A PARTY IN DISARRAY: VICTORIAN LABOR AFTER THE SPLIT 1955-1965

by

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To My Parents
This thesis is my own work and was written without collaboration with any other person. It has not been used for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Political parties, as Edmund Burke saw them, were bodies of united men agreed on some particular principle promoting national interest. The demands of a mass-electorate in Western democratic societies have rendered obsolete Burke's conception of "party," except in the sense that mass political parties seek power in government and in so doing may seek to promote the national interest as they define it. The modern mass-clientele party, as it operates in Western societies, is commonly at variance with Burke's conception. Mass-clientele parties are not united bodies in Burkean terms, but rather are coalitions of interests, rarely agreed on particular principles except in the most general way. This dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the theory of mass-clientele parties operating in a predominantly two-party system. Generalizations will be suggested that may have application to mass-clientele parties per se, based on the experience of the Australian Labor Party (hereafter, ALP) in Victoria.

The three major parties with representation in
Australian parliaments, the ALP, the Liberal Party of Australia and the Country Party, are all mass-clientele parties. Each of these parties is, to a varying extent, a client of particular patrons. Each party also seeks a clientele of its own by appealing to a mass electorate.

The patrons of a mass-clientele party may be wealthy or influential supporters, or special interest groups such as farmers' organizations or, in the case of the ALP, trade unions seeking through such a party to achieve certain ends.¹ Patrons may not necessarily have any direct influence in determining party office-holders, tactics or policies, but the views of a mass-clientele party's patrons will customarily be considered by those responsible for the management of the party, the party organization, and by the party's parliamentarians.

One major concern of a mass-clientele party will obviously be the means by which such a party can command a wide clientele within a mass electorate. A theoretical framework employing concepts elaborated by Berger and

Luckmann provides a method of examining the ability of political parties in seeking to attract such a clientele. The perceptions of reality by a political party, its "reality constructs," that is to say, what things they take to be "real" (whatever their "true" ontological status) constitute a distinct symbolic universe which will influence the party's political appeal. Ideas management, in other words the marketing of an array of reality constructs to a mass electorate, are as important as the reality constructs themselves in determining a party's potential appeal. The marketing of ideas involves the creation and manipulation of a symbolic universe.

Both the reputation of a party, and its leader-image, are best expressed in terms of a symbolic universe, that is to say, a constellation of ideas with both analytical and prescriptive force. A mass-clientele party's organization, its patrons, and/or its parliamentary leadership, may maintain a symbolic universe unacceptable to a majority or a large part of the electorate. This was


3Ibid, p. 118.
a major weakness for the ALP in our period. In particular the ALP lacked a leadership with the ability to create and maintain a symbolic universe capable of sustaining support from a wide-enough spectrum of the electorate, unlike the leadership of the Liberal Party under R.G. Menzies\(^1\) who were masters at symbolic manipulation.

This Introduction has touched on some theoretical considerations relevant to a mass-clientele party. In Chapter II we will consider and examine the theoretic functions of a mass-clientele party, and proceed to an outline of the linkage between effective function fulfilment and the strengths and weaknesses of the party's patrons.

Chapter III considers the theory of mass-clientele party organization. An examination of ALP history suggests that a lack of representativeness, the extent to which a mass-clientele party is unrepresentative of its membership, is a major cause of party instability and party fracture.

Chapter IV considers the problem of "levitimacy"

\(^{1}\)Sir Robert Menzies (d. 1979) holds the honour as Australia's longest serving Prime Minister, from 1939-1941 (United Australia Party) and 1949-1966 (Liberal Country Party coalition).
in a mass-clientele party. "Legitimacy" is seen as an apparent warrant of a mass-clientele party to command electoral acceptance, as the rightful continuing corpus of a mass party. Legitimacy is also seen as relevant to the place of the party's patrons. The role of legitimacy is specifically discussed in its use as a justification by the patrons of the Victorian ALP after 1955 in their maintenance of control over the Party organization.

Chapter V considers the place of parliamentarians in a mass-clientele party, and their relationship with the party's extra-parliamentary organization. We consider whether too close a relationship between the parliamentary leadership and the party's patrons is likely to be harmful to a mass-clientele party's electoral attractiveness.

Chapter VI is a case study of conflict between a mass-clientele party and its patrons, in the course of which a Victorian ALP decision to end office-seeking at the local government level was successfully challenged by the party's patron trade unions. We consider whether office-seeking forced on a mass-clientele party by its patrons may be harmful to the party's proper operations, and whether the party's operations in office-seeking at a higher level are affected by its office-seeking in local government.
Chapter VII considers the extent to which divisions in a mass-clientele party may arise from the party's patron-client relationship. We discuss the failure of the Victorian ALP in our period to open fully its organization to middle class membership, both as a cause of Party division, and a factor in explaining the Party's failure to improve its parliamentary representation.

Chapter VIII examines the existence of a link between the patrons of a mass-clientele party and the party's electoral effectiveness. In particular we consider the effect of articulation of policies by the party's patrons, as well as the general reputation of these patrons, on the electoral popularity of the party itself. In the case of the Victorian ALP we consider the effect of domination by the Party's trade union patrons of the Party's organization, and whether such effect is of harm or benefit to the Party in its contest of parliamentary elections.

Chapter IX concludes by reviewing our general findings. We consider the relevance of these findings to the almost complete electoral failure of the Victorian ALP in our period.
Why do we employ the Victorian ALP between 1955-1965 as our example of a mass-clientele party? The question can best be answered by an examination of certain features of the Victorian ALP in our period which suggest not only that the Victorian ALP provides empirical evidence of our theoretic contentions, but that the period itself is an interesting one in which to study the operations of a trade union party in a period of rapid social change.

The Victorian ALP illustrates well a situation in which a mass-clientele party is also a client of its patrons. The Victorian ALP organization during the whole of our period was under the effective domination of its trade union patrons. Both the Party's parliamentary leadership and the Party's ordinary membership were obstructed in appealing to a mass electorate by the Party's patrons. Representatives of the ALP's trade union patrons determined Party officeholders, tactics and policies by virtue of the fact that Party Conferences, the supreme body in the State Party, were comprised of an overwhelming majority of delegates from these unions in contradistinction to Party "branch" members.

It is a belief widely held that the Victorian ALP's record of electoral failure in our period arises from domination of the Party by persons considered of the "left." Such a view is simplistic. The terms "left" and "right"
can be applied only with limited utility in Australian politics, the ALP being the major "left-of-centre" party, with a commitment to greater support for the public sector of the economy and an objective of "democratic socialism," and the Liberal Party as the major "right-of-centre" party, supporting a mixed economy and promoting "free enterprise."

To describe individual ALP members as "left" does not take into account the wide range of individual intra-Party differences on most of the more important issues. Certain prominent Party office-holders are considered "left" because of their views on foreign policy issues, or their simultaneous holding of both ALP office and office in a trade union controlled by the Communist Party. It is a fiction that such persons were in actual domination of the Victorian ALP in 1955, although their influence was undeniably strong a decade later. It is also a mistake to assume that such persons held "left" views on all issues.

A grouping of policy issues around clusters, and an examination of attitudes held by individuals in reference to particular clusters, provides a better method of analysis of the views held by Party office-holders than by employing a simple "left-right" continuum. Hughes,¹ for example,

considered three dimensions of radicalism, described as "established socio-economic radicalism," "conscience radicalism" and "defence leftism" as more appropriate measurements of radicalism in Australian political opinion than a single "left-right" dimension. These dimensions were found to be not closely related to each other, a factor of relevance to an assessment of policy positions taken by ALP office-holders in our period. Frequently these office-holders would take radical positions in one dimension, such as in "defence-leftism" issues at the end of our period when Australia committed troops to fight in the interests of a pro-American regime in South Vietnam. They would also not take radical positions in others, particularly in the case of "conscience radicalism." There was even a retreat away from "socio-economic" radical positions, especially away from support for nationalization of industries per se.

The failure of the Victorian ALP to work with systems of ideas likely to command support from a mass

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1 Hughes, op. cit., pp. 104-107.

2 Ibid, p. 124.
electorate was a major factor in the Party's record of electoral failure. We will consider, particularly in Chapter VI, the outlook of the Party as appearing old-fashioned, reflecting realities of the inner-Melbourne working class suburbs rather than the _bourgeoisement_ in our period of a mass electorate. We will also consider, particularly in Chapter VIII, the role of "ideological" rhetoric. Both the Party's patrons and its office-holders frequently used rhetoric that was heavily "ideological" in a way that was not likely to attract votes.

The nature of the ALP, as a broad coalition of the left, was a major factor in restricting the development of systems of ideas which were marketable to a mass electorate. The Party attracted its share of "left-ideologue" members who, aided by certain of the Party's patrons, promoted ideas with limited appeal. The wide differences between "left" positions were, however, responsible for much of the Party's internal disputation. The ALP tradition of conducting Party disputes in public assisted the Party's opponents because the Party often appeared to be bitterly divided. The internal affairs of the ALP were not unlike, and received as much media coverage as, those of several Victorian football clubs. Liberal Party internal disputes were, in contrast to the position in the ALP, rarely known outside the Party itself.
Liberal Party members saw benefit for their Party in refusing to discuss with the media details of Party disagreements. Liberal Party organization at all levels appeared to operate like a responsible Company "Board" engaged quietly in efficient management rather than with the petty "squabbling" that appeared to be typical of the ALP.

Why was the ALP in our period so poor in ideas management? This question, to which we suggest certain answers in our Conclusion, involves a study both of the relationship between the Party and its patrons, and of the Party itself as a party of the "left." A study of the ALP's failure to win elections in our period can aid an understanding of ideas management by other mass-clientele parties. It can also assist in an understanding of the role played by Party leadership, as well as by the mass-clientele party itself, in the symbolic manipulation of ideas for the purpose of achieving electoral success.
CHAPTER II

LABOR AS A MASS-CLIENTELE PARTY

The most important feature of mass-clientele parties relevant to electoral success is that of function fulfilment, in other words, its adequacy in meeting the aspirations of both its clients and its patrons. This Chapter will initially examine the functions which may attach to a political party and especially mass-clientele parties, considered as a special type of mass party with distinctive characteristics and features. The effectiveness of function fulfilment in a mass-clientele party is often directly linked with the strengths and weaknesses of its patron(s). Such strengths and weaknesses will be explored with respect to the Victorian ALP during the period from 1955 to 1965.

Broadly speaking, political parties in pluralistic-democratic societies, including mass-clientele parties, may fulfil three functions.

The first function, "office-seeking," entails more than the mere contest of elections. Office-seeking is
purposive in a greater degree, having as its primary goal the attainment of power.

The second function, ideology-policy articulation, involves the expression both of a party philosophy and specific objectives. It may be concerned with matters largely rhetorical, or even with pure semantic expression intended primarily for intra-party consumption as a device for the maintenance of solidarity among the party "faithful." Equally ideology-policy articulation is often expressed "outwardly" to a mass-public to win electoral majorities.

The third function, representation-participation, is concerned with the party being representative of a small clique, or of a wider cross section of its own membership, or its present adherents, or a whole electorate, as well as the extent to which the party allows membership participation in its affairs.

The way in which a mass party seeks to perform all three functions distinguishes such a party from other types of political party. A mass party is a party seeking the allegiance of a substantial plurality of electors with a reasonable expectation of actually doing so. Whether or not such a party has "patrons" is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the definition of it; however, patrons
frequently play a crucial role in attracting or repelling a mass-clientele, as we have noted above. A mass party, in its pure form, additionally possesses an open membership,¹ is a medium for political participation for a greater electorate² and seeks to practice intra-party democracy.³

A mass party, defined in terms above, therefore seeks to perform each of the three functions of office—

¹M. Duverger, Political Parties, (B. and R. North, translators), London, Methuen, Third Edition, 1964, pp. 72-74 distinguishes between mass parties, with an open membership, and cadre parties, the latter being "notable led" as parties of influential persons rather than mere numbers of persons.

²See G. Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 41-42. Sartori places emphasis on channelment, seeing a mass party in terms of demands placed on the political system by universal suffrage, a medium by which is encouraged political involvement by a mass-public. Clearly, the office-seeking function of a mass party ought to be taken into account in such a definition.

³Mass parties are thus distinguishable from "mobilist" parties. While seeking to mobilize a mass-membership in the party interest and even enjoying mass support as did the National Socialist German Workers' Party, "mobilist" parties are not mass parties in the sense that their membership requirements imply an absence of intra-party democracy, even to the extent that party members are required to pledge total loyalty to the party leadership.
seeking, ideology-policy articulation and representation-participation in such a way that will assist the mass party to become politically effective. The stress placed on each function by the Victorian ALP will be presented below as an illustration of calamitous failure.

"Clientelism" is described by Blondel as an early stage in the development of political parties, where the relationship of electors vis-a-vis their representatives is that of a patron-client, characterizing, for example, a bond by which large landowners virtually control the votes of the men they employ. Clientelism is, however, present also in modern political parties, particularly in class-based parties as well as in parties where ideology is de-emphasized. Clientelism is seen in Sicily by Belloni,


Caciagli and Matina in the "mass clientele party." The presence of clientelism or clientelistic behaviour, such as the turning of public resources to advantage by party-directed patronage, distinguishes this type of mass party, of which the Catania Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party) is a good example. In the Catania Christian Democratic Party the patron-client relationship stems from the use of public resources by party officials to perpetuate the party organization, a clientele relationship existing in the ties of local party officials with the apparatus of the state. The patron-client relationship in the ALP arises from the Party's special relationship with the trade union movement. The ALP is, in part, the client of its trade union affiliate patrons who provide the Party with finance and may control the party organization.

The Victorian ALP possesses an open membership in that most Victorian residents sympathetic to the Party may

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become due-paying members of Party branches.\(^1\) However, due-paying members have no great say in the election and control of the party organization. The ALP is organizationally dominated by affiliated trade unions rather than by delegates representing ordinary members of Party branches.\(^2\) The trade union affiliates of the Victorian ALP in our period were, in effect, patrons of even ALP parliamentary candidates by virtue of the fact that a small group of trade union officials controlled the mechanism by which the Party pre-selection\(^3\) process operated.

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\(^1\) The branch is the grass-roots organ of the ALP, the title not being capitalized to distinguish it from the ALP State organizations, which are referred to as State Branches. All ALP members are required to belong to a branch, usually in the area of their residence. For a general treatment of the branch form of party organization see Duverger, op. cit., pp. 23-27. For a treatment of ALP branches see J. Jupp, Australian Party Politics, Melbourne University Press, 1964, pp. 70-72.

\(^2\) Trade unions affiliated with each ALP State Branch pay affiliation fees, and are entitled to send delegates to Party representative bodies, calculated on their total membership. Members of unions affiliated with the ALP are sometimes regarded as "indirect" ALP members by reason of the fact that some small part of their union membership subscription is paid to the ALP as an affiliation fee. ALP branch members are considered "direct" or "ordinary" Party members.

\(^3\) The term used in Australia for candidate selection by political parties.
mass-clientele party to interest-aggregation if it is to be effective. Its ideological stance may affect the way it attempts to do so. 1 Ideology-policy articulation can itself be seen as a function of intra-party representation-participation, a measure of party democracy or a reflection on party bases of support. The representation-participation function as treated by Ostrogorski 2 and Michels 3 is one of a hierarchical party in which the mass membership have little opportunity to effect policy decisions or change party directions. The case of the ALP in the period here addressed illustrates a failure to be concerned with the contribution of particular functions to political effectiveness. The ALP required a mass-clientele, and did not obtain one sufficient for the attainment of political power.

Office-seeking by a mass party is always a question of tactics. Such tactics will normally have as their aim

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an increase in the party's parliamentary representation. The articulation of a party's ideology and policy must, if it is to be in any way effective, have some appeal to a significant number of its potential devotees. In the Australian context, emphasis on ideology is likely to be disadvantageous in terms of electoral effectiveness.\(^1\) If a party neglects the presentation of policies, resting its case largely in terms of ideological principles, then it may deny itself the support the party may need from some segment of the electorate when some specific policy, such as a promise of minimum aid or fringe benefits to Catholic schoolchildren, might be sufficient to attract such votes without alienating the mass of party loyalists. Ideology-policy articulation is concerned with the management of ideas. The management of ideas by Western mass parties in our period showed a stress, at least by the most successful of such parties, on meeting consumer expectations.\(^2\)

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\(^1\)Only nine per-cent of respondents in a survey conducted in the Melbourne outer-suburban La Trobe House of Representatives electorate gave ideological reasons as explanations of why they voted for a particular political party. See C. Burns, *Parties and People: A Survey based on the La Trobe Electorate*, Melbourne University Press, 1961, p. 121.

\(^2\)See H. Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man*, London, Sphere, 1968 (1964), esp. Ch. 2, for, inter alia, a critique of the tendency for Western mass parties to become indistinguishable from each other in their respective statements of policy.
The relationship of representation-participation to effectiveness must be examined in terms of the presence or absence of intra-party democracy\(^1\) and the sub-function of leadership influence, especially the influence of the parliamentary leadership.\(^2\) A successful mass party will normally seek to provide a magnified representation of "key" groups within the party organization in the interests of maximizing that party's electoral support.

In a minor party single-function emphasis, with a specific function the concern of the party to the exclusion of other functions, is the normal position. The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) is an example of such a minor party, with emphasis almost entirely on ideology-policy articulation.\(^3\) But a mass party must seek


\(^3\)See A. Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia*, Stanford University Press, 1969, especially pp. 163-174 for a discussion of CPA organizational problems with reference to function-fulfilment. The CPA rarely fulfils an office-seeking function by reason of the fact that no more than two or three CPA candidates contest most parliamentary elections. The CPA also is not equipped to handle a representation-participation function in any sense of embracing diverse ideological positions among CPA members. Deviant groups are more likely to leave the CPA rather than participate as members seeking to change some CPA line, as happened at various times when the CPA fractured over attitudes to both Peking and Moscow.
to fulfil all three functions. In a mass-clientele party any special patron-client relationship is of substantive significance. In the ALP disagreements about the trade union dominated organizational nature of the Party are the subject of the most important intra-Party disputes. The position in the Victorian ALP can be compared with that in the Democratic Labor Party (hereafter, DLP), a party formed as a result of a split in the ALP in 1955.¹ The DLP, initially, fulfilled all three mass party functions, and could even be considered a mass-clientele party because of its relationship with at least some trade unions. Declining electoral fortunes turned the DLP into a minor party. DLP function-emphasis reflected this change, with the DLP becoming more concerned with the single-function of ideology-policy articulation.

A general statement can be made of the three functions of mass-clientele parties relevant to the ALP in our period. Discussion of office-seeking was concerned with such matters as whether the party ought to contest elections, usually as to whether the party ought to contest every constituency in parliamentary elections, sometimes

whether the party ought to operate at a particular level, such as in local government elections, or even whether the party ought to support certain candidates in elections for officers of particular trade unions. The style of ideology-policy articulation was concerned with such issues as whether the party ought to present particular policies, policy-research, the timing and form of policy presentation, and the questions of whether greater concern ought be given to the articulation of a greater ideological component or whether policies conform to some general party philosophy. Debate on representation-participation was concerned with the way in which the dues-paying membership was represented in the party organization and the opportunities available for participation at all party levels by both the party membership as a whole or of significant segments of opinion within the membership.

While at first sight such a general statement might appear equally applicable to a pure mass party the presence of a patron-client relationship ensures a different emphasis in the case of mass-clientele parties, particularly in the case of ideology-policy articulation and representation-participation. This is illustrated in the case of the Victorian ALP by specific problems which recurred throughout our period. Ideology-policy articulation became concerned with ideological issues an increasingly middle class electorate was disposed to eschew.
Economic management issues, with wider electoral appeal, did not appear to be issues with a vital intra-Party concern. It was seen by some members as more important for the Party to be ideologically "pure." These members, and an organization like the Victorian Labor College\(^1\) which, while not affiliated to the ALP was influential within it in familiarizing many trade unionists who became prominent members of the Victorian ALP organization with Marxist notions like the theory of "surplus value." Many saw the rhetoric of theoretical Marxism as more important than issues of social reform which were of more immediate concern with the electorate.\(^2\) Representation meant essentially labour representation, of trade union intra-Party dominance, and increasingly big union intra-Party dominance. The rank and file member, the ordinary dues-paying member in the Party branches, might participate actively in Party affairs, but his participation could never be meaningful in the knowledge that the structure of the Party allowed for virtually complete trade union dominance.

\(^{1}\)See R. Campbell, A College Education, Nation, 16 March 1968, pp. 5-6. This body sought to promote "independent working class education." Its secretary, Mr Ted Tripp (d. 1979), was a Trotskyite, and many ALP members accused the College of being Trotskyist.

with trade unions. The ALP has been described as the world's archetypal Labor Party.\(^1\) The *sine qua non* in a discussion on control of Australian political Labor is the extent to which Party organization is controlled by trade unions, and the degree to which this control should be exercised by the trade union movement over both Party organization and persons elected as Labor candidates to public office. The archetypal model has proved long-lasting and change resistant.\(^2\)

ALP structure is traditionally described from the bottom, starting first with the branches and affiliated unions.\(^3\) Delegates are elected by local branch members and affiliated trade unions to Annual Conference, the governing body of the Party in each State.\(^4\) Union delegates in our


\(^4\)Trade union delegates must also be members of local branches although their allegiance as Conference delegates is to their affiliated trade union rather than to their branch.
period were in the overwhelming majority at each Annual Conference.¹ Day to day administration of the State Branch was in the hands of a State Executive, in Victoria the Victorian Central Executive (VCE) elected by Annual Conference.² Throughout our period the VCE pre-selected all Victorian ALP parliamentary and local government candidates, and possessed the power to expel or suspend ALP members subject to an appeal to Annual Conference.

Federalism complicates any simple description of ALP structure. If history had created a party of the trade unions, the federation of the six Australian Colonies in 1901 created the raison d'être for a national organization with a federal structure. The ALP is organizationally six State parties rather than one national one, yet the Federal organization has great theoretic and sometimes actual power over State Branches.


²A token number of VCE members were in fact elected other than by Annual Conference before 1966. These included two Women's Central Organizing Committee (WCOC) representatives (one before 1957), and one Young Labor Association (YLA) representative after 1964. A rule change in 1965 provided for the election of WCOC and YLA members of the VCE by Annual Conference as from 1966. Since 1970 no Administrative Committee (as the VCE was renamed) members have represented the WCOC (now disbanded) or the YLA (now Australian Young Labor).
The most important feature of ALP Federal organization\(^1\) is that of State equality.\(^2\) At times State equality has proved radical in that the smaller States "pushed" what might have been considered extreme positions, such as the adoption of socialism by Federal Conference as the Party's basic philosophy in 1921,\(^3\) or intervention into the affairs of the Victorian Branch by Federal Executive in 1964.\(^4\) State equality was also, paradoxically, conservative in that it restricted the opportunity for mass participation in the ALP's Federal organization, by the larger industrial unions.

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\(^1\)Federal Conference, until 1967 comprising six delegates from each State Branch and held biennially, is the supreme governing authority of the ALP. Between Federal Conferences a Federal Executive, until 1967 comprising two delegates from each State Branch, is responsible for the interpretation of Federal ALP policy and the administration of the Party according to Federal Conference decisions. The Federal Parliamentary ALP Leadership and the two ALP Branches in the Australian Territories were given voting rights in the ALP Federal organization in 1967.

\(^2\)The larger States of New South Wales and Victoria were, on a population basis, very much underrepresented in the ALP Federal organization. At the 1954 Census almost two-thirds of Australia's population of 8.9 million lived in New South Wales and Victoria, yet these two States were represented by only one-third of the total number of delegates to Federal Conference and Federal Executive.


\(^4\)See Murray, op. cit., pp. 194-206 for a discussion of the circumstances under which Federal Executive acted to declare the VCE then in existence to be inoperative as from February 1955.
in the more populous States as much as by the mass membership. 1

The potential powers of the ALP Federal organization are best viewed as an aspect of internal party democracy. 2 Party democracy is a relative term, the democratic or undemocratic nature of a party depending on the extent to which, given an open membership, it allows membership participation in party decision making or in party representative bodies, and the adoption of certain party procedures. 3 Aspects of Federal organization which might be considered a restriction of party democracy are "State equality" and the way in which delegates from each of the State Branches are chosen. It could be argued that Federal organization is merely an extension of the ALP organization in each State, the Federal ALP being trade union dominated by virtue of the fact that the ALP in


3Such procedures include the extent to which the party restricts the free dissemination of ideas, or the freedom of party members to criticize the actions, statements and behaviour of those in positions of party power.
each State is trade union dominated.\textsuperscript{1} While such a view is an oversimplification in view of the fact that ALP State organizations rarely agree on many of the more important issues, the fact is that the ALP's Federal organization in our period did not give the appearance of being representative of a wider Party membership.\textsuperscript{2}

The ALP seeks to portray itself as a party practising internal democracy. Such a portrayal is largely rhetorical and untrue; the Party is controlled by a small number of trade unionists rather than by its mass membership in the Party branches. The democratic forms of membership are illusory; Party control is in the hands of a small group. The Burkean notion of virtual representation, that is, that the good of both the direct branch membership and

\textsuperscript{1}With delegates to both Federal Conference and Federal Executive elected by State Conferences (other than Tasmania) under a "winner take all" voting system, whether of the majority preferential or simple majority (first past the post) variety, a State Conference majority (or in the latter case plurality) is able to elect all Federal Conference and Federal Executive delegates from that State, such delegates in general being reflections of the ruling group in the State organization.

\textsuperscript{2}The allegation by Liberal Prime Minister R.G. Menzies in 1963 that the ALP was dominated by "thirty-six faceless men" who served as delegates to ALP Federal Conference may have achieved wide credibility because the ALP's Federal Parliamentary Leadership had no right to attend meetings of Federal Conference, let alone vote, unless invited to sit in on Conference sessions. See A. Reid, The Gorton Experiment, Sydney, Shakespeare Head, 1971, pp. 94-95 and photograph opp. p. 161.
the indirect union membership could be represented by the Party executive bodies, was advanced\(^1\) but such a justification is rarely accepted by Party members other than incumbent office-holders intent on retaining power. The position of Michels, that appointment methods of party executives aim at safeguarding the dominance of some particular group,\(^2\) is represented in our period by the internal operations of the ALP.

The period 1955–1965 was a disastrous one in terms of electoral performance for Australian Labor, particularly in Victoria. This was largely the result of the attitude of the ALP in Victoria to societal change. The Victorian ALP continued to represent the forces of tradition, of organizational conservatism based on trade union dominance tempered with social radicalism. The Victorian ALP failed to respond to changes in the Victorian population, a population increasingly middle class in nature.

\(^1\)R. W. Holt, interview, 2 September 1975.

We have suggested that the effectiveness of function fulfilment in a mass-clientele party is directly linked with the strengths and weaknesses of its patron(s). This is demonstrated by the Victorian ALP in our period in several ways. In respect of ideology-policy articulation the trade union patrons forced upon the party attitudes increasingly unacceptable to a middle class electorate. The concern of the Victorian ALP's patrons was with the maintenance of a symbolic universe that appeared to be old fashioned, rather than the adaptation by the Party to the alternative symbolic universe of the growing middle class electorate.¹ In respect of representation-participation the Party's patrons were more interested in maintaining their own powerful positions in the Party organization rather than opening up the Party organization

¹The likelihood that an increasingly complex "knowledgeable society" will require different strategies by political organizations, particularly of a less ideological nature, is suggested by A.F. Davies, Essays in Political Sociology, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1972, Ch. 1.
to a wider cross-section of the Party membership.

A mass-clientele party can never be fully effective if the patrons of such a party are a hindrance to the party in its effective fulfilment of our three listed functions. A mass-clientele party desiring electoral success must be more than merely a party of its patrons. It must also be representative of party members. The following Chapter will demonstrate the consequences to a mass-clientele party of a party organization increasingly unrepresentative of the party as a whole.
CHAPTER III

FROM ROME TO UTOPIA. A REINTERPRETATION
OF THE PARTY SPLIT

The extent to which the organization of a mass-clientele party is representative of the party as a whole, and even of the wider electorate, is an important factor in the mass-clientele party's ability to remain a stable party. A lack of representativeness is seen as a de-stabilizing factor, a principal cause of party fracture. The Victorian ALP in our period is an example of a mass-clientele party with such an organization unrepresentative of the party as a whole.

In the ALP of 1955 diverse groupings within the Party structure saw themselves as inheritors of Party traditions rather than as modernizers aiming at reconciliation between these traditions and the demands of a middle class electorate. The place of trade unions in the Party was the most important of these traditions. No challenge was made in 1955 aimed at reducing trade union influence in the Victorian Party. A challenge was
made, however, aimed at reducing the power of particular unions who were seen to be dominating the Victorian ALP. These were generally larger industrial unions controlled at this time by anti-Communist ideologically committed Catholics and a small number of anti-Communist non-Catholics.

Changes did not occur in the mass-clientele nature of the Victorian ALP in 1955. Changes occurred in the Party's patrons, who changed, at least initially, from larger unions representing unskilled and semi-skilled workers to smaller, principally craft unions where union members served an apprenticeship and generally considered themselves as "skilled craftsmen" rather than mere workers. The major change in the Victorian ALP in 1955 was in the Party's base of support. The Victorian ALP would lose the support of the majority of Victorian Catholics, support which the Party had previously commanded since the days of World War One.

The place of trade unions in Party organization was seen as an important Party tradition within the ALP, at least before 1955. An equally important tradition was the Party's special relation with Irish-Australian Catholics.¹

Poor working class Irish-descended Catholics had initially turned to the ALP because the Party appeared to support them as an "out" group in Australian society. The 1916 ALP split on the issue of conscription for overseas service in World War I not only consolidated Catholic support for the Party, but ensured a Catholic majority among ALP parliamentarians and in the Party organization.

Sympathy for the cause of Irish nationalism, and the possibility that Australian conscripts might be forced to fight in Ireland by the British were, as Australian Catholics saw it, valid reasons why they should side with the ALP as the only Australian mass party opposing the use of conscripts as "cannon fodder" in Europe. The able leadership of Dr Daniel Mannix, Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne from 1917 until his death in 1963, was also important as a catalyst for political action by Catholics, an importance lasting even after Mannix's death.

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From the 1920's until even into the 1960's Catholicism and Communism were the issues capable of arousing the greatest passions in the ALP. Union control of the Party did not become an issue of great controversy before 1955, even to a growing middle class membership. Communism represented a threat to the traditions of Australian Labor, an international movement anathema to a large section of the Party, particularly to the articulate representatives of a majority Catholic membership. Labor traditions were gradualist and anti-revolutionary, ones of adaptation to social change rather than promoting overthrow of the existing social order. Egalitarian changes would result from Labor government, not revolution.¹ The adoption of socialism as an objective by the ALP in 1921 was more symbolic than of real and practical importance. ALP "socialism" was little more than a declaration that the Party was by its very nature a different party to the conservative Nationalists,² not a positive programme for the recoordination of power within society on Marxian prescriptions.

¹That the Catholic component of the Australian working class was so influential may have contributed, as Jupp appears to suggest, to the lack of working class organizations with a Marxist or anti-clerical bias in Australia, the apparent reverse of the position in many countries of western Europe. See (Jupp), Catholics in Australian Politics, op. cit., p. 131.

²The Nationalist Party was the largest non-Labor party in Australia during the 1920's.
Australian Catholic opinion was to turn in new directions. After the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922 Australian Catholics ceased to regard "Ireland" as a burning issue. Young people emerging from the Catholic educational system, maintained in Australia despite Protestant attempts at school system secularization in the 1870's, were now becoming upward mobile, increasingly entering middle class occupations and professions after the 1920's, although continuing, on the whole, to support the ALP. Influenced by such writers as G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc, and the social teachings of the various Popes, in particular the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII and *Quadragesimo Anno* of Pius XI, their outlook was less Irish nationalist and intellectually wider in character. The writings of Chesterton and Belloc promoted an alternative to monopoly capitalism, the concept of a distributist state with emphasis on individual rights and smaller-scale production. *Rerum Novarum* served as an inspiration to Catholics who desired a theory of social justice.

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3See ibid, pp. 228-235 for an abridged text of *Quadragesimo Anno*.

justice to counter Marxist and other socialist theories which were considered as Godless and anti-Christian, supporting the sanctity of private property while condemning the abuses of capitalism. The encyclical Quadragesimo Anno was published in 1931 on the fortieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum. Whilst in part a restatement of the earlier encyclical it was also clearly an indictment of economic control and organization in the hands of both the state and private corporations, a reaction to the gradual replacement of laissez faire capitalism in much of Europe and the United States by the large scale economic operations of both the state and big corporations.

The ALP's adoption of "socialism" did not present any great difficulty for the Catholic intellectuals. Nor did it evoke opposition from such Catholics like J.H. Scullin, later to become Prime Minister. Scullin strongly supported the socialist objective, but his socialism was of a very moderate kind; he did not see socialism as necessarily involving nationalization by the state. ¹ The "Blackburn Declaration" appended to the socialist objective in 1921 made ALP socialism compatible with Catholicism while the meaning of socialism could be, inter alia, so defined as to approve the ownership of private property where this did not involve exploitation. ²

¹Crisp, op. cit., pp. 278-282.
The principal result of the entry into the ALP of a growing body of educated Catholic laymen was in the development and promotion of ideas based on Catholic social teachings. In the thirties such organizations as the Campion Society were formed and the Catholic Worker newspaper was established. Activity of a practical political nature, largely against what was seen as the growing strength of Australian Communism, resulted as an outgrowth from these earlier activities which were more intellectual in nature.¹ The development of Catholic Action² probably has the greatest significance for this practical political activity. Catholic Action in Australia is dated from a Synod held in Sydney in 1937, the bishops deciding to institute an

¹J.G. Murtagh, Australia: The Catholic Chapter, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1959, pp. 171-177.

²D.J. Geaney, Catholic Action, New Catholic Encyclopedia, New York, McGraw Hill, 1967, Vol. 3, p. 262, sees Catholic Action defined at two extremes. At one extreme is any lay activity inspired by the faith, while at the other extreme Catholic Action can be considered lay activity mandated by the Hierarchy. The term Lay Apostolate is seen as embracing all lay activity, as a generic term which could be used without quibbles over terms or ecclesiastical jurisdiction. W. Ginnane, What is Catholic Action?, Melbourne University Magazine, 1955, pp. 75-93, sees Catholic Action in terms of lay activity directly under the control of the Hierarchy. Catholic Action is probably best described as lay organization sanctioned and directed by the Hierarchy.
organization of both lay persons and priests.\footnote{Ginnane, op. cit., p. 76}
Santamaria was later to become the most activist Catholic opponent of Australian Communism. The National Secretariat did not have specifically political or industrial aims, and certain organizations it established\footnote{These organizations were the Young Christian Workers, National Catholic Rural Movement, National Catholic Girls' Movement and the Young Christian Students' Movement.} were religious, humanitarian or social in nature rather than political. These organizations served, nevertheless, as bodies through which could be found convinced recruits to serve in the cause of anti-Communism.\footnote{T. C. Truman, *Catholic Action and Politics*, London, Merlin, Revised Edition, 1960 (1959), p. 108 draws sinister conclusions about the Australian Catholic Action organizations. Compare Truman with Brennan, op. cit., p. 258.}
Irish nationalism was completely irrelevant.\(^1\) Opinions in the labour movement polarized between support for the Spanish Republic by Communists and most liberals and support for the cause of Franco by most of the more articulate Catholics.

That Communism in Australia had not been an issue with Catholics before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 may have been due to the policies of Australian Communists as much as to any lack of organization among Catholics. The Communist Party was banned from affiliation with the ALP by 1924 Federal Conference, mainly because the CPA supported Comintern policy directives from Moscow which aimed at destruction of the ALP rather than the pursuing of a united policy.\(^2\) This policy of the Comintern changed in 1935, with the CPA adopting the new policy, making overtures to the ALP in the form of seeking a united front.\(^3\) The influence of the CPA increased during the 1930's as a result of the economic depression and the rise of fascism in Germany. Front organizations such


\(^2\)Davidson, op. cit., p. 30

\(^3\)Ibid, p. 75. See also McManus, op. cit., p. 20–21.
as the Unemployed Workers' Movement, Friends of the Soviet Union and the Movement Against War and Fascism provided sympathetic workers in the CPA interest, but of most importance during this period was the success of CPA candidates in many trade union elections. ¹

CPA union successes were reflected at ALP Conferences in the sense that delegates from Communist-controlled unions could be expected to support CPA policies, in particular that of a united front, at ALP Conferences. The United Front as a recognizable ALP faction won control of the ALP in New South Wales in 1939.² In 1940 the United Front, by means of a strange secretive alliance with anti-organization delegates, many of whom were opposed to what they saw as a Victorian ALP dominated by John Wren³ rather than supporters of Communist positions,

¹See Santamaria, op. cit., p. 18.

²In 1940 Federal Executive intervened to de-recognize the United Front New South Wales Branch, led by J.R. Hughes and W.P. Evans, after State Conference had passed resolutions in support of Soviet foreign policy. The Hughes-Evans State Executive continued in existence as the State Labor Party until amalgamating with the CPA in 1944. See Gollan, op. cit., p. 129.

³John Wren is said to have dominated the Victorian ALP organization until as late as 1949. Wren's operations in inner-Melbourne were probably the nearest Australian equivalent of the Tammany Hall Democratic Party machine in New York State. Wren has been the subject of three books. The most impartial towards Wren is N. Brennan, John Wren: Gambler. His Life and Times, Melbourne, Hill of Content, 1971.
came within little more than a handful of votes in their bid to win control of the Victorian ALP organization when D.R. McSween narrowly failed to unseat P.J. Kennelly as Organizing Secretary.¹

The United Front never posed a threat to the control of the ALP in Victoria after 1940, possibly because of Kennelly's organizing skill, but because of its near success certain Catholics, most notably Santamaria, decided to organize an anti-Communist political and industrial opposition. This opposition was mobilized by a secret organization formed at a meeting held on 14 August 1942 which was later to become known as the "Catholic Social Studies Movement" or simply as "the Movement."²

Initially Movement concern was with the smaller craft unions where, with small memberships, it was a fairly easy job for dedicated anti-Communists to secretly round up enough members to oust pro-Communist or Communist incumbents from union office. The beneficiary of these tactics was J.V. Stout, a non-Catholic who was under Communist threat to his position as Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council (THC). Stout cooperated

¹See McManus, op. cit., p. 21.
²Santamaria, op. cit., p. 27.
with the Movement in this scheming.  

Different tactics were required in larger industrial unions where substantial anti-Communist organization was required for Movement supporters to win control. Movement objectives in the removal of Communist officeholders were achieved in many of the larger unions by means of Industrial Groups. These Groups consisted of ALP members or supporters who contested union elections in the name of the ALP, standing as "ALP Industrial Group" candidates. The first Industrial Groups were set up in New South Wales in 1945.\(^2\) In Victoria the Groups received ALP recognition in 1946, despite opposition to their formation by Acting Secretary P.J. Kennelly.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Santamaria, op. cit., p. 28. Control of the smaller unions was important for control of the THC. Representation on the Melbourne THC favoured the smaller unions, with a maximum delegation of four permitted to any one union. This system of representation worked against the interests of the larger industrial unions who were denied a voting strength on the THC commensurate with their substantial memberships. THC representation can be contrasted with the position in the Victorian ALP, where no maximum delegate strength applied to Annual Conference. The more members a union declared for the purpose of affiliation fee payment, payable on per capita union membership, the more delegates that union sent to Annual Conference.

\(^2\)McManus, op. cit., p. 40.

\(^3\)Ibid, p. 41. Santamaria, op. cit., pp. 23-24 claims Kennelly's enthusiasm in the anti-Communist cause diminished after the conversion of his ALP office from an annually elected one to a tenured appointment in 1944.
Sentematics's organizational abilities were placed at the disposal of the Groups, and without movement support the Groups would probably not have achieved most of their successes.

In the Victorian ALP Groupers (as Group members and Group supporters became known) succeeded in removing their opponents from the VCE by 1949. The earlier attempt by the United Front to remove from influence in the Victorian ALP persons who were considered lackeys of John Wren had in fact been achieved by the Groups. The resignation of P.J. Kennelly as Acting Secretary in 1949, and his replacement by Group supporters D. Lovegrove as Secretary and F.P. McManus as Assistant Secretary meant that Groupers now dominated the Victorian ALP organization.¹

The success of the Groups led to much bitterness and resentment. Even non-Communist union officials were opposed by Group candidates, and the organization of a Group in the Clothing Trades Union added to fears in the minds of officials in other unions that they too might be the victims of Group organization.² By the 1950's the

¹Murray, op. cit., p. 31.
Groupers were so strong as to be virtually unchallengeable inside the Victorian ALP. The very strength of the Groupers was a major cause of Party disunity.

Two circumstances changed dramatically the power structure in Victoria, and provided the nucleus of an anti-Group organization within the Victorian ALP. The first was the fall-out with the Groupers by J.V. Stout. Although a supporter of the Groups before 1950, Stout may have seen Group strength as a threat to his position as THC Secretary in the same way his position had earlier been threatened by Communists.\(^1\) The second was the defeat of P.J. Kennelly for pre-selection to the Melbourne West Province of the Legislative Council in 1952.\(^2\) Kennelly had frequently been criticized by News Weekly, the Movement newspaper, for his opposition to the Groups and his alleged appeasement of Communists such as E.F. Hill while a Minister in the Cain Labor Government from 1945

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\(^1\) For a commentary on Stout's relationship with the Groupers during this period see McManus, op. cit., p. 56 and Murray, op. cit., p. 33.

\(^2\) F.P. McManus, interview, 31 January 1978, claimed Kennelly's defeat for pre-selection to be Kennelly's own fault in the sense that resentment had been built up, thereby inviting opposition, because Kennelly had intervened in other pre-selection contests in the area covered by his own seat.
to 1947.\textsuperscript{1} To deny Kennelly pre-selection was, however, probably a blunder by the Groupers in that Kennelly would now use his considerable organizing abilities with the intent of obtaining revenge.

Stout and Kennelly were the key to the end of Grouper control of the Victorian ALP. They did this by aligning three recognizable elements of the Victorian ALP against the Groupers. These elements were the older traditional Catholics, such as Kennelly, Stout's supporters, largely among the craft union majority of the THC, and the Masonic-Protestant majority of the State Parliamentary ALP led by John Cain.\textsuperscript{2}

The unity of the Stout-Kennelly-Cain elements would not of themselves be enough. Groupers from Group-controlled unions, their supporters, and younger Catholics more likely to be in tune with the Movement held firm

\textsuperscript{1}P.J. Kennelly, interview, 29 January 1976, told the writer that with Hill's support he was able to settle many strikes which would otherwise be protracted with harmful consequences to the Cain Government. See also J. Larkin, "An old Irish son of a gun still knows the score," (interview by Larkin with Kennelly), \textit{Age}, 20 August 1979.

\textsuperscript{2}S. Merrifield, interview, 31 January 1976, suggested that the Masonic Lodge has at various times been described a considerable importance in the Victorian ALP. J.D. Fitzgerald, "Federal Intervention in the Victorian Branch of the Australian Labor Party, 1970," MA thesis, La Trobe University, 1975, suggests that Masonic influence can be exaggerated (p. 28).
control of the VCE. An alliance with Communists to change the composition of union delegations to Annual Conference was unlikely to succeed, given ALP rules forbidding such collaboration between ALP members and Communists, and the strength of the Groups in many of the more important unions affiliated with the Victorian ALP.¹ The only alternative was Federal intervention which the opponents of the Groups achieved in early December 1954.² It is not intended to present a chronology of events leading to this intervention, but the main consequences for the Party arose from the form Federal intervention took, the Federal Executive resolution that the VCE would cease to exist on 26 February 1955, and that a new VCE would be elected at a Special Conference to be held on 26 and 27 February 1955, a Special Conference boycotted by the pro-Group majority of the VCE who continued in existence as a separate Victorian Labor Party.³

The declaration of a newly elected VCE on Sunday, 27 February 1955 marked a watershed in Australian Labor history. An internal power struggle for control of the Victorian ALP had ended in bitter schism, a schism which would exist Australia-wide by 1957 when two Labor parties

¹See Murray, op. cit., pp. 19-21 for a list of Victorian ALP Industrial Groups.


would exist in each State. Four theories have been used by various writers to explain the 1955 split.

Firstly, left-conspiratorial theories argue that the split resulted from Communist influence within the ALP, of Communists seeking to destroy the ALP as a political force. A sophisticated exposition of this theory is presented by E.J. Hogan.\(^1\) Left-conspiratorial theories fail, however, to distinguish between the point of controversy, that of methods used to fight Communism, and underlying causes of a less simplistic nature.\(^2\)

Secondly, theories dealing in concepts of religious schism, argue that the split was the result of the Catholic Church Hierarchy and Church-led organizations seeking to control both the ALP and the trade unions. Truman\(^3\) and Ormonde\(^4\) argue from these


\(^{2}\)B.A. Santamaria, Review of R. Murray, The Split, Australian Quarterly 45 No. 2 (June 1971) is critical of Murray for underrating the role of the Communist Party in bringing about the split (p. 101). See also C. Clark, The Next Step for Catholics, The Tablet (London), 26 May 1956, p. 493. Santamaria, seeing ideology as a more rather than less important factor in the split, is closer to a left-conspiratorial position but (like Clark), he distinguishes narrow left-conspiratorial theories from 1955 split consequences.

\(^{3}\)T.C. Truman, op. cit.

premises. So do some who were leading anti-Groupers at the time of the split.\(^1\) Kylie Tennant,\(^2\) biographer of Federal ALP Leader H.V. Evatt, saw two of the leading protagonists of the split, Federal Parliamentarians S.M. Keon and J.M. Mullens, as "armed with the sword of Catholic Action against Evatt."\(^3\) The validity of these arguments would depend on both whether the Movement could be regarded as Catholic Action, implying a mandate from the Hierarchy, or "action of Catholics"\(^4\) where individual Catholics acted in their political activities in a lay capacity only, and whether Group and Movement supporters acted in a united way in pursuit of exclusively Catholic policies. Santamaria appears to suggest, in his Bombay Examiner articles, some form of Hierarchical control over lay political activity to be desirable,\(^5\) but his position in 1956 had changed to one that a link between a lay organization designed to "carry Christian principles into political life" and the Hierarchy is not desirable.\(^6\)

\(^1\)W.T. Divers, interview, 29 August 1975.


\(^3\)Ibid, p. 256.

\(^4\)This distinction between "Catholic Action" and "action of Catholics" is made by Truman, op. cit., Ch. VIII. Truman, however, argues that the Movement was always Catholic Action in that it received such a Hierarchical mandate (p. 211).


\(^6\)Record of interview, B.A. Santamaria by A.H. Hughes, 4 December 1956.
The Movement as Catholic Action would have presented Catholics with a dilemma in that they could not have opposed the Movement and remained in good conscience with their Church. ¹ It is possible Hierarchical sanction for the Movement before 1955 may have increased the organization's effectiveness by eliminating opposition to its activities by Catholics. The Movement, however, did not enjoy the unanimous support of the Australian Hierarchy. ² Santamaria's apparent change in attitude may have been the result of differences within the Australian Hierarchy, particularly between Cardinal Gilroy in Sydney and Archbishop Mannix in Melbourne about Church support for activities of a political nature. ³ The actions of Groupers in Victoria before 1955, even of Movement members, suggest they did not vote as a disciplined body at all times on the VCE. ⁴


²See especially McManus, op. cit., pp. 128-132. B. Ryan, interview, 29 January 1977, suggested the Hierarchy in South Australia, where he had been State Secretary of the DLP in the late 1950's, provided little support for political action by Catholics in the cause of anti-Communism.

³The Movement became the National Civic Council (NCC) in 1957, the result of a decision taken in Rome that the Australian Church should not be seen to be supporting political activity.

⁴Murray, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
they did not seek to force Catholic social policy on the ALP.\(^1\) The political actions of Catholics such as Santamaria can be explained more as the actions of strong-minded individuals rather than as the agents of Rome that some of the strongest opponents of the Groups suggest.

Thirdly, the split is seen as the work of individuals motivated by a desire for power, with emphasis on the manipulators rather than the Party structure through which they operated. Evatt's press statement of 5 October 1954 in which he condemned the actions of a small minority in the Party he considered responsible for disloyal and subversive actions directed from outside the labour movement, with News Weekly appearing to act as their organ,\(^2\) is generally considered the event principally responsible for Federal Executive actions in Victoria which precipitated the 1955 split.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)A Protestant backlash may have accompanied any such attempt. Even minor issues such as free transport for children attending Catholic schools and a Land Settlement Bill in 1953 which might have enabled preferential treatment for the National Catholic Rural Movement were the subject of bitter sectarian controversy during the third Cain Government from 1952-1955. See Murray, op. cit., pp. 91-105.

\(^2\)For the text of this statement see A. Dalziel, Evatt the Enigma, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1967, pp. 168-169.

\(^3\)Ibid, p. 156.
Evatt is seen by some writers as primarily responsible for the split, or of vital importance to subsequent events affecting the split's course. Lamdon sees the split in the context of attitudes by individuals towards the groups, the result of non-cooperation between industrial Labor men and newer conservative Catholics who joined the ALP after 1945. While some individuals were important in influencing the course of events, it is also necessary to consider the greater Party through which they operated.

Fourthly, the primary cause of the split is seen as the ALP's structure, and in particular the Industrial Group appendage within that structure. Campbell saw as a major cause of disunity an insistence by Group supporters of "structural integrity," permanence in the Party structure for the Groups and their independent


operation. The major cause of disunity was not this insistence by the Groupers, but rather their very success. The Groups, considered as a part of the Movement, were seen as a party within a party, an organization trying to take over the Party as a whole, thereby threatening smaller unions and traditional members of the Party.¹

We suggest that the form taken by the 1955 ALP split cannot be explained satisfactorily in terms of existing theories. The "split" in our view is best explained in terms of non-fulfilment of the representation-participation function; significant bodies of Party opinion were not represented in the Party structure at the higher Party executive levels. The 1954 VCE majority represented chiefly "Group-supporters," the remaining members were merely a token representation of moderate non-Groupers. The exclusion of significant "out-groups," particularly of craft unionists represented on the THC, made upheaval inevitable when these "out-groups" became organized. Unionists organized by W. T. Divers, Secretary of the Municipal Employees' Union, formed the nucleus of opposition to the Groups within the Victorian ALP, an alternative to the Group-controlled VCE ready to form an alternative administration in the event of the VCE's removal from office.

¹See A. H. Hughes, Psychology and the Political Experience, op. cit., p. 23, for examples of Movement influence in the pre-1955 split Victorian ALP.
The VCE in 1954 did not represent a wide enough cross-section of the Party membership. "Group-supporters," intent on preserving their stranglehold over the Party, did not question union domination of Party Conferences or the election of the VCE by a "winner-take-all" voting system. Had the VCE represented a broader range of Party opinion, including the Melbourne THC and parliamentarians such as Senator Kennelly, those opposed to the Groups would have been less disposed towards taking actions leading to the VCE's dissolution, actions which were in fact taken, culminating in the Special Conference of February 1955.

This Chapter has demonstrated the consequences of the unrepresentative nature of a mass-clientele party's representative bodies: they are a prime cause of party fracture. The ALP in 1955 failed to learn the lessons of the previous ten years. The personnel in control of the Victorian ALP largely changed with the Special Conference of 1955 and the election of a "new" VCE, but the Party's basic problem remained the same. The post-split executive bodies of the Victorian ALP were as unrepresentative as their predecessors. The Victorian ALP after 1955 continued with the same type of mass-clientele organization, with similar de-stabilizing consequences to those which existed before 1955. This was especially so after the replacement of the "new" VCE's
initial rulers. Non-Group craft unionists who dominated the "new" VCE in 1955 were replaced within a decade by industrial domination with a "leftist" flavour. The Victorian ALP moved more into the hands of left-wing socialists. These de-stabilizing consequences will be discussed in detail in Chapter VII.

The Victorian ALP after 1955 was dominated by the Party's patrons and the issue of "legitimacy." The following Chapter will discuss both the issue of legitimacy and the relationship of legitimacy to the desire of a mass-clientele party's patrons to effect changes in the party's organization.
CHAPTER IV

UNIONS AND THE PARTY. THE COALITION OF THE LEFT

The issue of legitimacy is important to a mass-clientele party in the sense that legitimacy is the authentic warrant of such a party to command the support of a large part of the electorate. Political parties can be considered legitimate according to three requirements of legitimacy. These are legal, philosophic and "pragmatic." Each requirement will be defined and considered later. It will be suggested that the requirement for "pragmatic" legitimacy is the most important test of political legitimacy. Concern with legitimacy may be so conservative an influence on a mass-clientele party as to become a preoccupation of its patrons and to militate against its mass appeal.

From the formal beginning of the ALP's greatest split, with the existence of two Central Executives in Victoria after 27 February 1955, the most important issue for both Executives was that of "legitimacy." Each Executive claimed to be the legitimate organization of
political Labor in Victoria, the "genuine" or "official" ALP entitled to support as such from trade unions, the Party membership, and the electorate. The early concern of the "new" VCE for legitimacy led to other issues about the mass-clientele nature of the Victorian Party, of concern for the Party's trade union base and concern that the Party remained free of any taint of Grouperism rather than the real issues of increasing branch membership and electoral success. That the "new" VCE's original concern was for legitimacy helped ensure not only that the unions remained dominant in the Party, but that a part of the unions, increasingly the big industrial unions acting as a coalition of the left, were the real controllers of the Victorian ALP.

The respective claims to legitimacy of the two Executives were direct reflections on the way various groupings in the Victorian ALP went during the 1955 split. The "old" Executive and its supporters claimed legitimacy that was both legal and philosophic. The "new" VCE originally claimed its legitimacy in terms of legality, that it had been properly elected under Federal ALP rules. Legal legitimacy soon declined in importance as a concern of the "new" Executive as its members increasingly realized that the only legitimacy to matter was a pragmatic one.

Claims to legal legitimacy rest on the operation
of party rules and accepted principles of party conduct. The legal legitimacy of the two Labor parties in Victoria after 1955 depended on whether certain actions of ALP Federal Executive in 1954 were valid exercises of Party authority. The justification by the VCE majority for the boycott of the Special Conference was on the grounds that there had been a denial of justice. The VCE majority considered a "Moscow trial" had been conducted into the affairs of the Victorian Branch by Federal Executive, the Branch not being provided with a proper opportunity to defend itself against charges by Evatt that the Victorian ALP was dominated from the outside by Mr Santamaria and the Movement.¹

Certain changes to Victorian ALP rules were ordered by Federal Executive to apply to delegate selection for the 1955 Special Conference in an attempt to maximize anti-group strength at the Conference.² The VCE majority


²Trade unions, such as the Australian Workers' Union, which had disaffiliated from the Victorian ALP before 1955 would be allowed to send delegations, and trade union delegates need not be ALP members. See Murray, op. cit., pp. 205–206.
sought an injunction in the Victorian Supreme Court, restraining the ALP Federal Secretary from holding a Special Conference. ALP members in the past rarely sought the aid of the Courts in internal Party disputes, for a decision of the High Court of Australia in 1934 appeared to exclude the internal operations of the ALP from Court jurisdiction.¹ The 1955 action, Woodhouse v. Schmella,² however, is distinguishable from the 1934 case in that it related to a dispute between State and Federal authorities of the ALP regarding control of the Party in Victoria rather than an individual seeking redress for some Party action he considered to his detriment. Martin J. was sympathetic to the arguments of the VCE majority presented by counsel for Woodhouse, finding the VCE had been denied natural justice in the handling of the Evatt charges by the Federal Executive, and that in the abridgment of the VCE's tenure of office the Victorian ALP Constitution had

¹The High Court in Cameron v. Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 refused to intervene in an action by an individual, Victorian Premier E.J. Hogan, who had been denied pre-selection by the VCE because of his support, as Premier, for the Premiers' Plan, a deflationary economic plan intended to aid recovery from the economic depression of the 1930's. It was held that no action arose in this case because ALP rules did not operate to create enforceable contractual rights and duties between members of the Party. See also Crisp, op. cit., pp. 301-302.

²Unreported. For the text of the Court decision see Victorian Records, 1955. The action was brought on behalf of the VCE majority in the name of prominent Grouper and VCE member David Woodhouse. Woodhouse opposed Premier John Cain as ALP candidate for the Northcote Legislative Assembly District at the 1955 Legislative Assembly election.
been overridden in a drastic manner. He also found that
the proposed election of new Federal Conference delegates
by Special Conference was aimed to deny a right of appeal
by the VCE to ALP Federal Conference until such right had
been too late to be effective. The action of the VCE
majority in *Woodhouse v. Schmella* failed on a technicality,
that the majority of Federal Executive members were
domiciled outside Victoria and because of this their
being placed under the jurisdiction of the Court was an
impossibility. The VCE majority could, in their rejection
of certain rule changes, claim to be acting out of
principle in boycotting the Special Conference, but their
action of non-attendance assured the success of their
opponents.

In 1960 the Supreme Court of Victoria finally
decided in favour of the "old" VCE in *Cameron v. McManus*.\(^1\)
In this action the ALP Executive sought control of
Australian Labor Trust Society Ltd. Vested in the
Society, a corporate body registered under the Victorian
Companies Act, was the property of the Victorian Branch
of the ALP, estimated in 1960 to be worth £20,000.\(^2\)

\(^{1}\) *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 October 1960.
\(^{2}\) Ibid.
The action by the successors to the "new" Executive of 1955 failed. The decision of the Supreme Court in vesting control of the Society in the hands of the DLP, as the successors to the "old" VCE were now known, suggests that the "new" VCE of 1955 was not validly elected under ALP rules, and that the DLP was entitled to the property held by the Labor Trust Society as trustees for the VCE in January 1955.¹

Concern with philosophic legitimacy was more appropriate for the "new" VCE now that its legitimacy in a strict legal sense was "under a cloud" following a judgment in the Courts. Philosophic legitimacy for a political party is defined here as legitimacy deriving from the acceptance of particular political principles.² Philosophic legitimacy for a labor party is seen as a measure of whether or not it follows accepted labor principles, however these may be defined. The "new"

¹The action of D. Lovegrove as State Secretary and of Premier John Cain and the minority VCE opponents of the Special Conference boycott aided the "old" VCE (and its successors) in its claim to control of the Labor Trust Society in that by resigning from the VCE on 11 February 1955 the "old" VCE was able to claim the support of all VCE members, the members of the VCE being shareholders in the Society. When shareholders ceased to be VCE members they were required to relinquish their shares within one month.

²S.M. Lipset, *Political Man*, London, Heinemann, 1959, pp. 77-78 sees legitimacy in the sense of capacity to engender belief in its appropriateness. Philosophic legitimacy for the ALP can also be seen in these terms where Labor stalwarts believe their Party to be a "true" labor party.
VCE was perceived by Chamberlain\(^1\) in such terms. The election of the "new" VCE at the Special Conference was seen as a symbolic act to restore socialist principles.\(^2\) Premier Cain also saw the dispute in terms of philosophic legitimacy deriving from Federal Executive acting in accordance with Labor principles in the sense that the "old" VCE and its supporters rejected Federal authority.\(^3\) The "old" VCE, on the other hand, claimed to be the linear successor to the Party of Scullin and Curtin, to support principles of egalitarianism and social justice, and to be acting from principles of "fair play" which the Federal Executive was alleged to have discarded.\(^4\)

The claims to philosophic legitimacy by both Parties were of dubious merit. These claims illustrated more the reactions of individuals to the result of a bitter power struggle than any well thought out statement of Party principles. The principle of Federal authority espoused

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\(^1\) F. E. Chamberlain, *A Selection of Talks and Articles on Australian Labor Party Principles*, Perth, (ALP, Western Australia Branch), n.d. (1964). Chamberlain was Western Australia ALP State Secretary and Federal Vice-President during the upheaval of 1954, as well being a leading supporter of Dr. Evatt and Federal intervention in Victoria.

\(^2\) Ibid, p. 11 and p. 19. Chamberlain claimed "socialist principles" to be more important than the winning of parliamentary seats.

\(^3\) *Age* (Melbourne), 16 April 1955.

\(^4\) McManus, interview. J.H. Scullin and J. Curtin were respectively Labor Prime Ministers from 1929-1932 and 1941-1945.
by Cain was a justification of Federal Executive intervention. Cain was demoralized by the split, and may even have wished a compromise had been reached by the "old" Executive with the Federal ALP authorities.¹ Cain's statement, in the event to prove wrong, that the troubles of the Party would "be over in a few months" can be interpreted as such a desire for compromise and reconciliation.² Cain's inability to control events arose from the intransient attitudes of people on both sides which he was powerless to influence or even moderate. Appeals to Federal authority could not convince those who felt the exercise of such authority in calling the 1955 Special Conference to be contrary to the spirit of the ALP Constitution.

The 1955 Hobart ALP Federal Conference developed into an exercise of power aimed at legitimizing the Victorian Special Conference. In our view the question of "philosophic legitimacy" did not assume an importance at the Hobart Conference: the outcome was determined by the calculations of manipulators of votes rather than logical principled debate. Two sets of delegates from Victoria sought to attend the Conference, but the delegates elected at the Special Conference

¹F. Courtnay, interview, 26 October 1975.
²See Murray, op. cit., p. 220.
representing the "new" VCE were seated to represent Victoria, a direct contravention of a 1927 precedent when neither of two rival New South Wales (NSW) Federal Conference delegations was allowed to vote until the delegates representing States other than NSW had decided which of the two NSW delegations ought to be seated.¹

As a result of the "new" Victorian delegates being seated the Conference was boycotted by almost half the total number of credentialled delegates, including a majority of delegates from States other than Victoria. The delegates who boycotted the Hobart Conference may have made one great tactical error. Their failure to hold a rival Federal Conference may well have ended any chance of a reconciliation in Victoria.² A rival Federal Conference would have done more than precipitate an Australia-wide split. It would have forced a reassessment by moderate delegates of the actions Federal Executive had taken in Victoria. The split was restricted, at least initially, to Victoria because of this error. Events in a single State are unlikely to arouse great passions outside the State concerned unless significant groups within the ALP in more than one State see the subject in dispute as


²See esp. Santamaria, Review of The Split, op. cit., for a comment on actions by certain boycotters which resulted in a rival Conference not taking place.
affecting their own vital interests. The State organizations in all States other than Victoria would have been forced to take a position had rival Federal Conferences been held. The appearance of rival Conferences may have produced a groundswell of reaction favourable to compromise.

The Hobart Federal Conference ended any claims to philosophic legitimacy by the "old" Victorian Executive because the action of the boycotters in not holding a rival Federal Conference suggested acceptance of the very acts they regarded as unprincipled. The refusal of the boycotters strengthened the hand of the "new" Executive, which could now claim to be acting with the approval of the Party's highest organ. The principal repercussion of not holding a rival Conference was to increase the day to day powers of Federal Executive, and of Federal Secretary Chamberlain until his retirement from that position in 1963. The power of Federal Executive, both to reconstruct State Branches and exercise general control over the Party was now beyond dispute.  

The final test of political "legitimacy" was therefore "pragmatic" rather than legal or philosophic, in that the distribution of power rather than determination by

1McManus considered Chamberlain to be both the leading anti-Group tactician before the split and an implacable opponent of re-unification afterwards.

2Kennelly, interview. See also Fitzgerald, "Federal Intervention," op. cit., esp. Ch. 1.
theoretic principle determined the "rightful" inheritors of the ALP mantle. Positivists, so to speak, won the day. Pragmatic legitimacy for a party is the essence of its political existence, the vital factor in determining the extent to which a party remains a substantial entity in a political system. A party claiming a legitimacy that is either legal or philosophic may be lacking the very ingredient preventing it from achieving any more than minimal electoral success. That ingredient is a measure of acceptance. "Pragmatic legitimacy" in the case of a political party is its ability actually to sustain a high level of acceptance and so to be regarded as the "authentic" inheritor of the party's selfhood.

In the case of Australian politics and of the ALP the question of pragmatic legitimacy is one of whether the ALP can be accepted as the dominant left of centre party capable of providing an acceptable alternative to the conservatives. The ALP derives such acceptance in terms of trade union affiliation and electoral support for the Party rather than in the philosophic sense of the ALP being a party of the working class or of socialist principles. There is no question of pragmatic legitimacy not being enjoyed by the ALP while the Party both enjoys affiliation by the majority or even a substantial number of Australian trade unions, and it receives substantial support from the electorate. The claim of the ALP to
pragmatic legitimacy is further enhanced by the election of endorsed ALP candidates to public office.

The claims of the "new" VCE to pragmatic legitimacy would prove stronger as the months passed throughout 1955, despite the fact that the mass membership in the Party branches largely deserted it by remaining with the "old" Executive. Organizationally the "new" Executive would enjoy affiliation by a majority of Victorian trade unions, support from the majority of Victorian ALP parliamentarians, and superior electoral support in terms of both votes cast and seats won compared to the "old" Executive.¹ The failure of the "old" Executive to sustain representation in the Victorian Parliament in 1955, apart from the single victory in the Legislative Assembly District of Richmond and the five Legislative Councillors with terms to expire in 1958,² ended any claim it might have had to pragmatic legitimacy.

The early failure of the "old" VCE to secure

¹See C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 1890-1964, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1968, p. 493, for results of 1955 Victorian Legislative Assembly election. The ALP (led by Cain) won 20 seats with 32.6 per cent of the total vote and the ACILP (led by Barry) won 1 seat with 12.6 per cent of the total vote.

²Members of the Victorian Legislative Council are elected for 6 year terms, with one-half of the Council Membership retiring each 3 years.
pragmatic legitimacy was the vital factor in the operation and political role of both Labor parties in Victoria after 1955. The failure of the "old" VCE to secure pragmatic legitimacy was to turn the ALP into less of a Labor party because most Victorian trade unions decided not to affiliate with it. The realization that the "new" Executive had secured pragmatic legitimacy was to act as a conservative influence. The ALP was to retain its pre-1955 mass-clientele structure, a structure not only out of tune with a mass public, the support of whom the ALP would require electorally if the Party was to again hold office, but a structure which would lead increasingly into a position where the Party appeared under outside domination, direction and control. This position manifested itself in the pre-determination of Party office-holders by a small clique of union officials, control over the actions of parliamentarians, and control of Party policy. Internally the free actions of Party organs appeared restricted by a system of hierarchical control, of branches by a left-wing VCE, and in turn of the Party as a whole by a left-wing Federal Executive and Federal Conference. Increasingly after 1955 the Party appeared a representative of big unions rather than the underdog or the oppressed, an increasingly ineffective embodiment of Australia's working class hopes and traditions.

The nature of "external" direction in the ALP is in
prescriptive theory a result of the mass-clientele structure inherent in the Party's Constitution. The formal structure and even the actions of some Party spokesmen are responsible for the "image" the Party conveys of being controlled "from the outside": such an image arises from the affiliation of dominant unions. External direction was central to the way in which the post-split Victorian ALP worked. External domination was apparent in the fact that a number of union officials were elected to the VCE and saw themselves as delegates on the VCE for some greater trade union movement, not as trustees for the Party as a whole. The "real" elections took place at a secret meeting of trade union officials held several weeks prior to the Annual Conference at which the formal election of the VCE was to take place. The meeting was restricted to ALP members so that suggestions of Communist influence might be met. At a time of intense popular anti-Communism any invitation allowing Communists to take a direct part in the pre-election process would have been anathema to a large part of the electorate, and also to many ALP members.

1 One official of most, but not all, unions affiliated to the Victorian ALP was invited to the meeting. The official sent was usually the Secretary but sometimes someone other than the Secretary would attend where the Secretary was a member of a party other than the ALP or of no party. I am grateful to the late W.T. Divers for providing me with detailed information on the "pre-election" meetings.

The union ticket decided at the "pre-election" meeting, always successful in the period 1955-1970 at Victorian ALP Conferences, represented a broad coalition of the left. Initially, however, it did not result in the election of more than a few members who could be categorized as representatives of the ALP's extreme left. VCE composition must be considered in respect of three distinct periods between 1955 and 1970.

The first period lasted from 1955 until 1958. The VCE in this period was even more a coalition of non-Communist opponents of the Groups and Freemasons. The "new" VCE of 1955 was regarded by many who subsequently supported Federal intervention in the Victorian ALP as being broadly based. On the "new" Executive were represented officials of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and the Australian Council of Trade Unions, parliamentarians and officeholders in a diverse range of unions. On the other hand the "new" VCE was more representative of unionists than its predecessor elected in 1954. Exactly

1For a discussion of the difficulties in defining the terms "left" and "right" see Hughes, Psychology and the Political Experience, op. cit., p. 100. Some VCE members with "left" views on foreign policy and defence also held what might be considered reactionary views on certain moral issues.

2Prominent VCE members who were Masons included W.T. Divers, F. Courtnay, J.P. Brebner and R.W. Holt.

3For example F.N. Wilkes and John Cain, Jnr. Wilkes has been ALP Leader in the Victorian Parliament since 1977.
half, or eleven of the twenty-two VCE members elected by
the 1955 Special Conference were trade union Secretaries. ¹
The "new" VCE was equally as unrepresentative of
professionals as its predecessor, and unlike its
predecessor unrepresentative of Catholics. R.W. Holt, a
solicitor, and Senator Kennelly were respectively the only
professional and prominent Catholic on the "new" VCE.
The "new" VCE could best be described as an Executive of
anti-Catholic craft unionists.

The second period was from 1959 until 1963. This
period saw the decline of craft unionist control with a
对应的 rise in the power of the industrial left.
Significant gains by the left in the larger unions at the
expense of the Industrial Groups were reflected by gradual
changes in VCE composition. "Unity tickets," how-to-vote
cards issued in trade union elections supporting ALP
members for some positions and non-ALP members (often
Communists) for other positions became a symbol of left-
ing strength in the Victorian ALP. ² The unity tickets of
most importance in Victoria to the ALP were in the
Australian Railways Union, controlled by the Groups until
their defeat by a unity ticket in 1957, and the Melbourne
Branch of the Waterside Workers' Federation, from where

¹ALP Victorian Central Executive 1956 Annual Report

²See D. Stephens, "Unity Tickets: A Problem in
left-wing delegates elected on a unity ticket led by H. ("Curly") Rourke were prominent at ALP Conferences after 1957. ALP members, although forbidden to assist in the preparation and distribution of unity tickets, or to permit their names to appear on such tickets, did so willingly and with little risk of expulsion from the Party. Opposition to unity tickets inside the Victorian ALP was originally opportunistic, to assist the Party counter DLP allegations of association by ALP members with Communists. Such opposition to unity tickets can be seen in the token expulsion of an ALP member during the 1961 Federal election campaign. Increasingly some VCE members, including J.P. Brabner and R.W. Holt, urged stronger action, but in doing so alienated themselves from others on the VCE. Holt lost his position as State President of

1R.W. Holt, interview, 2 September 1975. Holt suggested that while certain differences existed between the Victorian and Federal ALP organizations regarding interpretation of the unity ticket ban originally imposed by Federal Executive in September 1956, the settlement of such differences was always to the satisfaction of the VCE hard-core who expressed their opposition to any ban on unity tickets in such terms as that the ALP should not intervene in the internal affairs of trade unions. The problem of finance from affiliation fees payable by "unity ticket unions" was a factor Holt suggested some VCE members took too much into consideration. See also J. Jupp, Victoria Votes: The State Election of 15 July 1961, University of Sydney (Australasian Political Studies Association), 1961, p. 26.

2See VCE Minutes, 24 November 1961. B.H. Workman was expelled after he admitted to authorizing a unity ticket in the Building Workers' Industrial Union elections with members of the Communist Party.

3Holt, interview.
the ALP in 1965, and also ceased to be a member of the VCE. Brebner retained his position on the VCE, partly because he acted as convener of the "Ticketing Committee," as the pre-election meeting had become known, but also because whatever his differences with other VCE members he was a strong supporter on the THC of the larger industrial unions in a dispute over the THC representation system which favoured the smaller craft unions.¹ In this period the Trade Union (Unionists') Defence Committee (TUDC) was formed by the more left-wing unions. While the TUDC was formed ostensibly to counter NCC influence in the trade unions in fact it acted, through its newspaper "Scope" and by the publication of leaflets, to publicize and defend VCE policies, initially from attacks by the media and the DLP, but increasingly from inside the Party.²

The third period lasted from 1963 until Federal intervention into the Victorian Branch in 1970. In this period left-wing dominance of the VCE was complete and unchallengeable. The grip on Annual Conference by TUDC unions and their allies, sympathetic delegates from branches and some minor unions, could not be broken except by Federal intervention. The appointment of


W.H. Hartley, a Western Australian protégé of Federal Secretary Chamberlain, as State Secretary of the Victorian ALP in 1963 was to provide the Branch with an articulate spokesman for such causes as opposition to state aid for denominational (largely Catholic) schools and support for anti-American defence and foreign policies. Men of 1955 such as Divers, Courtnay and Holt who, while opposed to re-union with the DLP, might have acted as a counterbalance to the extremism of some VCE members were all missing from the VCE by 1965. ¹

The move further leftward by the VCE after 1963 represented a contradiction. Such a move, even if in keeping with the majority opinion of the Victorian ALP membership, especially from younger and generally radical members opposed to conscription for the Vietnam War, was unlikely to obtain ready acceptance by the electorate at large. ² Issues such as nationalization of monopolies supported by some VCE members had no electoral appeal. ³

¹McManus, interview, explained the change in VCE personnel by 1965 as "the extreme left having got rid of the Masons."


³A representative sample of 457 Melbourne voters in 1963 found that among "tractable" (non-committed) voters the election issues, ranked in order of importance, were education, unemployment, housing, foreign policy and social services. Only a minority of all voters, 29 per cent, favoured nationalization of some monopolies. See Hughes, "Psychological Dispositions," op. cit., p. 88 and p. 92.
Nor did the support of anti-American foreign policies, highlighted by the activities of some VCE members in peace organizations frequently exposed by the DIP as fronts for the Communist Party.¹ The Victorian ALP would have appeared more electorally acceptable had it articulated such policies as the maintenance of both the American alliance and a defence connexion with Britain, and the development for Australia of an independent military defence capability.² Most of all, however, the ALP in Victoria could not appeal to the majority of Catholic voters, in part because successive VCE's were intransigent in their attitudes toward government aid for Catholic schoolchildren, but principally because the Victorian Party was under-representative of Catholics and even anti-Catholic.


²The introduction of military conscription (national service) by the Menzies Liberal Government in 1964, and the service of such conscripts in support of anti-Communist American-backed regimes in South Vietnam was reacted to in a manner principled (but not electorally popular) by both the VCE and Federal Leader A. A. Calwell, himself a VCE member after 1964. See A. A. Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not, Melbourne, Lloyd O'Neil, 1972, pp. 251-252 and C. Kiernan, Calwell: A Personal and Political Biography, Melbourne, Nelson, 1978, pp. 240-257.
Legitimacy was seen by the trade union patrons of the Victorian ALP as the right of the patron unions to exercise control over the Party. It has been demonstrated that the securing of pragmatic legitimacy by the Victorian ALP was a major factor in the insistence by the patron unions on the maintenance of this Party control. Legitimacy in the sense of the right of a mass-clientele party to command the support of a greater part of the electorate was seen by the Victorian ALP's patron unions almost as if the crucial points were that the Party's vote should exceed that of the DLP, and that the DLP should not be represented in parliament. The Party seemed relatively unconcerned with its appeal to a majority of the Victorian electorate.

The trade union patrons of the Victorian ALP in 1955 were interested in the maintenance of a symbolic universe in which the Party should as much as possible be free of Group and Movement influence. By 1965 the symbolic universe of the Party's trade union patrons were constituted by Marxian ideological propositions and virtually anti-American foreign policy conceptions. The affect of these symbolic universes on the Victorian electorate, and especially on Catholic voters who before 1955 had comprised a large part of the Victorian ALP's base of support, will be discussed in Chapter VIII. We stress, however, that the problem of
representativeness, the Party organization representing patron unions to the exclusion of both the ordinary Party members and the middle class electorate from which the Party needed to attract votes, was a problem almost ignored by the Party's trade union patrons. These patrons were more concerned with their "legitimate" position of dominance over the Party organization.

The place of parliamentarians in the organization of a mass-clientele party is as important an issue for a mass-clientele party as the party organization itself. The following Chapter will consider both the issue of the place of parliamentarians and the electoral appeal of a mass-clientele party.
CHAPTER V

SUBORDINATION OR FAILED LEADERSHIP? PARLIAMENTARIANS AND THE PARTY

Parliamentarians are a vital part of a mass-clientele party. Parliamentarians and parliamentary candidates are media through which a mass-clientele party can effectively fulfil its office-seeking function. This effective fulfilment is achieved by the party's attainment of power, either in government or by being in a position of parliamentary strength. The electoral appeal of a mass-clientele party in modern Western societies is increasingly dependent on the ability of the parliamentary leadership and party parliamentarians to determine tactics and policy independent of the party's patrons. The relationship between party electoral appeal and the ability of party parliamentarians to act independently from the party's patrons is illustrated by the ALP in general, and by the Victorian ALP in particular.

ALP parliamentarians were not completely subservient to the party's trade union patrons, but ALP parliamentarians
were largely under their influence. This Chapter will discuss initially the place of parliamentarians in the ALP. Some subordination of parliamentarians to the extra-parliamentary organization is considered customary in the ALP. Such subordination is not considered in itself to be electorally harmful. We will then discuss the issue of subordination in the Victorian ALP. It will be suggested that certain actions of the Party's trade union patrons, particularly insistence on a particular form of pre-selection, were restrictions on the ability of Victorian ALP parliamentarians to act independently of their Party's patrons.

ALP parliamentarians are expected to act as agents for their Party rather than as individuals, at least in their public articulation of policies and in the performance of their parliamentary duties. Their place is therefore always, to a degree, one of subordination to the extra-parliamentary organization in that parliamentarians are expected to espouse policies determined by the appropriate Federal or

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State Conference, or interpretations of those policies in inter-Conference periods by the appropriate Federal or State Executive. In another sense ALP parliamentarians are individually subordinate to the majority vote of Caucus, a gathering or meeting of parliamentary members of the ALP. Subordination to the extra-parliamentary organization is qualified in that the parliamentary party is rarely directed by the extra-parliamentary organization. ¹ ALP parliamentarians in general readily accept major policies adopted by Party Conferences, but usually resist interference by the extra-parliamentary organization in the adoption of particular parliamentary tactics, including when the ALP in government should implement particular policies. ²


²A decision of 1965 Annual Conference in Victoria to support an extension of hotel bar-trading hours (with closing time extended by four hours from six o'clock in the evening until ten o'clock) without a referendum bound Victorian ALP Legislative Council Members to support a Liberal Party Bill to give effect to changes recommended by a Government-sponsored Inquiry. The Country Party, at that time holding the balance of power in the Legislative Council and able with ALP support to block any Government legislation, opposed any extension of trading hours for hotels without a referendum. The ALP Conference decision ensured successful passage of the Bill, and as a result six o'clock closing of hotel bars in Victoria ended in February 1966.
The Victorian position after 1955 was one of a VCE fearful of parliamentarians and so seeking to ensure that parliamentarians always remained more than customarily subordinate to the extra-parliamentary State organization. Some VCE members\(^1\) even advocated that parliamentarians ought to be completely subservient to the extra-parliamentary organization, but placing ALP parliamentarians in this position might have harmful electoral consequences, reducing the status of the ALP from that of a mass-party to that of a minor party with a primary concern for the articulation of ideology and a lack of concern for the representation-participation function in that parliamentarians as such would have no place in Party representative bodies and little voice in the making of Party policy.

Such a degree of subordination was in some ways a question of mistrust, and supposedly a means by which the labour movement could rely on Labor parliamentarians to act in its best interests. In the 1920's Childe saw radical unionists turned politicians as having undergone an outlook change, not acting on behalf of the labour movement but having become part of a

\(^1\)Courtney, interview, suggested to the writer that J.V. Stout held strong anti-parliamentarian views such as these.
bourgeois establishment.

The workers' representative is liable to get out of touch with the rank and file that put him in the Legislature, and to think more of keeping his seat and scoring political points than of carrying out the ideals he was sent in to give effect to. 1

If such a view was representative of the common thinking of ALP members in the 1920's it was also common in the 1950's and 1960's. 2 To F.E. Chamberlain parliamentarians who cease to represent socialist or working class ideals, whatever these might be, have no place as Labor representatives in both Federal and State Parliaments. 3 Executive control of pre-selection was a means by which untrustworthy politicians could be removed from office. The possibility that pre-selection might be denied was the way by which Labor representatives in parliament could be kept honest. 4

1Childe, op. cit., p. 31.
2Many ALP members in the latter period made analogies between the outlook change of parliamentarians of humble background after their election and that of union representatives on the factory floor, the outlook of parliamentarians changing in the same way militant shop stewards promoted to factory foremen so identify with management as to be regarded as "rags" by their former comrades. The factory foreman-parliamentarian analogy ought to have some place in ALP folk-lore given its frequent resurrection among left-leaning unionist members at ALP branch meetings attended by the writer in the early 1960's.
3Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 5.
4A sitting ALP Member defeated for pre-selection will almost always be defeated if he recontests his seat as an Independent.
The views of both Childe and Chamberlain were widely held by individual members of the VCE in 1955 and after. The views of Childe were reflected in the decision by both Executives to demand a pledge of loyalty by all Victorian parliamentarians elected on the ALP ticket in the sense that both Executives sought to demand a commitment to carrying out ideals. In the symbolic language of the times this meant that ALP parliamentarians either "refused to be intimidated by the Catholic Actionists"\(^1\) by supporting the "new" Executive or "showed courage"\(^2\) by supporting the "old" Executive.

The two Executives acted almost simultaneously in asking parliamentarians to declare their loyalty. Only parliamentarians who were also members of the VCE at the beginning of 1955 such as S.M. Keon, E.W. Peters and John Cain had already been obliged to declare their position. The decision of both Executives, almost one month after the conclusion of the Special Conference, obliged all Victorian Labor parliamentarians to take sides. The "old" Executive was the first to act, requesting all Victorian Labor parliamentarians to attend a meeting, the so-called Victoria Hall meeting, to be held at that

\(^1\)Divers, interview.

\(^2\)McManus, interview.
location in Russell Street, Melbourne, on Friday 25 March 1955. The "new" Executive countered by its adoption of the so-called Kennelly motion under which all Victorian Labor parliamentarians, as well as endorsed candidates and municipal Councillors, were written to and asked to make a written affirmation of loyalty to the "new" Executive within fourteen days.

The Victoria Hall meeting would be regarded by both Executives as a symbolic test of the "old" VCE's parliamentary support. J.V. Stout, President of the "new" Executive, acknowledged the significance of the Victoria Hall meeting in his circular of 23 March in which he advised parliamentarians and parliamentary candidates that they should not attend the Victoria Hall meeting.

1Argus (Melbourne), 22 March 1955. The delay in seeking declarations of loyalty from uncommitted parliamentarians was probably made in the hope that the Hobart Federal Conference in March 1955 would either end the fracture or confer legitimacy on the "old" Executive. The "new" Executive probably delayed asking parliamentarians to declare their loyalty in the expectation that, once Federal Conference conferred "legitimacy" on the "new" VCE some wavering parliamentarians might be induced to support it.

2VCE Minutes, 22 March 1955. The motion is named after its mover, P.J. Kennelly. The Kennelly motion was seconded by F. Courtnay.

3Murray, The Split, op. cit., pp. 234-236 does not explicitly refer to the significance of the Victoria Hall meeting in these terms.
called by what he referred to as the "bogus" Executive.\(^1\)

Attendance or apology at Victoria Hall would be considered a disloyal act, earning immediate suspension and later expulsion from the ALP.

The case of Senator J.J. Devlin, a farmer and former Australian Workers' Union organizer, is an example of the pressures faced by wavering parliamentarians in deciding which Executive to support. Senator Devlin attended the Victoria Hall meeting, yet later sought to affirm his loyalty to the "new" Executive.\(^2\) Correspondence between Devlin and Stout suggests Devlin sought to avoid taking sides in the dispute between the two Executives after actions by both Executives had made the option of "fence-sitting" impossible for Labor parliamentarians.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)J.V. Stout, Circular to Members, 23 March 1955. With parliamentarians, parliamentary candidates and Councillors allowed two weeks to reply in terms of the Kennelly motion Stout was probably using the circular to prevent waverers from attending the meeting. All persons attending the Victoria Hall meeting would be deemed to have declared their support for the "old" VCE. The term "bogus" was used at various times by both Executives in reference to each other.

\(^2\)See Murray, The Split, op. cit., p. 236 for a list of the twenty-five parliamentarians who attended the Victoria Hall meeting.

\(^3\)See Parliamentarians, ALP Victorian Records, 1955. Letter by John J. Devlin (Senator) to H.V. Stout dated 18 March 1955 suggests Devlin was a waverer. The letter requested from Stout information on the holding and date of Easter Conference, 1955, and advised the name of a delegate, further advising that "his name has already been sent to Mr McManus (Secretary of the "old" VCE) and acknowledged by him."
Devlin was suspended from ALP membership by the "new" VCE, but in effect asked for a lifting of his suspension in a letter of 31 March. Devlin sought to explain his attendance at Victoria Hall in terms of his being ignorant of the Stout circular proscribing the meeting, attending as

not as a supporter (of the "old" Executive) but only out of curiosity and which I thought was open to all public, but did not take in any discussions or votes and left before it was over. 1

His affirmation of loyalty to the "new" Executive was indirect, expressing a belief that decisions of Federal Conference were binding on all members. 2

Devlin's suspension was lifted only after some opposition at a meeting of the VCE on 7 April. At that meeting, which was described as the "night of the knife" by Murray 3 104 ALP members were expelled for supporting the "old" Executive. The opposition to the lifting of Devlin's suspension was explained by Murray in terms of tension between the industrial and political wings of the State ALP, 4 between industrial wing militants led by Stout

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2 Ibid

3 Murray, The Split, op. cit., p. 239.

4 Frequent reference is made by various writers on the ALP to an "industrial wing," in Victoria the trade unionist members of the VCE and leading officials of unions affiliated with the Party, and a "political wing," ALP parliamentarians seen to have differences in outlook, whatever their background, to trade unionist Party members.
who wanted to rid the Party of all vestiges of "Grouperism," and moderates in the political wing, among whom he included Cain, Kennelly and R.W. Holt, who preferred a softer approach to those parliamentarians who might yet, with some persuasion, come around to the "new" Executive. ¹

That Devlin's appeal against his suspension was upheld can be better explained in terms of an assessment by individual VCE members of Devlin's own actions rather than in terms of industrial wing-political wing tension.² Devlin's suspension could not have been lifted without the support of almost half the non-parliamentarian members of the VCE. The lifting of Devlin's suspension, about which there should not have been any question of division had all VCE members wanted to extend an olive-branch to any "old" Executive parliamentary supporters who might change their position, suggested hard-liners on the VCE would not support any form of rapprochement with the "old" Executive and its supporters without a fight. The lifting of Devlin's suspension was an aberration. The expulsions of the same night were more typical of the post-split VCE, that support for "Grouperism" in any form was not to be tolerated.


²Suggested to the writer by F. Courtnay, interview. Courtnay could not, in general, be considered a hard-line VCE member although his attitude towards the "old" Executive was always one opposed to reconciliation.
The reluctance of the VCE in 1955 to conduct pre-selection ballots by the traditional system was understandable. Organization of pre-selection ballots would have been difficult, given the short time remaining before the 1955 State election. No way existed of knowing which members were really in sympathy with the "new" Executive, the branch structure being disorganized consequent upon a majority of both branches and branch members supporting the "old" Executive. Later in 1955 fears of "infiltration by outsiders" and "Menzies fifth column membership" were used, at least by Stout, as a justification for continued VCE pre-selections.\(^1\) Such fears in the minds of the VCE leadership after the situation in respect of branch membership had become clear suggest a belief that Group and Movement influence in the Party was still a possibility.\(^2\) Branch resolutions to Annual Conference in 1956 suggested many ordinary members also opposed an immediate return to pre-selection by the traditional method for similar reasons.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Letter by J.V. Stout to G.H. Turner, 23 May 1955, and Circular G8 of 8 August 1955. G.H. Turner was Secretary to John Cain.

\(^2\) Courtnay, interview.

\(^3\) ALP (Victoria) Annual Conference Agenda, 1956, lists 23 motions on selection of candidates. Of these 11 motions from branches favour a continuation of VCE pre-selection for twelve months.
Once parliamentarians had pledged their loyalty to the "new" Executive the question of subordination meant VCE control of pre-selection and whether or not this control of pre-selection inhibited free parliamentary action, free public articulation of ideas, and the right of parliamentarians to criticise VCE actions. A pledge of loyalty to the "old" Executive did not mean subordination, but rather electoral oblivion for those parliamentarians who either chose the wrong side or who made a decision of principle that proved to be electorally foolish.

Pre-selection ballots by vote of ALP branch members and members of affiliated unions living in the electorate concerned were the traditional means of ALP candidate selection.\(^1\) Candidates for the 1955 Victorian State election who supported the "new" Executive, having been pre-selected in the traditional manner in 1954, were endorsed by the VCE without further ballot.\(^2\) New candidates for electorates where the originally pre-selected candidate supported the "old" Executive were selected by ballot of the VCE.

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\(^2\)J. McR. Dunn, retiring Legislative Assembly Member for Geelong West, was defeated in a pre-selection ballot in 1954 by a candidate who subsequently supported the "new" Executive. The VCE in 1955 refused to endorse Dunn, who re-contested his seat as an Independent, only to be defeated in his attempt to retain his seat. Dunn was readmitted to the ALP by Annual Conference in 1958, having been expelled in 1955 for opposing the selected ALP candidate.
Prior to 1955 certain questionable practices were carried out in relation to pre-selection ballots. These practices involved organizing the trade union vote and branch "stacking."\textsuperscript{1} Members of trade unions eligible to vote outnumbered many times the ordinary ALP branch members. An efficient organizer could maximize this vote for a desired candidate.\textsuperscript{2} Branch "stacking" involved the issuing by branch secretaries of ALP membership tickets en masse in the interests of a desired candidate. Such fraudulent practices as multiple voting were not unknown.\textsuperscript{3} The zeal with which Movement and Group sympathizers were able to organize the trade union vote was a sore point among many anti-Group candidates defeated for pre-selection before 1955.\textsuperscript{4} While some doubts have been expressed as to the quality of candidates selected under the traditional pre-selection ballot system, the traditional system ensured candidates in electorates normally considered safe for the ALP would need to organize support among ALP members and unionists in the electorate they wished to contest, and would normally need some association with that

\textsuperscript{1}Talk by F. Crean to the Australian Society for the Study of Labour History, Melbourne Branch, 20 June 1978, notes taken by writer.

\textsuperscript{2}R.W. Holt, interview. Trade unionists who voted who were not ALP members were required to subscribe a pledge of loyalty to the ALP, but many unionists who voted in ALP pre-selection ballots voted in parliamentary elections for parties other than the ALP nonetheless.

\textsuperscript{3}For an example of this see L. Allan, "The Northcote branch of the Australian Labor Party," MA (Prelim.) thesis, University of Melbourne, 1974, p. 67.

\textsuperscript{4}Crean, talk, op. cit.
The operation of pre-selection ballots also placed some limits over control of the Party by the VCE before 1955 in that some faction in control of the VCE could not always control the outcome of the ballots.  

The pre-selection of candidates by the VCE, originally intended as a temporary expedient before a return to the traditional ballot of Party members and affiliated unionists, became a permanent part of the VCE's operations until 1970. Annual Conference in each year until 1959 authorized a continuation of "emergency" pre-selection by the VCE for a further twelve months. Annual Conference in 1959 appointed a Committee of nine members to recommend a method of making future selections to Annual Conference in 1960.  

In 1960 the report of the

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1See A. Hughes, God help the ALP: .... A Ventilation of Discontent, <i>Melbourne University Magazine</i>, 1962, p. 59 where local pre-selection is considered as part of a strategy aimed at improving the ALP's image among middle-class voters.

2This point was made by J.D. Brosnan, interview, 28 January 1976. Despite the defeat of some Group-supported candidates the Group-controlled VCE before 1955 did not attempt to replace the traditional pre-selection ballots by some system of Executive pre-selection. Pre-selection ballots of the Party membership and affiliated unionists were retained as part of the DLP Constitution after 1955, although such ballots were rarely contested owing to the unattractiveness of DLP candidature with, apart from the Senate, no possibility of election for DLP candidates.

Committee, accepted by Annual Conference, legitimized VCE pre-selections. A token two (in 1965 increased to three) representatives of the local Campaign Committee would sit and vote together with the VCE during the pre-selection.\(^1\) Local representatives could rarely affect the result of a pre-selection given that they were outnumbered at least thirty to two by VCE members, but their inclusion at least gave the appearance that the VCE considered local feelings.\(^2\)

VCE pre-selection is sometimes credited with the choice of "superior" candidates, individuals of calibre, often with professional qualifications, who might not stand any chance of selection under the traditional system.\(^3\) It was also argued that a popular "local" candidate selected under the traditional system might lack ability, both in parliamentary debate and as a Minister in a Labor

\(^1\)ALP (Victoria) Decisions of Annual Conference, 1960.

\(^2\)G. H. Turner, interview, 4 February 1978, suggested that in the 1962 pre-selection of Captain S.J. Benson for the House of Representatives electorate of Batman local opinion had been almost completely disregarded by the VCE. See also Michelle Grattan, The Benson Affair, Australian Quarterly 39 No. 3 (September 1967) pp. 21-22. For a general discussion of local opposition to VCE pre-selections see C. Burns, Parties and People: A Survey based on the La Trobe Electorate, Melbourne University Press, 1961, pp. 21-23 and L. Allan, op. cit., pp. 64-72.

\(^3\)R. W. Holt, interview.
Government. 1 The case against VCE pre-selections is strongest when an examination is made of the number of VCE members successful in VCE pre-selections for parliamentary electorates considered safe for the ALP. 2 The pre-selection of a VCE member by the VCE, regardless of that person's calibre, presents the appearance of nepotism, that a VCE member was likely to be selected at the expense of other candidates possibly of higher calibre. 3 Kelly 4 interprets swings recorded against VCE members Divers, Courtney, Tripovich and Jenkins when contesting parliamentary elections as VCE pre-selected ALP candidates being suggestive of electoral feelings against both the VCE itself and the candidates as VCE representatives.

VCE pre-selection of parliamentary candidates, at least before 1966, was a potential rather than actual

1 R.W. Holt, interview. See also Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 11. For a contrary position of the worth of "local" candidates see W. Macmahon Ball, What Makes a Good M.P.?, Nation, 9 May 1959, p. 7.

2 VCE members at the time of their pre-selection (other than as a sitting member) in our period include R.W. Holt, 1955, W.T. Divers and P. Courtney, both 1958, J. Tripovich and Dr H.A. Jenkins, both 1960. S.H. Cohen became a VCE member in June 1961 after the VCE had pre-selected him for the Senate.

3 W.T. Divers, interview, denied that VCE members were in any favourable position in VCE pre-selections, pointing out that he had been defeated in an earlier VCE ballot by a non-VCE member before his pre-selection for the Legislative Assembly District of Footscray in 1958.

device for control over parliamentarians. In no case until 1966 was a sitting parliamentarian denied pre-selection by the VCE. Some VCE members, however, sought to intimidate individual Federal parliamentarians into supporting particular positions in the Federal Caucus. Opposition by VCE members to the Richardson Report on Federal Parliamentary salaries in 1959 was responsible for demands that the VCE direct Victorian Members of Federal Caucus, but such a position never became practicable, not so much because the parliamentarians themselves opposed it but because the Federal organization saw in such direction a threat to its own position, that the State organizations in the largest States might become too powerful at the expense of the smaller States given the fact that the majority of Federal Caucus Members would normally represent

1 The case of J. McR. Dunn, referred to previously, can be discounted as Dunn lost pre-selection under the traditional system in 1954. In 1966 S.J. Benson, sitting ALP House of Representatives Member for Batman, was unopposed for pre-selection before his expulsion from the ALP for refusing to resign from the Defend Australia Committee, a right-wing organization proscribed by ALP Federal Executive. For details of the Benson case see Michelle Gratton, op. cit. Sitting Members defeated for pre-selection by the VCE after 1965 were K.M.S. Holland in 1966 and W.T. Divers in 1969, both for the Legislative Assembly, and F. Courtnay in 1968 for the House of Representatives. Only in the case of Courtnay could the VCE's actions have amounted to the clear exercise of control over a parliamentarian opposed to VCE policies. Courtnay, interview, claimed his support for Federal Leader Whitlam, then seeking reform of the Victorian ALP, was responsible for his defeat by VCE member H.A. Jenkins, considered more reliably "socialist left" and anti-Whitlam by the VCE.

2 R.W. Holt, interview, provided the writer with several examples.
Victorian and New South Wales electorates. Approaches were made to individual Members at various times by both VCE members and officeholders in certain affiliated unions to support certain leadership candidates, such as R.T. Pollard rather than A.A. Calwell for Federal Leader in 1960, and to oppose construction of an American radio-communications base at North-West Cape, Western Australia, in 1963. Such approaches are the right of any individual or union, as is the right of individual Caucus Members to reject such approaches. That pre-selection might be denied is, however, a factor some Members may have considered in deciding how they should vote in Caucus and in public statements about matters considered of vital concern by the VCE, but the fact that Deputy Senate Leader Kennelly publicly opposed the VCE as early as 1961 suggested that fears of Federal Executive retaliation acted to discourage the VCE from taking such a course of action.

The fact that successive Ticketing Committees sought to include the State Parliamentary Leader, and in 1964 and after the Federal Leader, A.A. Calwell, in its

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1Kennelly, interview, suggested that direction of Federal Caucus Members by a State Executive would be contrary to the spirit of AIP Federal rules. Any attempt by a State Executive to direct the vote of Members from that State in Federal Parliament itself, rather than in Federal Caucus, would soon result in Federal AIP intervention.

2R.W. Holt, interview.

list of recommended VCE candidates, thus ensuring their election, is suggestive that the majority of affiliated unions preferred cooperation rather than confrontation with the parliamentary leadership. ¹ John Cain, A.E. Shepherd, C.P. Stoneham and A.C. Holding all served as VCE members while State Parliamentary Leaders. Stoneham's failure to re-nominate for the VCE while State Leader in 1962² is suggestive of an attempt to distance himself from the VCE, a hope that by not appearing as a VCE puppet he could improve the Party's State electoral chances given that left-wing domination of the VCE was seen as an electoral liability. Stoneham did not, however, publicly criticize the VCE. The failure of the parliamentary leadership, apart from Deputy Senate Leader Kennelly in 1961 and State Leader Holding in 1970, to take a clear anti-VCE position aided the VCE in its attempts to survive Federal intervention, especially after 1964 when an organized anti-VCE faction developed in the Victorian ALP. In particular Federal Leader Calwell preferred membership of the VCE in 1964, after he ceased to have any realistic possibility of becoming Prime Minister, rather

¹Federal Leader Calwell and State Leader Stoneham received all Central Executive documents, and were at liberty to attend all VCE meetings. See ALP (Victoria) 1963 Central Executive Report. The Federal and State Leaders did not have the right to vote unless they were also elected members of the VCE.

²Sun News-Pictorial (Melbourne), 5 June 1962.
than help initiate reforms which may have improved the Party's chances in Victoria of making electoral gains.\footnote{Calwell at no time urged Federal intervention in Victoria, unlike his Deputy Leader E.G. Whitlam, and the Senate Leadership under N.E. McKenna and P.J. Kennelly.}

In its attitude towards parliamentarians the VCE appeared obsessed with maintaining its pre-eminent position in the State Party. It was even helped in this respect by many of the parliamentarians themselves who felt safer with VCE pre-selections, a challenge to their endorsement under some other pre-selection system may have illustrated a lack of concern shown by them for their electorates. By its power of pre-selection the VCE saw itself as a guardian over the actions of parliamentarians, a re-assurance to the Party's patrons that parliamentarians would be a part of a greater mass-clientele Party, not an autonomous group outside it, by virtue of a readiness to remove those parliamentarians who might not act in the Party's interests. In actuality the VCE was something less, parliamentarians once pre-selected by the VCE being virtually certain of continued re-endorsement, at least before 1966.

The guardianship role as the VCE perceived itself
as fulfilling was most evident in its attitudes towards parliamentarians. The fact that parliamentarians owed their continued pre-selection to the VCE resulted in the place of parliamentarians being seen by the electorate as being very much subordinate to the Party's trade union patrons, with the VCE being seen as a representative of the patron's interests.

Victorian ALP parliamentarians, with few exceptions, showed themselves in our period as unwilling to challenge the right of the Party's patrons to exercise a considerable degree of control over the State Party. It has been demonstrated that Victorian ALP parliamentarians were unable to demonstrate an ability to act independently of their Party's trade union patrons. The fact that certain of the Party's patrons were considered by much of the electorate in ill repute, in particular those trade union patrons controlled by the Communist Party, added to fears by some parts of the electorate that an ALP Government would be unable to resist excessive demands for the adoption of particular policies by these patron unions. The quality of the ALP parliamentary leadership in our period was such that they were unable to appeal to a mass public. The inability of the leadership to win over a wider clientele in the Party's interests was because they lacked charismatic qualities which suggested to the electorate that they were their own men able to stand up
to both the Party's patrons and Party Executive bodies dominated by representatives of these patrons.

We have shown, in the course of this illustration, that the patrons of a mass-clientele party may be a barrier to the effective fulfilment of the party's office-seeking function by winning parliamentary elections. We have seen examples of this in Chapter IV, where patrons have opposed changes in party organization, and the present Chapter, where patrons have sought an undue degree of control over parliamentarians. In the following Chapter our concern will be with the municipal level, where we will examine conflict between the mass-clientele party's patrons and the party itself, and the likelihood that resolution of such a conflict will be largely favourable to the patron's interests.
CHAPTER VI

AN ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE FROM PARISH PUMP

CONCERNS - A CASE OF FAILURE

The greatest conflict between a mass-clientele party and its patrons, or even a particular patron, will arise where the mass-clientele party itself takes some action detrimental to what is seen by the patrons as their vital interest or concern. Such conflict, if unresolved, may result in particular patrons withdrawing their support from the mass-clientele party. The concern of the Victorian ALP for local government is presented as a case study of conflict between a mass-clientele party and its patrons.

The suggestion is made that the vital concerns, or issues seen as vital concerns, of a mass-clientele party's patrons may force on the party office-seeking at a level inappropriate to the party's proper level of operations. It will be demonstrated in the case of the Victorian ALP that local government office-seeking was

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seen as such a vital concern by the Party's patrons. Pressure by the Party's patrons resulted in the frustration of attempts by the Party organization to withdraw from office-seeking at the municipal level. This Chapter will first consider the place of local government in the Victorian ALP, and then analyse the difficult task faced by the Party in attempting to withdraw from operating at the local government level.

Local government is sometimes described as the "Cinderella" of ALP politics, yet, paradoxically, an observation of time spent on local government matters by the VCE and by the Executive Officers\(^1\) of the State Party would suggest local government to be the Victorian Party's vital concern. The importance of local government to the Party is, however, symbolic. With Labor Governments in Victoria a rarity Labor control of local Councils was seen as a symbol of ALP strength. Local government represents to the Victorian ALP a symbolic universe possessed with a meaning detached from reality, and a

\(^{1}\)The State President and State Secretary of the Victorian ALP together are referred to as the Executive Officers, but the term has also been used to include as well some other VCE office-bearers such as the Assistant Secretary/Country Organizer, the Vice Presidents and the Treasurer.
concern unrelated to the good of the greater Party in that the parish pump level of operation appeared to trivialize the Party and sometimes even hindered ALP candidates in electoral contests at a higher level. In short, concern with municipal politics resulted in magnifying the inward-looking limited characteristics of the Party. It made it even more petty in its concerns. The characteristic vice of the ALP in this period was to be "parish pump." When the domain of battle became the municipality the parish was almost a Liberal counterpart.

Local government interest by the Victorian ALP is in general little more than an interest in office-seeking for its own sake, whatever the aims of Party members at all levels in the Party organization. Party involvement in local government, as distinct from interest, is more complex.¹ Involvement is sometimes useful to the Party organizationally in that the local machine, which in some areas exists primarily for local government election purposes, can often provide a number of campaign workers for the Party in marginal electorates at the State and Federal level.² Involvement

¹This involvement is more directly related to the Party's mass-clientele structure, and takes the form of a wide range of activities from the maintenance of a local machine to the implementation by Labor-controlled Councils of ALP policies such as alienation of parkland or the negotiation of industrial conditions with the relevant unions.

²Kennelly, interview.
is also justified on the grounds that many parliamentarians and parliamentary candidates have obtained useful experience by being active participants in municipal government, in particular experience in ideology-policy articulation.¹ The type and extent of local government Party involvement, and the question of whether the benefits of this involvement outweigh the costs or liabilities are frequent matters of Party debate.

Party interest in local government is highest in the industrial suburbs of Melbourne, including the ALP's inner-Melbourne heartland, the local government areas of Collingwood, Fitzroy, Richmond and Northcote. A conversation with a typical inner-Melbourne ALP branch member or attendance at an ALP branch meeting in this area in the 1950's and 1960's, if not before and after, might suggest local government to be the principal concern of the Victorian ALP.² A high level of Party interest in local government, as distinct from interest by individual Party members, is generally limited to areas where the ALP


has a history of successfully contesting local government elections. The level of interest in our period was in many areas a consequence of Party rules which precluded ALP members contesting local government elections as Independents with local Party support but without formal Party endorsement.¹ In Melbourne middle-class suburbs, and in country shires where hostility towards candidates endorsed by the ALP was strong, the only way ALP members could in general secure election to the local Council was by standing for election as Independent candidates.² In the country ALP members would often contest Council elections without Party endorsement, but in Melbourne suburbs ALP members normally, but not always, complied with Party rules concerning candidature of ALP members in local government elections.³

That a small number of ALP members sought to contest municipal elections outside the industrial suburbs is more suggestive of apathy towards local

¹Normally Party members who offended in this way by contesting Council elections without seeking ALP endorsement were told that they should comply with the rules in future rather than suspended or expelled from the Party.

²The ALP is, apart from the DLP and the Communist Party, the only political party in Victoria of any consequence to contest municipal elections. For rural hostility to political party candidates in local politics see W. Grant, Independent Local Politics in England and Wales, London, Saxon House, 1977, pp. 9-39.

government than the effect of Party rules. It was still possible for ALP members to obtain Party endorsement yet campaign in middle-class or high-status areas as individuals without claiming a Party affiliation on campaign leaflets and how-to-vote cards. That few did so is suggestive that in the 1950's and 1960's local government was not the concern of a rising ALP middle-class membership.

ALP strength in Victorian local government was limited until the 1950's by a restrictive franchise as much as by lack of interest on the part of ALP local organizations unwilling to contest local Council elections. The eligibility to vote for local Councils was restricted to British subjects being property owners, who in many cases were absentee landlords, or principal occupiers. This restriction eliminated from voter eligibility adult children living at home with their parents, boarders and lodgers, and in many cases even spouses. The restricted franchise may not have caused a great deal of harm to the ALP,¹ but plural voting certainly did. The wealthier property owners or occupiers were entitled to three votes,

with poorer owners or occupiers who were more likely to vote for the ALP frequently entitled to one vote only. As well the fact that voting in many municipalities was not compulsory, and elections were held on a Thursday rather than a Saturday by some Councils, most notably Prahran and Melbourne City Councils, may also have harmed the chances of ALP candidates. An increase in property values without any increase in the property valuation needed for an entitlement to three votes reduced the anti-ALP bias of the municipal franchise by the 1950's.

ALP Councils by 1954 were located around, almost circling, the Melbourne central business district. While a gerrymander in favour of the central business district prevented the ALP from wresting control of the Melbourne City Council (MCC) from the pro-Liberal Civic Group¹ and the ALP could never win the City of Prahran with its high status areas of Toorak and part of South Yarra the ALP by now controlled most of inner-Melbourne local government. As well as the heartland the ALP was in a strong position if not a majority in the working-class Melbourne suburbs

¹ALP candidates normally won residential Wards in Carlton and North Melbourne on the MCC.
of Brunswick, Coburg, Footscray, Port Melbourne, Preston, South Melbourne, Sunshine and Williamstown.¹ The areas of ALP strength in suburban Melbourne, both in local government and parliamentary elections, are almost entirely north and west of the Yarra River, the Yarra being a social dividing line between areas of low socio-economic status to the north and west, and areas of middle and high socio-economic status to the south.² The ALP was, in general, weak in local government representation south of the Yarra River.³ In the provincial towns and rural districts of Victoria ALP representation in local government was in most areas non-existent. Outside the Melbourne metropolitan area the ALP normally won a local government majority only in the then coal-mining town of Wonthaggi.

¹Altona and Broadmeadows, both outer developing suburbs with high population growth and housing construction after 1955 also elected a strong representation of ALP Councillors.


³The only Melbourne suburban municipalities where the ALP was normally strong south of the Yarra River were Oakleigh, South Melbourne and Port Melbourne. Oakleigh and South Melbourne have high concentrations of working-class residents. Port Melbourne, an industrial and maritime area, is almost entirely working class with many waterside workers, seamen and factory workers among its residents.
The ALP split of 1965 caused an upheaval among the Party's inner-Melbourne Councillors as great as that among the Party's parliamentarians. A majority of inner-Melbourne ALP Councillors opted for the "old" Executive. The ALP Caucus in only one heartland Council, Northcote, the Legislative Assembly District represented by Premier John Cain being largely within the municipal boundaries, supported the "new" Executive. The importance of local government in inner-Melbourne to the ALP was illustrated by the Kennelly motion of 22 March 1965 in that local Councillors, together with parliamentarians, were required to declare their loyalty to the "new" VCE. ¹

The immediate local government aim of the "new" VCE was to defeat ACLP Councillors, and especially to retain control of inner-Melbourne for the ALP. In particular the "new" VCE sought to defeat Cr. W.P. Barry on the MCC, Barry being particularly objected to because of the fact that he led the Legislative Assembly

¹At the time of the split 156 ALP Councillors held office in Victoria, 64 of whom defected to the "old" Executive. Less than one-third of ACLP Councillors at the time of the split represented non-heartland Councils all of which, with the exception of one Councillor from each of Werribee and Wonthaggi, were in the Melbourne metropolitan area. Of the 92 Councillors who remained with the ALP over two-thirds represented non-heartland Councils. If Northcote were not regarded as a heartland Council the figure would be closer to ninety per-cent. See ALP (Victoria) Central Executive Report, 1955-1966, p. 13.
supporters of the "old" Executive who voted in the House to defeat the Cain Government. The symbolic target of the "new" Executive, perhaps even more than the MCC defeat of Bill Barry, was the Council of Richmond, a municipality considered the home of Grouperism. Before Movement organization Richmond Council was controlled by the organization of John Wren, perhaps the nearest Australian equivalent of the Tammany Hall Democratic Party machine in New York State. ¹ Wren operated the archetypal Irish-Catholic ALP machine.

From time immemorial Richmond had been Wren territory; it had also, either because of this or in spite of it, acquired the reputation for being the roughest and most corrupt municipality in the Commonwealth. ² Richmond was also the home of family political machines run by the O'Connell's and the Loughnans, rivalling in efficiency the machine of Bill Barry in Carlton and legendary throughout inner-Melbourne. ³ The most effective Richmond machine, however, was that of S.M. Keon, the ACTP Deputy Leader in the House of Representatives in 1955. ⁴ The Keon machine replaced Wren Councillors after 1945 and

³For a general treatment of ALP suburban machines see J. Jupp, Australian Party Politics, op. cit., p. 188.
⁴For a fictionalized treatment of the rise of the Keon (Kiely) machine in Richmond before 1950 see F.J. Hardy, Power Without Glory, Melbourne, Lloyd O'Neil, 1972 (1950), Ch. 14.
dominated political Richmond until it in turn was replaced after the 1955 ALP split.¹

The ALP was successful in defeating Barry at the MCC poll held on Thursday 25 August 1955.² The ALP was also successful in defeating most ACLP Councillors two days later in all municipalities except Richmond, where three retiring ACLP Councillors were re-elected.³ Richmond finally returned to ALP control in 1957. The DLP was soon dead as a force in local government. After 1956 DLP candidature would ensure defeat at almost all local government elections, and the DLP would not bother to pre-select candidates in Council elections other than for the MCC and those few DLP members who still sought their Party's endorsement in local Council polls.⁴

With the DLP as spent force in local government some ALP members questioned the need for the spending of time and money by the Party in contesting local government elections. Clayton branch, near the newly established

¹See O. McKenna, Keon, Cairns and all that ..., Recalling the Fiery Fifties, Richmond Scene, 1 November 1979 for a description of Richmond Council before the 1955 ALP split.

²Argus (Melbourne), 26 August 1955.

³In Victoria Council elections are held annually in August, Councillors being elected for three-year terms with one-third of each Council retiring every August.

⁴A. J. Jones, interview, 15 January 1976. A. J. Jones was a member of the DLP Victorian Central Executive.
Monash University\(^1\) proposed the abolition of municipal endorsements in a motion to 1962 Annual Conference,\(^2\) probably the result of a number of new academic and student members having joined the branch. Dissatisfaction with their local Council, Oakleigh, was almost certainly responsible for the motion, the performance of Oakleigh Councillors credited with being a factor in the 1961 defeat of the ALP's Oakleigh Legislative Assembly Member V.J. Doube, an articulate opponent in the Assembly of Liberal Premier H.E. Bolte.\(^3\) The Clayton branch motion was not debated at Annual Conference, the usual fate of most branch motions, but it was recognized by the Party Officers. In 1963 the VCE suspended from the ALP all but one ALP Oakleigh Councillors in a dispute, ostensibly, over whether a scholarship scheme by the Council conflicted with Party policy on aid to non-State (meaning in the case of Oakleigh Catholic) schools.\(^4\) The damage caused to the


\(^{2}\)Annual Conference Agenda, 1962.


Party by the events in Oakleigh was a major factor in causing a change in the attitude of the VCE towards local government endorsements. In 1963, at the urging of R.W. Holt and C.S. Wyndham, the VCE decided to recommend to Annual Conference that municipal endorsements by the Party be abandoned. The aim of the promoters of the VCE proposal was to prevent the Party being further dragged down by the actions of what were considered low-calibre and even in some cases corrupt Councillors. It was also considered the Party as a whole would benefit if parish pump politics could be removed from Party consideration, for the Party could devote more time to the formulation and articulation of policies at the State and Federal level. In particular the seemingly endless personality clashes and arguments over endorsements at the local level were great time wasters for VCE members.

The actions of the promoters of the VCE proposal to end endorsement of Party candidates in local government

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1C.S. Wyndham was appointed State Secretary of the Victorian ALP in 1960 after the election of the previous State Secretary, J.M. Tripovich, to the Legislative Council. He held the position until his appointment as Federal Secretary in 1963.


3The fact that local government pre-selections were conducted by the VCE took up a great deal of VCE time, probably more than double the time taken up with parliamentary pre-selections.
were ill-conceived and amateurish, whatever the merits of the proposal. The proposal failed to take into account two important factors. The first was the emotional attachment of Labor stalwarts, including especially Labor parliamentarians, to the old reality that the Party tradition of contesting local government elections was the life-blood of the Party in inner-Melbourne. The second was the mass-clientele nature of the Party. The proposal not only offended a trade union affiliate of some importance, the particular trade union, the Municipal Employees' Union (MEU) had not even been consulted about the proposal and first learned of it in the daily newspapers.¹

The promoters of the proposal backed-down, Conference referring the proposal to a Party committee on local government. The proposal was not heard from again. The VCE was not prepared in 1963 to take on State parliamentarians of high stature opposing the proposal representing inner-Melbourne electorates such as State Deputy Leader D. Lovegrove, F.N. Wilkes and K.M.S. Holland.²

¹Letter, C.V. Gardner (General Secretary of MEU) to C.S. Wyndham, 15 March 1963, Victorian ALP Records.

²Wilkes and Holland were both members of local Councils concurrently with being Members of State Parliament, a practice possible because of the fact that local Councillors in Victoria are not remunerated for their services.
Nor was it prepared to provoke the disaffiliation of the MEU over a matter few VCE members were likely to see as one vital to the Party. The VCE recommendation was too great a departure from the traditional operations of the Victorian Party. If the VCE had recommended a lesser proposal, such as that the VCE delegate the pre-selection of municipal candidates to branch members and that the Party only endorse local government candidates where this was desired by branch members within a particular municipality, such a proposal would almost certainly have been accepted.

The back-down of 1963 by the promoters of the VCE recommendation on local government meant more than a loss of face for some VCE members. It strengthened the power of industrial left unions in the Party who, while initially supporting the proposal, had second thoughts when confronted with its effect on certain trade unionists, MEU members working for Labor-controlled Councils. As a result of this realization the VCE after 1964 exercised a greater

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1The importance of ALP local government endorsements to the MEU was in the existence of a "logging committee" under which a log of pay and conditions claims were negotiated by the MEU with ALP-controlled Councils. ALP-controlled Councils also acted as wage and conditions pace-setters for non-Labor Councils. MEU officials believed that without the existence of a "logging committee" their members generally may have become worse off, even if the union became industrially militant.
control over ALP Councils and pre-selections.\textsuperscript{1} For the Party to turn in the other direction, to make local government the greater concern of the Party, was as much a cause of disequilibrium as the proposal to abandon local government altogether. When the limited powers of Australian local government are considered,\textsuperscript{2} the ALP as a party of egalitarianism and social change is unlikely to achieve very much from its local government involvement, but the Party nevertheless could have used local government as a means of encouraging political participation by a changing inner-Melbourne population.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}After 1965 the power of pre-selection was used as a control device by the VCE against Party dissidents. Several members of the "Participate," a group of ALP members opposed to the VCE, were denied or lost local government pre-selection in several municipalities.


Local government involvement must be seen as an integral part of the ALP as a mass-clientele party, at least in inner-Melbourne. Local government was a symbol of ALP strength, a symbol of what a mass-clientele party was about, where Party directed patronage arising from control of local Councils could be utilized in the interests of Party supporters. Office-seeking at the local government level, as we have suggested, did not benefit the Party as a whole.

We have observed above that the limited concerns of municipal politics impeded the broader task of ministering to the aspirations of the broader electorate. But the point of involvement in local government politics had other negative consequences. In particular local government became a symbol of trade union control over the Victorian ALP.

The attempt by certain VCE members to abandon the ALP's tradition of local government involvement brought about conflict between the Party and its trade union patrons. The main lesson which can be drawn from the resolution of this conflict is in the relationship of the Party's patrons with the Party organization. The resolution of this conflict, as we have seen, demonstrates that in a mass-clientele party the vital interests of the party's
patrons will resolve such conflicts in the patrons' interests out of a desire by the party organization to retain the patrons' support.

The conflict between Party organization and the Party's trade union patrons acted as a catalyst in bringing together the opponents in the Victorian ALP of the increasingly more powerful industrial left unions. The MEU, the principally affected union, was unhappy that the proposal for Party withdrawal from local government had been presented in the first place. Annoyed at the industrial left wing unions, who originally supported the proposal, the MEU became a firm supporter of forces gathering in the Melbourne THC under the leadership of M.C.C. Jordan opposed to certain members of the VCE. The local government proposal assisted in the formation of an organized faction in the Victorian ALP opposed to the VCE. The following Chapter will discuss the operation of factions within the Victorian ALP, and will demonstrate that a mass-clientele party, by its very nature, is liable to factionalism.
CHAPTER VII

THREATS TO THE RULING CLIQUE - MASS DISSIDENCE OR A MIDDLE CLASS CONSPIRACY?

Factionalism, the existence of identifiable groups within a party seeking power or a share of party offices, arises in a mass-clientele party as a consequence of the party's patron-client relationship. Where divisions exist within the patrons of a mass-clientele party it is suggested that such divisions will be reflected by factions within the mass-clientele party itself. Parliamentarians in a mass-clientele party are more likely to support different party factions rather than to form a faction of their own. It will be demonstrated with respect to the Victorian ALP that the Party's relationship with its trade union patrons rather than the election of Party candidates to public office is a cause of Party factionalism.

In a party with an organization elected largely by delegates from its patron trade unions disagreement between these patron unions will result in organized actions by combinations of particular union delegates on
party representative bodies. Such organized actions over
a number of non-related issues debated at party gatherings,
and in particular in the election of party executive bodies,
suggest the existence of a party faction. This Chapter
will discuss the development of such factions in the
Victorian ALP, and will consider the role played by the
Party's trade union patrons in the form Party factionalism
has taken over various periods. Of particular importance
for our period is the "modern faction" which first
developed in the Victorian ALP around 1939. A modern
faction consisted of an organized group, increasingly
permeated by an ideological element, which sought to
control decision-making and VCE elections at Party
Conferences.

The ALP is a Party prone to factionalism.
Factionalism is a Party tradition, being deeply rooted in
Party history, but the strength of factionalism in
particular periods is related to the degree of support
particular Party Executives can command from the Party as
a whole. Where a State Executive can be considered a
"ruling clique," unrepresentative of a large or significant
part of the Party membership, unresponsive to major demands
for more broadly-based representative and decision-making
bodies and autocratic in its operations Party "out-groups," elements in the Party denied the more important Party offices, are likely to operate as factions within the Party in their efforts to remove the group in effective Party control. Dissidence in the Party after 1955, originally confined to a small number of trade union officials, spread by the end of our period to a large group of middle-class members who formed the nuclei of opposition to the VCE until Federal intervention into the Victorian Branch in 1970.

Before the 1940's factions in the Victorian ALP operated in a Burkean sense in that factional operations revolved around individuals, with factional interests seen as concerned with the exclusively sectional. An analysis of ALP factionalism in Burkean terms would, however, be simplistic in the sense that a mass-clientele party such as the ALP within which factions operate, unlike the Westminster Parliament of Burke's era, is an entity of some complexity arising out of its mass-clientele nature. In particular the affiliation of trade unions places a restraint on the power of any faction based on loyalty to an individual. Without significant support from union delegates no such faction could exercise significant

1For a critique of Burke's definition of faction see P. Loveday and A.W. Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, Melbourne University Press, 1966, pp. 5-4.
Religious cleavages, Catholic-Masonic rivalry, and industrial wing-political wing conflict, although present in the Party, did not take factional form until after 1940 when the United Front became the prototype for modern factionalism in the Victorian AIP. The modern variety of AIP factionalism sees a more identifiable group of supporters with more defined objects, a collective decision making, greater emphasis on articulation of ideology and policy, and a lesser emphasis on loyalty to a "boss" or single individual. The concern of many United Front supporters was with replacement of what was seen as a corrupt Wren-supported State organization, but an ideological element assumed an importance not previously present in a Party faction. A successful United Front administration in Victoria may have suffered the same fate.


2 The "Socialisation Units" in the New South Wales AIP in the 1930's may also have operated as a modern faction. See R. Cooksey, _Lang and Socialism_, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1971.

3 For a critique of the usually held views of John Wren's influence in Victorian politics see H. McQueen in D.J. Murphy, op. cit., p. 311 and H. Buggy, _The Real John Wren_, Melbourne, Widescope, 1977.
as that in New South Wales in the sense that an administration seen as openly pro-Communist may well have invited a groundswell of resistance inside the Party leading to defeat at a successive Annual Conference or Federal intervention.¹

Supporters of the Movement and the Industrial Groups similarly constituted a modern faction in the Victorian ALP after 1945.² The Movement-Group faction proved long-lasting, being a force in the Victorian Party until most Movement-Group faction supporters defected to the ACLP in 1955, whereas the United Front ceased to exist as a recognizable faction after about 1943. The success of the Movement-Group faction had two results with important consequences for the future of the Victorian ALP.

The first was the creation of what was in effect a "two-faction system" in internal ALP elections, even a situation of two parties operating within the Party, the existence of two competing modern factions, each united by

¹See McManus, op. cit., p. 21.

²"Catholic Action at Work," op. cit., claims 70 delegates from different ALP branches and unions at Easter 1945 Annual Conference in Victoria represented the Movement.
an intense hostility towards the other. An Anti-Movement faction developed after 1949 from the ranks of Group opponents at Annual Conference, from delegates such as disaffected parliamentarians like Kennelly, craft union delegates like THC Secretary Stout and Plumbers' Union Secretary Courtway, delegates from smaller non-craft unions like Divers from the MEU and delegates from industrial unions not under Group control. The principal effect of pre-1955 two-faction conflict was the barrier it created towards reconciliation with the DLP. Reunion with the DLP, whatever else it might mean in terms of ALP adoption of anti-Communist policies, was seen by VCE members after 1955 as likely to mean dominance of the ALP by the old Movement-Group faction. Successive VCE's after 1955 also determined to prevent repetition of pre-1955 type two-faction conflict.

1 Movement-Group supporters in control of the Victorian ALP organization after 1949 can be more properly called a faction than ALP State organizations in previous periods in that Movement-Group supporters retained a permanent factional apparatus after control of the VCE had been achieved with the object of both securing and extending control of the Party by their faction.


3 For a discussion of what might have happened if ALP-DLP reunion had taken place see A. Hughes, Political Review, Australian Quarterly 41 No. 2 (June 1969), pp. 105-106.

4 R.W. Holt, interview, suggested this was in part the motivation behind certain suspensions and expulsions before 1964.
The second was the conversion of political wing-industrial wing rivalry, of tensions between parliamentarians and the trade union dominated extra-parliamentary organization, into participation by parliamentarians in the struggle between the two factions, forcing parliamentarians to take sides in the dispute between the Movement-Group Party organization and the Anti-Movement faction opposed to it. Such participation by parliamentarians illustrated the new nature of Party organization, where tensions would not generally be between parliamentarians and Party organization per se but between parliamentarians and different Party factions. ¹ The inclusion on the VCE after 1955 of parliamentarians who had cooperated with the Anti-Movement faction before 1955, and the pre-selection of several prominent VCE members for the safer ALP parliamentary seats helped minimize, but not eliminate, tension between ALP parliamentarians as a body and the State organization.

Despite Party traditions the existence of factionalism was not recognized by the Party Constitution before 1952. The prohibition on how-to-vote cards being

¹Anti-politician views widely held by the anti-Group Melbourne THC Executive in 1954 illustrated in expressions of resentment that the Cain Labor Government would not stand up to the Movement-Group-controlled VCE over a Tramway Union industrial dispute should not be looked at simplistically in terms of political wing-industrial wing tension, but as part of the wider Victorian ALP two-faction struggle of this period. See Murray, The Split, op. cit., p. 102.
issued by Party Conferences reflected views that factionalism was an objectionable feature of Party operations, and ought if possible to be eliminated, but the widespread flouting of Party rules by a mimeographed list of candidates, circulated in a semi-clandestine manner, made such views unrealistic. The election of Ticketing Committee VCE candidates by substantial majorities suggested that the majority of delegates to post-1955 Victorian ALP Conferences followed such a ticket. The adoption by Conference in 1962 of minor reforms proposed by State Secretary Cyril Wyndham included the "legalization" of "how-to-vote" tickets at Party Conferences. The Ticketing Committee list now appeared printed on attractive paper as the "official ticket," claiming to be "authorized by the Executive Officers."

1See ALP (Victoria) Constitution and Platform, 1959, p. 62 for the text of a 1918 Victorian Annual Conference resolution then still in force banning such tickets. The resolution provided, inter alia, "that the preparation and distribution of lists of tickets of recommended candidates is disloyal and unworthy conduct."


3This claim was a falsehood at least in 1965 in that retiring President R.W. Holt would not in that year have authorized the inclusion of some candidates on the Ticketing Committee list. The choice of the words "official ticket" by the organizers of the ticket did little to promote Party unity in that the use of the word "official" implied that other tickets were unofficial and by implication improper. The presence of an "official ticket" also suggested in the minds of some Conference delegates a relative absence of intra-Party democracy.
Conference delegates who followed blindly the "official ticket" in voting for the VCE, as well as for Victorian delegates to Federal Conference and Federal Executive, were legitimizing a decision made previously by some exclusive and secretive group of union officials that the Party would continue to be controlled by a small clique, that there would in effect be domination of the Party by one faction. ¹

The Wyndham reform of 1962 legalizing tickets recognized the existence of factionalism, but did not result in the Party becoming more effectively democratic in that Conference majorities could still determine almost all positions on the VCE. The lack of democracy in the Party was primarily the result of the Party's voting system, as much as by the underrepresentation of Party branches or the overrepresentation of trade union delegates at Annual Conference. ²

¹See A. Hughes, op. cit., p. 103.

²The Party Constitution provided for a "winner take all" voting system, the election of Party representative bodies by a majority, and after 1962 by a plurality (simple majority or first past the post) voting system. In the case particularly of VCE elections, with the exception of token representatives from the Party women's and youth organizations, the VCE was elected by Conference at large. A Conference majority could determine all members of the VCE other than, until 1965, the token women's and youth representatives, and between 1966-1970 all VCE members. In 1965 only three VCE members were elected from and by State Electoral Council delegates (Conference delegates elected by branch members in each State Legislative Assembly Electoral District) at Annual Conference.
It was one thing to recognize the existence of factionalism as the Wyndham reform of 1962 did. It was another for factionalism to operate in a positive way, for the Party as a whole to benefit by the minimization of inter-factional tensions.¹ The way in which the Party's voting system was used by the ruling group before 1970 was a cause of what has been termed "negative factionalism."² Negative factionalism is where the role played by particular Party factions is seen by Party members as being little more than in-fighting and where non-cooperation between factions is reflected in both ideology-policy articulation by the Party in general and in an apparent lack of enthusiasm by the Party towards fulfilment of its office-seeking function, particularly towards winning parliamentary elections. Negative factionalism was an undesirable by-product of the denial of representation to spokespersons of a large or significant part of the Party.

¹The use of proportional representation by the Victorian ALP since 1970 does not seem to have had this result either. See L. Allan, Ethnic Politics, op. cit., p. 29.

²This term was used by R.H. Hayles, interview, 18 December 1977 to describe the operations of the VCE after 1965. R.H. Hayles was Independent Labor Alliance (ILA) candidate for the House of Representatives electorate of Batman in 1969, the ILA being comprised of ex-ALP members seeking to defeat ALP candidates at the 1969 Federal election in Victoria so as to force Federal intervention on the Victorian ALP. For a discussion of the ILA see A. Hughes, Political Review, Australian Quarterly 41 No. 3 (September 1969), p. 94.
membership, and was an important factor in the upheavals of both 1955 and 1970. ¹

A majority electoral system need not have operated in a negative way, but did so because a Ticketing Committee or some other secret meeting determined to exclude from the VCE many persons who may have appeared as moderate rather than extremist to persons outside the Party, ² and was also able to obtain the allegiance of a majority of Conference delegates unable or unwilling to make their own assessments of VCE candidates. ³

A two-faction system which operated in the Party both before 1955 and after 1964 was in both periods the result of disaffection by large sections of the Party with the ruling group in control of the VCE. A situation where factionalism is minimal is rare in the Victorian ALP,

¹For a view that the use of proportional representation is desirable in private organizations (of which internal elections in political parties are an example) as a means of promoting cohesiveness see E. Lakeman and J.D. Lambert, Voting in Democracies, London, Faber and Faber, 1954, passim.

²R.W. Holt, interview, compared the position in Victoria, where the Ticketing Committee never included "right-wingers" in its list of VCE candidates, with the position in New South Wales where the "right-wing" State Executive was balanced with token representation in the early 1960's from the opposing "left-wing" Steering Committee faction.

³Many union delegates, often paid a generous expense allowance, voted en bloc in the presence of each other for Ticketing Committee candidates.
but such a situation existed in the Victorian ALP between 1955 and 1958. Opposition to the candidates supported by the Divers "pre-election" meeting for the "new" VCE to be elected at the Special Conference, largely from M.C.C. Jordan and certain former supporters of the Movement-Group faction such as D. Lovegrove and E.W. Peters did not take factional form. Such dissidence as there was from unionist supporters of the "Jordan ticket" in 1955 did not develop into large scale opposition to the VCE until about seven years later. Factionalism grew stronger as the VCE grew less representative after 1958, particularly after the VCE sought to exercise its authority by imposing sanctions against what were considered to be Party deviants. Four groups of Party members opposed the VCE in our period, but none by themselves constituted an effective Party faction.\footnote{Dutch-born A.J.C. van de Loo and his supporters, who formed the Progressive United Labor Party (PULP) to contest the 1961 State elections, is excluded from our list of VCE opponents because the PULP was formed primarily as a result of van de Loo's expulsion from the ALP for opposing an ALP candidate in a Broadmeadows Council election after his defeat in a VCE pre-selection ballot. The PULP claimed to oppose "Communist" influence in the ALP and "Catholic" influence in the DLP. All PULP candidates polled poorly. See J. Jupp, Victoria Votes, op. cit., pp. 23-24.}

The first group of Party members to oppose VCE policies were a number of Jewish members of the Party's New Australian Council (NAC), a multicultural group formed...
to encourage migrant participation in the ALP.\footnote{See A.F. Davies, *Essays in Political Sociology*, Melbourne, Cheshire, 1972, pp. 78-79, J. Jupp, *Arrivals and Departures*, op. cit., p. 88, and L. Allan, *Ethnic Politics*, op. cit., pp. 22-23.} This group expressed disagreement with the VCE over attitudes towards Communism and "unity-tickets." Its secretary, Bono Wiener, was expelled from the ALP. The influence of this group, both in terms of encouraging migrant participation in the ALP and of presenting policies within the Party, was never very great.\footnote{The publication of "Spotlight" by O. Rozenbres, a former member of the NAC, between 1960 and 1967 provided a publicity outlet for anti-VCE material, and is a useful source of information on friction and personality clashes within the VCE itself. Certain former members of the NAC also promoted the "ALP Rank and File Committee" to oppose S.H. Cohen after his pre-selection for the Senate by the VCE. This opposition was part of a Jewish community faction fight between members of the Polish-Yiddish anti-Communist Jewish Labor Bund (the members of which were strongly represented on the NAC) opposed to the more left-wing Jewish Council to Combat Fascism and Anti-Semitism, Cohen being a member of the latter body. See "Labor Yes, Sam Cohen No," ALP Rank and File Committee pamphlet, 1961.} The second group, the Melbourne University ALP Club (MUAILP Club), was not affiliated with the Party, but formed the nuclei of groups within both ALP branches and the Young Labor Association (YLA) opposed to the VCE, at least until 1962 and possibly until the Club was taken

\footnote{The MUAILP Club lost much of its drive in that year with the accidental death of its president, W. Thomas. See P. Coleman, "Death of a Hero, Bill Thomas," *Bulletin*, 5 May 1962. Thomas wrote articles opposed to the VCE for the magazines "Observer" and "Bulletin" under the pseudonym "Mugga."}
over by elements who did not represent the mainstream of
moderate ALP opinion in 1964.¹ Originally formed in 1949
as a breakaway from the Communist-controlled Labour Club,²
the MUAILP Club provided a moderate opposition to the VCE
for most of our period. The MUAILP Club formulated policies
which might have seemed anathema to many Party traditional-
ists, especially its advocacy of changes in immigration
policy,³ but had little effect on Party organization because
the Club had no great support base within the ALP.⁴

¹The MUAILP Club after 1964 ceased to have any
influence in Campus politics, mainly because the Club moved
too far to the right, even appearing to support the presence
of Australian troops in South Vietnam. A resurrected
moderate ALP Club in the mid 1970's again became a leading
political club on Campus, but no Melbourne University
political club is again likely to have the influence of the
MUAILP Club of the early 1960's because the growth of
tertiary educational institutions after 1961 ended
Melbourne University's special position as Victoria's only
provider of "radical student politicians."

²See P. O'Brien, op. cit., p. 68.

³The MUAILP Club can probably claim some credit for
the ALP's abandonment in 1965 of support for a "white
Australia." MUAILP Club members agitated for such a change
in the YLA, in Party branches, and at Annual Conference.
They were also active in organizations such as the
Immigration Reform Association and Student Action which
acted as pressure groups on the ALP. The activity of
MUAILP Club members in the Fabian Society, sometimes referred
to as a "downtown ALP Club," and later on Victorian ALP
policy committees, provided the great intellectual stimulus
for the formulation of policies on such issues as education
and civil liberties in which the Victorian ALP previously
had little interest.

⁴Some MUAILP Club members articulated demands for a
reform of the Victorian ALP, as did Senator Kennelly,
referred to previously, in 1961. The lack of a credible
alternative organization at that time made such demands
unrealistic.
The third group revolved around M.C.C. Jordan and the craft union majority of the THC. This group opposed Movement and NCC influence on the THC immediately post-split, but came to resist demands from the bigger industrial unions for greater THC representation from around 1960. 1

Considerable friction developed between Jordan and some members of the VCE, particularly J.P. Brehbner, in 1963. 2 This friction culminated in Jordan's suspension from the ALP on 25 January 1964. 3 Jordan was readmitted to the ALP a few months later, 4 but the VCE, by suspending Jordan in the first place, encouraged the formation of organized opposition to Ticketing Committee VCE candidates at 1964 Annual Conference. 5 The presence of a rival Annual Conference "ticket" in 1964 drawn up by Jordan and his supporters (the "Jordan ticket") led to the addition of two extra Federal parliamentarians, Federal Leader

1 See D. Plowman, op. cit.

2 Jordan was considered a "right-winger" by many VCE members, but some evidence exists (especially in the case of Brehbner) that the dispute on the THC was of as much a personal nature as an ideological one. See N. Groves, "A Study of the Origin of the 1967 Division in the Victorian Trades Hall Council," BA (Hons.) thesis, La Trobe University, 1972.

3 See The Jordan Affair, Spotlight, 15 February 1964.

4 See Hypocrisy and Sham: The Jordan Decision, Spotlight, 15 March 1964.

5 An additional factor was the active support of most VCE members for J.W. Wood in the election for Secretary of the THC contested by Jordan after Stout's death in March 1964. Jordan defeated Wood by a narrow margin.
A.A. Calwell and Dr J.F. Cairns to the Ticketing Committee list of VCE candidates, but the election of Calwell and Cairns did nothing to make the VCE more representative in that neither represented a significant body of Party opinion likely to support changes in the way the Victorian Party operated. The Victorian ALP Conference representation system, providing for large delegate entitlements from the larger industrial unions, ensured the defeat of the "Jordan ticket" by about a two-to-one margin. For the first time since 1955 the VCE in 1964 included no prominent representative from the Melbourne THC.

The fourth group, "the Participants," were formed in 1965.¹ In themselves the Participants were not an effective Party faction for they were comprised largely of middle-class and professional ALP members. The predominance of such "middle-class types," who were regarded with suspicion by the older generation among ALP stalwarts with blue-collar unionist backgrounds, ensured the group would be a minority in the ALP membership.

¹The group were first publicly referred to as "the Participants" in a newspaper article. See The Australian, 28 March 1968. Persons named in the article as Participants included R.D. Williams, Federal Secretary of the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional Associations, J. Cain, Jnr., son of a former Victorian Labor Premier, R. Kennelly, son of Senator P.J. Kennelly, R.E. McCarvie, barrister and Queen's Counsel, and "other intellectuals."
While the Participants received support from several interstate parliamentarians, in particular Federal Leader E.G. Whitlam and his Deputy L.H. Barnard, no Victorian parliamentarian, possibly for fear of losing pre-selection by the VCE, gave the group their public support.

The significance of the Participants should not be underrated. Combined with elements of the Jordan group they constituted a modern faction in the Victorian ALP, providing a credible alternative to the unrepresentative VCE. ¹ With the support of interstate parliamentarians such as Whitlam, Barnard and later Clyde Cameron the Participants acted as persistent sponsors of Federal intervention. ²

That a modern faction developed in the Victorian ALP after 1964 is even more the result of a denial of

¹The Participants unsuccessfully contested VCE elections at 1966 and 1967 Annual Conferences on a "representative ticket" which included several Jordan supporters on the THC, certain retiring VCE members such as J.F. Cairns, and Participants such as McGarvie, Williams, and Melbourne University Political Science lecturer James Jupp. The monthly journal of the Participants, "Labor Comment," was edited by journalist Robert Murray, author of The Split, op. cit. Labor Comment had a wide readership until 1970 and was a very effective propaganda weapon by the VCE's opponents.

²See A. Hughes, Political Review, Australian Quarterly 41 No. 4 (December 1969), p. 24 and J.D. Fitzgerald, op. cit., Ch. V.
representation to significant parts of the Party membership than the development of the Anti-Movement faction in the early 1950's. The significant difference between the early 1950's and the late 1960's is the growing influence in the latter period of a middle-class party membership. The Victorian ALP organization in the 1960's was unresponsive to the fact that middle class and professional persons sympathetic to the Party were alienated by a Party organization which denied them any great opportunity to participate in the Party except at the lowest levels unless they were prepared to support uncritically those holding the highest Party offices.

This Chapter has demonstrated the relationship of party patrons to the development of party factionalism using as a case study the Victorian ALP. We have seen in the case of the United Front in the late 1930's, the Anti-Movement faction of the 1950's, and the Jordan-Participants groupings of the 1960's that the operation of factionalism in the Victorian ALP is dependent upon the support of a significant number of the Party's trade union patrons. "Out-groups" such as the NAC and the MUALP Club could not be considered as Party factions in anything but the most ineffective sense.

Support by certain trade union patrons
enabled the Jordan and Participants groups to together form a modern faction after 1964. The fact that the Participants were seen by many Party members as being "white collar" or "intellectual" also proved a barrier to their growth as a faction in their own right. The Participants were anathema to certain Party members who were concerned with the maintenance of a symbolic universe which saw the ALP exclusively in terms of a working class trade union Party with no need to secure middle class support if the Party was to improve its parliamentary representation. Despite their predominance of middle class members the Participants were, however, able to operate in collaboration with certain groups of unionists, but these unionists were mostly members of smaller craft unions that supported Jordan on the Melbourne THC in their dispute with the larger industrial unions over THC representation. The fact that the Jordan-Participants groupings could not secure support from the larger industrial unions prevented them from becoming the majority faction in the Victorian ALP.

The majority faction in control of both Conference and the VCE towards the end of our period, the larger industrial unions and their allies, had certain weaknesses that helped prevent the Victorian ALP from achieving greater support from the electorate. The following Chapter will consider the existence of a link between the party patrons and electoral performance.
CHAPTER VIII

"IDEOLOGICAL PURITY" ABOVE POWER. A STUDY OF ELECTORAL FAILURE

This Chapter suggests a linkage exists between the patrons of a mass-clientele party and the party's electoral performance. It will be shown that the strengths and weaknesses of a mass-clientele party are directly linked with the strengths and weaknesses of the party's patrons. For a mass-clientele party the strengths and weaknesses of the party's patrons are an important factor in its chances of electoral success.

The Victorian Branch of the ALP demonstrates the linkage between patrons and electoral performance. We will first discuss the ALP's performance in Victorian elections and then analyse the reasons suggested to explain this performance. We will conclude with an assessment of the ALP at the end of our period, with the attitudes of trade union patrons in respect of both Party organization and policies seen as barriers to the Party commanding greater electoral appeal.

The ALP has a dismal electoral record in Victoria,
its only consistent electoral successes at the State and Federal level generally confined to electorates in Melbourne's northern and western industrial working-class suburbs. The ALP has held office in Government in Victoria for lesser periods than in any other State. Only once, in 1952, has the ALP ever won an absolute majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly, the lower House of the State Parliament. The ALP has never won a majority in the Legislative Council, the upper House of the State Parliament, and has rarely won a majority of Victorian seats in the Federal House of Representatives.

The failure of the ALP in Victoria to win both State Government and House of Representatives seats has been traditionally explained in terms of demography and geography. Demographic-geographic theories argue that the ALP's electoral position in Victoria is explained by the Party's weakness outside metropolitan Melbourne.

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1 See W. Dye, Australia in the Particular, Arena 3 (Autumn 1964), p. 23, for a discussion of this phenomenon.


The argument is sometimes put in terms of Victoria's rural land tenure, that smallholders predominate in Victorian farming communities rather than the large landowners typical of Australian farming elsewhere, and that the small farmer provides the real mass basis for conservatism in the State.\(^1\) It is also put in terms of a failure for heavy industry to develop in Victoria compared with New South Wales outside the State's capital city, by the absence of any large population centres outside Melbourne capable of sustaining radical politics.\(^2\)

Of more importance as a factor in ALP defeats in many Victorian State elections before 1965 than the mere absence of rural heavy industry or the presence of a substantial number of smallholder farmers was the existence of a rural gerrymander.\(^3\) This rural gerrymander, an overrepresentation of country electors in State Parliament, prevented the ALP from obtaining the maximum benefit of any State-wide uniform electoral swing in its favour. Under successive redistributions of State electoral

\(^1\) Dye, op. cit., p. 24.
\(^2\) (A.A. Staley), op. cit., p. 101.
boundaries the growth of metropolitan Melbourne as a proportion of the State's population did not result in a corresponding increase in the proportion of parliamentarians representing metropolitan Melbourne electorates. The extent of the ALP's disadvantage is illustrated by Rydon who calculated that the ALP needed over 57 per cent of the State-wide vote to win a majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly from 1937 to 1945, and about 54 per cent after the redistribution of 1945.

In inner-Melbourne before 1955 ALP candidates outpolled Liberal opponents by margins as great as four to one. In the safest Liberal seats Liberal margins against ALP opponents in straight two-way contests were not generally much better than three to two. The major non-Labor parties in Victoria benefit from single-member electorates by a more favourable distribution of their


2. See C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, Voting for the Victoria Legislative Assembly 1890-1964, Canberra, Australian National University, 1975. Examples of voting in two of the safer ALP inner-Melbourne Legislative Assembly electorates at two consecutive elections are Carlton, with ALP percentages of 66.9 in 1947 and 74.3 in 1950 and Collingwood, with ALP percentages of 73.4 in 1947 and 78.6 in 1950.

3. Examples of voting in the safer Liberal electorates from Hughes and Graham, Voting for the Victoria Legislative Assembly, op. cit., are Camperwell, with Liberal percentages of 67.3 in 1947 and 65.1 in 1950 and Glen Iris, with Liberal percentages of 61.2 in 1947 and 66.5 in 1950.
electoral supporters in that they consistently win a number of both country and middle-class suburban seats by smaller majorities than the majorities by which ALP candidates normally win the safer ALP seats. Massive majorities in a single-member electoral system, the system used in elections for the House of Representatives and both Houses of the Victorian Parliament, are effectively wasted votes for the ALP on a State-wide basis.  

The ALP continues to suffer from a large concentration of its supporters living in a relatively small area of inner-Melbourne, but there has been no heavy anti-ALP rural bias in elections for the Legislative Assembly since 1965.

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2 In 1961 the ALP held no Legislative Assembly seats in metropolitan Melbourne south of the Yarra River other than Albert Park, a seat including within its boundaries the strong Labor area of Port Melbourne.

3 The rural bias, although removed by the so-called "two-for-one" legislation of 1953 providing for two single-member Legislative Assembly electorates to be created within the boundaries of each House of Representatives electorate, was re-instated in a not heavily anti-ALP way in the redistribution of 1965. For the effects of "two-for-one" see F.P. McManus, The Tumult and the Shouting, op. cit., p. 55. Surprisingly P. Aimer, Politics, Power and Persuasion: The Liberals in Victoria, Ch. 2, does not assess the impact of the "two-for-one" redistribution on Liberal Party performance in Victoria after 1955.
The ALP's principal electoral problems in Victoria since 1955 result from the split of that year and the consequences of that split.

The major electoral consequence of the 1955 ALP split was that it saw a realignment of Catholic support which had previously gone to the ALP. Catholics who had previously voted for the ALP now voted for the ACIP or DLP in great numbers. The split itself converted previously ALP voting Catholics into effective voters for the Liberal Party. Two electoral surveys suggest support for the DLP of about half of the Catholic population eligible to vote.

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1 See Langdon, op. cit., p. 898.

2 This position arose because many Liberal candidates who lacked a plurality of votes over the ALP candidate in a number of individual electorates owed their election to the use of the preferential (alternative vote) voting system under which the overwhelming number of electors who voted DLP, at least in Victoria, directed their second effective preference to the Liberal candidate in accordance with the recommendation from the Party organization on the DLP "how-to-vote" ticket. Two Federal Liberal Party-Country Party Governments, the Menzies Government in 1961 and the Gorton Government in 1969, owe their election to DLP second preference direction in a number of marginal electorates. See L.F. Crisp, The DLP Vote 1958-1969 - and after, Politics V (May 1970), pp. 62-66 for a treatment of DLP preference distribution.

3 See Langdon, op. cit., p. 897 and Burns, op. cit., p. 85.
The fact that so many Catholics continued to vote for the DLP was a major factor in the ALP's failure to make electoral gains after 1955.

Warhurst suggests the realignment of the Catholic vote in Victoria in 1955 was due to a combination of upward mobility and fear of Communism. The decline in support for the ALP among Catholics may have been due initially to the image presented to them of leftward moves by the ALP in 1955 after moderate and right-wing Catholics left the Party to join the ACILP. The fact that almost all Victorian Catholic Labor parliamentarians joined the ACILP, and the support for the ACILP and later for the DLP by the Catholic Hierarchy, in particular by Archbishop Mannix and his auxiliary Bishop A.F. Fox, were also factors in the preference of many Victorian Catholic voters for the DLP.

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2Murray, The Split, pp. 252-253 describes the bitterness caused by the split among Victorian Catholics. Murray also suggests (p. 259) that ACILP parliamentarians were a disparate lot, even including W.G. Bryson who leaned to the left.

3Several Catholic parliamentarians, including Calwell, Kennelly and Peters, stayed with the ALP.

4For a heavily biased treatment see Truman, Catholic Action and Politics, op. cit., pp. 254-268 for a treatment of both the role of Mannix and Fox in their support for the DLP and the question of whether or not it was a sin for Catholics to vote for the ALP. In the immediate post-split period this question created considerable discussion among Australian, and particularly Victorian Catholics.
The DLP was at its most effective in opposing the ALP. DLP propaganda sought to portray the Party as a respectable alternative both to a "pro-Communist" ALP and a Liberal Party complacent to the threat of Communism and the need for more effective Australian defence forces rather than as a "Catholic Party" which many non-Catholic voters believed the DLP to be. \(^1\) Jupp's finding that the DLP proportion of the vote in some middle class electorates exceeded the Catholic proportion of the population at the 1961 State election is evidence that the DLP succeeded in attracting protest votes against particular policies of Liberal Governments. In the absence of DLP candidates some of these protest votes may have been directed to the ALP. That the DLP vote in Victoria remained so high, always above twelve per cent on a State-wide basis in our period, provoked expressions of hopelessness throughout the ALP, that there seemed little possibility of an ALP electoral success. There is, however, little difference in essence between these expressions and those common before 1952 in seeing a permanent minority role for the Victorian ALP. Both expressions really see Labor's Victorian failure in terms of political culture.

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1See D. A. Aitkin, Stability and Change in Australian Politics, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1977, pp. 68-70 and p. 177 for a discussion of non-Catholic attitudes toward the DLP.

ALP can be explained in terms of political culture suggest that there is something inherently conservative about Victorians and even about the Victorian ALP, whether the Party be controlled by a Wren machine, a Movement machine, or left leaning unions. The claim that Victoria might be an "odd" State, compared with the rest of Australia, has some credibility in that the Victorian ALP appears to have a parliamentary record, at least in State politics, of a party prepared to play kingmaker rather than itself being prepared to play the role of king. The original "kingmaker" role played by the Victorian ALP took place in the 1930's, when the Party supported a Country Party Government led by A. A. Dunstan. Such "kingmaking" is looked upon as an example of Victoria being "odd" compared with other States in the sense that in no other State has the ALP been prepared to support a Country Party Government, or for that matter has the Country Party been prepared to accept such support from the ALP.

1K.E. Beazley, Labour and Foreign Policy, Outlook 20 No. 2 (August 1966), p. 131. For suggestions that the weakness of Labor in Victoria derives from political attitudes in the 1890's see J.D. Rickard, Class and Politics, New South Wales, Victoria and the Early Commonwealth, 1890-1910, Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1976, pp. 43-44.


3Jupp, Australian Party Politics, op. cit., p. 16 describes ALP support for Dunstan after 1935 as "unique and somewhat demoralizing."
The presence of something "odd" about Victoria has been used as an argument by organizational conservatives in the Victorian ALP in order to justify a Party structure where trade union dominance and a "winner take all" electoral system ensure the dominance of a particular ruling group. They see the absence of ALP Governments in Victoria as justifying their support of extreme positions, that moderation will not in their view produce electoral success. Views such as these were widely held in the Victorian ALP after 1955. While such views were widely held the Party could not fulfil its office-seeking function with any degree of effectiveness. The Victorian ALP, even if it seriously considered itself capable of forming a State Government, lacked the will to even approach such an eventuality by winning parliamentary seats.

A major factor in the Victorian ALP's inability to win parliamentary seats was its emphasis on "ideological purity." Although a key issue in the post-1955 Victorian ALP the term "ideological purity" was never used in a very precise way. The term initially seemed to suggest opposition by the ALP to State aid for denominational schools (or simply "State aid") to the exclusion of all other issues, although after 1965 the term came to embrace opposition by the Party to conscription and Australia's participation in the Vietnam War. A great concern of
many 1955 vintage ALP members was that the "ideological purity" of the Party would be destroyed if the ALP admitted ex-members of the DLP or even too many Catholics as Party members. The Victorian ALP never articulated any well thought out set of policies with wider electoral appeal in our period.  

Concern with "ideological purity" destroyed any chance of the Victorian ALP's successful fulfilment of its ideological-policy articulation function in that by consistent opposition to "State aid" the Party offended a great number of Catholic voters. An indication of Catholic feelings on the issue is suggested by survey evidence that ninety per cent of Catholics were in favour of State aid to Church schools.  

The introduction of a limited form of "State aid" by the Menzies Liberal Party–Country Party coalition Government in 1964 made the ALP's policy electorally ridiculous in that it would be very difficult for the ALP to win an election with a policy that such aid be discontinued. Catholic voters in the past had supported the ALP when little prospect existed that any major party would give substantial aid to Catholic schools. With the

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DLP wholeheartedly supporting "State aid," and with changes in Liberal policy favouring aid, Catholics would have less reason to vote ALP. The blatant sectarianism of some VCE members would further encourage Catholics to vote against ALP candidates.

Anti-Catholic speeches were a ritual for some delegates at post-1955 Victorian ALP Annual Conferences, but such speeches were rarely reported in the media. Pamphlets authorized by VCE members did more electoral damage. The letter-box distribution of VCE member D.R. MacSween's "Black Hand of Santamaria" pamphlet in the Maribyrnong Federal electorate in 1961 is the classic case of sectarian propaganda distributed at the wrong time in the wrong place. The vitriolic nature of the pamphlet could only offend moderate voters, non-Catholic as well as Catholic, who might otherwise have voted ALP in that election.

1 Courtnay, interview.


pamphlet drew attention to some sinister (Catholic) "plot" masterminded by Santamaria to take over Australia's trade union movement in quality little better than undergraduate. It is possible that but for this pamphlet being distributed in the Maribyrnong electorate A.A. Calwell may have become Labor Prime Minister.

The public articulation of socialist policies was not, incredibly given its image as an extreme left organization, the practice of the Victorian ALP in our period. Socialism, if the basic philosophy of the Party, lacked precise definition. Nationalization of industries was the seeming extent of the Party's socialist commitment. ¹ The Party's younger intellectual members came to see socialism more in terms of egalitarianism, or in terms of a planned economy and an expanded public sector. ²

¹See comments by E.G. Whitlam in J. Wilkes (ed.), Forces in Australian Politics, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1965, p. 73 on socialization being limited in its application to nationalization. For an extreme of such limitation see T. Truman, Ideological Groups in the Australian Labor Party and their Attitudes, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1965, where ideological groups, defined as extreme left, moderate left, moderate right and extreme right are identified on the basis of attitudes toward nationalization of industries, the more favourable attitude toward nationalization suggesting a more sympathetic attitude on a test of socialism-communism (pp. 50-51). Attitudes limiting the definition of socialism to nationalization were common in the post-1955 split ALP.


In 1961 Annual Conference in Victoria could pass a resolution recommending to the next Federal Labor Government to immediately examine the position of monopolies such as Broken Hill Proprietary, Imperial Chemical Industries, Colonial Sugar Refining, Australian Consolidated Industries, Banks, Breweries and Oil with a view to socialization in line with ALP objective.  

The passing of such resolutions served little purpose other than to satisfy Party traditionalists unaware of electoral realities. The likelihood that public articulation of "socialist" policies such as these may have harmful electoral consequences was recognized by Federal Leader Calwell, who promised in his 1961 Federal election policy speech that a Labor Government would not nationalize any industries during its term of office.  

Candidates endorsed for parliamentary seats by the VCE also failed to publicly articulate ALP policies as socialist policies, even failing to mention that the ALP was a professed socialist party. Such failure was not unintentional, but reflected feelings that the electorate was not yet ready for such public articulation.  

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1ALP (Victoria) State Conference Decisions, 1961, p. 2.

2Age (Melbourne), 17 November 1961.

Conference, where trade union delegates, and even some branch delegates, ritualistically proclaimed that the dishonesty of the Party in neglecting its socialist objective in electoral campaigning cost the Party votes. Such delegates were rarely pre-selected, even by the post-1955 VCE, for winnable parliamentary seats.

If ALP parliamentary candidates in general recognized the mood of the electorate, at least to the extent of refusing to articulate policies the electorate found unacceptable, the Party in general did not. The mood of the electorate was moving in such a way that a Party which appeared to be fighting a "class-war," at least to the extent that the Party insisted on emphasizing its working class basis in its overrepresentation of industrial unions. It could not, therefore, appeal to an increasingly middle class political public. ¹

The Victorian ALP in our period has shown itself to have a poor record in the management of ideas. The ALP relied too much on the symbolic universe of its trade

¹For a view that class has become an increasingly irrelevant explanation of Australian voting behaviour see D.A. Kemp, Society and Electoral Behaviour in Australia, St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1978.
union patrons. Throughout our period its industrial union patrons saw the ALP too much in terms of an old and outmoded reality. The concern of the Party's industrial union patrons on such issues as "State aid," rapprochement with the DLP and anti-American foreign policy was seen by the electorate as "extremist." Criticism of the ALP by the Liberal Party and the DLP in the media, which sought to convince voters that the Victorian ALP and the Communist Party were little different, served only to reinforce concerns by the Victorian ALP's trade union patrons and the VCE for their own Party status. These concerns were misdirected.

The Victorian ALP in our period proved unable to remove the stigma of arguments that the Party was Communist by association with some of its patrons. The VCE as a body was not pro-Communist, nor did the Victorian ALP intentionally articulate Communist policies. However, the tolerance by the Victorian ALP of "unity tickets," (how-to-vote tickets in trade union elections listing both ALP members and Communists) and the presence of Communist officials in powerful unions affiliated with the Victorian ALP, were great weapons when used as propaganda by the Liberal Party and the DLP. The DLP was most effective in this regard in its use of television
advertising, especially after 1958.\textsuperscript{1} In a period of intense anti-Communist feelings among the electorate such propaganda almost certainly influenced many voters. Only an "opening-up" of the Party, by a much greater representation of branch members at Party Conferences and in the Party organization, could have helped the Party to create a structure better able to meet the electorate's aspirations and needs. An organization where trade unions, especially Communist controlled unions, were in such a powerful position did not serve it well. Propaganda alleging the Party to be pro-Communist was difficult for the ALP to counteract.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Television transmissions commenced in Melbourne and Sydney in 1956, but political parties did not effectively use the medium for electoral propaganda before 1961. In the 1963 Federal election the DLP used skeletons in a dramatic television advertisement to suggest an association between the ALP and the Communist Party.

\textsuperscript{2} The schism in the Communist Party of Australia between Moscow-line and Peking-line members in 1963 had effects on certain of the ALP's trade union affiliates which changed the effects of Liberal-DLP propaganda suggesting ALP-Communist associations by the end of the 1960's. The fact that Communism was no longer a monolithic movement controlled from Moscow, if it ever was in Australia, and the existence of wide divisions among Communist union officials, made such propaganda less credible.
We have demonstrated that weaknesses of a mass-clientele party's patrons will be linked with the electoral performance of the party itself. This was certainly the case in the Victorian ALP during our period. The Party did not effectively fulfil its ideology-policy articulation function, as we have seen, because the Party appealed to the symbolic universe of its trade union patrons. The Party failed to articulate policies which would win over Catholic voters who had formed a great part of the Party's base of support before 1955. The symbolic universe of family based social security and anti-Communist defence policies created by B.A. Santamaria had more appeal to these Catholic voters than the Victorian ALP's symbolic universe which appeared as one of anti-Catholicism. The Victorian ALP failed dismally to articulate policies sufficiently attractive to a wider electorate. The Victorian ALP failed to fulfil effectively its representation-participation function because the Party organization remained dominated by its trade union patrons, and was unrepresentative of significant parts of the electorate, particularly middle class voters and Catholics. In particular the domination of the Party organization by the Party's trade union patrons made difficult the task of presenting the Party as one which could attract wide appeal.
The split of 1955 had initially made difficult the task of winning elections, for the ALP lost many of its best parliamentarians and members of its organization. Once the Party had secured "pragmatic" legitimacy, acceptance by the electorate as the dominant Victorian left-of-centre party as we have discussed in Chapter IV, the Party could benefit by its own ideology-policy articulation, only if articulated in a way acceptable to the electorate. The split of 1955 need not have prevented ALP electoral gains after 1960, given the unpopularity of Menzies Government credit restriction policies, the so-called "credit squeeze," and unemployment in 1961-62 at record post-World War II levels not to be exceeded until the 1970's. In sum, the ALP failed to benefit from the Menzies Government's unpopularity because it appeared to represent its trade union patrons rather than a responsible alternative Government to the majority of the electorate.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The key theoretical issue for a mass-clientele party is one of such a party’s relationship with its patrons, and the affect of such a relationship on the party’s chances of electoral success. An extreme mass-clientele party may consider itself exclusively as a client of its patrons, the primary concern of such a party being merely to satisfy any demands which the patrons might make. A pragmatic mass-clientele party is likely to consider itself less a client of its patrons, its concern being more with seeking a clientele of its own, preferably a clientele embracing a wider spectrum of the population, by appealing to a mass electorate.

The appeal of a mass-clientele party will depend upon its "reality constructs," a climate of ideas and ideas management. "Reality constructs,"\(^1\) perceptions of reality employed by a mass-clientele party, may, in their particularities, suggest that the concern of the party is

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\(^1\) Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., pp. 13-15; discussed more at pp. 196 ff.

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closer to its patrons than to a mass electorate. As Berger and Luckmann observe: "What is 'real' to a Tibetan monk may not be 'real' to an American businessman." In the case of a mass-clientele party what is "real" to its patrons may not be "real" to a large number of voters. Reality as perceived is considered as apart from and without prejudice to that which is real. The array of reality constructs employed by a mass-clientele party, its patrons and its leadership, especially its parliamentary leadership, will govern that party's potential appeal. The employment of reality constructs must, however, be considered in the light of the prevailing climate of ideas within the electorate. To be electorally successful a party must be able to "manage" ideas with wide appeal: it must employ reality constructs expressing a concern for the electorate. An analysis of ideas management by a mass-clientele party will suggest the capability of the party in appealing to a wider electorate.

The Australian Labor Party is at a disadvantage compared with its conservative opponents in that the Party employs reality constructs which result from the domination of the Party by its trade union patrons. The trade union

1Berger and Luckmann, op. cit., p. 15.
patrons of the Party deal in systems of ideas which are frequently unacceptable to a large part of the electorate. This was particularly so in our period in respect of foreign relations and education. The rhetoric employed by certain of the ALP's patron unions which saw foreign relations chiefly in terms of anti-American foreign policies, together with support for overseas left-wing insurgency movements, and education in terms of intransigent opposition to State aid for Church schools, were anathema to many voters.

The climate of ideas and ideas "management," the way in which particular reality constructs are marketed to a mass electorate, have an equally great affect on a party's electoral appeal as the reality constructs themselves. The climate of ideas, the prevailing character of beliefs, attitudes and opinions held by the community, have generally benefited the Liberal Party in Australia because the Liberal Party has been better at managing ideas, either because Liberal policies better reflect community attitudes, or because the Liberal Party has been able to create a symbolic universe capable of sustaining mass electoral support.

Conservative parties in Australia have been much better in their use of language than the ALP. This fact
may in part be explained by an examination of the social strata from which the Liberal Party and Country Party leadership is normally drawn, where command of persuasive rhetoric is much more readily available. It can also be explained by the fact that the ALP is restricted in its use of persuasive language by its patron unions, as well as by the use of language, particularly by some intellectuals, that is heavily ideological rather than pragmatic.

Liberal Party ideas are drawn from long experience in positions of power and the management of affairs, both in government and in business. The ALP is at a disadvantage in that it has a difficulty in adopting an appropriate language of discourse because of the ideological element of both some Party members as well as certain of the Party's trade union patrons. Such ideas as widespread public ownership and a withdrawal from all United States defence agreements by Australia are particularly cases where the Party is unlikely to achieve widespread electoral support. The letter by Federal Leader H.V. Evatt to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in 1954 is such a case involving an inappropriate language of discourse where, whatever Evatt's principled intentions, public attitudes towards Communism and the Soviet Union suggested electoral unpopularity for the ALP was the likely result of Evatt's revelations that he had engaged in correspondence with a Minister of the
Soviet Government. The ALP suffers from the militancy of certain of its patron unions. The reputation of some unions, for example in our period the Waterside Workers' Federation, with their record of industrial unrest and ideological militancy, also worked against the ALP.

The electoral impact of ideas management by a mass-clientele party is likely to have great electoral consequences in times of rapid social change. A mass-clientele party cannot respond to social change where the patrons of that party are by nature conservative and hold static ideas, unacquainted with or at least bewildered by changes in a wider society and unwilling to accede to even minimal demands by party members and party adherents for changes that will make the party more acceptable to the electorate. Even minor policy changes, such as an acceptance in an increasingly affluent society that the electorate will no longer accept a party's commitment to large scale nationalization of industries, are likely to result in an actual increase in such a party's vote given that the party has otherwise some appeal to potential voters.

—Dalziel, op. cit., Ch. 14.
The ALP suffers in that the experiences of those upon whom it draws for ideas have frequently been learned from industrial disputes. The Liberals, as we have suggested previously, can draw on men with wide experiences in the management of existing institutions. The ALP is also at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Liberal Party in that the domain of ideology present within the ALP is dominated by left-ideologues with ideas at some distance from the received ideas of society. The ideas of left-ideologues, no matter how seemingly intelligent to their promoters, display a lack of judgement if presented to the electorate as serious ALP policies. Even proposals for economic planning, commonly presented by younger left-ideologues in our period in the ALP, were incongruous in the way they were presented in that they assumed an increasing role for the public sector which might not meet the expectations of a middle-class consumer society.

The ALP failed to attract sufficient members with pragmatic ideas. Those it did attract it failed to promote,

1A.C. Theophanus, *Australian Democracy in Crisis. A Radical Approach to Australian Politics*, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1980, Ch. 6D, in his reference to unions makes no mention of any ideas emanating from the leadership of Australian unions other than by union leaders seeking to justify their own positions.
with rare exceptions, to positions of parliamentary leadership. The ALP in our period lacked the leadership ability of the Liberals, especially a leader such as R.G. Menzies with a remarkable ability to manipulate ideas. As a Liberal Prime Minister, Menzies saw pragmatism not as an option but as a necessity if the Liberals were to win a succession of electoral victories. The presentation of ideas such as the maintenance of an affluent consumer society, the protection of private property and the promotion of private home ownership were important factors in the continued support for the Menzies Government by the majority of the electorate. The ALP in contrast was hamstrung by its inward looking preoccupations and the false assumption that these were of much interest to the electorate.

It has been suggested in Chapter II that the most important feature of mass-clientele parties relevant to electoral success is that of function fulfilment and that mass clientele parties fulfil three functions, those of "office-seeking," "ideology-policy articulation" and "representation-participation." The effectiveness of function fulfilment is demonstrated by consideration of a number of theoretical issues. In analysing the extent to which each of these theoretical issues was resolved in the case of a particular mass-clientele party, we have
suggested the extent to which function fulfilment by that party was effective. These theoretical issues are concerned with the effects of a party's general representativeness, the performance of party parliamentarians, and the operation of a party's organization on function fulfilment. The ALP in Victoria from 1955-1965 has been presented as a case study of a mass-clientele party where the relationship between function fulfilment and electoral performance can be demonstrated.

In fulfilment of its "representation-participation" function the Victorian ALP was at its weakest. At executive level the Party was unrepresentative of significant sectors of the Party membership. The principal problem in respect of "representation-participation" was one of representativeness. The general representativeness of the Victorian ALP, as we saw in Chapters III and IV, was one in which the trade union Party patrons were dominant in the Party organization. We suggested in Chapter III that a lack of representativeness is a major de-stabilizing factor, and a principal cause of fracture, in a mass-clientele party. We suggested that a lack of representativeness was a major cause of the 1955 ALP split. As we saw in Chapter IV the 1955 split did not result in any substantial changes in the Victorian ALP's organizational structure,
which remained dominated by the Party's trade union patrons. The Party's controllers in 1955 were different from their predecessors of 1954 in that they were largely representative of a small group of union officials, mainly from smaller craft unions, who were the main opponents before 1955 of the Movement-Group faction which had then been in control of the Victorian ALP. But the Party's controllers, as well as the Party as a whole, were markedly unrepresentative of a large part of the Victorian population, the Victorian Catholic community, which before 1955 represented a large part of the Victorian ALP's base of support. Differences in personnel after 1955 in the Victorian ALP organization did not make the Party more electorally successful. The changed personnel of 1955 were not sufficiently representative of the *bourgeoisisation* taking place in the greater electorate.

The centralized nature of the Victorian ALP organization after 1955, and in particular of the trade union dominated VCE, exercised a control over Party affairs that sustained the impression, particularly to the wider electorate but also to some Party members, that it was virtually complete. This was demonstrated in respect of
the Party's "office-seeking" in Chapters V and VI, with
the control by the VCE of pre-selection, not only of
parliamentary candidates but also at the "parish pump"
level in local government. In Chapter V we suggested that
pre-selection of parliamentary candidates by the VCE
placed parliamentarians in a position where their ability
to act independently of the Party organization might be
restricted. In our period very few ALP parliamentarians
were willing to challenge the exercise of control over the
Party by the Party's patrons. No parliamentary leader of
great appeal emerged in our period.

In fulfilment of its "office-seeking" function the
patrons may be a strength financially in the supply of
funds for the purpose of electioneering. In the case of
the Victorian ALP trade union affiliates provided much of
the Party's funds. The supply of funds by party patrons
may also be a weakness. The fact is that in a mass-clientele
party, the supply of funds identifies the locus of control,
both in the eyes of the party itself and the electorate.

The party's patrons as a consequence are sometimes
able to make demands of the party which are not
in the party's best interests. Party "office-
seeking" at the municipal level, as we saw in
Chapter VI, is an example of "office-seeking" forced
upon the Victorian ALP even when such "office-seeking" may be against the Party's best interests. Municipal "office-seeking" to the Party is costly in terms of both money spent in electioneering and the appearance provided by such electioneering of Party concern for the trivial or concern for local Councils rather than for the operation of government at a higher level. The existence of ALP Councils was, however, of vital interest to certain unions in that these Councils paid higher wages to members of these unions than non-ALP Councils. The vital concern of certain of the ALP's trade union patrons forced the continued "office-seeking" at the municipal level of ALP candidates, whatever the benefits to the greater Party of an ALP withdrawal from local government election contests. Concern for "office-seeking" at an inappropriate level of operations for the Victorian ALP in local government is a demonstration of the power of the Party's patrons.

The controllers of a mass-clientele party will see as their vital interest the maintenance of such control, ensuring that no changes in the Party's structure will undermine their own controlling position. This was exactly the position in the post-1955 Victorian ALP. As we saw in Chapter VII it was in the interests of the Party's trade union patrons that the overwhelming majority of delegates to Annual Conference represented affiliated trade unions
rather than the Party branches, for this ensured that trade unionists would control composition of the Party organization. VCE elections at Annual Conference did little more than legitimize a decision made previously at a secret meeting of trade union officials, the "Ticketing Committee," which drew up a list of recommended VCE candidates. With a "winner-take-all" majority (and later plurality) voting system and the overwhelming number of Conference delegates voting for the "Ticketing Committee" list all candidates on the list were elected, thus ensuring the domination of the Victorian AIP by a group of patron unions.

We suggested in Chapter IV that changes in the Party organization, such as a strengthening of representation from the larger industrial unions throughout our period, reflected changes in the composition of the Party's patron unions rather than changes in the greater society or even in the workforce, where the rising proportion of workers employed in service occupations rarely belonged to unions affiliated with the AIP. An increase in white collar and professional members in the Victorian AIP after 1955 was not reflected by changes in the way the Party was run. A faction formed by white collar and professional Party members, the "Participats," sought changes in the Party aimed at making the Victorian AIP
more representative of a wider electorate, but the "Participants" were unable to break the stranglehold on Party organization by the Party's trade union patrons, at least before 1970.

The failure of Party organization to adequately reflect changes in the wider electorate was due, as we demonstrated in Chapter VIII, to the attachment of the Party's patrons, and many Party stalwarts, to the old "reality" forms. "Intellectuals" were not encouraged to become members of the Party lest they become too numerous, with a common fear expressed at ALP branch meetings by the frequently repeated phrase that intellectuals might "take the Party over." Those intellectuals who did join were to be tolerated rather than encouraged to express ideas. In order to secure pre-selection, or even influence other delegates by speechmaking at Annual Conference, it was necessary for intellectuals to be somewhat disingenuous. Many prominent Party members saw the Party better served by pre-selection to the safer ALP parliamentary seats of "decent" union officials or of ALP local Councillors with working class backgrounds. They opposed the selection of newer more highly educated members who might have more appeal to a middle class electorate. Despite such a climate of anti-intellectualism, many intellectuals did join the Party, and often did influence the Party with
their ideas, but their ideas were often "left" ideological and frequently extremist "left" rather than pragmatic. For this reason Party parliamentarians and officeholders with academic backgrounds or higher education such as J.F. Cairns and W.H. Hartley did not have great appeal to a middle class electorate and indeed probably lost more votes than they attracted.

Labor policies of increased welfare and education spending were electorally popular, and in some electorates may have aided ALP candidates, but the Party had to divest itself of the old reality forms which frequently coloured and shaped policies of limited appeal, suggesting Labor was a Party of austerity, of mass-produced State Housing Commission low quality housing, the production of poor quality consumer durables by public industries and nationalized public utilities like the railways managed with a minimum level of competence. Labor therefore could not effectively fulfil its "ideology-policy articulation" function. White collar and professional wage and salary earners increasingly saw their real interests in the maintenance of that consumer-oriented property owning society the Liberal Party could claim with authority it was interested in preserving. The Liberal Party under Menzies identified with the aspirations of middle class voters for home ownership, durable consumer goods and economic security.
The Liberal Party was at an advantage, vis-a-vis the ALP, that it could claim it stood for all of society, and not just a section of it.

As we suggested in Chapter VIII the weakness of the Party's patrons was at least as important as articulation of the old reality forms by Party spokesmen in limiting the Victorian ALP's electoral appeal. One such weakness, at a time of intense popular anti-Communism, was the affiliation of some Communist-controlled unions with the Victorian ALP. The Liberal Party and especially the DLP frequently made claims in the media that the Victorian ALP was under strong Communist influence. ALP organization where trade unions, especially Communist-controlled unions, were in such a powerful position, combined with the participation by some VCE members in peace organizations which appeared to support Communist Party positions made such propaganda difficult for the ALP to counteract.

The creation and maintenance of a symbolic universe capable of sustaining mass support from the electorate was thus not within the capabilities of the ALP as it was constituted in our period. This is demonstrated in the concern of the Party organization to defend "ideological purity." As we saw in Chapter VIII such concern took the form, at its most intense, of both opposition to State aid for Church schools and opposition to rapprochement with
the DLP. **ALP** spokesmen saw themselves in competition with an alternative symbolic universe created by *B. A. Santamaria*. Heavily ideological and anti-Communist, Santamaria's ideas sustained the DLP as an auxiliary of the Liberal Government, at least until the early 1970's. In its concern for "ideological purity" the Victorian **ALP** was seeking to distance itself from the perceived oppositional symbolic universe of *B. A. Santamaria* so much that it appeared unconcerned with the needs of the very people, particularly Catholics, whose votes might have enabled the **ALP** to attain government. "Ideological purity" to the Party's Victorian office-holders was in fact used as a slogan in justification of actions aimed at strengthening their grip on Party control.

The movement of the post-1955 Victorian **ALP** too much in the direction of seeing itself largely as a client of the larger industrial unions was a major factor in the Party's inability to secure wider electoral appeal. The split of 1955 need not have prevented **ALP** electoral gains after 1960 had the Party paid more attention to the unrepresentative nature of its mass-clientele structure so that the Party appeared as a party of moderates rather than of industrial union extremists. The post-1955 Victorian **ALP** served its patrons well by accommodating their prejudices, but in so doing the Party failed to attract a wider clientele because it alienated much of the electorate.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACLP
Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist)

ALP
Australian Labor Party

CIR
Commonwealth Law Reports

CPA
Communist Party of Australia

DLP
Democratic Labor Party

MCC
Melbourne City Council

MEU
Municipal Employees' Union

MUALP Club
Melbourne University Australian Labor Party Club

NAC
New Australian Council

NCC
National Civic Council

PULP
Progressive United Labor Party

THC
Trades Hall Council

TUDC
Trade Union (Unionists') Defence Committee

VCE
Victorian Central Executive

YLA
Young Labor Association

WCOC
Women's Central Organizing Committee
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