. The introduction to this exchange further demonstrates this prioritization of category over individual; the classic type of prostitute (line 196.910) introduces the description of the strip in Chicago. The classic type of prostitute is then, through the collective pronouns (lines 202.633, 208.113, 211.712), linked to line 215.711 You see all these … these hookers. This repeated collective referral and linking of two category names functions to establish the ‘prostitute’ / ‘hooker’ category; furthermore, this local membership categorization device (i.e. functioning within and endogenously produced by the immediate conversational context) is linked to a global device through the classic type pre-pended to ‘prostitute’. That is to say, that Corinna explicitly invokes some shared, sociocultural normative understanding of ‘prostitute’ in this utterance. A minor comment should be made on line 205.979, in which Corinna uses it to refer to the sex workers on the strip. Given the immediately following line is lined with em the use of the pronoun it is taken to be (self-perceived as) incorrect, and line 208.113 is an instance of self-repair.
Corinna and Patrick’s talk is not simply a case of differentiation between how ‘known people’ (i.e. friends, in this case Tom) are spoken of in conversation, as compared to non-friends, or less known people. Although the categorization of strangers could perhaps be considered more necessary in conversation, and known entities have a more-or-less unique index which is sufficient to index such shared understanding as is necessary for the conversation to occur (i.e. names), there is nevertheless an observable difference between Corinna’s category-focused talk (as in the above example) and non-identified third-parties, as shown below.

Extract 20 SBC 045

50         (H) So after Victor's,
51.484     after Tom had two women,
52.946     like,
53.308     ... fighting over who he's gonna go home with,
55.566     (H) he went home with this like uh,
57.181     .. one other girl,
58.418     like a heavy-set girl,
59.446     and,
59.667     (H) me and Janine and all of us were walking down the hill.

The central lines of this segment – 55.566 to 58.418 – show Patrick talking about an unidentified person – one other girl. The girl, as an individual, is introduced first, and subsequent descriptive information is provided (line 58.418 like a heavy-set girl). The girl is introduced as a singular, identifiable individual – one other girl – and the following description is attached the idea of an individual. Heavy-set girl could be argued to be categorizational in some sense; i.e. that such a description constitutes Patrick categorizing the girl into a category of heavy-set girl. In Patrick’s talk, the girl is introduced, and subsequently (if at all) categorized. The categorizing adds to the personhood of the girl – Patrick transforms the notion of the girl from completely generic and anonymous to a more specific individual. Girl is the initial index of the individual, and the categorization of heavy-set girl is subsequent and arguably subordinate to girl. By contrast, in Corinna’s utterances, the category is introduced first, and the collective them is used until a specific individual exemplar of the category is introduced to the conversation.

Corinna introduces two women as such categorized exemplars. The first is a woman seen in a bar (Victor’s) and the second is a woman seen on the street whilst driving
around Chicago on a visit. The first woman is introduced in lines 247.116 – 249.587 (Corinna).

**Extract 21 SBC 045**

247.116 there was a pr- --
247.606 a Russian prostitute,
248.966 in Victor’s,
249.587 on Wednesday night.

Corinna follows this with a number of utterances which can be seen to have some evaluative content. They are as follows:

**Extract 22 SBC 045**

257.676 she always dressed like an alien.
259.430 (H) And then she always looks so goofy.

**Extract 23 SBC 045**

277.161 she kinda looked like a Judy Jetson,
278.729 I mean she looked really goofy,

**Extract 24 SBC 045**

289.726 CORINNA: .. Um,
290.571 .. Mary said,
291.365 it was like,
291.670 she’s a .. prostitute,
292.868 she’s really weird too.

Corinna’s evaluative talk around the **Russian prostitute** is clearly different from Patrick’s narrative about their friend Tom; in Patrick’s earlier narrative, the evaluative utterances of the kind produced by Corinna are entirely absent. There is a distinction between Tom, as a friend, and the more anonymous woman in the bar, in that the woman in the bar could be considered to be the object of a stance act. That is to say, that there Corinna evaluates the woman (i.e. in line 278.729 **I mean she looked really goofy**), and following an understanding of the operation of stance in conversation, the woman thus evaluated occupies the ‘object’ position in the stance triangle. Tom, however, is not allocated to the object position of a triangle during Patrick’s narrative.

It is possible to see further examples of people as stance object in Corinna’s talk. Corinna introduces a second character, the **classic hooker**. The woman is introduced within a narrative frame, in which Corinna recounts a visit to her friend Rob in Chicago.

**Extract 25 SBC 045**

315.415 So we were driving around in the city and,
316.889 (H) all of a sudden we see the classic hooker.
Again, Corinna’s utterances have clear evaluative content, in line 348.478 she just looked nasty. It is possible to discern Corinna’s position relative to these women, and see that Patrick’s responses to the narrative (below, line 350.051) indexes positive alignment with the stance(s) framed within Corinna’s narrative.

This analysis would seem to suggest that speakers in conversation can take a stance on a person – that people can function either as subjects or as objects, for the purposes of stance and stance-taking. This does not, however, account for critical differences between how Tom is spoken of, and how the women are spoken of, in Corinna and Patrick’s talk. The women are not introduced as individuals per se; Corinna refers to both within a wider frame which is headed, in line 196.910, by foregrounding the category of classic type of prostitute.

This recapitulates Corinna’s stance act in terms of a stance act performed towards a category, rather than an evaluation of a subject. The stance object, in Corinna’s utterances, is the category to which the women belong, rather than the women themselves as individual subjects. The stance object is created in situ by the speakers themselves, through the operation of a membership categorization device (Sacks, 1995), which minimally consists of a member (the women), and rules for categorization (the conditions by which the member is categorized). The membership categorization device is deployed by Corinna to foreground a socially constructed, mutually understood (by the speakers) category (understood as prostitutes, or potentially female sex workers in general). The category label indexes a socially constructed notion of a particular social category in which people may be placed according to some particular characteristic of
that person. Categorization is not simply linguistic collective reference or generalization; it is a social action which has consequence for the social actors involved. Membership categorization is a mechanism by which an individual’s social identity may be established and communicated. In other words, membership categorization serves to communicate some information about a person, and to communicate and reflexively constitute the socio-cultural context of an interaction in terms of the individuals relevant to that interaction.

The individuals spoken of (the two women) are examples of the category. They are not like Tom, or (in Cam and Lajuan’s conversation explored in the previous Chapter) like Scott; the women are not primarily introduced into the conversation as subjects, but are associated with a particular category. The category-based social identity is the only information made relevant by Corinna; the conceptualization of the women-as-subjects is subsumed by the categorical identity to which they are assigned. This is not to suggest that speakers are unaware that these women might be subjects, but that they are spoken of in the immediate context in terms of the categories to which they (for Corinna and Patrick) belong, and importantly embody some conversationally relevant aspect of that category. Membership categorization foregrounds the category to which the women belong, and it is this category which is made maximally relevant to the stance act. In addition, although the stance object can be seen to be a membership category, rather than a subject, it is possible to see how stance indexes are used to mitigate the taking of stance on potential subjects. Corinna uses look, dressed like to index the stance that she takes towards two of her category prototypes; in only one instance does she use a stative verb to index stance (line 292.868 she’s / {she is}). This suggests that, even when a potential subject is to some degree ‘objectified’ through foregrounding of their membership category, there is still a distinction between people and things – between subjects and objects – made by speakers in conversation.

The women Corinna and Patrick speak of, and categorize for the purposes of evaluative stance acts, are more-or-less unknown to the speakers. Categorization is the primary, and perhaps the only, social mechanism by which they differentiate these women from all other possible women. Membership categorization, in terms of examining evaluative
stance-taking in conversation, can be seen to be deployed by speakers in situations where the individual is known as a particular and specific individual. Far from being deployed in situations where an individual’s subjectivity is unknown (as in the case of the women in the above data), membership categorization can be seen to be critical to the management of evaluative stance and other subjects. In the following data, from SBC 036 *Judgmental on people* (Du Bois & Englebretson, 2004), the participants are Lisa and Kevin (who are siblings) and Marie, who is a friend of Lisa’s. There is also a baby present; Marie is the child’s mother.

*Extract 28 SBC 036*

623.395 KEVIN: .. There's a new mayor here right?
625.067 I mean,
625.613 LISA: Yeah,
625.985 [it's um],
625.996 KEVIN: [Martinez]?
626.713 LISA: Martin Chavez.
627.137 MARIE: [2Chavez2].
627.759 LISA: <-Ke[vin doesn't] [4know=4].
628.27 KEVIN: [3@(HH) @3]
628.908 MARIE: [4Martinez4]?
629.686 KEVIN: [5(H) @5]
629.721 MARIE: [5Garcia5]?
630.534 KEVIN: @@@@@
631.195 LISA: <VOX I just know he's hispanic VOX>.
632.368 MARIE: Lu[ce]r=
632.542 KEVIN: [And there's a Martin XX].
633.543 MARIE: @@@@@
635.087 KEVIN: [2(H) So he's not quite as2] crooked as Saavedra,
635.087 MARIE: [2@= (H)2]
637.1 KEVIN: [3or3],
637.1 LISA: [3Well we3] don't know yet.
638.059 @= [4@@@@4]
638.633 KEVIN: [4You'll find out soon4].
639.641 MARIE: [H] He's kinda w- --
640.955 LISA: . You don't like him?
642.104 MARIE: .. Yeah he I li- he's kinda like,
643.418 down to earth I think.
644.555 LISA: Oh you like him,
645.103 I thought you were gonna say he's [kinda weird].
645.731 KEVIN: [Where's he from].

In line 639.641, Marie appears to attempt to perform a stance-taking act, although she terminates her utterance. It is clear from Lisa’s following utterance (line 640.955) that Marie’s utterance was expected to be a stance-taking act by other speakers; Lisa is seeking clarification of what she believes was intended to be Marie taking a stance
towards the new Mayor (introduced in line 623.395). Marie then responds, in line 642.104, with *Yeah he I li-*, to which Lisa replies (after the remainder of Marie’s utterance) indicating her understanding of Marie’s stance.

Although the above suggests that the *origo* of stance-taking in this conversation is Marie’s utterance in line 639.641, this is not, in reality, the case. Marie’s utterance is clearly a point at which Lisa at least assumes that her friend is attempting a stance-taking act, in that she responds immediately in her following utterance to seek clarification of Marie’s utterance, and indeed the phrasing of her utterance suggests that she has presupposed the stance that her friend is likely to take. Lisa’s response seeks confirmation of a likely stance, that she expects Marie to have taken, and to be attempting to index through her utterance in line 639.641. That is to say, that Lisa’s utterance can be seen to be evidence that she (as a speaker) has a conceptualization of the potential for stance acts within a given interaction, in the sense of understanding that subjects and objects are present and that stances may be taken by subjects on such objects. Both Lisa and Marie are oriented to the mutual achievement of social actions, and the presupposition that *He’s kinda w-* could be a stance-taking act springs from this mutual ongoing construction of a structured set of relationships between subjects (intersubjectivity), and between subjects and objects (stances). Lisa understands that *he*, in Marie’s utterance, indexes an object (the *new mayor*) and therefore presupposes that Marie is taking a stance towards this object. This is not to abrogate the role of anaphora in determining referent for *he*; indeed, the indexical sign-vehicle relationship is achieved to some degree as a result of such anaphora. In other words, Lisa anaphorically resolves *he* to refer to the *new mayor*, and understands that this can also index a valid stance object within an emergent mutually constituted stance matrix.

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23 This argument relies on understanding the *origo* of stance acts in a conversation, as briefly mentioned above. The *origo* for any particular stance act may be available to the participants, as in, there may be a point at which the various parts of performing a stance act are introduced into the conversation, but it is far more likely that this is not the case; indeed, the argument that I propose is that as stances are understood and deployed by speakers in conversation within the *stance matrix* (or in the process of mutually constituting and co-constructing the *stance matrix*)
This presents a situation where a person (the **new mayor**) is a stance object; Lisa and Marie’s utterances (642.104 to 644.555), as stated above, index the stance that Marie takes towards the **new mayor** (in terms of Marie taking a stance, and Lisa querying a stance that she assumes to have been taken). It can be argued, however, that the speakers are, as in the conversation between Corinna and Paul, deploying membership categories in conversation, and that the stance that Lisa and Marie take is similarly towards the category, rather than a stance on a subject. This can be seen by examining the way in which the speakers introduce and co-construct the **new mayor**, which (as will be shown) is predominantly an object, rather than a subject. The **mayor** is introduced in terms of being the **new mayor**, of occupying a category, in this case as an elected local government official. In addition, none of the speakers have clear personal knowledge of the new mayor – his name is unclear, and the information presented is that he is the **new mayor**, and that he is Hispanic (lines 623.395 and 631.195). The speakers understand this person – the **new mayor** – almost entirely in terms of the categories in which he may be and is categorized, and the categories are therefore the predominant feature of him, as a person, that is available to be included in the ongoing social interaction. It is important to note that categories and the people thus categorized are understood by speakers as individual, locally instantiated and produced deployments of membership categories and members. The **new mayor** is not merely a generic mayor – any mayor, any where – but the specific individual relevant to the context in which the social interaction occurs. By deploying membership categories in conversation, the speakers are undertaking the work of deploying sociocultural knowledge in everyday life, and furthermore creating a shared understanding of a person about whom they are talking. In short, by using category-rich terms to introduce the person – the new mayor – the speakers effectively agree to understand this person in terms of the categories that those terms invoke into the conversation (by categorizing the person to whom they are applied).

This does not fully resolve the disjunction between a subject – or at least a potential subject (the mayor) – being used as a stance object. Unlike in the conversation between Corinna and Paul, where specific individuals assigned to membership categories where predominantly exemplars of such categories, the new mayor is indisputably a specific
individual, and the speakers are clearly and plainly aware that the new mayor is a person – and furthermore, is therefore a person who could \textit{(ceteris paribus)} potentially function as a subject in a conversational interaction with any one of them. However, even given this recognition – indeed, recognition as a ‘real person’ could be said to be a necessary condition for the operation of membership categorization – personhood (i.e. the property of being an individual) does not entail subjectivity, used here to refer to the status or property of being a subject, as well as the projected and instantiated subjectivity (as a stance act) of that subject. The new mayor’s subjectivity is only in potential\textsuperscript{24} – it is a quality of \textit{irrealis} (so to speak), rather than observable or observed reality (\textit{realis}) – whereas the object properties of his person (the categories of which he is a member) are, from the perspective of ongoing construal of reality through shared sense and meaning-making from the speakers in the conversation, actual and factual. The categories are (in this conversation, the public office and supposed ethnicity of the individual) established as real and definite, foregrounding and emphasizing object aspects of an individual, whilst the subject aspects – i.e. the personal and unique qualities of the individual – are vague, undefined and, ultimately, prove unimportant to the speakers. This can be seen in the sequence of information given about the new mayor; the category is introduced first (line 623.395), and the only other definite information is ethnicity (or more precisely, a membership category aligned with and constituted along perceived ethnic differences and/or identifiable characteristics, such as name folk-etymology).

What this analysis shows is that there is a distinction made by speakers between subjects and people – people being understood as potential subjects, as real individuals, but without their subjectivity (and therefore their status as a subject) being made relevant to the conversation at hand. Whilst subjects are engaged with in terms of intersubjectivity, or are reference to shared past intersubjectivity, non-subject people are understood through the categories which define them for the speakers in the

\textsuperscript{24} As in, the mayor’s subjectivity is not made relevant by the speakers in the available conversation, and therefore the existence of such subjectivity is a matter of probability and presupposition rather than mutually oriented-to knowledge held by the speakers.
conversation. The **new mayor** is minimally sketched by the three speakers, and this is then sufficient for him to function as the object of Marie’s stance (and Lisa’s supposition of Marie’s potential stance). A potential subject can be seen to be deployed as an object through the foregrounding of categorical – and hence subject-like – features. This analysis is not, of course, particularly highlighting the notion of co-presence of subjects within interaction, and this is an important point to the conceptualization of subjects and how stance is achieved and understood by speakers in conversation. The critical point is that it is possible to see, in the analysis above, how speakers co-construct a stance object by deploying membership categorization, achieved through linguistic means, in conversation. In addition, it is possible to see how a person who is used as a stance object – a person on whom a stance is taken – is categorized prior to such stance-taking acts are performed by the speakers in conversation.

The important point is that categorization intervenes between the subjectivity of the stance-taking subject and that of the subject-as-object categorized individual. We can see that speakers manage the subjectivity of others through the use of membership categorization. This then leads to a proposition that the extent to which a subject can be placed in the position of an object is proportional to the extent to which that subject is understood to embody or exist as a category – i.e. that the more distal the relationship between two subjects, the more reliant upon categorizational information a subject will be to understand the identity of the other subject (the more that that other will be simply a member of one or more categories, rather than a fully-fledged individual), and in addition the lesser the likelihood that the first subject will engage in intersubjective interaction with the second and in addition to both of these the less that the first subject will feel the need to acknowledge and manage actual or potential intersubjectivity between him or her self and the second subject. This is of course not to argue that it is not possible for a subject to take a stance on another subject; what my analysis suggests is that it is possible for speakers to avoid doing so. Furthermore, this leads to a discussing of the nature of subjectivity and intersubjectivity and how that is managed by speakers in conversation.
Effectively, what I argue in relation to stance acts towards people is that stances are understood to be a distinct form of social act and social relationship, and are particularly held by speakers to be distinct from mutually available subjectivity (intersubjectivity). This is by no means a new observation; what is important is considering the implications of arguing that a stance can be taken only on an object, and that it is held to be distinct from the relationship between a subject and another subject. I have shown that on at least some occasions when an evaluative stance is taken towards a person (as distinct from a subject), membership categorization is deployed by speakers to reduce the extent to which they are placing subjects into an object position with the stance matrix. Occasions when a subject is placed in an object position in a stance act could easily be called objectification, with the negative connotation associated with the term fully understood and intentionally introduced. To take a stance on a subject is an activity which speakers have an option to avoid and which can be abrogated through the deployment of and orientation to category-based identities.

Category-based roles (Goffman, 1997c), and the knowledge of such roles and identities, are critically connected to the social situation (Goffman, 1997b). Membership categories are the specific operation of sociocultural knowledge in interaction; each membership category invokes shared knowledge about the category, and by extension, about the people thus categorized. In other words, categorization is part of the operationalization into a specific interaction of knowledge about the social situation (in Goffman’s terms). This suggests that categories themselves can be deployed in terms of presupposed notions of stance; the relative positioning of subjects in the interaction is part of such shared cultural knowledge and the deployment of membership categorization merely makes such knowledge relevant. Or, alternatively, the local co-construction of a category for the purposes of categorizing some person may enable speakers to co-construct stance relative to the category prior to categorizing a subject-as-object. The former, for example, although not from the CSAE data-set, in re-examining Goodwin’s (2006) stance-taking analysis of school-girl talk. In this data, Goodwin (2006) presents a girl categorizing another as a ‘dork’; this can be considered similar, to some degree, to Corinna’s hooker. The category is shared between participants and is, in Sacks’ terms (Sacks, 1995; Schegloff 2007), ‘inference-rich’, in
that the membership category invokes knowledge particular to the social situation (Goffman 1997b).

6.3 Summary

A component of the argument that I advance in favor of the stance matrix is that speakers in conversation make a distinction between subjects and objects, and that the matrix is constituted by the real (i.e. the mutually achieved indexed social actions) stances and the potential stances of subjects on available objects. The capacity of subjects to possess subjectivity and to project that outwards into the stance matrix—and hence into the social and interactional reality of other speakers—is the critical distinction between a subject and an object, and this awareness of difference defines the operation of the matrix. The need (understood as a necessity arising in conversation because of the internal desires and decisions of the speaker, rather than an externally imposed or absolute ‘need’) for subjects to take stances on other subjects can be managed through the transformation of subject to object through foregrounding of categorical identity. I would further argue that all such subject-object transformation is achieved through categorization, and that any occasion in which a subject takes a stance on such a transformed subject-as-object implicitly involves the replacement of that subject with a local category deployed by the speakers in the interaction for the purposes of that interaction. Further, large-scale (and possibly quantitative) analysis would be required to examine the extent to which this subject-object transformation is deployed by speakers; this analysis can only conclude that such transformations are possible and can be achieved through particular communicative means.
Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusion

7.1 Discussion

At the outset of this thesis, I operationalized stance as a social action. Furthermore, the stance act is defined and understood for the purposes of this thesis as the triune act whereby a subject positions the self, evaluates an object and aligns with other subjects (Du Bois, 2007; Englebretson, 2007a; Kärkkäinen, 2006). This is the fundamental orientation of this thesis that informs and lies beneath the analysis developed in the preceding Chapters; stance is a linguistically enabled social action, achieved through particular communicative means. Furthermore, fundamental to the conceptualization of stance as a social action is that the linguistic means by which it is achieved are indexes (Ochs, 1996; Silverstein, 1992; 2003; 2006) of stance; that is to say, that the communicative act of stance-taking indexically invokes the social (stance) act. Stance furthermore understood to be the instantiated and operationalized locus of subjectivity in interaction (Kärkkäinen, 2006; Kockelman, 2004). The subject (from whom subjectivity originates) is conceptualized as a social being, construed within sociocultural practices (Bourdieu, 1990; Foucault, 1972; 1982).

The central contention and research aim of this thesis is to establish that stances in conversation occur as part of a structure, formed of the vectors of stance and alignment. This structure is the stance matrix. Each subject is located within the matrix in a particular location, or node, at which there is an intersection of that subject’s stances on any object relevant to the interaction at hand, the subject’s position relative to other subjects, and the specific alignment of particular stances with other subjects. The stance matrix can be seen to be importantly related to the stance triangle (Du Bois, 2007). In Chapter 4, the stance matrix is shown to be formed through the establishment of multiple stance triangles by the speakers. In this analysis, I demonstrate that speakers actively use and respond to particular stance acts with related stance acts; subjects (speakers) can be seen to deploy stance acts that are specifically related to (through the
indexical stance-taking that achieves these stance acts) and therefore relative to other stances. Similarly, the stance matrix encompasses the complex interrelationships of multiple subjects taking stances on a particular object – in the example of Melissa, the stance matrix, as a framework for conceptualizing the relative positioning of herself, her parents and her younger brother, can be seen to encompass multiple stance triangles between each subject and every other subject, with a single object for each stance.

An important aspect of how speakers orient to structures of stance is the sequential ordering of stance-taking. In Chapter 5, the sequential deployment of object-indexes is argued to establish the connectedness of the objects and the stances taken upon them. The framework that I have proposed, and the analysis that I developed throughout Chapters 4 and 5, emphasized this relativity in terms of the subjects, objects and stances themselves – that is to say, the occupants of the social space (Bourdieu 1992), rather than the linguistic means by which they are made relevant to the interaction at hand. This may appear somewhat divergent from the approaches to sequentiality taken by Keisanen (2007) and Haddington (2006). The difference, however, is in emphasizing sequentiality of stance-taking (the linguistic means by which stance is achieved) and the resulting structural relationships between subjects and objects. This applies also to intersubjectivity (Kärkkäinen, 2006); the emphasis of the framework that I have developed across Chapters 4 and 5 is on the social orientation of speakers-as-subjects to other socially constituted subjects, and to socially constituted objects. The stance matrix is inherently compatible with the notions of sequential construction of stance and of intersubjectivity and alignment advanced by these and other studies, as the stance matrix concerns the structure which is indexed by such linguistic behavior.

This leads to the question of the stance act and the stance-taking act. Following Du Bois (2007), and Ochs (1996), stance is understood to be achieved principally by the
operation of the principle of indexicality. The communicative acts\(^{25}\) - stance-taking – that speakers use to achieve stance are indexes of stance acts. In my analysis, I have adopted a specific understanding of indexicality; following Silverstein (1992; 2003), indexicality is understood to be reflexively constitutive of social context, and the ‘space’ (in metaphoric terms) between the indexical sign-vehicle and meaning to be boundlessly large. This allows for the heterodoxy of stance-taking and the local contingency of how stance-taking is understood to index particular stances. By this I mean that speakers can be seen to use a potentially limitless variety of linguistic means to achieve stance, dependent only on the successful resolution of that particular indexical meaning-relation by other speakers. This can be seen, in particular, in Melissa’s *agree* in Chapter 4. The stance act indexed by *agree* is determined by the mutually oriented-to understanding of the indexical relationship between *agree*, as an indexical sign-vehicle, and the stance. In Chapter 5, a further implication of indexicality is proposed; the indexing of an object as a stance object is an implicit contestation (by the speaker) that the object so indexed is an object on which a particular stance can be taken. The understanding of indexicality which I have proposed, and shown to be in operation through the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5, accounts for the ways in which speakers construct objects upon which to take stances, and take stances through locally-relevant linguistic means. This supports the argument that indexicality is critical to an understanding of stance and stance-taking in conversation.

Repositioning indexicality – particularly in terms of the limitless model that I have proposed based on Silverstein (2003) and Ochs (1996) – as critical to the operation of stance in conversation raises some questions about conventionalized and grammaticalized encoding of stance, stance markers, and discourse markers as indexes of stance. Implicitly, I am arguing that stance is constructed in the immediate oriented-to context by speakers, and both the precise relationship between the subject and the

\(^{25}\) It should be reiterated, as noted throughout this thesis, that although the communicative acts in this thesis are, by virtue of the data utilized in the analysis, equivalent to spoken utterances, the theoretical position of this thesis is that communicative acts can, potentially, include both verbal and non-verbal behaviour.
object, and the means by which the stance is indexed, are constituted by such local context. Additionally, the metapragmatic (Silverstein 2003) implications of indexicality are such that the indexical meaning-relation, and the indexical object, are constructed through the operation of indexicality. This raises the question of how typologies of stance (such as in Precht, 2003; 2008) or the encoding of stance and subjectivity (Verhagen, 2005; Lempert 2008; White, 2003, among many others) fit with the stance matrix. There is perhaps no simple answer that adequately resolves the tension between the encoding (and grammaticalization) of expressions which achieve social acts, on the one hand, and the implicit local contingency of social acts on the specific here-and-now in which they are achieved, on the other. For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to say that the stance matrix is an inherently social structure that is achieved indexically by communicative means, and to acknowledge that there is, in the literature, widespread discussion of conventionalization (of one kind or another) of the communicative means that are used to index stance acts.

In Chapter 6, I consider cases in which subjects can be argued to be deployed as stance objects. This is argued to be critically important to the stance matrix and to the understanding of stance as subjectivity (Kärkkäinen, 2006; Kockelman, 2004). In the analysis of subjects-as-objects presented in Chapter 6, I argue that membership categorization (Sacks, 1995) is used by speakers to transform subjects into objects through foregrounding the social categories and/or roles (Goffman, 1997c; Sacks, 1995) to which those subjects belong. The analysis suggests that speakers are aware, more-or-less, of a difference between subjects and objects, and that the ways in which subjects and objects can be positioned relative to one another (within the stance matrix) is fundamentally different. Intersubjectivity and alignment are possible with subjects, whereas they are not with objects. This distinction is therefore made explicit through the deployment of membership categorization to deploy subjects-as-objects. This can be contrasted with the analysis of non-present subjects in Chapter 5; I argue that Lajuan introduces the subjectivity (and stance) of other subjects as being relative positions within the stance matrix. Thus, in the analysis presented in Chapter 6, non-present subjects are transformed as objects, for the purposes of taking a stance on the subject-
as-object, whereas in Chapter 5, non-present subjects are positioned relative to stances taken by the speakers (Cam and Lajuan).

Fundamentally, the stance matrix is the central outcome of my investigation of stance and stance-taking in conversation. In developing this framework, I have emphasized stance acts as social action, and stance as subjectivity. The stance matrix is an important development in conceptualizing stance in interaction because it attempts to represent the complex structure of interrelated and interdependent stance relationships that speakers orient to in social interaction. The stance matrix is a reflection of the complex milieu of subject-object relations, and intersubjectivity, against which stance is performed.

Despite the stance matrix, and the associated discussion of indexicality and membership categorization, fulfilling the research aims of this thesis, the analysis that I have presented raises some questions that are not necessarily fully resolved, and suggests future directions for research. The following section outlines some of these implications, and sketches pathways for future work on stance and social interaction.

7.2 Implications and future directions

The following section is intended to present some of the open questions, implications and future research directions that arise from the analysis and discussion hitherto conducted.

Firstly, the position that stance is the instantiated locus of subjectivity in interaction has some significant implications. If stance is understood to be subjectivity, then logically, the stance matrix is also, predominantly, subjectivity, and as a corollary to the proposal that the stance matrix includes multiple stances, can be understood to be a more complete representation of a person’s subjectivity than a single stance. This is naturally a relatively straightforward proposition, but implies that a person’s position in the stance matrix relative to multiple objects and intersubjectively aligned to multiple subjects can be considered is the realization of that person’s subjectivity, in so far as it
is made available to other subjects. This suggests that the achievement of stance is a fundamental unit of the linguistic achievement of the construction of the self and selfhood, in terms of the subject coming into being through the self-constituency of actions. In other words, by taking a stance, and by assuming a position within the stance matrix, a person actively deploys their subjectivity, and also actively constructs their self in terms of that subjectivity. To take a stance on an object is to constitute the self as a subject who can take such a stance. I do not claim that this is fully supported by the analysis underpinning the stance matrix – however, the structure of the stance matrix, particularly in terms of Foucault’s notion of the subject (Foucault, 1982), is strongly suggestive of such a conclusion. Certainly, the social construction of self through stance and stance-taking is an area that may be of significant interest for future investigation. Similarly, the mutually constitutive relationship between indexes of stance and stance acts is an area that requires further investigation, in particular the resolution of the meaning-relations between the meaning of utterances in terms of conventionalized understanding and their capacity to ‘mean’ (and achieve) social action.

I have touched upon, in the discussion of membership categorization and indexicality, the connection between the microsocial operation of social actions and interaction, and macrosocial structures and social spaces. The stance matrix, as it is ongoingly constructed by speakers, is a constantly shifting realization and co-construction of social knowledge – not only the construction of the self (as suggested above), but also of objects, and the relationships between subjects and objects. This suggests that stance acts in conversation can be seen as the microsocial realization of macrosocial structures and the microsocial foundations of the creation of such macrosocial structures and knowledge. As an individual act, a particular stance may not be considered particularly profound; the stance matrix suggests otherwise. That speakers construct complex and durative structures of specific stances suggests, at least in principle, that the broader, macrosocial stances and attitudes may be similarly constructed from the everyday stances and resultant stance matrix (matrices).

This can be extended to Du Bois’ (2007) proposition that stance has the capacity to assign ‘value’ to objects. This is to some degree also taken up by Johnstone (2007) in
terms of stance linking to local and regional identities. I have suggested that ‘value’ can be understood in terms of ‘capital’ (Bourdieu, 1992). Stance, therefore, is the exchange or trade\(^{26}\) of capital on the basis of specific objects; stance acts trade capital between subjects on the basis of objects and stances. The matrix could perhaps be recast as the stance market, whereby social capital is accumulated through the stance acts performed by a particular subject. This is to suggest that stance may shed light on the interactional construction and realization of social spaces (Bourdieu, 1989; Bourdieu, 1992), and the creation of linguistic markets for social capital. The critical future direction for research on stance is therefore to further examine the microsocial foundations of social spaces and structures, and to explore how stance in social interaction can be seen to be related to personhood and social capital.

### 7.3 Conclusion

The analysis that I have presented, in the preceding Chapters, of natural conversation in social situations, shows how speakers deploy, achieve and respond to stance acts in social interaction. I have shown how speakers use heterodox indexical expressions to index stance acts – to perform stance-taking acts – in conversation; the relationship between the indexical sign-vehicle and the stance act so indexed is locally produced by speakers in and through a particular context. I have shown that stances occur as part of a structure in conversation, involving the intersubjective relationships of aligning and disalignment between speakers and the stances that they take on objects in conversation. In relation to subjects in conversation, I have shown that a clear distinction is drawn by speakers between subjects and objects when engaged in the ongoing mutual construction of the stance matrix, and that membership categorization is deployed by speakers to effectively allow the deployment of subjects and potential subjects as stance objects. This analysis is certainly not an exhaustive catalogue of stance – or stance-taking – that can be seen to be present in the data. Nor has it intended to be so; the

\(^{26}\) Adopting Bourdieu’s (1992) market-based metaphor
intention has been to explore, through micro-analysis of conversational data, aspects of
the operation of stance in conversation.

I have argued for the *stance matrix* as a conceptual framework for stance in
conversation. As I have shown, the stance matrix is a complex structure of interrelated
vectors of stance acts that is oriented to by speakers (by subjects), minimally in terms of
stance acts, and consequently in terms of stance-taking. The stance matrix is a
theoretically boundless structure, in which potentially infinite subjects have infinitely
relative positions on all possible objects upon which they may or may not have taken a
stance. Thus, the stance matrix is the unbounded intersection of the subjectivity of all
subjects. In practice, the stance matrix is limited by the endogenous mechanisms of
conversation; it is the product of speakers’ joint efforts to make it available and
construct multiple stance triangles through stance-taking.

Finally, the stance matrix must be considered in terms of the everyday reality of social
life. Essentially, the matrix is a reification of the commonplace sociological work of
subjects as social actors. It is engaged with effortlessly, and oriented to as part of the
normative social reality. The apparent complexity of the stance matrix is illusory; at its
core, the stance matrix is an attempt to account for the ways in which people orient to
the attitudes, opinions and positions of others, and understand those opinions as being
held on different objects.
References


Appendix 1 – Transcription conventions

Units
Intonation Unit RETURN
Truncated intonation unit --
word SPACE
truncated word _

Speakers
Speaker identity/turn start :
Speech overlap [ ]

Transitional Continuity
Final .
Continuing ,
Appeal ?

Terminal Pitch Direction
Fall \
Rise /
Level -

Accent and Lengthening
Primary accent ^
Secondary accent '
Booster !
Lengthening =

Tone
Fall \
Rise /
Fall-rise \/
Rise-fall \/
Level -

Pause
Long ...(N)
Medium ...
Short ..
Latch ing (0)
Vocal Noises
Vocal noises ( )
Inhalation (H)
Exhalation (Hx)
Glottal stop %
Laughter @

Quality
Quality <Y Y>
Laugh quality <@ @>
Quotation quality <Q Q>
Multiple quality features <Y <Z Z> Y>

Phonetics
Phonetic transcription (/ /)

Transcriber's Perspective
Researcher's comments (( ))
Uncertain hearing <X X>
Indecipherable syllable X

Specialized notation
Duration (N)
Intonation unit continued &
Intonation subunit boundary |
Embedded intonation unit <| >
Reset False start < >
Codeswitching <L2 L2>

Non-transcription Lines
Comment $
Interlinear gloss $G

Reserved Symbols
Phonemic/orthographic ,
Morphosyntactic coding = * # { }
User-definable " ~ ;

For further detail see
http://projects.ldc.upenn.edu/SBCSAE/
http://www.linguistics.ucsb.edu/research/sbcorpus.html
Appendix 2 – Transcripts

SBC 019 – Doesn't work in this household

1.175 FRANK: ... (TSK) Well,
1.995 [with all--] --
1.995 MELISSA: [Not] before I gradu[late2].
3.01 FRANK: [2We12]t=
3.415 they're really concerned about these proposals on the ballot,
6.031 for next week.
7.079 ... or two weeks from now,
8.151 or whenever it is,
8.849 next week I guess.
10.177 MELISSA: ... Mom?
10.969 ... [do I] really have to go through and r- read this,
10.969 FRANK: [(SNiff)]
13.088 MELISSA: to make sure that I didn't leave out any of my sentences or
15.813 JAN: [2You2] need to make progress.
17.629 not go back over what you've already done.
19.749 MELISSA: [Okay],
20.145 because out of the eight that I've done,
22.008 ... I notice on one of them I skipped two sentences?
24.733 .. They weren't really important,
25.897 but I did skip two of em?
27.155 .. and so now I'm paranoid that I'm gonna skip a bunch more, so I have
to go back and proofread.
30.811 does it matter?
32.93 JAN: ... Not at this point,
34.048 You should be making progress.
36.237 MELISSA: ... (Hx)
36.843 Okay.
37.425 FRANK: (SNiff)
38.892 JAN: ... Your ten minutes are up.
41.291 MELISSA: ... And I've proofread the whole thing.
43.713 ... %
45.157
45.92 JAN: How many pages .. do you have [to copy].
46.997 MELISSA: [<P Excuse me P>].
47.766 .. (H) Just two more.
49.629 ... actually,
51.422 <<PAPERS>>
52.703 that.
53.215 JAN: (H) okay,
54.054 I'm gonna check on you in ten minutes,
55.893 if you haven't gotten one page done,
57.989 in ten minutes [you'll go-] --
58.688 MELISSA: [One side] of a page?
It takes me a long time, because I've got to go over the sentences, figure out, .. if I'm gonna rewrite them or leave them the same, (H) [and just] write them out.

MELISSA: I can't write them exactly the way they are, because they stink.

MELISSA: (H) I'm fine.

MELISSA: [I'm not gonna do any better] downstairs.

MELISSA: (H) I'm fine.

FRANK: [2You also have algebra2] to do.

MELISSA: I can skip algebra.

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: [I'm not gonna do any better] downstairs.

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

MELISSA: (H) I'm fine.

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

MELISSA: ... <MRC So what MRC>.

FRANK: ... ~Melissa,

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: <@ That was rude @>.

JAN: [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

MELISSA: (H) I'm fine.

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

MELISSA: .. <MRC So what MRC>.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: <@ That was rude @>.

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

MELISSA: .. <MRC So what MRC>.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: <@ That was rude @>.

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

MELISSA: (H) I'm fine.

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

MELISSA: .. <MRC So what MRC>.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: <@ That was rude @>.

JAN: .. [2you- (Hx)2] --

MELISSA: [2Alright fine2].

MELISSA: [2Nine o'clock .. in the evening2].

MELISSA: .. Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,

MELISSA: .. <MRC So what MRC>.

FRANK: You've visited with ~Ron,
MELISSA: ... <HI I didn't HI>.

BRETT: ... I know.

[don't].

MELISSA: That's actually very good lettering sir.

BRETT: (H) ... [2I know2].

JAN: [2(H)2] This is your final &

MELISSA: [3(H)3] <F<VOX> No=m VOX>,

BRETT: (H) [4you gave me F>4] another ten minutes.

JAN: & [4warning4].

No I [5didn't,]

FRANK: [5No,]

no longer5].

JAN: I have retracted it.

MELISSA: (TSK) [6(H)6]

JAN: [6You argued6] with me long enough,

I changed my mind.

MELISSA: .. Okay,

.. I= retract .. all my arguing.

I totally agree.

I should go downstairs.

Now can I stay up here?

JAN: .. No.

RON: ... (SNIFF .. (Hx) (Hx)=)

BRETT: ... Doesn't work in this household.

FRANK: ... You may use my desk.

.. Well wait a minute,

it's a royal mess,

isn't it.

MELISSA: ... Yes it is.

FRANK: You'll just have to carefully set things aside.

BRETT: (H) <SING Sym[phony]=).

FRANK: [And I'll go through the] [2piles2],

RON: [###][2(H)2][3@3]

JAN: [3we3] [4can go down there and4] [5si=t.

BRETT: [4<SING dun= da-da-dum=4],

FRANK: [4at my earliest convenience4].

BRETT: [5da-da-da-dun da-da-da=5],

JAN: .. You wanna go down there and si=t5)?

BRETT: Dun-dun-dun-dun dun da-da= SING> --

MELISSA: .. (H) [<VOX No=.

JAN: [XXXX]

MELISSA: you} guys,

.. I wanna be able to be with you VOX>.
SBC 036 – Judgmental on people

623.395 KEVIN: .. There’s a] new mayor here right?
625.067 I mean,
625.613 LISA: Yeah,
625.985 [it’s um],
625.996 KEVIN: [Martinez?]
626.713 LISA: Martin Ch[avez2].
627.759 LISA: <@ ~Ke[3vin doesn’t] @> [4know=4].
628.27 KEVIN: [3@(Hx) @3] [4004]
628.908 MARIE: [4Martinez4]?
629.686 KEVIN: [5(H) @5]
629.721 MARIE: [5Garcia5]?
630.534 KEVIN: ####
631.195 LISA: <VOX I just know he’s hispanic VOX>.
632.368 MARIE: Lu[cero=?
632.542 KEVIN: [And there’s a Martin XX=].
633.543 MARIE: ####
635.087 KEVIN: [2(H) So he’s not quite as2] crooked as Saavedra,
635.087 MARIE: [2@= (H)2]
637.1 KEVIN: [3or3],
637.1 LISA: [3Well we3] don’t know yet.
638.059 @= [4###4]
638.633 KEVIN: [4You’ll find out soon4].
639.641 MARIE: (H) He’s kinda w=--
640.955 LISA: .. You don’t like him?
642.104 MARIE: .. Yeah he I li- he’s kinda like,
643.418 down to earth I think.
644.555 LISA: Oh you like him,
645.103 I thought you were gonna say he’s [kinda weird].
645.731 KEVIN: [Where’s he from].
SBC 044 – He Knows

172.101 LAJUAN: but,
172.543 .. % .. black people also=,
174.487 th- those that have more,
175.897 tried to teach you to be stronger.
177.433 (H) But I think they instilled tried m- tried to make me so strong,
180.629 (H) that they forgo=t,
181.871 ... that I was a person.
183.489 And I mean like,
184.054 I I often feel like at times that,
186.002 (H) .. (TSK) and maybe it's the gayness coming out in me but,
189.224 ... (H) I don't like it,
191.124 like and when I was hom=me,
192.066 .. just went home to Indiana.
193.271 (H) I went to hug my sister,
195.016 .. and I still feel that she finds a coldness in hugging.
198.072 CAM: ... She doesn't like to hug.
199.297 LAJUAN: .. (H)= No.
200.056 My family's not very much hugging.
201.58 CAM: .. Oh.
201.894 LAJUAN: I mean,
202.149 my whole life,
203.115 .. we’ve never been very,
204.471 you greet someone,
205.436 you don’t s- hug them.
206.226 You’re just like <VOX hi VOX>,
206.897 how are you,
207.638 ... and even like male female.
209.833 (H) You don’t do it.
210.862 CAM: ... See uh my .. [my] mother was like that more so.
212.541 LAJUAN: [((THROAT)])
214.661 CAM: (H) And then my father was .. d=ifferent.
216.964 LAJUAN: .. Very emotional?
218.059 [Very hugging]? CAM: [Yeah],
218.701 very hugging,
219.15 they were just --
219.538 (H) .. See my [family is] more,
220.028 LAJUAN: [((THROAT)])
220.921 CAM: it's it's different.
221.955 [It's like],
221.955 LAJUAN: [Mm].
222.367 CAM: %= each member of the family is s=lightly different,
225.172 .. and different a- amount of .. touch.
227.67 LAJUAN: .. (H)= I always sai=d,
229.401 ... that if I had children,
231.196 ... I would always --
233.637 Especially if I had a son,
I would hug him, just so he knew that I loved him.

I think it’s important, I think it’s [good],

[((THROAT))]

.. I don’t think you can overly hug, .. um,

.. with family and stuff like that.

Yeah.

See and that’s how I feel,

is that,

(H) I want to hug him,

because I want him to know that I do love him.

Mhm.

.. I I I want my children,

.. if I if I ever ha=d children,

(H) to know=,

(H) ... tha=t,

there is nothing wro=ng with showing physical affection between two

men.

It doesn’t make you gay.

.. Right.

.. You know,

and that= is one of the things that ~Scott was saying yesterday,

it really bothered ~Scott a lot,

because his nephew,

(H) .. uh,

.. kept calling him Aunt ~Sco=tt.

... Because,

and his nephew was just being rude and obnoxious about every gift,

(H) .. he he unwrapped,

and his brother said,

(H) oh that’s just the way kids are today,

and I’m like,

(H) no that’s the way you train your kids.

.. (H) If you don’t train your kids to be any better,

... then they are,

and see and in ~Scott’s family,

like his brother,

his older brother’ll say,

oh ~Scott’s my best friend.

(H) But he’ll tease ~Scott about=,

oh why aren’t you married.

You know,

you must be a fa=g.

Or this,

(H) and he’ll lau=gh it off,

(H) and he doesn’t realize,

well yeah ~Scott i=s gay,

(H) and it hurts ~Scott.
CAM: He doe=sn’t know that he’s gay?

LAJUAN: (THROAT) Hm-mm.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: (THROAT) Hm-mm.

CAM: Has no idea.

LAJUAN: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: (THROAT)

LAJUAN: Has no idea.

CAM: He’s probably he’s gonna drop him off, which is why I have to close those blinds soon.

LAJUAN: Has no idea.
oh I’ll give it back,
I’m gonna invest it and I’ll give it back in three months.
(H) So,
he gives ~Scott --
.. It takes him instead,
a year and a half to pay ~Scott back.
(H) Like w- .. ~Scott’s got twenty-five thousand dollars just to lay
around.
.. Like that.
.. You know and,
(H) .. that’s the way his brother is.
.. You know very,
... and he’s just,
.. he’s just meas-n to ~Scott.
He says things to ~Scott,
.. just like,
... oh = just awful things about [gay= and].
.. why does]n’t .. ~Scott say something.
.. (TSK) (H) Because,
.. ~Scott hasn’t dealt with his gayness himself,
and he hasn’t dealt with,
... who he is.
.. And that’s why he doesn’t say anything.
So you can’t really blame the guy in [the sense] that,
[(THROAT)]
he doesn’t [2know he’s hurting him2]? 
2(H) If ~Scott2] doesn’t stick up for himself,
Right.
(H) And I [keep tell]ing ~Scott,
[(THROAT)]
you’re gonna have to say something.
[(THROAT)]
[(H)] Because all of these things are hurting you.
2<VOX Yeah=2] VOX>,
2And ~Scott2]'s like oh it doesn’t bother me,
and I’m like then why are you talking about it.
... I said i- if that would have been my nephew,
and he would have said that to me,
I’d’ve knocked him across that chair,
I don’t care how [big he was.
[<VOX @@@@@@@ VOX>
( H) %
tried pulling something on
.. We went shopping,
(H) and tried the little attitude in the in the mall.
(H) And I grabbed her and I said,
I don’t care if you are my sister’s child,
(H) ... I will knock you across that bench,
<HI in a [sec]ond HI>.

CAM: [8]
LAJUAN: I said [2I don't have to2] take that.
CAM: [20002]
LAJUAN: <X @I just it's X> --
You will never go shopping with me again.
CAM: .. $$$$$[8]
LAJUAN: [Um],
I just don't believe in it,
and I I I’m sorry,
I was not hit as a child,
but I also was not nasty,
like some kids now?
(H) He's right.
.. They do talk <X bad X>.
Some of the kids say things,
but kids always do,
but=,
(H) that's [not an] excu=se.
>ENV: (((PHONE_BEEPS)))
CAM: Exactly.
LAJUAN: .. (((THROAT)))
>ENV: (((PHONE_BEEP)))
LAJUAN: ... Hello?
... Hello=?
... What's wro=ng.
SBC 045 – Classic Hooker

0    PATRICK: ... (SNIFF) .. (Hx) .. Ow.
2.471 CORINNA: .. Is he still a virgin?
3.59  PATRICK: ... [Uh],
4.771 CORINNA: [Just] out of curiosity,
5.457 PATRICK: ... he bought a hooker.
6.405 CORINNA: ... @
7.109 PATRICK: ... But,
7.877  =as he .. a .. virgin when you knew him?
9.735 CORINNA: (H) .. (COUGH)
11.089  ... I meant,
13.317 has he ever had a .. girl where he didn't have to pay her.
15.702 PATRICK: .. @Oh @oh,
16.43  ... he got,
17.747  .. I told you about the time he got like .. a blowjob .. at the lakefront.
18.047  CORINNA: ... No,
21.174 you didn't.
22.667 PATRICK: Oh no way.
23.429 .. Um,
24.15  well what happened was,
25.11  (SNIFF)
25.431  .. I was just,
26.254  % me and Janine,
27.072  well let me .. back up here.
28.33  .. I started hanging out with Janine,
29.86  ... Janine and I got smashed,
31.69  and we .. like .. made out at the lakefront.
33.671  .. I don’t need the details.
34.558 CORINNA:  [By the] way,
35.071 I saw the Janine last night.
36.59  PATRICK: .. Oh cool,
37.283  ... (SNIFF) how’s she doing.
39.023 CORINNA: .. Okay.
39.527 PATRICK: I haven’t seen her in half a billion years,
41.082  so,
41.504  .. um=
42.908  but anyways,
43.409 we were like .. making out and stuff at Duncan lakefront,
45.345  so that’s what we regularly,
46.674  <PAR well not regularly,
47.648  did this like th .. two three times,
49.397  something like that PAR>.
50  (H) So after Victor’s,
51.484 after Tom had two women,
52.946 like,
53.308  ... fighting over who he's gonna go home with,
(H) he went home with this like uh,
.. one other girl,
like a heavy-set girl,
and,
(H) me and Janine and all of us were walking down the hill.
... You know,
going down,
... where the pier is?
... Except,
we were going down that big hill?
... And it's like uh,
... me and Janine were used to walking down that steep grassy part,
and they went around.
(H) So we hurried up and went in the grassy part,
... by the tennis courts.
(H) It was real dark,
and you couldn't see us at all,
after we had gotten .. to that little plank.
(H) So we like hurried up to this one spot we always went to,
we sat and looked around,
and Tom and them were yelling and screaming for us.
... (H) You know and they,
.. started making out,
like,
.. a hundred yards away from us.
... (SNIFF) (TSK) You know,
... but there's trees,
and they were standing,
... in front of a tree,
.. so you couldn't see them,
and we were sitting by .. like .. a tree,
(H) so you couldn't see us.
... So they were making out,
... (H) and we're sitting there talking and stuff and junk,
... and it's like,
(H) all of a sudden we hear,
... (LIPS)
... and that was just the damndest noise,
and [a very] distinctive noise,

CORINNA: [Θ]

PATRICK: (H) so,
... I'm like,
... <@ I know they're not @> doing what I think they're doing,
... (H) and we're looking around the corner,
I couldn't see anything.
... (H) And then all of a sudden,
I saw=,
... Tom I don't know,
took a step back or something,
and I could see Tom.
... (H) Or something,
I don't n- know, on this side of the tree, and then I saw ... a head. Or a movement .. lower ... than what I saw Tom. So then the picture became clear that, (H) he's getting & head from this chick he didn't even know, CORINNA: @@@[@] [And] that was kinda cool. So, ... I don't know= if [he],

PATRICK: [So] did he do her, or did he just get the blowj[2ob2].


PATRICK: It's like, .. it was getting late and she had to work in the morn[ing].

CORINNA: [0]=@@@@@@@@

PATRICK: ... But, and that's the first chick I ever saw him with here in the United States otherwise, ... He's only paid for it.

CORINNA: ... Did he pay for it back home?

PATRICK: Or, fifty bucks, for hookers, ... <X well X>, .. it's kind of a good price, I mean,

CORINNA: (Hx)

PATRICK: ... nowadays here, you'd have to like, ... you know, .. pay fifty bucks to go out to dinner and a movie, and then= you have to be % real nice, ... and then maybe just may=be, something mi=ght happen,

PATRICK: i=f she likes you and, (H) if the wind's blowing in the right directio=n and,

CORINNA: (H) <WH just WH> no one tripped over anything earlier in that day, and well,

CORINNA: (H) ... take fifty bucks,

PATRICK: go get a hooker, and then,

CORINNA: .. go out <@ with your friends @> and have some fun.

PATRICK: .. Or you could always go down to= that one strip in Chicago.

CORINNA: ... The one over %,

PATRICK: % .. by Crowbar?

CORINNA: ... No?

CORINNA: ... It's like .. by the bridge?
PATRICK: ... Okay what,
.. what's,
.. what [ah-] --
CORINNA: [There's like] a whole strip.
That's like that whole strip right there.
There's all the --
% the classic <MRC type of prostitutes[= MRC]>.

PATRICK: [R]eally?
CORINNA: Yeah.

CORINNA: [There's like] a whole strip.
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CORINNA: Yeah.

CORINNA: [There's like] a whole strip.
That's like that whole strip right there.
There's all the --
% the classic <MRC type of prostitutes[= MRC]>.
CORINNA: (H)= <VOX He was like, uh, n-o VOX>? (Hx) @@@

... (H) S=o, .. and then, .. there was, actually, there was a pr- --

a Russian prostitute, in Victor's, on Wednesday night.

PATRICK: ... Really,

I didn't see her.

CORINNA: ... She was j- --
She was like standing right by us.

... %And, .. it's cause,

Mary was like, .. oh my God,

She always dressed like an alien.

(And) And then she always looks so goofy.

PATRICK: [N]o=, I had never s- --

I didn't see her.

Where was she.

CORINNA: ... Uh, ... At the bar?

... And she had these like spandex pa- --

I mean she did look like kind of like she had a space outfit on?

... It was like ... black, and it was like the skirt flared out and shit?

And it was just, she kinda looked like a Judy Jetson,

I mean she looked really goofy,

PATRICK: No.

You gotta .. point her out .. like Wednesday.

CORINNA: .. %A=nd (Hx), .. %A=nd (Hx),

... I was like, .. oh my Go=d.

You know?

@So,

PATRICK: ... % I'll bring some extra money,

.. no?

CORINNA: .. Um,

.. Mary said,

it was like,
she's a .. prostitute,
she's really weird too.

PATRICK: ... Wow=.

.. That's kinda cool.

CORINNA: .. (TSK) Yeah so,

.. anyway,

that,

.. and then um,

.. I'll never forget the one time Rob and I went down to Chica-

.. I went .. to visit Rob in Chicago.

(H) It was a Sunday afternoon,

.. (H) it was like,

.. probably like three or four in the afternoon.

We were like,

let's take a drive around the city.

(H) You know?

Just ... for a Sunday drive.

So we were driving around in the city and,

(H) all of a sudden we see the classic hooker.

She's got,

(H) the fishnet stockings on,

obviously she's like a five-dollar hooker,

(H)

PATRICK: Yeah[=].

CORINNA: [tr]y ing to get her f- --

her afternoon f=ix.

So that she can ... go get drugs.

(H)= And she's got ... her skirt,

she had a miniskirt on.

(H) She had her sk- her hand in her s- --

She's like ... exposing her bush,

... and,

... it's like,

... you know,

Using her to=ngue and shit,

and she's like leaning,

<SM she's like come here SM>,

like this to us,

and we're like,

... uh,

.. keep driving.

@=

.. We were like,

oh= that was just nasty.

[She just] looked nasty.

PATRICK: [XX]

Wow.

Well you could've .. pulled over and said hello.

.. No but,

the only hooker I th=ought I saw,

.. okay,
I think I told you about this.

When me and Steve Greg and ... Tom went to ... like ... Chicago?

... Did I tell you about that <X one day X>?

CORINNA: <YWN Oh I love that YWN>.

.. Yeah,

PATRICK: .. X[X]

CORINNA: [I remem]ber that.

PATRICK: [2that hooker2] --

CORINNA: [2(H) It was like2],

<VOX oh come on guy=s,

I'm not a carjacker VOX>..

[..= @@ @@@]

CORINNA: ..

PATRICK: [@@]

(H) Well] yeah,

but,

.. no this hooker was kinda interesting.

(H) .. U=m,

we were pulling .. near .. Crowbar,

we were looking for --

pulling out,

(H) uh,

we saw this hooker.

... Across the street.

.. Kinda waving us over.

... A=nd I'm looking at it,

and everyone's like saying,

yeah,

pull over pull over pull over.

... You know,

and I'm like,

okay=,

this is kinda cool,

... uh=,

... s=o=,

... I'm thinking,

okay just for a joke,

we should pull over or say something.

... But the=n,

... I looked over to the right,

CORINNA: ... (COUGH)

and there's this white v=an.

... Clea=n white van,

in= .. (H) ... warehouse district.

... You know,

s=it[t]ing there,

... you know across the street from this hooker.

... And I'm like,

.. n=o=,

I'm not gonna be on Cops.

(H) Cause that's what it was.

.. And then she eventually like,
we started drive away,
(H) and then she started walking towards the white van,
<X it's a $front man X>,

... but,
then she started walking towards the white van,

... that's the only hooker we've seen.

CORINNA: ... Oh no this one,
on,

... that whole --
... It was like you know when you go --
... When you .. turn off the freeway,
by that Blockbuster,

and you turn left?

PATRICK: Mhm.

CORINNA: (H) Okay.

... It's like y- --
W- --

.. And you're going straight?

And you go over that bridge,

... just .. before you hit the bridge,
and on= the bridge,

... until you get to that street that .. you turn on Crowbar,

it's all lined with hookers,

in the summertime?

PATRICK: .. T_(Hx)

So why don't they like bust em.

CORINNA: .. No there are cops there that bust em,

PATRICK: ... They just keep going back though.

CORINNA: Yeah.

They just keep going back.

PATRICK: .. Wow[-].

CORINNA: [It's li]=ke,

now= it's too cold .. for them,

.. but,

... uh,

... otherwise .. they,

... there's like,

the whole strip is just the clas[sic type of] .. hookers.

PATRICK: [(THROAT)]

.. Thank you for the information.

CORINNA: .. You're [welcome],

PATRICK: [@@@]

... I'll sure remember that.

Next time I'm like,

... feeling kinda bored.

CORINNA: ... And once,

it was kind of funny cause uh,

.. (SNIFF) ... it was like,

all these cops are like ... there.

.. You know they're like driving,

they don't do anything.

PATRICK: ... Hm.
CORINNA: .. Some of em.

... You know they just keep driving,
you know or they'll,
(H) they'll stop,
and they'll like .. talk to the girls or whatever and,

PATRICK: .. <X Really X> cool,

CORINNA: .. and shit,

PATRICK: get lucky on duty XX.

CORINNA: ... Did you hear about that cop .. in Milwaukee?

PATRICK: Oh= yeah,

I loved that.

... That was .. h=ilarious,

... Ah who cares,

<X it's X> not me.

CORINNA: .. @@@

PATRICK: Dumbass.

... So,

... u=m,

.. like what are we doing,

we='re gonna grab some movies a=nd,

CORINNA: .. Yeah.

... [<X looks like X>],

[drink],

.. cause it's still early.

.. Cause you're too sober for me.