WHY SHOULD I BE MORAL?

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne, for the degree of Master of Arts.

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CONCLUSION.
INTRODUCTION
'I've never heard the case in favour of justice as against injustice argued to my satisfaction...'


Plato put this complaint into the mouth of Glaucon. For more than two thousand years the attempt to provide what Glaucon asked for was a central concern of writers on ethics and morality. Yet in this century - a short period, relative to the history of moral philosophy - many leading philosophers have treated the problem raised by Glaucon as if it were not a real problem at all. They have said that Glaucon is asking for something which it is logically impossible to provide, and that his request is therefore improper and his problem a pseudo-problem. Even those contemporary philosophers who do not take this view seem to have been affected by its prevalence, for they tend to regard as a side-issue what was once a fundamental question of ethics. In the following pages I will argue that Glaucon's request is, from a logical point of view, quite proper, that it raises a real problem and that no-one has yet answered Glaucon satisfactorily. In the course of this argument, it will emerge that other important problems of ethics, including the vexed issue of the 'naturalistic fallacy' appear in a new light if my treatment of Glaucon's question is correct. For this reason, even if contemporary philosophers should wish to ignore the question which interested so many of their predecessors, they cannot do so without going astray in areas which have been central to recent moral philosophy.

Just what was Glaucon's question? In order to understand it we must bear in mind that the Greek word usually translated as 'justice' has a wider meaning than 'justice' has today, for it covered nearly the whole field of morality, both individual and social. (1)

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Hence the request is for 'the case for morality against immorality' and the question may be most simply put as 'Why should I be moral?' or 'Why ought I be moral?' By 'moral' is meant, of course, morally good - we are not using the term in the sense in which its opposite is 'non-moral'. A clearer formulation might be: 'If there are moral reasons for doing an action, and no moral reasons against doing that action, is it necessarily rational to do the action?' Can morality be rationally justified in all circumstances and for all rational beings? An example may help to make this concrete: Smith, an ordinary man who earns enough to support himself but would not mind a little more, is walking down a quiet street one night when he finds a purse containing a few dollars and the owner's address and telephone number. Smith guesses, from the shabby appearance of the purse and the poor suburb mentioned in the address, that the owner is probably quite poor, poorer than Smith himself. Smith is well aware that it would be immoral for him to keep the purse. (Non-cognitivists may substitute their own terms for any terms in this example which presuppose objectivity.) But does Smith's sincerely held moral judgment settle the practical question of what to do with the money? He may still wonder what it is rational for him to do. Moral considerations favour returning the money, but there are other, non-moral grounds for keeping it. Which is the more rational course of action? This problem is the subject of this thesis. (My example is just a more realistic version of the case which Glaucon puts to Socrates - if a man had Gyges ring, which makes him invisible whenever he desires, so that he can commit unjust acts with impunity, why should he act justly?) 'Why should I be moral?' is the formulation that has been most commonly used when this question has been discussed, and as it is as clear as any other brief formulation of the question, I shall adhere to it throughout.

I shall not give any further definition of the terms of the question in this introduction. It is because they have interpreted the question, and the terms in it, in certain ways that many modern
writers have rejected it, and if the question is to be allowed to be proper, arguments against these interpretations must be found. Such arguments would be out of place in an introduction, and will be found in Part 1. It is in this part that my own view of the precise meaning of the question will gradually emerge.

The question has, as I have already said, been a central concern of moral philosophers from the time of Plato until the Nineteenth Century. It would be tedious to list the philosophers who have discussed the issue, for the list would exclude hardly any of the major moral philosophers of the past. The names of some of them will occur in the course of this thesis.

Nor has the discussion been confined to philosophers. The problem is one which every thinking person must face. Accordingly it is treated in many novels and plays. In Macbeth, to give just one familiar example, Macbeth is well aware that to kill Duncan would be a 'horrid deed', because, as he says to himself,

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........this Duncan
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been
So clear in his great office, that his virtues
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against
The deep damnation of his taking off....
(Act 1 Sc. vii)
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whereas Macbeth knows that his only motivation for the assassination is 'vaulting ambition'. Here the clash of moral and non-moral reasons is dramatised and the issue of whether to be moral is raised.

Notwithstanding the past philosophical and literary popularity of 'Why should I be moral?' it has been rejected by many of the best-known and most influential moral philosophers since Henry Sidgwick (2) and has been neglected by others. The contemporary attitude may be traced to two philosophers who have been widely thought to have shown that the question is not a proper one: F.H. Bradley and H.A. Prichard.

2) For the reason why Sidgwick is chosen to mark the turning point see p. 132, below.
Bradley's Ethical Studies, which contains an essay entitled 'Why Should I Be Moral?' first appeared in 1876, while Prichard's famous article 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?' appeared in Mind in 1912. Despite the historical importance of these writings, Bradley's rejection of the question was only partial, and was in any case extremely confused, while a careful reading of Prichard's article reveals that it does not even discuss our question. Moreover in his later writings Prichard implies that the question is a legitimate one.

Modern moral philosophers have not relied on Bradley and Prichard. They have advanced their own reasons for rejecting the question, reasons deriving in the main from the concepts of morality they hold. These reasons are discussed in Part 1 of this thesis, in which I argue that the question is a proper one. If the question is proper, an attempt must be made to answer it. One way to answer it would be to show, by an analysis of rational action, that moral action satisfies the criteria for rational action, whereas immoral action does not. Immanuel Kant may be interpreted as attempting to answer the question by arguing in this way, and some contemporary writers have sought to do the same. I discuss these attempts in Part II and conclude that they are unsuccessful. An alternative way of answering the question is by showing that it is rational to be moral, because being moral is in accordance with rational self-interest. Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Butler and many others, including a few modern writers, have argued that man's nature is such that he can achieve true happiness only if he is morally good. Traditional doctrines of heaven and hell provide a reason for being moral, and have been alluded to not merely by theologians, but also by writers of philosophical importance, such as Aquinas, Hobbes, Butler and Paley. More recently, some psychologists have alleged that there is a connection between the most important virtues and the happiness of the agent. These and related views are discussed in Part III. The reader will observe that each part of

3) For a fuller discussion of Bradley and Prichard see the Appendix to Part I.
this thesis consists of an examination of a number of distinct views, and he will probably find that this causes the central argument to develop jerkily. Unfortunately this cannot be avoided if the many arguments and objections that have been made in relation to this topic are to be covered, which is essential if the conclusion is to be soundly based. In the Conclusion, I consider the present state of the question and argue that 'Why should I be moral?', despite its age-old importance, has yet to be answered. I maintain that the question is vital not only to the individual but also to society, and that if changes are made on a social level, it may be possible to answer it. This raises issues of political philosophy. A society in which the question could be answered would be a step closer to being an ideal society than a society in which this is not the case.
PART 1

THE QUESTION REJECTED
What is it to reject a question? Under what circumstances may one do so? The technique of dissolving philosophical problems by demonstrating them to be pseudo-problems and rejecting the question which led to the problem has been popular among philosophers recently. There have been attempts to treat the age-old problems of perception and induction in this way. The question 'How do I know that this table really exists?', when asked by a person who acknowledges that he can see and touch the table, and that conditions are normal, is sometimes rejected on the grounds that by 'really exists' we mean no more than that the object may be seen, touched, etc. under normal conditions. The question is rejected because the questioner, who has all the grounds that can possibly be given for the belief that the table exists, persists in asking for additional grounds. If this is right, then the problem generated by the question is not a real problem.

A question which would be generally accepted to be improper is the question 'Why should I accept valid reasons?' This question can only be answered by giving reasons for or against accepting valid reasons, and to give reasons presupposes that one is prepared to accept valid reasons. The question is not meaningful, since the asking of it assumes what the question challenges. Reason is the ultimate justifier, and no justification can be asked of reason itself.

Finally, questions may be rejected because they contain an incorrect assumption. An example is that old lawyer's question 'Have you stopped beating your wife?' This question must be rejected if the person asked has never beaten his wife.

I do not claim that these are the only grounds on which a question may be rejected. They merely illustrate that some questions are improper and have to be rejected. We must now consider if this is also the case with 'Why should I be moral?'. 
(i) THE SIMPLEST REJECTION

There is one very simple way in which 'Why should I be moral?' may be rejected. If the 'should' in the question is interpreted as a moral 'should', then the question is nonsense. It is then a moral question, and one cannot ask moral questions about morality. It must be rejected for the same reasons that 'Why should I be rational?' must be rejected. Just as one cannot ask for reasons for being rational, or for a rational justification of rationality, one cannot ask for moral reasons for being moral, or for a moral justification of morality. This mode of rejecting the question is used by Stephen Toulmin when he says of those who ask 'Why ought one to do what is right?' (an equivalent, for present purposes, of the question we are discussing) that they

....are sufficiently answered by the peculiarity of their own questions. For let us consider what kind of answer they want when they ask, 'Why ought one to do what is right?' There is no room within ethics for such a question. Ethical reasoning may be able to show why we ought to do this action as opposed to that, or advocate this social practice as opposed to that, but it is no help where there can be no choice. And their question does not present us with genuine alternatives at all. For, since the notions of 'right' and of 'obligation' originate in the same situations and serve similar purposes, it is a self-contradiction (taking 'right' and 'ought' in their simplest senses) to suggest that we 'ought' to do anything but what is 'right'. This suggestion is as unintelligible as the suggestion that some emerald objects might not be green. (1)

Now this is correct only if the question is interpreted in the manner chosen by Toulmin. But must it be interpreted this way? Toulmin claims that he is taking the terms in 'their simplest senses', but does not support this parenthetical claim.

Certainly 'ought', like 'should', may be interpreted in a moral sense, as when we ask 'Should I pay my taxes if the money may be used for burning villages and bombing civilians?' or 'Ought I tell the truth when if I do so the life of an innocent man may be endangered?' On the other hand, it seems equally clear that both terms may be used in a non-moral sense, such as when we are told 'You ought to stop eating sweets between meals' or when we ask our share-broker 'Should I buy shares in Rock-Bottom Oil?' Toulmin himself admits that considerations of personal happiness are not moral considerations, and he also admits that 'you ought to...' may be used in such a way that it has 'hardly more force' than 'you will enjoy' or 'you will regret it later if you don't.'

It is, I think, a generally sound canon of interpretation that when a word can be interpreted in two ways, one of which makes the sentence in which the word occurs self-contradictory or meaningless, while the other does not, one should interpret the word in such a way as to make the sentence meaningful, unless there is some strong reason to the contrary. Of course, a question may be confused, and if it is, it is important to expose this confusion. In this way, a philosophical 'problem' may be shown to be a pseudo-problem, a mere result of confusion. On the other hand, over-eagerness to find confusions may produce a failure to note that a real problem persists after all confusions have been dispelled. If an American tourist in Melbourne asks us to direct him to the nearest drug-store, we may, if we are familiar with American practices, warn him that in Australia drug-stores, or chemists do not sell soft drinks, confectionary or similar items. In so doing, we are more or less rejecting his question - we suspect that he has confused or is unaware of the proper names of Australian shops, and that he really wants to be directed to a milk bar. But if he assures us that he has not made this mistake, and wants some aspirin, then we will try to answer his request. Similarly, if someone asks why he should be moral, we may warn him that if he

2) Toulmin, op. cit., pp. 157-60. Toulmin does recognise that 'Why should I be moral?' may be interpreted differently, but suggests that if it is, it is not the business of the philosopher to answer it. (pp. 163, 165) For some comments on this view, see pp.132-6, below.
is using 'should' in a moral sense; his question is meaningless. But if he assures us that he is not committed to taking a moral point of view, and is asking a question which is not within morality but about morality, his question must be accepted and an attempt made to answer it.

(ii) ROSPER'S DILEMMA

If 'Why should I be moral?' will not be interpreted in this thesis as a moral question, as a request for moral reasons for doing what is moral, the query may be raised as to what sort of question it is, and what sort of reasons it does request. One obvious answer to this query is that the questioner will be satisfied if he is shown that it will be in his own interest to be moral. This is how Plato attempted to answer Glaucus, and many other writers have followed Plato's lead. John Hospers, in his book Human Conduct, recognizes that this is a possible interpretation of the question, but argues that even if interpreted in this way, the question must be rejected. His argument is as follows:

If it is to a man's interest to perform the act, of course, he probably won't ask the question... He will ask the question only when the performance of the act is not to his own interest. No matter what answer we give him - that the act is conducive to society's interest or simply that it is right - he refuses to accept it as a reason for performing the act in question.... But what is the questioner demanding? What he wants, and he accepts no other answer, is a self-interested reason.... But the situation is ex hypothesi one in which the act required of him is contrary to his interest. Of course it is impossible to give him a reason in accordance with his interest for acting contrary to his interest. That would be a contradiction in terms. It is a self-contradictory request, and yet people sometimes make it and are disappointed when it can't be fulfilled. The skeptic shows us an example in which he would be behaving contrary to his interest and asks us to give him a reason why he should behave thus, and yet the only reasons he will accept are reasons of self-interest. It is no wonder that such a
questioner must be disappointed. So must the seeker
after square circles. (3)

There are two flaws in this argument. The first is that
Hospers makes a very simple mistake when he says of the person
who asks 'Why should I be moral?' that 'He will ask the question
only when the performance of the act is not to his own interest.'
The most that Hospers can possibly be entitled to say here is
'He will ask the question only when he thinks that the perform-
ance of the act is not to his own interest.' People may be un-
certain about whether an act is in their own interest, or they
may simply be mistaken in believing that it is not in their own
interest. In such cases they are quite likely to ask why they
should perform the act, even though they know that it is immoral
not to do so. Hospers is wrong to say that it is only when the
act is in fact not in a person's interest that he will ask this
question. The actual state of affairs does not determine whether
a person asks the question, it is only what the person believes
to be the actual state of affairs that may do so. This may seem
a minor slip on Hospers's part. It is really an error which
invalidates his rejection of 'Why should I be moral?' For once
it is appreciated that the asking of the question does not
necessarily imply that the act to be performed is not in the
agent's interest, there is no self-contradiction involved in
asking whether there are any reasons of self-interest in favour
of performing the act. No objection can be made to a person who
believes that an act is not in his interest asking whether the
act is in fact not in his interest. On the contrary, such a
question shows an admirable caution and shows a willingness to
hear other views. The knowledge that the act in question is
morally obligatory and that countless writers from Plato onwards

Italics in original, as in all quotations unless otherwise
specified. M.G. Singer deals with the question in a similar
manner in his Generalization in Ethics (London, Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1963) pp. 319-27, and R. Baier says of the
objection that it is a 'powerful argument, and I have no-
where seen a satisfactory reply.' (The Moral Point of View,
have held that it is in our own interest to act morally, may well make someone uncertain as to whether his belief that the act is not in his interest is correct. Alternatively, a person may be certain that the act is not in his interest, and ask the question to show his contempt for morality, as a challenge which he believes cannot be answered. Yet it may be possible to answer him, for his certainty may be misplaced. These are cases which indicate that Hospers has not shown our question to be improper.

In the preceding paragraph we have not queried Hospers's assumption that the questioner, if he is not asking for moral reasons, must be asking for reasons of self-interest. Although the question has been shown to be a proper one even when this assumption is accepted, the assumption cannot be justified, and is the second flaw in Hospers’s argument. The question need not be asked by those who have decided to act solely in their own interest. A person who asks 'Why should I be moral?' may be asking if it is rational to act in accordance with moral reasons, rather than reasons of other kinds, such as self-interested reasons or perhaps aesthetic reasons. Hospers says:

Philosophy works only when people can be appealed to by rational considerations. Many people, perhaps most people when their selfish interests are involved, cannot be appealed to by rational considerations....

But this is to assume without argument that it is not rational to follow one's 'selfish interests'. Whether this is so may be just what the person who asks why he should be moral is inquiring about. He believes that moral reasons point towards the performance of the act; he believes that reasons of self-interest point against the performance of the act. Is the more rational thing to do, to perform the act? This is not a question

4) ibid., p. 195.
5) In the final chapter of his book, Hospers does produce an argument in support of this assumption. In so doing he is attempting to answer the very question he rejected earlier. The argument is briefly discussed in Part II of this thesis, pp. 118-20.
of self-interest, any more than it is a question of morality. The question could, of course, be answered by showing that in fact self-interest as well as morality points to the performance of the act, just as it could be answered by showing that in fact morality as well as self-interest points against the performance of the act. But the question can be tackled even if the questioner's beliefs are granted. Morality provides reasons for acting, but so does self-interest, and so does art. When there is a conflict, surely reason is not silent: Surely it is not the case that it is no more rational to follow one course than another? But can a rational justification for following morality be given? This is what our questioner seeks to know. He is asking the ultimate practical question, the question that only comes into its own when questions of morality, of prudence, and of any other source of reasons for acting have been settled. It is a question that one must answer before one can claim to have thought out one's principles of conduct to the limits of reason. Hosper's attempt to show that asking this question is like seeking a square circle fails on two grounds, but it is an instructive failure, because the two flaws in the argument correspond to the two possible ways of answering the question - they may be regarded as gaps in the case for the question being unanswerable, each of which 'lets in' a way of answering the question. Because the question may be asked when the act is thought not to be in the questioner's interest, and not just when it actually is not in the agent's interest, the question may be answered by showing that, in all cases in which the act is morally good, it in fact is in the questioner's interest to perform it. Because the questioner need not be taking self-interest as his ultimate end, but may be asking which end it is rational to take as ultimate, the question may be answered by showing that reason prescribes that we make morality our ultimate end. These two modes of answering the question form the subjects of Part III and Part IV of this thesis respectively. But we have still to consider some other ways in which the question may be rejected.
In discussing Fosper's arguments, I have said that it might be possible to give a satisfactory answer to 'Why should I be moral?' by showing that morality and self-interest harmonise. In the Introduction I termed this approach 'traditional', linking it with some of the greatest philosophers of the past. To this mode of answering our question an objection is often voiced. The objection is that it is impossible to provide self-interested reasons for acting morally, because a person who does an act for such reasons is never acting morally. This point was forcefully made by F.H. Bradley, who argues that 'Why should I be moral?' is based on the assumption that morality is good only as a means, and not as an end. Of this assumption, Bradley says:

...what is clear at first sight is, that to take virtue as a mere means to an ulterior end is in direct antagonism to the voice of the moral consciousness. That consciousness, when unwarped by selfishness and not blinded by sophistry, is convinced that to ask for the Why? is simple immorality; to do good for its own sake is virtue; and never to act but for the sake of an end, other than doing well and right, is the mark of vice. And the theory which sees in virtue, as in money-getting, a means which is mistaken for an end, contradicts the voice which proclaims that virtue not only does seem to be, but is, an end in itself.

Taking our stand, then, as we hope, on this common consciousness, what answer can we give when the question why should I be moral?, in the sense of What will it advantage me?, is put to us? Here we shall do well, I think, to avoid all praises of the pleasantness of virtue. We may believe that it transcends all possible delights of vice, but it would be well to remember that we desert a moral point of view, that we degrade and prostitute virtue, when to those who do not love her for herself we bring ourselves to recommend her for the sake of her pleasures. (6)

Bradley's rejection of the question is akin to the rejection of 'Have you stopped beating your wife?', when asked of a non-wife-

6) F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, (Oxford University Press, 1962) pp. 61-3. The quotation is not intended to give a full account of Bradley's views on our question. A fuller account is given in the Appendix to this Part.
beater. The question is based on a false assumption. It is not entirely clear if Bradley means to reject requests for self-interested reasons for being moral (what will it advantage me) or requests for any reasons at all (to ask for the why?). In the form in which he states it, it could be applied to any request for a reason for being moral which treats morality as a means to some end. It has been regarded as showing that it is immoral to ask why one should act morally.

Let us apply this to the example given in the Introduction. Smith wonders what to do with the purse he has found. He acknowledges that it would be immoral for him to keep it, but he asks why he should be moral. Someone now tells him that unless he returns the purse for the sake of acting morally, he has not acted morally at all. Does this help Smith decide what to do? Smith is not committed to the moral point of view. He is wondering whether to act morally or immorally. To tell him that a certain way of acting is not morally good does not settle his problem. It does show, if it is sound, that to attempt to persuade Smith to act morally by arguing that morality is a means to some end which he accepts cannot succeed. But Smith need not be asking for an answer of this sort. He may be prepared to take morality as an end in itself, provided it can be shown that it is contrary to reason not to do so.

Bradley's objection, even if accepted, cannot in itself show that it is contrary to reason to take an end other than morality as one's ultimate end. We are told nothing about the rationality of acting morally for the sake of acting morally. There are two possibilities: either it is rational to do so, or it is not. To take the latter possibility first: if it is not rational to do so, a proper reply to the question of why one should be moral is not to reject the question but to admit that there is no reason why one should be moral. Smith, if he received this reply, would no doubt keep the purse, since there is no reason against doing so, and he would like the money. The idea that there is no reason at all for being moral may seem too
absurd to be seriously held. Yet Bradley's objection tends in this direction. The doctrine that to ask Why? is immoral, that we desert the moral point of view when we attempt to answer this question, makes morality a closed system, a system whose logic is circular. Morality makes sense, once one accepts its premises, but no rational justification of these premises can be given, or even requested. The premises must be accepted by a leap of faith. (Bradley himself was not averse to acts of faith, as can be seen by the concluding chapter of *Ethical Studies.*)

Morality is, on this view, no more rational than any other end, for any end may be accepted by an act of faith. So described morality is of no interest to those who wish to act rationally. It is unlikely that many people will take this view of morality.

The former possibility - that it is rational to act morally for the sake of acting morally - is preferable. Can one accept that such action is rational, without adducing considerations which treat morality as a means? It might be said that the basis for the belief that it is rational to take morality as an end is simply that if it were not rational to do so, morality would be entirely illusory; but morality is not entirely illusory, and hence we must accept that morality is a rational end. Kant sometimes argued in this way. The ultimate issue here is the reliability of 'the common moral consciousness.' Another way of supporting the belief that it is rational to take morality as an end, which does not rely on the assumption that morality is not illusory, is to show by argument that it is rational to behave in a certain way, and to show by an analysis of morality that it is also morally good to act in this particular way. Thus morality becomes rational in itself, and is not taken as a means, except perhaps as a means to acting rationally. Kant argued in this manner also. But it must be noted that neither of these methods of arguing involves the rejection of 'Why should I be moral?'. Rather, they attempt to answer the question by a proof that it is rational to be moral. Accordingly, they dealt with in Part II, in the course of the discussion of Kant's views on the rationality of morality.
The objection we have been discussing, then, gives no support to the view that our question must be rejected. It does, if the common moral consciousness on which it is based is sound, show that to offer certain kinds of reasons for being moral, particularly self-interested reasons, is self-defeating. Hence we shall not discuss answers of this sort until we have discussed, in Part II, the soundness of this common moral consciousness.

(iv) MORAL PRINCIPLES DEFINED AS OVERRIDING PRINCIPLES

The course I have taken up to now may have made some people impatient. For while I have not specified the meaning of 'moral' or 'morality', I have used these terms in such a way as to imply that accepting that the performance of an act is morally wrong is in no way logically tied to deciding not to do the act. I have assumed that a man may have moral principles, and yet may choose not to act on them. I have written as if a man's moral principles are distinct from the dominant or overriding principles he happens to have. Many contemporary moral philosophers would claim that all of this involves a misunderstanding of the concept of morality. For example, R.M. Hare opens his book *The Language of Morals* by writing that:

If we were to ask of a person 'What are his moral principles?' the way in which we could be most sure of a true answer would be by studying what he did.... it would be when, knowing all the relevant facts of a situation, he was faced with choices or decisions between alternative courses of action, between alternative answers to the question 'What shall I do?' that he would reveal in what principles of conduct he really believed. (7)

While according to P.M. Nowell-Smith:

A man's moral principles are 'dominant' in the sense that he would not allow them to be over-ridden by any pro-attitude other than a moral principle....it is part of the force of the phrase 'moral principle' that

he cannot (logically) wonder what he ought to do if there is a moral principle on one side and not on the other. If I regard something as immoral, then, however trivial it may be and however great may be the non-moral advantages of doing it, I cannot debate with myself whether I ought to do it; and we discover what our own moral principles are very often by putting just this sort of question to ourselves. (8)

As a final example, D.H. Monro writes:

For any man there must be some principles...which he habitually follows when he is faced with a conflict of ends. Whatever these principles may be constitute his moral principles; because that is just what the word 'moral' means. (9)

These writers all maintain that there is a logical connection between a person's moral principles and his choices; but they differ among themselves as to the nature of this logical connection. The connection is most direct on Monro's account. He holds that a man's 'moral principles' may simply be defined as his overriding principles. Nowell-Smith, in the passage quoted, appears to take this view also, but in fact he introduces an additional complication by requiring that for a principle to count as a moral principle the person who adopts it must be prepared to apply it universally, or impartially. (10)

Thus Nowell-Smith defines 'moral principles' partly as overriding principles and partly as universal or impartial principles, without really attending to the question of whether the two elements of his definition coincide. Hare's position is more complex still, for Hare defines a man's moral principles as the principles he is prepared to prescribe universally, deducing from this that he must prescribe them to himself also.

These short extracts and very brief summaries are intended, not to give a proper account of the positions of the writers, but

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10) Nowell-Smith, *op. cit.*. P.309.
to indicate their bearing on the question to be discussed in this thesis. It should be clear that if any of these writers is correct in his account of what a moral principle is, and what is involved in making a moral judgment, 'Why should I be moral?' is not a proper question, for judging an act to be moral, that is, to be morally good, or to be in accordance with one's moral principles, entails a decision to perform the act. We must therefore examine the arguments these writers offer in support of their concepts of morality before we may conclude that our question is a proper question.

We will, however, confine our attention to the views of Monro and Hare. These two writers have developed their views on the nature of moral principles at considerable length, while Nowell-Smith devotes only a few pages of his book to the particular topic that concerns us. Insofar as Nowell-Smith defines moral principles as dominant or overriding principles, his account does not differ from that of Monro. His requirement of universal application or impartiality is introduced and put aside after only two paragraphs and is greatly in need of more precise specification. In this respect, any points that need to be made about Nowell-Smith's position will be covered by discussion of Hare's views on universalizability.

We will start with Monro, for he stands at the extreme limit of the meta-ethical spectrum which ranges from subjectivism to those theories which attempt to define morality in terms of a specifiable, usually socially oriented content. Monro does not even temper the force of his subjectivism by incorporating into his definition of 'morality' a formal characteristic such as universalizability, which would have the effect of making a normal man's moral principles acceptable to others. Moral principles are, he says, simply expressions of overriding desires or principles. If this is so, 'Why should I be moral?' may be transcribed as 'Why should I act in accordance with my overriding desires or principles?'
This cannot be a significant question, for on Monro's account 'any principle that would enable one to say "One ought not to follow the dictates of morality" is itself a moral principle.' (p. 225). On whatever criteria one decides ultimate questions of conduct, these criteria are one's moral principles. But is Monro's definition of morality tenable?

What precisely is Monro's position? He experiences some difficulties in formulating his definition of morality as overriding, and while it is unnecessary to trace step-by-step the path by which he arrives at his final statement, some indication of the difficulties is instructive.

Monro begins with the formulation already quoted: a man's moral principles are the principles he habitually follows when he is faced with a conflict of ends. But as Monro recognises, and as the use of the word 'habitually' signifies, this implies that a man's moral principles are those principles which have power over him, rather than those which have authority for him. Thus a man living under a brutal dictatorship may desperately want to protest against the crimes of the regime, but may nevertheless habitually support it because he is terrified of reprisals if he does not, and his nerve fails him every time he is about to protest. His moral principles differ from those of people who habitually support the government through indifference or the belief that its crimes are justified. To overcome this difficulty, Monro amends his definition:

> Every man will have principles of this kind which he generally follows or at least thinks of himself as following. When he departs from them, he feels guilt and remorse. (p. 127-8)

There are difficulties here too. Monro simply assumes that guilt is a concomitant of any departure from overriding principles, but this need not be so. A man may throughout his life act on the principle of exclusive concern with his own interest. He may nevertheless occasionally yield to generous
impulses and contribute small sums to charity. It is plausible to suppose that in some cases these impulses produce no guilt at all - they may even produce a brief warm glow. This does not mean that they are not departures from overriding principles. The man may afterwards remind himself that he could have used the money for his own purposes, and that this would have been more sensible. He may call himself 'soft' or a 'sucker for a hard-luck story.' Perhaps he regrets giving the money away, but regret is not the same as 'guilt and remorse' for these latter feelings are particularly associated with a certain kind of act - those acts we normally call morally wrong.

This is the next problem for Monro's new formulation. How does one define 'guilt and remorse' without a prior definition of morality? Monro is aware of this problem, but cannot overcome it satisfactorily. He eventually defines guilt as 'the emotion we feel when we do not allow an overriding policy to prevail,' adding that although this appears to involve circularity it in fact does not, because it just is the case that failure to live up to ideals, or failure, as a result of lack of effort, to obtain peculiarly important objectives, is attended by a quite distinctive emotion. (p. 215). But is this so? Monro admits that there is an emotional reaction which is 'undoubtedly guilt' that may be felt when one does not depart from an overriding policy (for example, if one acts in a way which one believes to be right, but which one has only recently come to believe to be right. p. 209). There are also other cases. The self-interested man may easily feel guilt when he thinks of the men he has ruined by his competitive business practices, while as we have said, he may not feel it when departing from his overriding principles. Monro has not made out a case for saying that all men feel a distinctive emotion when they depart from their overriding principles, regardless of the content of these principles and regardless of the beliefs and principles which they no longer hold but which were instilled into them at an early age by their parents and teachers.
Perhaps Monro realises that he is on shaky ground when he relies on guilt and remorse, for in its final form his analysis does not mention these feelings. Ultimately, he explains 'overriding desires' as 'the desires that (on reflection and most of the time) one most wants to gratify.' So 'I ought to do X' finally is said to be equivalent to 'Doing X is what, in the long run, I most want to do.' (p.213). Guilt and remorse are still relevant, but apparently only as an indication of what a person most wants. (p.223). This is a paradoxical conclusion indeed. The usual contrast between what one is morally obliged to do and what one wants to do reduces to the difference between long-range and immediate wants.

Monro mitigates the force of these paradoxes by a vital concession. He does not assert that 'I most want' is the only meaning of 'I ought.' He concedes that there is more than one sense of 'moral', although this fact has, he says, been overlooked because all senses normally coincide when moral terms are applicable. Thus as well as moral considerations being overriding, they usually are 'of a certain kind.' In one place this 'certain kind' is said to be 'say, those embodying the point of view of an impartial, dispassionate observer,' (p. 132; cf. p. 206) while in another place Monro explains the double sense of morality by saying that if 'moral' is not used to mean that which is wanted most, then it refers to 'the morality of the community in general.' (p. 223). So we have three possible senses of 'moral'. How are they related?

Monro claims that it is analytically true that our moral principles are those principles which have authority for us. He also says that the connection between a rule being a moral rule and embodying the point of view of the impartial observer is 'no doubt analytic.' (p. 132). Probably he would say the same about acceptance of the rule by the community in general, but we may limit our discussion to the first two defining characteristics. Monro accepts the implication that two distinct
characteristics, the occurrence together of which is synthetic, may both be tied analytically to the same word. He defends this by giving as an parallel the following:

Suppose that I define 'water' as H2O and also as a liquid with a boiling point of 100°C. That water is a compound of hydrogen and oxygen is an analytic statement. It is also an analytic statement that water has a boiling point of 100°C. But it is of course synthetic that this particular combination of hydrogen and oxygen has this particular boiling point. (p. 131).

This account of analyticity might be challenged, but I do not wish to digress into this controversy, as Monro's account of the relation of the defining characteristics of 'moral' can be seen to be inadequate on less controversial grounds. The point is simply that while two defining characteristics of water, or anything else, may be satisfactory so long as the two characteristics remain true of the one subject, the situation becomes extremely awkward if this should not be the case. But in regard to the definition of moral principles, Monro himself admits that the two characteristics which he regards as analytically connected to the term 'moral', are not always true of the one subject. All he claims is that:

as a matter of fact most of us do guide our lives by principles which do embody the point of view of the impartial dispassionate observer. (p. 132).

One wonders if even this claim is factually accurate, but in any case, Monro acknowledges that 'we may well find someone' who guides his life by maxims of, say, self-interest, and that if we do we may say to him 'those just are't moral rules by definition'. This is an admission that when the two characteristics are not both present, the 'overriding' characteristic may be dropped, and in making this admission Monro has surely conceded enough for our purposes. We can now give sense to 'why should I be moral?', because we may understand 'moral' as referring to principles embodying the point of view of the impartial observer, and 'should' in a non-moral sense. We
can thus specify the meaning of 'moral' independently of the principles a person takes as overriding, or commits himself to acting upon, and we have a perfectly proper question: 'Why should I act on principles embodying the point of view of the impartial observer?' One may, if one likes, interpret 'should' according to Nonro's analysis as 'most want', so that the question becomes 'Do I most want to act on principles embodying the point of view of the impartial observer?' This corresponds to the self-interested interpretation of the question, assumed by Plato and so many later writers. For reasons given earlier, I think a wider interpretation preferable: 'Why is it contrary to reason not to act on principles embodying the point of view of the impartial observer?'

It may be thought that Nonro's concession is unnecessary. Had he adhered firmly to the view that a person's moral principles are simply his overriding principles, and that no contrary definition of 'moral' is possible, he would not have incurred the objections I have pressed against him. This may be true, but had he attempted to do so, his position would have had such paradoxical consequences as to be untenable.

Firstly, how could one, on this view, explain the fact that we think of some people as being deliberately and consistently immoral? We commonly think of these people as doing their wicked deeds knowing them to be immoral. It is hard to see what Nonro could say about this, had he not conceded that there are other meanings of 'moral'. Admittedly, as Nonro says, we can speak of 'Satan's morality' (pp. 129, 225) but such people also, and I think more often, speak of their own principles as a denial of morality or as immoral principles. This is an important facet of moral discourse. It is the basis, for example, of C.V. Boyer's study of villains in Elizabethan tragedy. Boyer defines the subject of his study in this way:
when a character deliberately opposes moral law from wilfulness, and for the purpose of advancing
his own interests, recognizing at the same time 
the sanction of the law he defies, we call him a 
villain. (11)

Yet if one were to maintain that one's overriding principles 
are one's moral principles, one would have to say that the 
people Moyer calls villains are in fact following their own 
moral principles, which happen to be self-interested, and one 
would have to deny that a person can deliberately oppose a 
moral law which he himself recognises as a moral law. One 
would have to say that people whom we normally call villains, 
and distinguish from conscientious but misguided people, 
really do what they think they ought to do.

In a similar way, Mouro-without-concessions could not 
contrast 'moral' with 'amoral', in the way we normally do. 
We call a man amoral if he seems to have no awareness of moral 
considerations. But practically everyone must have some over-
riding principles, so practically everyone must have some 
moral principles, if moral principles are defined as overriding 
principles. Only the man who makes his choices in a purely 
arbitrary manner, or the man who is too indecisive to choose, 
is an amoral man.

Finally, what would one say when a person acknowledges 
that his overriding principles are not moral principles? One 
of Mouro's own examples of what someone might make an overriding 
principle is 'what the neighbours will think'. (p. 127). A 
woman who does treat this as her overriding principle need not 
think of it as constituting her morality. If she says to her 
daughter: 'The neighbours will find out and disapprove if you 
buy your contraceptives at the local chemist, so you ought to 
get them somewhere else,' she may well be using a non-moral 
'ought'. She may even say: 'I have no moral objections to 
your buying contraceptives wherever you like, but the neighbours 
disapprove, so don't do it locally!' In this way we 
commonly distinguish our overriding principles from our moral

n) C.V. Boyer, The Villain as Hero in Elizabethan Tragedy (London, Routledge & 
principles. This is perfectly intelligible.

For these reasons it is, I think, impossible to deny that 'moral' has meaning independently of what a person most wants, or the overriding principles he happens to have, and this, as we have seen, is all that is needed to establish that 'why should I be moral?' is a proper question. It is true that I have not attempted to show that the overriding sense is not a sense of 'moral', but it is not necessary to do so for our purposes. Because 'why should I do what is in accord with my overriding principles?' is scarcely a sensible question, we may assume that if someone asks 'why should I be moral?', they are not using 'moral' in the overriding sense, even if such a sense does exist. This is just another use of the canon of interpretation introduced earlier, to the effect that if one interpretation makes sense while another does not, the former is to be preferred.

In addition, it should be realised that anyone who did reject 'why should I be moral?' on the grounds that moral principles are the overriding principles a person has, would have made a verbal gain and not a substantive one. There could be no ultimate question about being moral, on this analysis, but 'being moral' has no content at all. So long as one acts on one's overriding principles one is being moral, and one can adopt any principles at all. An egoist is just as moral as anyone else, and so is a sadist, or even someone with lunatic overriding desires. If we desire to influence conduct by rational means we must still attempt to give the egoist, the sadist and the person with lunatic desires reasons for acting in a way that we regard as morally good — to show consideration for the interest of others, for instance, or to act in a way that would be approved by an impartial observer. It is my view that when the egoist, sadist or person with lunatic desires, challenges us to give him reasons for acting in one of these ways, or in some other way in which we think all people should act, this challenge is best expressed by the question 'why
should I be moral?' If this should be denied on verbal grounds, the practical problem remains. We may call the egoist's overriding principles his moral principles, but what reasons are there for him to alter his 'morality' to something, which promotes goods such as justice, honesty or the welfare of all? This is the question to be discussed in this thesis and providing we are clear on the problem, the form of words used to describe it is perhaps not so important.

Most definitions or characterisations of morality attribute a logical feature or content to moral principles, by means of which at least some principles of action which most people would agree to be highly undesirable can be shown not to be moral principles. For example, if moral principles must be acceptable to an impartial observer, then purely egoistic principles are not moral principles. Other writers have made universalizability a feature of moral principles, and have used it to argue that normal people, when acting morally, will act with concern for the interests of others. Other writers have characterised morality in terms of a specific content, such as the happiness or welfare of all, the commands of a Supreme Being, a 'natural law' which man has within himself, or moral truths which man can perceive through intuition. Here too, reason may be used to show, quite directly in some cases and less directly in others, that certain forms of conduct are contrary to moral principles. It is because Monro's definition is devoid of any feature of this kind that it is possible for any principle to be a moral principle, on his account. On the other hand it is this very featurelessness which, were it all that could be said of moral principles, would make it possible to ask 'Why should I be moral?' If any reason for acting which one adopted could be a moral reason for acting, one could not ask why one should act on moral reasons.

So the reason why Monro's account makes moral principles ineffective as a means of rationally influencing conduct is the same as the reason why his account leaves no room for asking why one should be moral - in both cases it is that any principle can be a moral principle. This suggests that any
analysis of morality which does allow moral argument a role in influencing conduct must allow room for asking why one should be moral. If it is necessary to limit the application of the term 'moral principle' in order to hold that certain principles cannot be moral principles, then one can always ask what reasons there are for acting on those principles which are said to be moral principles, rather than those which are beyond the limits of morality.

This conclusion runs counter to the views of R.M. Hare. Hare's position is that moral judgments do have a certain logical attribute and that in virtue of it argument may be used to make it likely that a man's moral principles will favour concern for the interest of all, justice and so on, rather than sadism or pure egoism. Yet, as we have already seen, Hare believes that there is a logical tie between a man's moral principles and the principles on which he acts, and if this were true, there would be no possibility of asking why one should be moral. How this is alleged to be so, and whether it is so, must be the subject of a separate section.

(v) HARE AND UNIVERSAL PRESCRIPTIVISM

According to Hare's view of the nature of moral judgments, which he calls 'universal prescriptivism' to asent to the judgment that X is morally obligatory is to prescribe that X be done by everyone, including oneself. Thus one cannot assent to a moral judgment and still wonder if one should do the act one has acknowledged to be morally obligatory. On this view it would be inconsistent, illogical, or a misuse of words, to ask 'Why should I be moral?'

The difference between Hare's account of a moral judgment and Moore's account of a moral principle is Hare's stipulation that for a judgment to be moral, one must be prepared to apply it to everyone, including oneself, that is
one must be prepared to universalize it. It is also obvious that if
this is accepted, it is a powerful aid in discouraging a man from
certain views which do not take account of the
interests of others, for such moral views, if applied uni-
versally, would entail that one must accept that one's own
interests ought not to be taken into account by others. (12)
On the other hand, it is equally clear, one might think, that
in seeking universalizability essential to moral principles,
Hare has given: 'Why should I be moral,' a foothold once again.
The question may now be interpreted as 'Why should I act only
on those principles which I am prepared to universalize?'

Hare has a ready reply to this. It is that universal-
izability is not just a property of those judgments we call
'moral', it is a property of all 'decisions of principle' and
g of all value judgments. (13) It applies to all 'oughts' (FR p.165)
It is true that Hare sometimes writes as if universalizability were true only of moral judgments, but
it cannot be denied that he frequently and explicitly states
the contrary, and that his arguments for universalizability
are applicable to other judgments. He claims that moral
judgments are universalizable in just the same way as descrip-
tive sentences, and for the same reason:

Moral judgments about particular things are made
for reasons; and the notion of a reason, as always,
brings with it the notion of a rule which lays down
that something is a reason for something else.
[This] involves [a] universalizability. (FR p.21; cf Ch.11.
passim, p.30)

Clearly this sense of universalizability would apply to any
judgment which claims to be rational. Moreover, it does seem

12] I am here assuming that universalizability can be
formulated in such a way as to meet the objections
that have been urged against some formulations.
Some reasons for this assumption are given later.

1965) (henceforth FR).
that Hare is right in holding that insofar as one cannot, without inconsistency or self-contradiction, use 'ought' in one way at one time and in another way at another time when in a similar situation, 'ought', like descriptive words, is universalizable.

Hare thinks that this logical sense of universalizability for which he has argued may be an effective tool in argument with any person who agrees to avoid inconsistency and self-contradiction. Thus no question can arise about why one should act only on those judgments one can universalize, because all judgments based on a reason and not held in an inconsistent or self-contradictory manner are universalizable. Notwithstanding its all-embracing nature, universalizability can, according to Hare, show some principles of conduct to be self-contradictory, and others to be highly unpalatable. For example, Hare says:

If a person says 'I ought to act in a certain way but nobody else ought to act in that way in relevantly similar circumstances', then.... he is implicitly contradicting himself. (FR p.32)

and similarly:

....the principle that one ought not to make exceptions in one's own favour [which when] interpreted merely as a denial that it can be the case that I ought to act in a certain way, but that others in relevantly similar circumstances ought not, is analytic (a repetition in other words of the logical thesis) .... (FR p.33)

Thus Hare claims to be able to show, by means of universalizability, that an egoist who is not prepared to universalize his egoism, that is, to grant that other people ought to act egoistically too, is guilty of self-contradiction. If this claim is sound, Hare has successfully shown how moral argument can influence behaviour without allowing the question of why one should be moral a logical foothold. Nor is the exclusion of non-universalizable egoism (we may call it 'extreme egoism') by any means all that Hare thinks can be done with universalizability. Hare believes that
universalizability can be effective in a wide variety of contexts in dealing with those who do not respect the interests of others. For example, Hare believes that he can show that a person cannot consistently say that he ought to put a second person in prison without at the same time saying that he himself ought to be imprisoned if he is ever in the same position as the other person now is. Hare also has an effective device for preventing the first person from alleging that the fact that the second person has, say, a black skin, is a relevant difference. Hare simply asks the first person to imagine a situation in which the roles are reversed, in which his own skin becomes dark, and the skin of the dark person becomes light. This forces the racist to abandon his original judgments, on pain of consenting to his own imprisonment for racial reasons. (FR pp. 106-7, 170-2, 218-9). Clearly, if all this really follows from the acceptance of a simple logical truth about all judgments based on a reason, Hare has achieved a great deal. Provided one acts on decisions of principle, on judgments made for a reason, one cannot avoid acting on principles or judgments that are universalizable. These universal principles and judgments about how one should act constitute one’s moral principles and judgments, and so if one acts on decisions of principle or judgments based on a reason one necessarily acts on moral principles or judgments. The connection between the principles one acts on, and one’s moral principles, is as tight as with Monro (provided only that the need to avoid inconsistency and self-contradiction is admitted), yet having moral principles, on Hare’s view, is inconsistent with being an extreme egoist, and is very likely to lead to a high degree of respect for other people’s interests. For it implies that one treat the interests of others in the same way as one treats one’s own interests.

Unfortunately Hare’s account is unsound. If universalizability is a logical property of any judgment made for a
reason, if it is involved in the notion of a rule, which lays
down that something is a reason for something else, then what
I have called 'extreme egoism' is perfectly compatible with
universalizability. The extreme egoist uses 'ought' in accord-
ance with a universal rule - the rule that everyone ought to do
whatever is in his (the extreme egoist's) interests. The
extreme egoist does not reject Hare's stipulation that the
logic of 'ought' dictates similar judgments in relevantly
similar circumstances. Instead, he reduces this to vacuity
by treating the fact that it is his interests and not those of
another person at stake as a relevant circumstance. Hare
never shows why this is not a relevant circumstance, and there
is no way in which this could be shown, short of abandoning
the claim that universalizability is a logical requirement
which must be observed if one is to be consistent in one's
judgments. The extreme egoist is perfectly consistent in
judging that everyone ought to do whatever will advance the
extreme egoist's interests.

The consequences of Hare's inability to exclude extreme
egoism by any logical sense of universalizability common to
all 'ought' judgments are serious, for the forms of argument
which Hare proposes to use against those who do not respect
the interests of others are ineffective against the extreme
egoist. The extreme egoist who wishes to put his business rival
in gaol for the reason that his rival is acting in a manner
which harms the interests of the extreme egoist, cannot be
asked to imagine a situation in which the roles are reversed,
in which the feature in virtue of which the egoist wishes to
imprison his rival, is a feature which belongs not to the
rival, but the egoist. This is easy to imagine for a racist,
but logically impossible for an extreme egoist. For the
relevant difference is just that it is his, the extreme
egoist's interests that are being harmed. If it were not his
interests, but his rival's, that were being harmed, then of
course the extreme egoist would not consent to being put in
prison - the extreme egoist would be inconsistent if he did consent to being imprisoned on such grounds, for he has been maintaining all along that his own interests are the only ones to be taken into consideration. The fact that in a case in which he himself would be the loser, the extreme egoist would not advocate the same course of action as he would if he were not the loser, merely shows the consistency of the extreme egoist's assertion that the fact that it is his own interests that are being advanced or retarded is a relevant difference between cases. The consistent extreme egoist is invulnerable to the type of argument Hare employs against racists and others, because extreme egoism, by definition, advances the interest of the extreme egoist, while all other relevant differences, such as skin colour, can conceivably operate for or against the interests of the person who takes them to be relevant. So the extreme egoist can trample over other people's interests without having to consent to those hypothetical unpleasant consequences which Hare thinks would deter anyone who is consistent in his judgments from doing so. (14)

There is, then, nothing logically wrong with the judgments of the consistent egoist. It may well be thought, however, that there is very much morally wrong with them. It may be thought that there is another, stronger sense of universalizability, which is a feature of moral judgments, but not of descriptive judgments or of other judgments made for a reason. Hare does sometimes write as if this stronger sense of universalizability is what he has in mind. In one of the

14) The extreme egoist owes his invulnerability to the fact that, as Ernest Gellner has said:

My "being myself" seems to me independent of the predicates which apply to me, and to be something that would survive the replacement of all of them by others... (Ethics & Logic', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1954-5, p.162)
passages cited previously (FR p.107) Hare refers to the possibility that a person may attempt to use as a relevant difference between cases a property which is not 'properly universal' and he explains 'properly universal' property as 'one describable without reference to individuals.' If the property does not meet this condition, Hare says, the person 'has not met the demand for universalizability and cannot claim to be putting forward a moral argument at all.' In this passage, Hare employs a sense of 'universal' which is quite different from the sense which he earlier defined at some length and which he said was common to descriptive judgments and to all judgments made for a reason. There is no difficulty in making a judgment which is descriptive and/or made for a reason, yet cannot be made without reference to individuals. The judgments of the extreme egoists are in this category. The other significant point about the passage is that, in a tacit admission that he is not now using 'universal' in a logical sense common to all 'ought' judgments, Hare does not accuse the person who uses a property 'not properly universal' in an 'ought' judgment of self-contradiction or of inconsistency, or even of mis-using 'ought'. Instead he merely says that such a person cannot claim to be putting forward a moral argument. It seems that in this passage and elsewhere (FR p.98-9, 218-9) Hare is using universalizability as if it were a property characteristic of moral judgments and not to be found in descriptive judgments, or in non-moral judgments based on a reason. Indeed, in a recent Critical Notice, (15) Hare has admitted that some 'oughts' are not universalizable. He suggests that this may be the case with the question 'How ought we to live?', which he refers to as 'Plato's question'. This question, he points out merely 'in the interests of historical accuracy' was 'at least partly a prudential one' in which case the 'ought' would not be universalizable. This casual admission that there are non-universalizable

'oughts' is contrary to the passages from both LM and FR already cited, but it lends further support to the view that universalizability is not a property of all judgments based on a reason. Other writers have argued that universalizability, in a strong sense which excludes extreme egoism, is a property peculiar to moral discourse (16) and in the Critical Notice Hare seems to be approaching this view, although in his books he argues only for the wider sense.

Against the view that universalizability, in a strong sense which excludes extreme egoism, is a property peculiar to moral language, and a requirement which any judgment or principle must satisfy before it is acceptable as a moral judgment of principle, I have no criticisms to make. There seems to me to be good grounds for holding that a judgment is not a moral judgment unless one is prepared to apply it without reference to individuals, that is, without favouring oneself or any other particular person simply on the grounds that it is oneself, or some other particular person, who is involved. Accordingly I would hold that extreme egoism is not a moral principle, and that the arguments Hare employs against racists and others apply to all who claim to act on moral grounds. But it is clear that while universalizability may thus be resurrected as a powerful tool in moral arguments, a foothold has now once again been allowed for the question of why one should be moral. If one can make judgments based on a reason which are not universalizable, the question arises why one should act

16) Cf. M.G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics. It should be noted that, although it is hard to see how Hare can argue for universalizability except as peculiar to moral discourse, once he has conceded that it is not a property of all 'ought' judgments, in the same Critical Notice Hare writes that 'it does not particularly matter' whether there is a sense of 'moral' in which Plato's question is a moral question.
according to judgments which are universalizable rather than according to judgments which are not universalizable. If it is possible to answer Plato's question with a prudential, non-universalizable 'ought', or with a universalizable, moral 'ought', which answer is it the more rational to accept? Hare is unable to preserve a logical tie between making a moral judgment and deciding to act, while simultaneously allowing the possibility of effective moral argument. In other words, if there is a possibility of convincing a person that, morally speaking, it is wrong to do an act, then the question of why one should be moral cannot be ruled out. The question could only be ruled out at the cost of denying reason the place Hare seeks to give it in morals, and then Hare, like Monro, would be committed to saying that any principle of conduct was a moral principle. This we have already seen to be untenable.

I think we have established the foundations for a theoretical refutation of universal prescriptivism, and consequently for the refutation of any attempt to hold 'Why should I be moral?' to be improper on the ground that to judge an act to be moral is to prescribe to everyone, including oneself, that the act be done in relevantly similar circumstances. This theoretical refutation receives strong support from its ability to explain, in a natural and ordinary manner, situations which must be artificially 'explained away' by the universal prescriptivist.

The universal prescriptivist denies that a person can judge an act to be morally obligatory without committing himself to do the act in the appropriate circumstances, that is, a person cannot hold that he is morally obliged to do an act, yet decide not to do it. We have seen, on the other hand, that a person who asks questions such as 'How ought I to live?' or 'What ought I to do?' may be answered with advice about his own interests, or with advice about the moral aspects of the situation. Now it would seem that a person could accept that the moral advice he is given in reply to his question is, from
the moral point of view, entirely correct, and yet might decide to act prudentially. He accepts, in other words, the reasons he has been given for the view that X is morally obligatory, but he does Y because he judges that Y will bring him greater personal benefit - although he does not think this personal benefit alters the moral issues significantly. This person seems able to judge that X is morally obligatory - for that is what accepting the correctness of the moral advice he has been given amounts to - yet he does not decide to do X. But what, it may be objected, is involved in 'accepting the correctness of the moral advice' if not a decision to do what is advised to be morally obligatory? The answers that could be given to this query are varied, depending on the meta-ethic one holds. One might accept that for an act to be morally obligatory it must be one, the non-performance of which would be condemned by an impartial observer, and that this is the case with X, the act in question. One might accept that it is morally obligatory to promote the greatest happiness of all, and that X does promote far greater happiness for all than Y. One might accept that justice is an intrinsic moral good, that it is obligatory to promote intrinsic goods, and that X is just, while Y is unjust without promoting any other intrinsic moral good. Or, to accept as much as possible of Hare's account, one might accept that one cannot judge an act to be morally obligatory unless one is prepared to prescribe that everyone should do it in the appropriate circumstances, and that in the circumstances X is the only act that one would be prepared so to prescribe. If a person accepted any of these views - and others are equally possible - it would be true to say that he judged doing X to be morally obligatory, yet it is compatible with such a judgment that the person decides, on non-moral grounds, to act in a way that he knows an impartial observer would condemn, or that he knows will not promote the greatest happiness of all, or that he knows will be unjust without promoting any other intrinsic moral goods, or that he knows he would not be prepared to prescribe universally.
Judging an act to be immoral, and yet deciding for non-moral reasons to do it seems to me to be an accurate description of the way many people occasionally behave. Many people act morally only if their own self-interest is not greatly retarded by so doing. Hare denies that this is possible in the chapter of FR entitled 'Backsliding' (Ch. 5). In this chapter, Hare suggests four main explanations of the familiar occurrence of someone not doing what they admit they ought to do: (FR 75-83)

(i) His admission may be insincere.
(ii) He may be psychologically unable to perform the action.
(iii) In saying that he ought to do the action, he may mean simply that the action is 'required by the accepted morality of his society'. His failure to perform the action indicates his dissent from the accepted morality of his society in this instance.
(iv) In saying that he ought to do the action he may mean merely 'that it is the sort of action, the thought of whose omission induces in him certain feelings.'

Hare’s explanations fail to cover in any plausible way all possible cases of a man not doing what he acknowledges that he is morally obligated to do. For example, imagine a juryman who, after hearing a trial is convinced that the accused is guilty and ought to be convicted. He intends to give his verdict accordingly. At this point, according to Hare and according to ordinary opinion, he would be making a moral judgment that he ought to say that the accused is guilty. Before he can announce his verdict, however, he is offered a large bribe if he gets the accused an acquittal. As he is one of those people who puts his own interests above moral considerations, if there is a serious clash, he accepts the bribe and states it to be his view that the accused is innocent. The juryman nevertheless continues to believe – perhaps even says to himself or his wife – that the prisoner was guilty and that he ought, morally, to have been convicted. He does not mean by this that the accepted morality of society, from which in this instance he
dissents, holds that guilty people ought to be convicted, for he does not dissent from this view of the moral aspects of the situation. Nor does he just mean that he has certain feelings about not having convicted the prisoner, for he may or may not have such feelings, and in any case the feelings are consequent on, and not constitutive of, the judgment that it is immoral to release prisoners one believes to be guilty if one is bribed. Nor would it seem that the juryman must have been 'psychologically unable' to refuse the bribe. Unless one is to define 'psychologically unable' in such a way as to cover all cases in which sincere moral judgments are not acted upon, there is no basis for saying that the juryman must have been psychologically unable to refuse. Psychological inability suggests that there is some sort of compulsion operating. An alcoholic might be described as psychologically unable to stop drinking. Terms like 'weakness of will' and 'backsliding' are appropriate in cases in which there is a definite decision to act in one way, yet the person acts in another, and in such cases one might well say that the person was psychologically unable to act in the way he had decided to act. But the case we are considering is nothing like this. The juryman acts in the way he decided to act. His judgment that it was morally obligatory for him to say that the prisoner was guilty did not constitute a decision to do this. The decision only comes after considering whether his own interest is affected by the action. Prior to the offer of the bribe, the juryman could not see that any major considerations of self-interest were relevant to the decision, so he decided to act in accordance with his moral obligations. After receiving the offer, however, he changed his decision, on the grounds that new considerations now existed. There is no action contrary to decision here, as in the cases of psychological inability Hare cites.

Our conclusion must be that Hare has failed to give any ground for holding that, in a case such as the one described the juryman is not making a proper moral judgment. After all, the juryman has not, even on Hare's terms, come to a contrary
moral judgment, for he is certainly not prepared to prescribe universally that all jurymen should acquit prisoners when offered large bribes. He knows that if this happened, the legal system would break down and crime would increase greatly, which he does not want to happen. He also knows that if he had been robbed or assaulted by someone, he would not want that person acquitted by means of a bribe. Surely the juryman is still making the same moral judgment as he was before he was bribed. The effect of the bribe has not been to alter his conviction that he is morally obliged to find the accused guilty (how could a bribe possibly do that); it has simply brought non-moral considerations to bear on his decision. (17)

Some other remarks of Hare on a similar point reveal a further odd consequence of prescriptivism. In LM, Hare wrote:

If I really admit that the life of St. Francis was morally better than mine, and mean this as an evaluation, there is nothing for it but to try to be more like St. Francis, which is arduous. (p.142)

This is the strange position to which a universal prescriptivist is forced, as are all those who hold that moral reasons always override non-moral ones. So contrary is this position to the actual beliefs of human beings that Hare attempted to moderate it in FR (p.155). But his grounds for doing so are unconvincing. He claims that we may admire a virtuous man without trying to be more like him if the way in which that man was virtuous does not fit into a coherent ideal which we find ourselves able to pursue. But although we may genuinely believe that people like St. Francis were morally superior to ourselves, the fact that we do not act as he did has little to do with our trying to live a different life, but one of equal moral worth. Few of us could claim that we are doing this.

17) Other good counter-examples to Hare's views may be found in H.J. McCloskey, Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1969, pp.71f. McCloskey also points out that the most disturbing thing about Ch.5 of FR is the a priori way in which Hare attempts to fit examples into a preselected system of explanations.
Nor do we live differently because of any 'inability' to live like the saints. Most of us never even decide to try, so how can it be said that we are unable to do so? On the other hand, the 'problem' about the way we place a high moral evaluation on such lives, yet make no attempt to follow their example, disappears once it is recognised that the fact that many of us take self-interest into account in deciding what to do is not inconsistent with the fact that we make evaluative moral judgments.

There is still one more reply that Hare could make. He could deny that anyone can make an evaluative judgment and not act on it, even if none of his four explanations seem to apply, on the ground that he has defined 'value-judgment' as a judgment which is recognised by whoever assents to it as entailing an imperative. (LM p.168). This appears an arbitrary limitation on the use of a term which, as I have tried to show, has a quite proper and distinct meaning. Indeed, I doubt that value-judgments, as Hare defines them, exist at all. While value-judgments may entail imperatives in combination with certain principles of action, or certain wants, they cannot do so in themselves. To judge a strawberry to be a good strawberry does not entail an imperative unless one cares for strawberries. Similarly, I would say, to judge an action to be morally good does not entail an imperative unless one 'cares for' morality - that is, unless one has decided to act on moral principles. One may or may not decide to do so, and this decision need not impair one's ability to make moral judgments. If one decides not to act on moral principles, then one may make moral judgments without committing oneself to any action. (18)

In defining the term 'prescriptive' in FR, Hare makes the same move, maintaining that if a person does not act in the

way he judges he ought to, then he is not making a prescriptive judgment (with the qualifications listed above). This can be accepted - 'prescriptive' is not a term in common use, as is the case with 'value-judgment'. But the real question is, as Hare recognises, whether moral judgments are prescriptive:

The substantive part of the prescriptivist thesis is that there are prescriptive uses of moral words, and that these uses are important and central to the words' meaning. (FR p.84)

This is certainly the issue between prescriptivism and its opponents. Hare goes on to say why he thinks that the prescriptivists claim must be accepted. Because of its brevity, I will quote the passage in full:

But that prescriptive uses of moral language exist, at any rate, cannot be doubted. Prescriptivism would be refuted if it could be shown that we do not ever use moral words in the way that I have characterised as prescriptive. To counter this attack, it is only necessary to produce examples of such a use, and to ask the reader whether he finds them at all untypical. I will produce just one. If a man is faced with a difficult moral choice, and asks a friend or adviser 'What do you think I ought to do?' is it not sometimes the case that if he says 'You ought to do A', and if the man then proceeds not to do A, he will be said to have rejected the advice? (FR pp.84-85)

Here, however, Hare still does not meet the objection I have raised, because he has written into the example that the man wishes to do what is morally best - this is presumably what is meant by saying that the man is faced with a difficult moral choice. I do not deny that so long as a man has decided to act on moral grounds, his acceptance of a moral judgment entails an imperative unless he alters his decision. But it is only in combination with such a decision that moral judgments do entail imperatives, and it is possible to judge morally without having decided to act morally. In this respect, moral judgments are just like factual or descriptive judgments. Once a man decides to buy red paint, the acceptance of a descriptive judgment about the colour of a can of paint entails an imperative, provided he
does not alter his decision to buy red paint. He might alter his decision, if the price were too high, but then so might the man who had decided to do the act he had judged to be morally obligatory. Hare's example does not touch the contention that, without a prior decision, no judgment, moral or otherwise, entails an imperative. If we reformulate Hare's example so as to test my contention — say by replacing 'faced with a difficult moral choice' by a neutral term like 'wondering what to do' — then, if we understand the 'ought' in the advice given to be a moral 'ought' (which is obviously in accordance with Hare's intentions, as the example is a test of whether we use moral words prescriptively) I do not think it is true to say that a man who is advised that he ought morally to do A will be said to have rejected the advice if he then does not do A. At least, I do not think he can be said to have rejected the advice in the sense necessary for Hare, that is, in the sense that he did not agree that he was morally obliged to do A. Perhaps he could be said to have disregarded the advice. What cannot be ruled out is that he may afterwards say to his advisor 'I accepted your opinion that I was morally obliged to do A, but I decided to look after my own interests instead.'

It may be thought that there is at least one exception to the statement I made earlier, that no value-judgment entails an imperative. Judgments like 'the best thing to do', or 'what you ought to do', when 'best' and 'ought' are understood as meaning 'all things considered', and 'all things' includes reasons of all sorts, moral and non-moral, seem to entail an imperative. No doubt if a person were given advice of this sort, and did not do the action he was advised to do, he would be said to have rejected the advice. On the other hand, in order to give such advice, in order to know what 'all things considered' included, it would be necessary to know the principles of action, and perhaps the wants, interests and desires of the person one was advising. This kind of value-
judgment is really elliptical. It is equivalent to 'the best thing according to the criteria you use in deciding what to do' and I have already said that, in combination with the acceptance of certain principles of action, value-judgments may be prescriptive.

We may thus conclude that prescriptivism fails as an analysis of moral judgments, this failure being due to the possibility of making a judgment within a specific set of criteria, without necessarily accepting the criteria on which the judgment is based.

(vi) CONCLUSION

We have examined various arguments, commonly regarded as showing that 'Why should I be moral?' is an illegitimate or improper question, and have seen that none of them satisfactorily establish this conclusion. Although one or two of the writers we shall discuss in the next section do treat the question as confused or redundant, these writers do argue that it is rational to be moral, and that the proper reply to 'Why should I be moral?' is an assertion of the rationality of acting morally, rather than, as with Hare and Monro, an assertion of the logical impossibility of deciding not to act morally. The assertion that moral behaviour is rational distinguishes the arguments to be considered in the next part from those just considered, which denied that any question can be asked about the rational justification of morality.

In the Introduction, the reader was promised that in Part 1, some light would be thrown on the meaning of the word 'moral' in the question we are discussing. It may be felt that this topic is still largely unilluminated. We have rejected two analyses of what moral principles and moral judgments are, but no alternative analysis has been put forward in their place. This has been deliberate. To attempt a satisfactory

19) especially H.J. McCloskey.
analysis of the meaning of 'moral' would be a major digression. Moreover, since the issue has been hotly disputed, and the disputants are divided into a number of irreconcilable schools, if this thesis were based on one particular definition of 'moral', its conclusions would necessarily carry conviction only for those who accepted the particular definition. On the other hand 'moral' is not defined beyond what is necessary to establish that 'Why should I be moral?' is a proper question — and I hope I have shown that definitions which make it logically improper are unsatisfactory — then the conclusions reached may be acceptable to the holders of a wide range of philosophical opinions.

Even so, is a negative definition of morality the best that can be offered? The reader may well accept the desirability of not giving a full analysis of the meaning of 'moral', and yet may think that something better can be offered than: 'To judge an act to be morally good is not equivalent to saying that it is in accordance with one's overriding principles, nor does it mean that one prescribes that the act be done by everyone, including oneself.' This is all that has been said up to now about the definition of morality, and the reader's request for something more positive is reasonable. Therefore I suggest one requirement which I consider to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a principle to be a moral principle. I have already hinted at this requirement. It may be summed up in one word: impartiality. A principle is not a moral principle if it is grounded on the preferment of a specific person, simply because he is the particular person he is. The same applies if it is grounded on the preferment of specific people, just because they are the particular people they are. The chief effect of this requirement is to rule out extreme egoism as a moral principle. There is no logical mistake involved in holding the fact that 'I am I' to be a relevant consideration in deciding to act, but to do so is morally reprehensible. This requirement is ancient and widely accepted.
As 'Do unto others as you would have them do unto you' it appears in Jewish, Christian and Confucian ethics, and in many others. It is clearly related to Kant's doctrine of universal law. It is close to the stronger, non-logical sense of universalizability which we have seen that Hare uses in arguments with racists (although he never argues for its existence), the sense he once refers to as 'describable without reference to individuals'. Perhaps the best elaboration of the requirement is to be found in Marcus Singer's book, to which I have already referred. Most modern writers have adhered to the requirement in some form. For the Utilitarians it was the principle that everyone is to count for one, and no-one for more than one. For intuitionists, impartiality follows automatically from the objective, non-personal nature of moral properties or predicates. For Natural Law theorists it seems to follow from the alleged uniformity of man's nature. The requirement has been put forward in so many different forms that it is not worthwhile listing them all, but the idea that for a principle to be a moral principle it should be acceptable to an impartial observer should also be mentioned. Hardly any writers deny the principle altogether. Opposition to it comes mainly from the belief that an attempt is being made to smuggle in impartiality as a logical requirement of any principles of conduct, (20) and my own view is contrary to this. I assert that impartiality is a logical requirement of all moral principles, but I assert that one makes no logical error in guiding one's life by partial principles. There have also been disputes over the issue of whether impartiality or a related requirement is a sufficient condition for a principle to be a moral principle. I do not assert that it is. Further controversy has come about because the formulation of 'willing one's principles to be universal' has strange consequences - it would be immoral to drive to work after peak-hour, for example, according to this formulation. I do not

think this universalisation formulation of the requirement is satisfactory.

A further important objection to impartiality as a logical requirement of moral terms is the belief that to act contrary to a logical condition for a principle being a moral principle must be to act non-morally and not immorally. Therefore, it is held, such a requirement must be normatively neutral, and cannot have substantive moral consequences—nothing can follow from the way we use the term 'moral principle'. (21) As Singer points out, (22) this doctrine is absurd, for one ought, morally, to act on moral principles whenever there is a clash between moral and non-moral principles, and it is immoral not to do so. Hence a substantive moral judgment must be incorporated into any definition of 'moral principle'. Why then does the doctrine seem so plausible? One reason is again that attempts have been made to present non-compliance with a logical condition of a moral judgment as a logical error. For logic itself to have normative consequences would indeed be surprising; but for the logic of morals to have such consequences is not so surprising. A more fundamental reason for the plausibility of the view that a logical requirement of 'moral principle' must be normatively neutral is that the relation between the moral/non-moral and moral/immoral distinctions has been widely misconceived. It is commonly thought that the former distinction is logically prior, and that moral and immoral (that is, morally good and morally bad) are sub-classes of moral principles, as opposed to non-moral principles. In a recent article, Sid. B. Thomas, Jr. has argued convincingly that


the class/sub-class model (or genus/species, as he puts it) is misleading in this context. (23) It is the notion of morally good which is prior. Thomas urges that an appropriate model for comparison is the relation of the distinctions between valid and invalid deductive arguments, and deductive and non-deductive arguments. An invalid deductive argument is an argument which makes a claim to be a deductive argument, but is not. A non-deductive argument neither is, nor claims to be, deductive. The notion of a valid deductive argument must be prior, because it is possible to decide if an argument is a valid deductive argument without considering what it claims to be. So one may decide that an argument is not a deductive argument without knowing whether it is an invalid deductive argument, or a non-deductive argument. We do not have to establish the class before the sub-class, and so this model is inappropriate. Similarly, a moral principle may be distinguished from a non-moral principle by its claim to satisfy the basic requirements for moral goodness, one of which is, on my view, impartiality. An immoral principle claims to satisfy these requirements, but does not. There are admittedly still some points in need of further consideration, especially the idea of a principle making a claim, but I think that, once we are rid of the class/sub-class model, we may accept the correctness of the contention that the logical requirement dividing moral from non-moral cannot be normatively neutral.

A final objection to non-neutral definitions of morality may arise through the invoking of 'the naturalistic fallacy'. If it is part of the meaning of 'moral' that moral goodness is inconsistent with favouring one's own interests simply because

23) S.B. Thomas, Jr, 'The Status of the Generalization Principle', American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 5 (1968) pp. 174-82. I draw only on his account of the distinction discussed (pp. 180-2), not his view of the nature of the Generalization Principle (which is like Hare's) nor his view that Generalizability is a sufficient condition for a principle to be a moral principle.
they are one's own interests, while refusing to allow that others are morally entitled to act similarly, then from an indicative statement (a description of a person acting in this way) we may deduce that the person is immoral, and that he ought not, morally speaking, continue to act in this way. Here is an 'ought' from an 'is', which so many writers have thought to be impossible. Our previous discussion of moral judgments shows how what Hume thought to be 'altogether inconceivable' (24) is possible. According to Hare, the logical rule which is the basis of both Hume's and Moore's remarks on this point, as well as many related arguments, is simply the rule that no imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one imperative.(25) Hare, believing that moral judgments are imperative in form, considers that this shows that no moral judgments can be deduced from purely indicative premisses.

But if, as we have argued, moral judgments do not in themselves give rise to an imperative, then one may accept the logical rule about no imperatives from indicative premisses, and yet hold that moral judgments may be deduced from such premisses. Once we realise that there is no logical tie between moral judgments and action, we need not be so sceptical of a logical tie between indicative statements and a moral judgment.

It may still be objected that Moore's 'open question' argument has not been met. (27) If the question 'Is it morally good to be impartial?' is a meaningful question, and cannot be reduced to 'Is it morally good to be morally good?', then it will be claimed that one cannot define moral goodness in terms of impartiality. To this I may reply that I have not done so - I have said that impartiality is a necessary requirement of moral goodness, but not that it is sufficient. The open question argument may be made applicable to my requirement, however,

25) Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 28-30
26) See pp. 42-5, above.
by being phrased in the negative: 'Is it morally bad to be partial?'. To this question I must reply that the answer is 'Yes', and that once the meaning of morality, and the meaning of impartiality, in the sense in which I am using it, are fully understood, it will be seen that it would be self-contradictory to assert that it could be morally good to be partial. It is worth noting that Moore used his argument against definitions of 'good', without specifying that he was using the term in a moral sense. The argument is more plausible against 'good', for this is a broader term than 'morally good'.

There are, then, no valid objections to saying that impartiality is a necessary requirement for a principle to be a moral principle, and I define 'moral' only insofar as to assert that impartiality is part of its meaning. This does not mean self-interested action, or favouring individuals is always wrong, of course. If one is prepared to admit that anyone else has the same moral rights as one has oneself, to act in a similar way in similar circumstances, favouritism or self-interest is compatible with impartiality. Thus universal egoism, the doctrine that everyone ought to look after their own interests, satisfies the impartiality requirement. Extreme egoism does not. One formulation of 'Why should I be moral?' is therefore 'Why should I act on principles which I am prepared to apply impartially, rather than, say, on the principles of the extreme egoist?'. This question must be interpreted not as a query about the moral obligatoriness of impartiality, but as a request for reasons for acting impartially. I believe my defining characteristic of morality to be compatible with the full-range of meta-ethical theories, from non-cognitivism to intuitionism. I take it that as now understood, 'Why should I be moral?' is a proper question, and one which is obviously important. Obviously the next task is to see if this question can be answered.
In discussing the major arguments for the rejection of 'Why should I be moral?', little mention has been made of F.H. Bradley, and none at all of H.A. Prichard, although, as has already been said in the Introduction, these two writers are commonly considered to have been major exponents of the view that the question is improper or illegitimate. The reason why the views of Bradley and Prichard have not been considered in full is that in the case of Bradley there is extreme difficulty in establishing just what his views really are, while a close examination of Prichard's work reveals that he never really rejected our question at all. Hence in dealing with Bradley and Prichard, the principal task is to ascertain just what positions each took up in relation to the question, rather than, as with the other objections we have been considering, to see if the objections are sound. With the exception of the most straightforward and probably also most important of Bradley's arguments, which has already been considered, any discussion of Bradley and Prichard, must be primarily scholarly rather than philosophical, and interrupt rather than advance the central argument of the thesis. Yet because of their contemporary importance, they cannot be omitted. This appendix seemed the best solution to the organizational problem involved in not omitting Bradley and Prichard, while not interrupting the flow of the argument.

(i) BRADLEY

In attributing any view to Bradley, it is very difficult to be sure that he really held the view attributed to him. One reason for this is that he wrote in a kind of Hegelian dialectic, which means that he frequently contradicts what he has written previously, and then 'transcends' the contradiction in a new position altogether. Apart from this, he is occasionally inconsistent in an ordinary manner. The result is confusing, but I shall attempt to give his views on 'Why should I be moral?' as well as can be done.
There is one statement on this topic which can be made with complete confidence: Bradley did not totally reject the question. This may come as a surprise to some, but it can be confirmed by the following passage, in which Bradley concludes the section commonly regarded as containing the argument that the question is improper and must be rejected:

Has the question, Why should I be moral? no sense then, and is no positive answer possible? No, the question has no sense at all; it is simply unmeaning, unless it is equivalent to, Is morality an end in itself; and if so, how and in what way is it an end? [24]

So we may ask if morality is an end in itself, which does not appear significantly different from asking if it is rational to take morality as an end in itself. And we may ask how and in what way it is an end, which apparently is not very different from asking why it is rational to take morality as an end in itself. This concedes a very large part of the field. It allows the question in the sense in which it is discussed in Part 11, that is the question as to whether morality is in itself rational. It allows, as Bradley explicitly states, argument as to whether 'something not virtue', such as one's own pleasure, is the end in itself. (p.61) Bradley participates in this argument when, in Essay 111, he argues that to take one's own pleasure as the end, to live a life of pleasure for pleasure's sake, will inevitably result in a failure to find satisfaction.

24.) F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford University Press, 1962) p.64. For an indication of how the myth persists that Bradley rejected all questioning of whether morality is an end in itself, cf. the paraphrase of this passage in Richard Wollheim's F. H. Bradley (London, Penguin Book, 1959) p. 236:

'But, Bradley goes on, though it is true that, interpreted in the obvious way, the question Why should I be moral? makes no sense and admits of no positive answer, there is a way of making it quite respectable: and that is to see it as equivalent to the question, Given that morality is an end in itself, what is this end?..."
Bradley does not allow our question, however, in the sense discussed in Part III, in which attempts to show that morality is in the agent's interest are examined. Against such attempts he uses the argument already quoted and briefly discussed, (25) that virtue is only to be found in doing good for its own sake, and that it is to degrade and prostitute virtue to recommend her for her pleasures or advantages. Bradley's condemnation of such practices in the passages quoted is forceful and uncompromising, but two points need to be made here. Firstly, one would think that if it is proper to ask whether morality is an end in itself, then it is possible that the answer, when we eventually find it, may be that it is not. If morality is not an end in itself, then surely it is possible that it is nevertheless rational to be moral as a means. In this case our common moral consciousness, which tells us that virtue must be recommended for her own sake, would have to stand aside, if virtue is to be recommended at all. No doubt Bradley believes that morality is an end in itself, but if it is conceivable that, say, pleasure is a superior end, then it is conceivable that the question of whether virtue is a means to pleasure may arise, and if to ask this question is to prostitute virtue, the choice for virtue would appear to be prostitution or extinction. Our common moral consciousness would have to be revised in either case, and the former revision appears less drastic.

The second point brings out well the nuances of Bradleyan dialectic. After his attack on recommending virtue as a means to something else, Bradley goes on to develop an ethical system which could have been especially designed to do just that. The essence of Bradley's ethic is that through morality man comes to self-realization. In Essay V, 'My Station and Its Duties', Bradley argues that man is part of an organic whole, his society or state.

25) See pp. 4 above.
Only as part of this organic whole can I be real, and moreover:
when I give myself to it, it gives me the fruition of my own personal activity, the accomplished ideal of my life which is happiness. (p.165)

Under these circumstances:
I feel the satisfaction of an inward realization. (p.179)

While when I fulfil 'my station and its duties':
I am what I ought to be and find so my contentment and satisfaction. (p.181)

It is the State, which bestows, for obedience:
...individual life, satisfaction and happiness. (p.185)

Not only is happiness to be found in this way: there is no way of finding happiness in any other way:
And the licentious young man, anxious for pleasure at any price, who, without troubling himself about 'principles', does put into practice the principles of not conforming with custom, finds after all that the self within him can be satisfied only with that from whence it came. (pp. 200-1)

Admittedly, the ethic of 'My Station and Its Duties' is not Bradley's last word. Typically, he partially rejects it in later chapters. But this does not affect the importance of Bradley's appeal to 'satisfaction', for in the second last essay Bradley again emphasizes that through morality one finds:
...a permanent and everlasting source of pleasure... (p.292)

and that:

In morality, as a rule, what you give is returned to you with interest; and the bestowal of the self on the good is rewarded by the general heightening of the individual life. If happiness is the realization of one's ideal in one's own existence, the attaining one's end as a whole in the private self, and by and for the private self, then, so far as men can be happy, in the main it is true that virtue is happiness; and virtue does not necessarily imply self-sacrifice. (p.309)

In the 'Concluding Chapter', Bradley returns to the dangers of dwelling on the satisfaction of virtue, but his reasons are different now:
To dwell on the satisfaction which comes from right doing
need not be wrong, but it is very dangerous; it is a
most slippery position; for the moment it leads us to
enjoyment which does not arise from function, or does
not react to stimulate function, then, from that
moment, it is bad and goes to corrupt. (p.337)

This seems to mean that it is alright to praise virtue for its
satisfaction, so long as this praise leads to 'function', which
is apparently equivalent to issuing in practice. This is vastly
different from Bradley's original position. On the other hand
this passage may refer only to a person's 'inner life', 'dwell'
meaning merely 'think of', so it is not certain that it has
application to the question of recommending virtue to another.
Still, insofar as the man who asks 'Why should I be moral?'
asks it of himself, as Smith the purse-finder did, Bradley seems
to approve him telling himself that he will gain satisfaction
from virtue, if this will stimulate him to return the purse.
Whatever the interpretation of this last passage, it cannot be
denied that Bradley has, throughout the later Essays, infringed
against his own canon. We may conclude that although Bradley
does produce a notable argument against the possibility of recommend-
ning virtue as a means to some other end, he does not take his
own argument very seriously.

What else does Bradley say about 'Why should I be moral?'
being an illegitimate question? The answer is very little,
and that little is obscure. He begins by interpreting the question
in this way:

In 'Why should I be moral?', the 'Why should I?' was another
way of saying, What good is virtue? or rather, For what
is it good? and we saw that in asking, Is virtue good as a
means, and how so? we do assume that virtue is not good,
except as a means. The dogma at the root of this question
is hence clearly either (1) the general assertion that only
means are good, or (2) the particular assertion of this
in the case of virtue. (p.59)

Now we have already seen that Bradley later allows that there is
a sense of our question which does not assume virtue to be a
means, that is the sense in which the question asks if virtue is
an end in itself. In the passage just quoted, Bradley might be
interpreting 'should' as a moral term as Toulmin did. (26) This is suggested by the use of the term 'good', for if the 'should' is non-moral, it would be more natural to say not that the questioner is challenging that virtue is good in itself, but rather that he wishes to know why, or in what way, this constitutes a sufficient reason for him to be virtuous. But it is more likely that Bradley means by 'For what is it good?' something like 'what is the use of it?', and a short dialogue with a hypothetical opponent reveals that Bradley thinks of the questioner as taking his own pleasure to be his end. This is nearer to the question of 'What will morality advantage me?', which he then raises. Prior to doing so, however, he makes a point which could be construed as a rejection of the question. After his opponent admits that his end is his own pleasure, Bradley asks 'Why?', and says:

Your reply must be, that you take it to be so, and are prepared to argue on the thesis that something not virtue is the end in itself. And so are we.... If any theory could stand upon the What for? as a rational formula which must always hold good and be satisfied, then, to that extent, no doubt it would have an advantage. But we have seen that all doctrines alike must reject the What for? and agree in this rejection, if they agree in nothing else; since they all must have an end which is not a mere means. (p.61)

The point of this could be that there is nothing wrong with replying to 'Why should I be moral?' simply by asserting that virtue is the end in itself. Its claim to be the end in itself is as good as any other possible end, including one's own pleasure. To this argument, it might be objected that it just so happens that most people do desire pleasure for its own sake, whereas they do not happen to desire virtue for its own sake; and does this not constitute a valid reason for holding pleasure, not virtue to be the end in itself? In any case, Bradley's assertion that 'all doctrines alike must reject the What for?' would, if accepted, mean that no end is any more rational than

26) See p. 46, above
any other, that virtue has no better claim to be a rational ultimate end than the collection of bottle tops. This, as we have seen, is scarcely tenable. It would make the correct reply to 'Why should I be moral?': 'Well, why not?'. Alternatively, the question could be held to be illegitimate - but only if all questions about ultimate ends were equally illegitimate. Few people are likely to want to take this position, and Bradley is not one of them. As can be seen from the passage quoted above, Bradley says that he is prepared to argue on the question of whether something not virtue is the end in itself. And Bradley also says a few lines later:

... the question is now, as it was two thousand years ago, Granted that there is an end, what is this end? ...The claims of pleasure to be the end we are to discuss in another paper. (p.61)

In this passage, Bradley is saying that the question really boils down to the question of what do we take as our ultimate end, and he mentions two candidates, virtue and pleasure. This question is much like the one which, as we saw earlier, Bradley does not reject, namely the question of whether morality is the end in itself. So the argument from the logical need for some end to be beyond the 'What for?' is not, in Bradley's view, an argument for rejecting 'Why should I be moral?'. Bradley's argument is merely concerned with showing that an end like pleasure has no advantage over virtue in respect to this question.

There is one more argument which could be attributed to Bradley, although I am doubtful if it is really to be found in his work. It could be said, on the basis of passages such as the last one quoted that Bradley, somewhat like Monroe (27) rejects 'Why should I be moral?' because the real question is 'What is the end?', and this end, whatever it is, is what one properly calls one's morality. I do not deny that suggestions of this view are to be found. Bradley does elsewhere refer to getting

27) See pp. 70-71, above.
the maximum pleasure as the 'moral end' for the hedonist, (p.101) and says that for the hedonist, virtue is 'not virtue at all', if not a means to pleasure. (p.92) On the other hand, he also speaks, as we have seen, of assertions that virtue is not the end, which would be a self-contradictory assertion if virtue, or morality, meant 'the ultimate end'. To take virtue as a means, Bradley says, is to make an assumption which is in opposition to the voice of the moral consciousness, but he does not say that it is self-contradictory. (p.61) Indeed, Bradley regards it quite possible for a person to choose to be immoral, and finds it necessary to argue against such a choice on the grounds that it is unsatisfying. (p.63) The whole tenor of Essay 11 is that it is not possible that hedonism, and morality or virtue is the end, which contradicts the view that he rejects the question on the grounds that the end, whatever it is, is morality.

To conclude: Bradley only rejected 'Why should I be moral?' in the sense of 'What advantage will I have from it?' and he was not consistent in rejecting it even in this sense. Other senses of the question, including the central sense in which it is asked whether one should take morality, or some other end such as pleasure as the end in itself, Bradley did not reject.

(ii) PRICHARD

It is widely accepted that Prichard argued that 'Why should I be moral?', in the sense we are discussing the question (where 'should' is not a moral term) is an improper question. This view is expressed, to give just one example, in the recent Encyclopedia of Philosophy, where it is said that in his famous article 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest On A Mistake', which appeared in Mind, in 1912, Prichard argued that traditional Ethics (for example, the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, Bentham and Mill) goes astray in trying to work out some general answer to the question of why it is reasonable or worthwhile to do one's duty. Prichard's point is that the question itself is the result
Thus one is led to think that the mistake referred to in the title of Prichard's article is that of asking 'Why should I be moral?'. Yet in this article Prichard never argues that this question is improper. What he does argue is that it is a mistake to attempt to vindicate our moral intuitions, to attempt to show that our moral sense is not illusory. It is this attempt which Prichard insists is a mistake which underlies almost all moral philosophy.

It is easy to see why it might be thought that Prichard was branding as illegitimate the question which we are concerned to discuss. Prichard uses terms such as 'ought', 'should' and 'justify', meaning by them 'morally ought', morally should', and 'morally justify'. Thus Prichard does discuss, and dismiss as illegitimate, questions such as 'Is there really a reason why I should act in the ways which hitherto I have thought I ought to act?'. This question does resemble a version of the question we have been asking, 'Is there a (sufficient) reason to do what one (morally) ought to do?', but in fact the question is quite different. The difference may be seen in the word 'hitherto' which appears in Prichard's question. Prichard thinks of the questioner as doubting whether his moral beliefs are sound. That this is so becomes clearer if we read on, for Prichard immediately continues: 'May I not have been all the time under an illusion in so thinking?'. In rejecting these questions as illegitimate Prichard is simply affirming the intuitionist position that our moral intuitions are an unquestionable source of moral knowledge. A careful reading of the article shows this interpretation to be indisputable. It is adequately shown by


the way Prichard argues from analogy with what he takes to be a mistake in the theory of knowledge. Prichard argues that any doubts about whether we are right in thinking $4 \times 7 = 28$ are removed once we appreciate that our immediate apprehension of this is a condition of knowing it, and that the question as to whether we do know it is illegitimate. (MO pp.14-16) This situation may be analogous to an attempt to dispute the truth of our moral intuitions, but it cannot possibly be thought to be analogous to the question we are concerned with, which does not dispute that what one takes to be morally good really is morally good. Prichard's conclusion is that the only task of moral philosophy is to realize the self-evidence of our moral intuitions, which again shows that he is not concerned with questions outside morality.

Another reason for the widespread misinterpretation of this article is that Prichard does spend much of the paper discussing passages from Plato and others who argue that morality is advantageous to the moral agent. Prichard does this because he believes that these writers are seeking to show by these arguments that our moral intuitions are correct. Unsurprisingly, his 'refutation' of Plato and the other writers consists in showing that this approach can only make us want to do what is moral, it cannot show us that we ought to do them. (MO p.3) This may be true, but it is surely possible that Plato and the other writers were not trying to do anything but make us want to do what is moral, in the sense of giving us reasons for wanting to be moral. There are difficulties of interpretation, due to different moral concepts, and problems of translation, with Plato, but certainly Butler who is one of the other writers Prichard mentions does not doubt that what conscience tells us is morally good really is morally good. His arguments from self-interest are not attempts to show that conscience is correct in its judgments, but that it is in accordance with 'reasonable self-love' to do as directed by conscience.

In his later writings, such as 'Duty and Interest', and the long essay 'Moral Obligation', Prichard does make the important
distinction which & failed to make in 'Does Moral Philosophy
Rest On A Mistake', the distinction between moral and non-moral
'oughts'. It might be thought, therefore, that the view that
Prichard has shown 'Why should I be moral?' (in the sense in
which we are discussing it) to be illegitimate has its origin
in these works. Kurt Baier, who is accurate on the point of the
earlier article, cites 'Duty and Interest' when discussing what
he takes to be Prichard's rejection of the question as illegiti-
mate. (30)

In the first twenty pages of 'Duty and Interest',
Prichard interprets Plato and Butler as he did in 'Does Moral
Philosophy Rest On A Mistake'. Then comes a change. Prichard
notes that both Plato and Butler 'in a certain voice of thought'
are trying to show that morality is advantageous for the agent.
But Prichard, even here, does not think that the inquiry whether
morality is advantageous for the agent is an illegitimate enquiry.
What he does do is to argue that Plato and Butler's motivation
for this inquiry comes from their view that even if we know some
action to be right we will not do it unless we think it is for
our own advantage; and that this belief in turn stems from the
belief that the desire for some good to oneself is the only
motive of deliberate human action. Prichard then maintains that
this is a false view of human nature insofar as men do sometimes
act disinterestedly. He instances benevolent actions and actions
done from a desire to do one's duty. Thus Prichard claims that:

....there is no reason to admit the truth of Plato's
reason for trying to prove that right actions must be
advantageous...for we shall be able to maintain that
his [the agent's] desire to do what is right, if strong
enough, will lead him to do the action in spite of any
aversion from doing it which he may feel on account of
its disadvantages. (31)

He concludes:

For the reasons given I shall treat it as established

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30) K. Baier, The Moral Point of View, pp. 11-12.
31) H.A. Prichard, Duty and Interest, Oxford, University Press
(1928) p.28.
that, though there is to be found in Plato and Butler what is really an attempt to prove that right action is advantageous, the question of its success or failure can be ignored, since the attempt is based on a fundamental mistake about actual human nature. (32)

Pritchard is not saying here that the question 'Why should I be moral?' is illegitimate, improper, or to be rejected. He says simply that it is unnecessary to ask the question, because the motive that has led to asking it is based on a factual error. This does not mean that the question cannot be asked, but that it is of no importance. Plato's attempt might, if Pritchard is right, be likened to efforts by one country to build a foolproof defence system against a second country, when in fact the second country does not and never will intend to attack the first country. The defence-building may be unnecessary, but it is still quite possible for a General in the first country, even if he learns that he will never be attacked, to ask 'Are my defences foolproof?'.

But in fact, in saying that the question of the success or failure of the attempt to show that morality is advantageous 'can be ignored', Pritchard overstates his case. For Pritchard himself acknowledges that it is not always the case that the agent's desire to do what is right is strong enough to overcome the aversion towards doing what is right produced by the belief that the act is disadvantageous. Nor does Pritchard take the view that an action is only right if it is done from the desire to do one's duty. (33) Therefore he must admit that sometimes the question of whether morality is advantageous may be an important practical issue. He gives no hint of what his answer would be in cases where there was only a weak desire to do what is right, and a strong desire to do what is advantageous. It is at least possible that in Pritchard's view it would not be rational for such a person to act morally. But the main point that concerns us is that Pritchard, in 'Duty and Interest', does

33) See the essay 'Moral Obligation', reprinted in the volume of the same title, pp. 129-35.

not reject the question as illegitimate.

Prichard says little more about this in his other work which discusses the topic, 'Moral Obligation'. This essay is basically a re-write, with additions, of 'Duty and Interest'. But it is worth noting because passages in this book have led yet another writer astray. C.D. Broad, in his Critical Notice of the book Moral Obligation, (34) discusses the question 'Ought a man to do his duty?' and says that in the essay 'Moral Obligation', Prichard thinks that the question has a meaning if and only if psychological hedonism be accepted'. Broad adds that the 'ought' must be a non-moral 'ought', and describes Prichard's view as being that if psychological hedonism be accepted, then the answer is that no general answer is possible. On the other hand, 'if we do not assume that all men have at all times, mutatis mutandis, the same ultimate purpose, the question collapses'.

In fact Prichard's views in this essay are if anything more explicitly opposed to this view - that without psychological hedonism the question is meaningless - than he was in 'Duty and Interest'. Prichard does say that if the view that men always pursue their own good be accepted, the question does not admit of a general answer; but he goes on to say that:

\[\text{...if we think our purpose in action is not always the realization of our own good, the question will have disappeared as one admitting of a general answer, since the answer on any particular occasion will depend on what our purpose happens to be. (MO 112-3)}\]

The situation, therefore, appears to be little different, in Prichard's view, if we accept psychological hedonism or not. If there is any distinction, it appears to be between a question which might have a general answer, but in fact does not, and a question which cannot have a general answer. But a question

which cannot have a general answer is not meaningless, and it
does not 'collapse'. 'Why should I lose weight?' does not
have a general answer - the appropriate answer may be 'because
otherwise boys will not ask you out', or it may be 'for your
health's sake'; or it may be 'so that you can go on fighting
in the bantamweight division'. This does not show that there
is anything wrong with the question, it just means that we
must tailor the answer to the individual questioner. Prichard
argues that this is true of 'Why should I do my duty?' and
points out that Plato and others have assumed that the question
could be answered in a way that would apply to all men.
Prichard goes on to say, as he did in 'Duty and Interest', that
some people sometimes do their duty for its own sake, and that
then the question becomes redundant. None of this amounts to
a rejection of the question discussed in this thesis, and
whether Prichard is right in saying that no general answer is
possible is a question that can only be answered after a care-
ful examination of the general answers that have been offered.
PART 11

THE QUESTION ANSWERED BY AN APPEAL TO REASON

10. **Conclusion**

In considering this question, we say, as a conclusion, that the presence of a conclusive reason is a necessary condition for truth. We have shown that if a reason is conclusive, the conclusion will be true. The absence of a conclusive reason does not necessarily mean that the conclusion is false, but it is a necessary condition for the conclusion to be true. Thus, when the presence of a conclusive reason is a necessary condition, we can say that, in such cases, we have to rely on the presence of conclusive reasons to establish the truth of the conclusion. We cannot, in such cases, rely on other forms of justification.
In this section we discuss attempts to answer the question 'Why should I be moral?' by showing that it is always rational to be moral, irrespective of whether acting morally is in one's own interest. The answers to be discussed are, by and large, a priori. They depend not on the nature of human beings, nor on what people want, but on an analysis of reason, and of rational action, combined with an analysis of morality. These analyses, it is claimed, reveal that morally good action is also rational action, and that to act contrary to the dictates of morality is also to act contrary to the dictates of reason.

(1) RATIONAL ACTION

In discussing this issue, we are, of course, discussing a question about reason in action, or practical reason. Just how reason is effective in practical matters - or indeed, whether it is effective at all - has been debated for a very long time. I do not intend, in this thesis, to put forward my own account of precisely what is involved in the term 'rational' as it is applied to action. (1) This, like the omission of any full definition of 'morality' in the previous part, may seem to be a cowardly way of avoiding important issues. My grounds for not giving an account of practical reason are not quite the same as my grounds for not defining morality. Had I given my own

1) I will, for convenience, use the terms 'rational' and 'irrational', rather than 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' throughout. Frequently the two terms are used interchangeably, and I do not believe any attempt to distinguish them is likely to be profitable. I understand 'rational' and 'irrational' in a broad sense - I am interested in whether a person who knowingly acts immorally is acting contrary to reason, or on weak reasons when there are stronger reasons, for acting otherwise. I think 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' unsuitable for expressing this notion because they are strongly tied to ordinary or average behaviour, irrespective of whether this behaviour is contrary to reason - consider, for example the legal notion of 'the reasonable man', who, under circumstances such as provocation, may act on very weak reasons, and contrary to very strong reasons.
definition of rational action, any conclusion reached on the question of whether moral action is rational action could have been true by definition. If, for example, I had said, as Aristotle and Hume have said, that deliberation about action begins with something wanted, that practical reason applies only to means and not to ends, (2) then it would be no more rational to take morality as one's ultimate end than to take the collection of bottle-tops as one's ultimate end. Moreover, if one cannot tell what action is rational for a person until one knows what he wants, obviously no a priori answer to the question of whether it is rational to be moral is possible. Similarly, if I were to say that only action which is in one's own interests is rational, it would be true by definition that it is irrational to sacrifice one's own interests for the sake of morality. On the other hand, if I were to define rational action as doing whatever is morally obligatory, it would follow immediately that it is always rational to be moral. Even definitions from which no immediate answer to the question may be drawn must tend to bias the investigation towards one answer rather than another.

It might be suggested that there is nothing wrong with conclusions which are true by definition, provided the definitions are apt. Some people have thought that philosophy must be primarily concerned with showing whether or not propositions are true in this way. It may be that there is nothing objectionable about a conclusion being true by definition, if the definition can convincingly be shown to be correct; but no-one, to my knowledge, has yet produced anything like a convincing definition of rational action. Most recent attempts (some of which we shall be considering in this section) have been little more than verbal legislation. The view that rational action is

necessarily based on wants appears plausible, but leads to problems in that we normally regard some ends or wants as more rational than others, and the fact that a person desires something more than anything else does not always seem to rationally justify his action. Even if the action is the best way of satisfying the desire, we may hold the action to be irrational if the desire is a lunatic one, such as a desire to avoid stepping on the cracks in the footpath, and the action is carried out irrespective of other circumstances, such as that one is about to be attacked by hoodlums. Yet alternative accounts have problems too. As it is possible for us to proceed without giving a complete account of rational action, it will be best if we do so, thus avoiding a difficult, lengthy and unnecessary task which would lead us away from our real concern.

All this thesis requires is a starting-point, on which to base our examination of analyses of rational action which link reason to morality. This starting-point must be a basis of action such that, when no other considerations are relevant, it is undeniably rational to act in accordance with the basis of action. Such a starting-point would give us prima facie grounds for saying that an action in accordance with the basis of action was rational, and an action contrary to the basis of action was not as rational. We could then ask if any valid arguments exist which would override this prima facie reason for judging actions in this way, and relate acting rationally to acting morally.

The issues in this last paragraph may become clearer if made concrete. Self-interest is the most obvious candidate for an incontestable basis of rational action, although there are many others. It cannot be denied that where only considerations of self-interest are relevant, it is more rational to act in accordance with one's own interest than contrary to one's interest. This seems likely to be denied only by those who
hold, as Hume may have held, that rationality does not apply to ends at all, that no end is any more rational than any other. Such a view, is far more extreme than the view, mentioned above, that rational action depends on what one wants, for it holds that no action, whether based on wants or not, is rational or irrational, unless it involves a false judgment. But even Hume did not always hold this view, and frequently writes as if an action based on no want or desire would be irrational. Hume does say that it is not contrary to reason to prefer one's own acknowledged lesser good to a greater, but he justifies this by saying that one may have a more 'ardent affection' for the former. (3) An example would presumably be staying for another drink in the pub, even though by doing so one will be late at an interview for an excellent new job, and thus not get the job. Most people would say that such behaviour was irrational, but Hume would not. What I want to stress, however, is that the starting-point I have proposed - that action in accordance with self-interest is prima facie more rational than action contrary to self-interest - is compatible even with Hume's view that if one has a strong desire for something which is not in one's interest, it is rational to act against one's self-interest. For the qualification 'prima facie' means, as I have said, 'in the absence of other relevant considerations', and a strong desire is obviously a relevant consideration. I have left it entirely open whether strong desires do in fact rationally override self-interest. This is a question with which we need not concern ourselves here. If this is understood, I do not think my starting-point is likely to be opposed. I am in no way defining rational action in terms of self-interested action. I am merely saying that if all an agent knows about an action is that it will further his interests, he may conclude that, prima facie, it is rational for him to do the action. This starting-point is more likely to be criticised for being trivially, or vacuously true, than for being false. But it is not trivially

true, as can be seen if we attempt to substitute for 'self-interested' such terms as 'destructive', 'instinctive', 'wasteful', 'violent' and so on.

The point that I am making is not new. It was made by Sidgwick, for example, when he said that most of us would consider irrational a man who declines to do what he knows would bring him happiness, simply because he does not care about happiness. As Sidgwick saw, this does not exclude the possibility of there being other sources of rational action. Sidgwick thought it was equally rational to be benevolent. This starting-point, then, leaves it open whether, if self-interest and morality should conflict, it is rational to be moral or to be self-interested. In investigating this question we will begin by taking self-interested action to be rational in the absence of any other relevant considerations. We then ask if there are any grounds for saying that moral reasons (which we take to mean, at the very least, reasons which are impartial) are rationally superior to self-interested reasons. This question involves a detailed examination of a number of distinct philosophical views.

This method makes it unnecessary for me to give a full account of rational action. For there are only two possible conclusions to our enquiry. If any of the positions we examine do establish that it is more rational to be moral than to be self-interested, whenever the two clash, our question has been answered. It is, I admit, theoretically possible that there is a third source of rational action which is superior to the reasons of both morality and self-interest. Perhaps some religions claim that religious reasons for action are of this sort, although most religions would rather say that it is a moral duty to do as directed by the religion. One can also imagine an

5) ibid., Bk.111. Ch.xiii.
extreme aesthete claiming that it is rational to be guided by aesthetic reasons rather than moral or self-interested reasons, but again it is more likely that the aesthete would say that Art is his morality. Both religious and aesthetic reasons, when held in this manner, are held impartially. If the Bohemian declares that Art demands the sacrifice of all one has, then he too must sacrifice all he has, unless he can produce a relevant difference between himself and others which is not simply the egoistic reason that he is himself. Hence the basic minimum requirement for being moral reasons does not exclude all aesthetic or religious reasons.

The other possible answer to our enquiry is that none of the arguments we examine show that it is less rational to be self-interested than to be moral if the two clash. In this case, we would have to conclude, at least tentatively, that morality is not overridingly rational.

It is of course possible that I overlook an argument more convincing than those that I do examine, but I hope to cover all the major arguments that are currently advanced, as well as one or two not so major ones. Any arguments that I miss, or any new arguments, will have to be considered on their merits when they are put forward.

It may be objected that I have weighed the odds against morality by starting from self-interested rational action, thus placing the burden of proof on those who think moral reasons superior. The objector may, without denying the *prima facie* rationality of self-interested action, hold that morality is an equally uncontroversial *prima facie* source of rational action. Surely, the objector may argue, in a case where only considerations of morality are relevant, it is more rational to act morally than immorally. If the *prima facie* rationality of moral action is just as incontestable as the *prima facie* rationality of self-interested action, why not take, the starting-point moral action, and examine whatever arguments there might be to show that self-interested reasons are
rationally superior to reasons of morality, concluding, if none of these arguments succeed, that self-interest is not overriding rational?

This objection almost answers itself. Firstly, there are sound methodological reasons for not taking morality as our starting-point. We want to know if reason directs us to act morally. If we took morality as our starting-point, then even if we found that there are no grounds for believing that it is more rational to be self-interested, all we would be entitled to conclude would be that it is rational, in the sense of 'not irrational', to prefer morality to self-interest. We could not conclude that it is more rational to do so, or that it is less rational or irrational to favour self-interest. But the purpose of our investigation is to see if it is contrary to reason to act immorally, not if it is rational to act morally. A second methodological reason for testing arguments for the higher rationality of morality against the prima facie rationality of self-interest, rather than vice versa, is that there do not seem to be any arguments for the rationality of self-interest, whereas there are several for morality. The reason why this is so is at the same time a third reason for starting from self-interest. Morality is not as uncontroversial a prima facie source of rational action as is self-interest. Both philosophers and ordinary people are more inclined to doubt the rationality of moral action than of self-interested action. As M.G. Singer says:

It is curious that no one would ever think of asking what is the rational basis of prudence. Why is the corresponding question about morality thought significant? No doubt because prudence is already regarded as intrinsically rational, while morality is not. The reason for this can only be a prejudice in favour of self-interest. (6)

Prejudice or not, this seems to be the popular opinion. Sidgwick agrees:

Common sense does not think it worthwhile to supply the individual with reasons for seeking his own interest... (7)

This remark is a contrast to Sidgwick's earlier statements that men 'frequently' and 'widely and continually' ask for reasons why they should act morally. (8) This is why Plato, Butler and others, none of whom would be likely to pander to irrationality, thought it necessary to show that it is in the interest of each of us to act morally.

Our starting-point is therefore justified intrinsically and from a methodological point of view. But even if the reader disagrees with it, he will find that it does not intrude greatly into the following discussion of arguments which seek to connect reason and morality. The reader may test the following arguments against any other suitable prima facie source of rational action, if he wishes. The main purpose of the starting-point is to serve as an indication that reason does have a place in action, and as a position against which to test the arguments we are about to consider.

(ii) AN INTUITIONIST APPROACH: McCLOSKEY

We begin this part with an account of the connection between reason and morality which could have been placed in the previous part. H.J. McCloskey, in his recent book Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics, (9) puts forward an account of moral obligation which has the effect of making 'Why should I be moral?' a confused or redundant question. This would argue for discussing his views in the previous part. But with McCloskey unlike the writers already discussed, the question is redundant.

7) Sidgwick, op.cit., p.419.
8) ibid., p.5.
not because to decide that one is not going to do what is morally obligatory is illogical, but because it is irrational. This is an important difference between McCloskey's views and those of Monro, Hare and others, a difference McCloskey shares with the other writers we are to discuss in this part. McCloskey differs from others views to be discussed in this part, in that for him judging an act to be morally obligatory and judging it to be rational to do the act are not distinct judgments.

McCloskey argues that morality is objective. "Good", he claims, 'is the name of a consequential property, a property which we apprehend by intuitive, rational insight. Statements about which things are good are thus explained as being factual, information-imparting statements.' (p.151) Statements about what we ought to do are equally objective, according to McCloskey, but he explains their objectivity differently. As 'ought' and not 'good' is the key to the rejection of 'Why should I be moral:' for McCloskey, it is the account of 'ought' with which we are here concerned.

McCloskey begins his inquiry into the meaning of 'ought' statements by examining non-moral uses of 'ought'. He contends that to say that some-one is obliged by, say, etiquette, to do something is equivalent to saying that he is constrained by reasons of etiquette to do the action. Parallel accounts are given of legal obligation, and of being logically obliged to believe something. Moral obligation is then explained in a similar manner: 'We are morally obliged when we are constrained to act in a certain way by moral reasons.' (p.152) So far, we have a plausible account of moral obligation, but one which does not suggest that 'Why should I be moral?' is in any way inappropriate. This question would now be interpreted as asking if there is any ground for supposing that moral reasons are rationally preferable to other reasons, such as reasons of self-interest. But, McCloskey maintains, there is something about
moral reasons which is unique to them:

Moral reasons are reasons which claim authority to override all other reasons for acting. They are reasons of the greatest importance, and they enjoin action in a categorical way, and independently of my wants, likes, social and legal sanctions, etc. (p.132)

If McCloskey meant by this merely that moral reasons claim moral authority to override all other reasons, that from the moral point of view they enjoin action independently of my wants, likes, social and legal sanctions, then his point would be indisputable, but it would not be true of morality alone. Legal reasons, for example, claim legal authority to override all other reasons of action. The law will not listen to argument that the law under which a prosecution is made is an immoral law. If the law says that conscientious objection to the war in Vietnam is not a ground for exemption from conscription, then no court will heed attempts to resist conscription on the grounds that it is immoral to force a person to act against his conscience. Thus the law enjoins action in a categorical way, and independently of my wants, or of moral reasons or social sanctions. An action which is against the law is illegal, irrespective of any moral, personal or social reasons in favor of it. To this extent, there is a parallel with moral reasons, for neither my wants, nor legal reasons, nor social sanctions, prevent my action being immoral if it is contrary to the dictates of morality. McCloskey, however, evidently believes that there is a different sense in which moral reasons claim authority to override other reasons, for he goes on to say that to grasp a moral reason is:

....to see that as a rational being one is bound to perform certain acts and to abstain from others, for reasons apprehended as moral reasons are reasons of the greatest importance.... To assert that an action is obligatory for Smith is to imply that there are reasons of overriding importance which constrain Smith to perform that action. (p.132)

According to McCloskey, then, moral reasons lay claim to - and do in fact possess - the ultimate authority of reason.
That this is so is not nearly as apparent as that they possess moral authority. It is not clear how moral reasons possibly could 'claim' anything other than moral authority, for any claim which is inherent in a moral reason, qua moral reason, would seem to be necessarily a moral claim. We may, however, leave aside this 'claim' of moral reasons, which is possibly only intended as a metaphor, and consider instead whether moral reasons really do rationally override all other reasons. This is the important issue, and it would not be settled even if we could establish - or refute - McCloskey's contention that they lay claim to this authority.

That moral reasons are rationally overriding must either be analytically true, or must be established by argument, if it is to be accepted as true at all. McCloskey provides no argument, and it appears from various passages that the view he takes in his book is that it is an analytic truth. (10)

One of the passages in which this appears has just been quoted. Others include:

'Ought' therefore is to be explained, not in terms of a property, nor in terms of likes, wants, wishes, demands, attitudes, but in terms of people being constrained to act in particular ways by certain types of reasons of overriding authority and importance. (p.133)

McCloskey has confirmed this in conversation with me, although he simultaneously maintains that the connection between being morally obliged and being constrained by overriding reasons is synthetic a priori. This appears to be a case of a synthetic a priori which can be reduced to an analytic truth, but we need not concern ourselves with this additional complication. The essential point is that the connection is alleged to be a necessary one, and that it does not need to be demonstrated by argument - it is said to be immediately apparent.
The point is also made more briefly:

For an action to be obligatory, is for it to be one for which there is an overriding, decisive, moral reason. (p.135)

But there is difficulty in holding, consistently with McCloskey's general meta-ethical view, that there is a necessary connection between moral obligation and rational overridingness. McCloskey does not define 'ought' in terms of overriding reasons. He holds that 'ought', like 'good' and 'right', is indefinable. He never says that we can distinguish moral reasons from other reasons because the former are overriding. Rather, he holds that we apprehend by intuition what are or are not moral reasons. Nor does he say that for an action to be obligatory is the same as there being overriding reasons for doing it. As can be seen from the passages quoted, he says at one place that only 'certain types' of reasons of overriding authority are relevant to moral obligation, and in another place he goes so far as to designate the type of overriding reason required for moral obligation as a 'moral reason'. (11)

This would all be redundant if 'moral reason' or 'moral obligation' could be defined in terms of overriding reasons. Equally, 'overriding reason' cannot be defined in terms of moral reasons, for McCloskey recognises that two moral reasons may clash, and in this case only one can be rationally overriding, although both are moral reasons.

11) In a further passage McCloskey does appear to define 'moral' in terms of overriding reasons (p. 134) but he has said in conversation that he did not intend to do so, and that the passage is in need of alteration. If one did define 'moral' in this way, one would be committed to saying that when purely self-interested reasons, or reasons of self-interest and immediate desire clash, whichever of these reasons is rationally overriding is a moral reason.
Our concepts of morality and overriding rationality are thus admitted to be distinct. This means that if there is a necessary connection between them, it is unlike the connection between say, 'father' and 'male parent'. On the other hand, it might be said that there are necessary truths, such as 'everything coloured is extended' in which the concepts which are necessarily connected cannot be defined solely in terms of each other. Is the necessary connection between obligation and rational overridingness like the connection between colour and extension? This is a possible, but implausible position. It is implausible because it is a characteristic of necessary truths that they are accepted by practically everyone who understands the terms involved. Thus once someone understands what we mean by 'coloured' and 'extended', he invariably agrees that everything coloured must be extended. Yet this is by no means the case with obligation and rational overridingness.

McCloskey would need to argue that a person who does not think that there are always overriding reasons for acting morally has a deficient understanding of either morality or rationality. As McCloskey does not discuss the concept of rational action, he would presumably claim that the deficiency is in the man's understanding of morality. But if making a moral judgment is at all like seeing or apprehending something to be the case, as McCloskey says it is, why should the acceptance of a belief, such as that it is rational to do what is in one's own interests, hinder one's understanding of morality? A man who decides that it is rational to act on self-interested reasons rather than legal reasons does not have a defective understanding of what is involved in law. Similarly, there are men who appear to have a complete understanding of morality, but do not believe that it is necessarily rational to act on them. For example, a man whom we may call Jones may decide that his country has wrongly violated the sovereignty of an independent nation. This violation can only be stopped, Jones
is convinced, if there is a widespread protest. Moreover Jones, who has made a study of events in Nazi Germany, believes that every citizen who does not openly indicate his dissent from his country's actions is morally responsible for those actions. When Jones is asked by some friends to put his name to a newspaper advertisement protesting against the national foreign policy, he agrees that he is morally obliged to do so. This is a sincere judgment, and it is obviously not merely a judgment about what Jones' society believes one ought to do, or that there is a convention which approves of such actions. So Jones is definite about his moral obligations. Need he be equally definite about what it is rational for him to do? There may be strong non-moral considerations against making a public protest. Assume that Jones is employed by a man with a violent dislike of opponents of his country's policies. Jones believes that if his employer sees Jones' name on the advertisement, he will find an excuse to sack him. Jones does not believe that this affects the moral issues, (too many people in Germany would have had the same excuse) but he does think that this means that it is not rational for him to fulfil his moral obligations. However Jones says to his friends that if he can find another job, in which he is free to protest, even if it is not quite as good as his present one, he will do so. In this example, Jones treats morality as very important, but not as overriding all other considerations. He considers it rational to be moral even if this involves a moderate sacrifice of his interests (a worse job) but not if it involves a larger sacrifice (a period of unemployment). Does this mean that Jones has a defective understanding of morality? To say this, one would have to hold that a large proportion of people have a defective understanding of morality, and we would need strong arguments to accept this. It seems particularly difficult for McCloskey to produce such arguments, because throughout his book, he emphasises the need for a satisfactory account of morality to be based on ordinary moral discourse and ordinary moral concepts.
The incompatibility of McCloskey's account with ordinary beliefs may be brought out more sharply if we consider more extreme cases. Imagine that an army officer asks his men for a volunteer who is required to go to almost certain death, this being the only way to save the lives of many others. We may assume that in such a situation, the men - or at least those without wives and children - have moral reasons for volunteering, and only non-moral, or less important moral reasons against volunteering. This implies, on McCloskey's account, that it is contrary to reason not to volunteer and that if we do not see this, we have a defective understanding of morality. McCloskey's problem is reminiscent of Hare's difficulties on this topic. It will be recalled that Hare could not satisfactorily explain how it is that we have moral ideals, such as the way of life personified by St. Francis, but do not try to live up to them. If it is true that there are stronger moral reasons in favour of a life like that of St. Francis than there are against such a life (which seems probable) then McCloskey is also implausible in his explanation of our failure to adopt such a life. Where Hare would say we are contradicting ourselves or making a logical error, McCloskey must say we are making an error of reason. This may be so. But it is surely not obvious that it is so, simply because of the nature of morality and of reason. It is not obviously true in the way that other necessary truths are obviously true.

The same point applies to immoral action, that is, action deliberately engaged in with a full understanding that it is immoral. McCloskey's account implies that people who deliberately do what they really know to be immoral are acting against reason. This may be true in some cases, but it does not seem to be an accurate description of all instances of immorality. We normally think of people who are deliberately and knowingly immoral as rather different from people who act in error, or from a defective understanding. Genuine errors are usually not considered moral faults. It is true that some writers, such as Bosanquet, have treated stupidity as a moral fault, but for
McCloskey to do so seems, once again, inconsistent with his stress on the need for a meta-ethic to be compatible with ordinary moral judgments. We must conclude, therefore, that while moral reasons may be rationally overriding, the two concepts are distinct, and it is unconvincing to assert that it is an analytic truth, or an immediately apprehended necessary truth, that moral reasons are rationally overriding.

(iii) KANT'S ARGUMENTS

a) Introductory

Traditionally, those who have held that it is rational to be moral have not asserted that there is an analytic connection between overriding reasons and moral obligation. They have produced arguments to show that morality is rational. The 'traditional' approach among those who have held that morality is more rational than self-interest is really simply Kant. Kant's dominance in this line of thought cannot be overemphasised. It is still apparent to-day, as we shall see. This justifies the considerable amount of space which must be allowed for any serious discussion of his arguments.

Kant held that, with all ends other than morality, no question of rationality arises. An action is rational if it is suitable for achieving a given end, but ends in themselves are neither rational nor irrational. Here Kant agrees with Hume. Kant did think, however, that it can be presupposed, a priori, that happiness is an end for all men. Thus Kant would have agreed with our starting-point, that it is rational to act in such a way as to gain happiness when no other considerations are relevant, for he held it to be a dictate of reason that if one wills the end one wills the means to it. Nevertheless, Kant thought that such action is not fully rational. Precepts of prudence are rational only as a means to a further purpose or end, and this end is not itself commanded by reason. Rational precepts such as these, which are based on some end, Kant terms 'hypothetical imperatives'. By contrast, Kant maintains that
morality is an end which is itself rational. The precept of morality enjoins action irrespective of purposes or ends. It is the 'Categorical Imperative'. Its commands are those of an unconditioned rational necessity. They are objective and universally valid. They must be followed 'even against inclination'. Clearly if Kant can make out his claim that the Categorical Imperative is an imperative of reason, he will have established that reason directs the sacrificing of self-interest to morality whenever the two clash. (12)

At this point a difficulty arises which cannot be avoided in any discussion of Kant: interpretation. Already, in the final sentence of the preceding paragraph, I have taken sides in a dispute over Kant's aim in the Groundwork, for it is not universally accepted that Kant does attempt to prove that the Categorical Imperative is an imperative of reason. A.R.C. Duncan interprets Kant as arguing that morality must involve the use of a priori synthetic practical judgments (that is, judgments of pure practical reason) but he says Kant is chiefly concerned to show how such judgments are possible. (13) This interpretation gains plausibility from the fact that it relates the task of the Groundwork - which is seen as asking how morality is possible - with that of the Critique of Pure Reason, which asked how mathematics and physics are possible. In the Groundwork, according to this interpretation, Kant analyses morality in order to show that in morality there is a purely rational motive, but his central problem is that of showing how such a purely rational motive affects the will. Hence on this interpretation Kant only 'proves' that the Categorical Imperative is an imperative of reason insofar as he shows

12) All the points in this exposition are taken from Kant's *Groundwork of The Metaphysic of Morals*, pp. 40-50. (henceforth GR; The page numbers refer to the second German edition of the Groundwork. They are given in the margin by Paton, *The Moral Law*, London, Hutchinson, (1966), which is the translation I use.

that otherwise morality is meaningless. On the other hand another noted Kantian scholar, H.J. Paton, thinks that Kant tries to prove the rationality of the Categorical Imperative by means of the transcendental argument of Section 111 of the Groundwork. (14) Taking the words of this section at their face value, perhaps this is the more plausible interpretation, for Kant says that his conclusions are sufficient to establish the validity of the imperative of practical reason, although he denies that it is possible to explain how (Kant's emphasis) pure reason can be practical, that is how pure law can act as a motive of the will. (GR pp.124-5)

Instead of attempting to settle the dispute between these two interpretations (other interpretations have been offered as well, but these do not bear as directly on the question with which we are concerned), I intend to give consideration to both. This would be necessary even if the more orthodox interpretation - Paton's - could be shown to be correct, because Kant did not always adhere to the arguments he advanced in the final section of the Groundwork. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant takes the moral law as given, as:

an apodictically certain fact, as it were, of pure reason, a fact of which we are a priori conscious. Thus the objective reality of the moral law can be proved through no deduction, through no exertion of the theoretical, speculative or empirically supported reason; and even if one were willing to renounce its apodictic certainty, it could not be confirmed by any experience and thus proved a posteriori. Nevertheless, it is firmly established of itself. (15)

Here then Kant proceeds by assuming that morality is real,


15) Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p.47, (henceforth CPR; page numbers refer to the Prussian Academy edition, and the translation used is by Lewis Beck (New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1956).
and showing that it follows from this that the Categorical Imperative is based on reason. This line of argument has been more popular with followers of Kant than the argument of the final section of the Groundwork. Even Paton, one of Kant's most sympathetic interpreters, regards the argument of this section as a clear failure. (16) Paton, like Kant in the passage just quoted, suggests that no justification of morality is needed. We are more certain of morality than we could be of its alleged justification. He thinks that the first and second sections of the Groundwork, in which Kant is said to have shown that the Categorical Imperative, or its equivalent, the principle of autonomy, is 'the necessary condition of all moral judgments and so of all moral actions' adequately establish the rational validity of the principle of autonomy. (17) It is also true that, in the Groundwork as well as the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant treats this as a very important consideration. Thus he writes:

....bare conformity to universal law as such that is, action in accordance with the Categorical Imperative ....is what serves the will as its principle and must serve it if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept. The ordinary reason of mankind also agrees with this completely in its practical judgments and always has the aforesaid principle before its eyes. (GR p.17)

This position is akin to Bradley's rejection of any self-interested arguments for acting morally, as we shall see more clearly when we examine Kant's concept of duty. Kant goes further than Bradley, in explicitly rejecting not only self-interested reasons, but all empirical reasons, and instead of saying that such reasons 'degrade and prostitute' morality, he says that duty would be illusory, if it had to be supported by such reasons. Although he treats it as

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16) Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p.244.
important, Kant himself, in the Groundwork, did not think the argument from the certainty of morality conclusive. As he said at the end of the second section:

We have merely shown by developing the concept of morality generally in vogue that autonomy of the will is unavoidably bound up with it or rather is its very basis. Anyone therefore who takes morality to be something, and not merely a chimerical idea without truth, must at the same time admit the principle we have put forward. This chapter, consequently, like the first, has been merely analytic. In order to prove that morality is no mere phantom of the brain - a conclusion which follows if the categorical imperative, and with it the autonomy of the will is true and is absolutely necessary as an a priori principle - we require a possible synthetic use of pure practical reason. (GR pp. 95-6)

Later Kant refers to the moral law as 'a principle which well meaning souls will gladly concede us, but which we could never put forward as a demonstrable proposition' (GR p. 109). So Paton is, as he is aware, differing from the Kant of the Groundwork in saying that the certainty that morality is not an illusion is the best reason for the claim that reason, in the form of the Categorical Imperative, can determine the will directly; but Kant would have thought this reason of considerable weight and in the Critique of Practical Reason he does appear to regard it as the best reason. Another recent expositor of Kant, Stephen Korner, indicates his apparent concurrence with Paton's view by totally ignoring Section 111 of the Groundwork in his account of Kant's moral philosophy. He discusses the first two sections, but then, without explanation or warning, switches to a discussion of the Critique of Practical Reason and concludes his account without making a single reference to the final section. (18)

Duncan's interpretation of the Groundwork and Paton's interpretation of the Critique and the first two sections...
sections of the *Groundwork*, agree that Kant's views, insofar as they concern us, are based on an assumption: The assumption that morality is not illusory. This is explicit in Paton, and is involved in Duncan's contention that Kant's starting-point is that a purely rational motive is implied by morality. (19) We may therefore meet arguments based on either of these interpretations by showing that morality— or rather, Kant's concept of morality—is illusory. I attempt to show this in the following sub-section. It is a task which appears at times to take us away from our topic, and for this reason it may be helpful if I give a brief outline, in advance, of the sub-section.

Kant believes that it is rational to be moral. His belief is based on his analysis of 'the concept of morality generally in vogue'. If this concept of morality is not completely mistaken or illusory, then reason must direct us, in an *a priori* manner, to be moral (since the concept excludes empirical reasons for being moral, such as benevolent desires, sympathy, or self-interest). But can we assume that this concept of morality is correct? Examination of the concept shows that we cannot. The Kantian concept of morality is mistaken. Moreover, a different account of morality is available, which explains why Kant should have believed that morality demands action which is determined by reason alone, without "empirical" motivation. Hence morality can survive the finding that it is not *a priori* rational to be moral.

There remains the argument of the final section of the *Groundwork*, which on Paton's view—and here I am inclined to agree with him—is an attempt to show, by a "transcendental deduction" that reason directs us to act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, and that the concept of morality analysed in the preceding sections is

therefore demonstrably not illusory. This argument is the subject of a separate sub-section, which in turn is followed by a brief discussion of a passage in the Critique of Practical Reason.

(b) The Argument from the Concept of Morality

In the first two sections of the Groundwork, Kant analyses what he variously refers to as the 'ordinary rational knowlege of morality' (the title of Sec.1.), 'the common idea of duty' (p.vi) and 'the concept of morality generally in vogue' (p.95). But Kant does not stand aloof from this concept of morality. He accepts it himself. His use of the term 'knowledge' is an indication of this, and it is also clear both from his arguments, which are in support of the common concept, and from the personal manner of his exposition of it. Indeed, the argument we are about to consider assumes that the concept is the only possible concept of morality, and that if the concept is mistaken, all morality is 'illusory'. Paton, in his commentary, puts this point strongly. The consequence of denying Kant's conclusion, he says, is that:

all our moral judgments without exception are illusory. We cannot say, for example, that the sadists of Belsen acted wrongly, but only that we happen to dislike their conduct - especially if it is directed towards ourselves. (20)

This is a standard reply to all forms of moral scepticism. The sceptic's admission that in condemning the Nazis he expresses more than his personal disapproval is taken to show that he does not really think morality illusory. This reply may refute some sceptical assertions, but it is out of place here. To assert that Kant's concept of morality is mistaken is not to assert that all morality is illusory. Alternative concepts of morality are possible, which allow condemnation of the Nazis in a manner which is at least as effective as the condemnation possible on the Kantian concept.

20) Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p.204.
But first we must sketch Kant's concept of morality and the argument for the rationality of morality which is based on it.

The element of the ordinary concept of morality from which Kant draws the necessary consequence that reason directs action in accordance with the Categorical Imperative is the idea that action motivated by inclination cannot be moral action. Kant puts this view in passages such as this:

To help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are many spirits of so sympathetic a temper that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest, they find an inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them and can take delight in the contentment of others as their own work. Yet I maintain that in such a case an action of this kind, however right and however amiable it may be, has still no genuinely moral worth....for its maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of such actions, not from inclination but from duty. (GR p.10)

According to Kant, it is only when such a person somehow loses 'all sympathy with the fate of others' so that he is no longer moved by any inclination, but acts 'for the sake of duty alone' that 'for the first time his action has its genuine moral worth'. (GR p.11) From this passage it appears that Kant held a more extreme position still - that he held, not merely that action motivated by inclination cannot be moral action, but that action which is in accord with any inclination, or in which there is any mixture of inclination and duty, has no genuine moral worth. This is suggested by the phrase 'for the first time', but here we are touching on a disputed issue which it is not necessary for us to settle. All that is needed as a foundation for the argument which interests us is the more moderate position. As the extreme position entails, a fortiori, the moderate position, the question of which position Kant held is of no concern to us. If the moderate position is sound, it follows that it is impossible to act morally because of any desires or inclinations,
whether self-interested or altruistic. This would seem to exclude all empirical motivations. Accordingly if moral action is to be possible at all, a priori reason must direct us to act morally. Since it is a priori, this reason must be valid for all rational beings.

The weakest point of this argument is its starting-point - the concept of morality which implies that action done from inclination cannot be moral action. Firstly, although Kant felt that the opposition between moral action and action done from inclination is quite clear in the 'ordinary rational knowledge of morality' one cannot be equally confident about such a claim today. Kant saw duty as the central moral concept, at least insofar as human beings are concerned, and it is by equating moral action with action done from duty that reaches his position on action done from inclination. Today we seem to talk less about our moral duties, and more about what it is morally good to do. One cannot state confidently today, as Kant repeatedly does, that common reason regards action done from duty as of greater worth - 'beyond all comparison the highest' (GR p.11) than action done from inclinations such as sympathy and benevolence. If two people did an identical action - say, stopped to help a motorist who had had a breakdown on a lonely road - and one of them, when asked why he did so, replied 'We have a duty to help those in distress', while the other said that he stopped because he sympathised with the motorist's plight, I do think that everyone would agree with Kant in holding that the former reply evinces markedly higher worth. (21) There is a more weighty reason for believing that Kant's account of the worth of dutiful action is incorrect. This is a point which has been made often, but is no less effective for that:

21) Cf. the classic example of a good deed, the story of the Good Samaritan, who saw a wounded man lying helpless, 'had compassion on him', and looked after him. (The Gospel according to St. Luke, X, 30-38).
if action for the sake of duty is of supreme value, how is it that, in deciding what attitude we should take towards men such as Himmler and Eichmann, we do not concern ourselves with their quite possibly sincere claims that they acted for the sake of duty? On Kant's view, Himmler would deserve not only praise, but also esteem, if it is true that, as he said in a speech to the S. S., he carried out the extermination programmes, despite his natural dislike of them, because he felt duty-bound to do so. In fact, however, the common reason of mankind, the ordinary knowledge of morality, feels no hesitation in condemning Himmler as a monstrously immoral man, irrespective of the truth of his claims.

22) 'Himmler pointed out that the Einsatzgruppen (liquidation squads) were called upon to fulfil a repulsive (widerliche) duty. He would not like it if Germans did such a thing gladly .... They had undoubtedly noticed that he hated this bloody business (dass ihm das blutige Handwerk zuwider ware) and that he had been aroused to the depths of his soul. Himmler had just previously witnessed the machine-gunning of about 100 Jews, and had shown signs of strong physical nausea. But he too was obeying the highest law by doing his duty, and he was acting from a deep understanding of the necessity of the operation.' From a report of a speech by Himmler to an S. S. Einsatzgruppe, quoted in H. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, (Chicago, Quadrangle, 1961) pp. 218-9.

Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem in 1961 implicated Kant even more directly. During the preliminary police examination, according to the official record, Eichmann 'suddenly declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant's moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty.' During the trial, one judge questioned Eichmann on this, and the accused replied: 'I meant by my remark about Kant that the principle of my will must always be such that it can become the principle of general laws.' Later Eichmann said that he had ceased to live according to Kantian principles after being charged with the administration of the 'Final Solution', which contradicts his earlier statement. Eichmann cited, in support of his Kantian attitude to his duty, the fact that out of the millions of cases which passed through his hands, he allowed sympathy to sway him from the path of duty only twice (that is, he only bent the regulations to help Jews on two occasions) and for these lapses he had 'confessed his sins' to his superiors. See H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, (London, Faber, 1963) pp. 120-3.
Defenders of Kant deny that his doctrines could imply a favourable judgment of Himmler and other Nazis. This is a point worth further consideration, for if a favourable judgment really is implied by Kant's concept of morality, this is the most convincing refutation of this concept possible. Those who claim that Kant's concept of morality is not consistent with praise and esteem for mass murderers assert that in saying that action done from duty has supreme worth, Kant is not saying that conscientiousness—doing what one thinks one ought to do—is of supreme worth. Rather he is saying that it is action motivated by a desire to act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative that possesses supreme worth. In other words, it is not enough that one do, for the sake of duty, what one thinks to be one's duty. It is only if the action really is one's duty, really is in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, that one's action has supreme worth. Therefore Kant is not committed to approving of the actions of people like Himmler, even if Himmler did think that he was doing his duty, and was motivated by this thought. For Himmler was wrong in thinking that it was his duty to exterminate Jews. It could not have been his duty to do so, because it was not in accordance with the Categorical Imperative.

The question that is raised by this defence of Kant is: what does Kant mean by 'action for the sake of duty'? Does he mean action motivated by what is thought to be one's duty, or only action motivated by what is thought to be and is one's duty? And if the latter, how exactly are we to interpret the Categorical Imperative, which tells us what our duty is? 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' is one of Kant's formulation. (GR p. 52) Is it the test of duty? Or is another formulation the true test, such as 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end? (GR pp. 66-7)

Once the question is put like this, I think it is clear that Kant failed to make the necessary distinctions. By this I do not mean simply that he failed to see that the various formulations of the Categorical Imperative are not necessarily identical in application; far more importantly, and less
excusably, Kant failed to distinguish between acting for the sake of what one thinks to be one's duty, and acting for the sake of what really is one's duty. He failed to make these distinctions, because he thought that, provided a man was not misled by inclination, no 'far-reaching ingenuity', no 'science or philosophy' is necessary to distinguish good and evil, right and wrong. (GR pp.19-21) Many passages may be quoted in support of this belief of Kant:

What is required in accordance with the principle of autonomy of choice is easily and without hesitation seen by the commonest intelligence...That is to say, what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone...the moral law commands the most unhesitating obedience from everyone; consequently, the decision as to what is to be done in accordance with it must not be so difficult that even the commonest and most unpractised understanding without any worldly prudence should go wrong in making it. (CPR p.36)

ordinary human reason...always does have the principle of universal law always before its eyes and does use it as a norm of judgment. (This passage appears at least three times in almost identical terms: GR pp.17,20; CPR p.69).

In the Lectures on Ethics there is a passage that is especially relevant to crimes like those of the Nazis, which were crimes against 'natural law' committed in accordance with a positive laws:

In respect of his natural obligations no man can be at fault; the natural laws must be known to all; they are contained in our reason; no man can, therefore, err innocently in respect of them, and in the case of natural laws there can be no innocent errors....But what is a man to do when a positive and a natural law conflict? Take for example the case of a man who is taught by his religion to execrate adherents of other religions, or that of a man who is told by the Jesuits that good can come from knavery. Such a man would not be acting in accord with his conscience; the natural law is known to him, and he is aware that he ought on no account act unrighteously. The verdict of natural conscience being in conflict with the verdict of instructed
conscience, he must obey the former. (23)

While the Categorical Imperative, in some form (I would say, in the form of the requirement of impartiality) seems to be a necessary condition of a moral judgment, it is false to say that everyone, when not misled by inclination, actually does judge in accordance with, and properly apply to the practical situation, Kant's imperative and that this ensures that one is not mistaken about one's duty. Assuming that the proposition is not made trivial by the use of 'did not act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative' as the criterion for whether a person was 'misled by inclination', Himmler apparently was not misled by inclination. Nor was Eichmann. (24) In this case, defenders of Kant have the choice: either the Nazi war criminals did judge and act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, or Kant was mistaken in thinking that we cannot err about our duty if we put aside inclination. It is likely that defenders of Kant will take the latter course, for the former implies praise and esteem of the perpetrators of genocide. But can Kant simply jettison the idea that only inclination can cause us to mistake our duty? To do so would involve him in difficulties, for Kant has strong theoretical reasons, stemming from his concept of morality, for holding the view that only inclination can cause us to mistake our duty. We have seen that it is a central doctrine of this concept of morality that in order to act morally one must not be motivated by expected results, or by any 'objects of the faculty of desire'. (GR pp.13-17) How then is the will to be determined?


24) As Arendt points out, Eichmann regarded his policy of 'no exceptions' as proof that, with only two exceptions, he had never allowed his inclinations, whether self-interested or sentimental, to sway him from the path of duty. (op. cit., p.122) Indeed, as Arendt says, evil in the Third Reich was not naturally tempting: one had to resist the temptation not to commit it. (p.134)
Kant answers this question as follows:

Since I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular law, nothing is left but the conformity of action to universal law as such, and this alone must serve the will as its principle. That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. (GR p.17)

This is the passage in which Kant arrives at the formula of the Categorical Imperative for the first time. He does it solely by considering action unmotivated by inclination. Such action, he says, must have as its principle conformity to universal law. Yet we have seen that the worst crimes may be unmotivated by inclination. It follows that if the Categorical Imperative is to be discovered solely by considering action unmotivated by inclination, the Categorical Imperative is compatible with the worst crimes. It is an entirely trivial principle, which, like Hare's 'descriptive' sense of universalizability is compatible with practically anything, including universal laws like 'exterminate all Jews'. Kant later puts forward a stronger, morally significant formulation of the Categorical Imperative which may not be compatible with such crimes, but this merely shows that Kant was wrong to regard the formulations as equivalent, and he offers no independent arguments for the later formulations. In any case, if one drops the view that it is only inclination which can cause us to mistake our duty, the argument by which Kant introduces the Categorical Imperative is undermined. The conclusion that may be drawn from this is that it is not possible to defend Kant from the implication of praise for Nazis by saying that Kant finds supreme moral worth only in action done for the sake of the Categorical Imperative, and not simply in conscientious action. This defence introduces into Kant's analysis a distinction which he did not make, and which cannot be made without undermining Kant's notion of the Categorical Imperative-
the very notion on which the 'defence of Kant' is based:

There are also less complex considerations which strongly incline me to believe that Kantians are committed to saying that the actions of the conscientious man who happens to be mistaken about his duty still possess supreme moral worth. In the opening pages of the *Groundwork* Kant contrasts intelligence and judgment with a good will. He does not even include intelligence and judgment among those quantities which he says are helpful to a good will. The good will is good in itself, 'good through its willing alone'. (p.3) These views are often repeated. It seems that it is the intention to do one's duty that is vital for Kant. This is the most natural view to take of the statement that 'Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law', although here there is again ambiguity in that the law as it is thought to be is not distinguished from the law as it is. These passages are not conclusive, but I think they are persuasive. Paton agrees with my interpretation of Kant on this point. He admits that Kant under-rated the need for judgment and discrimination in deciding the right course of action, and says that Kant would have held that the good will of the good but stupid man would have a 'unique and incomparable value which could not be out-weighed by the evils resulting from his natural defects'. (25)

Finally, it is perhaps worth mentioning that what has just been said applies to all interpretations of Kant. There are passages in Duncan's book which appear to vitiate this. Duncan says that Kant's propositions about duty 'represent common ideas about the nature of morally good actions. Kant does not raise the question whether these propositions are true or false. It is sufficient for his purpose that they

represent common ideas about the nature of morally good actions, of actions in which moral worth is indubitably realised. At this stage of his argument, as we shall shortly see, Kant is prepared to entertain the idea that the ordinary view of morality, together with what is implied in it, is a vain delusion." (26) That Kant does not put forward his own ideas, on moral worth, but merely analyses the common concept of morality, is in agreement with what I have said earlier. The rest of the passage does not seem to be consistent with Duncan's own interpretation of Kant. If Kant's concern with morality stems from his desire 'to examine the nature of moral experience in order to show how reason functions practically in it', (27) it is hard to see how he can be indifferent to the question of whether moral experience is as he has analysed it, and in particular whether reason really does have a function in morality. Kant only 'entertains the idea that the ordinary concept of morality, together with what is implied in it, is a vain delusion' in the sense that, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he entertains the idea that mathematics and physics may also be vain delusions. It is never a live possibility for Kant. He may admit at stages in the argument that he has not shown that morality is no delusion, but he cannot admit this at the end of the argument, for if he did, his argument would be worthless. Duncan himself elsewhere indicates that Kant believes that moral goodness is only to be found in those actions in which a man acts because he believes that he ought so to act, and that the relation of moral goodness and action from duty is central to Kant's argument. (28) One may agree with Duncan that Kant's main purpose in the Groundwork was not to suggest a criterion of moral goodness, but one may not hold that Kant can be indifferent as to when moral goodness is manifested.

26) Duncan, op. cit., p.69
27) ibid., p.65; cf. p.54
28) ibid., p.54; cf. pp.52, 156.
We have now seen that the concept of moral goodness from which Kant derived the doctrine that if morality is possible at all, then a priori reason must direct us to act morally, is an unacceptable concept. How then did Kant come to hold it, and how is it that Paton has defended it as in accordance with "our ordinary enlightened moral judgments"? (29) I think it is worth digressing a little in order to attempt to answer these questions, particularly because in doing so it is possible to sketch an alternative account of morality which suggests that our rejection of the Kantian concept does not prevent us from making meaningful moral judgments which express more than our own personal approval or disapproval.

The point I want to make is that even if some of our moral intuitions, feelings or judgments do incline us to regard action done for the sake of duty as having a 'distinctively moral value' not shared by action done from sympathy, benevolence or generosity, (30) we need not accept these intuitions, feelings or judgments uncritically. But I must emphasise that the account of morality I am about to give is only a hypothesis, designed not to refute the Kantian view, but to suggest a possible explanation of why this view, which, I think, has already been shown to be untenable, appears to be implied by some of our everyday moral beliefs. In particular, I do not expect for the following account of morality the same widespread acceptance that I hope will be accorded to my earlier claim that impartiality is a necessary element of every moral judgment, and I do not regard acceptance of it as necessary for understanding of the meaning of 'moral' in 'Why should I be

29) Paton, op. cit., p.55
30) ibid., p.59; cf. Chs. 11 & 1V, passim. For Kant's sharp distinction between action which has 'genuine moral worth' and action, such as action from natural sympathy, which may be right, amiable and deserving of praise and encouragement, see GR p.11.
I find it more plausible to regard morality as a product of man in society than as something to be discovered by a priori reason. Morality's function, insofar as something which is not consciously created can have a function, is to promote what men in society value - that is, what they value in common, or impartially, not as individuals. (We need not discuss here whether there is only one ultimate good, such as human welfare, or a number of distinct and irreducible goods such as truth, justice and human welfare). Moral judgments promote these goods by praising and encouraging actions which tend to bring about goods, and condemning and discouraging those actions which tend to hinder the production of goods or to produce evils. By 'tend' in this context I mean that the action in question is of a kind which is likely to, or in normal circumstances would, have the effects referred to. Morality pays particular attention to the motivation of actions, because this is a good indication of the tendency of the action to promote good or evil, and also because it is here that praise and blame may be effective in altering the tendency of a person's actions. Conscientiousness is a particularly useful motive, from a communal point of view. A man who is conscientious will, if he accepts the moral code of his society (and if most people in a society did not accept the moral code of their society, then it would not be the moral code of their society) always tend to promote what his society values. A man may have no generous inclinations, yet if his society approves of gifts to charity, and if he accepts this moral judgment, he will give to charity. He may despise those with a different skin colour, yet if he accepts that it is his duty to treat all men equally, then he will do so. Conscientiousness is a multi-purpose virtue. Of course, qualities such as warmth of personality, affectionateness, spontaneity, creativity, and so on cannot be promoted by conscientiousness. The conscientious father may, for duty's

31) The account is also not original. It owes much to Nowell-Smith's Ethics, and is similar in spirit to many other theories.
sake, provide for his children as well as any other man, but he cannot love them for duty's sake. Nevertheless, we can easily understand why it is that conscientiousness is frequently praised and encouraged.

On this view, conscientiousness is of value only for its consequences. Yet, unlike, say, benevolence, conscientiousness can and will be praised and encouraged only for its own sake. For to praise conscientiousness for its consequences would be to praise not conscientiousness but something else altogether. It would be to praise not 'doing your duty for the sake of doing your duty', but 'doing your duty for the sake of the consequences of doing your duty'. To be specific: to say 'Do your duty, because by doing so you will make many people happy, and if you do not do so many people will suffer' is to encourage benevolence and not conscientiousness. This means that the common moral consciousness must think of conscientiousness as good for its own sake, and this explains Kant's insistence that the ordinary conception of morality esteems it as good in itself and not for its consequences. We can also explain why it should be thought that moral worth, the highest worth, is, when taken in its strictest sense, incompatible with action from inclination. It has already been said that praise and blame, including moral praise and blame, serve the purpose of influencing action. (To say this is not to take any position on the question of the meaning of moral terms, unless one were to assimilate use to meaning in a rather crude way). Now if a person has an inclination towards doing a desirable action which provides him with a motive sufficiently strong to ensure that he will do that action, there is no need to influence him to do that action. Under these circumstances, the use of moral language as an attempt to influence him would be inappropriate. (We do not normally say that people ought to do, that it is their duty to do, whatever gives them the greatest pleasure, for most people have sufficient motivation to do this anyway. On the other hand, we might say this to a person
who, we thought, should have more pleasure, and might not, without our influence, do what was necessary to have it. Thus we might tell a woman who had spent her whole youth nursing her aged and demanding mother and was now, after her mother's death, thinking of looking after her hypochondriac aunt, that she ought to get some more enjoyment out of life, that she ought to think about herself for once). It follows that distinctively moral language has successfully served its purpose only if the action has been done from duty. If one tells a person that he ought to do something, and he does it not because he believes he ought to do it, but because he feels sympathy for a third person, the advice has been ineffective. Therefore whenever an act is done from inclination, morality is, strictly speaking, ignored. It is true that, in acting from sympathy or benevolence one is acting from a morally good motive. Yet one is ignoring morality, in the sense that if we all promoted what is valued from such motives - inclinations, as Kant would call them - there would be no function for the central moral utterances, like 'You ought (morally) to do X,' 'It is immoral to do Y'. It is in this sense that action motivated by inclination has no 'distinctively moral worth'. Moral praise is inappropriate when inclination is a sufficient motive. The action would have been performed even if the agent had not believed that he had a moral obligation to do it. This is not to say that it is always incorrect to give moral praise to an action done from inclination. If there are hearers other than the agent, the praise may encourage them to perform similar actions. But again, insofar as the hearers perform the action because of the moral praise, they are not doing it from inclination. And if the praise is not 'he did what he was morally obliged to do' but 'even though he was in a hurry himself, he stopped to help a complete stranger for whom he felt sorry', then we must grant Kant that there is a sense in which the praise is not moral praise.

We can now see how it is that, if we construe 'moral' in a narrow sense, and emphasise what is 'distinctively moral'
about our ordinary moral beliefs, one can arrive at the Kantian concept of morality. Yet we can also see how this concept is mistaken. Kant takes 'the concept of morality generally in vogue' at its face value. He seems unaware that this concept is a concept held by men in society and shaped by society, and that it promotes certain ends. The real value of conscientiousness is to be found in its consequences, although it is praised for its own sake, and we accordingly find it difficult to think of as not good in itself. Conscientiousness is a kind of artificial virtuous inclination upon which we are encouraged to act because our own natural inclinations are not likely to be strong enough to ensure actions which are desirable from an impartial point of view. So duty for duty's sake, far from being the only purely rational motive, is actually a motive which is inculcated into us in such a way that it cannot be questioned and must be followed blindly, if it is to be followed at all. (32)

We can now also see that rejecting the Kantian concept of morality does not involve scepticism or even subjectivism about morals. We may still make statements about what we think is good from an impartial viewpoint. Our judgments may differ a little from those of Kant. We will judge a man who consistently acts from inclinations such as benevolence, or a desire for justice or honesty, which have a strong tendency to promote what we impartially value, as just as good a man as the man who consistently is conscientious. We may give the latter more distinctively moral praise, but then we are not likely to emphasise this distinctively moral worth, or to rate it above goods which are moral goods only in a wider sense of moral.

32) The preceding two paragraphs apply, in part and with some minor modifications which I leave to the reader, to Bradley's argument, based on the 'common moral consciousness', that self-interested reasons for acting morally cannot be given. See pp. 15-18, above.
Finally, because of our primary concern with ends, we will not praise conscientious men who have perpetrated great evils for the sake of what they thought to be their duty. We may praise conscientious action, like other well-intentioned actions, even if it does not lead to good consequences, unless the consequences are especially evil, for normally the value of encouraging the motive will outweigh the undesirable results. Ultimately, however, we shall attempt to provide other motives for desirable action, in the manner which I suggest in the conclusion of this thesis.

We have now dealt with the argument, said by Paton to be Kant's most important argument for the rationality of the Categorical Imperative, that since action according to inclination cannot be moral action, unless the Categorical Imperative is an imperative of reason, all morality is illusory. We have seen that this argument is based on a concept of morality which can imply praise of mass-murderers, and which takes as basic data moral opinions which themselves may be explained in a manner quite contrary to Kant's views. On Duncan's interpretation, we need discuss Kant no further. We have rejected the concept of morality which was Kant's evidence for the existence of pure practical reason, and in these circumstances his attempt to show how such reason may be possible holds no interest. But on Paton's reading of the Groundwork we must also consider the argument Kant advances in the final section, for it is in this section that Kant believes he has proven, by means of his 'transcendental deduction' that a rational agent as such would necessarily act in accordance with the supreme principle of morality. This argument would, if successful, show that Kant's account of morality is after all correct, but we need not concern ourselves with this issue again.

33) Attempts to reformulate Kant's Categorical Imperative and argue that this reformulated version is a rational basis for morality are considered below. See pp. 11-12, 6. 34) Paton, op.cit., p. 244.
Our interest in the Kantian concept of morality derived from its use as a postulate from which it was argued that reason must direct us to act morally. In the final section, Kant attempts to do just the reverse - to show that the Categorical Imperative is an imperative of reason and hence that morality is not illusory. On this interpretation, the final section is highly relevant to our topic.

(c) The Transcendental Deduction of Morality

The argument of the final chapter of the Groundwork is unfortunately the sort of argument which is very difficult to discuss here. This is because Kant draws on the conclusion of his Critique of Pure Reason at crucial points in the argument. A full consideration of the chapter would therefore involve a discussion of this work, which is obviously beyond the scope of this thesis. Despite this, there are some points about the argument which can be made without any detailed consideration of the Critique, and I think that these will prove sufficient to cast strong doubts on the validity of the argument.

Basically, Kant's argument may be reduced to the following: There are two distinct standpoints from which we may conceive ourselves: firstly as members of the sensible world, subject to the normal laws of causality, and secondly as members of the intelligible world, when we are not caused by anything outside ourselves. This distinction corresponds to the distinction between appearances which we can know through the senses, and things in themselves, which we can never know. Insofar as we know ourselves through the senses, we must conceive of ourselves as belonging to the sensible world, but insofar as we are capable of reasoning a priori we must conceive of ourselves as belonging to the intelligible world. As rational beings and consequently as members of the intelligible
world we must think of ourselves as independent of determination by causes in the sensible world, that is, as free. To freedom there is 'inseparably attached' the idea of autonomy and to this the universal principle of morality, which is consequently the ground of all actions for rational beings as such. On the other hand as members of the sensible world we are determined solely by desires and inclinations. From this conflict of opposites reason, and hence morality, emerge dominant because the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world, and because our will belongs entirely to the intelligible world. (pp.105-11).

The problems involved in this argument are so numerous and so difficult that it is hard to know where to begin. Insuperable difficulties arise from the alleged interaction of the two standpoints. One of these difficulties is the explanation of freedom. Another is the question of how we take an interest in the moral law. The best that Kant can say about these problems is that we can comprehend their incomprehensibility. (p.128)

Among other difficulties is the fact that as time, according to Kant, belongs to the sensible world only, our will must be timeless, even though we ourselves exist in time, and our will causes us to act at particular times. Yet another difficulty is that although there can be no knowledge of the intelligible world, except the negative knowledge that it is beyond the laws of nature, we can apparently know that it is a world of reason.

The key point in the argument, and at the same time its greatest weakness, however, is the claim that we must think of ourselves as free and therefore as subject to the principle of autonomy, or the Categorical Imperative. Many philosophers would agree that we have free will, but how can one deduce from this that we are subject to the Categorical Imperative? Kant is able to make this deduction only because he is using 'freedom' in a quite different sense from that which we normally employ when we talk about freedom of the will. Kant arrives at this concept of freedom by defining will as 'a kind of causality
belonging to living beings so far as they are rational'.

This definition is satisfactory, provided it is remembered that 'causality' just means 'power to produce action or thought'. Kant then says that freedom, negatively conceived, would be the property this causality has of 'being able to work independently of determination by alien causes'. (p.97) By this Kant means, as he says in more detail in the Critique of Practical Reason, that the will must work independently of the sensible world, to which all perceptions, all feelings, all desires and everything else which exists in time belong. (CPR 95-7) This is the kind of freedom for which Kant argues, and it is only on the basis of such a concept that his argument can proceed. We are therefore not free, in Kant's sense, when we choose on the basis of our wants, no matter how carefully considered the choice may be. This means that arguments from our own consciousness of freedom in action cannot be used in support of Kant's concept of freedom - indeed Kant, like the determinist, must attempt to refute such arguments, for our consciousness tells us that we are just as free when we choose whether to spend a certain amount of money on a book or a pair of socks as we are when we act for the sake of duty. Kant would hold that in the former case our choice is determined by natural necessity - only in the latter instance do we act freely. This concept of freedom raises another great difficulty, namely that it implies that the immoral man, the man who does act from desires instead of from duty, is not free. This conclusion, implying as it does that no man is ever responsible for his wrong-doing, is unacceptable to Kant. He tries to avoid it by saying that we are responsible for the indulgence we show in letting our desires over-ride the rational laws governing our will (p.118) but this will not do, for if we are free even when our will is subordinate to desires, later steps in the argument will not follow, as we shall see shortly.

We have up to now been dealing with what Kant calls the negative definition of freedom. The transition from the negative
to the positive definition is made by means of a very dubious argument. It should be remembered that we have no knowledge of freedom because it belongs to the intelligible world, so Kant must argue solely from what is involved in the absence of determination by natural causes. Kant claims that because the concept of causality carries with it the concept of laws (that is, laws of cause and effect) so the causality of the will must have its own special kind of law, and this law, being free from all natural necessity, must be simply the principle of acting for the sake of law itself. (p.97-8) This argument contains at least three errors, any one of which would be sufficient to invalidate it. Firstly, Kant is using 'causality' here in the sense of a cause which, because of the laws of natural necessity, always produces a certain effect. Such a cause is a cause precisely because there are laws which connect it to its effect. In this sense of cause, however, the will is not a cause for it is not of the sensible world, and if it were not for the fact that 'causality' may also just mean 'power to produce action or thought' we could not have accepted the definition of will as a kind of causality. We do not think of the will as a cause in the sense in which, say, fire is a cause of a kettle boiling. Secondly, and this is an error which pervades the whole argument, as we can know nothing about the will, as part of the intelligible world, we cannot know that the connection between cause and law, which holds in the natural world, has any application in the intelligible world. Thirdly, the role assigned by Kant to law in the intelligible world is unlike the role he assigns to laws in the sensible world. Kant says that it is in accordance with a law that we must posit an effect of a cause. Thus laws specify the relation between the cause and the effect. But Kant does not allege that any law determines the effect of the will. Effects are unimportant. Rather he says the will acts for the sake of the law, law thus being the motive. So there does not seem to be any parallel between the function of law in the sensible world and in the intelligible world. Yet Kant appears to argue for the existence of law in the intelligible world by
means of a parallel or analogy. He gives no other grounds for supposing that causes in the intelligible world are connected with laws.

Kant uses the conclusion reached by means of this argument - that only a will which acts for the sake of law itself can be free - to argue that because rationality presupposes freedom, rationality is only to be found in acting for the sake of law itself. This is why Kant cannot afford the concession involved in saying that we are also free when we allow our desires to dominate us, for in this case such action would have as good a claim to be rational as does action for the sake of law.

There are other doubtful steps in the argument, in particular the assertion that the sensible world is subordinate to the intelligible world, an assertion intended to show why actions which occur in the sensible world nevertheless have their ground in the intelligible world. Kant also appears to be guilty of a slide when he abruptly refers to the intelligible world as 'the intellectual world'. (p.107) Nevertheless I intend, to avoid prolonging our examination of Kant unnecessarily, to dispense with discussion of these difficulties, for I do not think any of them as great as the difficulties surrounding Kant's concept of freedom. In establishing that we are free, Kant uses highly questionable arguments and arrives at the most paradoxical of conclusions - we are free, but we have no choice, for we are free to act only in accordance with the law; we are free, even though our behaviour is as predictable as a lunar eclipse; (CPR p.99) our freedom is timeless, although our free thought and action take place in time; and so on. The paradoxes are endless, yet Kant offers no explanation of them, beyond saying that we can comprehend their incomprehensibility. Can we? Such a conclusion might be acceptable as a last resort if we had proceeded by means of unchallengable arguments from indubitable premises. But this has manifestly not been the case. On these grounds I think we are entitled, without further discussion, to
say that the arguments of the *Groundwork* do not show that it is rational to act morally rather than prudentially, if morality and self-interest should clash.

(d) A Passage from the Critique of Practical Reason

For the sake of completeness, there is a little more than must be said about the other main work of Kant germane to our topic, *The Critique of Practical Reason*. It has already been noted that the central argument of this work is an analytic argument which, like the first sections of the *Groundwork*, takes a false view of morality as its starting point. This argument has been discussed. There is, however, another passage in the *Critique* in which Kant, despite his repeated assertions that 'how the law in itself can be the direct determining ground of the will ... is an insoluble problem for human reason' (CPR pp.72,80; pp.120,122) does attempt to explain 'what the moral law effects (or better, must effect) in the mind, so far as it is an incentive'. (CPR p.72) The result is something which looks very much like an attempted solution of the problem Kant has so frequently declared to be insoluble.

In this passage (CPR pp.71-90) Kant admits that the moral law must be an incentive of the will, and moreover that it must produce a feeling. This is because any check on inclination or feeling is itself a negative feeling, which Kant says is still a feeling. This feeling is respect or reverence for the moral law. (The German word is 'Achtung'. It is usually translated as 'respect'; but Paton gives grounds for believing that 'reverence' is more in accord with Kant's meaning. (35) Nevertheless I will retain the more common translation.) The feeling of respect is, Kant maintains, a unique feeling in that it is the only feeling which can be known a priori, for it is produced by an intellectual cause and is not of empirical origin. This intellectual cause is reason. Thus Kant asserts that we can know, a priori, of the existence of a feeling, prod-

35) ibid., pp.63-4
uced by reason, in every rational being. The argument advanced in support of this assertion however are fallacious. Kant says that the moral law must be an object of respect because it strikes down self-conceit. It does this because "all claims to self-esteem which precede conformity to the moral law are null and void. For the certainty of a disposition which agrees with this law is the first condition of the worth of the person... and any presumption [to worth] prior to this is false and opposed to the law". (p.73) Even if it be granted that, from the moral point of view, this is correct, Kant's next step just does not follow. For this step is the claim that:

the moral law inevitably humbles every man when he compares the sensuous propensity of his own nature with the law...the moral law, therefore, is even subjectively a cause of respect. (p.73)

All that follows from the first assertion is that there can be no valid claim to moral worth where there is not conformity to the moral law. But why, a rational being may well ask, should I be concerned with moral worth? Kant himself denies that there can be any kind of moral feeling which is prior to the moral law. (p.75) Why then should the rational being be particularly interested in the kind of worth which is associated with the moral law? Kant's argument is question-begging, because it presupposes that every rational being will be concerned with the moral law and will accept its standards. It is not difficult to think of examples of men who have esteemed themselves greatly while showing nothing but contempt for the moral law. Big-time gangsters such as Al Capone seem to be in this category. Such men make no pretension to moral worth, but base their self-esteem on qualities which they consider more important, such as cunning, strength, bravery and so on. If Kant is referring to the objective moral law, as he seems to be doing, for he again does not consider the possibility of men being mistaken about what the moral law commands, another class of men who are not humbled by their failure to conform with the law comes to mind - dictators like Hitler, Mussolino, Stalin and countless others who have gone down in history as men whose enormous self-conceit
was only surpassed by their moral depravity. (Kant cannot deny that these men were rational beings, for if he were to do so he would have to say that the moral law did not even apply to them).

The question that is at stake here is not whether such men were rational beings, but whether they were rational in their criteria of self-esteem. Yet Kant overlooks this question and simply asserts that the moral law inevitably humbles every man. One wonders how such a claim can be made a priori. Kant makes the same point in a different way when he says:

to a humble plain man in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose or not...respect is a tribute we cannot refuse to pay to merit whether we will or not; we can indeed inwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly. (p.77)

Again, this is just false, if 'righteousness' and 'merit' have any definite content, as Kant clearly does mean them to have. It may be true to say that we cannot help respecting those in whom we perceive the qualities on which we base our own self-esteem, to a higher degree than we perceive them in ourselves, but this is by no means the same as saying that an objective and impartial moral law necessarily produces a feeling of respect in us.

We may therefore conclude that these arguments - the only ones advanced by Kant towards the explication of the direct determination of the will by the moral law - do not succeed in their task. With this, we have completed our examination of Kant. None of the arguments to be found in his writings establish that reason directs us to act morally.

(iv) NEO-KANTIANS

In this section, I will examine some recent arguments which seek, in a manner reminiscent of Kant, to show that morality is rational. These attempts are based on an analysis
of the notion of reason and, like Kant, link rational action with action in accordance to some principle, the universalization principle, the principle of treating others as ends, or the principle of impartiality, which is alleged to be the basis of morality. In order to confine the discussion within reasonable limits, I shall not investigate the question of whether these allegedly fundamental principles of morality really are sufficient to provide a basis for all morality. Impartiality, in a non-trivial sense, I have already said to be a necessary condition for all moral principles, and thus far I am in agreement with those who seek to prove that reason directs us to act morally by proving that reason directs us to act impartially; but I have not gone so far as to say that some form of impartiality is a sufficient condition for moral goodness. Nevertheless, if the rationality of acting on impartial principles could be demonstrated, it is obvious that this would be an important step towards demonstrating the rationality of morality. It would provide a ground for action, the rationality of which overrides the prima facie rationality of acting in accordance with one's own interests, that is, it would show that if self-interest and morality should clash, it is irrational to follow self-interest at least insofar as self-interest is not impartial. It would show that extreme egoism, the policy of not caring at all about the interests of others, not even to the extent to which one would like others to care about one's own interests, is an irrational policy. If this can be established, then, after it has been established, we may consider whether the irrationality of all immorality has been established.

(a) Paton: Rational Judgments must be Valid for all Rational Agents.

It will be remembered that H.J. Paton was dissatisfied with Kant's argument, in the final section of the Groundwork, for the rationality of the Categorical Imperative. Paton, however, does not consider it necessary to conclude that Kant's conclusion cannot be proven. Instead, Paton suggests, Kant
could have established that reason directs us to act according to a universally valid law simply by means of direct insight into the nature of reason. (36) Paton gains his insight by means of an analogy with theoretical reason, claiming that unless principles of theoretical reason are valid for all rational beings 'there is an end to rational discourse and indeed to anything that may properly be called thinking'. He then claims that the same applies to practical reason - the principles of rational action must be valid for all rational beings, and:

...to say this is to say that a rational agent as such will necessarily act on a principle universally and unconditionally valid for all rational agents as such. This proposition is identical with the principle of autonomy.

Paton says that if his contention is admitted as regards theoretical reason but denied application to practical reason, 'the onus of proof surely lies on those who at least appear to be making an arbitrary distinction'. This misrepresents the issue. Far from 'making an arbitrary distinction' in denying that rationality directs action in accordance with the principle of autonomy (!!.. act always on the maxim of such a will in us as can at the same time look upon itself as making universal law' GR pp.72-3), I am not making any distinction at all between reason as used in theory and practice. I deny that 'practical reason' can mean anything except reason - the same reason we use when speculating about theoretical matters - used to make a practical judgment. If Paton were then to say: 'Well, you admit that theoretical judgments are valid for all rational beings, why do you deny this for practical judgments?' I would reply that they are universally valid in the same sense. Just as the theoretical judgment that, given certain evidence, it is rational for me to believe a certain conclusion, is 'universally valid' in that if this is true, then it is also rational for anyone else with the same evidence to believe the same conclusion; so the practical judgment

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36) ibid., p.245-6
that given certain wants or interests it is rational for me
to do a certain action is 'universally valid' in that, if it
is true, then it is rational for anyone else with the same
wants to do the same action, if in the same circumstances.
In other words, Paton is right in saying that a rational agent
as such will necessarily act on a principle universally valid
for all rational agents as such, but wrong in identifying this
trivial point with the principle of autonomy, unless the
principle of autonomy is also to be interpreted in a trivial
way which does not exclude such 'universal laws' as an extreme
egoist would accept, like 'Everyone always do what is in my
interest'. Thus Paton has no grounds for saying that self-
interested action is ever contrary to reason, for one may say
that the principle 'Always act self-interestedly' is valid for
all rational agents. In saying this, one makes no distinction
between theoretical and practical reason, in regard to the
requirement of universal validity.

Paton would perhaps reply that I am making an obvious
mistake. I have ignored the fact that his argument is expressly
concerned with rational agents as such. My objections, based
on the fact that people have differing wants, are therefore
beside the point, for these wants are not rational, and do not
affect the question of how a rational agent, qua rational agent,
would act. My answer to this is that a rational agent as such
could never act at all - which amounts to saying that the notion
of a rational agent as such, an agent with no wants, desires,
inclinations or interests, is unintelligible. To be an agent
it is necessary to act, but why would such a being act? What
could move him to do so? How would he act? To reply that he
would act for the sake of universal law as such is merely to
shift this problem, for we still have no idea of what the
rational agent would do. How could he choose whether to act
on one maxim or another, if both could be regarded as universal-
ly valid? Although there may be some maxims that are self-
contradictory as universal laws, for example, 'always  

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drive to work after peak-hour', there are an infinite number of maxims which do not become self-contradictory when universalized. Even within the examples Kant gives of the application of the Categorical Imperative, there are maxims which are not self-contradictory when universalized. The problem about universalizing the maxim of not helping others, for example, only arises because everyone has 'non-rational' needs for love and sympathy. (GR pp.56-7) A rational agent as such would not have these needs, and so he could rationally refrain from helping others in distress.

No attempt to choose a middle position in order to avoid the alternatives of a rational agent acting to satisfy his own most important wants, and a rational agent as such not acting at all, can succeed. By a 'middle position', I mean the view that while the agent's actions may originally stem from his wants, the agent will, if he is rational, only act on those wants which he can will to be universally valid. (37) To see why such a position cannot be supported by means of the argument Paton employs, it is only necessary to recall what has already been said. The admission that the rational agent does have wants destroys Paton's argument, for our original refutation was based just on this point: rational agents, if they have

37) There is some textual support for the belief that Kant took such a position. He does say that practical reason cannot 'import an object of the will - that is, a motive of action - from the intelligible world', it can only provide 'a power so to act that the principle of our actions may accord with the essential character of a rational cause, that is, with the condition that the maxim of these actions should have the validity of a universal law'. (GR p.119) On the other hand, this looks to be plainly contrary to Kant's earlier statement that the free will must have as its principle 'the principle of acting on no maxim other than the one which can have for its object itself as at the same time a universal law' (GR p.98) for this implies that the object or motive of the will must be a universal law. So in this passage reason is seen as providing the motive for acting. Nor could Kant claim any less than this if he is to justify his belief that moral worth is only to be found in action done for the sake of the law.
wants of their own, operate from different starting-points (wants, needs or desires) and there is no reason to expect that they should act on principles which are universally valid, except in the sense in which a principle such as 'always act self-interestedly' is universally valid.

(b) Gauthier: Rational Judgments must be Acceptable to all Rational Agents

David Gauthier argues for a similar position, and by means of similar arguments. His general thesis is: 'All wants of all persons are to be included in the basis of practical reasoning by any agent'. (38) This proposition he attempts to justify by an examination of the rational agent. Gauthier argues firstly that rational agents must be autonomous agents. This need not concern us. It is his second claim which interests us. This claim is that it is rational for an autonomous agent to respect the autonomy of other agents, to treat other agents as ends in themselves. (p.118) The argument for this is as follows:

Now if I consider only my own wants in determining what I ought to do, there is no reason why another person should agree with my practical judgment. For he will naturally consider only his wants, and thus reach a conclusion established on very different grounds. He cannot be expected to share in the end of my action unless it takes into account his wants. Thus I must consider, not only my own wants, but also his, in determining what I ought to do. (p.118)

Gauthier also puts the argument in this way:

Just as [the rational agent] considers his own prudential activity rationally justifiable, so he must consider [another rational agent's] prudential activity similarly justifiable. As a rational agent naturally seeks acceptance, from the other, of his judgments, and correspondingly recognises the other's claim to seek similar acceptance from him.

The weakness of this argument is plain. In the first passage, there is an ambiguity in the word 'agree'. It is, of course,

true that if I consider only my own wants, another rational agent, considering only his own wants, need not 'agree' with my practical judgment, in that he may not make an identical judgment himself, and might well prefer me to make a different judgment. But this will be just because he has different wants, and it is not equivalent to saying that he will not 'agree' with my judgment in the sense of accepting my judgment as a rational judgment for me, given my wants, to make. In this sense it is true that if one considers one's own prudential activity rationally justifiable, one must consider another's prudential activity rationally justifiable. This is just the trivial sense of universalizability, in which all judgments based on a reason are universalizable. It has nothing to do with considering the wants of anyone else, for it may be that all rational agents consider each other rationally justified in following the principles of extreme egoism. This would imply that they try to hinder each other in doing what they admit everyone is rationally justified in doing, but this seems entirely possible. Two generals on opposing sides in a war may accept each other's actions and judgments as rationally justified, even though if they consider each other's wants at all it is only in order to thwart them. Their main purpose is to prevent the other from doing what they admit he is rationally justified in trying to do.

In discussing briefly opposing views Gauthier considers the view that the wants of each rational agent provide reasons for, and only for, that agent. His objection to this is that when such wants conflict, the conflict will be decided by force, or by a compromise accepted as mutually preferable to force. This Gauthier considers 'a practical denial of their rationality', for he thinks it 'subverts the status of the rational agent' (p.121). This is not very convincing. The assumption that force is not rational requires argument, as is shown by the example of the generals just given. Still more doubtful is the claim that a compromise accepted as mutually preferable to force somehow subverts the status of a rational agent. In
international relations such a compromise is usually thought of as a paradigm of rationality. Gauthier's objections are surely question-begging.

Indeed, Gauthier appears to realise the weakness of his case himself when he remarks that his thesis cannot be established beyond doubt, and concludes the chapter by suggesting that it be taken as: 'An invitation to commit oneself, to say, in the words of Luther, "Here I stand; I can no other". This is an unfortunate conclusion for a chapter designed to show that if we are to be rational we must act in a certain way. For Gauthier's final appeal is to faith.

(c) Taylor: A Rational Way of Life Must Be Impartially Chosen.

Rationality may be linked with impartiality more directly. This may be exemplified by the following quotation from Paul Taylor:

The conditions for a rational choice among ways of life must be specified. I suggest that these conditions may be grouped under three general headings: conditions of enlightenment, conditions of freedom, and conditions of impartiality. I shall say that a choice is rational to the extent that it is free, enlightened, and impartial. (39)

Taylor makes it clear that by 'impartial' he means disinterested, detached or objective, and unbiased. He suggests that in order to 'eliminate entirely the element of self-interest' one may incorporate into the conditions of a rational choice the stipulation that the person making the choice 'not know what position he himself would have in any chosen way of life.' (p. 170) So Taylor's requirement of impartiality is plainly no trivial one. It is very close to, if not identical with, the requirement which I have suggested is a necessary condition for moral judgments. It is also diametrically opposed to our starting-point, the prima facie rationality of self-interest. But is it really a requirement of rational choice among ways of life?

It is not quite clear how much stress Taylor would place on the stipulation that his conditions for a rational choice apply to a choice between ways of life. Sometimes he writes as if his conditions apply to any rational choice, although they are introduced in the context of choices between ways of life. In any case, he gives no argument in defence of his conditions. He says merely:

...they are the conditions which I presume anyone, in any way of life would accept as defining a rational choice, in the ordinary sense of the word 'rational'. If people on reflection were not willing to accept these conditions...I would ask them what conditions they would give for defining a rational choice. If they offered some which I had not thought of, and which did seem (to me and to them) to elucidate further our ordinary meaning of being rational in making choices, then these new conditions would go into the definition. (p.176)

In my view, this is sheer effrontery. Taylor takes it for granted that any criticism of his conditions must be in the form of additional conditions, building on those he has suggested and thus 'further' elucidating the meaning of a rational choice. He does not even consider the possibility that one or more of the conditions he has specified is not a necessary condition of a rational choice at all. But surely this is the case. Our ordinary notion of making a rational choice,

(40) Even here Hospers does not differ from Taylor. Hospers puts the argument in the form of a dialogue, with 'West' presenting Taylor's requirements for rational choice against 'East', who at one point proposes a kind of extreme egoism. When West asks East if he can give a better explanation of the concept of rationality, however, East meekly admits that the requirements are 'excellent', and wonders only if they are not necessary without being sufficient. (pp. 588-9)
whether among ways of life or otherwise, does not require impartiality. Take the case of people who have considerable wealth, living in a society in which there are also people who live in poverty. If they were to choose their way of life in such a way that they did not know what position they would themselves have, wealthy people would probably choose a world in which all had equal wealth. This implies that they are not choosing in a truly rational manner, in choosing to live the life of a wealthy person in such a society. Yet the great majority of wealthy people do choose to retain their wealth, and it is safe to say that this would also be true of most poor people, if they ever became wealthy. Are we to say, then, that practically no-one is fully rational in choosing their way of life? Taylor, strangely enough, accepts this conclusion. His conditions, he says, are ideals. He admits that no actual choice among ways of life can ever satisfy them completely, and that no actual choice can ever be fully rational (p.165). But having said this, can he claim to be explicating the ordinary meaning of making a rational choice among ways of life? There is a difficulty here in that 'rational choice among ways of life' is hardly a concept with an everyday use or meaning. But Taylor gives no grounds for supposing that rational choices among ways of life are very different from rational choices about other matters. It would seem that in the ordinary meaning of 'rational' we do say that some actual choices are rational. We do not mean by this 'rational to a certain extent'. We speak of choices as rational or irrational more frequently than 'fairly rational', 'nearly rational' or 'not very rational'. Moreover Taylor does not provide a single example of the ordinary use of the concept of rational choice, neither among ways of life, nor about other matters. Even if we accept that ordinary language is to be the criterion, Taylor nowhere shows that his conditions satisfy his own criterion. I think it is obvious that they do not. (41)

41) For some additional considerations which bear on this point, see pp.73-4, above, and p.124 fn., below.
The attempts to prove, by an analysis of reason or of rational action, that it is rational to act on some principle which involves considering others in the same ways as one considers oneself, have all failed. It has even been suggested that such an analysis could result in the opposite conclusion. J.A. Brunton points out that there is a logical distinction between self and others, and comments: 'It is generally recognised that sensitivity to logical distinctions is a mark not of irrationality but of reason'. (42) This may be true, but it would be a mistake to place any weight on this consideration.

(v) BAIER'S SOCIAL APPROACH TO REASON

The writers discussed so far in this section have used a priori arguments to show that reason demands that we act morally rather than in our own interest should there be a clash. But it is possible also to argue from the well-being of society. This kind of argument, which has been associated with Hobbes, (43) has been put forward recently by Kurt Baier in his book The Moral Point of View. (44) Baier maintains that 'Why should I be moral?' may be answered by a demonstration that moral reasons rationally override all other reasons for action. He agrees with our starting-point, that it is prima facie rational to follow one's self-interest (pp. 299-300, 306) but argues that when self-interest and morality clash, it is no longer rational to follow one's interest. This is the argument we must

44) Baier, K. The Moral point of View, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1958). A considerably abridged and slightly rewritten paperback edition has appeared recently, but I have continued to use the fuller and more familiar edition. Important changes in the new edition are noted.
But first, we may note that Baier has an acceptable definition of morality. He incorporates the condition of impartiality—or as he puts it, the principle that 'moral rules must be for the good of everyone alike'—into his account of the moral point of view, and excludes extreme egoism, which he regards as logically distinct from morality. (Ch. 8)

Baier's argument for the supremacy of moral reasons appears simple. To see that moral reasons are superior to reasons of self-interest, all we need to do is examine two hypothetical worlds, in one of which moral reasons are always treated by everyone as superior to reasons of self-interest, while in the other the reverse is the practice. If we do this, we see at once that the former world is the better, because the latter is a Hobbesian state of nature, in which life is nasty, brutish and short. This shows, according to Baier, that provided we live in a society, moral reasons are superior to reasons of self-interest. (p. 310)

Baier admits that this argument is valid only if we look at the question from the point of view of people as a whole, and not from the

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45) We are not concerned, in this thesis, with the question of whether moral reasons are prima facie reasons for action. Baier believes they are, but his argument for this point is extremely weak. The test he uses for determining whether a consideration is a valid prima facie reason for action contains the logical fallacy 'Premises of an argument are true if the argument is valid and the conclusion is true.' (p. 299; this sentence has been omitted from the abridged edition.) Of course, if Baier can make out his claim that moral reasons are overriding reasons, this would show that they are also prima facie reasons. On the other hand, the failure of the argument for the stronger claim would not prove that the weaker claim cannot be sustained either. This question I leave open.

46) Although this account of the moral point of view is retained in the new edition, there is a new preface in which Baier seems to define morality as overriding, which would be inconsistent with the rejection of egoism as a morality (which is retained in the new edition) and would make quite redundant the whole enterprise of showing morality to be rationally overriding. (Abridged Edition, pp. xix–xx)
viewpoint of any particular individual. His critics have accused him of 'simple verbal confusion' in changing from the viewpoint of the individual to that of everyone. (47) One is certainly entitled to ask why reason demands that the individual, wondering what to do, must consider matters from the point of view of everyone, why he must choose between alternative hypothetical worlds, rather than base his decision on the facts of the real world, in which one's own decision to be moral or immoral may have little effect on the way other people act. This must be answered satisfactorily before Baier's account could be accepted. I think Baier does have an answer, however, and that his switch from the point of view of the individual to that of everyone, or of society, cannot simply be attributed to confusion.

The ground of Baier's use of the point of view of everyone, in arguing that it is rational to follow moral reasons rather than reasons of self-interest, is his concept of reason. In the course of his book Baier puts forward, though in a piecemeal fashion and with some apparently contradictory passages, the view that reason, at least in the area of reasons for action, is a socially-dependent concept. Thus in the third chapter, Baier answers the question 'How do we know that something is a reason for action?' by saying:

We begin with certain beliefs; let us call them 'consideration-making beliefs' or 'rules of reason'. These are propositions to the effect that if a line of action is of a certain sort, then the agent has a reason for or against entering upon it .... we learn the consideration-making beliefs prevalent in our community as part of our education. (pp. 94-5)

So the question of whether we take self-interest to be a reason for action can be answered by showing that in our society self-interest is generally regarded as a reason for action. This explains why Baier

spends much of his book in examining which individual, social and moral rules of reason are accepted by our society. But Baier is not a complete relativist about reasons for action. He is always aware of the fact that acceptance by society of a rule of reason does not justify that rule. His final chapter is an attempt to justify some of the rules of reason our society accepts, and the particular section we are now considering is an attempt to justify the rule, which Baier alleges is accepted in our society, that it is rational to act on moral reasons rather than on reasons of self-interest whenever the two clash. (48)

48) Once again, we are not strictly concerned with the question of what 'rules of reason' are accepted by our society. The matter is worth a brief comment, however, both for its intrinsic interest and because some philosophers have tried to argue that if something is commonly held to be rational, no further questions can be asked about whether it is really rational. (Cf. J. J. C. Smart, 'Reason and Conduct', Philosophy vol 25, (1950) pp. 209-224.) This approach surely ignores the possibility that we may find it highly desirable to encourage certain forms of conduct, and hence be reluctant to admit that alternative forms of conduct are equally rational; in addition, we may be mistaken in assessing some kinds of action as rational or irrational.

Is it 'generally agreed' in our society that moral reasons are superior to reasons of self-interest, as Baier claims? (p. 106; cf. p. 308) This is an empirical question, but Baier does not indicate that he has carried out any opinion polls, or done any other kind of investigation of what people think. Presumably he regards the matter as so obvious that no research is required. But is it? One does not get this impression from ordinary speech. Compare the way we describe actions: in a case in which moral reasons are not involved, a man who acts contrary to self-interest, knowing well that he is doing so (for example, a man who would like more money, but refuses to participate in a safe, honest and lucrative financial venture, although to participate would not involve any hardship for him) is likely to be said to be acting irrationally. On the other hand, in a case in which moral considerations are involved, a man who acts against such considerations for reasons of self-interest is said to act immorally, but not irrationally. A thief is not usually thought of as irrational unless the risk of being caught is out of proportion to the gains of his theft. Nor is understating one's income for taxation purposes usually thought irrational, though it is clearly not for the good of everyone alike, and most people would agree that it is immoral. As a psychiatrist has said: 'It is difficult to argue that the white-collar criminal who defrauds his government or firm with impunity is behaving in an unreasonable
Baier apparently holds that it is society's acceptance of the rule that must be justified, and not the acceptance of the rule by the individual. The result is that if one is living in a society, it is impossible to talk of a valid rule of reason without relating this to one's society. Acting rationally, Baier seems to be saying, means acting in accordance with what it is rationally justifiable for one's society to accept as valid rules of reason.

This interpretation cannot be established conclusively, for the crucial passages are ambiguous. For example, in discussing criteria for deciding whether something is rational, Baier says:

> Our very purpose in 'playing the reasoning game' is to maximize satisfactions and minimize frustrations. Deliberately to frustrate ourselves .... would be to go counter to the very purpose for which we deliberate and weigh pros and cons. (p.301)

and later, in discussing the possibility that the fact that we enjoy something is not a reason for doing it, he says:

> In such a world, 'following reason' might be less rewarding than following instinct or inclination. Hence it cannot be following reason, for it must pay to follow reason at least as much as to follow instinct or inclination, or else it is not reason. (p. 303)

These passages have been interpreted as maintaining that it is only rational to do what is in one's own interest. This is a plausible interpretation, but it would mean that Baier completely contradicts himself when he later says that although the individual may do better by following self-interest, and morality may require genuine sacrifices from him, it is rational to be moral because 'the best possible life for everyone is possible only by everyone's following the rules of manner. His actions might be deplorable on moral grounds, but if evaluated in terms of the success goal of our society, he would be looked upon as a rational man .... we must acknowledge that there are probably many criminals who by any criteria of social judgment should be called normal or rational.' (S. L. Halleck, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime (New York, Harper & Row/Hoeber Medical Books, 1967) It is surely not as obvious as Baier assumes that our society accepts that it is irrational to allow self-interest to override morality.
morality....' (pp. 314-5) In the new edition Baier concludes by saying explicitly that although it is better for everyone that morality be observed, this

.... does not mean, of course, that a person will not do better for himself by following self-interest than by doing what is morally right. But of course such a person cannot claim that he is following a superior reason. (abridged edition, p. 157)

So Baier does not equate acting rationally with acting self-interestedly. How then can we interpret the passages quoted above? It will be noted that in the first of the two passages, Baier uses the plural 'our', while in the second he uses an impersonal form. If we interpret these passages as referring to everyone individually, Baier is obviously attempting to prove a self-contradictory thesis: that when morality clashes with self-interest, it is in one's interest to be moral. But both 'our' and the impersonal form may be interpreted as referring to everyone collectively, or to society, and in this interpretation there is no contradiction in Baier's thesis: following reason must be rewarding for society, but may involve the individual in genuine sacrifices.

We may therefore assume that Baier is to be interpreted in this way, for if my interpretation is mistaken and he is to be interpreted as he has been in the past, his arguments, being blatantly self-contradictory, do not merit further consideration. What of his argument, then? If Baier were right in saying that the question of what it is rational to do cannot be answered without answering the question of what it is rational for society to accept as a rule of reason, then the only way to show that it is rational to act on moral reasons rather than on self-interested reasons is to do what Baier has done - to show that this is a better rule of reason for society to adopt than any alternative. So allegations of confusion and attempts to refute Baier on the grounds that he has not shown that it is rational for an individual, as distinct from a society, to regard moral reasons as overriding, are superficial. To refute Baier it is necessary to attack his concept of reason in action. This is not easy, because a concept which is expressed so vaguely that most critics have missed it altogether is a difficult
target. Yet it is possible to argue against it. One argument that may be employed is a variation of G. E. Moore's well-known 'open question argument'. If, as Baier asserts, acting rationally in a society means acting in accordance with what it is rational for society to accept as rules of reason, it should not be possible for an individual to ask intelligibly: 'I know I am acting in accord with what it is best for my society to accept as a rule of reason, but am I acting rationally?' This question is intelligible. It is a question which arises quite naturally once one understands Baier's account of reason. The fact that it does arise indicates that Baier's account cannot be true as a definition. But if it is not analytically true, on what ground is it to be held? Baier presents no argument for it. There are other serious problems on Baier's account of reason. What are we to make of the notion of reason outside society, in a 'state of nature'? If, as one might think by analogy with the notion of reason in a society, it is rational to look after one's own interest when one is not a member of a society, then we have two distinct concepts of reason, which is in itself a ground doubting the account of reason that has been given. A greater problem arises from the view that reason outside society cannot be the same as reason in society. One must be able to ask whether it is rational to be a member of a society or not. The answer to this question must be based on criteria of rationality which are applicable both inside and outside a society. A person outside a society must have criteria on which he can rationally decide whether he should become a member of a society, and a person inside a society must have criteria on which he can rationally decide whether he should remain a member of his society. These criteria must surely be the same — otherwise a person might find that from the point of view of a person in society it is rational for him to remain a member, but from the point of view of a person outside society it is rational for him to remain outside. This is to say that the concept of reason in action which Baier uses falls down when applied to this fundamental question. His criteria are not the
ultimate criteria of rationality after all, so he has not shown that it is ultimately rational to regard reasons of morality as superior to reasons of self-interest. Indeed, it could be said that the deliberately immoral man is a man who has, de facto, chosen to leave society, although he may keep his decision to himself. Unless Baier can show why such a decision is irrational, he has not shown that it is irrational to be immoral. Hence I think it clear that, not even on a generous reading, does Baier establish the concept of reason which he requires if he is to avoid self-contradiction.

(vi) CONCLUSION.

The conclusion of this part may be simply stated. No adequate arguments or other considerations have been found to support the view that reason prescribes that we act morally, rather than in accordance with self-interest. The prima facie rationality of self-interest has not been overridden. Once again, Sidgwick sums up the essence of the matter:

It would be contrary to Common Sense to deny that the distinction between any one individual and any other is real and fundamental, and that consequently 'I' am concerned with the quality of my existence as an individual in a sense, fundamentally important, in which I am not concerned with the quality of the existence of other individuals: and this being so, I do not see how it can be proved that this distinction is not to be taken as fundamental in determining the ultimate end of rational action for an individual. (49)

49) E. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 498. It should be noted, however, that nothing in this part of the thesis shows that it is irrational, or contrary to reason to act morally rather than self-interestedly. That morality does not rationally override self-interest does not entail that self-interest rationally overrides morality. This question I leave open.
It may be objected that even if we cannot prove on theoretical
grounds that it is rational to subordinate self-interest to morality,
there is still the practical difficulty that this does seem to entail
a Hobbesian state of nature. How is it that, if it is rational for
everyone to seek his own interests, regardless of the interests of
others or of moral considerations, mankind is not in a state of
continual war, every individual against every other individual? How
is it that killing, robbing, lying and deceiving are not the norm,
rather than the exception? Somehow, it may be felt, our conclusion
must be wrong. It appears theoretically justifiable, but its
consequences are contrary to the actual state of the world, and too
catastrophic to be acceptable.

This objection assumes that our own interests are completely
opposed to what we normally regard as morally good behaviour - that is,
consideration for others, benevolence, justice, impartiality and so
on. This assumption must be examined. It may be that morally good
behaviour and self-interest do not clash after all. If this is so
then, provided the explanation of the 'common moral consciousness'
which has been given is accepted, the rationality of morality may be
based upon what we have hitherto seen as its chief opposition - the
rationality of self-interest. 'Morality' here refers, of course, not
to the motivation of action which was central in the Kantian notion
of 'moral worth' and Bradley's idea of virtue, but to what I have
suggested is the object of encouraging such motivation, the promotion
of valued ends. If we may assume that it is these ends, and not the
motivation, which are of primary importance, we may see whether self-
interest can be used to provide a rational justification for morality.
For those who follow Kant or Bradley in insisting that motivation is
the crux of morality, I do not know of any means by which a rational
justification of morality can be given.
PART III

THE QUESTION ANSWERED BY AN APPEAL TO DESIRES AND INTERESTS

Man's duty must meet the challenge to morality posed by our question by attempting to show that there is really no clash between morality and self-interest, provided the two are properly understood. The morally good life, they say, is also the truly happy life for man. In addition, some of these writers say, it is by virtuous action that man fulfills his function as a human being. Others put this point in terms of human flourishing; in order to flourish as a human, they maintain, man must be virtuous. This kind of view is also popular outside philosophy. Demonstrated works of literature testify to the belief that one cannot prosper by evil - ...
(i) INTRODUCTORY

We have seen, in the previous section, that 'Why should I be moral?' is a legitimate question and that attempts to answer it by arguing it is contrary to reason to act immorally, even if it is in one's interest to do so, have been unsuccessful. We are now to consider a different kind of approach to the question, the common characteristic of which is an appeal to facts about human nature and about the world in which humans live. Answers of this kind have been given by most writers in ethics - and in theology - from ancient times to the end of the Nineteenth Century. Some, such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Spinoza and Shaftsbury meet the challenge to morality posed by our question by attempting to show that there is really no clash between morality and self-interest, provided the two are properly understood. The morally good life, they say, is also the truly happy life for man. In addition, some of these writers say, it is by virtuous action that man fulfils his function as a human being. Others put this point in terms of human flourishing: in order to flourish as a human, they maintain, man must be virtuous. This kind of view is also popular outside philosophy. Innumerable works of literature testify to the belief that man cannot prosper by evil - Macbeth is again a classic example. Films and comics make the same
point, and it is expressed in everyday maxims like 'Honesty is the best policy'. Other writers, of whom Hume, Butler, Bentham and J.S. Mill may be the best known, assert that men have non-selfish desires or feelings, such as benevolence and sympathy, which lead them to act morally. It is also possible to appeal to conscience. Moreover, many of these considerations are compatible with each other, and have been put forward jointly by the same writer. Thus Butler argues that virtue coincides with self-interest, thinks that men are, by and large, benevolent, and also stresses the role of conscience.

Would these theories, if sound, answer our question? Could they provide a rational justification of morality? Many writers would claim that they cannot, for many writers emphasise the distinction between providing a motive and a justification. To give reasons of the sort we have mentioned, these writers claim, may give a questioner a motive for acting morally, but they can never show that it is rational to act morally. (1) But this distinction between a self-interested motivation and a rational justification obviously rests on the assumption that it is not rational to act in one's own interest. If, as we saw in the last section, the grounds on which this assumption is usually based are inadequate, then

1) For example, K. Baier, The Moral Point of View, pp.153, 156-62; M.G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics, p.326
we may tentatively assume that it is rational to act in one's interest. If it is rational to act in one's interest, then to show that morality is in one's interest is to show that it is rational to act morally, which is to provide a rational justification of morality. Indeed, even if we were to neglect the conclusions of the previous section, and to preserve an entirely open mind on the question of whether it is rational to be moral or self-interested if morality and self-interest dictate contrary courses of action, to show that morality is in one's interest may be to give a rational justification of acting morally. For to show that morality is in one's interest is to show that morality and self-interest do not dictate contrary courses of action. Accordingly the question of how it is rational to act if morality and self-interest clash can never arise in practice. Provided that one accepts the prima facie rationality of self-interest, provided one accepts that it is rational to act to promote one's own interests rather than to retard them, when moral considerations do not clash with one's own interests, then one must agree that to show that to act morally is also to promote one's own interests is to show that it is rational to act morally.

The distinction between motivation and justification does have some application, however, in regard to those theories which see morally good behaviour as based on natural desires or inclinations, or on feelings of guilt produced by
acts contrary to one's conscience. To say 'acting morally is in accord with your desire to be kind to others' is not sufficient to rationally justify acting morally, for it is not as obvious that it is rational to act in accordance with one's desires as it is that it is rational to act in one's own interest. Why should one not neglect one's desires, if one also has contrary desires, or contrary interests? Why is it not rational to make an effort to suppress benevolent desires, in the same way as, it is often said, it is rational to make an effort to suppress aggressive desires? Why not attempt to ignore or suppress guilt feelings, as we attempt to ignore or suppress feelings of jealousy? In order to meet these objections, those who would rationally justify morality on grounds such as these must argue also that it is impossible, irrational, or undesirable to ignore or suppress the desires and feelings on which morality is based. In the case of feelings of guilt, the most common argument has been that these feelings cannot be totally suppressed, and that to ignore them is not in one's interest, in that they are incompatible with a happy existence. In the case of feelings of benevolence and love for others, it might be argued that to suppress these feelings is not in one's interest because it cuts one off from the greatest source of happiness available to man. With the addition of these arguments, the theories
of Hume, Butler, Bentham, and Mill may be considered as attempts to show that it is rational to act morally, and in this form they will be considered in this section.

Another objection that may be made to the discussion, in a work of philosophy, of answers to 'Why should I be moral?' which appeal to facts about human nature is that such answers, because they involve assertions about matters of fact, are beyond the scope of philosophy. In the past, it may be said, philosophy was a broader subject, and philosophers discussed questions which are today better left to scientists of various sorts. Questions about what desires men have, and about when they are likely to be happy cannot be adequately dealt with by conceptual analysis, or by a priori argument. For this reason, some philosophers would say that we have now pursued our question as far as is possible for philosophy to go, and that we should hand over the remaining problems, including the problem of morality and self-interest, to better qualified people, such as psychologists, social workers, or perhaps theologians. (2) There is some basis for such suggestions, just as there is some basis for confining the operations of state police within state boundaries; but in both cases, it seems to me legitimate to cross a boundary if the quarry is important, and if no-one else is ready and able to take over the chase. I cannot take a rigidly defined attitude to

philosophy. If the work of psychologists or of workers in other disciplines is relevant to problems of a philosophical nature, it seems perverse not to draw on the results of such work. If it be insisted that factual issues are not philosophical issues, then I must confess that my desire to do philosophy, so defined, yields to my desire to arrive at the truth, so far as it can be ascertained, about the question raised in this thesis. In any case, the subject of our discussion has not been neglected by all contemporary philosophers, and it has only been indirectly approached by non-philosophers (with the exception of religious thinkers). Our discussion therefore proceeds along familiar philosophical paths, pausing to examine the opinions of non-philosophers when these opinions bear on the views of philosophers. Before we do discuss the views of the one or two contemporary philosophers who have discussed the question of self-interest and morality, however, I intend to deal very briefly with a rather different, and historically very important argument for the view that self-interest and morality coincide.

(ii) REWARD AND PUNISHMENT IN THE AFTER-LIFE

For millions of people, throughout recorded history, the question 'Why should I be moral?' has been answered by the belief that virtue is rewarded and vice punished in a life after death. This belief in varying forms is to be found in
most of the major religions of the world, including Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. If we take the words of the Gospels in their most natural sense, it would seem that one of the most important ways in which the teachings of Jesus differed from the attitudes of his time was that he emphasised the importance of reward in the next world, and not in this world, as a reason for being moral. (3) Nor has this idea lacked adherents among philosophers. According to Warrender, it is the ultimate basis of obligation for Thomas Hobbes. (4)

3) This is not the accepted interpretation of the message of Jesus today. While I make no comment on the accuracy of the Gospel account of Jesus, it is undeniable that the Gospels do report Jesus as preaching a morality of self-interest. The belief that Jesus praised virtue for its own sake may have its origin in the fact that sayings such as 'Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them...' are emphasised, while the reason given for this advice:...'otherwise you have no reward of your Father, which is in heaven.' is neglected or interpreted metaphorically. (Matthew VI, 1) The reasons for praying in secret are identical — those who pray in public have their reward (that is, have received it) whereas if one prays in secret 'thy Father, which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.' (Matthew, VI, 5 - 6) One could also cite the Beatitudes, in which various groups are held to be blessed, because they will be rewarded in heaven (Matthew V, 2-12). But it would be tedious to quote more passages, and those interested may pursue the matter for themselves. Cf. Matthew V 43-8, VI, XIX 27-30, XXV 31-46; Mark III 29, VIII 34-8, IX 41-8, X 21; Luke IX 24-5, XII 4-5, XIV 7-14. The belief in the imminence of the Second Coming (Cf. Matthew VI 34, X 23, XVI 28, XXIV 34; Mark IX 1, XII 30 etc.) is of course part of the ground for the belittling of riches and rewards in the present world, and the emphasis on rewards given by God.

Joseph Butler, despite his stress that in general, virtue and self-interest coincide in this world, is forced to argue that where this coincidence is not complete, 'all shall be set right at the final distribution of things.'(5) More recently, James FitzJames Stephens wrote:

Christianity, in a word, in relation to morals, is a means ... by which an infinitely greater importance may be and is attached to the distinction between right and wrong (understand it as you will) than reasonable men would attach to it if they simply calculated the specific ascertainable effects of right and wrong actions, on the supposition that this present world is the whole of life.(6)

Even Henry Sidgwick had reluctantly to admit, at the conclusion of his Methods of Ethics, that unless there is a Supreme Being who rewards obedience to duty and punishes violations of duty, one must abandon the hope of putting morality on a completely rational basis.(7) In the present century, belief in heaven and hell, and in a life after death is less widespread than it once was, and this kind of answer to 'Why should I be moral?' has accordingly become less important. It is curious that the reduced acceptance of this popular answer to the question has been paralleled, not by a revival of interest in attempts to find other answers, but by a rejection and neglect of the question itself. It is, in

5) Joseph Butler, Sermons, III par. 8.
my view, the absence of the reassuring belief that God has so ordered the world that those who do what is right in this world will have their reward in the next, which makes the question of why one should be moral so pressing.

I do not intend to discuss the religious answer further, except to say that, for reasons which cannot be adequately presented in this thesis, I cannot accept its fundamental premiss, which is that there is a life after death in which we are rewarded or punished according to our behaviour in this world. Those who do accept this premiss have a justification for acting morally. Whether one should consider such a justification a rational justification is another matter. The premiss of the justification is usually held on the basis of faith and not reason, which means that the justification is not ultimately rational. One may say, however, that it is rational for those who do believe in reward and punishment in the after-life to act morally, for they believe that morality and self-interest do not clash.

Those who accept the premiss of the religious answer to our question need read no further, for they have an answer to the question which those who do not accept this premiss must still seek to answer. From this point on, then, I write for those who, like myself, do not believe that morality has the support of Divine sanctions.

Can it be shown that, because of the way in which human beings are constituted, morally good or virtuous conduct is in the true interests of every human being? This has been alleged, in various ways. Probably the most direct connection that can be claimed to exist between morality and human nature is this: a piano, because of the sort of thing it is, has as its end the production of certain sounds. Man, because of the sort of thing he is, also has certain necessary ends. These ends coincide with (or are) our duties. This view, which has been advanced by a contemporary Thomist with a high reputation in some circles, makes use of an analogy between man and an object made by man. Such analogies have a long history, but are no better for that. Man, unlike pianos or knives, has purposes of his own, and can choose which purpose to adopt. Even if (and this is a supposition I do not accept) man were made for a purpose, he could still ask why he should fulfill that purpose.

A better analogy has been urged by another contemporary philosopher. The nature of a plant determines what the plant needs to flourish - water, sun and minerals in varying proportions - and what will prevent it from flourishing - frost, sandy soil and so on. Similarly, the nature of man determines what he needs to flourish, and perhaps what man

does need is virtue and not vice. (9)

Before considering this possibility, it is necessary to pause in order to see just what is relevant here. Talk of a connection between morality and human nature immediately brings to mind the contentious philosophical issue of 'naturalism', that is, the view that morality may be characterised factually, in terms of fulfilling human wants, needs and so on. We are not here concerned with the problem of whether such a characterisation can be given. It has already been argued in this thesis that impartiality is a minimum requirement of moral language. There is no point in our attempting to give any further specification of morality. Even if moral predicates could be defined in terms of satisfaction of human wants and needs, no answer to the question of why one should be moral would be provided by such a definition. For it would still be true that, in accordance with the requirement of impartiality, it is morally good to satisfy not only one's own wants and needs, but also those of others. Naturalistic definitions of morality do not answer our question, because they do not, in themselves, show any connection between acting morally and satisfying one's own wants and needs, that is, between self-interest.
and morality. The answering of 'Why should I be moral?' requires a theory connecting the possession of virtue, or the practice of it, with the interests of the virtuous man, and to show this is to do more than put forward a theory about the nature of virtue.

Egoism, held impartially as a moral theory, that is, held in the form 'Everyone should do what is in their interests', seems to be an exception to this. It does, merely by a definition of moral terms, connect morality and self-interest. Yet if impartial egoism is to be at all plausible, it would somehow have to show that the end which it must value - the impartial promotion of interests - is not hindered rather than advanced by action based on the maxim that everyone should be concerned only with their own interests. Thus egoism is involved in the task of showing that people's interests are such that the pursuit of them will be possible in a world in which other people are also pursuing their interests without regard to the interests of anyone else. This task is a kind of mirror-image of the task of other ethical theories faced with 'Why should I be moral?'. These non-egoistic theories invariably hold that human welfare, the satisfaction of human interests, is morally good, even if not the whole of what is morally good. To answer our question by an appeal to self-interest they must
therefore argue that following one's own interest is not incompatible with acting in such a way as to promote — or at least not to hinder — the welfare of others. Therefore, although I shall approach the question from the point of view of the common, and I think sound, belief that virtue or moral goodness cannot be defined simply as the satisfaction of one's own interest, what I have to say will be applicable to those who hold a form of egoism which does not violate the requirement of impartiality.

Despite the fact that the possibility of showing a connection between self-interest and morality does not depend on any particular definition of morality, the connections which have normally been alleged, and which we are about to consider, do assume that certain specified character traits or ways of acting are morally good, whereas others are morally bad. Thus, while not defining moral terms, they do assume that morality has a particular content. They make no meta-ethical claims, but they accept certain normative judgments, such as that great envy and pride are vices, that justice is virtue and that altruism and kindness to others are morally good. I think that these judgments will be accepted by most readers. For those who do not accept them, the attempted answers to the question of why one should be moral will not be answers to this question at all — they will
merely be answers to the question of why one should not be envious or proud, and why one should be just, altruistic and kind to others. This cannot be avoided.

Let us then return to the suggestion that man needs to be morally good in order to flourish, as a plant needs sun. Could one not make the same point against this suggestion that was made against the idea that man was made for certain purposes? In other words, could one not sensibly ask why one should do what is necessary to flourish? If we judge a flourishing life, once it has been described to us, as boring, unpleasant or miserable, do we have any reason for choosing to flourish? The only answer to this would be that a boring, unpleasant or miserable life could not possibly be a flourishing life. In order to remove the possibility of it being rational to choose not to flourish, a flourishing life must be taken as equivalent to, or at least including, a happy life. In this way it is in a person's interest to flourish, and it is as rational to choose to flourish as it is to choose to act in one's own interest. We must now ask: is there a connection between moral goodness, or virtue, and the happiness of the morally good and virtuous man?

(iv) ENVY, PRIDE & HUMAN NATURE: WERTHEIM

One might expect that no general, blanket answer can
be given to the question of whether there is a connection between virtue and the happiness of the virtuous man. The case for such a connection is certainly more obvious in regard to some virtues than in regard to others. In a recent article, Peter Wertheim has discussed the vices of envy and pride in an attempt to show that:

...there is an internal connection between these vices and frustration or self-destruction of one kind or another, so that it is logically odd to refer to a person deeply marked by these vices as happy, and natural to describe him as unhappy.\(^{(10)}\)

On envy, I find Wertheim convincing. Wertheim begins by remarking that envy is a mark of a bad man, that a good man might be occasionally envious, but could not be habitually so. He then says that envy is a state that must be unpleasant, that one could not want for its own sake, because the concept of envy involves unfulfilled wants, and resentment at the fact that they are unfulfilled. It thus necessarily has what Wertheim calls an 'unpleasant feeling tone'. This is the main ground of Wertheim's case for a connection between being deeply marked by envy and being unhappy, and I think it is indisputable. We may relate this case to our inquiry in the following manner. If a markedly envious character is not morally good, then one instance in

\(^{(10)}\) Peter Wertheim, 'Morality and Advantage', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vo.42 (1964) pp.375-87
which 'Why should I be moral?' may be asked would be when a person accepts the view that, on moral grounds, he ought to attempt to combat the strong envy he frequently feels. If such a person were to ask why he should be moral, he would be asking, insofar as his question was limited to present circumstances, why it is not rational to be envious. An answer in terms of the 'unpleasant feeling tone' of envy should satisfy this query.

After dealing with envy, Wertheim considers pride. He agrees that some forms of pride are perfectly compatible with being a good man, but holds that there is a sense of pride which is incompatible with goodness. This is the type of pride which leads a man to exalt himself against others. The mark of people who are proud in this sense, Wertheim says, is that they dwell on themselves to the complete exclusion of all others, or if others come into consideration it is only as a contrast to the superiority of the proud man. Most would agree that this sort of pride is morally bad, that it is a vice. Can it be shown to be contrary to the interests of the proud man? Wertheim thinks it can, although he admits that pride, unlike envy, brings satisfaction. This is because envy is consciousness of a lack of something which another has, whereas pride is consciousness of having something which
another lacks. Wertheim bases his case on the proud man's tendency to cut himself off from others. Recognition of the worth of other people, and especially of his need for them, would threaten the proud man's image of himself, Wertheim claims. Without such recognition, friendship and love are impossible. Friendship and love, however, are necessary for 'flourishing as a human person'. One does need other people, and so to cut oneself off from them is self-wounding.

Wertheim's account of the internal connection between pride and unhappiness seems to depend on a factual claim in a way that his account of the connection between envy and unhappiness does not. This is the claim that men need friendship and love if they are to flourish as human persons. Wertheim attempts to show that it is not merely 'purely contingent' that men need other men in order to flourish. I do not think it would matter much if this were contingent, so long as it were true of all men, but as Wertheim's case for its truth is that it is true in a non-contingent, conceptual way, it is worth quoting his attempt to show that the claim is not contingent:

The need for (relationships of friendship and love) lies at the heart of the concept of a human person. The suggestion that our need for other men in this sense is purely contingent appears to involve either that what is envisaged is a non-human type of being or, what we would classify as an insane, neurotic or deprived human person. Neither of these alternatives goes any way to rebutting the claim that a man needs other men to flourish. (p.385).
It will be noticed that in this passage Wertheim asserts not that pride is incompatible with happiness, but that it is incompatible with human flourishing. We saw earlier, however, that in order to establish that immorality or vice is irrational, it is not sufficient to show that it is incompatible with flourishing, unless one cannot be truly happy except by flourishing. Is Wertheim using 'flourishing' in this sense? It seems plain that he is not. Even if we accept for the moment that an insane, neurotic or deprived person cannot be truly happy, what are we to make of the 'non-human type'. Wertheim's claim that there is a conceptual connection between pride and non-flourishing rests on a definition of 'human person' which excludes rational members of the biological species *homo sapiens* who do not need friendship and love. Whether such members exist is obviously a contingent matter. If they do exist, and were to ask Wertheim why they should not be proud, all he could tell them is that they are non-human types and will not flourish as a human unless they develop needs for friendship and love. This does not establish that it is irrational for them to refuse to attempt to develop such needs, and to remain

11) To be accurate, it should be said that people who show no need for others are usually classified by psychiatrists as psychopaths or sociopaths rather than as neurotics. The significance of this is that it is by no means universally accepted that psychopaths cannot lead perfectly happy lives. (See p. 524, I below)
proud, for they may well be happier flourishing in their own 'non-human' way. Worse still, Wertheim could be faced with a troublesome query from those who are human persons, as defined. Such people may believe that they would be happier if they suppressed their needs for friendship and love so far as is possible, and satisfied other needs and interests, which are incompatible with the satisfaction of the needs for friendship and love. It could not be shown on conceptual grounds that such a policy will not succeed. This means that it could be rational to cease being a 'human person', as Wertheim defines the term. So Wertheim's attempt to show by conceptual means that pride 'has internal implications for the agent of a kind that he cannot want for their own sakes' fails. (p. 386) One wonders why Wertheim should have attempted to make the connection a logical or conceptual one. Perhaps he felt that as a philosopher this was all he could do. If so, this is an indication of the restrictions of such an attitude to philosophy. So let us now investigate whether Wertheim's conclusion can be supported by empirical means. If men need friendship and love, in order to be happy then pride of the sort that cuts them off from relationships of friendship and love will not be in their interest. But do all men need friendship and love in order to be happy? As we shall see, this is a question that is relevant to the question
of whether other vices more important than pride, can be in one's interest. It therefore merits discussion at some length.

Psychologists have written a good deal that is relevant to the question of whether men can be happy without friendship and love. There is much that supports Wertheim's position. Most modern standard works which discuss human needs list the need for love and affection as one of the most fundamental human needs. (12) That deprivation of love and affection in infancy has deleterious effects is now generally accepted. We are, however, concerned with adults, or at least older children. What evidence is there that the need for love and friendship endures beyond childhood? Some support may come from this:

The investigations of K.E. Appel, F.E. Fiedler, C. Rogers, V.E. Frankl, H.J. Eysenck, G.W. Allport, R. Assaglioni, E. Strauss, and other psychiatrists and psychologists show that the main curative agent in the treatment of mental disorders is not so much the specific technique used by various schools of psychiatry as the establishment of the rapport of empathy, sympathy, kindness and mutual trust between the patient and the therapist and the placing of the patient in a 'social climate' free from inner and interhuman conflicts. (13)


This would seem to indicate that mental disorders are frequently associated with a lack of friendship and love. So some people do need friendship and love, in that it assists them in recovering their mental health. For such people, pride would appear to be harmful. But we are still far from being able to say that all or even most people need friendship and love, for only a few people ever require treatment for mental disorders. The fact that those who do have mental disorders need friendship and love does not in itself show that lack of friendship and love is a cause of mental illness.

Another psychologist, A.H. Maslow, is prepared to go further. He suggests that human beings have a hierarchy of needs. This hierarchy begins with the most basic physiological needs, such as the needs for food, vitamins and various minerals. Only when these needs are satisfied do 'second-level' needs emerge. According to Maslow these are the needs for safety and security. Again, only when these needs are fulfilled do 'third-level' needs arise. It is on this third-level that Maslow places the needs for love and affection. Maslow seems to reach a conclusion very like that of Wertheim when he puts forward the 'bold postulation' that:

...a man who is thwarted in any of his basic needs may fairly be envisaged as a sick man. This is a fair parallel to our designation as sick of the man who lacks vitamins or minerals. Who will say that a lack of love is less important than a lack of vitamins?
Since we know the pathogenic effects of love starvation, who is to say that we are invoking value questions in an unscientific way, any more than the physician who diagnoses and treats pellagra or scurvy? (14) Now the physician who not only diagnoses, but suggests that we cure, illnesses like scurvy is making a value-judgment. He judges the illness to be undesirable. In the case of scurvy, this value-judgment is unlikely to be contradicted, but is this true of the 'illness' that results from lack of love?

At this point, the extensive literature on 'psychopaths' becomes relevant. 'Psychopath' is a psychiatric term used to describe a person with certain characteristics, or with tendencies towards these characteristics. One of these very widely recognised characteristics is that the psychopath does not form deep relationships of friendship or love with other people. (15) This is certainly abnormal, but is it an illness that the psychopath would like cured? Is it in the interests of the psychopath that he become like the rest of us in this respect? Will he be happier if he does? At least one psychiatrist has been unable to answer these questions in the affirmative. S.L. Halleck writes:

The psychopath constantly seeks to be free of deep attachments to other people. He perceives the normal ties of affection, dependency, trust and love as fetters or traps which must be avoided at all costs.

14) A. Maslow, Motivation and Personality p. 105 cf. p. 348
15) A good survey of the literature on psychopathy up to 1956 is to be found in W. & J. McCord, Psychopathy and Delinquency, (New York, Grune & Stratton, 1956).
He seeks a type of freedom in which what he does, who he is and where he goes is independent of the appraisals of others... The charms of the psychopath, his bewildering comfort in stressful situations, and the observation that we at times envy, admire or even hate him, are clarified if we consider his behaviour in the light of a search for freedom. Alan Wheelis, in his novel The Seeker describes the intense feeling of pleasurable release experienced by a man who makes an almost conscious decision to cease to care about others. The major character of the book, a psychoanalyst, finds that he is then able to maintain a lucrative practice, gain professional acclaim through superficial accomplishments, overcome many of his anxieties and experience new success in seducing desirable women. The behaviour of the major character is clearly psychopathic. But what fun he has while suffering from this 'disease'! While we may personally deplore the behaviour of certain entertainers, business people or even psychiatrists who live excitingly above and beyond the codes most of us hold to be dear, we would be dishonest if we did not consider the possibility that 'these people have something.' [It is likely that] it is his apparent freedom. We can argue that this is an immoral freedom, that it is an unsatisfying freedom, or that it is basically an inhuman freedom. It is still a commodity so often lacking in the lives of most of us that it is highly coveted... From some frames of reference and in some value systems, psychopathy 'can't be all bad.' Obviously, for the psychopath himself his behaviour may be sustaining and gratifying. (16)

This indicates that to lack love is by no means as universally agreed to be undesirable as to lack vitamins. In fact, Maslow admits that psychopaths do not need love, and that in certain cultures or under certain extreme circumstances, the love needs may be destroyed. (p.131) This admission is surely incompatible with the equating of a lack of love with

16) S.L. Halleck, Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime, pp.103-8
a lack of vitamins.

Psychopaths themselves testify to their own belief that they are happier as they are. Halleck reports interviewing a psychopath who said:

'Most people seem to have to believe in something to survive. Me, I have learned to believe in myself. My goal is to make myself as happy as I possibly can and to experience life to the fullest... (after I stopped needing other people)... I started having fun. Since that time life has been easy, and I can be happy even though I am in prison.' (17)

William McCord describes meeting 'Joseph Borlov,' (a pseudonym) whom he calls 'a typical psychopath.' McCord quotes Borlov as saying:

'A lot has happened to me, a lot more will happen. But I enjoy living and I am always looking forward to each day. I like laughing and I've done a lot. I am essentially a clown at heart - but a happy one. I always take the bad with the good.' (18)

McCord, who refers to Borlov as having a mind which, although completely asocial, was 'capable of sparkling analysis,' gives no indication that he dissents from Borlov's picture of his happy life. The McCords' definition of a psychopath as 'an asocial, aggressive, highly impulsive person, who feels little or no guilt and is unable to form lasting bonds of affection with other human beings,' (19) contains nothing which entails that the psychopath suffers from his psychopathy. As

17) Halleck, op. cit., p. 105
18) W. & J. McCord, op. cit., p. 6
19) Ibid., p. 2
Halleck notes, all the traits listed in this definition, and in the American Psychiatric Association's description of 'sociopathy' are 'derived from the values and morals of our culture' — perhaps it would be better to say that they are derived from social values, and not from an individual's point of view. Applying the label 'sick' or 'psychopathic' creates the impression that the state so labelled is undesirable for the individual, but in the case of psychopathy it appears to be only society that necessarily suffers. The psychopath is often out of place in a mental hospital, and the clever psychopath is unlikely ever to be there. When we consider that psychiatric literature on psychopathy is inevitably based largely on those psychopaths who have failed, who have been convicted of offenses or have sought therapy,  

20) Halleck, op. cit. p.101 This is not to say, of course, that psychopaths are always or even often happy people. Frequently their aggressiveness and impulsiveness lead them into painful contact with society, and eventually to prison. The asociality of some psychopaths is pointless, and others are not prudent enough to take precautions against being detected. Naturally, such aggressive and impulsive imprudence figures prominently in most psychiatric studies, which are nearly always based on offenders who have been apprehended. But there is little doubt that, as Halleck suggests, a person may have certain psychopathic tendencies, such as a lack of a need for others, without being impulsive or imprudent. The McCords agree with this in that they regard guiltlessness and lovelessness as the crucial psychopathic traits. (op.cit. p.17.)

21) Halleck, op. cit., p.101
the possibility that to be psychopathic in some respects is a desirable state for some people becomes a probability. For this reason attempts to show that everyone needs relationships of love and friendship, that it is in everyone's interests to have such relationships, cannot be accepted. Thus we must reject, on the basis of the empirical evidence available to us, Wertheim's contention that pride 'has internal implications of a kind which the agent cannot want for their own sakes.' It may be true that most people do not want these implications, but some people may, and Wertheim has not shown that they are irrational.

Wertheim states that the considerations he advances about envy and pride are part of the much larger enterprise of showing that the traditional virtues and vices are intrinsically connected with the perfection of human capacities, the meeting of human needs and the development of human personality, and that, taken together, they are essentially related to the possibility of happiness for the moral agent. While the traditional vices are intrinsically connected with the frustration of human capacities, the corruption of human powers and the warping of human personality, and are linked in such a way that they destroy the possibility of happiness for the individual (pp. 375-6)

22) Maslow does have another reason for saying that the psychopath does not live a satisfactory life. This reason arises from Maslow's concept of self-actualisation, which we will consider shortly. But Maslow admits that this theory is, as yet, based on inadequate evidence. See p.172f below.
Wertheim acknowledges that his analysis of envy and pride cannot possibly prove this general thesis, but suggests that what he has done lends support to the belief that something analogous may be shown about the other vices. As we have seen that Wertheim's point holds only for envy, a vice which may be defined in terms of the unpleasant feeling of resentment, and not for another vice, which has no direct conceptual connection with anything unpleasant, we will not give much weight to this analogy. But another contemporary philosopher has argued for a similar view on some important virtues, including justice. This argument we must consider.

(v) JUSTICE AND HUMAN NATURE: FOOT

In her article 'Moral Beliefs' Phillipa Foot has argued that the virtues of prudence temperance, courage and justice are beneficial to those who possess them. The article has been widely discussed and criticised, but the discussion has centered on her naturalistic approach to the meaning of moral terms, rather than her belief in the advantages of virtue. Another point she makes in the article, namely her statement that 'if justice is not a good to the just man, moralists who recommend it as a virtue are perpetrating a fraud' (p.100) has also tended to distract

attention from her view that justice is advantageous. The statement just quoted seems to be based on the unargued assumption that whatever virtue is, it must be rational to be virtuous. (24) This assumption as should be clear by now cannot be supported. People who believe that it is only rational to act in their own interest may make moral judgments in which they treat their own interest impartially with those of others. There does not seem to be much difficulty in holding that justice is a virtue even though it is not necessarily rational to be just. In any case, Foot's account of the way in which justice is a good for the just man is independent of her belief that if it is not rational to be just, justice is no virtue.

Foot asserts first that prudence, temperance and courage necessarily benefit a man. Her arguments for this are extremely brief, but argument is scarcely needed for prudence and temperance anyway. It is because of what these

24) In her Introduction to Theories of Ethics, Foot states that she has abandoned this assumption, and with it the view that justice is necessarily a good to the just man. She admits that someone who takes no interest in the common good has no reason to be just. (p.9) She has thus completely abandoned the position discussed in the text. Nevertheless, the article remains the best recent statement of this traditional position that I have seen, and it has been cited by those with similar views (e.g. Wertheim, p.380). Hence I consider it merits discussion, whatever Foot's present views may be. Indeed, her own decision to print it unchanged indicates that Foot herself would still agree that it is worthy of discussion.
virtues are, she says, that they tend to benefit the agent — prudence quite obviously, and temperance insofar as one is not being temperate in shunning things which do one no harm, even when taken in large quantities. Whether courage benefits a man is less clear. Foot contends that the harm a man may suffer through being courageous is always incidental harm, dependent on some factor like underestimating a risk. (p.99) Is this so? A man who is courageous for a cause — for his country, his religion, or for the truth — may well be worse off because of his courage, without any such underestimation of risk. He may simply have judged the cause he believes in to be worth more than his own well-being, and have suffered accordingly in a way that a less courageous man would not have. It is only if courage is conceived as limited to facing something fearful for a good for oneself, rather than for some larger group or cause, that courage necessarily tends to be a good to the courageous man. But this is not the kind of courage that is characteristically praised as a virtue and feted in legend and the Reader's Digest.

It is with justice that Foot is chiefly concerned, and we too are more concerned with justice than with temperance or courage, for it is a more important aspect of morally good conduct. According to Foot, justice

...covers all those things owed to other people: it is under injustice that murder, theft and lying come, as
well as the withholding of what is owed for instance by parents to children and by children to parents, as well as the dealings which would be called unjust in everyday speech. (p.99)

Foot asserts that it is only if we consider particular just acts in isolation that difficulty arises about showing justice to be more profitable than injustice. Foot admits that individual acts of justice may lead a man to suffer, and even to die, in rare cases. Nevertheless she maintains that injustice cannot, in general, be profitable, and that any profit that does arise from it will be incidental. The basis of this conclusion is as follows. The unjust man must either admit to others that he is unjust, or else hide the fact that he does not recognise the rights of other people. If he admits it, everyone who has anything to do with him will be wary of his potential injustice towards them, will guard against it, and may well act unjustly towards him. If, as is more likely, the unjust man pretends that he is just, what then? Foot replies:

Philosophers often speak as if a man could thus hide himself even from those around him, but the supposition is doubtful, and in any case the price in vigilance would be colossal. If he lets even a few people see his true attitude, he must guard himself against them; if he lets no one into the secret he must always be careful, in case the least spontaneity betray him. Such facts are important because the need a man has for justice in dealings with other men depends on the fact that they are men and not inanimate objects or animals. If a man only needed other men as he needs household objects, and if men could be manipulated
like household objects, or beaten into a reliable submission like donkeys, the case would be different (p.103)

We will accept, for the moment, that this shows that under normal circumstances it is rational to be just. Does it follow that one must, rationally, die for justice? It seems madly paradoxical to say that self-interest dictates that one accept a sacrifice of this nature, yet Foot thinks that this is so. She says of the man who dies for justice:

For him it turns out that his justice brings disaster on him, and yet like anyone else he had good reason to be a just and not an unjust man. He could not have it both ways and while possessing the virtue of justice hold himself ready to be unjust should any great advantage accrue. The man who has the virtue of justice is not ready to do certain things, and if he is too easily tempted we shall say that he was ready after all. (p.104)

Unsurprisingly, Foot fails to prove her paradoxical position. The flaw in this passage may be located in the word 'had', in 'he had good reason'. If 'had' is taken to refer to some time in the past, before the man could foresee that he would ever get into a situation in which justice would bring disaster upon him, he may, like everyone else, have had good reason to be just. But if 'had' is intended to refer to the time immediately before he died, when he knew that justice would lead to his death, he could not possibly have had good reason, of the sort adduced by Foot, for continuing to be just. Before he knew the situation he would eventually be in,
all he would have had on which to base the decision whether to be a just man or an unjust man was the belief that for most men, justice is advantageous, and that so far as he knows, he does not differ relevantly from other men. But now that he is faced with death if he continues to be just, he is aware that his own case does differ relevantly from that of other men. One of the premises on which he based his decision to be just has turned out to be false. It would be the height of irrationality for him not to let his new knowledge of the consequence for him of being a just man influence the question of whether he should be just in the present circumstances. Imagine a man who, when young and in a good job, resolves that he will save ten dollars a week, no matter how strongly tempted he is to spend it, because most people regret it if they have nothing saved by the time they want to marry, yet are easily tempted to spend all their earnings. Unexpectedly, the young man loses his job, and has to live off an unemployment pension of exactly ten dollars per week. In accordance with his previous resolution, which like anyone else he had good reason to adopt, he continues to save ten dollars a week, and so starves to death. Such behaviour is sheer lunacy, yet it really does not differ from Foot's description of the man, who, because he once had good reason to believe that justice would benefit him, dies for justice.
Foot's case for being just unto death, as D.Z. Phillips has pointed out, is circular. The reason for being just is that being just is in one's interest, yet the reason for doing what is indisputably and irrevocably contrary to one's interest, with no possibility of compensation, is that it is just.

Such plausibility as Foot's argument possesses derives from her claim that if one is to be just at all, then one must be just unconditionally, no matter what befalls one. This notion has its origin, however, in an idea of justice which Foot rejects — the idea that if one is just one must be just in principle, that is, just for the sake of being just. This is incompatible with the view that one should be just because justice is advantageous for the just man. To adopt a policy of being just no matter what, while acknowledging that circumstances might arise in which one knows that one's interests will be irreparably harmed by persevering with justice, is to abandon the policy of doing what is in one's interest.

In any case, it can hardly be claimed that the unpleasant consequences Foot attributes to injustice will apply to the man who is just in all situations except when faced with death. Foot only discusses the case of a man who

commits injustice 'whenever the unjust act will bring him advantage.' (p.103) The case of a man who commits injustice only when it is necessary to save his life is very different. One cannot say of such a man that, if he makes his attitude known even those who combine with him will know that on a change of fortune, or a shift of affection, he may turn to plunder them, and he must be as wary of their treachery as they are of his.

It is absurd to say that there can only be trust and friendship amongst those who would die for justice. In the normal circumstances of life, the question of whether to die for justice does not arise. We may be uncertain as to whether those we like and trust would die for justice, without fearing that they will plunder us.

Foot's account of the connection between justice and happiness does not hold in the extreme case when justice leads to death. The most it can possibly show is that it is in our self-interest to adopt a policy of being just except when one's life is at stake. We must now ask if it does establish this. Is Foot right about the inevitable penalties of injustice? Do they outweigh the possible benefits in more or less normal cases? It will be helpful if we described a case that seems to go against this view, and then see what Foot could say about it. John Hospers, in Human Conduct, gives an example which he thinks indicates the falsity of the universal
There is a young bank clerk who decides, quite correctly, that he can embezzle $50,000 without his identity ever being known. He fears that he will be underpaid all his life if he doesn't embezzle, that life is slipping by without his ever enjoying the good things of this world; his fiancée will not marry him unless he can support her in the style to which she is accustomed; he wants to settle down with her in a suburban house, surround himself with books, stereo hi-fi set, and various objets d'art, and spend a pleasant life, combining culture with sociability; he never wants to commit a similar act again. He does just what he wanted to do; he buys a house, invests the remainder of the money wisely so as to enjoy a continued income from it, marries the girl and lives happily ever after; he doesn't worry about detection because he has arranged things so that no blame could fall on him; anyway he doesn't have a worrisome disposition and is not one to dwell on past misdeeds; he is blessed with a happy temperament, once his daily comforts are taken care of. The degree of happiness he now possesses would not have been possible had he not committed the immoral act. (26)

We are not told about the clerk's relations with other people after his embezzlement. Is it true that he either has to pay a colossal price in vigilance, hiding his secret, or else guard himself against those who know what he has done? If he elected to keep his embezzlement to himself, he would have to pay a certain price in vigilance, perhaps inventing some tale of a killing on the stock market or race track in order to explain his sudden wealth. But is this price such as to outweigh the gains he has made? If one is to maintain

26) op. cit., pp 180-1. Also quoted for the same purpose by K. Nielsen, 'Why should I be Moral?', Methodos vol. SV, (1959-60) p. 304
that it is, one must have something in mind over and above the simple fact of not telling others that one has embezzled money. Of course, to be continually unjust would necessitate greater vigilance - the more one has to keep secret, the harder it is not to let something slip. But our bank clerk is aware of this, and is content with what he now has; He has resolved to commit no more acts of injustice. There seems to be no reason for believing that a man of moderately strong will could not keep to such a resolve, and if this is so we may disregard Foot's claim that we should not consider particular acts in isolation, but rather the virtue of justice.\(^{(27)}\) Our bank clerk may not have the 'virtue of justice', but what consequences does this have, apart from those which stem from the only serious act of injustice he ever commits? Perhaps Foot thinks that even one hidden secret will harm the clerk's relations with other men. This is suggested by her statement that the need for justice depends on the fact that a man needs other men in a way that is different from the way he needs household objects. This can be interpreted as making the same sort of claim that we have already discussed in the context of Wertheim's article - the claim that man needs to have relationships of love and friendship with other men. Alternatively, it may be interpreted as referring to the fact that man often needs the

\(^{27)}\) Foot, *op. cit.*, p.104
co-operation of other men to achieve his own goals. In either case, the previous discussion of psychopaths counts against Foot's claim. The psychopath, as we have seen, does not need or want relationships with other men. As one such person said to Halleck:

'I can talk to people, use them and enjoy them, but I can't let them mean anything to me.' (28)

The McCords agree that the psychopath 'treats people as he does objects: as means for his own pleasure'. (29) Moreover the psychopath is usually extraordinarily successful in using people in this way. There are many recorded instances of psychopaths who, when caught by their employer or some other party in the act of stealing or embezzling, have talked their intended victim into 'giving them one more chance' by omitting to report the matter to the police. Still more surprising is the way they persuade courts and parole boards to give them chance after chance. They also manage to acquire such a hold over their wives and girlfriends that the women are ready to take them back even after being abominably treated time after time. (30) This ability to manipulate the very people one has treated unjustly is no doubt partly due to the attractive

28) Halleck, op. cit. p.106
29) McCord, op. cit. p. 13
30) Halleck, op. cit. pp. 102, 104; M.S.Guttmacher & H.Weihofen, Psychiatry & The Law, (New York, Norton, 1952) p.91
appearance and great personal charm which many psychopaths possess. Halleck says that the psychopath is 'often a charming and exciting person', and says of the person who made the statement just quoted:

He entered the interview room with poise and dignity, an unusually handsome individual who, although dressed in prison garb, managed to be neater and better groomed than anyone else in the room. He stated that he was pleased to have the opportunity to talk to a group of intelligent men and throughout the interview showed an ease which disturbed the onlookers. (31)

There is a striking similarity in McCord's description of the man he calls Borlov:

He was a handsome man, slender, wavy-haired, and always immaculately garbed in the prison dress. (32)

and McCord describes another typical psychopath in this way:

Throughout our interview he talked freely, controlling the situation with a glib stream of sophisticated conversation. His business suit, his conservative tie, and his clipped moustache proclaimed him as a successful young man 'heading for the top.' (33)

It would appear, then, that some people can treat others like household objects, and yet get what they want from the people they treat in this way. So our embezzler may not suffer because of his need for other men. It might also be noted that Hospers describes him as desiring 'sociability', not friendship.

31) Halleck, op cit., pp. 104-5
32) McCord, op. cit., p.4
Perhaps a different criticism will be made of Hospers's example. Is the clerk likely to be so happy in his new life? Hospers has given us a man with conventional goals: the suburban house, the pleasant life of culture and sociability, the fiancée who would not marry him until he had money. It is understandable that Hospers should describe a man with these goals, for these are the things which money can provide, and money is a most convenient target for dishonesty and injustice. But is it the way to happiness? Hospers has chosen his ground cautiously, however, for he claims not that the clerk will become ideally happy, but that he will be happier than he would have been had he remained an honest bank clerk. It is, we may feel, the fault of our social and economic system that the lives of so many must be dull and unstimulating, that the best they can hope for is the sort of life the bank clerk achieves by his embezzlement, but this is the way things are, and under these circumstances can it be denied that successful embezzlement may improve one's lot?

While it must, I think, be granted that the clerk could become happier through injustice than he had been before, it might be said that still greater happiness, happiness of the sort which someone with psychopathic tendencies, no matter how happy he thinks he is, can never experience, could be achieved by a just life. This raises the
question of the nature of happiness, and the way in which happiness is best achieved. To explicate the notion of happiness in detail is, once again, beyond the scope of this thesis. But I think that the ordinary, everyday meaning of happiness is sufficiently unproblematical to enable us to say that it is at least not obvious that the degree of happiness which may be achieved by a person who does not care for his fellow-men need be less than that which may be achieved by one who is not cut off from others in this way. In any case, even if it is true that the psychopath who can have no meaningful relations with other men is precluded from reaching the highest degree of happiness possible for man, this does not prove that justice is necessary for happiness. For injustice (unlike the kind of pride described by Wertheim) need not cut one off from all men. The bank clerk may be able to take his wife into his confidence, and his solitary unjust act may not hinder them from having as satisfactory and meaningful a relationship as any other couple. Nor is it apparent that the clerk's relations with his friends will necessarily be adversely affected, whether he takes them into his confidence or not. The unjust man might have mildly psychopathic tendencies, which reduce his need for affectionate relationships with more than a few people, but this need not prevent him from having any satisfactory relationships at all. The assertion that this kind of mildly psychopathic state, in
which a man has feelings of love, affection, sympathy and benevolence only for a very restricted number of people, is incompatible with true happiness can only carry convictions if made on the basis of some sort of theory as to how happiness is best achieved. We shall now proceed to consider a psychological theory which does imply that the fullest form of happiness cannot be achieved in the manner suggested by Hosper's example. But before doing so, we should conclude our discussion of the considerations put forward by Foot. She has failed to show that it is always in a man's interest to be just. As with Wertheim, it is the attempt to adduce arguments which apply universally which brings about the refutation of her position. Foot feels that it is essential that there be a reason for being just which applies to all men in all circumstances. It is because of this that she rejects the idea of bringing the general practice of justice under the motive of universal benevolence. She says that many people do not have any desire for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. She refers to the 'thousand tough characters' who will be able to say that they have been given no reason for being just, and the many others who would say the same if they were not too timid or stupid to question the accepted code of behaviour. (34) Unfortunately, her own account is no more water-tight.

34) Foot, op. cit., p.102
(vi) BASIC NEEDS AND SELF—ACTUALIZATION: MASLOW

We have now discussed two recent attempts to show that certain vices harm a man, and that their opposites are likely to benefit him. Neither of these attempts has been entirely successful. We have not discussed the writings of the great philosophers of the past on this issue. As I said earlier, Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Butler to a certain extent, and Shaftesbury have all attempted to show that virtue benefits the individual by giving an account of man's nature which allows the conclusion that the happiest life for the individual is to be reached through virtuous behaviour. Other writers, on examining man's nature, have found the motive for moral behaviour in benevolent or sympathetic desires, or in the need to avoid the reproaches of one's conscience. I do not intend to discuss any of these writers individually, despite their historic importance. I think their contemporary philosophical significance has been adequately summed up by Maslow in this brief passage:

Humanists for thousands of years have attempted to construct a naturalistic, psychological value system that could be derived from man's own nature, without the necessity of recourse to authority outside the human being himself. Many such theories have been offered throughout history... most of them rested on psychological assumptions of one sort or another. Today practically all of these can be shown, in the light of recently acquired knowledge, to be false, inadequate, incomplete, or in some other way lacking.

This is a sweeping generalization, admittedly, but I think it
is justified. All the writers in this category were 'armchair psychologists', and armchair psychology is no longer good enough. If their conclusions have not been disproved, they have at least been shown to be in need of empirical confirmation, which none of the writers of the past provide. Thus far one can agree with Maslow. The big question is whether one can agree with him when he goes on to say:

But it is my belief that developments in the science and art of psychology, in the last few decades, make it possible for us for the first time to feel confident that this age-old hope may be fulfilled if only we work hard enough. We know how to criticize the old theories, we know, even though dimly, the shape of the theories to come, and most of all, we know where to look and what to do in order to fill in the gaps in knowledge that will permit us to answer the age-old questions, 'What is the good life? What is the good man? How can people be taught to desire and prefer the good life? How ought children to be brought up to be sound adults?,' etc.' (35)

Before considering Maslow's grounds for his belief that the ancient questions can at last be answered, it will be well to consider once again the connection between this kind of answer to 'Why should I be moral?' and naturalistic theories of ethics, for Maslow confuses these issues quite badly. Maslow believes that psychological researches can answer ultimate moral questions such as 'What is the good life?' He believes he can construct, empirically, a value system. He attempts to do so in a way which shows that he has failed to appreciate the problems involved in moving from facts to

35) A. Maslow, 'psychological Data and Value Theory', in Maslow (ed.) New Knowledge in Human Values, p. 119
values. This may be illustrated by the following passage:

If it is objected by the technical philosopher, 'How can you prove that it is better to be happy than unhappy?' even this question can be answered empirically, for if we observe human beings under sufficiently wide conditions, we discover that they, they themselves, not the observer, choose spontaneously to be happy rather than unhappy, comfortable rather than pained, serene rather than anxious. In a word, human beings choose health rather than illness, all other things being equal (with the one proviso that they choose for themselves and that the conditions be of a kind that will be discussed later). (36)

Maslow's answer to the 'technical philosopher' is of course no answer at all. Whatever other ways of going from facts to values may be possible, this one is not. One cannot prove that something is better by showing that it is always preferred. To do so is to make the same sort of fallacy J.S. Mill incurred when he argued that because everyone does desire happiness, happiness is desirable. The fact that everyone does choose something does not show that they should choose it, that it is good that they choose it. If everyone chose to torture animals to death in the cruelest possible manner, this would not mean that it was better that they do so than that they not molest animals. Or if, as Hobbes has been taken as saying, everyone would, if they were free to choose without fear of punishment, make war, every man against every other man, this would not show that it is better for them to do so. Hobbes certainly thought just the opposite,

36) Motivation and Personality . p343
and was prepared to go to extreme lengths to stop such a state of war. If it so happens that under the conditions Maslow specifies, people choose something that is bad, that cannot be accepted from an impartial point of view, that hinders the efforts of everyone else to reach their own goals, then we must attempt to change the conditions in order that people choose differently. I have quoted this passage from Maslow to show, not that Maslow's theories, insofar as they apply to our problem, are mistaken, but that for the purposes of this thesis, the empirically-based value theory Maslow constructs is irrelevant and better ignored. Maslow's psychological theories, even if entirely correct, could not establish any ultimate normative ethical judgments, for they are concerned with what is best from the individual's point of view, and not with what can be impartially accepted. What they may be able to establish, however, is that people who behave in certain specifiable ways, people with certain specifiable character traits, are likely to be happy, whereas people who behave in opposite ways and have opposite character traits will not be happy. If one judges these ways of behaving, once they have been specified, as morally good, and if one judges these character traits, once they have been specified, as virtues, then one may regard Maslow's theories as attempts to show that morally good behaviour and a
virtuous character are likely to lead to happiness, whereas immoral behaviour and a vicious character will not lead to happiness. If the theories are then successful, one could rely on the point Maslow makes in the passage just quoted, that people do in fact choose to be happy rather than unhappy, to show that one has established a conclusion that will motivate people towards acting morally and being virtuous. Alternatively, one can claim to have established that acting morally is in one's interest, and hence that it is rational to be moral.

All this may not be sufficiently clear. Let us make it concrete. Assume that, as Maslow says, actions which promote the happiness of others, and the kind of character which is associated with such actions, are likely to lead to happiness for the agent; and that actions which cause pain and suffering to others, and the kind of character which is associated with the performance of such actions, will not lead to happiness for the agent. This does not, in itself, prove, as Maslow thinks, that making others happy is morally good, and causing suffering to others is morally bad. But the connection between making others happy and making oneself happy can be used to provide a possible answer to 'Why should I be moral?'. I say 'a possible answer' because the question is only answered if the questioner accepts that it is morally good to make others happy, and morally bad to cause them
suffering. Thus our method of applying Maslow's theories is the same as the method used with Wertheim and Foot. (37)

Admittedly the present method of answering 'Why should I be moral?' cannot answer the question in a foolproof manner, a manner which does not allow in theory the reply 'But that is not what I take to be morally good!' Without establishing normative judgments (something it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to do, even if it could be done) this theoretical loop-hole cannot be closed by the method we are using. It might, however, be possible to make the loop-hole of little practical significance by proving a connection between happiness for the agent and those types of action or traits of character that are usually held to be immoral. It would, I think, be widely agreed that the following list of diverse character traits includes the most important virtues:

- kindness
- unselfishness
- magnanimity
- self-respect
- tolerance
- respect for others
- genuineness
- sympathy
- generosity
- self-reliance
- friendliness
- brotherly love
- honesty
- straightforwardness

All I claim for this list is that a demonstration that these character traits are necessary for the happiness of the agent

37) See pp. 45-6, above
would go far towards answering 'Why should I be moral?' Such a demonstration would answer the question in the hypothetical manner already mentioned: if you judge these character traits to include the chief virtues, the virtues which give rise to all or most morally good actions, then you have an answer to 'Why should I be moral?' which is applicable for these chief virtues, and for the morally good actions which flow from them. The answer is hypothetical in theory, but in practice I think it would answer the question as it would be asked by most people today.

Can it possibly be the case that those character traits listed above are all necessary for the happiness of the agent? Everyday examples would seem to indicate that this is not so. The example of the bank clerk suggests that honesty may be associated with less happiness than dishonesty. Maslow thinks differently. All the character traits I have listed are taken from a list he gives, headed 'Some Phenomena That Are In Large Part Determined By Basic Need Gratification.' (38) Maslow asserts that a life in which one's basic needs are gratified is a life which embodies the major virtues. Moreover Maslow holds that the person whose basic needs are gratified is a healthy, contented, self-developing, self-fulfilling person with a greater possibility of joy, delight, 

38) Motivation and Personality pp.120-122
positive emotional life, and happiness, while a person whose basic needs are not gratified is frustrated and likely to be neurotic. This is the essence of Maslow's psychological theory which I suggest would, if sound, serve as an answer to 'Why should I be moral?' In Maslow's own words:

We can now certainly assert that at least a reasonable, theoretical and empirical case has been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or need for, growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization, or psychological health or maturation, and specifically as growth towards each and all of the sub-aspects of self-actualization. That is to say, the human being has within him a pressure (among other pressures) toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good, and a lot else. That is, the human being is so constructed that he presses towards fuller and fuller being and this means pressing toward what most people would call good values, toward serenity, kindness, courage, knowledge, honesty, love, unselfishness, and goodness..... In addition, there are subjective confirmations or reinforcements of self-actualization or of good growth toward it. These are the feelings of zest in living, of happiness or euphoria, of serenity, of joy, of calmness, of responsibility, of confidence in one's ability to handle stresses, anxieties and problems. The subjective signs of self-betrayal, of fixation, of regression, and of living by fear rather than by growth are such feelings as anxiety, despair, boredom, inability to enjoy, intrinsic guilt, intrinsic shame, aimlessness, feelings of emptiness, of lack of identity, etc. (38)

38) 'Psychological Data and Value Theory', op. cit., pp125-7. Other psychologists have put forward similar views, especially Erich Fromm in Man for Himself (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1948). I have chosen to discuss in detail the views of Maslow, and not of Fromm, because Maslow offers a fuller theoretical and empirical argument for his position, while Fromm tends just to state his views as if they were facts, without offering any empirical proof for them.
In *Motivation and Personality* this theory is more fully developed. As we have seen, Maslow asserts that human beings have basic needs, which are sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious. These needs are at different levels. The lowest are the purely physiological needs. If these are unsatisfied, all other needs are pushed into the background, and are unimportant. But when the physiological needs are satisfied, other, higher needs emerge. The next needs to emerge are the safety needs - the desires for safety from destructive forces, threats of injury and disruption of satisfying routines. When physiological and safety needs are satisfied, belongingness and love needs are felt. The individual needs to belong in a group of some sort, and hungers for affectionate relations. Maslow stresses that the love needs involve both giving and receiving love. If all these needs are gratified, there arises a need for esteem, which includes both the esteem of others and self-esteem. But even when all these needs are satisfied, Maslow holds, the individual may (perhaps always will) feel discontented and restless unless he is doing what he is most fitted for. This Maslow terms the need for self-actualization, which he contends is the highest need.

39) The following points are taken mainly from Chapters 5-7, and Chapter 17.
It is important to note that these needs are not inculcated needs, on Maslow's view. He terms them 'instinctoid', suggesting that they are 'innately given to at least some appreciable degree'. The hereditary component he sees as 'simple conative lack, tied to no intrinsic goal-achieving behaviour, as blind directionless demands'. As for the question of whether the hierarchy of needs is universal:

No claim is made yet that it is ultimate or universal for all cultures. The claim is made only that it is relatively more ultimate, more universal, more basic than the superficial conscious desires, and makes a closer approach to common human characteristics. Basic needs are more common human than superficial desires or behaviours. (sic) (p. 102)

Maslow's instinct theory differs from traditional ideas of instinct in that he does not think all instincts are powerful, uncontrollable or unsuppressible. The higher instinctoid needs, he says, are weak and easily masked, modified or even suppressed by habits, suggestions, parental and cultural pressures. Yet they persist and demand gratification insofar as their frustration produces pathological consequences.

The instinctoid nature of the needs is important for our purposes, for if they were simply inculcated needs which could be suppressed without harmful consequences to the agent, such suppression would be a rational alternative to moral behaviour. This point constitutes a serious weakness in the views of those writers - Hume, Shaftesbury, Butler, Bentham
and Mill—who sought to answer the question of why people are moral by pointing to unselfish desires such as sympathy, generosity and benevolence. As we have already seen, this may provide a motive for moral behaviour, but not a rational justification, for if I ask why I should not steal from my neighbour and receive the reply that because I sympathise with my neighbour I will not want to steal from him, it may be possible for me to attempt to harden my nature, to suppress my sympathetic urges. If I want my neighbour's goods enough, this may be a rational course of action. Past writers have never been able to show why this course is not rational. Maslow's views, however, could provide a reason why it is not rational to attempt to suppress sympathetic desires: the reason that sympathetic desires are part of a need to love and be loved, a need which cannot (at least, not after infancy) be suppressed, a need which is only fully gratified if it extends to all mankind, and which, if not gratified, will produce pathological consequences such as neurosis, which the agent himself would regard as undesirable.

It may have been noticed that Maslow's view does not provide a justification for kindness, unselfishness and so on under all circumstances. Physiological needs, Maslow holds, must be satisfied before other needs arise, and so the man who is wondering whether to steal bread, which he needs be-
cause he is really hungry, cannot be told that he is frustrat-
ing other, higher needs. But if it is possible to satisfy
physiological needs in a manner which allows the satisfac-
tion of higher needs as well, this is the rational method to adopt,
because the fullest happiness is possible only when all needs
are gratified. Thus it is only in a society in which everyone
could satisfy his physiological needs in a manner compatible
with kindness, sympathy and honesty, that Maslow's theory
would provide a reason for everyone acting in a kindly,
sympathetic and honest manner; yet even in our society few
immoral acts are motivated by desires to satisfy physiological
needs, and it could perhaps be argued that dishonest or
unkind acts which are necessary to satisfy needs such as
hunger are not immoral.

A more serious doubt about the universal application
of Maslow's theory arises because of Maslow's reluctance to
claim that the basic needs are completely universal, a reluc-
tance which is made necessary by Maslow's admission that the
psychopath, through lack of love in infancy, has 'lost forever
the desire and ability to give and receive affection'.
(pp.98-9) So any answer to the question of why one should be
moral which is derived from the love needs will not be applic-
able to psychopaths. On the other hand, if Maslow is correct
in saying that it is in infancy that the psychopathic character
is formed, this has no relevance for anyone who does not
happen to be a psychopath. One cannot, as did the protagonist in the novel referred to above, make a decision to cease caring about others (40) - or rather, if one does make such a decision, one will find that one's love needs persist, and that their frustration produces neurotic symptoms and leads to unhappiness.

The next question is this: how are the virtues I have taken from Maslow's list of 'Phenomena That Are In Large Part Determined By Basic Need Gratification' connected with the needs which he alleges we have? This is, unfortunately, obscure. There is an obvious connection between self-respect and the esteem needs, since the esteem needs include the need for self-esteem, but little else is obvious. What else do the esteem needs dictate? Insofar as the esteem of others is concerned, can it not be obtained by a false reputation for good conduct as well as by good conduct itself? In some societies esteem could be obtained by doing acts which are the antithesis of morality and of kindness and respect for others. For example, in Nazi Germany it was possible to get esteem by beating Jews. In our society, esteem is often obtained by non-moral activities, such as prowess on the football field. As for self-esteem, Maslow says nothing which prevents us from believing that this may be assured by being

40) See p. 153, above
particularly successful at obtaining one's goals, whatever these goals may be. The psychopaths described by Halleck and McCord certainly do not appear to be lacking in self-esteem. What about the love needs? If, as Maslow says, these needs include both giving and receiving love, it is obvious that they will lead towards kindness, sympathy and other related traits. But here one must ask: kindness towards whom? sympathy with whom? For if the belongingness and love needs can be satisfied by loving and being loved by a limited number of people, then they do not lead to kindness and sympathy for all, to brotherly love, tolerance and respect for others, which they would have to do if they are to be moral virtues and are to lead to morally good action in more than a very limited number of cases. Maslow admits that these general traits are not directly related to the satisfaction of the needs. Affectionateness is a direct consequence of the love needs, and self-respect is a direct consequence of the esteem needs, but kindliness, generosity, unselfishness and the like are, Maslow says, 'one step removed'. He says they 'seem to be consequences of the consequences, by-products of general need gratification, i.e. of generally improving psychological life condition.' (p.114) Elsewhere he asserts that 'People who have enough basic satisfaction to look for love and respect (rather than just food
and safety) tend to develop such qualities as loyalty, friendliness, and civic consciousness....' (p.149) But no evidence for this is given. These appear to be the only statements in which any attempt is made to show the link between the phenomena alleged to be determined by the basic need gratification, and the basic need gratification itself. It is woefully inadequate, and hardly an advance on the unscientific armchair philosopher-psychologists of the past whom Maslow has criticised.

Maslow does, however, have another basic need to fall back on: the alleged need for self-actualization. As this is the highest of the hierarchy of needs, and one which only emerges after all lower needs have been gratified, to describe a self-actualizing person is to describe a person, all of whose basic needs are gratified. Maslow sometimes traces the character traits listed to self-actualization, and sometimes to full gratification of needs itself. To take first the consequences of full gratification as such, Maslow argues that just as frustration is now accepted as one determiner of hostility, so it can be accepted that the opposite of frustration, that is, gratification, produces the opposite of hostility, that is, friendliness. (p.111)

But this is again an a priori argument, and it does not carry much conviction. One would certainly expect that gratification should produce an absence of hostility, insofar as
hostility is determined by frustration, but it is going beyond this to say that it will produce not the absence but the opposite of hostility. Hunger, Maslow says in another context (p.149) involves selfishness, but does the satisfaction of hunger produce unselfishness? Maslow advances no other arguments from the consequences of gratification as such.

In a passage quoted earlier from another work, Maslow made self-actualization the source of various virtues, such as kindness, courage, honesty, unselfishness and even 'goodness'.(41) In Motivation and Personality he also ultimately relies on self-actualization. But although Maslow gives more evidence for a connection between self-actualization and these virtues than he gives for a connection between the gratification of other needs and the virtues, the evidence is still most unsatisfactory. The only support for a connection between self-actualization and virtue is a study Maslow has done of allegedly self-actualizing people. (Ch.12) This study was based on just 5 living people who were said to be truly self-actualizing, plus 8 historical self-actualizing people, as well as 38 partial, potential or possible cases of self-actualizing people, 13 of whom were again historical.

41) See p.174, above. In making self-actualization (which is equivalent to self-realization) the ground for harmonizing virtue and self-interest, Maslow is in the tradition of philosophers such as Spinoza and Bradley.
Selection of subjects was on the basis of absence of 'neurosis, psychopathic personality, psychosis or strong tendencies in these directions' and positive evidence of self-actualization, that is, full use and exploitation of talents, capacities, potentialities etc. The negative criterion biases the sample towards loving, considerate people by the exclusion of psychopathic personalities. Psychopathy, as we have seen, is not a mental illness in the sense in which neurosis is, for it need not involve suffering for the individual. Psychopathy is, as the McCords note, 'almost the antithesis of neurosis.' A study of military criminals has shown that psychopathic criminals have the least neurotic tendencies (42). As for the positive criteria, the decision as to whether a subject fulfilled them seems to have been a subjective decision by Maslow and his colleagues. There was apparently no attempt to ensure an absence of bias in the original field from which the final subjects were screened: the subjects came from college students and friends of the researchers, with no search for self-actualizing people in any other milieu. Maslow does not pretend that his study is methodologically sound. He makes apologies to 'those who insist on conventional reliability, validity, sampling etc.' (p. 200) He feels publication of the results

42) W. & J. McCord, op. cit., p. 40
is nevertheless justified because the problem is important and no better methods are possible at present. It is hard to see why less subjective methods of sampling could not have been employed. In any case, this is the evidence on which Maslow's claim that there is 'a reasonable, theoretical and empirical case' for a human tendency to self-actualization, which involves virtuous behaviour, must largely rest.

Maslow did find that the subjects of his study were kindly people, that 'they have for human beings in general a deep feeling of identification, sympathy and affection...' 'they love or rather have compassion for all mankind,' they have 'a certain quantum of respect for any human being just because he is a human individual....' Moreover Maslow found that his subjects were 'strongly ethical, they have definite moral standards, they do right and do not do wrong,' although their standards of right and wrong are not the conventional ones. In addition, the subjects studied were found to lead lives that we might well agree to call particularly happy and fulfilling. Among the features Maslow found which tend towards this conclusion are: lack of overriding and unreal guilt, crippling shame or severe anxiety; acceptance of their own nature; hearty appetite, enjoyment without shame

43) This point could provide a total answer to our question, not merely an answer that is hypothetical in the sense specified on p.176-7, above.
or apology; sound sleep; enjoyment of sex lives without unnecessary inhibition; spontaneous and natural behaviour; serene and calm reaction to personal misfortune; independence of the good opinion and even affection of others; capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life with awe, pleasure and wonder; deeper and more profound personal relationships; creativity; peculiarly comfortable relations with reality; continual character growth; basically satisfied condition. On the basis of factors such as these, some of which are explained in more detail and some of which are left obscure, Maslow speaks of the self-actualizing person as one who is happy, and as one who when 'doing his duty and being virtuous is simultaneously seeking his pleasure and being happy.' One could no doubt object to Maslow's concept of happiness, which is nowhere fully or consistently worked out. But philosophers have spent much time discussing the concept of happiness without arriving at any specification which is reasonably precise and yet plausible. I think we may accept Maslow's word that the people he terms self-actualizing do lead particularly happy lives, desirable lives from an individual as well as an impartial point of view. It is in one's interest to lead a life which has at least some of the features of the life of the self-actualizing person.
But what does the fact that the persons Maslow examined led lives of this sort really prove? Even if we do not 'insist on conventional reliability', it proves very little. No evidence is presented in support of the belief that the virtues possessed by these people, their 'strongly ethical' nature, their kindness and respect for others, are intrinsically connected with self-actualization. Insofar as these virtuous traits are simply the gratification of basic needs other than self-actualization, whatever evidence there is that human beings have such needs may be used to support the belief that their gratification is part of self-actualization, but we have seen that Maslow does very little to connect virtues with basic need gratification in itself. Insofar as the traits go beyond what is strictly necessary for such gratification, the basic needs cannot be invoked. Without a proper, objectively based study of both self-actualizing and non-self-actualizing people, it is impossible to determine which of the traits Maslow noted are essential to self-actualization and to the happy life Maslow's subjects lead, and which are inessential. It would seem that many psychopaths experience most of the aspects of the life of the self-actualizing person which make for happiness, including lack of guilt, shame and anxiety (more complete lack than with Maslow's subjects) acceptance of own nature, sound sleep, enjoyment of sex life without inhibitions, serene and calm
reaction to personal misfortune, independence of good opinion and affection of others (again more complete), perhaps creativity, and a basically satisfied condition. With the exception of the fact that he needs at times, to put on a false front in order to deceive others, and his lack of personal relationships, the psychopath seems to have much of what the self-actualizing person has. Instead of being happy and seeking his pleasure in doing his duty, the psychopath is happy and seeks pleasure in acting without any concern for his duty. Considering, once again, that the psychopaths studied are almost invariably those who have been unsuccessful in their activities, have been too impulsive, too aggressive, too stupid or very unlucky, and have consequently been caught, the reports of their attitude to life are impressive. It is worth recalling the remark Borlov made to McCord while he was in prison: 'I enjoy living and I am always looking forward to each day.' This provides grounds for believing that the possibilities of happiness for an intelligent person with some mild psychopathic tendencies are as good as those for people who are kind, loving and virtuous. Maslow's study, because it excludes all those with any psychopathic tendencies, cannot be used to oppose this belief. Nor does Maslow

44) Some writers have believed that the psychopath may be highly creative. Cf. Sir David Henderson, Psychopathic States (New York, Norton 1939). The McCords disagree: op. cit., pp.26-7.
provide evidence to show that the most important source of happiness in the life of a self-actualizing person which the psychopath lacks, namely the ability to have deep personal relationships, could not be possessed without necessarily having feelings of kindness and respect to all men. As for the need to deceive others - many psychopaths seem to enjoy doing so, and are proud of their skill. Thus Maslow proves neither that self-actualization always involves acting in a virtuous way, nor that one cannot obtain the 'subjective reinforcements', that is, the benefits of self-actualization without being self-actualizing as Maslow defines the term.

For these reasons we must answer the question raised earlier, namely the question of how the virtues that Maslow alleges are in large part determined by basic need gratification are in fact related to the needs which he alleges men have, by saying that this relationship has not been established. The evidence for it is so weak that we cannot even say it is probable. This means that we cannot demonstrate by means of Maslow's theories that the major virtues are necessary for the true happiness of the agent, for even if we accept Maslow's hierarchy of needs, it would seem that they can be gratified in ways which do not involve morally good action.

Our discussion of Maslow has been conducted along internal lines, and on the adequacy of his theories for
answering our question. We have not considered outside evidence, evidence provided by other views of man's nature which are opposed to the views of Maslow. In view of the conclusions we have reached on internal grounds, it is not really necessary to do so. We may merely note that Maslow's theory is quite opposed to the Freudian view that man is innately aggressive and selfishly pleasure-seeking in his basic desires, that morality is grounded on the internalization of the demands of parents and society, and hence that morality frustrates rather than gratifies basic desires. (45) There is also some evidence based on the work of naturalists, ethologists, and anthropologists which goes against Maslow's view, although the connection between animal behaviour, and even the behaviour of primitive man, with the behaviour of modern man must always introduce some element of doubt into theories of the nature of man based on such evidence. (46) Arthur Koestler has argued that there is neurological evidence for some sort of universal human mental disorder. His theory also has implications contrary to the theory Maslow suggests. (47)

45) See especially S. Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents.  
46) For a highly dramatic and considerably over-stated account of this kind of evidence and the conclusions which may be drawn from it, see Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (1967 New York, Dell), which contains a bibliography.  
Instead of looking at these controversial and multifarious theories, let us look at one particular study which does not seek to argue for a theory of the nature of man, but merely to discover some facts. It is relevant not only to our discussion of Maslow, but also to our discussion of Wertheim and Foot – in fact, to the whole question of whether moral people are happier or mentally healthier than immoral people.

(vii) AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

Under the sponsorship of the Harvard Law School, and the direction of two noted criminologists, Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, a large research team compared 500 juvenile delinquents with 500 non-delinquent children, the groups being carefully matched in age, intelligence, national origin and residence in under-privileged neighbourhoods. (48) The study took ten years and is, to the best of my knowledge, the only such large-scale comparative study. It is universally recognised as an outstanding piece of research. Although it has, like all leading studies, been subjected to a certain amount of criticism, most of this criticism has related to

aspects which do not concern us.\(^{(49)}\)

It is of course true that questions about moral and immoral conduct can never be fully answered by examination of criminal and non-criminal conduct. Some criminal behaviour may not be immoral (for example, stealing food for a starving sister) while much immoral behaviour is not criminal. Some non-criminals may be classified as such only because they have not been detected in their criminal activities. Nevertheless the Glueck study is useful for our purposes. The Glueck define delinquency as 'repeated acts of a kind which, when committed by persons beyond the statutory juvenile age of sixteen are punishable as crimes...' (p.13) The most common offences were larceny, burglary, violation of probation and offences of a vandalistic nature such as malicious injury to property. The delinquents had an average of 3.66 court appearances. An attempt was made to ensure that the control

\(^{(49)}\) For example, the drawing of causal conclusions from the data presented. (Cf. T. Hirschi & H. C. Selvin, Delinquency Research (New York, Free Press 1967), passim.) One criticism which could render the study less useful for our purposes, however, is that all the delinquents in the study had been apprehended, and most of them had served short periods in institutions. A finding that delinquents are less happy than non-delinquents might therefore be attributable to this factor, which is not a necessary concommitant of immorality. On the other hand, a finding that delinquents are just as happy as non-delinquents is not likely to be disputed on this ground. Bearing in mind therefore, that the study is somewhat weighted against such a conclusion, we may use the Glueck's findings.
The character, personality structure and temperament of the subjects were examined by means of Rorschach Tests and Psychiatric interviews. The Rorschach analysts and psychiatrists were not aware which of the subjects they were examining were delinquents and which non-delinquents. The results relevant to the happiness and mental health of the subjects are briefly summarised below. Where differences between groups are noted, they are statistically significant.
Firstly, the results of the Rorscharch Tests (Ch.XVIII): (95.7% : 89.2%) A marked degree of a generalized, vague sense of insecurity or anxiety was present in more non—delinquents than delinquents (95.7% : 89.2%). A more severe state of insecurity and/or anxiety, referred to as a neurotic feeling, also had a higher incidence among non—delinquents than delinquents (11.5% : 3.5%).

A feeling of not being loved or wanted, described as 'very often repressed, has become unconscious and may lead to an exaggerated need for affection, recognition, success and so on. It is the feeling that one is not accepted, not included, or even rejected by others. It is the feeling of a lack of positive human relationship to a particular person or group...' was present to a marked degree among 88% of non—delinquents, but only 84.3% of delinquents, despite an earlier finding that there is in fact greater parental affection on the part of the parents of the non—delinquents.

A feeling of helplessness, described as a 'particularly frequent and important, and very often unconscious kind of insecurity feeling, in which the individual feels that he cannot do or change or influence anything, especially with regard to the course of his own life' was present to a
marked degree in a considerably greater proportion of non-delinquents (35.7% : 23.3%)

Fear of failure was likewise found to be more characteristic of non-delinquents, being markedly evident in the personality-character of 34.9% of them, compared with 23.1% of the delinquents.

Feelings of not being recognized or appreciated, and feelings of resentment, on the other hand, were present to a marked degree among considerably more delinquents than non-delinquents, the ratio in the case of the former feeling being 21.1% : 13.1%, and in the case of the latter feeling 49.7% : 30.8%. Attitudes of hostility, suspicion and defensiveness were also found to a greater degree amongst delinquents.

Masochistic trends, described as 'a tendency to suffer and to be dependent' were less evident among delinquents than among the control group, being markedly present in 17.9% of the latter, and only 5.2% of the former.

Vivacity or liveliness in behaviour was shown by decidedly more delinquents (50.7%) than non-delinquents (23.3%). A higher proportion of the delinquents were also extrovert to some degree. (54.6% : 35.1%)
Finally, in regard to mental pathology, the Rorschach Test found that considerably fewer delinquents had neurotic trends (24.6% : 35.8%), this being defined as 'a condition in which the individual suffers from more than the average insecurity and anxiety (conscious or unconscious) against which he develops protective devices differing qualitatively or quantitatively from the culturally accepted ones and leading to conflicts which are, as a rule, not solvable by him for the time being.' On the other hand, naturally enough, more delinquents than non-delinquents were markedly psychopathic, although the numbers were small in both groups. (7.3% : 0.4%) Psychopathy was only vaguely defined, the main trait being said to be the 'fleeting, non-integrative, superficial quality of his personal relations.'

Relevant traits and qualities in which the two groups did not differ in a statistically significant manner were feelings of isolation, described as 'the feeling of being alone ... and of not being sufficiently capable of giving and receiving love and affection', attitudes of kindliness and trust, that is 'the basic expectation that others will be friendly, humane, trustworthy (though this expectation may be tempered by realistic caution)' and spontaneity of self-expression, said to be 'the quality of genuine expression of the self, of genuine experience, feeling, thought, and action,
as opposed to conventional or otherwise "suggested" feelings, thought and so on.'

The main findings of the psychiatrist's interview with each boy that are relevant to our enquiry are, firstly, that the incidence of emotional conflicts was far higher among delinquents than non-delinquents. (74.8% : 37.6%) These conflicts arose out of intra-family relations, failure to satisfactorily assume an adult role, out of relations with companions and out of inferiority feelings. The second relevant finding, however, was that these emotional conflicts were resolved in significantly different ways by the different groups. A larger proportion of the delinquents tended to resolve their conflicts by extroverted methods known as extroversion of action, which 'implies that a boy refuses to take responsibility for his behaviour' (28.1% : 17.1%) or extroversion of affect, which is said to imply 'internal as well as external harmony, an indulgence of feelings and instincts, easy placation of a boy's feelings as well as those of society, and an easy acceptance of creeds and customs which excuse or justify such a self-gratifying life.' (24.3% : 13.3%), or both these extroverted methods. Correlating with this a much lower proportion of the delinquents than of the non-delinquents (5.2% : 42.4%) were found to resolve their conflicts by introversion. In introversion,
emotional expression is turned inward and, while present, does not manifest itself plainly, particularly in the social field. Such a person faces facts painfully. In self-defence he must develop many inhibitions. There is a tense over-alertness.' Thus while delinquents have more emotional conflicts, they tend to resolve them in less painful ways.

The picture that emerges from the Glueck study is a complex one, and it is not entirely clear that the results of the Rorscharch Tests and the Psychiatric interview accord with each other but it can, I think, be fairly confidently stated that the study gives no support to the view that moral goodness and happiness or mental health tend to be found together, while immoral attitudes and actions tend to be associated with unhappiness and mental illness. If anything, the study suggests the reverse, although neither group can be described as either happy or mentally healthy. But it is significant that most of the subjectively unpleasant states referred to were found to have a higher incidence among the non-delinquents, and it must be recalled that these findings were obtained despite the fact previously noted, that all the delinquents had been detected in their delinquency by the law enforcement agencies. The delinquents, no doubt because they associate in gangs, do not appear to suffer the consequence which Foot thought the unjust man must suffer—they do not
have to be constantly hiding their secret, nor are they insecure and afraid that others will act unjustly towards them, or betray them. Nor have Maslow’s views been borne out, for unselfishness, sympathy, respect for others, and honesty would seem in our society to have not a direct but an inverse relationship to mental health and the absence of neurosis, if the results of the study are accepted. This may not apply however, to more privileged people.

It would be absurd to regard this study as providing a definitive answer to the question of the relationship between morality and happiness, or morality and mental health. The study itself is not beyond criticism, and, more importantly, it is of limited assistance to us because it was not designed to deal with the question we are investigating. Nevertheless, in the absence of better or more suitable studies, its findings must be given some weight.

(viii) CONSCIENCE AND GUILT

Another element of human nature which has sometimes been seen as providing a connection between morality and self-interest is conscience. Conscience has long been a phenomenon of interest to philosophers, and its exact nature has been much disputed. The questions about conscience with which we are here concerned, however, do not require us to go
into all these controversies. We are concerned with conscience, not as a source of information about right and wrong, but as a consideration against acting in a way that one considers to be wrong. To put the matter in the terms of our general enquiry: if one acknowledges that a certain action is wrong, does one's conscience provide one with a reason against doing it? Does acting contrary to one's conscience inevitably produce guilt feelings? If so, are such guilt feelings so serious that they cannot be outweighed by the benefits of acting wrongly? In considering possible reasons against an immoral action, Kai Nielsen puts the question in this way:

...is it really worth it? He must consider again the power of his conscience (superego) even though he rationally decided to reject its authority? Will it give him peace? Will the fun be worth the nagging of his conscience? (50)

Nielsen thinks that no general conclusion can be reached here - with some individuals it is true that, because of their conscience they could not be happier by pursuing a policy which was in opposition to it, while perhaps other individuals could be happier in this way. But other writers have thought differently. To quote just one example, Kant has said:

Conscience is the representative within us of the divine judgment-seat: it weighs our dispositions and action in

the scales of a law which is holy and pure; we cannot deceive it, and, lastly, we cannot escape it because, like the divine omnipresence, it is always with us....Many have argued that conscience is a work of art and education, and that it judges and sentences by force of habit; but if this were the case, men with a conscience not so tutored and practised could escape the stings of conscience; there are, however, no cases of this. (51)

Whether conscience is divine, natural, or universally inculcated in us does not concern us: the important part of this passage is the claim that conscience not only judges, but also sentences, and no-one can escape its stings. Joseph Butler also thought that conscience was universal in man (though in different places he appears to mean different things by it) but he feels the need to justify virtuous conduct by showing that on other grounds it is in accord with 'reasonable self-love'. Apart from a reference to the 'peace and tranquility of mind' which accompanies action according to conscience, conscience itself plays no part in this justification (52).

There are two varieties of conscience theory with which we are concerned, and the distinction between them is important for the purposes of assessing their truth. One is


52) Joseph Butler, Sermons. For the universality of conscience cf. Sermon III, par.4; the reference to peace and tranquility, III, par.8. The reference to 'reasonable self-love' and its coincidence with the dictates of conscience is in Sermon III, pars 8 and 9.
the sort that Kant and Butler held – that conscience approves and disapproves of the same actions in all men, and inflicts guilt feelings on those who act contrary to these universal dictates. This I will call the 'objectivist' position. It is objective insofar as it holds that the judgments of conscience are identical in all men. It is also possible to hold a 'subjectivist' position – that although different men's conscience may approve and disapprove of different things, every man feels guilty if he does what he himself acknowledges to be wrong. In view of the obvious objections that may be made against the objectivist view which do not apply to the subjectivist view, it is surprising to find that it is the former view which has been, and still is, by far the most popular. This is probably due to its association with Natural Law theories. In fact, I have not been able to find a writer who argues consistently for the subjectivist position. It should be noted that both theories, unlike some of the theories we have been considering previously, apply to the moral views a person holds, and not just to certain specific virtues which a person may or may not consider to be morally good. Both conscience theories hold that whenever a man does something which he believes to be morally wrong, his conscience will trouble him. The difference between the two forms of conscience theory is simply that according to the objectivist view, 'what he believes to be morally wrong'
has a content which is common to all men, while on the subjectivist view this is not so.

The objections to the objectivist position are many and have been made repeatedly. The variations in the moral beliefs of different groups of people seems to provide irrefutable evidence that the conscience of mankind is not uniform. It is hard to think of a single moral prohibition that has been held to be a prohibition in all societies. Cannibalism was once natural to many groups, eskimoes have practised parricide and matricide, incest was approved in the royal house of ancient Egypt, and some tribes of American Indians have no prohibitions on lying or stealing provided one is successful. The consciences of men like Kant and Butler would have disapproved of sexual activities apart from monogamous hetero-sexuality, yet there is almost no form of sexual practice which has not been approved by some society.

The objectivist or Natural Law theorist may reply that varying beliefs about matters of fact have produced these varying moral positions, or that they are not disagreements about basic principles, and merely represent different ways of reaching an end upon which all men agree. I do not find these replies convincing. People do disagree about basic principles and ultimate ends - some hold honesty to be good in itself, others only insofar as it conduces to the general
welfare. Some have been concerned with the welfare of all, others only with the welfare of their own tribe. These differences are not factual, and they are not subordinate to some more ultimate or basic principle on which there is agreement. Nor can the objectivist seriously contend that in those societies which approve of practices such as cannibalism and parricide, people felt guilty about these activities. There is no evidence which supports such a contention. In fact, some anthropologists hold that in some societies, little or no guilt is experienced, even when a prohibition of the society is violated. Instead, the moral code is supported by a strong sense of shame—but this depends on the contravention of the prohibition being known to others. There is no internalized sanction, no conscience in our sense of the term.\(^{53}\)

The objectivist position is also vulnerable to criticism based on research such as the Glueck study, which we have just discussed. If conscience is universal and uniform, delinquents have presumably violated its dictates to a far greater extent than non-delinquents. Accordingly, they should feel more guilt. The Glueck study did not attempt to measure guilt feelings specifically. The nearest it came to

doing so was a measure of 'ambivalence towards authority', which was said to have 'secondary implications of guilt feelings.' It appears that a person who had conflicting attitudes towards authority could be expected to feel guilt because, to put the matter very crudely, that part of him which accepted or approved of authority would feel guilt on account of the thoughts, desires or actions of that part of him which did not accept or approve of authority. In particular, any delinquent who had ambivalent feelings could be expected to feel guilt on account of his delinquent actions, while a delinquent who had no ambivalent feelings towards authority might be expected not to feel guilt, as he does not, even on an unconscious level, recognise the validity of the authority which he rejects by his delinquent actions. The Gluecks found marked ambivalence in more delinquents than non-delinquents (35.7% : 14.4%) but on the other hand ambivalence was found to be totally absent in 58.6% of delinquents, suggesting that a majority, despite their delinquent acts, had no guilt feelings. (p. 220) In addition, the findings already mentioned, which showed delinquents to be less anxiety ridden, less introverted and less neurotic than their non-delinquent counterparts, indicate that delinquents are unlikely to feel guilt, or worry about whether they have acted wrongly, to a significant degree.
The objectivist can overcome some of the points just made by 'softening' his position, and bringing it a little closer to that of the subjectivist conscience theorist. He can do this by conceding that man's universal and uniform conscience can be distorted. Many Natural Law theorists have defended their position in this way, and in this form, the objectivist view of conscience is also to be found amongst one or two contemporary psychologists. Of these, perhaps R.E. Money-Kyrle has paid most attention to the topic. He argues that there are two kinds of conscience, with two corresponding kinds of guilt feelings. The first kind he terms 'persecutory', and says it is an irrational conscience based on internalized fears of parental disapproval. This kind of conscience, and the persecutory guilt feelings which are associated with it, may be removed by psychoanalysis. After this has happened, Money-Kyrle alleges, a 'depressive' conscience will emerge. After complete analysis a person will no longer have an internal source of guilt, but he will still be capable of experiencing depressive guilt and distress if he injures or neglects others. This is because in proportion as anyone is conscious of his own psychology

he has an empathetic understanding of his fellows." This depressive conscience is said to be humanistic, and Money-Kyrle claims to have proved that wisdom (insight into one's own psychology) involves humanism. Fortunately, Money-Kyrle, although he writes as if he were reporting empirical matters, offers no objective evidence at all for his conclusions. The claim that all men, deep-down, have an empathetic understanding for their fellows is surely dubious, and desperately in need of support, especially if the claim is that all men have empathetic understanding with every man, qua man, as Money Kyrle must claim if the conscience is to be a truly humanistic one. Of course, because the depressive conscience may, on Money-Kyrle's view, be hidden or covered by a persecutory conscience, this view is not easy to refute. Evidence of people who do not consciously experience depressive guilt when they injure or neglect their fellows will not refute the theory, for it may be said that they have persecutory consciences which do not condemn such practices. But what of those who do not seem to experience any sort of guilt at all? Once again, we may refer to the literature

55) Psychoanalysis and Politics, p.68. E.Fromm, in Man For Himself, pp. 158-172 argues for a similar 'humanistic conscience', but fails completely to provide evidence for this view, or to meet possible objections.
on psychopaths. In the words of the McCords:

...the psychopath — and this is a crucial trait — has few internalized feelings of guilt. In the usual sense, the psychopath has no conscience. He can commit any act with hardly a twinge of remorse... The vast majority of social scientists have found that the psychopath, whatever crime he may commit, feels little guilt.

The McCords quote statements in support of this view from a sociologist, a psychologist, a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst. 

Further support for the belief that psychopaths are unaffected by guilt feelings comes from polygraph (lie-detector) tests, which measure uncontrollable symptoms such as heart-rate, pulse, blood volume, electrical conductivity of skin, etc. By means of these tests, an operator can detect a lie with about 90% accuracy on most people. The tests are unhelpful with psychopaths.

Moreover because Money-Kyrle says that the humanist conscience is based on empathetic understanding with others and on love, one might expect him to admit that psychopaths, who as we have already seen do not have empathetic understanding and love for others, do not have humanistic consciences and thus do not experience guilt. This Money-Kyrle refuses to admit, although without

56) W. & J. McCord op. cit. pp. 10-13
58) Psycho-Analysis and Ethics,' p. 436
giving any explanation or basis for his assertion that everyone has the capacity for feeling guilt. He admits that some people do not consciously experience any guilt, but claims again without evidence, that they have unconscious guilt.

The subjectivist theory of conscience can withstand some of the objections I have made against the objectivist position, but not all. Diversity in moral beliefs is of course quite acceptable to the subjectivist viewpoint, but the existence of cultures quite without guilt would be damaging for it. The fact that delinquents do not experience more guilt than non-delinquents may be accounted for by the subjectivist on the hypothesis that the delinquents do not acknowledge that their own conduct is immoral. Although some studies have shown that knowledge of right and wrong does not differ between delinquents and non-delinquents, it might be argued that these studies have not distinguished between knowledge of conventional standards and acceptance of standards as one's own. Juvenile delinquents, after all, are not mature adults, and this may be reflected in their moral beliefs. So the subjectivist may retain his belief that if a person fully accepts that a certain act is morally wrong, and yet does the act, he will feel guilt. The final objection,

however, is the one that is most difficult for the subjectivist. In the face of the evidence on psychopaths, I do not think it can be held that all men do suffer from significant guilt feelings when they do what they know to be wrong. For psychopaths do admit that what they do is wrong. The man McCord calls Borlov, a forger, robber, and finally murderer, wrote in one of his letters:

....all men, whatever their fate, could take a good lesson from the Bible - the fundamental truths of religion must guide us all(60)

Admittedly, Borlov was a liar too, and he may have been insincere in writing this. Yet, intelligent as he was, he must have realized that his action was wrong, not just in the sense of being conventionally held to be wrong, but also in the sense that an impartial judge could not possibly approve of what he did. He must have realized that he was acting in a purely egoistic manner, without paying any attention to others, and that he would not approve of others acting in the way he acted. This entitles us to say that he must have realized that he was acting immorally. Other studies of psychopaths support the view that they know that their actions are morally wrong, although one must admit that it cannot be conclusively proved that they are not merely

60) W. & J. McCord, op. cit., p.11
parroting the moral judgments of society. (61) The important thing is that psychopaths often do not claim that their own conduct is morally justifiable. They may say that it 'makes sense' to act as they do, but they do not dissent from the conventional prohibitions on stealing, cheating, forging, lying or killing, in the sense of holding contrary moral beliefs. (62)

Before leaving this topic, it may be worthwhile to look briefly at Freud's views, in view of the particular importance of the idea of guilt in Freudian psycho-analytical theories, and the respect that continues to be accorded to Freud's views in some circles. Nielsen's use of the Freudian term 'super ego' in parenthesis after his reference to conscience suggests that he may have had Freudian theories in mind, although the term is also employed by non-Freudians. (63)


62) Cf. the psychopath interviewed by Halleck, op. cit. p. 105

It is not always appreciated that those who seek to use Freudian theories of the unconscious workings of the super-ego in order to show that if one behaves immorally one will be punished by the super-ego are in total contradiction to Freud's writings on the effect of behaviour on the actions of the super-ego. For while it is true that, according to Freud, the super-ego may 'punish' the ego by inflicting upon it depression, neurosis or some other unpleasantness, Freud repeatedly states that such punishment is inflicted not for acting contrary to the demands of the super-ego, but for wishing to act in such a way. Yet we cannot avoid wishing to act in a contrary manner, for our instinctual desires are contrary to the dictates of the super-ego. The renunciation of the wish does not appease the super-ego, but increases its severity. In Freud's words:

"...instinctual renunciation is not enough, for the wish persists and cannot be concealed from the super-ego. Thus, in spite of the renunciation that has been made, a sense of guilt comes about....every renunciation of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and tolerance." (64)

This explains the paradox that:

"...the more virtuous a man is, the more severe and distrustful is the super-ego's behaviour, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness furthest who reproach themselves with the worst sinfulness. This means that virtue forfeits some part of its promised reward;"

64) S. Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents, Standard, Ed. vol. XXI pp. 127-8
the docile and continent ego does not enjoy the trust of its mentor, and strives in vain, it would seem, to acquire it. (65)

Hence:

Whether one has killed one's father or has abstained from doing so is not really the decisive thing. One is bound to feel guilty in either case, for the sense of guilt is an expression of the conflict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between Eros and the instinct of destruction or death. This conflict is set going as soon as men are faced with the task of living together. (66)

It should therefore be clear that no support can be obtained from Freud's theories for the belief that a person's conscience provides him with a reason for doing what he believes he ought to do. Freud himself gives no more objective empirical evidence for his views than those psychologists whose opposing views we have previously examined. But J.C.Flugel, in arguing for a similar view, is able to cite some empirical results. In an experiment by D.W.MacKinnon, college graduates were asked to attempt difficult puzzles. The answers were accessible to the subjects, but they were instructed to consult them only in certain cases. Not knowing that they were being observed, 46% of the subjects

65) ibid., pp.125-6

violated these instructions. All the subjects were then asked 'Do you often feel guilty in ordinary life?' An affirmative answer was given by 75% of those who did not violate the instructions, and only 29% of those who did.

Flugel comments:

Here we see what appears to be an experimental corroboration of the psycho-analytic finding, perhaps first clearly expressed in *The Ego and The Id*, that the more we repress our aggression the more likely is this aggression to turn against ourselves and...to ally with moral tendencies.... The results show again an inverse relation between outwardly directed aggression and the inner feeling of guilt. (67)

Once again, it could be argued that the violators did not believe they were acting immorally, but it appears to me implausible to suggest that 46% of a sample of college graduates believe that cheating in such circumstances is morally acceptable and may be impartially approved. It is also possible that those who cheated lied about their guilt feelings. We are certainly not entitled to regard Freud's theories on this topic as having been proven correct, but they cannot be assumed to be incorrect either.

A related point about guilt which those who would use it as a reason against immorality must consider is that guilt is, for some people, a reason for committing a seriously

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immoral act. This was, again, first noticed by Freud, but has now received wide acceptance by psychiatrists and criminologists. Guttmacher and Weihofen describe the motivation of such people well:

By having punishment meted out by society they achieve some surcease — they no longer harass themselves because of their deeply buried, and to them wholly unacceptable, unconscious wishes, for which they have an over-whelming sense of guilt. (68)

Thus an overt, immoral act, for which one is punished, may reduce guilt felt on account of wishes which have not resulted in action. This kind of person is thought by most writers to be rare. No one would say that many people will feel less guilt in this way, and committing a crime in order to be punished is hardly a rational way of reducing guilt from unconscious wishes. Nevertheless, the phenomenon must throw doubt on the universality of the claim that we all feel guilt at acts we know to be wrong.

I think we must therefore agree with Nielsen that it is not possible to say of all men that their conscience and capacity for guilt means that they cannot be happier by

68) Guttmacher & Weihofen, op.cit., p.89 The passage quoted is a summary of the position of F.Alexander ('Neurotic Character', International Journal of Psychoanalysis Vol.II (1930) p.292) which the authors consider 'far too generally applied', but they agree that it does have application in some cases. For the origin of the view, see S.Freud, 'The Criminal From a Sense of Guilt' in Some Character-Types Met With in Psychoanalytic Work Standard Ed. Vol XIV, p.311
acting in a way they acknowledge to be immoral. There are two reasons for saying this. Firstly, some men do not have a capacity for feeling guilt to any significant extent, and secondly, it may not always be the case that whether a person feels guilty depends on whether he commits acts he believes to be immoral. Of these two reasons, the former is better established.

(ix) CONCLUSION

The claim that it is in the interest of every individual to act morally has not been substantiated. Only with a few vices, which have a special relation to the agent, such as envy imprudence and intemperance, has this claim been justified. It has been shown to hold for all people for virtues such as justice, honesty, kindness, or unselfishness. Hosper's bank clerk apparently can profit by dishonesty, provided that he can be sure that his embezzlement will not be detected, and provided his personality has the mild tendencies towards psychopathy which may be read into Hosper's description (the lack of a worrisome disposition, absence of a propensity to dwell on past misdeeds, and a desire for sociability rather than deep or profound relationships, correspond to the two chief traits of the psychopath, guiltlessness and lovelessness).
We have been primarily concerned with arguments for a universal connection between morally good behaviour and self-interest. Yet now that we have seen that these arguments fail, it is natural to ask whether this connection can be established for some people, and if so for how many. This question could only be answered by extensive studies and surveys, but it is possible to point out some relevant considerations. The example of the bank clerk is favourable to immorality in some aspects which do not apply to normal people in normal circumstances: the personality of the clerk, the absolutely minimal risk of detection, and the opportunity to transform a drab, unrewarding life into a much happier life by a single act. The risk of detection and punishment is something we have barely mentioned, because it is so well-known, but its importance as a factor in linking self-interest with morality for many people can hardly be over-estimated. (69) Estimating the applicability of the personality factor presents difficulties. We have not discussed to what extent it is possible consciously to inculcate in oneself the traits which enable the mildly psychopathic

69) This seems to be the basis of the obligation to be just for Hobbes, at least in Leviathan. Justice, as Hobbes defines it, is 'the not Performance of Covenant.' As promises are not Covenants unless there is a Civil Power to enforce them, one can only be unjust when there is such a power, in which case, Hobbes claims, injustice is not reasonable because of the improbability of success. (Everyman Ed., pp 74-6) But cf. p.57 above. The weakness of the argument is, of course, that sometimes success is probable.
personality to avoid paying a heavy price for his immorality. Must one be born slightly psychopathic in order to benefit from immorality? Or must the tendencies be produced in childhood? This is an important question for any normal person seeking a rational answer to the question of why one should be moral. It is akin to the question already raised about ethical theories, such as those of Hume, Butler and J.S. Mill, which depend in varying degrees on desires such as benevolence and sympathy as the basis for moral action. If these desires can be easily suppressed, then one must ask whether it is not rational to do so. Similarly, if it is possible to make oneself slightly psychopathic, to harden oneself, make oneself independent of others, suppress guilt feelings and feelings of sympathy, the question must arise whether it may not be rational to do this. Most studies of the causes of psychopathy however, do locate the origin of the syndrome in infancy or childhood. (70) On the other hand, most of these studies have been of extreme, and particularly criminal, psychopaths. It cannot be definitely stated that it is impossible for an adult consciously to suppress feelings of sympathy and guilt, or the need for others. The process one must go through, as an adolescent or even an adult, in

70) W. & J. McCord, op. cit. Ch IV.
'picking oneself up' after being disappointed in love is a suppression of feelings in relation to a particular person - and sometimes even in relation to a whole sex, as when someone swears that he has had enough of women, and will never trust one again - which suggests that the same may be possible with feelings which, although more general, are less intense. Certain theories of conscience, such as Eysenck's view that conscience is a kind of conditioned reflex, would appear to imply that guilt can be consciously reduced. (71) The evidence is too scanty to permit a definite conclusion, but it is reasonable to hold that for most people, some degree of conscious reduction in feelings of guilt, sympathy and love for others is possible. One must still weigh the gains and losses. If immorality involved suppressing the ability to have profound personal relationships, this would be, for most people, a loss beyond any compensation. But as we have seen, there is no proof that the ability to have full relationships with a limited number of people cannot survive the suppression of universal feelings for others, feelings for mankind in general. Close relationships within a gang are compatible with an absence of sympathy for others outside the gang. Because of the almost infinite variations in

71) H.J. Eysenck, Crime and Personality, p.iii.
personalities, it is probably best if we avoid a general conclusion on this issue. No connection between morality and self-interest has been shown to hold for all. It seems obvious that it holds for some. The number of people for whom we may assert that there is a connection lies between none and all, but just where it lies remains unknown.
CONCLUSION

Our conclusion, negative as it is, has important consequences for both theory and practice. The revolutionary consequences have already been touched upon in the course of the argument, especially in the discussion of Part I. We have seen that the only regular controls of moral behavior - whether through social sanctions or punishment - are those that are efficient in the sense of
We have now completed our enquiry into the question which forms the title of this thesis. The results of this enquiry may strike some as disappointingly negative—perhaps even alarmingly so. We have seen that the question is a proper, rational question. It is also quite obviously a question of vital importance both for the individual and society, so much so that one may wonder how society could survive, if the question is completely without answer. Yet we have also seen that the question has not satisfactorily been answered by an appeal to reason, nor has it, to date, been shown that it can be answered for everyone by an appeal to self-interest. So our conclusion is that although 'Why should I be moral?' is a proper question, it is yet to receive a convincing answer which is applicable to all rational beings at all times. We must tentatively conclude that some people, some of the time, may rationally decide to do what they accept to be morally wrong. Immorality need not be irrational.

This conclusion, negative as it is, has important consequences for both theory and practice. The theoretical consequences have already been brought out in the course of the argument, especially at the conclusion of Part I. We have seen that one very popular analysis of moral language—universal prescriptivism—breaks down in the attempt to
exclude our question. Universal prescriptivism seeks to make moral argument effective, while preserving a logical tie between accepting a moral judgment and deciding to act on it. This it cannot do, because - to put the matter in a way which assumes the argument put forward earlier - one may accept a moral judgment and then wonder whether one should be moral, that is, one may be prepared to apply a judgment universally, yet one may wonder whether to act on it, rather than on another judgment which one is not prepared to apply to anyone but oneself. We have seen also that if 'Why should I be moral?' is a proper question, that old bogy, the 'naturalistic fallacy', at least in the form argued for by prescriptivists and imperativists does not prove that indicative statements cannot entail a moral judgment. Hence, some definition of morality may be possible, beyond the minimum requirement of impartiality which I have suggested. Our later finding, that morality has no necessary connection with what it is rational to do, permits an approach to the task of definition which offers more hope of success than attempts, such as that of Foot, to prove that justice is a virtue by showing that it is rational for everyone to be just - an attempt which would never have been made, but for the assumption that there must be some universal connection between morality and action.

Other problems of morality become less perplexing if
we accept that it may not always be rational to be moral. For example, the age-old problem of people doing what they believe to be morally wrong, which has puzzled philosophers since Socrates and Aristotle, may now be seen to be no problem at all. All the names commonly given to this problem—'incontinence', 'weakness of will', 'backsliding'—imply a lack of control on the part of the agent. His action is regarded as stemming from the failure of his reason to control his actions, reason being assumed to be on the side of morality. If the assumption that reason is always on the side of morality is dropped, the main ground for regarding avowedly immoral action as a philosophical problem disappears.

A final obvious theoretical consequence of our conclusion should be a revival of interest in the ancient problem of moral philosophy which this thesis has discussed. For our conclusion has not been that no answer to 'Why should I be moral?' is theoretically possible. We are not entitled to draw any such conclusion, for our method has been to examine answers which have been offered. We have found these answers inadequate, but this does not prove that no adequate answers are possible. We have adduced some considerations

1) Of course, this only explains some moral instances of weakness of will. There may be genuine cases of weakness of will, such as when a person does not do what he believes reason directs him to do.
which any adequate answer would have to deal with, and it is not easy to see how these considerations could be dealt with. Yet it is possible that future attempts to answer the question will succeed where past attempts have failed, especially in showing, on the basis of better research, that there is a connection between morality and self-interest.

Those who accept that it is yet to be shown that reason directs everyone, under all circumstances, to act morally, will agree that this is of the utmost significance for ethical theory. But what does this conclusion mean in practical terms? What are we to do about those people who rationally act immorally? Must we simply accept that for this reason there will always be a certain amount of immorality? In order to answer this question we must, like Aristotle at the conclusion of his Ethics, look beyond ethics to politics. It is a question which must be answered on the social, rather than the individual level.

No society accepts all immorality. All societies have systems of prohibitions, backed by sanctions, which seek to prevent certain important forms of immorality, usually immorality which harms others. In modern societies these prohibitions are incorporated in our legal system, and the sanctions are fines, gaol terms and perhaps death in extreme
cases. Our legal system is designed to eliminate the possibility that it may be in the interests of an individual to do any of a large range of immoral acts, from murder through robbery, embezzlement and fraud to dangerous driving and dropping litter. If our legal system were successful in this, it would not be rational to commit the immoral actions prohibited by our laws. Hence an obvious way of reducing the applicability of our conclusion that for some it may sometimes be more rational to be immoral than moral is to improve the legal system, including the detection and apprehension of criminals. But there are limitations on the effectiveness and desirability of using the law in this way. It does not seem feasible that in the foreseeable future there will be such a remarkable improvement in crime detection that no one can have good grounds for believing that he can commit a crime without being detected. Nor is the prospect of an all-seeing, all-powerful law enforcement agency a uniformly pleasant one, especially if it should fall into the hands of an unscrupulous government. In some circumstances, too, investigation into the lives of citizens is a greater evil than the crimes which may thus be detected. In addition, the law must work through the infliction of a certain amount of unpleasantness on those who violate it, if it is to ensure that it is not in a person's interest to commit crimes.
Finally, some would argue that the law is not a suitable instrument for eliminating the possibility that it may be in the interests of an individual to act immorally, since the law should not be concerned with morals at all, but only with the prevention of harm, or, as others would say, only with the prevention of harm to others. There are two possible replies to this objection. One is that, as J.S. Mill says:

...the self-regarding faults...are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch they may be carried, do not constitute wickedness...they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have a care for himself. (4)

If this view of morality were accepted, then I think that no objection to the enforcement of morality by law could be sustained on the basis of the common distinction between the field of law and the field of morals. If this view of morality is not accepted, the second reply that may be made is that for 'the self-regarding faults' to be immoral, they must cause harm to their possessor. If this is so, they are in

the same category as envy, imprudence and intemperance, vices which are intrinsically contrary to the interests of their possessor, and thus vices which it is irrational to cultivate for their own sake. In support of this view, it might be said that as a self-regarding act can hardly involve harm to others, dishonesty, deception or injustice, in what way can it be immoral unless it is contrary to the best interests of the agent? This argument might be rejected by someone with a belief that, say, to indulge in pleasure, even if no harm is done, is wrong. My own view is that such a belief could not be supported, but I will not stop to argue this, for I admit that the previous objections to the use of law to enforce morals are sufficient to force us to look beyond the law for a complete solution to the problem of making immorality irrational for all. (5)

J.S. Mill, once again, is the source of a suggestion that society has means other than laws at its disposal:

To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking

5) For a consistent attempt to construct guidelines for a system of legislation which would ensure that morality (in this case, utilitarian morality) is in accordance with the interests of every individual, see the works of Jeremy Bentham.
practically it may be called) the interest of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over the human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may fill a large and prominent place in every human being's sentient existence. (6)

In this passage Mill argues on the assumption that a utilitarian morality is the true one, but the methods he proposes would be applicable to other moral beliefs. Someone with a different normative view may substitute whatever end or ends he holds to be ultimate whenever Mill refers to 'the general good'. Mill recognises, then, the need for harmonising the happiness, or interests of the individual with the course of action that is morally desirable. He mentions law as one way of promoting this harmony, but not the only way. In addition, he refers to 'social arrangements' and 'education and opinion'. Let us consider first 'social arrangements'. Mill does not elaborate on what he means by social arrangements, apart from education and opinion, but the possible effects of social arrangements on the relation of the individual's happiness to

6) J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, (Everyman Ed.) p.16
morally desirable ends may be easily seen. Indeed, important insights into social systems and political philosophies may be obtained by investigating the way these systems and philosophies seek to harmonise the pursuit of individual interests with some greater good, thus answering, for every member of the society, the question of why one should be moral.

The social arrangements of capitalism in its purest form - laissez-faire capitalism - were based on the belief that the interests of all would best be served by allowing each to pursue his own interest in an unimpeded manner. Of course, to allow everyone to be entirely unimpeded was never thought feasible, but at least in the economic sphere, the accumulation of wealth by individuals was held to be desirable by economic theorists because it promoted the general welfare. A particular view of the nature of man's interests is also implied by the philosophy of pure free enterprise. This is that man's interest lies in the accumulation and increase of his own wealth and material possessions. It is an oversimplification, but otherwise correct, to say that capitalism, in its purest form, treats man as economic man, and treats man's nature as egoistic. For capitalism, as for Hobbes, man is and always will be, narrowly self-seeking. Capitalism differs from Hobbes in holding that, at least in the economic sphere, good will come from the uninterrupted pursuit of these
narrowly conceived goods.

Capitalism, in its conception of human nature and human interests, is diametrically opposed to the long humanist tradition that man's true interests lie in friendship, benevolence and love for all. This tradition, in which Maslow should be placed, provides a basis for various utopian schemes, including an anarchic society. (7) If man's true interest consists in promoting the general good, or other moral goods such as justice and honesty, then once men realized this, compulsion would not be required in order to make it rational to be moral, neither in the economic sphere, nor in other matters. But we have seen that this view of man's interests is not an accurate description of the actual state of affairs, and any attempt to set up an anarchist society which does not take account of this can be expected to fail.

Many marxist and communist writings differ from both capitalism and anarchism in their approach to the harmonisation of man's interests with those of society, in that while these latter treat human nature and human interests as fixed, marxists see man as infinitely malleable. At present man is narrowly egoistic, but this is a consequence of the present economic system. Change the economic system, and one changes

7) As Maslow himself recognises: Motivation & Personality p.350
everything, including man's consciousness. In bourgeois, and earlier economic systems, there is antagonism between the interests of the individual and the interests of society, but under communism such antagonism would disappear, and the state would wither away. (8) There would be no psychopaths under communism.

Laissez-faire capitalism and anarchism can be shown to be mistaken. The good of all cannot be secured through economic freedom, and every man's interest does not appear to lie in morally good conduct. The communists have also been shown to be wrong, insofar as the economic changes carried out under those countries which call themselves communist have not altered human nature — or at least not for the better and not in a way which has led to the withering away of the state. It may, of course, be claimed that these states have not put real communism into practice. The assertion that real communism would have the desired consequences thus becomes unprovable. But one is inclined to doubt that purely economic changes could alter human nature as radically as marxists suggest.

Yet the marxists are surely right to assert that

8) Cf. various works of Marx and Engels, especially The Communist Manifesto, The German Ideology, Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of the Political Economy, Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, etc.
human nature, and hence the interests of the individual, can be changed. Recently Herbert Marcuse has put forward a marxist kind of view in psychological terms. Marcuse claims that Freud's proposition that civilisation is based on the permanent subjugation of human instincts is true of present society, but not necessarily true of all societies. Present-day culture, Marcuse argues, represses basic human needs. If this culture were abolished, these needs could be reactivated, man would cease to wish to suppress and dominate his fellow-man, and he would lose his aggressive impulses. (9) Whether Marcuse is right appears to be a question which can hardly receive a definite answer unless our culture is abolished in the way he suggests. I will only say that I do not find his arguments sufficiently convincing to justify putting them to the test.

But there are other ways of changing human nature in order to align the interest and happiness of each individual with the interest and happiness of the community. We have seen that Mill spoke not only of 'social arrangements' but also of 'education and opinion'. Again, Mill does not elaborate on this topic in Utilitarianism, but he does do so in the course of his essay on the Utility of Religion. (10)

9) Cf. various works of Herbert Marcuse, especially Eros and Civilisation, (London, Sphere 1969) and One Dimensional Man (London, Sphere, 1968)

Here he argues that principles of justice, veracity, and beneficence may be taught and encouraged without the assistance of religion. He refers to three main influences which may be used to foster adoption of moral principles: authority or 'the influence in human affairs which belongs to any generally accepted system of rules for the guidance and government of human life', the 'almost boundless' power of education from infancy onwards, which can coerce and if necessary destroy any natural inclination, and 'the power of public opinion; of the praise and blame, the favour and disfavour, of (one's) fellow-creatures' on which are based motives such as love of glory, praise, admiration and respect, as well as fear of shame and dread of ill-repute or of being disliked or hated. Mill describes the basis of the secular morality he proposes:

A morality grounded on the large and wise views of the good of the whole, neither sacrificing the individual to the aggregate, nor the aggregate to the individual, but giving to duty on the one hand and to freedom on the other their proper province, would derive its power in the superior natures from sympathy and benevolence and the passion for ideal excellence: in the inferior, from the same feelings cultivated up to the measure of their capacity, with the super-added force of shame. This exalted morality would not depend for its ascendancy on any hope of reward; but the reward which might be looked for, and the thought of which would be a consolation in suffering, and a support in moments of weakness, would not be a problematical future existence, but the approbation, in this, of those whom we respect, and ideally of all those, dead or living, whom we admire or venerate. (11)

11) ibid., p.50
There are problems involved in all this which Mill does not appear to recognise. Public opinion may be deceived, and if the thought that his conduct would not have been approved by the dead is of no concern to a person, what then? Nor does Mill stop to ask if morality will in fact be 'generally accepted...for the guidance and government of life.' Why should it be, if it is contrary to the interests of individuals? People will, of course, pay lip-service to it, but this will not influence others, if it can be seen that it is merely lip-service. Mill's could reply to this that more weight must be given to education, which, when early, possesses a command over the feelings which is retained even by those who have given up the opinions which they were taught in their early years. (12) But herein lies another problem. Mill includes the teachings of one's parents in 'education', as well as school instruction. He must do so if, within the present social system, education is to begin in infancy. But what if parents do not educate their children in the manner desired? Why should parents educate their children in this way? May it not be in the child's interest, as well as that of the parents, to be educated to take advantage of opportunities for lucrative, undetectable immorality? All these questions Mill fails to discuss. Mill may be right in his claim that the ultimate answer is that

12) ibid. p. 39
there must be planted 'in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole', that the individual must be made unable to conceive of finding happiness except through morally good conduct, and that he must be made to feel a direct, dominant, and presumably irremovable impulse to promote the general good. But he does not say how this is to be done.

Perhaps it is not surprising that we can now specify in more detail how Mill's programme could be carried out. Education and psychological methods of control have advanced far in the past century, and some writers have ceased to regard the family as an eternal and indispensable basis of society. Aldous Huxley, in *Brave New World*, gives an indication of how far such methods may be taken. He places all upbringing in the hands of the state, and the state uses methods such as the endless repetition of slogans while the child is asleep, in order to alter his conception of his own interests. At this point, one's moral preferences are relevant. Those who hold that deliberate conditioning and training of infants and young children is morally repugnant will put strict limits on the methods which may be employed in harmonising individual and social interests. On the other hand, we have seen that such a programme of education has been endorsed by the foremost philosopher of liberalism.
Against *Brave New World* we must place another utopia, one looked upon more favourably by its author. In his novel *Walden Two*, B.F. Skinner, the noted behavioural psychologist, describes a community based on a scientific and experimental approach to the question of reconciling the conflict of interests between the individual and the community. He makes out a plausible case for the belief that we now have sufficient knowledge of human behaviour to fashion human nature in such a way that everyone finds happiness in contributing to the general welfare. But some critics have found Skinner's utopia appalling, and the question of the moral legitimacy of this kind of answer to 'Why should I be moral?' must be faced. This question I leave to the reader, with a final quotation from Karl Mannheim, another advocate of individuality, who yet recognises the need for planning:

At first sight the growth of techniques of influencing human behaviour seems to increase the pressure put upon the individual. On the other hand, it is possible that a more skillful use of more subtle techniques would give scope for more finesse in the art of social control; and provided that the groups using these techniques wished to preserve the individuality of their subjects, there would probably also be less danger to the formation of individual personalities. A primitive chieftain whose only method of social control is a whip is more likely to damage the personality of his subjects than, for instance, a democratic society which works out a set of social rewards as incentives to the working man to produce spontaneous co-operation on his part.
This example reminds us that even past societies continuously exercised social control over their members, even though indirectly and unconsciously, and that the problem of the power of social influence upon personality is not really new, but has to be investigated anew in the present situation. The difference today is perhaps only that we shall gradually be able to speak about these influences not only in general terms but to specify them according to our growing knowledge of psychology and sociology, and that we shall assess the harm or profit that accrues from them by empirical methods. (13)

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography includes the principal books and articles which are relevant to 'Why should I be moral?', as well as any other works which are discussed at length in this thesis, or which I have found particularly useful. It does not include all works which have been referred to - references to these will be found in the footnotes. Where various editions of a work exist, a reference to the edition used will be found in the footnotes, if the work has been cited.

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