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Fig. 1. Arthur Streeton, *Portrait of Professor Marshall-Hall*, 1892, pen and ink on envelope, image courtesy of the State Library of Victoria.
Abstract

The literary oeuvre of the first Ormond Professor of Music at the University of Melbourne, George William Louis Marshall-Hall, registered the key philosophical, scientific, and political debates that raged in English and Australian periodicals during the period 1888–1915. His works, encompassing lectures, poetry, articles, and marginalia, also show Marshall-Hall reacting to his social surroundings, playing an active part in the intellectual communities of London and Melbourne. The thesis divides the author’s literary development into three periods, detailing each period’s principal works and the social and historical catalysts that caused his shifts between them. In the first section, 1888–92, it is argued that Marshall-Hall’s use of the philosopher of evolution Herbert Spencer in his London writings 1888–90 was influenced by his family’s scientific legacy and the progressive publishing rationale of the publisher of The Musical World Francis Hueffer. By participating in London’s Wagnerian literary culture he developed the evolutionary justification of Wagner’s works that he then took to Australia. In Australia 1891–92, conservative newspapers challenged Marshall-Hall’s Wagnerian and Spencerian writings. In response, he revaluated his ideas using the mystical metaphysics of Arthur Schopenhauer. In doing so, he can be seen drawing again from his family’s scientific legacy, which is referenced throughout Schopenhauer’s works. The second period, 1893–1899, is characterised by Marshall-Hall’s rejection of Spencer and Schopenhauer’s systematic philosophies in favour of a Nietzschean rhetoric drawn from the first translations of Friedrich Nietzsche’s works. This intellectual shift is seen as a response to what Marshall-Hall saw as the hypocrisy of idealist progressives, in particular the solicitor and criminal anthropologist Marshall Lyle, who communicated with Marshall-Hall through annotations in a volume of Nietzsche’s works. In the third period, 1900–1915, Marshall-Hall’s conservative reaction against the growing Australian labour movement is detailed, as well as his radical swing to the left upon his return to England in 1912. It is shown that the outbreak of the First World War led to his ultimate rejection of European philosophy by the time he returned to Australia in 1914, after which he adopted a mystical nationalism reminiscent of his original Wagnerian beliefs until his death in 1915.
Declaration

This is to certify that

i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the MA except where indicated in the Preface,

ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,

iii. the thesis is less than 50,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Matthew Lorenzon (6 October 2010)
Dedication

To Donald and Mary Ferguson.
Acknowledgments

This study was made possible only through the generosity of many individuals who had the patience to field a misplaced request, answer an incomprehensible question, or entertain a vague intuition from its author. Peter Tregear’s enthusiasm for the project quickly saw me trade in my philosopher’s hat for a pair of white archive gloves and begin rifling through collections. Justin Clemens made sure I kept the hat handy. For their help during these early, often bumbling forays into archival research I am thankful to Astrid Krautschneider, the staff of the Grainger Museum, and the staff of the Louise Hanson-Dyer Music Library at the University of Melbourne. I would like to extend a special “thanks” to Charlotte Smith and Katie Wood of the Cultural Collections Reading Room and the University of Melbourne Archives. Tracing the 1896 edition of *The Case of Wagner* with marginalia by Marshall-Hall (then a shelf copy at the National Library of Australia) was only possible through the kind cooperation of Kenneth Hince, Thérèse Radic, Richard Divall of the Marshall-Hall Trust, and Robyn Holmes of the National Library of Australia. In tracing the elusive figure of Marshall Lyle I am indebted to Silvano Montaldo of the Museo di Antropologia Criminale, Diane Horrigan of The Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, and the staff of the Public Records Office of Victoria. With limited opportunities to travel for research and the scope of this thesis requiring visits interstate and overseas, I would like to extend my gratitude to those friends who translated an e-mail, took a library detour to chase up an article, or located a letter in their local archives on my behalf: Huw Hallam, Adrian Hawkes, Julia Jackson, and Amy McDonnell. Finally, I would like to thank Martine Hawkes, whose feedback and *Derrision* throughout the duration of this thesis has been invaluable.
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Introduction

This thesis provides a unique exposition of the literary oeuvre of the first Ormond Professor of Music at the University of Melbourne, George William Louis Marshall-Hall. Marshall-Hall’s written works register some of the key philosophical, scientific, and political debates that raged in English and Australian publications, correspondence, lecture halls, and drawing rooms 1888–1915. By showing Marshall-Hall’s changing role in these debates, both in print and in private correspondence, this thesis presents a more nuanced analysis of Marshall-Hall’s biography within the intellectual climate of his time than has hitherto been available.

Marshall-Hall has been steadily revisited for biographical renovation and as part of larger cultural-historical studies over the past three-quarters of a century. In tracking his selection for the Ormond Chair in 1891, scandal in 1898, effective dismissal in 1900, and return to the Ormond Chair months before his death in 1915, scholars have sought to identify the major social conflicts of late nineteenth-century English and Australian culture. “The Case of The Dismissed Professor,” as Kenneth Hince put it in 1958, has variously been taken to reveal distemper between religious and secular authority within the University of Melbourne (Blainey 118), Melbourne’s temperance movement and bohemians (Dunstan 189–91; Radic, “A Man Out of Season” 203), Hebraists and Hellenists (Turnbull; Rich, “Hellenism and Hebraism”), and conservatives and liberals (Clark 412; Docker 58).

If one aspect of Marshall-Hall’s biography has been repeatedly evoked to justify his case as symptomatic of wider conflicts in Australian cultural history, it has been his prominent role as a reader, author, lecturer, and socialite. However, in furnishing their studies with claims about his intellectual activities, scholars have often painted Marshall-Hall as a monochromatic ideologue of one colour or another. With

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1Marshall-Hall’s generation was the first in their family to hyphenate their last two names, those of their grandfather, the physiologist Marshall Hall, as explained in Joseph Rich’s Doctoral dissertation “His Thumb” 2. Scholars generally use the hyphenated form in deference to Marshall-Hall’s practice. Marshall-Hall and his brother will be distinguished in parenthetical citations by their first initials, though only John Edward Marshall-Hall will be distinguished by his first initial in the body of this thesis for ease of reading.

2Following Meirion Hughes’ work on nineteenth-century music journalism, I have used the term “English” rather than “British” in keeping with the language used by the subjects themselves who “tended not to use the ‘British’ adjective in cultural matters” 1. The term “British” will be employed to highlight the role of music in the British colonial project.
only fleeting references to the texts and social milieus that Marshall-Hall engaged with, scholars have appeared conflicted as to which ideas Marshall-Hall subscribed and how and when he came in contact with them. The three principal discrepancies addressed in this thesis revolve around the place of Herbert Spencer, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche’s writings in Marshall-Hall’s thought. The lack of scholarly consensus regarding Marshall-Hall’s intellectual life highlights the need for a study of his intellectual influences. Without such a study, scholars risk a simplistic understanding of this formative epoch in Australian history.

Marshall-Hall’s writings register, largely due to their lack of grand synthesis, an exemplary dialogue between idealist and vitalist philosophical discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. His interest in these discourses was largely expressed in response to evolutionary theories of the role of the artist in society, the development of criminal anthropology, and nationalist and labour politics leading up to and in response to the federation of the Australian colonies and the First World War. At times his writings invoked Herbert Spencer, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche’s systematic, scientific, or idealist thought; at other times they repeated the vitalist ideas of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Richard Wagner, and Thomas Huxley on the singularity of artistic experience. In tracing the use of these writers by Marshall-Hall and his contemporaries through published works, marginalia, and correspondence, this thesis shows how often conflicting idealist and vitalist readings were elicited in support of or against the historical events and social and cultural configurations of their time.

3 Spencer is not recognised as an influence on Marshall-Hall by Thérèse Radic and Warren Bebbington. Rich briefly discusses him in relation to Marshall-Hall’s later works “His Thumb” 161. This thesis shows that Spencer’s influence played an important role in his social movements and can be found in Marshall-Hall’s works throughout his life.

4 Rich criticises Radic and Bebbington for privileging Marshall-Hall’s reading of Schopenhauer over Nietzsche “His Thumb” 152. Scholars have tended to emphasise Marshall-Hall’s reading of Nietzsche, for which they rarely provide evidence Clark 412; Radic G. W. L. Portrait 15. This thesis argues that Nietzsche’s short-lived influence on Marshall-Hall in 1898–1900 cannot be taken as representative of his ideas as a whole.

5 This thesis argues that Schopenhauer’s ethical and metaphysical philosophy was wielded by Marshall-Hall from 1891 onwards, against Rich’s claim to the contrary “His Thumb” 152.

6 This thesis will not go into detail concerning Marshall-Hall’s dramatic or poetic works unless they have a direct relevance to his theoretical writings and intellectual biography. The influence of poets, novelists and playwrights upon Marshall-Hall’s writings is similarly expanded upon only in reference to his evocation of idealist and vitalist discourse. See appendix one for a chronological list of Marshall-Hall’s written works including poetic and dramatic works.

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The first chapter of this thesis details how Marshall-Hall’s London writings 1888–90 challenged the discursive divisions of English periodicals by providing one of the first significant engagements with Spencer’s evolutionary theory of music in Wagnerian journals. Once in Australia, his literary works divided the Australian press between those newspapers that were willing to overlook the anti-bourgeois and elitist implications of Wagner’s doctrine of the role of the artist in society, and those that were not. With his Spencerian lectures also garnering criticism from those who disagreed with his theory of the emotional signification of music, he reinforced his doctrine with appeal to Schopenhauer’s idealist metaphysics.

Chapter two, covering the period 1893–1900, is centred around “the Liedertafel moment,” or the speech in praise of war and against religion presented at a concert of the Melbourne Liedertafel on 1 August 1898. As has been shown, the speech shocked the Melbourne public and started a chain of events that led to his effective dismissal in 1900.7 In this speech Marshall-Hall adopted a vitalist nomenclature drawn from the first translations of Nietzsche’s works into English. It is argued that his vitalist reading of Nietzsche was an attempt to distance himself ideologically from what he saw as the self-interestedness and hypocrisy of idealist progressives leading up to the federation of the Australian colonies in 1901.

Throughout the next ten years, Marshall-Hall’s conflict with the growing Australian labour movement led to the downfall of the Marshall-Hall Orchestra in 1912, contributing to his choice to leave Australia for Europe in 1913. Chapter three explains how Marshall-Hall’s conservative and idealist views were reversed by his experiences producing his operas in London 1913–14. Confronted with London’s conservative cultural elite and disgusted by the faceless violence of the First World War, Marshall-Hall returned to Australia, and to a nationalist romanticism reminiscent of his 1888 socialist, vitalist, and Wagnerian views.

Despite my appeal to the antinomies of vitalism and idealism in the conflicts of Marshall-Hall’s age and my best efforts at literary aplomb, there is no overall dialectic or Geistesgeschichte at work in this thesis. Quite contrary to making overarching claims about philosophical, social, and political thought, this thesis shows that the

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7 For an account of the events leading up to Marshall-Hall’s dismissal, see Rich “His Thumb.” For a more general biography, see Thérèse Radic’s book *G. W. L. Marshall-Hall: A Biography and Catalogue.*
singular mutation of ideas on a social and historical level in English and Australian intellectual culture 1888–1915 can only be shown through close textual analysis of primary sources.

*Literature Review*

This thesis is a timely return to primary documents of Marshall-Hall scholarship. As the Australian historians Ann Curthoys and John Docker write in *Is History Fiction?*, “[h]istory wars . . . have a way of driving historians back to their sources, checking the relationship between historical narration and analysis on the one hand and the documentary and other records on the other” (232). Though nothing resembling the history wars surrounding major events such as the Gallipoli Campaign or the Frontier wars with indigenous Australians has ever been witnessed in regard to Marshall-Hall, he has nevertheless been represented in strikingly contradictory ways that beg to have their sources examined.

The earliest scholarly mention of Marshall-Hall recognises his importance as a literary figure. Ernest Scott’s *A History of the University of Melbourne* provides a first-hand account of the often playful way Marshall-Hall interacted with texts through copious marginal comments. Scott’s observations are particularly significant when considered in relation to the marginalia found in a volume of Nietzsche’s works belonging to Marshall-Hall. The volume exhibits not only Marshall-Hall’s blunt ripostes and exclamations, but also a level of sustained analytical thinking. In this thesis a similarity is demonstrated between Nietzsche’s personal and critical modes of reading and Marshall-Hall’s marginalia in the volume leading up to his 1898 scandal.

Only after Geoffrey Blainey’s account of Marshall-Hall’s dismissal appeared in his 1957 *Centenary History of the University of Melbourne* did Hince proclaim that “students have left G. W. L. Marshall-Hall inappropriately obscure, quite by-passing his memory in the scramble for Australian subjects” (25). Blainey highlights Marshall-Hall’s 1891–92 lectures for the University Extension Scheme as exemplifying the University of Melbourne’s reformist project to “stimulate an interest in higher learning” among rural and working people (113). Blainey contrasts the social reformist

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8 The volume is the 1896 edition of *The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, Twilight of the Idols*, and *The Antichrist* (hereafter *The Case of Wagner*) translated by Thomas Common and edited by Alexander Tille. See copy held at the National Library of Australia, RB MOD 2613.
aims of the University Extension Scheme with the University Council’s pandering to middle class Protestant opinion in the dismissal of Marshall-Hall, framing Marshall-Hall’s dismissal around questions of academic free speech and increasing religious influence within the University of Melbourne. This thesis builds on Blainey’s claim that the University Extension Scheme never quite reached its working class audience by examining Marshall-Hall’s lectures within and without the Extension Scheme. It is argued that many of the views Marshall-Hall expressed in 1898 conformed with middle class opinion at the time, and that the changing tone of Marshall-Hall’s public lectures brought on by his 1898 reading of Nietzsche’s works can be attributed to a personal antagonism against the progressive social thought of his contemporaries.

An understanding of the intense but short-lived impact of the 1896 Nietzsche volume on Marshall-Hall’s thought would also inform Keith Dunstan’s 1968 and Len Fox’s 1978 accounts of Marshall-Hall’s praise of war in the Liedertafel speech. In attacking Melbourne’s temperance movement and praising war in the same breath Marshall-Hall was not only reacting to local stimuli, but transmitting the language he had found, ostensibly only a few months earlier, in the introduction to the volume by its editor, Alexander Tille.

Through Thérèse Radic and Warren Bebbington’s theses of 1977 and 1978 respectively, the place of Marshall-Hall’s intellectual influences within Melbourne’s late nineteenth-century cultural history received their first extended treatment. In Some Historical Aspects of Musical Associations in Melbourne, 1888–1915 Radic provides an account of the key players in Marshall-Hall’s election to and dismissal from the Ormond Chair of Music. Of interest in this account is Radic’s work on Marshall-Hall’s early lectures in Australia that incited “the ridicule of the press” (Radic, “Some Historical Aspects” 718), though the intellectual sources of these lectures, as well as the intellectual underside to the moral outrage over his poetry Hymns Ancient and Modern, will be elaborated upon in this thesis.

Bebbington’s Master of Music thesis The Operas of G. W. L. Marshall-Hall considers Marshall-Hall’s writings importance to our understanding of his musical development. Bebbington provides twelve roughly chronological abstracts of Marshall-Hall’s ideas. While these abstracts, including an extensive bibliography of Marshall-Hall’s written works, provide a general introduction to Marshall-Hall’s ideas,
they suffer from a range of anachronisms and lacunae. Bebbington draws on writings within an eleven year span throughout which Marshall-Hall’s ideas changed dramatically (60). Spencer and Huxley’s significant intellectual influences on Marshall-Hall are marginalised in Bebbington’s account, possibly a symptom of scholars’ desires to romanticise Marshall-Hall’s Nietzschean and Schopenhauerian associations over his unmistakeable reading of English evolutionary theorists.

In 1980, 1982, and 2002 Radic provided invaluable expansions on her account of the case of Marshall-Hall through her variously republished biography and catalogue of the Marshall-Hall collection at the Grainger Museum. While Marshall-Hall’s intellectual influences are only fleetingly referred to, with an undue stress on German authors, Radic’s works most accurately represent the overall developments of Marshall-Hall’s thought. Radic notes the early influences from Wagner and Schopenhauer, though she also includes Nietzsche as an influence from this period (G. W. L. Portrait 15), for which there is little evidence before 1898. Marshall-Hall’s interaction with Australian artists, particularly Lionel Lindsay, is also referred to (15), though this thesis seeks to reverse Radic’s intimation, alongside Juliet Peers’ 1987 article, that the influenced flowed from the latter to the former. The argument that Lionel came under Marshall-Hall’s senior influence in his discovery of Nietzsche is here mounted upon a consideration of the publishing history of Nietzsche in Australia, Nietzsche’s appearance in the Lindsays’ autobiographies and letters, and the conditions under which Marshall-Hall and the Lindsays interacted. Most importantly, Radic identifies the movement from Marshall-Hall’s early “advocacy of Wagnerian theory” to “newer ideas” after 1907 that coincided with his musical turn towards Puccini’s operas (14). This thesis expands on Radic’s conjecture, showing that though his intellectual sources do not change during this period, his readings of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche take on a more idealist tone consonant with his desire for the clear melodies of Puccini and against what he saw as the fanciful “idealism” (G. Marshall-Hall, “Against Ideals”) of the Australian labour movement.

The 1981 volume of Manning Clark’s *A History of Australia* provided the benchmark for the next decade of scholarship into Marshall-Hall’s intellectual life,

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9 In keeping with the *Australian Dictionary of Biography Online Edition* entry for the Lindsay family by Bernard Smith, I refer to Lionel Lindsay by his full or first name to differentiate him from his brother Norman Lindsay, to whom this thesis also makes substantial reference.
albeit marred by a lack of understanding of the changes in Marshall-Hall’s thought already flagged by Radic. In reference to the First World War, Clark claimed that Marshall-Hall “and the bourgeoisie were in agreement,” that he “was a vitalist and war was evidence of vitality; war determined the worth of a man: war distinguished the full-blooded from the degenerate” (412). Clark clearly drew from the 1898 Liedertafel speech in arguing for Marshall-Hall’s vitalism, which Clark unjustifiably attributes to his becoming familiar with Nietzsche’s philosophy “from the lectures of his followers in England” (163). In 1898 Marshall-Hall and the bourgeoisie certainly were in agreement that war was a good thing, but Marshall-Hall rejected these ideas upon his return to Australia in 1915. For the next decade scholars would tacitly accept this interpretation of Marshall-Hall’s intellectual life.

In 1984 and 1986 two theses from the History department of the University of Melbourne sought to contextualise Marshall-Hall’s dismissal within Matthew Arnold’s cultural dichotomy of Hebraism and Hellenism. In framing the conflict between Marshall-Hall and his Protestant contemporaries within Arnold’s dichotomy, Martin Turnbull’s Honours dissertation and Joseph Rich’s Doctoral dissertation both caricature Marshall-Hall’s intellectual life as vitalist, Hellenic and Nietzschean. These arguments are mounted at the cost of an understanding of Marshall-Hall’s idealism. This thesis argues against Rich’s assertion that it is “radically misleading” (152) to consider Schopenhauer’s idealism a major influence upon Marshall-Hall’s thought. Rich’s argument that Marshall-Hall did not subscribe to the ascetic ethical imperatives of Schopenhauer’s philosophy against Marshall-Hall’s repeated profession of his debt to the philosopher does not stand to scrutiny. Marshall-Hall did relate Schopenhauer’s ascetic ethical doctrine in his lectures, and Rich’s attempt to find analogues between Marshall-Hall’s thought and twentieth-century developments in psychology by Sigmund Freud and Karl Jaspers, highlighting the inaccessibility of the noumenal, or “unconscious” will, except in the most profound moments of artistic experience (155–56), provides a reasonable facsimile of those aspects of Marshall-Hall’s thought that might be more accurately labelled “Schopenhauerian.”

Turnbull’s thesis is more convincing in its use primary texts and newspaper evidence to suggest that Marshall-Hall was an important mediator of Nietzsche’s

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writings into Australian cultural life. Turnbull cites the similarity of the prefaces of *Twilight of the Idols* and *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (32), while also recognising Marshall-Hall’s debt to Spencer in the 1899 “The Essential in Art” lecture series (39). Though Turnbull did not have the space to elaborate on these themes and peruse Marshall-Hall’s copy of *The Case of Wagner*, which may have led to a less simplistic association of Nietzsche’s thought with Marshall-Hall’s vitalism, his account of Marshall-Hall’s dismissal is especially valuable for its detailing how the Australian press arranged itself for or against Marshall-Hall and the literature he espoused (32).

In contrast to Clark’s account, in 1991 Docker referred to Marshall-Hall as the “socialist . . . Wagnerite” beloved of *The Bulletin* (58), evoking Marshall-Hall’s earlier principles to associate him with Australia’s bohemian cultural elite. Recent scholarship by Peter Tregear has also turned away from Clark’s bourgeois vitalist, arguing that Marshall-Hall’s reading of Nietzsche invigorated his musical engagement with the Australian landscape, albeit construed in Wagnerian terms (“European Sounds”). This thesis is not an attempt to rehabilitate Clark’s warmongering Nietzschean, nor the socialist Wagnerite of Docker’s summary. Closer attention to Marshall-Hall’s writings would only have provided both historians with more damning (or favourable, depending on your point of view) evidence to fuel their own preconceptions.

With further revisions to Radic’s biography and a conference on Marshall-Hall projected for the near future,11 much research is currently underway dealing with aspects of Marshall-Hall’s life that are outside of the focus of this thesis. I have particularly refrained from addressing the much speculated-upon exchange of ideas associated with Symbolist art between Marshall-Hall and Australian artists. Nevertheless, this thesis makes evident the point that closely tracking the textual evidence of an author paints a radically different picture of a figure’s public life than more general historical accounts.

**Methodology**

According to scholars of nineteenth-century intellectual history, idealism and vitalism are a problematic couple. A common approach to their exposition is to consider

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idealism a product of, or corroborated by, vitalist beliefs, as do Michael Roe and Tom Gibbons in their studies of vitalism in Australian progressive social thought and evolutionary theory in England (Gibbons 5; Roe 1–2). However, Marshall-Hall evidently wrestled with the concepts throughout his life, not always holding them in a consonant or supportive relationship to one another. Insomuch as Marshall-Hall wrote in 1907 that “German idealism has produced much in this world, even a Kant and a Bismarck: but, before all and above all, German music” (“German Music”), it would seem inappropriate to equate idealism with Kant’s foundational idealist project to determine what can be known from the standpoint of purely rational or 
\textit{a priori} knowledge, without any knowledge through experience, or \textit{a posteriori} knowledge. Marshall-Hall would have been in direct disagreement with Kant, who relegated music to an after-dinner pastime, degrading it as merely a “play” of “sensations” without any rational concept (202).

To Marshall-Hall, German idealism was represented principally by Schopenhauer’s Platonic doctrine wherein “music portrays \textit{directly} the Eternal Ideas” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis) (“Pathetic”). In privileging \textit{a priori} knowledge, Schopenhauer argues, Kant was “one-sided,” debarring the noumenal, or the outside world, from informing philosophy (3: 6). Since the Eternal Ideas were noumenal, seated in the world rather than in the mind, Schopenhauer advocated for scientific method in philosophical enquiry, praising Marshall-Hall’s grandfather’s work in reflexology throughout his \textit{World as Will and Idea} (1: 151; 2: 133, 483; 3: 6). Marshall Hall’s studies in reflexology supposedly bridged the gap between philosophy as metaphysics and mere “materialism,” or observations of experiences, because they gave the philosopher knowledge about “the immaterial substance, soul” (3: 6). Schopenhauer believed that the world was moved by the “soul,” “force,” or “will” of nature (1: 145–46). Reflexes, to Schopenhauer, were “expressions of will” (1:151), for “[t]he will itself is present in the whole organism, since this is merely its visible form” (2: 483).

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\textsuperscript{12} As is evident from “Debate,” Marshall-Hall exhibited familiarity with Plato’s \textit{Republic} from as early as 1888. Books 3–7 present Plato’s theory of the Eternal Ideas as objective forms existing independently of our knowledge of them. For discussion of Plato’s ideas in relation to music, see Plato \textit{Republic} 3.398–403.

\textsuperscript{13} For a biographical study of Marshall-Hall’s grandfather, Marshall Hall, see Manuel.
Following Schopenhauer’s juxtaposition of will and idea in *World as Will and Idea*, rather than Kant’s idealist project, “idealism” is here broadly defined as any philosophical or intellectual endeavour that privileges a “principium individuationis” or “principal of individuation” that allows for measurement and discussion of things in the world. ¹⁴ To Schopenhauer the *principium individuationis* of time and space allowed for the presentation of the singular will as intelligible Ideas (Schopenhauer 146). Non-representational music, to Schopenhauer, provided the form or structure of the otherwise non-representable will to human experience (1: 334–35). Evolutionary theories of music, particularly Herbert Spencer’s, are here considered idealist because they placed music within the purview of science, attempting to show how music evolved alongside speech as a definite language of the emotions. ¹⁵

In contrast to idealism, I follow Michael Roe and his work *Nine Australian Progressives: Vitalism in Bourgeois Thought 1890–1960* in defining “vitalism” as the belief in an omnipresent, unquantifiable “life-force” that gave rise to an ideological “quest for new sources of creativity, which might enrich every part of man’s being and life” in late nineteenth-century social thought (1–2). Though Roe principally traces vitalism to Henri Bergson’s “élan vital” and Nietzsche’s “will to life” (13), the term can also apply to romantic aesthetic doctrines that privileged the singularity of artistic experience (2). As such, the term can also be employed for interpretations of Schopenhauer’s “will” as life-force, especially when referring to heightened musical experience, that neglect its Platonic “objectification” (Schopenhauer 332–33). Schopenhauer’s philosophy will therefore be discussed as either idealist or vitalist, according to the way in which it was invoked by Marshall-Hall and his contemporaries.

¹⁴ The distinction between the *principium individuationis* and undifferentiated force was developed by Nietzsche into his “Apollonian” and “Dionysian” modes of art in *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music*, first published in English by its later title *The Birth of Tragedy: Or, Hellenism and Pessimism*. Though *The Birth of Tragedy* did not appear in English until 1909 and Marshall-Hall did not make the distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian modes of art in his writings, Nietzsche’s distinction prefigured the antinomies that Marshall-Hall and his contemporaries faced in their discussions around art, science, and politics.

¹⁵ See Herbert Spencer, “The Origin and Function of Music.” Providing a methodological precedent for this thesis, German idealist and Spencearian philosophy is also taken as a united intellectual force against religious and mystic philosophy in Francis Smith’s Master of Arts thesis in the History Department of the University of Melbourne 11.
Just as it is important to distinguish idealist Schopenhauerism from vitalist Schopenhauerism, so it is necessary to distinguish idealist Wagnerism from vitalist Wagnerism. Idealism appeared in Wagner’s writings with his conversion to Schopenhauer’s philosophy in the mid-1850s (Rather 63). Wagner’s early writings did not consider music’s relationship to Platonic Ideas. Rather, they suggested that a culture’s particular music sprang from its members feeling a “common need” as part of a universal spiritual force called “Necessity” (73–77), analogous to Schopenhauer’s “will” but betraying its Idea-less origin in the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach (Ellis in Wagner Art-Work xi).

The importance of distinguishing between different moments of an author’s intellectual development is illustrated by Roe’s generalisation that the vitalist “[j]oy in order and in work, supernationalism, heroic morality, propaganda, elitism, [and] the leader principle” all found themselves manifest in the fascisms of Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany (13). While the legacy of vitalism in fascist governments of the twentieth century is not the topic of this thesis, Roe’s dictum would have benefitted from being informed by Peter Viereck’s identification of Wagner’s nationalistic socialism as a synthesis of idealist and vitalist doctrines:

Wagner’s originality . . . lay in adapting the romantic values to another age. Not to the past, not even to his own age, but to the age his nerves foresaw of complete material and spiritual mechanisation. Thereby he found the synthesis for which he had groped for all his life: Schopenhauer plus Feuerbach: Volk plus communism: circus plus bread: National Socialism. (125)

Clark’s claim that Marshall-Hall was a Nietzschean “vitalist” (412) would similarly benefit from the consideration of Marshall-Hall’s marginal annotation—provided in this thesis—of the first volume of translations of Nietzsche’s works into English. While Marshall-Hall’s volume of Nietzsche’s works has been known to scholars since Hince’s 1958 article, the insights that it affords into the transformation of Marshall-Hall’s ideas around the time of the Liedertafel address and his relationship with the solicitor and criminal anthropologist Marshall Lyle have not yet been
thoroughly drawn out. This thesis extends the notions of idealism and vitalism to a consideration of Nietzsche and Marshall-Hall’s marginalia, showing that both authors exhibited personalised, passionate, irrational, or vitalist marginalia alongside reasoned, idealist annotations. It is shown that through this discursive process, Marshall-Hall made both vitalist assertions and idealist arguments, determining that Nietzsche’s will to power was the proper conclusion of Schopenhauer’s observations of life.

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16 Lyle communicated with Marshall-Hall through four signed annotations on the contents page of The Case of Wagner. The similarity of the marginalists’ signatures may have contributed to this second interlocutor being overlooked in Hince’s analysis.

17 As it is customary to provide a portrait of the subject of a biographical study, I have included Arthur Streeton’s 1892 portrait of Marshall-Hall, scrawled on the front of an envelope to Tom Roberts (see fig. 1) to highlight the importance of marginal communication in the writing of intellectual history.
Chapter One (1888–92): From Biscuit Box to the Ormond Chair

*Herbert Spencer and Wagnerism in London*

Marshall-Hall’s London publications of 1888–90 see the composer harnessing Spencer’s evolutionary theory of music in support of Wagner’s “advanced” school of composition. In doing so, Marshall-Hall’s writings exemplify the crumbling division between general interest and music periodicals that were limited in their content by the music catalogues of their publishers. By using Marshall-Hall’s publications to illustrate conflicts between the vitalist literary culture of the “gallery” and the idealist literary culture of the “stalls” with their respective musical heroes Wagner and Arthur Sullivan, this chapter shows that divisions along vitalist and idealist lines were a greater determinant to an article’s place of publication than their literary genre. By introducing Spencer’s idealist theory to Wagnerian publications, Marshall-Hall staked a claim on the growing interest in Wagner’s idealist theories propagated by Marshall-Hall’s editor at *The Musical World*, Francis Hueffer. This claim, through those that it angered and those that it impressed, would be translated into his selection for the Ormond Chair of Music in 1890.

Marshall-Hall’s 1888 article for *The Musical World* “Music as a Development of Speech” provided one of the first extended expositions of Spencer’s theory of the evolution of music in English music periodicals. Though he did not cite Spencer in the article, Marshall-Hall later attributed his ideas to Spencer in *The Monthly Musical Record*, writing that “[i]n the columns of *The Musical World* I endeavoured a short while ago, to show how speech acting upon musical sound had produced what Herbert Spencer aptly terms ‘an idealised language of the emotions’” ("Music as a Religious" 150). The turn of phrase “idealised language of the emotions” is drawn from Spencer’s theory of education, a collection of articles republished in 1861 as *Education: Intellectual, Moral and Physical*. In *Education*, Spencer argues that “music is but an idealization of the natural language of emotion; and . . . consequently, music must be good or bad according as it conforms to the laws of this natural language” (*Education* 18).

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18 The terms “advanced” and “progressive” are used interchangeably in the Anglophone press throughout the late nineteenth century to describe the late romantic style whose proponents were variably seen to be Wagner, Franz Liszt, Robert Schumann, and even Félix Mendelssohn. See “Mr. D'albert”; “London Symphony”.

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Though the text is not identified, Marshall-Hall’s *Musical World* article reflects the first blow in the 1857–90 debate between Spencer, Charles Darwin, and Edmund Gurney:¹⁹ Spencer’s “The Origin and Function of Music.”²⁰

The muscles that move the chest, larynx, and vocal chords, contracting like other muscles in proportion to the intensity of the feelings; every different contraction of these muscles involving, as it does, a different adjustment of the vocal organs; every different adjustment of the vocal organs causing a change in the sound emitted;—it follows that variations of voice are the physiological results of variations of feeling. (Illustrations 214)

Or in Marshall-Hall’s words from “Music as a Development of Speech”:

The nerve centres excited by various emotional stimuli contract the muscles, and this in the case of those of the chest and larynx produce sound. Such movements, at first accidental and purposeless, become in time inseparably associated with the emotional state which originated them, and so become an index or expression of it. (958)

While the debate made its way from scientific and general interest journals to the pages of music periodicals in the early 1880s, it drew less engagement from English music periodicals than from their German and French counterparts.²¹ Spencer first appeared in the English musical press in an anonymously authored article for *The Musical Times* in 1883 that briefly compared Spencer and Schopenhauer’s theories of

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¹⁹ Spencer’s theory was published first as “The Origin and Function of Music” in Fraser’s Magazine for Town and Country for 1857, followed by Darwin’s theory and riposte to Spencer in *The Descent of Man*. Gurney took them both to task in his 1876 article in *The Fortnightly Review* in “On Some Disputed Points in Music,” repeating his arguments from the 1866 book *The Power of Sound*. Spencer had the last word, publishing a response to the authors once they were both dead in the 1890 article “The Origin of Music.” For a thorough account of the exchange between Darwin, Spencer, and Gurney see Kivy.

²⁰ The most readily available publication of this work in 1888, along with other works that Marshall-Hall referred to during this period, was Spencer’s collection of essays *Illustrations of Universal Progress*. For instance, “Bain on the Emotions and the Will” 300–24 in Marshall-Hall’s “Education” and the doctrine of evolution from the simple into complex from “Manner and Fashion” 61–114 in “Chair”.

²¹ The debate was summarised by Carl Stumpf in the 1885 article for Vierteljahrsschrift für Musikwissenschaft, “Musikpsychologie in England.” The Gazzetta musicale di Milano published a translation of Spencer’s original work in 1880, and an extended discussion of the topic was serialised in La Revue et Gazette musicale de Paris in the same year, its last year of publication. Similarities between Wagner and Spencer’s ideas might have been recognised by Camille Benoit, the author of *La Revue’s* article, who, according to K. Ellis, was probably discouraged from publishing directly on Wagner’s theories.
music (“How to Account for It”). Marshall-Hall did not merely summarise Spencer’s position, but used his idealist theory and its evaluative implications for music pedagogy to justify the music of his bohemian musical coterie.

In 1888 Marshall-Hall cited the composer and virtuoso pianist Eugen D’Albert, the student of Liszt who rejected his English upbringing and early musical education (“Mr. D’albert”), in condemning the “narrow, base views of art” propagated in English schools of music (“Music: Some Faults” 155). In justifying the superiority of Teutonic music, Marshall-Hall drew on Wagner’s theories that found unwitting support in Spencer’s theory of evolution.

In the polemic article “National Opera,” Marshall-Hall used Spencer’s theory of the evolution of music to ratify Wagner’s theory of musical nationalism from The Art-Work of the Future, a work that he would have read in the original German before its translation in 1892. To Wagner, German music, and Beethoven’s late symphonies in particular, transcended national particularity and attained the status of “universal art” (126). Unlike French and Italian music, German music was seen to be the simple expression of the character of a “Folk,” generally “propertyless,” moved by the force, using a term drawn from Feuerbach,22 of “Necessity” in a “common need” (73–77). The same terms rang through Marshall-Hall’s article, where he defined the “nation” as “a conglomerate body of the world’s workers … whom a common want, a common necessity, has bound together in mutual friendship.” To Marshall-Hall, national music was therefore “that which is based on, and has its origin in, the characteristics of the nation,” a prescription that one would think opened the door to a theory of national particularity. Rather, Marshall-Hall repeated the Spencerian argument that music was “merely a development of the emotional side of speech, its naturally evolved sequel.” Following Wagner, Marshall-Hall argued that

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22 Wagner’s translator, William Ashton Ellis, identifies Feuerbach’s influence in Wagner’s use of the terms “need” and “Necessity” in the preface to the volume: “On the very first page of the Art-work we have these terms employed in a sense which, thought its substance foreshadows the ‘Will-to-live’ of Schopenhauer, yet takes its form from Feuerbach’s ‘Whence, then is the world? From Want (Noth) is it, form Need, from Necessity. But not from a necessity which lies in another essence (Wesen) cut off from itself—which is a sheer contradiction—but from its most own, most inner necessity, from the necessity of Necessity’” (Ellis’ emphasis). As Ellis elaborates, though Feuerbach was an idealist philosopher who “professed to abhor abstractions,” Wagner used them in a vitalist sense to justify his theory of musical nationalism in “terms of abstract nomenclature” Ellis in Wagner, Art-Work xi.
[w]e can at once detect and imitate the peculiar devices which distinguish . . . different styles—a trick of the pen merely. And if every musical thought be expressed in the most direct and simple way, we shall find, to our surprise perhaps, that the music has become—German! The Germans have no style. The German heart is apparently too full, and withal too naive to seek a style. (“National Opera”)

Marshall-Hall’s project for an English national music was then a pursuit of German music on English soil, or in his own words, “England will only attain a worthy style of her own when she gives birth to a composer who, disdaining particularity, takes his place by the side of Wagner, Beethoven, Schubert—not German but world composers” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis). Wagner’s doctrine of the superiority of German music was assimilated as a tacit corollary to Spencer’s evolutionary theory.

The resulting theoretical apparatus chimed with the existing antipathy London’s liberal, intellectual Wagnerites of the gallery and the newspaper music critics of the stalls. In 1914 Marshall-Hall recalled the feuding between the two parties that shook London towards the end of the nineteenth century:

> In those seventies and eighties the whole musical world was convulsed with the quarrels of the Wagnerites and anti-Wagnerites. . . . Only those living in European musical circles can have any idea of the ferocity with which this storm in a tea-pot raged. (“On Music” 28 May)

George Bernard Shaw remarked upon Marshall-Hall’s gallery advocacy of the advanced school when he described Marshall-Hall as “a representative of young genius, denouncing the stalls, trusting to the gallery, waving the democratic flag, and tearing around generally” (136). Marshall-Hall perpetuated this image of the bohemian Wagnerites of the gallery in his 1914 reminiscence, recalling that a group of them attended a concert of Gioachino Rossini’s *Semiramide* at Covent Garden to protest the insult to art from the gallery. After being thrown out by the police, the group “paraded the streets with wild gestures, furious, indignant, a wonder to the passers-by.”

Marshall-Hall’s reminiscence also suggests that the gallery Wagnerites pursued their own literary culture.

The literary culture of the gallery Wagnerites was alluded to by Marshall-Hall when he claimed that they “were the revolutionary, the enlightened, the liberal, thinkers” (“On Music” 28 May). Gallery antics were accompanied by outbursts in the
press, with Marshall-Hall echoing Spencer’s condemnation of “the swarms of worthless ballads that infest drawing-rooms, as compositions which science would forbid” (Education 42). As Marshall-Hall echoed:

Shall we Englishmen, who pride ourselves on manliness and self-control, who affect to despise all that is maudlin and unheroic, and are ashamed that a truth-speaking tear should stain our cheeks, shall we for ever whine forth love-sick, mock-sentimental ballads which ridicule our hearts, and shame our self-respect? (“Music: Its Place”)

Though he bemoaned his 1880s poverty, Marshall-Hall’s background and education placed him in a privileged position to make overtures to the group’s intellectual activities. His contribution of Spencer’s theory to gallery periodicals stemmed from the philosophical, literary, and scientific education instigated by his grandfather, a well-known physiologist.23 The senior Marshall Hall expected his son (Marshall-Hall’s father) to excel in subjects such as philosophy, art and languages, “the subjects lacking in Hall’s early curriculum” (Manuel 27). The elder Marshall Hall also informally schooled his son in the sciences, corresponding with the geologist Professor J. D. Forbes on his behalf (Manuel 28). Similar foci of science and languages can be found between Marshall-Hall and his father’s educations, with the young musician possibly studying chemistry at King’s College (G. Marshall-Hall, “Ethics”; Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 7), maintaining a life-long interest in botany (Bebbington 42), and claiming proficiency in five languages when applying for the Ormond Chair (G. Marshall-Hall, “Application”).

As a scientist by birth and a musician by force of will,24 Marshall-Hall was uniquely positioned to participate in London’s music writing industry at a point when

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23 There is disagreement between Marshall-Hall scholars as to the influence of Marshall-Hall’s father upon his early life, as evident in Rich, “His Thumb” 340; Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 7. This thesis presents the original argument that Marshall-Hall’s intellectual life, and the events of his professional and personal life that surrounded it, developed with a debt to his family rather than in spite of it. Writing was also a family affair, with his brother John Edward Marshall-Hall recalling that they “amused themselves by bringing out a weekly paper” when G. Marshall-Hall was fourteen (“Particulars”). J. Marshall-Hall also provided commentaries on Wagner’s operas in The Magazine of Music and The Musical World, debating Tristan Und Isolde in the latter with his brother, who assumed the pseudonym “Siegfried II.” See J. Marshall-Hall, “Literary Side” and “Tristan”. For G. Marshall-Hall’s response, see “To the Editor of the ‘Musical World’”.

24 Marshall-Hall’s musical studies, whether opposed by his family or not, appear to have been inspired and persistent J. Marshall-Hall, “Some Particulars”.
the content of general interest and music journals converged. According to Leanne Langley, where music periodicals once struggled to find a market for the “hybrid” format that brought together printed music and discursive writing, publications such as *The Musical World* flourished in the late nineteenth century with their critical and speculative content (587–88). Even hitherto church and vocal music-oriented publications such as *The Musical Times and Singing Class Circular* saw the adoption of the “broad English view of music” exhibited in the general press “which placed serious articles on Beethoven, Wagner, Italian opera, and national music alongside articles in history and political economy, literary criticism, and fiction” (587). Marshall-Hall’s London publications show that the idealist or vitalist content of particular articles constituted a greater determinant as to where they were published than, as Langley argues, their broadly journalistic, critical, or speculative genres (585). As such, they reveal the role of individual editorial and authorial preferences in the spread of evolutionary thought in nineteenth-century music periodicals.

Despite their shared propensity for carrying speculative writing, subsidised periodicals of the stalls such as *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Musical Times*, and independent publications of the gallery including *School* and *The Musical World*, were divided by their idealist and vitalist allegiances, manifest in their advocacy of the music of Arthur Sullivan and Wagner respectively. Wagner’s translator William Ashton Ellis referred to this division and the difficulties it posed for the publication of Wagner’s works when he bemoaned “the difficulty of making any musical journals ‘pay’ in England, unless it be the organ of a great music-publishing house” (15). The first translation of Wagner’s Feuerbachian book *Opera and Drama* appeared in *The Musical World* 1855–56 in a notoriously poor translation (Sessa 25). While *The Musical World* was originally a mouthpiece for J. Alfred Novello’s publishing house, in 1837 the publication was bought by Frederick Davison. Under Davison the publication “excelled in its verve and controversial edge” (Hughes 85–88). The

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25 See Hughes; Langley. A dedicated consideration of the socio-political basis of this convergence is yet to appear, though Hughes has hazarded the rise in cheap newspapers after the Newspaper Act of 1855 as a cause. King cites the spread of literacy after the Education Act of 1870 as a general tonic to late nineteenth-century periodical culture 41.

26 Anne Dzamba Sessa relates commentary on the poor translation: “William Archer wrote in *The Magazine of Music* 18 April 1866, that ‘a schoolboy translating Goethe with a dictionary and grammar, and retaining the exact order of words would produce a sufficiently ludicrous result. This was the procedure adopted by the translator of Wagner who seems, however, to have made scant use of the Grammar’” 153n.
conditions under which Wagner’s vitalist, Feuerbachian work and Marshall-Hall’s Spencerian “Music as a Development of Speech” appeared were markedly different due to the editorial rationale of the idealist Wagnerite Francis Hueffer.

Hueffer’s editorial rationale brought the periodical into Marshall-Hall’s price range and was welcome to the idealist as well as reformist tone of Marshall-Hall’s writings. In 1886 Hueffer lowered the price of The Musical World from 4d, which was a high price compared to the subsidised Musical Times at 1½d (Hughes 86), in order to “bring [The Musical Times] within reach of all classes of musical readers” (Hughes 13). Hueffer no doubt brought the periodical within the means of Marshall-Hall’s gallery Wagnerians, short as they were of clothing, transport, and even food. Ella Winter recalls Marshall-Hall seeking work with his overcoat buttoned up to hide his lack of a collar, an item that would have cost as much as The Musical Times under Davison’s editorship (Patterson). In 1914 Marshall-Hall recalled (with a sense of the voluntary poverty to which they subjected themselves) that he and his friends were all heroic for tragedy. . . . In our fervid imaginations there was significance in the eating of a slice of bread and butter (to say the truth, we often had to do without the latter), and we accompanied the process in our musical mind’s eye, or rather ear, with terrific death-motives on a gigantic orchestra—much as Richard Strauss does, when, in his ‘Domestic Symphony,’ the mother smacks the baby. (“On Music” 28 May)

How could Marshall-Hall have afforded butter (at 1s per week (Patterson)) when even “twopence for the ‘bus was more than [he] could manage” (“On Music” 28 May)? Winter recalls the story that Marshall-Hall sought work with his coat buttoned up to hide his lack of a collar, a garment that cost only 4d. If work as a singing and composition teacher and an orchestral and choral conductor at the London Organ School and Instrumental College of Music (Rich, “His Thumb” 5) barely kept Marshall-Hall out of homelessness and forced him to compose seated on a biscuit box (Winter), then supplementing his income with music writing was an important part of his livelihood.

It is not surprising, then, that Marshall-Hall would capitalise on the spread of Hueffer’s idealist Wagnerism. Beyond economic reforms, Hueffer brought a knowledge of Wagner’s Schopenhauerian works to the journal, having published a
treatment of Wagner’s Schopenhauerian doctrine in 1874 entitled *Richard Wagner and the Music of the Future*. Hueffer’s editorial rationale was a political one, privileging the language of “‘reform,’ ‘renewal’ and ‘revolution’” (Hughes 28). As an idealist Wagnerian and liberal thinker, Hueffer opened the pages of *The Musical World* to the sorts of idealist speculative musical discourse that had boiled away in the general press for many years. Not least of these discourses was the debate between Darwin, Spencer, and Gurney. 27 Marshall-Hall’s dalliance with Hueffer’s paper, however, placed him at odds with London’s Sullivanite music journalists and their powerful allies.

From the vantage point of *The Musical World* and other reformist journals such as *School: A Medium for All Matters of Educational and Social Interest*, Marshall-Hall attacked the newspaper music critics and their periodicals that sought the future of English music in the “simple tunefulness” (Hughes 131) of Sullivan’s operas. According to J. Marshall-Hall, much of Marshall-Hall’s invective against newspaper music critics was aimed at Joseph Bennett, music critic for *The Daily Telegraph* 1870–1906, who wrote that “Wagner could not write a melody” (“Particulars”). In an article for *School*, Marshall-Hall condemned a critic, possibly Bennett, for referring to Arthur Sullivan as “a genius,” and calling Wagner’s works “bombastic noise” (“Progress”). Bennett’s *Letters from Bayreuth* certainly reflected these judgments, claiming that in Wagner’s *Das Rheingold* “[r]arely, indeed, do we come upon a passage that can strictly be called melodious, and, for the most part, the ear has to endure the musical equivalent of ‘bald, disjointed chat’” (41).

27 An objection may be raised here that the English music public was already beholden to musical idealism in the form of the music theorist Eduard Hanslick’s *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, first translated as *The Beautiful in Music* by Gustav Cohen in 1891. Bebbington argues that Marshall-Hall would have been familiar with the work, which was “famous by the 1880s,” and that he would have disagreed with its conclusions 61. Marshall-Hall would have opposed music theorists who sought to drive a wedge between “sensation” and “feeling” (or “emotion”) in aesthetic considerations Hanslick 20. It is also likely that Marshall-Hall would have disagreed with Gurney, who accepted Darwin’s theory that music evolved from mating calls rather than speech. Gurney developed a formalist conception of music wherein the instinct behind mating calls was sublimated into “Ideal Motion” *Power of Sound* 165. To Gurney, music gives rise to a range of affects that little resemble the amorous inspiration of mating calls, but his theory does not allow for Spencer’s one-to-one correspondence of emotions to musical phrases. Neither of these sources are mentioned or intimated by Marshall-Hall. Though Marshall-Hall could have read Hanslick in the original German, there is no reason to suggest that he did. The fact that Marshall-Hall’s vitalist Wagnerism relied upon the idealist basis of Spencer’s theory shows that his thought from this period was not, as Bebbington characterises it, simply “pro-Wagner” and “anti-Hanslick” Bebbington 71.
Marshall-Hall’s writings on political matters also brought him into conflict with Shaw, whose political views and criticism of progressive musicians infuriated the young socialist. Referring to Marshall-Hall, Shaw wrote that “[y]oung genius has rather a habit, by the way, of writing to my editor to denounce me as flippant and unenlightened” (136). Marshall-Hall’s conflicted social position felt the razor-edge of Shavian critique in response to his letter “The Music of the People”:

[S]ociety is not divided into ‘animated clothes-pegs’ on the one hand and lovers of Beethoven in ligatured corduroys on the other. For Beethoven purposes society is divided into people who can afford to keep a piano and go to operas and concerts, and people who cannot. Mr Marshall-Hall’s idea that the people who cannot are nevertheless screwed up to concert pitch by honest, thorough, manly toil, shews [sic] that, though he be an expert in the music question, in the labor question he is a greenhorn. (136)

Almost a year later Marshall-Hall would throw Shaw out of his office by his (4d) collar because of a review of the violinist Joseph Joachim of which the former did not approve (Winter).

Marshall-Hall’s place in the intellectual divisions of London’s music scene, and the furthest reaches of the British empire, are reflected in his successful application for the Ormond Chair of Music at the University of Melbourne in Australia, a position advertised at £1,000 a year (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 12). As close friend of Bennett, George Grove was in direct opposition to Hueffer and the Wagnerites. Bennett and Grove dined together with Sullivan (Bennett, Forty Years 106) and Grove described Hueffer as “a beggar on horseback” (Hughes 29). Radic suggests that “overtones of mild scandal surrounded tales of [Marshall-Hall’s] departure” from the Royal College of Music, then under the directorship of Grove, in

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28 Only later would Shaw become an advocate of Nietzsche’s philosophy, calling into question Clark’s suggestion that Marshall-Hall became familiar with Nietzsche’s writings during this period from “his followers in England” 163.
29 It should be evident by now that Marshall-Hall held no “vaguely socialist idealism,” as Radic suggests G. W. L. Portrait 9, but with his synthesis of Spencer and Wagner, a full-blown nationalist and socialist radicalism as Viereck identifies in Wagner’s synthesis of Feuerbach and Schopenhauer.
30 Bebbington cites Marshall-Hall’s letter to the editor as appearing in The Star 31 May 1889 (225), though on closer inspection the newspaper does not contain it. Copies are held in the GM and UMA scrapbooks.
31 Marshall-Hall may have been angered by the review of 28 February 1890 in which Shaw wrote that “Joachim scraped away frantically, making a sound after which an attempt to grate a nutmeg effectively on a boot sole would have been as the strain of an Aeolian harp” 332.
the early 1880s (G. W. L. Portrait 8). After Marshall-Hall’s death, Laver recalled that Grove’s positive testimonial for Marshall-Hall’s application for the Ormond Chair was the result of ill-feeling from he and others, who wanted Marshall-Hall “at the antipodes.” As Blainey writes, Grove “would never be happy until he was twelve thousand miles away” (115). With this in mind, Grove’s testimonial, highlighting Marshall-Hall’s intellectual achievements, glows suspiciously:

His knowledge of Music, theoretical and practical and his power of teaching it, gained during eight or nine years practice, are very great. He is a practised and able lecturer and has a wide knowledge of literature of various kinds and he has a remarkable power of exciting the interest and enthusiasm of his pupils. (Grove in G. Marshall-Hall, “Application”)

Twelve thousand miles away, the Ormond Chair of Music was being founded on reformist ground. Francis Ormond, whose £20,000 endowment established the Chair of Music at the University of Melbourne (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 7), may have welcomed the progressive writings of Marshall-Hall had he lived to meet him and as much as he would have despised his anti-clerical views.32 The editorial in The Age suggests that Ormond offered the endowment “to accomplish a measure of social reform,” following attempts in England “to draw the lower and, as has been tried in some cases, even the criminal classes, within the magic circle of pure artistic enjoyment” (“Editorial” 1885?)

Marshall-Hall’s application resounded with Ormond’s social aims, claiming that “so important a post can only be properly filled by a man who has not only a thorough mastery of the technique of music, but who has the power of imparting to others enthusiasm for what is great and noble, and whose elevating influence is such as will be felt throughout society.” This Marshall-Hall considered “the aim of [his] life,” referring the Council to the his Musical World, Magazine of Music, and School articles for “[t]he scientific grounds for this belief, and the manner in which such aims can be carried out” (“Application”). The deciding vote in Marshall-Hall’s election to the

32 As Tregear suggests, “it was a belated effort to preserve what was considered to be Ormond’s ideals after his death which was in part the downfall of the Ormond Chair’s first occupant” (Conservatorium 5). Ormond died of “overwork” on 5 May 1889 at Pau, France. For further biographical details, see Chambers.
chair, however, came from Sir William Robinson in consultation with Grove (Rich, “His Thumb” 7–8). Breaking a deadlock amongst the University Council, Robinson recommended Marshall-Hall for, amongst other accomplishments, being “a scholarly and original writer”, despite his “outspoken manner” (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 13).

Marshall-Hall’s London writings are well characterised by the critic who condemned his reliance, as a composer rather than as a writer, on “the most advanced methods of the Bayreuth revolutionist” (“London Symphony” 150). Combining idealism and vitalism, or method and revolution, Marshall-Hall’s London writings based politically and musically revolutionary ideas upon the science of his time. That Marshall-Hall set out to stake such a claim on evolutionary discourse can be traced to his familial influences, though the discursive fluidity of London music writing and the spread of idealist Wagnerism can also be cited as causes. This combination of discourses placed Marshall-Hall in the running for the Ormond Chair of Music. While Spencer’s reformism appealed to Australia’s progressive cultural elite, his outspoken Wagnerism may have hurried him out of England. As chapter two shows, Marshall-Hall spared little time in making his views known in Australia by reprinting his essays and presenting public lectures. While Marshall-Hall’s reformism was evident in his lectures for the University of Melbourne’s Extension Scheme, his philosophy of music took on a more elitist tone with the replacement of Wagner’s Feuerbachian vitalism with Schopenhauer’s theory of the will. In Schopenhauer’s idealism Marshall-Hall found a rival to Spencer’s theory of music, endearing himself to Australia’s artists and conflicting with Melbourne’s middle class in arguing for the primacy of music in education.

*The Schopenhauerian Turn*

Marshall-Hall arrived in Melbourne on 7 January 1891 (Radic, “Man out of Season” 200) and promptly set about disseminating his opinions in public lectures and the Australian press. Australian music periodicals had a habit of folding in their first year of publication until *The Australian Musical News* appeared in 1911. Without the outlet of local music journals the newspapers, primarily Melbourne’s weekly liberal

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33 For instance, *Williams’s Musical Annual and Australian Sketch Book* of 1858 and the *Illustrated Journal of Australasia* of 1855. For a more comprehensive list, see Fellinger.
paper *Table Talk* and conservative daily paper *The Argus*, printed Marshall-Hall’s lectures and articles. The papers’ reactions to Marshall-Hall’s lectures reveal the divisions between those who were willing to overlook the elitist implications of his vitalist Wagnerism and those who were not. With conservative and liberal papers alike approving of Spencer’s theories, Marshall-Hall used Melbourne as a testing ground for his theories of musical signification. The results of his Spencerian experiments came back negative and Marshall-Hall was cornered by criticism of his Wagnerian doctrine for its “unquestionable” claims. He responded not by tempering his views, but by rendering them beyond debate in Schopenhauerian terms.

Upon his arrival in Australia, the progressive paper *Table Talk* reported favourably on the musical reformer’s London music criticism. Founded by the Polish migrant journalist Maurice Brodzky in 1885, *Table Talk* was the source of whistle-blowing on fraudulent banking practices and parliamentary corruption that eventually saw its demise in 1893 (Cannon). As a fellow Spencerite, Brodzky named his first son “Leon Herbert Spencer Brodzky,” (later Spencer Brodney) possibly in honour of the philosopher that Marshall-Hall also held dear (Cannon).

*Table Talk* reprinted extracts from Marshall-Hall’s *Musical World* and *Magazine of Music* articles on 16 January 1891, along with the commendation:

That Mr. Hall [sic] has ideas of his own upon music and the way both to teach and to learn it, and also upon how we can most profitably listen to it, had been already made evident to those who had read some of his papers on music contributed to the English press.

The extracts from Marshall-Hall’s articles reflect the editor’s interest in his Spencerian theories. *Table Talk* highlighted Marshall-Hall’s critical *raison d’être* of communicating “the atmosphere of thought” of the composer, a view justified in Spencerian terms in “National Opera”:

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34 I have used the term “unquestionable” in place of the term “unfalsifiable” in order to use the parlance of Marshall-Hall’s time. The term “falsifiable” is here drawn from Karl Popper’s *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* of 1935, translated by the author. To Popper, the value of a scientific system lies not in whether it can be proven, but whether it is capable of being disproven: “I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a criterion of demarcation” 18. As is shown below, it was precisely the unfalsifiable and hence unscientific nature of Marshall-Hall’s Wagnerian claims that were criticised in *The Argus*. 

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Music for ever fixes the meaning intended by the author. . . . Every emotion has its equivalent in a musical phrase, which is susceptible of an incalculable number of modifications, each of which represents a shade of emotion.

Spencer’s theory of musical signification formed the basis of Marshall-Hall’s early lectures and his initial statements of intent in Australia raised little comment. At his inaugural lecture at the University of Melbourne, Marshall-Hall rehearsed his belief in the expressive and transformative power of music, claiming that

[m]usic to a musician is a language by which, even more definitely than by speech, it is possible to express his every emotion, simple or complex. . . . The lofty passions which lead to acts of heroism, the human sympathy which should be the foundation of morality and justice, he is enabled to let stream through his heart, creating within him noble and generous impulses. . . . Such is the meaning of music to me, and my energies will be chiefly devoted to make this meaning clear to others. (“Chair”)

He continued to explain, in Spencerian terms, that “[m]usic is then an idealised language of the emotions, capable of arousing, purifying, and sustaining these.” Marshall-Hall’s educational program also reflected his evolutionary theory of German musical supremacy, noting that the educational system he proposed was “based on what is sometimes called the German, but more properly might be termed the International School of Music.” He did not hesitate to elaborate on the Spencerian reasons for this choice:

If we accept Mr. Herbert Spencer’s definition of progress as the evolution of the simple into the complex, its applicability to the motions is readily perceived on comparing man in a savage and in a highly civilised state, especially as regards the emotion understood by sympathy, which is daily assuming more and more complex forms, modifying every successive human ideas [sic] of justice and morality. (“Chair”)

Spencer’s evolutionary theory did not function through Darwin’s principle of natural selection (Francis 296), but a cosmic principle of harmony in diversity, as Marshall-Hall explained:
Those who have studied the works of Darwin and his followers, though they may not agree with his deductions, must at least note the marvellous modifications which the physical organs have undergone, and the manner in which each primarily unimportant trait tends to become particularized and aggrandised in one or another animal; each atom endeavouiring, as it were, to follow out a distinct course, to adapt itself to a distinct use, to find for itself some distinct work to do, by which its own individuality may reach the highest perfection, and its capability find the most suitable employment. There is a fixed object to which life strains, or, ceasing to strain, dies. Music, too, must have this object—or die. (“Work” 137)

Marshall-Hall did not take Spencer’s theory of harmony in diversity to suggest that a plurality of musics could co-exist, but rather that the organs of the human body evolved to one perfect form of music: German music. Not only did Germany have the most advanced music, but also, according to Marshall-Hall, the most advanced emotions as well.

At this point, in 1891, Marshall-Hall evidently saw science and art as necessarily linked spheres of thought, arguing in his Queen’s College lecture entitled “Art, Artists, and Amateurs” that “[s]cience and art were sisters, and those who studied them should be brothers and sisters too.” A scientific approach to music criticism wherein the testimony of composers was verified against the critic’s reaction to the work appeared in Marshall-Hall’s Musical World series “The C Minor Symphony,” on Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 in C Minor, Op. 67. Portions of this series were republished in the Table Talk article of 16 January 1891. Informed by Spencer’s theory that music was a language of emotion, Marshall-Hall used biographical information to describe what he believed Beethoven to have felt when he composed the symphony: 36

How entirely definite was the design of this work in Beethoven’s mind, [sic] may be gathered from the ready and striking words with which this genius, to whom speech was usually a difficult labour, answered the query as to what caused him to write down those simple, yet

35 Darwin’s “follower” is Spencer, though Spencer’s own engagement with Darwin was one of assimilation, rather than discipleship. As Weikart clarifies, Spencer’s philosophy exhibited a theory of evolution via the inheritance of acquired characteristics drawn from Lamarck, not the Malthus (from whom Darwin borrowed), before the publication of The Origin of the Species in 1859 21.

36 Marshall-Hall is possibly drawing from the biography of Beethoven published by the composer’s secretary Anton Felix Schindler in 1860.
extraordinary four notes with which the Symphony opens—‘So knocks Fate at the door!’ (69)

His commitment to understanding the emotional state of the composer did not protect him from committing emotional anachronisms. In describing an interchange between wind and string instruments in the fifth symphony, he conjured Beethoven’s words provided as a subtext to the main themes of his string quartet no. 15.37

Exhausted, he appears to give up hope for the moment, and hold parley with the inflexible power within (bar 195). How pathetic is this question and answer, the contrast between the comparative feebleness of the wind and the firm mass of tone of the responding strings: “Must it be?” the former seems to ask. “It must be!” reply the latter. (117)

He testified that his theory of musical signification was “the result of many experiments” and that he had not “formed a theory and squeezed [his] facts into it by hydraulic pressure” (“Education”). “On the contrary,” he proclaimed, “I was only led to my present opinion by observing how in a number of different cases, consisting of widely different temperaments, a hearing of good music properly rendered produced the same result” (“Education”). For instance, he subjected a room-mate to nightly performances of Beethoven’s Sonata No. 10 in G Major, Op. 14, No. 2 until the poor, embattled Sullivanite admitted that it was “a grand thing” (“Education”). If Marshall-Hall’s lectures for the University Extension Scheme are considered an extension of his London “experiments,” then the results came back negative.

Like his London room-mate, Marshall-Hall attempted to reform Melbourne’s affects, fed as it was on the strains of “Offenbach, Gounod, Sullivan, Nicolai and Mendelssohn” (Bebbington 10). Scholars are unanimous that Marshall-Hall, driven by his ideas as much as his deeply felt love of music, dramatically improved the standard of music in Melbourne,38 a judgment that this thesis would not wish to disavow them of. It is nevertheless the case that as an experiment, Melbourne did not unanimously confirm the hypotheses of Marshall-Hall’s public lectures. The Herald published a scathing account of Marshall-Hall’s lecture on the opening motif of Beethoven’s fifth

37 For Beethoven’s subtext, see Beethoven 201.
38 See for instance Bebbington, “Operas” 9; Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 35.
symphony, highlighting the discord between Marshall-Hall’s intentions and his listeners’ reactions:

With infinite courage and delicious absence of any humour Mr Marshall Hall undertook to majestically strike these four awe-inspiring notes, and all the long-haired young gentlemen and short-haired young ladies in the audience tried, no doubt, to look as though when the gifted fingers of Mr Marshall Hall tinkled those four notes, they all heard the sound of Fate knocking at the door of Wilson Hall. (“Editorial” 4 Oct. 1892)

The Argus reported that London’s Daily News also questioned the possible experimental results of Marshall-Hall’s early Australian lectures:

All this is very fine. We dispute neither its eloquence nor the interest of a passage which shows how much a lively fancy can discover in five bars of music. But it is really what Mr. Marshall-Hall imposes upon Beethoven. The music says nothing of the kind, in test of which assertion let it be played to any number of intelligent hearers who have not been told how they must interpret it, their perception of its meaning being afterwards taken. We are prepared to abide by the result. (“Musical Notes”)

The London Illustrated News, reporting on the performance of a concert overture by Marshall-Hall in 1893, regretted that Marshall-Hall had sent a series of subtitles to the themes of his work. Though a consideration of Marshall-Hall’s musical works is beyond the scope of this thesis, the incident implies that he composed in much the same fashion as he analysed works, providing an approximation of the emotive signification of his work in language:

[A]pparently he has written this overture since he took up his residence in the Antipodes, since the manuscript was sent thence and accompanied by a letter to his brother, in which he endeavoured to explain the meaning of his various themes. The young composer would have done better had he spared himself the trouble of sending this elucidatory epistle. None was needed, and, as a matter of fact, his ‘mottos’ are calculated rather to puzzle than to assist the perceptive faculties of the hearer. (“Music”)
If readers were not frustrated by Marshall-Hall’s unconfirmed Spencerian hypotheses, they were infuriated by his Wagnerian corollary to Spencer’s theory, including his socialist rhetoric of national masses united under a universal work of art and his seething scorn for the middle class of which, with his “comfortable income of £1,000 a year” (“Music”), he was now firmly a part.

What prompted Marshall-Hall to unleash his vitalist Wagnerism at the 1 July 1891 public lecture “The Artist” is not known. Had his lecture been published in *Table Talk* it may have fallen before more sympathetic eyes, but his lecture was printed in *The Argus*, “the voice of Victorian conservatism” with “a thundering right-wing line in its editorials” (Murray 30). Here it was reported that Marshall-Hall attacked the man who “passes through life easily” and “takes quietly to his pipe and toddy” as engaging in “a subtle form of an evil selfishness.” He argued that by the complacent comfort and self-interest of the average man “[h]umanity becomes divided into a multitude of sections, . . . countries, nations, counties, families, individuals.” The role of the artist was “to change all this . . . by implanting in all mankind the desire of change.”

Confronted with what appeared a vitalist and elitist diatribe, *The Argus* sprang into the offence.

“This oracular declaration,” the following day’s editorial read, “will fall with some severity on the Melbourne public, which has been rather inclined to take pride in its scientific spirit” (“Editorial” 4 July 1891). To the critic from *The Argus*, Marshall-Hall’s Wagnerian doctrine was unscientific because it was a romantic assertion, and not evidentially based.

The lecture delivered on music and other matters by Marshall-Hall . . . has one obvious and distinctive merit. It calls for no criticism; it requires no explanation. If the reader is an artist, then he will understand that he has been ‘born into two worlds.’ . . . Should the reader, on the other hand, be unable to understand much of the rigmarole, he can placidly set himself down as one of the generality, who are unfitted to enter into the finer feelings.

39 By effectively dividing people into those who were born artists and those who were born “average,” “The Artist” can be read as a vindication of Clark’s claim that Marshall-Hall saw “[i]t was the duty of the elect to preserve and hand on to posterity culture unharmed by the ’untutored multitude’” 163. By the measure of what Marshall-Hall saw as the reformist and pedagogical mission of the artist, Clark’s claim that he sought to protect the cultural property of an elect few seems less tenable.
In fact, Marshall-Hall had unfavourably compared “the constantly changing bubbles of reason and science” to the “heaven” of art (“Artist”). Only the born artist had access to the latter with their acute sympathy for “the pressing, semi-conscious need of man” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis) (“Artist”). Marshall-Hall’s use of the term “need” was mocked as “evidently a mystic word that must always be printed in italics” (“Editorial” 4 July 1891). The Argus condemned the “bombast and unreality and unmeaningness of all this quasi-religious talk,” suggesting that “the world will probably jog on contentedly, affording him with good humour a quiet corner, in which he may deliver the curious mixture of phrases which he has learnt, without understanding, from the foolish Sturm und Drang period of German literature” (“Editorial” 4 July 1891).^{40}

Marshall-Hall planted his heels in response to the criticism of his Spencerian and Wagnerian doctrines, suggesting that the author of the “silly abusive rodomontade . . . [had] never heard of Herbert Spencer, Goethe, or Wagner” (“‘Artist’ in a Rage”). His response can be considered “symptomatic of Marshall-Hall’s inability to accept correction” (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 17). However, Marshall-Hall’s philosophy did, in fact, respond to the criticisms insofar as his lectures for the University Extension Scheme in 1891–92 provided the first evidence of Schopenhauer’s influence upon the composer.^{41} Marshall-Hall replaced his italicised, vitalist nomenclature with Schopenhauer’s theory of the will and the Platonic ideas from World as Will and Idea. With appeal to Schopenhauer, Marshall-Hall withdrew his equal respect for science and art. Schopenhauer’s philosophy invested the artist with unquestionable access to both scientific individuation and the will, giving the artist authority over the interpretation of works of art, as well as a fundamental role in presenting the public with the noumenal “source” (G. Marshall-Hall, “‘Artist’ in a Rage”) of scientific conjecture.

^{40} In condemning Marshall-Hall’s use of German literature, The Argus noted Marshall-Hall’s paraphrase of Wagner, the first and only example of Marshall-Hall directly referencing the composer’s ideas (see appendix one). In “The Artist” Marshall-Hall noted that “[m]usic, as Richard Wagner has said, is the realisation of the full capabilities of man. Music portrays to us man as he might be.” Marshall-Hall may have been paraphrasing Wagner from The Art-work of the Future, where the composer writes that “with one waive of the enchanter’s wand, will holy, glorious Art . . . show her fruitfulness, as the purest and most perfect satisfaction of the truest, noblest need of perfected mankind; i.e. of men who are all that which of their essence they can be, and therefore should and shall be” 82.

^{41} Apart from the Argus criticism, the fact that the University Extension Lectures formed a more academic medium for his ideas may have contributed to his bringing out this influence on his thought.
The reformist goals of the University Extension Scheme were described in an advertisement in Melbourne’s “centre-left” paper of the day *The Age* (Murray 30). According to the advertisement, the Extension Scheme was aimed at “people . . . evidently of various sorts and qualities; some from printing presses, others from counting houses, others from factories and shops, others from markets and ‘works’” (“University Extension”). The outcome of the Scheme was generally accepted not to be the conferral of certificates, but the building of informal ties between the staff of the University and local communities. Citing Toynbee Hall’s successful Extension Scheme, *The Age* published that it would be the greatest mistake to suppose that the mere acquisition of knowledge is all that comes out of the scheme. These students have formed both central and local ties. In the first place they have learnt to bring their difficulties to the lecturer and get his advice, and so doing they have found a valuable friend. . . . Surely it is no small thing that the barriers of distrust and ignorance, which separate class from class, and produce ill feeling and social danger, should be thus melted down.

Marshall-Hall took his role as an Extension lecturer seriously, for his lectures demonstrate the justification of his beliefs that his other public lectures lack. It appears that his 1892 Geelong Extension lecture “The Education of the Future” was one long justification of his riposte to the critic from *The Argus* that he held no “contempt for logic and reason” and that his criticism of science did not apply to the “true scientist” who “regards not the bubbles, but their source” (“‘Artist’ in a Rage”). By following Schopenhauer in regarding empirical observations capable of proving that the “source” of scientific observation was a universal, noumenal will, Marshall-Hall both presented an illogical argument and effectively placed the scientist in a secondary position to the artist.

Though “The Education of the Future” appeared to be a reference to Wagner’s *The Art-Work of the Future*, Wagner’s thought was represented only by proxy of Schopenhauer’s *World as Will and Idea*, sections of which Marshall-Hall set as reading for the course, along with essays by Spencer including “The Origin and Function of Music.”42 Apart from these readings, Marshall-Hall elicited the help of

42 “The Education of the Future” contradicts Rich’s claim that “It is . . . radically misleading to identify Schopenhauer, as does Turnbull, and as did a number of the Ormond Professor’s contemporaries; or the
Huxley’s essay “On Descartes’ ‘Discourse’” to critique Spencer’s pedagogical proposal that “science” was the knowledge “of most worth” (Education 53). In Spencer’s evaluation, the “worth” of knowledge was considered in terms of how it may aid, in order of importance: Survival, gaining a livelihood, raising children, citizenship as fluency in the history of one’s nation, and art (Education 53). Marshall-Hall acknowledged Spencer’s claim that in all of the above fields “the faculties of perception must be brought into play before the reasoning faculties; that we must start from the concrete and end in the abstract” (“Education”). However, Marshall-Hall believed that Spencer denied his own principle of education, that one should begin with the concrete and end in the abstract, in demoting artistic activity to the least important function of society.

To Marshall-Hall the fine arts, and music in particular, provided the means “to experience all states of feeling, whose relations one with another are shown by science” (“Education”). In claiming art for a first philosophy, Marshall-Hall was not satisfied in arguing that the “states of feeling” that art revealed were only those highly evolved emotions such as he had identified in German culture. By an excursion through the philosophies of Schopenhauer and Huxley, Marshall-Hall argued that art rendered feeling “in its most comprehensive sense,” as both emotion and sensual perception. Marshall-Hall evoked Schopenhauer’s theory of music as a bridge between the vitalist will and the idea, quoted from World as Will and Representation:

Music is thus by no means like the other arts, the copy of the Ideas, but the copy of the will itself, whose objectivity the Ideas are. This is why the effect of music is so much more powerful and penetrating than that of the other arts, for they speak only of shadows, but it speaks of the thing itself. (1: 332)

In Huxley’s notion of “consciousness,” Marshall-Hall found another English appeal to the inseparable link between sensation and will. Marshall-Hall repeated Huxley’s claim that

19th century Symbolists as do Bebbington, Radic and Virginia Spate, as leading influences on his thought. Indeed had he been more firmly under the sway of these people there is every chance that the controversy, which is the subject of this inquiry, would never have occurred” Rich, “His Thumb” 152. 43 From “The Education of the Future” onwards, Marshall-Hall would use the terms “feeling” to refer to both “sensation” and “emotion.” See, for instance “The Essential in Art” 4.4: 40.
we have seen clearly and distinctly, and in a manner which admits of no doubt, that all our knowledge is a knowledge of states of consciousness. ‘Matter’ and ‘force’ are, so far as we know, mere names for certain states of consciousness. … Thus it is an indisputable truth that what we call the material world is only known to us under the forms of the ideal world; and as Descartes tells us, our knowledge of the soul (N.B. namely, of what we feel) is more intimate and certain than our knowledge of the body. (Huxley in “Education”)

It was one thing to claim that music was a language of the emotions, but quite another to claim that music undercut empirical observation by directly accessing the source of sensual perception. Marshall-Hall was only able to make this philosophical leap by claiming that Schopenhauer was “the prophet of science and philosophy, whose dicta every new scientific discovery goes apparently to confirm.” Here Marshall-Hall can be read committing the logical fallacy of “affirming the consequent,” such as he may have read about in the works of Aristotle that he had cited as early as 1891 (“Pathetic”). Though Schopenhauer argued that music was a copy of the will and thus a language of the feelings, that music was a language of the emotions (on Spencer’s account) did not necessarily entail that music was a copy of the will.

Marshall-Hall’s Schopenhauerian turn incited outright gush in *Table Talk* and further incensed readers of *The Argus*. *Table Talk* published that “The Education of the Future” “appealed to every class of thinkers, and revealed him as one who has studied deeply the highest philosophy of the age” (“Coming Men”). To *Table Talk* the lecture was “not only aglow with earnest, truthful enthusiasm, but almost perfect in style,” illuminated as it was with “Huxley and Spencer, and the philosophic essays on art by Schopenhauer.” Without these intellectual influences, so the reporter in *Table Talk* argued, Marshall-Hall “would hardly take so broad a view of his duties to the students at the University and the Melbourne public generally.” The paper

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44 In classical logic, the fallacy of affirming the consequent is an argument with the form “if $p$ then $q$ and $q$, it follows that $p$” Blackburn. For instance, consider the invalid argument “if the will is experienced as both sensation and emotion and music is a copy of the will ($p$), then music is a language of the emotions ($q$). Music is a language of the emotions ($q$). Therefore the will is experienced as both sensation and emotion and music is a copy of the will ($p$).”

45 This was probably not the case. The Extension Scheme appears to have suffered from an under-representation of the working people that Marshall-Hall desired to reach. If working people could afford the Extension courses, then why did Marshall-Hall ask permission of the University Council on 16 July 1892 to deliver “a series of six lectures or so in the evening on music” for “business people” to whom “the methods and expenses connected with the University Extension Scheme are beyond their means and time”? “Letter to the Council”.
provided no suggestion that Marshall-Hall was anything but efficacious in this mission, nor that his Spencerian hypotheses were anything but confirmed by his audiences. In regard to his Wagnerian outbursts, the paper decreed that

[i]f one were inclined to seriously criticise Mrashall Hall’s [sic] methods and the unfortunate way he has of occasionally arousing the antagonism of those worshipping at the shrines of the highest exponents of art, his youthful enthusiasm is remembered, and one reflects that it is only “years that bring the philosophic mind.”

Where public taste disagreed with Marshall-Hall’s judgements, he could always, as a foregone conclusion, blame it on the public’s as-yet defective relationship to the will and write them down as “Philistines” (“Philistine”). “I have never said,” Marshall-Hall wrote to The Argus in 1892, “that the people here were incapable of understanding music, were ‘unmusical,’ but what I said, and say, is that they as a whole have as yet no taste, no judgment, and are profoundly ignorant of what music is” (“Music in Melbourne”). Schopenhauer’s philosophy provided Marshall-Hall with a system that precluded the sorts of falsifiable claims about the meaning of music made possible by Spencer’s theories. Where testament from a composer or observation of an oesophagus under stress could once be brought in as evidence in the interpretation of a work, Schopenhauer’s philosophy lent an infallible authority to the artist as interpreter. Both Melbourne’s resistance to Marshall-Hall’s interpretive claims and the capitulation of Marshall-Hall’s room-mate to his musical judgment confirmed his Schopenhauerian views on the laws of musical expression.

Until 1898 Marshall-Hall presented fewer public lectures, focusing instead on his activities as Professor of Music, starting the Melbourne University Conservatorium of Music in 1895 (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 20). As will be discussed in chapter two of this thesis, the 1 August 1898 Liedertafel address saw his public appeal to Schopenhauer’s idealism give way to a pro-war, vitalist rhetoric of “power” drawn from the first translations of Nietzsche’s works, in particular the volume’s “Social Darwinist”46 preface by the editor Alexander Tille. Nietzsche’s works functioned as a

46 “Social Darwinism” is a neologism, here employed in keeping with contemporary usage as referring to theories of natural selection applied outside of the natural sciences Hodgson. Following Mark Francis I have refrained from using the term to describe Spencer’s evolutionary metaphysics and theory of music as they do not strictly rely on a theory of natural selection 296.
differend around which Marshall-Hall distinguished himself from his idealist contemporaries. Though Marshall-Hall appeared volatile and confrontational in the furore leading up to his dismissal in 1900, his attempt to distance himself ideologically from his contemporaries can be attributed, beyond a pugnacious character trait, to a contempt for the self-interest, if not corruption, amongst idealist progressives as the Australian colonies moved towards Federation.
Marshall-Hall’s early Australian writings presented fundamentally Wagnerian vitalist beliefs, explained with appeal to Spencer’s theory of evolution and Schopenhauer’s idealism. The radical, fateful, though short-lived shift in Marshall-Hall’s thought evident in his 1 August 1898 Liedertafel address saw him adopt a vitalist nomenclature drawn from the works of Nietzsche that would later be explained as the logical conclusions of his fundamentally idealist, Schopenhauerian philosophy. This chapter will trace Marshall-Hall’s thought through an examination of his intellectual engagements with several key texts and contemporaries.

The first of these engagements was with Alexander Tille. Marshall-Hall, of anyone in Australia, was uniquely placed to read the first volume of Tille’s series of translations of Nietzsche’s works when it was published in 1896.\(^{47}\) Marshall-Hall was acquainted with Wagner, Schopenhauer, and as is evident from the Liedertafel speech, Otto von Bismarck, all figures vehemently attacked by Nietzsche throughout the four books included in the first volume: *The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche Contra Wagner, Twilight of the Idols*, and *The Antichrist*. Tille’s choice of Nietzsche’s later works for the first published volume of his series was far from accidental. He prefaced the volume with a universal call to arms, challenging Spencer’s theory of harmony in diversity with a radically Social Darwinist appeal to Darwin’s theory of natural selection (xiv). Tille believed that the works he had chosen were united by the same “drift of thought,” namely “[p]hysiology as the criterion of value of whatever is human, whether called art, culture, or religion!” (xvii). Being acquainted with the works of Spencer and Darwin, Marshall-Hall was also ideally situated to engage with Tille’s preface and the evolutionary implications of the Nietzsche volume.

\(^{47}\) Marshall-Hall’s volume of this work contains evidence that Marshall-Hall had some familiarity with *The Antichrist* in the original German before he encountered the 1896 translation. On page 126 of *The Twilight of the Idols* Marshall-Hall marked out the passage “[f]or example, it is there said *with application to sexuality,* ‘if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out’” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis). Marshall-Hall’s annotation reads that “[f]or the original, ‘only it’s not exactly the eye that is meant.’” He is probably referring *The Antichrist* where, on page 311 of Common’s translation, Nietzsche writes “[a]nd if thine eye cause thee to stumble, cast it out. . . .” (Mark. IX. 47.)—It is not quite the eye that is alluded to.”
Another key Nietzschean engagement was with Lionel Lindsay, whose involvement with Marshall-Hall around the time of the Liedertafel address suggests intellectual traffic between the two. Lionel’s idealist reading of *The Case of Wagner* provided Marshall-Hall with a credible idealist model for reading the author, leading one to speculate upon the reasons for Marshall-Hall’s adoption of Tille’s reading. As is argued, it is through Marshall-Hall’s marginal communication with the solicitor Marshall Lyle that Marshall-Hall’s vitalism might be interpreted as a reaction against the corruption and self-interest that he saw accompanying the scientific and idealist posturing of Melbourne’s progressive professional class.

These engagements raise some key questions that shall be addressed in this chapter. Confronted with his ideal combination of literary influences, why was it that Marshall-Hall followed Tille’s reading with so little critical attention to Nietzsche’s text and his own Spencerian intellectual legacy? Furthermore, why did Marshall-Hall adopt his vitalist position when Lyle and Lionel Lindsay both provided credible models for idealist readings of the volume? As this chapter will show through a consideration of his marginalia in *The Case of Wagner*, his defence of the Liedertafel address against the University Council and newspapers, and his rehabilitative series of lectures “The Essential in Art,” Marshall-Hall did in fact perform an idealist reading of the Nietzsche volume, defending Schopenhauer against the philosopher and claiming that Nietzsche’s “will to power” (*Case of Wagner* 182) as he understood it, provided the necessary conclusion to Schopenhauer’s theory. The force of his vitalist rhetoric, however, was a position established in direct opposition to what he saw as an ingenuous and corrupt idealism pervading Melbourne’s political and cultural elites.

Lyle’s exploitation of personal contacts in procuring photographs of Australian criminals on behalf of the founder of criminal anthropology Cesare Lombroso exemplifies the self-interest that Marshall-Hall saw motivating late nineteenth-century Australian progressivism. Conducted during the Melbourne sitting of the Australian Federal Convention in 1898, Lyle’s research implicated the Australian politicians and government officials George Reid, Alexander Peacock and John Evans in a program to scientifically identify “criminal types,” effectively excluding them from the emerging Commonwealth, at the same time as the Federal Convention debated the inclusion of a constitutional definition of citizenship based on race. As historian of the Australian
constitution John Williams argues, “[c]itizenship in the 1890s was a matter of exclusion rather than inclusion,” with debate around citizenship at the 1898 federal convention in Melbourne focusing on “the rights of the states to discriminate against non-whites” (“Race” 10).

As shall be demonstrated in this chapter, Marshall-Hall’s vitalist response to these events was divided. Through his opinions on the music for the first sitting of the Australian Federal Parliament and his Australian National Song of 1899, it is evident that he still looked to Greek Antiquity and German music for the future of Australian culture. However, Marshall-Hall directly opposed Lyle and Lombroso’s identification of the criminal type and the artistic and scientific genius as evolutionarily regressive beings. Where Lyle and Lombroso looked to empirical evidence of physical and behavioural characteristics to determine the evolutionary value of a person, Marshall-Hall maintained that a person or civilisation could only be judged by their art. While advocating universal warfare and a global monoculture, Marshall-Hall’s Nietzschean vitalism resisted the drive of criminal anthropology to systematically exclude members of society based on their physical and behavioural characteristics.

Alexander Tille and the International Pedigree of Social Darwinist Thought

Marshall-Hall’s reading of The Case of Wagner can be dated to around 26 July 1898, that of a clipping from The Argus glued in place and annotated on page 201.48 Marshall-Hall’s reading of The Case of Wagner shows that he did not only take part in a burgeoning culture of militarism in Australia, but an international vitalist culture through the influence of the series’ editor, Alexander Tille. Both Tille and Marshall-Hall were forced to leave their respective universities in 1900 due to their public effusions, though a stark contrast can be drawn between the way Tille manipulated his literary sources to hide his own convictions while Marshall-Hall openly claimed the ideas he drew from Nietzsche as his own.

The first quotations of Nietzsche in Marshall-Hall’s works appear in a speech given at a concert of the Melbourne Liedertafel on 1 August 1898. Clark’s

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48 See “Mr. Reid.” This date conforms with the fact that Marshall-Hall’s signature, still faintly visible on the inside of the front cover, matches that of the 25 March 1898 score of Alkestis, with its abbreviation of Marshall-Hall’s name, its large size and scrawled tail. The full score of Stella from 1909 differs in its round, florid tail, full name, and rounded characters.
understanding of Marshall-Hall as a vitalist appears to have developed from accounts of this Liedertafel address. In discussing Marshall-Hall’s 1914 return to Australia, Clark wrote that “[o]n war [Marshall-Hall] and the bourgeoisie were in agreement. War was a good thing. He was a vitalist and war was evidence of vitality; war determined the worth of a man: war distinguished the full-blooded from the degenerate” (412). As Clark and other scholars have identified, militant vitalism was a commonly held position around the Second Boer War, causing one to question why Marshall-Hall’s ebullient and confrontational nature would adopt it in this particular speech. Marshall-Hall’s reading of Tille’s preface provided a source of inspiration for the oration, but Marshall-Hall would not have readily adopted Tille’s anti-Spencerian reading of Nietzsche without further impetus. As shall be shown, Marshall-Hall’s speech must be contextualised amongst the idealist readings of Nietzsche by members of Marshall-Hall’s social milieu that provided the true antagonists against which Marshall-Hall raged.

Marshall-Hall also followed the example of his idol, the conductor Hans von Bülow, in dedicating the Liedertafel concert to the recently deceased Bismarck, naming him a “man of blood and iron.” Bülow had scandalised the German public in 1892 by making a speech from the conductor’s podium praising the Prince, and thereby condemning Kaiser Wilhelm:

We musicians, with heart and brain, with hand and mouth, we consecrate and dedicate the heroic symphony of Beethoven to the greatest spiritual hero to have seen the light of the world since Beethoven. We dedicate it to Beethoven’s brother, to the Beethoven of German politics, to Prince Bismarck! Prince Bismarck–Hoch! (Bülow in Walker 423)

Or in Marshall-Hall’s words,

Gentlemen,—This people have today suffered a great loss. A mighty heroic figure has passed away. Bismarck is dead. The man of blood and iron. Yes! That is what men should be made of—iron, and blood! (“Much Ado”)

49 See Dunstan 89–91; Rich, “His Thumb” 259; Fox 48.
The speech had precedents in Marshall-Hall’s own writings, repeating the familiar Spencerian criticism of “your drawingroom music, your royalty ballads, your nauseous British oratorio sentimentality, your popular music” condemned as “merely musical diseases—the outcome of debility, of impotence, of refined vice, or sickening effeminacy.” While Marshall-Hall’s condemnation of debilitating popular music can be read as a Spencerian trope, the opinion found new expression in Nietzsche’s “will to power.” Never before had a rhetoric of “power” appeared in Marshall-Hall’s work, and the audience was regaled with what may have been one of the first public transmissions of Nietzsche’s ideas in Australia. Marshall-Hall intoned that

All nature, inorganic and organic, is based on a system of warfare, in one case this is represented by chemical action and reaction; in the other, by physical and intellectual conflict. Life means war, and war is a good thing. Nay! The best of all things. It is a symptom of vitality, energy, superabundant strength. . . .

How healthy it is to see, even in the midst of our modern piling, knock-kneed, pseudo-religiousness, the vast armaments of nations preparing for the struggle for power; to see the ability, the energy, the splendid ferocity of merchants combating for the place of superiority in the market; to see the enormous intellectual output of scientists, artists, philosophers—all bursting with energy, vitality, hostility. This is life—what a philosopher has called a grand life.

Indicating his influence from the text, Marshall-Hall marked out the passage “[o]ne has renounced grand life, when one has renounced war” in his copy of Twilight of the Idols (129). Presenting a gold-mounted baton to the acting conductor of the Melbourne Liedertafel from 1897, Marshall-Hall concluded the speech by saying “I can only wish that he may always disdain ‘peace of soul,’ and all other kinds of peace, and remain a fighter to the end, winning for himself a foremost and most honourable place among his fellow artists.” “Peace of soul” is also marked out several times throughout the volume (130, 259). The scandal that ensued saw the philosophical basis of Marshall-Hall’s ideas obfuscated in a media frenzy over his supposedly improper book of poems Hymns Ancient and Modern.

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50 Marshall-Hall underlined this term in his copy of The Case of Wagner 182, 202, 226, 242, 245. See appendix two.
Following the Liedertafel address, Marshall-Hall’s opponents including Laver and Leeper began an eventually successful campaign to have him removed from the Chair of Music.\textsuperscript{51} Two literary cultures, represented by the two major Melbourne papers, *The Age* and *The Argus*, were instrumental in the ensuing furor.\textsuperscript{52} While Marshall-Hall’s words on war were immediately portrayed as scandalous in *The Argus*, particularly because they were uttered in the presence of Sir John Madden, acting Administrator of the Government, they disappeared from the anti-Marshall-Hall discourse within a couple of days. In their place, Marshall-Hall’s *Hymns Ancient and Modern*, published less than a month prior to the Liedertafel address (“Professor Marshall-Hall” 8 Aug. 1898), was paraded through the pages of *The Argus* as literature not befitting a teacher of young ladies (“Professor Marshall-Hall” 5 Aug. 1898).

With the attack of 5 August, and a collection of letters to the editor and sermons by prominent Melbourne religious figures on 8 August, the grounds of the offence began to shift away from the militarism of the address to Marshall-Hall’s poetry. The attack of 8 August began with the accusation from Reverend C. H. Barnes that Marshall-Hall had “deliberately and shamelessly flaunted profane unbelief and gross animalism in the face of the community . . . in public speech and on the printed page.” Marshall-Hall’s words on war were only broached in Reverend J. Gibson’s concluding commentary on St. Paul. Referring to “decadent poets and novelists of the fleshly school” and directly referencing Marshall-Hall’s praise of the recently deceased Prince Bismarck, Gibson asked (prophetically, considering Marshall-Hall’s reaction to the First World War): “Have they been on a battle-field to know what the horrors of war really are, that they talk so glibly in praise of ‘men of iron and blood’?” (“Professor Marshall-Hall” 8 Aug. 1898).

Marshall-Hall’s anti-religious views were nested within his Nietzschean philosophical stance that targeted the perceived hypocrisy of scientists, politicians, and religious authorities alike. The poem “A Supplication” from *Hymns Ancient and*...
Modern demonstrates this association. The Argus published Marshall-Hall’s verse “Watch and Pray,” in which he is depicted praying “with thumb unto [his] nose” for his “many foes.” Published next to his satirical verse on “Teatotallism,” his “foes” appear to be Melbourne’s Protestant community (Marshall-Hall in “Professor Marshall-Hall” 8 Aug.). However, “A Supplication” presents a different mocking prayer, offered not only for “Saints […] for their lewd ideas,” but also himself “for his songs” and “Reid for his long ears” (Hymns 47). Marshall-Hall may have been facetiously referring to Lombroso’s The Man of Genius, in which long ears are associated with a variety of defects including “loss of moral sense” and “morbid vanity” (5–6). Marshall-Hall’s real quarrel with Reid was with his democratic ideals, which he saw as betraying a lack of healthy, Nietzschean instinct.53

Turnbull acutely identifies a thematic similarity between the Prefaces of Hymns Ancient and Modern and The Twilight of the Idols (32). Marshall-Hall wrote that “the mutual caresses of lovers are the physical expression of the deepest intellectual truth. . . . But it is the misfortune of our times that such works are open also to the prurient, the immodest, the eternally vulgar” (n.p.). This passage shows a marked similarity to Nietzsche’s passage “[i]t is only Christianity, with its resentment against life at the bottom, which has caused sexuality to be regarded as something impure; it cast dirt on the commencement, on the pre-requisite of our life” (230). Marshall-Hall vigorously underlined this passage in his copy. The Hymns Ancient and Modern poems “To a Critic” and “Wild Oats” also present the Nietzschean themes of power and instinct, claiming that “[t]he weak must ever fear the strong,” and

The soil where e’en wild oats won’t grow  
Is nought or little worth, I trow! (Hymns 41)

The verses quoted from Marshall-Hall’s Hymn to Sydney during the newspaper furore betray a similar preoccupation with mankind’s “natural” instincts (“Professor Marshall-Hall” 8 Aug.), suggesting that Marshall-Hall was familiar with Nietzsche’s writings as early as 1897.

Criticism of Marshall-Hall’s comments on war entirely disappeared by the time of his defence, published in an open letter To the Chancellor and Council of

53 See below, 75.
Melbourne University on 11 August. On the topic of this document The Argus again shifted attention away from the content of the Liedertafel speech, towards the book of poetry:

Professor Marshall-Hall has published his letter to the University Council, replying to the charges made in ‘The Argus’ that he has issued immodest and impious verses under the burlesque and offensive title of ‘Hymns Ancient and Modern.’ (“Professor Marshall-Hall” 15 Aug. 1898)

The charges made in The Argus concerning Hymns Ancient and Modern formed only a part of Marshall-Hall’s defence to the University Council. The Professor extensively quoted from his 6 August defence in The Age dealing with the philosophical grounds of his doctrine on war.

The Age alone challenged Marshall-Hall’s address on the grounds of his words on war. The critic argued that Marshall-Hall unduly restricted his theory of conflict and evolution to military conflict, citing Huxley, Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Swift, and Machiavelli to argue that conflict is “cosmic process” and that “it is Love and not War which makes man fittest to survive” (“Editorial” 6 Aug. 1898). Marshall-Hall responded that “[a]fter the cowardly libels to which I have been subjected in other quarters, it is refreshing to turn to an antagonist who is a gentleman, and who strikes straight in the face, and not from behind my back.” As in his defence to the University Council, he restated the Liedertafel address, arguing that by “war” he meant a vitalist, universal, as well as international, war, encompassing “physical, commercial, and intellectual” conflict (“Marshall-Hall and His Critics”). As he reiterated to the University Council, he believed his words to have a contemporary pertinency. He commented on England’s waning influence upon Chinese railways and trade (“Marshall-Hall and His Critics”), foreshadowing the Second Boer War in commenting that “[w]ere [his] opinions more general would there now be a South Africa Question? a Soudan Question? an Indian Question?”

Apart from the in The Age, Marshall-Hall’s comments on war received limited discussion in the press, partly due to their taking part in a burgeoning public discourse

54 See “The Chinese Question” for some of the geo-political events mentioned in Marshall-Hall’s defence.
on warfare that implicated both religious and secular figures. As Dunstan points out, “[i]t [was] all very well to advocate war and bloodshed—that barely raised comment—but to advocate sex was something far, far worse” (190). The Argus immediately ridiculed Marshall-Hall’s speech as

a sort of dithyrambic chant in honour of war, [that] ought to have been delivered to an accompaniment of war-drum. To make the performance artistically complete, indeed, Professor Marshall-Hall ought to have tattooed [sic] himself and executed a war-dance at appropriate intervals throughout his oration. (“Editorial” 3 Aug. 1898)

In explanation of the general lack of controversy surrounding Marshall-Hall’s militarism, Rich is correct in noting that Marshall-Hall’s views were consonant with dominant religious views of the time, citing the correspondent in The Herald who recognised the similarity between Marshall-Hall’s own views on war, and the Church’s support of the Boer War (“His Thumb” 259):

[T]he utterances of this gentleman which first provoked public resentment were chiefly of a nature glorifying the blood-red deeds of battle. [sic] Now seeing, as has been lately pointed out, that the Nonconformists, for the most part, heartily condone the present awful war between fellow-Christians in South Africa, one would have thought the Professor’s present critics would be generally in sympathy with that gentleman: and that our fighting Christians (in their easy chairs) would look upon the militant musician as a brother-in-arms, or rather a sheep of the fold. (“Professor Marshall-Hall” 16 June 1899)

Marshall-Hall’s stirring of a militant fanaticism in those around him leading up to and during the Boer War has been outlined by Fox, who noted the similarity between the 21 May 1899 Boer War demonstration at the Stock Exchange and the hundred university students who descended cheering and jibing in Marshall-Hall’s favour upon the University Council’s 18 June 1899 meeting (48). Rich builds on this theme, writing of Marshall-Hall’s students “replacing the ‘hero buttons’ attached to their hatbands in celebration of Roberts, Kitchener and Baden Powell, with ones honouring Marshall-Hall” (“Meaning” 75). If Marshall-Hall’s vitalist militarism was consonant with Melbourne’s community at large, then why did it appear as the central focus of his Liedertafel speech?
Marshall-Hall’s apparent turn to a vitalist theory of universal warfare, defended in newspapers and before the University Council, can be traced to the Preface to the volume of Nietzsche’s works, by Tille. Tille had expressly set out an anti-Spencerian and anti-Huxleyan introduction to The Case of Wagner. Tille criticised Spencer’s evolutionary theory of the coherence of diverse beings over natural selection through conflict, arguing that

Mr. Herbert Spencer’s own philosophical development has been one long campaign against natural selection and elimination. . . . The whole drift of Mr. Spencer’s thought almost appears to be inspired by the question: how to evade and veil the logical consequences of Darwin’s evolutionarism for human existence? (xi)

Tille’s criticism shows that he held the mistaken belief that Spencer borrowed his ideas from Darwin. As in his theory of music, Spencer’s theory of evolution can be seen to develop simultaneously or prior to Darwin’s, with a significant debt to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (Weikart 21).

Tille moved freely between Britain and Germany as professor of German at Glasgow University (Manz 118). The Nietzsche scholar Steven Aschheim critically identifies Tille as “the most rabid Nietzschean and social Darwinian in pan-Germanic circles” (123), while Stefan Manz relates Tille’s books that insisted that “war between Britain and Germany was a necessity” (124). As Manz points out, the works chosen by Tille for publication were “exclusively from Nietzsche’s later works” (118), the reason for which can possibly be found in Tille’s introduction to the volume. Where Darwin argued, here in Tille’s paraphrase, that the “tribe” with the most “courageous, sympathetic, and faithful members who were always ready to warn each other of danger, to aid and defend each other” was the most likely to survive, Tille saw only their swift demise due to “a rapid decline of individual strength and thereby of the tribe itself” (x). To Tille, rather than cooperation, it was “the selection of the fit and the elimination of the unfit” that drove “human progress” (x), a view that leads Alfred Kelly to assert that in Tille’s work “the full dehumanizing brutality of radical Social Darwinism becomes evident” (107). Tille did not just believe in “passive” natural selection wherein slums “purged the nation of useless citizens, but sought to actively ‘help’ nature by killing cripples and lunatics and giving more food to the gifted
members of society” (Kelly 107). Marshall-Hall expressed disturbingly similar views in the Liedertafel speech, arguing that “the man who cannot act and assert himself, who is of no worth, must go to the wall.”

Only one passage from Tille’s introduction is marked out in Marshall-Hall’s pencil, a quotation by Thomas Huxley from his Romanes lecture “Evolution and Ethics.” Huxley called for the continuation of ethical thought in spite of the seemingly amoral implications of Darwin’s theory of natural selection (xiv): “Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it” (Huxley in Nietzsche, Case of Wagner xiv). Tille rejected Huxley’s separation of man from the “cosmic process” of evolution through conflict, asking “why should not we measure man by the standard which Darwin has enabled us to apply to nature?” (xiv).

Marshall-Hall appealed to Tille’s prioritising of physiology in his marginal defence of Wagner. In Wagner’s “agitating the swamp,” as Nietzsche described his indistinct rhythms (Case of Wagner 9), Nietzsche heard a “magician” who seduced his listeners over to those beliefs most “dangerous to life”: Christianity and “Buddhistic” nihilism (9). Wagner could persuade his listeners to believe without thinking: “He is possessed of every ambiguity, every equivocation, everything, in fact, which persuades the undecided, without making them conscious of what they are persuaded to” (9). To Marshall-Hall Wagner, like Bismarck, embodied a physical instinct that underlay and ultimately redeemed his intellectual errors, writing in The Case of Wagner that

Wagner, both in his life & music, represents to us a type of the Italian Renaissance period,—is perhaps the most singularly forcible type of the man in whom healthy instinct surmounts all life-hostile environment. Intellectually he seems to have often fallen into serious error, hence his weak plots—which are redeemed by the splendid subjects, & strong music, to which he was instinctively attracted. —Nietzsche does not distinguish between the mere accidental transition-stages of his intellectual life, & the sure instinct which always remained healthy & vigorous.—Hence the muddle and confusion of his criticisms. (50)

Marshall-Hall may be seen here in the midst of the very Wagnerian and Bismarckian illusion that Nietzsche railed against in The Case of Wagner.
While Marshall-Hall’s case was being considered in Melbourne a similar series of events were unfolding in Glasgow that starkly contrasts the two Nietzscheans’ modes of literary reference. A pro-Boer publication by Tille in the German journal *Die Woche* had outraged the students of Glasgow University where he was teaching. The *Glasgow Herald* reported that

Dr Tille and a number of Professors were unceremoniously shoved into a classroom, where they were kept prisoners for some time. Dr Tille suffered somewhat hard usage at the hands of the students, and several of them possessed themselves of parts of his gown. ("Extraordinary Scene")

Tille managed to calm the students by pleading that the offending words, those that "heavily criticised British action in South Africa and ridiculed the state of the British army" (Manz 121) were not his own, but "merely extracts from the pro-Boer English papers" ("Extraordinary Scene"). Whereas Tille, in his articles as much as in his publication of Nietzsche’s works, spoke in another’s voice, Marshall-Hall “owned” his positions. Marshall-Hall’s defence against the university council, according to Geoffrey Blainey, is the first ever vindication of free speech for academics, a particularly daring argument at a time of increasing religious power within the University of Melbourne (118). Tille was the better scholar and was able to shift the blame of his own opinions, while Marshall-Hall would bear the brunt of his judgments. Tille would resign and Marshall-Hall would be removed from the Ormond Chair of Music.

While Tille may have provided Marshall-Hall with a directed reading of the Nietzsche volume, his anti-Spencerian reading of Nietzsche was significantly at odds with Marshall-Hall’s earlier philosophy. Furthermore, two figures, both of whom had contact with Marshall-Hall around the time of the Liedertafel address, could have provided him with models for idealist readings of the volume. From the viewpoints of art and science respectively, Lionel Lindsay and Lyle not only produced idealist readings of the volume, but also may have provided antagonism against which Marshall-Hall reactively read the volume.

"Art Without Edges” in the Nietzscheism of Lionel and Norman Lindsay
In developing his vitalist interpretation of *The Case of Wagner*, Marshall-Hall would have conflicted with the rival interpretation of Lionel Lindsay, to whom he could have introduced the work in the months leading up to the Liedertafel concert of music from the play *Alkestis*. Marshall-Hall composed an extensive score for the play and Lionel assisted Harold Desbrowe Annear in painting the set (Radic, *G. W. L. Portrait* 23–24). It is possible that the Lindsays’ significant engagement with Nietzsche’s works, including that of Lionel’s younger brother, Norman, was catalysed by Lionel’s interaction with Marshall-Hall around the time of the *Alkestis* production. Similarities appear between Marshall-Hall’s Liedertafel speech and the technical execution and themes of some of Norman’s pen drawings. Like Marshall-Hall over a decade earlier, though not necessarily in imitation of him, Norman’s 1926 criticism of his early 1920s pointillist pen drawings shows the artist turning away from Wagner.

Lionel had come to know Marshall-Hall through Arthur Streeton, who read one of his first published lectures in Australia and wrote to the author “to the effect that ‘this is the kind of stuff we want’” (J. Marshall-Hall, “Particulars”). Marshall-Hall’s involvement with Australian artists including the Heidelberg school led to four portraits, several stays at the artists’ outhouses at the Chartersville Estate, stays with Streeton at Mosman’s Bay, and a highly speculated upon exchange of ideas (Bebbington 102–03). While working on the *Alkestis* set, Lionel convinced Leeper that the improvised figures of the temple’s frieze were drawn from “some Sicilian coins found last year in Syracuse.” “How Marshall Hall [sic] laughed when I told him,” Lionel recalled, “and Hall’s laugh was a roar” (*Comedy* 117). Evidently on close terms with Marshall-Hall, Lionel’s idealist reading of Nietzsche nevertheless starkly contrasted with Marshall-Hall’s adoption of a vitalist Nietzschean rhetoric in the Liedertafel address. In contrast to Lionel’s interpretation of the work, Marshall-Hall’s reading was apposite to Norman Lindsay’s, developed in later years.

Lionel’s idealist reading of Nietzsche, sharing with the author a love of Bizet’s *Carmen*, celebrated life in clarity of thought and definition in art, or “art with edges,” to

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55 While scholars generally use the title “Alcestis” when referring to this work Radic *G. W. L. Portrait* 24; Bebbington 17, I have used the name “Alkestis” in accordance with the autograph score held in the Grainger Museum.

56 Portraits are extant from 1891, 1892?, and 1899 by Streeton (including the pen and ink work at the beginning of this thesis), one by Roberts from 1900, and a work, currently untraced, by E. Phillips Fox Radic *G. W. L. Portrait* 19.
reverse Lionel’s condemnation of Wagner’s music. Lionel writes in his autobiography, within a 1902 context, that “Nietzsche’s *Contra Wagner* had long been my book of hours, had fortified my love of Mozart, Beethoven, and Schubert, and confirmed my distaste of Wagner’s windy romanticism; that music without edges which can never satisfy an exacting sense of form” (*Comedy* 119). Lionel expanded on the importance of first volume of Tille’s series upon his art and life, echoing Nietzsche’s meteorological rhetoric of Bizet’s “more southern, more tawny, more scorched sensibility” (*Case of Wagner* 8).

The *Contra Wagner* and *The Antichrist* had been my discovery. Up to this Gautier and George Moore had been our spiritual guides, but here was new light, and fresh wind that blew away all that cumbered our ideas, a philosophy founded on physiology, a return to living values, with art enshrined as the praise of life. (*Comedy* 122)

It is possible that the exorbitant prices of Nietzsche’s works inhibited the book from easily coming into Lionel’s possession, for which recommendation by a friend might have been necessary to urge the reader into the costly purchase. Furthermore, while the pending publication of the works of the “German decadent” was mentioned in *The Sydney Morning Herald* on 18 April 1896 (“Literary Gossip”), the issue quickly disappeared from Australian booksellers’ advertisements, the financial troubles of Henry and Company in 1896–97 possibly contributing to their scarcity in England, and presumably in Australia as well (Thatcher 23).

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57 In England the 1896 edition of *The Case of Wagner* was priced at 10s 6d and *Thus Spake Zarathustra* at 17s. These were “prices which put them quite out of the reach of the average book buyer” according to David Thatcher, and put the publisher Henry and Company out of business in one year 23. Australian prices for Nietzsche’s works were comparable to English prices into the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1903 a copy of *The Dawn of Day* supplied through the Australian booksellers George Robertson and Co. fetched 10s “Geo. Robertson.” In 1908 Cole’s Book Arcade advertised *A Genealogy of Morals*, *The Case of Wagner*, and *The Dawn of Day* at 10s 6d each “Cole's Book Arcade.” As Professor of Music at the University of Melbourne, Marshall-Hall’s £1,000 a year salary would easily have survived the dent of half a pound for a book of philosophy. Lionel, on the other hand, recalls becoming stranded in Sydney in the late nineties with 6d as “a week’s provision” *Comedy* 95. Between the inception of Tille’s series in 1896 and his experience of *Carmen* in 1900, Lionel worked first for the *Free Lance* at £2 per week and the *Hawklet* for 35s, then in relative poverty for the *Clarion*, *Tocsin*, *Daily Telegraph*, and *Rambler Comedy* 67. The detail of Lionel’s credit, expenses and debt in his autobiography leads one to speculate as to where half a pound might have been left over for one of Nietzsche’s hardcover works. Norman remembered his own method of book subsidy: “Those that I had no money to pay for I filched, risking detection as a sneak-thief” *My Mask* 82.
Nietzsche and Lionel both expressed an appreciation of, if not obsession with, Bizet’s *Carmen* for its clear melodic lines. Nietzsche opens *The Case of Wagner* with praise of Bizet’s *Carmen*, juxtaposed with criticism of Wagner:

I have heard yesterday—will you believe it?—the masterpiece of *Bizet* for the twentieth time. I again held out with meek devotion, I again succeeded in not running away. This victory over my impatience surprises me. How a work perfects one! One becomes a “masterpiece” one’s self by its influence—And really, I have appeared to myself, every time I have heard *Carmen*, to be more of a philosopher, a better philosopher than at other times. (5)

With Bizet one takes leave of the *humid* north, and all the steam of the Wagnerian ideal. Even the dramatic action saves us therefrom. It has borrowed from Mérimée the logic in passion, the shortest route, *stern* necessity. It possesses, above all, what belongs to the warm climate, the dryness of the air, its *limpidezza*. (7–8)

In Lionel’s illustrations for Mérimée’s *Carmen*, etched during a trip to Spain in 1902, his outlines were sculpted through stark contrasts. “[T]he sun of Spain is a great draughtsman” he wrote, “and, struck by a happy slant of light, the farmhouses and cultivated uplands with their lines of olives seemed nearer in the clear air” (L. Lindsay in Holden 18). In Lionel’s etching of a Dominican friar the character in the foreground is set against the brilliant white of the wall behind him and the dark window in the background (see fig. 2).
Norman developed a contrasting, vitalist reading of Nietzsche's works that drew less on *The Case of Wagner* and more on *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, which he encountered around 1899–1900. While he does not appear to have left any evidence

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58 Norman most likely discovered Common's 1898 translation of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* under the imprint of William Reeves in 1899. Common independently published his translation after the translation of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* from Tille's series was promised to him but taken up by Tille himself Thatcher 25. Norman recalls reading Nietzsche's "Midnight Song" from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in "one of the shilling parts Thomas Common was translating of Nietzsche's works, in a bookshop in my student days" *Letters* 574. The reference to Norman's "student days" helps date this encounter around 1899, as Norman claims that his student days spanned between "the age of seventeen and twenty" *My Mask* 82. The note that he first read "'Midnight Song' from *Thus Spake Zarathustra* [in
of his reaction to the book from this period, his later reminiscences about the book’s powerful effect on him may be cautiously treated as consonant with his earlier ideas.

In 1898 Marshall-Hall’s vitalist reading of Nietzsche privileged the spontaneity of music without scientific edges, praising Wagner in the nebulous terms of “all that is manly, and energetic, and full of power” (“Much Ado”). As has been shown above, Marshall-Hall’s praise of power and instinct is associated with his critique of religion. Norman’s early pen drawings also criticise religion, while being executed in a style appropriate to Nietzsche and Marshall-Hall’s praise of “energetic” life. Lionel wrote of Norman’s 1904 work Pollice Verso that “[n]ow, stimulated by the new philosophy of Nietzsche, must he pose the pale nihilism of Christianity against the pride of body and spirit” (L. Lindsay in N. Lindsay, Pen Drawings of Norman Lindsay n.p.; N. Lindsay, Pen Drawings of Norman Lindsay Plate 17). The 1906 work The Scoffers (N. Lindsay, Pen Drawings of Norman Lindsay Plate 21), depicting the rake Panurge mocking Christ from the foot of the cross, was made in the “direct stroke method” (Letters 385). To Norman, the direct stroke method represented the freshness and spontaneity possible in pen drawing, of “hitting the value at the first essay, and never going back over the stroke to build up tone if required” (Letters 385). Norman’s philosophical turn from his earlier vitalist, anti-religious period to the pessimistic philosophy of the 1920 book Creative Effort is accompanied by a technical shift from the direct stroke method to pointillism.

In 1920 Norman contrasted the ethereal life of the artist to the banality of every day life in which “[t]he small quantity of administrative intelligence that governs the vast incapable mob is a fixed quantity, sufficient for the needs of its generation, neither higher nor lower than the one that went before” (Creative Effort 10). For Norman “the creative mind is its own question, its own eternal enigma,” recurrent in its ineffability (Creative Effort 10). Norman concluded with his ethos of eternally recurring creative effort, claiming that “[i]t is sufficient for us to know that the enigma exists, for by that knowledge we advance towards it” (Creative Effort 253).

To Norman, the artist’s fate was to eternally proceed in creative effort amongst the “primitive mud of earth, through eternal savagery, in the midst of brutal sights”


59 See 42–43
This pessimistic view of civilisation was in part exacerbated by his brother Reginald’s death in the First World War. The “eternal savagery” of man enmired in the primitive mud brings to mind the notebook that Norman gave to Reginald and which was returned “splodged with his blood” (My Mask 43). No wonder Norman found company in Wagner’s “creative despair” (Creative Effort 253), the Wagner who is quoted by Norman as asking

[what man during a whole lifetime can gaze into the depth of this world with a calm reason and cheerful heart, when he sees murder and rapine organised; lies, impositions, hypocrisy? Will he not avert his head and shudder in disgust? (Wagner in Creative Effort 251)

Marshall-Hall decided as early as 1914 that Wagner’s music was tainted with the organised murder and rapine of the First World War (see below 83), but to Norman, Wagner was the answer to the mud and death of war. The woman in Norman’s c. 1920 pointillist pen drawing Wagner is lifted by an angelic being in what is possibly an allegory for the creative experience, or Norman’s experience of listening to the composer (see fig. 3).

Though the figures of *Wagner* appear weightless, disappearing into the page, they are the products of crippling repetition. To Norman, Wagner’s compositional style and his own 1920s pointillist etching technique both achieved what sounded or looked like diffuse form through painstaking over-work. Norman explains the pointillist style, art without edges, as a purely technical innovation transported directly over from his etching technique (*Letters* 385). He used “the dot to convey the grey and light values” in an attempt to replace the “waxy, feeble effect that lightly etched greys have in an etching” (*Letters* 383). Amid a tirade on Nietzsche and Wagner, in 1926 he complained of “etching pessimism” (*Letters* 259). For, “what sort of possible achievement can there be to an art which is done by hand which permits one to cover half-an-inch of copper with dots and then becomes so cramped that one must rest it?” (*Letters* 259). Like
Marshall-Hall, (see below 83). Norman later repudiated Wagner and his philosophy in similar terms, writing that he felt the “over-diffuseness in Wagner” to be a product of “the effect of uncertainty as to emotional definition, and an intellectual effort to force concentration by overloading forms as we are all inclined to do when the central principle of a work becomes uncertain” (Letters 259).

In pointillist etching, Norman found the technical equivalent of the Wagnerian “limbo of incessant effort” (Letters 383) prescribed in Creative Effort. He recognised that the central principles of his 1920’s works, philosophical and artistic, were uncertain and overworked. In 1914 Marshall-Hall would similarly complain of the mechanical reproduction of Wagner’s philosophical ideas and musical style. (see below 83). In the late 1890s, however, Marshall-Hall saw Wagner as the model artist whose authority extended beyond the concert hall to the ethical and political dimensions of national life. In 1900 Marshall-Hall and Lionel’s mutual friend Lyle took an interest in the volume, communicating with Marshall-Hall through four annotations on the book’s contents page. Through his communication, Lyle presented Marshall-Hall with yet another idealist reading of the text, this time influenced not by Nietzsche’s views on art, but by his experience as a criminal anthropologist.

Marshall Lyle and Criminal Anthropology in Australia

Lyle also performed an idealist reading of Nietzsche, this time on the contents page of Marshall-Hall’s volume. Lyle is best known for his defence, with Alfred Deakin, of the serial killer Frederick Bailey Deeming in 1892. Currently Rachael Weaver’s The Criminal of the Century is the only study in which Lyle receives significant attention.  

By way of a brief biography drawn primarily from newspaper sources: Thomas Moore Lyle, the cousin of Sir Thomas Ranken Lyle “Passing Show” was born (c. 1865) in Strabane, Ireland, of Orange stock. Lyle became an Irish nationalist and moved to Melbourne after his father committed suicide amidst financial difficulties “Irish News”; “Editorial” 15 June 1892. He campaigned as an Irish nationalist throughout his life “Irish News.” With Deakin, Lyle defended Deeming using an insanity plea “Editorial” 27 April 1892, after which he was part of a campaign to establish a scientific definition of insanity for legal purposes. This campaign, including a paper at the 1892 Intercolonial Medical Congress by a medical witness from the medical trial Intercolonial, resulted in a definition being put forward and, it would appear, adopted “Windsor Murder” 24 May 1892. As General Consul for Colombia “Consul-General,” Lyle then took to campaigning for a prison system in which prisoners laboured for their own subsistence Lyle, “The Criminal Problem” and the abolition of capital punishment Lyle, “Letter” 26 May 1894. Lyle lectured to the Australian Natives’ Association on “Italian Criminology” “Editorial” 23 Feb. 1895. With “Miss Rusden,” possibly a member of Rose Scott’s family, Lyle lectured on “women’s franchise” in 1895 “Advertising” 3 Oct. 1895. In the late 1890s Lyle frequented the Melbourne Anarchists’ Club Merrifield. He also advised John Percy Jones on
If this chapter lingers excessively on Lyle it is not only because Marshall-Hall directly countered the diagnoses of criminal anthropology, both of genii in Lombroso’s *The Man of Genius* and of Nietzsche in Lyle’s marginalia. Lyle’s research on behalf of Lombroso during the Melbourne Federal convention also provides an example of the corruption and self-interest amongst Australian progressives against whom Marshall-Hall developed his vitalist reading of Nietzsche.

Laver recalled evenings spent with Marshall-Hall and Lyle, indicating that Marshall-Hall shared Lyle’s interest in criminology:

Marshall-Hall took a keen interest in Philosophy and Criminology and was a student of Schopenhauer a noted German and Dr --- the great Italian criminologist. These subjects were discussed often at Hall’s and my houses. Professor Henry Laurie the Professor of Mental Philosophy in the Melbourne University, Mr. Marshall Lyle, a well known legal man and who was keenly interested in criminology, F.S. Delmer who was then a Trinity College Student and later a Professor of English at the Berlin University, my guardian Otto Jung, whose nephew is one of the best known psychological authorities in Europe, and I took active part in the discussions. (Laver)

The “great Italian criminologist” was Cesare Lombroso, the founder of Criminal Anthropology whom Lyle was reported to have been “studying . . . with all the zeal of a new convert” by 1887 (“A Sharper’s Amazing Career”). It is likely at meetings such as these that *The Case of Wagner* was passed back and forth, the conversation of the evening continuing in the margins of the book. Lyle appears in the Lindsays’ autobiographies when the artists move into the squalor of their apartment in the Sun buildings on the corner of Melbourne’s Queen and Bourke Streets (*Comedy* 110).61

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61 In *The Nervous Nineties* Docker paints Melbourne as struggling against Sydney’s cultural pull, losing artists to the larger bohemian clique of *The Bulletin*. Docker argues that Melbourne “had to rely less on a free-floating bohemian intelligentsia surviving on journalism, than on more stable elements of the historically strong Melbourne professional class: lawyers, politicians, [and] academics” 233. Contrary to Docker’s diagnosis, the intellectual traffic around Marshall-Hall’s Nietzsche volume in the fallout of the Liedertafel address reveals a porous social group of artists, politicians, and scientists. Furthermore, Marshall-Hall’s antagonistic move away from the reformist ideals of his coterie to a right-wing, radically Social Darwinist position based on free economic and social warfare conflicts with Docker’s picture of the “socialist . . . Wagnerite” beloved of *The Bulletin* Docker 58.
Lyle occupied offices in the Sun Buildings while he defended Deeming in 1892, and remained near the buildings for the rest of his career. Norman recalled that Lyle informed him and his brother of Marshall-Hall, Lyle, and the Lindsays’ mutual friend Ernest Moffitt’s death:

Lionel and I had a room at Sun Buildings in Bourke Street at the time, and it was Marshall Lyall [sic], the police court lawyer, who had a room in the same building, who broke the news to us. Lyall, a Dublin Irishman, had gained much notoriety by his defence of Deeming, the murderer of several wives, and we had known him on and off for years. (My Mask 113)

A photograph entitled “Melbourne,” dated 1897, appears in Lionel’s autobiography depicting Marshall Lyall [sic] with the artists and writers J. B. Castieau, E. G. Salter, Lionel Lindsay, Montague Grover (Comedy 14):

Fig. 4. “Melbourne.” Lionel Lindsay. Comedy of Life. Sydney: Halstead Press, 1967. Print.

Lionel also recalls that Norman’s illustrations of Boccaccio “were made on a pale-blue foolscap that Marshall Lyle gave him,” and that Lyle “had never been forgiven by the Melbourne public for his quixotic courage” in defending Deeming (Comedy 110). Lionel also makes mention of Lyle’s intellectual interests, remarking that “[h]e was a scholar, more interested in prison reform than the practice of the law, and managed by the aid of his chief clerk to eke out an existence” (Comedy 110). Norman recalls Moffitt’s funeral, which provides a picture of Marshall-Hall amidst his professional and bohemian associates:

Marshall-Hall was a big man, and he wore there a misfitting frock coat, too tight across the chest and loose about the tails. With his black beard and unbrushed mass of black hair, he endured the ordeal of the funeral service only by holding himself rigid, but when the coffin was lowered into the grave, his self-control snapped suddenly. He made desperate efforts to restrain his grief, stamping about with a contorted face and throwing out his arms in a distracted way, till, at a crisis of the unbearable, he turned and ran, leaping graves with his coat tails flying till he reached a hedged avenue and disappeared. Marshall Lyall [sic] was standing by me and said in an awed voice, “Will you only look at that.” (My Mask 113–14)

When Lyle unsuccessfully defended Deeming with Deakin by pleading an insanity case “Editorial” 27 April 1892, the term “insanity” was found to have little substance, with little or no agreement as to what it was and how it related to the law. The Age reported Justice Molesworth’s definition of “a defect of reason from disease of the brain or mind” (“Narbethong Murder”), though after administering tests for “intellectual defects” and “diseases of the brain” numerous doctors and one Dr. Dick, Inspector of Lunatic Asylums, found no case for intellectual insanity (“Windsor Murder” 2 May 1892). On the criminal anthropological grounds of “instinctive criminality,” however, Deakin and Lyle had a stronger case, even though abetting a crime by claiming that one was hereditarily or evolutionarily predisposed to commit it was by no means a conventional legal strategy. As The Brisbane Courier reported, the case for instinctive criminality differed from intellectual insanity both in its legal credibility and methods of diagnosis (“Editorial” 25 Apr. 1892). The burden of proof
in such legal matters, as became evident in this trial, was to lie with the scientific authority of the medical profession.

Defective or diseased intelligence which may prevent a person from recognising the nature of an act, or which robs him of the power of control, is within certain limitations enough to remove the sufferer from the criminal category. Where madness can be proven the only matter to be decided is whether the specific act alleged was beyond the discriminating ability of the prisoner; and, if so, there is no alternative but to confine him under proper restraint. With regard to Williams [Deeming], however, the question seems to be shaping itself into one of moral imbecility rather than mental insanity. It has recently been argued upon high authority that failure to distinguish between right and wrong should be held to relieve a person from the consequences of misdoing, but the irresponsibility of the instinctive criminal has scarcely been admitted by the British Courts. Still, there can be no doubt that the tendency of the legal mind at the present day is to fall more into line with medical opinion upon this subject. (“Editorial” 25 Apr. 1892)

Though Lyle described Deeming during the trial as an “abnormal offspring of a mother’s womb” (“Editorial” 25 Apr. 1892), he attempted to establish Deeming’s instinctive criminality through a series of testimonies from Deeming’s family claiming that he had a family history of hallucinations and delusions (“Editorial” 25 Apr. 1892). While the skull measurements and physiognomic analysis of criminal anthropology were not brought forward as evidence, as Weaver shows, the tone of Lombroso’s spectacular descriptions, combining popular psychology and criminal anthropology, were reflected in both the press and the court room. Weaver argues that a comparison of popular literature surrounding the Deeming case and Lombroso’s “famous . . . scientific writing on criminality” (68) reveals a similar characterisation of the criminal as

[a]n atavistic being who reproduces in his person the ferocious instincts of primitive humanity and the inferior animals. Thus were explained anatomically the enormous jaws, high cheekbones, prominent superciliary arches, solitary lines in the palms, extreme size of the orbits, handle-shaped or sessile ears found in criminals, savages

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63 Lyle clearly had Lombroso in mind as a model during this case, writing while preparing Deeming’s defence that he was “not cleverer than Despim or Lombroso, and when preparing this defence, they were surrounded by assistance, and had ample time” Lyle, “Marshall Lyle Letter.”
and apes, insensibility to pain, extremely acute sight, tattooing, excessive idleness, love of orgies, and the irresistible craving for evil for its own sake, the desires not only to extinguish life in the victim, but to mutilate the corpse, tear its flesh and drink its blood. (Lombroso in Weaver 68)

Weaver compares Lombroso’s description of the criminal body with the descriptions of Deeming during his court proceedings from the press, including the following striking example:

He entered the court smiling. He quickly cast his snaky eyes around the court as he entered and then remained standing outside the dock. All eyes were fixed upon him to see what kind of human monster he really was. He is short of stature with a low receding forehead, indicating intellect of a low order while his ears spread out like Japanese screens before a drawing room door. His cranium tapes behind, just above the base and corresponds in the opposite direction with his projecting chin. The general contour of his face is not only uninviting but repulsive in no ordinary degree and when once seen could not be easily forgotten (Evening Standard in Weaver 69).

While there may have been an ambient public familiarity with Lombroso’s ideas at the time, his works were not yet available in English and the Lombroso passage quoted by Weaver is from the first translation of Criminal Man by Gina Lombroso-Ferrero of 1911 (Weaver 279n). The only work of Lombroso’s available to Anglophone readers in 1892 was Lombroso’s book that argued artistic and scientific genius accompanied forms of atavism, The Man of Genius.

Marshall-Hall could not abide by Lombroso’s theory that genius implied a fault in one’s physiology or instinct. In The Man of Genius, Lombroso argued that scientific and artistic genius resulted from an imbalance in a person’s biological economy, placing the artist and the scientist alongside the insane and the criminal in his grotesque physiognomic parade:

Just as giants pay a heavy ransom for their stature in sterility and relative muscular and mental weakness, so the giants of thought expiate their intellectual force in degeneration and psychoses. It is thus that the signs of degeneration are found more frequently in men of genius than even in the insane. (vi)
Few intellectual giants were spared Lombroso’s diagnosis, with an extensive catalogue of Darwin’s quirks providing evidence of a dreadful biological recidivism (356-57).

In 1905 Marshall-Hall defended the quirks of artists as irrelevant responses that any person might make towards the rough-and-tumble of life, as *The Argus* reported:

> All those oddities of the man of genius that people like Lombroso classed as madness—(hear, hear)—were the clothes of his character. People were jostled as they went through life, but that was part of life, which was much the same as it was 6,000 years ago. (“Joy Life”)

If there was a fault of instinct to be found in an artist, it was in the character of their work. As a model of apparently healthy artistic life, Marshall-Hall urged the audience to imagine themselves having just left Streeton’s Camp in Mosman’s Bay, Sydney. How wonderful and unique a sensation it was to wake up with a restored, exuberant sense of freedom and irresponsibility, to wake up with the intoxicating splendour of sunbeams dancing like a riotous troop of Maenads, with gold glittering, dishevelled hair that with wild, rapturous gestures of invitation disported themselves to the amorous music of the summer breezes. All was movement and quivering life. Nature panted through her whole being with a divine thirst, an unashamed self-abandonment to a unique, intense, supreme moment of joy, and beneath the splendour and vigour of this immanent, multiplied, voluptuous vitality body and mind quivered and bounded, as though interpenetrated by an instantaneous current of electrical fluid. Like the frozen, inanimate thought at the glowing, impregnating touch of genius, the soul stirred and vibrated and cast off the lassitude and disgust induced by too continuous contact with the squalid, . . . maggot-like life of modern humanity. (“Joy Life”)

To Marshall-Hall it was not, as it was to Lombroso, physical characteristics that determined the evolutionary status of a person, but the emotive character of their art. He openly professed, in a chilling afterthought to his praise of the Australian landscape and artists, that art which did not inspire such optimistic vigour “represented the art of a degenerate race” (“Joy Life”).

Marshall-Hall and Lyle’s annotations in *The Case of Wagner* show the two readers approaching the text from the opposite points of view of criminal anthropology and Schopenhauerian vitalism. Lyle approached Nietzsche’s works
from an idealist, medical point of view, attempting to diagnose Nietzsche’s mental instability from symptoms evident in his writing. Marshall-Hall availed Nietzsche of Lyle’s accusations, as much as Schopenhauer and Wagner from Nietzsche’s, by making claims to the writer’s underlying, vital “will” or “instinct.” While Marshall-Hall’s readings appears to be an outright vindication of some of Nietzsche’s more vitalist aphorisms, on closer inspection Marshall-Hall defends Schopenhauer against the philosopher’s criticisms, arguing that Nietzsche’s will to power is the proper conclusion to Schopenhauer’s observations of life. As shall be shown, in defending Schopenhauer, Marshall-Hall defended the same empirical psychology that Lyle brought to bear on Nietzsche in The Case of Wagner. With Marshall-Hall effectively defending Lyle as he attacks him, Lyle’s activities as a researcher for Lombroso at the time of the correspondence must be examined to uncover the social basis of his antagonism.

Lyle identifies Nietzsche’s encroaching dementia in his first annotation on the contents page of The Case of Wagner:

Note the flat contradictions of himself contained in this volume regarding the question of criminals.
Note the inability (apparently) to continue logical reasoning, and sentences started but not finished about which asylum inspectors can tell you a lot.
Note amidst clever witticisms the most palpable errors as to accepted fact.
Note the egoism.
If Nietzsche be a sane guide, why keep thousands of equally sane in our asylums? Yet, society must protect itself, or try to.

The Australian public was already familiar with the story of Nietzsche’s mental collapse and ensuing illness by 1897 (“Literary Gossip” 11 Dec. 1897). With specific diagnoses lacking from the literary gossip of The Sydney Morning Herald, Lyle’s reading of the Nietzsche volume shows an original and prescient understanding of Nietzsche’s condition, which had already developed when his later works were written (Orth). Contemporary research on Nietzsche’s condition still associates his “grandiosity” or “developing grandeur” with the onset of a frontotemporal dementia (Orth), the same symptom being identified by Lyle who asks Marshall-Hall to “See Hack Tuke’s Dictionary of Psychological Medicine for an explanation of egotistic
exaltation as found amongst the insane and found alas in this volume, I at least submit.“Attesting, perhaps with tongue-in-cheek, to the fluidity of psychological conjecture in both medical and legal discourse, Lyle claimed that he was not able to provide an effective definition of insanity:

It is very possible that I am insane or if not insane exceedingly stupid. I am not prepared to dispute such an issue, vague and trashy as it is in the legal realms. But assuming presumptuously that I am sane (an indefinable term), I am inclined to submit not arrogantly but humbly that this volume bears evidence of insane mental exaltation such as alienists recognise today.

In 1892, since he took Spencer’s theory of music as a proof of Schopenhauer’s theory of the will, Marshall-Hall may have been in agreement with Lyle. However, in 1898 Marshall-Hall believed that empirical proof (such as the identification of intellectual error) no longer indicated a fault of one’s instinct. As in his marginal defence of Wagner’s “weak plots,” Marshall-Hall believed that intellect was secondary to instinct, taken as a synonym for “will”:

intellect itself is merely an outcome of instinct. Hence the absurdity of inculcating moral tendencies through the former. It is man’s physique & physical environment which should occupy the attention of all “improvers”, statesmen, etc.—as his instincts (& consequent intellectual tendency) depend entirely upon [sic] the healthiness or source of these.—It requires us great observation of life to perceive that the intellect is altogether without permanent influence upon [sic] the life-course of men. It merely carries out more or less cunningly the imperious demands of instinct. (Marshall-Hall in Nietzsche, Case of Wagner 178–79)

64 Marshall-Hall may not have been in disagreement with the definition of “exaltation” in Hack Tuke’s Dictionary of Psychological Medicine, as it suggested that illusions of grandeur are the result of an otherwise healthy, life-affirming instinct: “It has been pointed out that exaltation has its natural foundation in the brain of every man, woman, or child (Clouston). Its counterparts—castle-building and day-dreaming—are to a greater or less extent as inseparable elements of active, vigorous, intellectual life, as is that hope of which they are but one expression, and without which life is but dust and ashes. Insane exaltation, then, is but the pathological development of a principle essentially physiological, and which restrained within due limits is not necessarily unhealthy. The particular temperament that predisposes to this condition is a proud, sanguine, imaginative, ambitious, and egotistical one” 469.
While Marshall-Hall appears to defend a vitalist reading of Nietzsche against Lyle’s idealism, a close reading of Marshall-Hall’s marginal notes shows that he disagreed with or disregarded many of Nietzsche’s ideas. On comparison, Marshall-Hall and Nietzsche both exhibited dual vitalist and idealist marginalia. While they engaged with texts in forceful and irrational annotations, they also engaged in reasoned debate.

Not only did Nietzsche and Marshall-Hall share the same vitalist underlines and remarks in their marginalia, they also engaged in reasoned marginal debates. Nietzsche’s personalised response to books, stemming from a belief that “the writings of an author express his personality,” was coupled with a philological, “scientific” approach to the reading (Brobjer 17, 19). Nietzsche wrote that “[i]t was only when the art of correct reading, that is to say philology, arrived at its summit that science . . . of any kind acquired continuity and constancy” (Nietzsche in Brobjer 19). Brobjer divides Nietzsche’s theory of “good reading” into two processes. Firstly, the reader must practice “slow, careful, thoughtful reading that is able to defer judgment and decision,” secondly, the reader must exhibit the opposite character of “personal presence, involvement and rumination” (Brobjer 19).

Marshall-Hall’s inspired, piecemeal, vitalist uses of Nietzsche’s forceful assertions are reminiscent of Jacques Barzun’s nineteenth-century intellectuals to whom “[t]he Nietzschean view of art was doubtless too difficult,” and to whom it would have been easy to “echo here and there an isolated outburst against morality or a hymn to reckless strength, and to unite Nietzsche with Wagner and Ibsen as the prophets of the new life” (Barzun 306). Indeed, sometimes Marshall-Hall’s annotations reflect Bebbington’s claim that his reading was “as irrational as it was passionate” (Bebbington 62), or Len Fox’s characterisation of marginal notes in books now in the possession of Mrs Shirley Schneider of Adelaide as “schoolboyish” (Fox 48). The vitalist, playful Marshall-Hall would respond with outbursts of “Bosh” (Marshall-Hall in Nietzsche, *Case of Wagner* 47), such as that next to Nietzsche’s criticism of Wagner:

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As well as rejecting Nietzsche’s criticism of Wagner, Marshall-Hall caused a minor scandal by dedicating a concert to Henrik Ibsen in 1893 in defence of an attack against the playwright from *The Argus* “Orchestral Concert.”
Nietzsche exhibited an almost identical system of marginalia in his habit of entering into a dialogue with the texts—expressed in underlines and marginal lines, exclamation marks, question marks, and notabenes (NBs) in the margins and, most importantly, by reactions in the margins or at the top or bottom of the pages, from single words to extended comments. (Brobjjer 15)

Nietzsche’s books from the period 1870–80 contain almost ten annotations, underlines and comments per page including conversational comments such as “bravo”, “yes”, “no” and “why” (Brobjjer 16). Marshall-Hall’s marginalia is similarly personal and prolific, with almost every page containing some sort of marginalia and a large “bravo!” at the end of the text.

In particular, Marshall-Hall’s underlining of passages relating to the will to power suggest that Marshall-Hall simply underlined titillating fragments instead of seeking order in Nietzsche’s aphorisms. Take, for instance, the assertion “[h]is sense of power,
his will to power, his courage, his pride—they decrease with the ugly, they increase with the beautiful” (182).

Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power, involved as it was in a critique of Bismarck’s nation-building enterprise, was incompatible with Marshall-Hall’s dedication of the Liedertafel concert to Bismarck. In Nietzsche’s criticism of nationalism, Bismarck has been shown to represent the “will to power” in “negative terms” because he “abandoned the intellectual, even spiritual’ meaning of ‘power’” (Görner 244). Here Marshall-Hall’s lack of pencil marks betray more than their presence. Marshall-Hall silently passed over the section “What the Germans Lack” in Twilight of the Idols from The Case of Wagner where Nietzsche writes that “[i]t costs dear to attain to power: power stupefies ... ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ I fear that has been the death of German philosophy” (155). By contrast, Marshall-Hall crossed out page after page of Nietzsche’s criticism of Wagner, declaring it “mostly absolute nonsense” (51–55). Rather than agreeing or disagreeing with Nietzsche’s criticism of Bismarck, his lack of annotations may indicate that Marshall-Hall just “did not get it.”

When considering the Marshall-Hall’s defence of Schopenhauer contained in the volume, it becomes apparent that Marshall-Hall also practiced a more careful style of reading. Nietzsche criticised Schopenhauer as a “psychologist,” the meaning of which was in flux at the time of both Nietzsche Marshall-Hall’s writing. To Nietzsche, “psychologist” referred to anyone who empirically observed people to

66 Rich anachronistically refers to the later ideas of Sigmund Freud and the existentialist psychology of Karl Jaspers in elaborating Marshall-Hall’s use of psychological terminology including “instinct,” “unconscious” and “conscious” Rich, “His Thumb” 154–56. While, as Rich indicates, psychological nomenclature could have influenced Marshall-Hall through the works of several “pre-Freudian Europeans” 157 and Laver recalled evenings at Marshall-Hall’s house with Otto Jung, a nephew of the psychologist Carl Jung, the only evidence we have as regards Marshall-Hall’s interest in psychology comes from his comments on the developing science of criminal anthropology and his reading of Nietzsche’s works.
deduce an (inherently self-affirming) ethical principle therefrom. Such was the use of the term in Nietzsche’s later works, beginning with *On The Genealogy of Morals*, where Spencer is criticised for equating “whatever has proven itself useful from time immemorial” as “good” (Nietzsche, *Genealogy* 14). It is unlikely that Marshall-Hall had read *On the Genealogy of Morals* in 1898 due to a lack of apparent engagement with its ideas and conclusions. Also, he marked out the book’s title in asterisks in the publisher’s catalogue in the back of *The Case of Wagner*, suggesting that he was interested by the title and would possibly have purchased the translation when it was appeared in 1899.

However, Nietzsche employed the term “psychologist” in the same sense when attacking Schopenhauer in *The Case of Wagner*, criticising the ethical conclusions that Schopenhauer drew from his observations of life:

> [Schopenhauer is a] case of the first rank for a psychologist, as being an ill-natured, ingenious attempt to bring into the field, in favour of a general nihilistic valuation of the whole of life, the very opposite instances, the grand self-affirmations of “will-to-life”, the exuberant forms of life. He has interpreted in turn art, heroism, genius, beauty, grand sympathy, knowledge, will for truth, and tragedy, as phenomena resulting from “negation,” or from the need of negation of “will” (*Case of Wagner* 183).

Marshall-Hall was an advocate of Schopenhauer’s ethical imperatives, expounding Schopenhauer’s asceticism in his 1892 Bendigo Extension lecture. Marshall-Hall said that

> even as the greatest joy, *i.e.*, satisfaction of desire, has but a brief span of life, and is speedily succeeded by a longing for something new, so that music which depicts nothing but the elation consequent on such satisfaction must soon become wearisome. But music-tragedy includes all possible states of feeling, and thus all possible variety. Moreover, a true picture of the world, of life, of man’s self is presented, inasmuch as the constant fading away of joy and the innumerable frustrations of the will are depicted to a marvellous minuteness. The nature of existence is revealed to us in a perfectly painless manner. The individual is enabled to understand, and become one with, all creation. He who has subdued the will finds satisfaction in re-experiencing life by this artificial means, entirely without harm to himself or others, and in observing the ceaseless yet futile efforts of the will to satisfy its
insatiable appetite, for thereby he gains courage to continue in his asceticism. ("First Sonata")

In the Bendigo lecture Marshall-Hall equated the denial of will with an increased capacity for enjoying life, an argument that he brought against Nietzsche in The Case of Wagner.

Where Nietzsche argued that “Schopenhauer speaks of beauty with melancholy ardour . . . in beauty he sees the generative impulse negatived” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis) (Case of Wagner 184), Marshall-Hall responded that to Schopenhauer the “generative impulse” was “negatived” “[o]nly during the moment of ‘pure contemplation’—when this is over he counts that the ‘will’ re-asserts itself with increased strength (an instance of the honesty which prevented Schopenhauer from allowing his “system” to interfere with his facts)” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis) (Marshall-Hall in Nietzsche, Case of Wagner 184–85). Marshall-Hall appealed to the apparently empirical virtues of Schopenhauer’s psychology to suggest that his philosophy as a whole advocated the “art, heroism, genius, [and] beauty” that Nietzsche claimed it subjugated to a pious, nihilistic valuation of life.

As such, Marshall-Hall argued that Nietzsche was misled in his judgment of Schopenhauer’s subjugation of “exuberant forms of life” to the single, morbid imperative of the cessation of will. Succinctly expressing his own attitude towards the asceticism of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, Marshall-Hall argued that “[i]t is merely Schopenhauer’s reductions with which Nietzsche quarrels.—indeed his own really form the fitting conclusion of the former’s observations of life” (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis) (183). To Marshall-Hall, the will to power, understood in vitalist terms as “exuberant,” or “grand” “forms of life” was the fitting conclusion to Schopenhauer’s idealist doctrine of the will.

In defending Schopenhauer as a psychologist, Marshall-Hall effectively defended the sort of scientific approach that Lyle brought to the pages of The Case of Wagner. It is evident that Marshall-Hall’s defence of Wagner and Schopenhauer was made at the expense of a revaluation of Spencer’s scientific approach. So much is

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67 Marshall-Hall’s emphases are retained in this thesis using the typographic notation established in appendix two.
hinted at by Lyle’s amazement at Marshall-Hall, Nietzsche, and Tille’s challenge of the Spencer’s views:

Does Nietzsche in this volume expose religious superstition more effectively than the measured reason of Voltaire, Ingersoll or Bradlaugh? Yet subtract his attack on religion and what philosophy does he leave? I fail to see that Nietzsche has any philosophy. Whatever decadence there may be in this age, as in every age “as it was in the beginning”, it is surely a sign of decadence to imagine that this volume is a specimen of anything triumphant in human reason. The idea that this insane one overthrows Herbert Spencer! Put on the fiddles! (Contents)

As probably the latest mark in The Case of Wagner, Marshall-Hall dismissed Lyle’s reasoned approach: “Well! M. Lyle, whether you are insane or Nietzsche I don’t know, but he’s damned good reading and you’re not!! Ha! Ha!” (Contents). When the marginalia in The Case of Wagner is analysed closely, Lyle and Marshall-Hall are shown to both appeal to science, either as a criminal anthropologist or a Schopenhauerian. With their fundamental agreement on this point, it would appear that a deeper antagonism lay behind Marshall-Hall’s Liedertafel speech and his marginalia with Marshall Lyle. Marshall-Hall’s contempt for those in power would have caused him to rail against the progressive idealism of Australian politicians and Lyle, who Marshall-Hall saw as acting in self-interest when pursuing their reformist programs.

**Marshall-Hall and Federation**

In my opinion he was always a good-natured, generous, humorous boy at heart, capable of youthful enthusiasms and loyalties to a quixotic degree. By nature revolutionary and rebellious towards standpatters’ opposition. In his earlier period [corrected to “career” in pen] he lacked the patience and wisdom that came later in his life after the storm and stress period. (Brookes, “Unveiling” 3)

whatever the ‘Argus’ attacks, always succeeds. (Lyle, “Letter to Cesare Lombroso”)

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68 The Museo di Antropologia Criminale in Turin, Italy, contains three letters from Lyle, correspondence from several other Australian criminologists, and the photographs of Australian criminals.
Student of Marshall-Hall and husband of Ivy Deakin (daughter of Alfred Deakin), Herbert Brookes’ reminiscence provides a first-hand glimpse of the driving forces behind Marshall-Hall’s intellectual activity during the 1890s. Brookes mentions the humorous and rebellious nature that cornered him in a Schopenhauerian aesthetic ideology against the progressive scientism of Australian politics; the storm and stress of his Nietzschean rhetoric. Though The Argus attacked both Marshall-Hall’s lectures and Lyle’s research on behalf of Lombroso, they were far from united in their views. In his lectures towards the close of the nineteenth century Marshall-Hall mobilised this antagonism against the progressive elite—possibly exemplified by Lyle’s research as a criminal anthropologist at the time—that he saw clamouring for power as the Australian colonies approached federation.

By 1899 the vitalist rage of the Liedertafel lecture gave way to the more reasoned 1899 lecture series “The Essential in Art.” However, Marshall-Hall retained his Nietzschean terminology in criticising precisely the sort of progressive social thought that Lyle propagated. Like Nietzsche, Marshall-Hall professed a doubt in progressive social thought on the grounds that intellectuality was a tactic of the physically weak, used to overcome the Napoleonic instincts of others. The term “psychology” was used in the Nietzschean sense, that of examining behaviour in its wider biological and metaphysical context:

> [h]as anything which tends to the strength and stability of a nation ever yet been effected by your visionaries, your fanatics, who would reconstruct the world according to their own pseudo-philanthropic imaginations? Psychologically examined, it turns out that their wonderful ideals, their reforms, their spirituality are merely a symptom—a symptom of weakness. It means they have not the necessary robustness, energy, hardness, to front, to understand, to use life as it is. (“Essential” 4.3: 25)

Marshall-Hall may have been referring to Lyle’s apparently self-serving use of political contacts in his research on behalf of Cesare Lombroso in 1898. Lyle approached George Reid, then Premier of New South Wales, during the 1898 Melbourne Federal Convention to ask for photographs and criminal records of prisoners in New South Wales. The informality of Lyle and Reid’s communication
may explain the complete lack of correspondence from Lyle in Reid’s correspondence held at the National Library of Australia. Reid, who according to *The Argus* “share[d] with Lombroso the opinion that criminology is a study that ought to be encouraged”, sent “photographs of and records of all the leading New South Wales criminals, male and female, for many years past, to be forwarded to the ‘master’ in Italy” (“Editorial” 30 Mar. 1898). The photographs were mentioned by Havelock Ellis, the translator of *The Man of Genius*, in his introduction to *The Criminal*. Ellis wrote that he had received from Lyle “a valuable series of photographs of Australian criminals (belonging, however, not to Victoria but New South Wales)” (xvii).

In Lyle’s 1898 letter to Alexander Peacock, Chief Inspector of Victorian prisons and member of the federal convention, he asked for “some photos and records attached of criminals in Victoria.” The Victorian penal system prisons had seen significant reform since Captain John Evans “inherited a prison system that was tainted by allegations of corruption and mismanagement” (O’Toole 207). During his time as Inspector General 1890–1903, Evans saw prisons “treating each prisoner as an individual and addressing their specific needs” through “classification and separation” (O’Toole 207). Lyle name-dropped Evans to convince the Chief Secretary of the importance of his research: “If you will permit me, I will give to Captain Evans, with whom I am well acquainted, full details as to the sorts of criminal photographs which are of scientific value” (Lyle, *Letter to Chief Secretary*). Evans acceded that “[a]s this request is made in the interests of science I see no objection to supplying the photographs and criminal histories” (Evans). Though Evans expressed suspicion about Lombroso’s motives, particularly his need for names and records to be attached to the photographs, he wrote that “Mr. Lyle has, as he says, perfect faith in the Professor’s conclusions” (Evans). On 29 July 1898, Lyle wrote a warm letter of thanks to Evans for “the receipt of 40 photos with records attached of Victorian criminals” including, amongst others, Frederick Deeming and Edward Kelly, adding that he would “call and see [Evans] in a few days” concerning some additional photographs that he would like in the collection (Lyle, *Letter to Captain Evans*).

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69 This letter held at the Public Records Office of Victoria is cited as VPRS 3992, Unit 989, G3155 in the on-line catalogue notes to VPRS 8369: Correspondence, Photographs and History Sheets of Certain Male Criminals at the Public Records Office of Victoria. The correspondence currently resides in VPRS 3992, Unit 707. The initial piece of correspondence marked G3155 was “top-numbered” and filed with the proceeding pieces of correspondence as H3155.
Marshall-Hall would have disagreed with the conclusions of Lyle’s research on philosophical grounds. To him, power and vitality could not be diagnosed with a cranial map. Rather, he understood power in aesthetic terms, such as he related during his “The Essential in Art” series. Art, as that which revealed the world’s “essential character,” was “the product of only the highest mental organisations” and so was only for “men of power” (4.3: 25). He directly cited Schopenhauer in justification of this hierarchy, illustrating Schopenhauer’s doctrine of artistic experience by recounting a mountaineering trip with his father:

I remember many years ago, when on an expedition among the Savoy Alps with my father, staying for luncheon on a ridge of rock at the foot of an enormous precipice at least 1000 feet in height. It was in the spring, and the huge rocks in front of us were crowned by towering heights of snow. All of a sudden, with a crescendo of sound that was terrifying, this vast mass began to move, bearing with it enormous rocks, and whole clouds of debris. As it swung over the edge of the precipice it appeared as if the very mountains were being heaved from their resting-place, and were toppling upon us. The end of the world seemed to have come. So wrapt was I in awe and wonder at this disastrous cataclysm of nature, that I remained motionless without a thought of our personal danger, which was not inconsiderable; while my father, springing up without a moment’s hesitation, seized me by the collar and dragged me off behind a sheltering rock. Thus did destiny decree that Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the beautiful and the sublime should be exemplified by us some hundred years after its formulation. On the whole, however, I recommend those who wish to exercise their faculty of pure contemplation on an avalanche, to do so through a telescope.” (4.5: 10)

70 The following passage, quoted by Marshall-Hall, shows that Marshall-Hall read the 1883 edition of the first volume of *World as Will and Idea*, translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp. There is no strong evidence to suggest that he ever read past the first volume: “The artist is one that possesses this objective or subjective faculty of pure contemplation, and the power of presenting to the understanding mind the inner nature of life, in the clearest, most significant, and unmistakable manner, in works of art. . . . Schopenhauer brings out the point clearly in the following words (p. 239) : ‘While science, following the unresting and inconstant stream of the fourfold forms of reason and consequent, with each end attained sees further, and can never reach a final goal not attain full satisfaction, any more than by running we can reach the place where the clouds touch the horizon ; Art, on the contrary, is everywhere at its goal. For it plucks the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world’s course, and has it isolated before it. And this particular thing, which in that stream was a small perishing part, becomes to Art the representative of the whole, an equivalent of the endless multitude in space and time. It therefore pauses at this particular thing; the course of time stops; the relations vanish for it; only the essential, the (Platonic) Idea, is its object.’” (4.3: 26).
The Savoy Alps were not alone in inspiring experiences of the sublime. The Australian landscape also inspired revelations in the composer. However, the character was essentially the same. Recalling his earlier Wagnerian ideals, Marshall-Hall used Schopenhauer’s theory of art in claiming that there was “but one art” (4.3: 26). It is not surprising, then, that Marshall-Hall used Hellenic imagery and Teutonic music to describe the truths bequeathed to him by the Australian landscape:

Who can hear the Introduction to Franz Schubert’s colossal Symphony in C without feeling that he is in the presence of immense masses of inorganic nature? I remember on the track to the Wellington Falls, near Hobart, at a certain point suddenly that stupendous work of the Titans reveals itself. One giant rock lies piled on the other, mountain high, so that the heavens above, and the holy gods, and Zeus himself, seem small and impotent, and of another feeble existence. Then I understood for the first time the fable of the war between the gods and the Titans—then for the first time I saw the physical embodiment of Schubert’s sublime opening to the Symphony. (4.3: 27)

In 1898–89 Marshall-Hall’s association of the Australian landscape with German music took on political overtones. While Marshall-Hall was raging at the Liedertafel concert about the need to keep popular music out of drawing rooms, the Convention debated how to keep people of non-Anglo-Saxon descent out of the Commonwealth-to-be. 71 In a supplement to The Argus of 20 July 1899 John Quick urged the colonies to “vote for a constitution which is founded on the indestructible principle of Anglo-

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71 Though not included in the Australian Constitution, John Quick offered a definition of the Australian “citizen” based on race that would “not open the door to members of those undesirable races, and it would empower the Federal Parliament to exclude from the enjoyment of and participation in the privileges of federal citizenship people of any undesirable race or of undesirable antecedents” Australia 1753. The call for a definition of citizenship accompanied the discussion of clause 110 provided, according to Edmund Barton “for the equality of citizens of the Commonwealth—for the prevention of those of them who happen to reside in one state having their citizenship abridged as compared with citizens of the same Commonwealth residing in another state” Australia 665. The clause was eventually included in a modified form as section 117, using the term “subjects of the Queen, resident in any state” in the place of “citizen” Williams, “Race”: “Clause 110-A state shall not make or enforce any law abridging any privilege or immunity of citizens of other states of the Commonwealth, nor shall a state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” Australia 665. As the constitutional historian John Williams points out, and as is particularly important in the case of the rights of prisoners, who were refused the right to vote until the 1970s O’Toole 131, “[i]t would be nearly ninety years after the commencement of the Commonwealth before that section would operate as a substantive guarantee [of any person within a state’s jurisdiction receiving the equal protection of its laws]” Australian Constitution 801.
Saxon unity” (“Federated Australia”). To this supplement Marshall-Hall contributed an “Australian National Song,” the second stanza of which read

Australia, Australia, Land of the Golden Fleece
To thee our fathers boldly steered their fearless
Argosies

Marshall-Hall may have been praising the work of artists such as Tom Roberts, whose depiction of the “activities of the shearing shed and similar subjects” led Australian painters out of what “Marshall-Hall termed the suburban bush, and paint the national life of Australia” (Croll 16). Marshall-Hall’s “golden fleece” could be a reference to Roberts’ painting *The Golden Fleece* from 1894, itself a reference to the “argosies” of the legend of Jason and the Argonauts. Painting the Australian landscape in the garb of Greek antiquity was not new to Marshall-Hall by this point. Arthur Jose points out that in his 1897 *Hymn to Sydney* Marshall-Hall “could not really praise Sydney, much though he desired to, except by importing Wardour Street irrelevancies; St. Mary’s Cathedral had to masquerade as Ninus’s tomb, and the ferry-boats as beaked Phaeacian galleys” (42). From this song it is evident that Marshall-Hall was still in thrall of the Wagnerian notion of a world-culture or world-composers, using Greek Antiquity as a model.

The 1899 “Australian National Song” appeared after Marshall-Hall’s tirade against the 1897 competition for music to accompany the first sitting of the Australian Federal Parliament. Marshall-Hall suggested that “some composer of recognised genius be approached” such as Dvořák, Brahms, Parry, Stanford, or MacCunn (“Music and Federation”). When his own federal ode received the approval of the Protectionist Alfred Deakin, Marshall-Hall gushed in response

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72 It is conceivable that Deakin and Marshall-Hall influenced each other in their mysticism and literary sources. In extant sources pertaining to Deakin’s reading the earliest reference to Nietzsche is, as has been noted Roe 18, in a letter to Walter Murdoch from 1906: “Nietzsche I found very valuable for though he acts as ‘advocatus diaboli’ he pricks so many conventional bubbles & sounds the shallows of masquerading ‘morality’ so well that he helps to drive one to deeper foundations & more sincere inspiration” La Nauze and Nurser 24. It is unlikely that, as John La Nauze writes, Deakin was “impressed” by Nietzsche in his “youth” 232, as Deakin was 40 years old when the first translations of Nietzsche’s works appeared in 1896. While Deakin appears to have been the more methodical and prolific reader, he did not read German Norris. The two evidently shared a literary bond, with Marshall-Hall advising Deakin in 1913 that he should write a novel. Marshall-Hall’s 1898 hierarchy of instinct and intellect is evident in this letter: “I hope the novel-form because it lends itself, as nothing else, to the depiction of Action, and Action is the highest form of poetry and knowledge. While the different
I was very delighted to hear that you were favourably impressed by my Federal Ode. You are one of the few men out here whose opinion I value highly. Mr Mackey tells me you wish to recite it in your peroration next Monday. I can assure you that this would be an event which I should be proud to my Dying Day. (*Letter to Alfred Deakin* 4 July 1899)

Marshall-Hall’s appeal to German musical supremacy, as well as his mythologising of Australia’s white migrant population in “Australian National Song” appealed to Deakin, resonating with his Protectionist policies of racial exclusion, most notably the White Australia policy, as stated in 1901:

> The ultimate result is a national determination to make no truce with coloured immigration, to have no traffic with the unclean thing, and to put it down in all its shapes without much regard to cost. Those Chinese, Japanese, or coolies who have come here under the law, or in spite of it, are not to be permitted to increase. (Deakin in O’Neal 698)

However, as has been shown, Marshall-Hall did not advocate theories of evolution based on physical characteristics such as can be found in Deakin’s speech where he refers to “lower Latin types” and “Caucasian separateness” from the “Aryan family” (Deakin in O’Neal 698). To Marshall-Hall, evolutionary value could only be judged in aesthetic terms.

Framing his political discourse in aesthetic terms, Marshall-Hall considered Napoleon a “human avalanche” (“Essential in Art” 4.3: 25) and condemned the populism of Australian politicians. By contrast, both Lyle and Lombroso identified Deeming as a “Napoleonic” criminal type, a prodigal “murderer” and a danger to mankind. In a letter to Lombroso dated 4 November 1897, currently held at the Museo di Antropologia Criminale in Turin, Lyle wrote:

> Characters can give all the different points of view, and the will-power from which reason springs. I feel you are a soul saved from the fire – from the point of view of Art. You have done enough for politics, now return to your natural element.” (*Letter to Alfred Deakin* 31 Jan. 1913).

73 Marshall-Hall’s “aestheticisation of politics” provides an opening for theoretical discussion along the lines developed by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in *Heidegger, Art, and Politics: The Fiction of the Political* and *Musica Ficta: Figures of Wagner*. This discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis, and the above term can be taken very simply (it is hardly opaque philosophical jargon in Lacoue-Labarthe’s work) as meaning that Marshall-Hall shaped his political discourse according to aesthetic criteria.
When you said he was Napoleonic you confirmed what I said at the time. By-the-bye have you read Herbert Spencer’s indictment of the ‘man of destiny’, to be found in his introduction to the Study of Sociology? He puts the great Napoleon in the position of, perhaps, the world’s greatest criminal. I think it is highly desirable in the interests of morality that a big scoundrel should be shown up. Just at present we have a sort of hero-worship going on; we have Napoleon plays in our theatres, and the people who will execrate the name of a Deeming, will worship a bigger murderer, Napoleon! I have no love for militarism, but I confess I have a loving for the Duke of Wellington. For as you know he smashed up Bonaparte.

If Marshall-Hall disapproved of Lyle’s sycophantic use of Reid as a political contact, then he held a greater disdain for the un-Napoleonic, populist tactics of Australian politicians. The newspaper clipping from 26 July 1898 inserted into page 201 of *The Case of Wagner* reveals Marshall-Hall’s contempt for Reid as a public figure:

This sally was greeted by loud laughter, in the midst of which the Premier was hit on the chin by a flour-bag. The crowd roared, but Mr. Reid took the assault in good part, kissing his hand and bowing repeatedly to the people, who became still more convulsed at the grotesque spectacle of the Premier standing with his face and waistcoat smothered in flour and making no attempt to wipe it off.

Mr. Reid (continuing) said that even his opponents made him look whiter than ever, and all could now see that a white man he was. (“Mr. Reid”)

Marshall-Hall cynically responded in the Nietzsche volume that

> [t]he English “great man,” and the “great class” he truckles to, are not inaptly characterised by the following incident. In Spain or Italy, the incident would have been avenged with the stiletto—but they are not democracies. (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis)

Of course, Marshall-Hall was not averse to committing his own “corrupt” acts. He had not met Reid before 1913, and requested an invitation to Reid from Deakin in order to save himself inconvenience when travelling, a sycophantic act he contributed to “the corruption of mankind” *(Letter to Alfred Deakin 31 Jan. 1913).*
Despite Marshall-Hall’s attack on Australian progressive politics, Madden (himself a conservative (Campbell)) offered conciliatory words at the conclusion of the “Essential in Art” series. The legislative assembly had earlier been asked whether they were “in the position of being able to exercise any discipline over Mr. Marshall-Hall, in relation to his public utterances” (“Professor Marshall Hall” 10 Aug. 1898) and Madden ensured the audience that “[e]veryone who had observed his doings here was thus far assured that in the work he had to do he certainly performed wonders,” even though “[i]n the side-shows he set himself to produce he did produce startling effects from time to time.” Madden cautioned that “[i]t would sometimes be better for the professor if he were not so conservative of his views,” though he “greatly admired the professor because there were so many who resented him” (“Essential in Art” 11 Aug. 1899).

In 1898–99 Marshall-Hall rejected the scientific theories of evolution from Spencer and Lombroso as badges of progressive political power. He retreated into a Nietzschean vitalism that found limited acceptance from his porous social sphere of bohemians, scientists, and politicians alike. By looking towards Greek Antiquity and German music for the future of Australian culture his ideas may be seen to reflect the Protectionist policies of his friend Deakin. However, far from advocating evolutionary theories based on physical characteristics such as race, Marshall-Hall directly opposed Lyle and Lombroso’s identification of the criminal type and the artistic and scientific genius, as evolutionarily regressive. Where Lyle, Lombroso, and Deakin looked to empirical evidence of physical and behavioural characteristics to determine the evolutionary value of a person, Marshall-Hall maintained that a person or civilisation could only be judged by their art.

Marshall-Hall’s literary activity waned significantly after his dismissal in 1900, in part due to his establishment of a new conservatorium (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 20). The writings that did surface showed his growing dissatisfaction with the Australian labour movement. In response to the Australian labour movement, Marshall-Hall was required to bifurcate his use of the term “idealist” to refer to, on the one hand, the irrational dreams of social reformers, and on the other, his Schopenhauerian philosophical pedigree. As the following chapter shall demonstrate, his return to London and the outbreak of the First World War saw key revisions in his thought. The
difficulties associated with staging his operas caused him to adopt a radical leftist tone in his letters to his friends James Barrett and Franz Dierich. The outbreak of the First World War and his subsequent return to Australia was accompanied by a rejection of this idealism and the adoption of a nationalist mysticism in his articles and lectures.
Chapter Three (1900–1915): Idealism and the First World War

Against Ideals and Idealists

In the years following the Liedertafel address and his dismissal from the Ormond Chair of Music the growth of the Australian labour movement saw Marshall-Hall appeal to his Schopenhauerian idealism to counter what he saw as the irrational reformism around him. He distinguished between Schopenhauerian idealism and the supposedly fanciful and idealism of social reformers with their appeal to Plato’s *Republic* and Thomas More’s *Utopia*. Marshall-Hall’s retreat into his idealist pedigree saw his use of Schopenhauer significantly change. Rather than applying Schopenhauer in pseudo-Nietzschean proclamations about the role of the artist in society, he deployed Schopenhauer’s ideas in a poetic fashion, taking them as artistic concepts rather than philosophical doctrines.

Marshall-Hall’s only significant series of articles during the next eight years appeared during a trip to Europe in 1907. He was impressed by the conductors he heard in Berlin, particularly Arthur Nikisch, and was introduced to the art of Max Klinger and Gustav Klimt (G. Marshall-Hall, “Musical Musings”). Marshall-Hall evidently felt room to move, intellectually and artistically, far from the antagonisms in which he had caged himself in Australia. The “Music in Berlin” series (though the articles were not uniformly titled so) betrays Marshall-Hall’s lifetime association of philosophy and music, writing in his only extant reference to Kant, that

> Whether after two thousand years Kant will any more be compared with Plato, or Bismarck with Pericles may be doubted: but, to a certainty, the only artistic phenomena of the 18th and 19th centuries which will be placed on an equal footing with ancient art or the art of the Renaissance will be the work of German musicians. (“Richard Strauss”)

The “Music in Berlin” series was but a moment of reflective calm. On returning to Australia, Marshall-Hall was faced with a rapidly progressing labour movement that threatened his orchestra. In 1908 Marshall-Hall published an extended essay on the

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74 As Marshall-Hall wrote to *The Argus* from Berlin: “I confess I am in love with Nikisch” “Musical Musings.”
labour question entitled “Ethics and Bootblacking,” scorning the devaluation of “the other rewards besides those [workmanship] fetches in the market” in “the many fine speeches of the orators of our Labour party, who alone of our citizens . . . have at heart the interest of us workers; whose philanthropy alone is devoid of self-seeking.” As is evident from his altercation with Shaw, Marshall-Hall ever fancied himself a worker, and his use of the objective personal pronoun above shows that this self-esteem had not changed with a conservatorium of his very own. Marshall-Hall recalls a particularly thorough bootblack he visited, as a student at King’s College, who epitomised the proud workman with whom he shared such fellow-feeling. In contrast to the bootblack, Marshall-Hall recalls meeting an “an artisan” around the time of the 1905 election that saw Deakin installed as Prime Minister, who claimed that “if he were not obliged, he would never do another stroke of work of any kind.” To Marshall-Hall this work-averse attitude “smacked too much of that system of ‘privilege’ which . . . was the scorn of democracy,” plunging Australia into the grasp of a workers’ aristocracy.

Marshall-Hall came out in support of the proposed educational reforms of Frank Tate’s Preliminary Report of the Director of Education Upon Observations Made During an Official Visit to Europe and America, eventually passed by Deakin’s Commonwealth Liberal government as the 1910 Education Act (Selleck). Tate proposed the expansion of state schooling to an elementary level, as well as an increase in technical and vocational education. Sarcastically, Marshall-Hall suggested that “[t]o read Mr. Tate anyone would think that national well-being and morality were in some way dependent on thorough and intelligent work, and that all our state schools ought to make it their one aim to inculcate this absurd doctrine” (“Ethics”).

Melbourne’s May Day committee should have known better than to ask him to provide music for the 1908 May Day parade. Marshall-Hall had never entertained Melbourne’s far left, with his writings absent from the labour journal Tocsin despite the fact that the journal agreed with Marshall-Hall’s position, as stated above in The Case of Wagner, that the physical health and environment of a person affected their moral reasoning and hence was the proper focus for reform (Rich, “His Thumb” 115). Rich is correct in arguing that Marshall-Hall’s elitist views did not endear him to the management of Tocsin (Rich, “His Thumb” 386), including Lyle who provided much-
needed legal advice to the paper (Lyle, *Letter to John Percy Jones*). Marshall-Hall published an open letter in response to the request in which he condemned the committee’s “hyperbolical rant,” suggesting that their motto be Goethe’s “there is nothing more monstrous to contemplate than ignorance in action” (Goethe in G. Marshall-Hall, “May Day”). In much the same way as Marshall-Hall’s spirited attack on labour politics did not entail a complete rejection of state power in education and industry, his attack on the May Day committee was an attack on what he saw as the paradox of their proposed revolution, namely that they sought to “proclaim the future of universal brotherhood from beneath a flag which of intention is blood-coloured,” proposing violence against “fellow-men, who have no more than [the committee] the power to alter the course of things” (“May Day”). The younger Marshall-Hall might have said that the senior had ceased to feel that common need of the propertyless classes.

Though Marshall-Hall mobilised Schopenhauer’s philosophy in political terms, from “The Essential in Art” onwards his uses of Schopenhauer took on a poetic or Symbolist tone. The article “The Orchestra: Its Mystic Voices” shows the Symbolist idealisation of nature into mythical creatures that Bebbington traces to “The Essential in Art” (Bebbington 62). Marshall-Hall evoked a hierarchy of orchestral instruments from the percussion as “the spirits of caves and grottoes;” the brass as “swarthy cave giants and their underlings, the dwarfs and gnomes;” the woodwind as “living, growing organisms;” and “the purely human family of string instruments.” This hierarchy is strikingly similar to Schopenhauer’s hierarchy of harmony, with the bass voice as “the lowest grades of the objectification of will, unorganised nature, the mass of the planet;” the middle voices as “the whole gradation of the Ideas in which the will objectifies itself;” and the “principal voice” as “the intellectual life and effort of man” (1: 334–35).

The connection between Marshall-Hall’s broadly Platonic aesthetic theory and his political thought was elaborated in “Against Ideals and Idealists” from 1911. “Against Ideals and Idealists,” published in the second issue of *The Australian Musical News*, was the last text that Marshall-Hall published before leaving Australia after the collapse of his orchestra. Marshall-Hall targeted those who would take Plato’s *Republic*, and More’s *Utopia* seriously. Marshall-Hall considered the texts unrealistic,
fit only for an “after dinner conviviality,” delineating starkly between philosophical idealism and the “idealism” of social reformists. Speaking, it seems, to his younger self, Marshall-Hall continued that

[u]nhappily, a number of most amiable, well-meaning, and otherwise intelligent people, through their untutored reading of such-like effusions, often seem to receive a sort of twist in the brain, from which they occasionally never quite recover, or only tardily, after long and bitter experience. Moreover, since weakly constituted brains are most easily infected, this morbo-idealism spread like an epidemic among those who lack the culture to refute its fallacies; so that, as the dog in the fable, they drop their bone of fact in their anxiety to seize the shadow of fancy. (“Against Ideals” 32)

By contrast, Marshall-Hall vindicated sense of the world “idealism” provided by Schopenhauer and the English writers Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Isaac Taylor:

An idea is literally that which is seen. Coleridge defines it as the “visual abstraction of a distant object” Isaac Taylor, as “the image of a visible object” Schopenhauer, modernising Plato, says ideas are the permanent qualities of transient phenomena. All agree that an idea is a mental reproduction of some thing existing. (“Against Ideals” 32)

Marshall-Hall’s renewed interest in idealism was also evinced in his programs for the final performances of the Marshall-Hall Orchestra. Marshall-Hall’s Spencerian theory of musical evolution extended to the music of Indigenous Australians, as reflected in “The Form of a Symphony” printed in the program notes to the Marshall-Hall Orchestral Concerts of June 1911. Marshall-Hall repeated the notion that melodies were developed and varied through an evolutionary process, and that music as a whole evolved towards its ideal state (“Form” 3 June 1911: 115–16). To illustrate this point, he compared Teutonic music with the music of “the Australian Blacks, [in whom] we find the general constructive principle of repetition at work, though without, or with a minimum, of variation” (“Form” 3 June 1911: 16). This artistic application of evolution theory led Marshall-Hall to reject the notion of abstract music:

In conclusion, then, it has been my endeavour to show that the term abstract cannot properly be applied to music—not even to Symphonic form, which is commonly supposed to be the most abstract of musical
forms. On the contrary, just as Melody, Harmony, and Rhythm, the sensuous elements of Music, have their origin in our physical nature, so also the forms which arise from the play of these musical elements, take their characterisation from those physical movements through which our feelings express themselves. ("Form" 24 June 1911: 25)

Marshall-Hall’s idealism can be read as a reaction against the conflict breaking out within the Marshall-Hall orchestra, wherein the Musicians’ Union players would refuse to play with non-Union players. The conflict ended in 1912 with the disbanding of the orchestra and Marshall-Hall’s return to England. Radic argues that Marshall-Hall left in disgust, and intended to leave indefinitely (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 29). Living in London, Marshall-Hall conjured memories of his raging twenties in The British Australasian. Marshall-Hall revaluated Wagner’s music using his Spencerian theories and criticised his younger self, and his Wagnerian vitalism in much the same terms that he did Australian political life:

like most liberals, we considered that the whole world should see as we saw, and do as we did. All the rest did not count. And, indeed, we had our excuse. For the present generation can hardly imagine the effect of the first dawning of a great genius such as that of Wagner. . . . All this was at first so novel, so alluring, that it completely blinded his admirers to a certain monotony and heaviness of style which he has not always avoided, and to the fact that his vocal writing is too often dependent on the symphonic structure of his work, and does not arise from the natural capacities of the human voice, or the natural expression of human emotion. ("On Music and Musicians” 28 May)

Marshall-Hall’s articles took on the flippancy of Shaw and other London newspaper critics, turning frankly anti-philosophical at points. Echoing Nietzsche’s condemnation of Bismarck’s “Deutschland über Alles,” Marshall-Hall wrote that

Not Wagner, but Wagnerism, has killed musical individuality in Germany. Even the highly generalised character-types of Wagner are slavishly imitated, and reproduced by the thousand. Too often on the stage one seems to be looking at galvanically animated philosophic ideas, rather than intelligible men and women ("On Music and Musicians” 28 May)
Marshall-Hall’s revaluation of Wagner on the grounds of Spencer’s theories accompanied his shift towards the music with edges of Verdi and Puccini (“Music and Drama”). The Argus described Marshall-Hall’s opera *Stella* as “brimming over with melody from start to finish,” with “rich and sensuous” harmonies and “simple and natural rhythms” (“Music and Drama”). The opera even included “an unabashed straight-forward waltz, which will doubtless soon be heard in every ballroom in Melbourne” (“Music and Drama”). Marshall-Hall had evidently developed a new understanding of Ibsen’s “the joy of life,” in line with Lionel’s “art with edges,” that looked towards every day life and simple, definite melodies. Where Marshall-Hall’s 1905 lecture “The Joy Life” furnished the Australian landscape with the creatures of Hellenic mythology and his 1891 Ballarat Extension lecture claimed that “[s]o far as can be judged from historical records, the ancient Greeks before the period of their decline must have been a nation impregnated to the very core with what Ibsen calls the ‘joy of life’” (“Pathetic”), *Stella* showed Marshall-Hall followed Ibsen in attempting to portray common people, rather than historical or mythological characters. As Marshall-Hall wrote to Deakin:

> My real success is that I got my audience to sympathize with a nurse, and a country-doctor: for whom Fate, and suffering, loom as largely as for puppet-kings and queens. The poetry lies entirely in the treatment, and to reveal the poetry which underlies the commonplaces of life, seems to me no uninteresting artistic achievement [sic]. *(Letter to Alfred Deakin 13 May 1912)*

Rather than finding London a haven of idealist culture, Marshall-Hall found producing his operas more difficult in London than in Australia. His unsuccessful activities in London brought him into conflict with that city’s conservative cultural elite, catapulting him back to the political left. The outbreak of the First World War cemented the revision of his political and aesthetic idealism, causing him to side with the vague and dreamy idealists, in fact the vitalists that he so heavily criticised in 1911.

*The Anarchist with Definite Principles*

The final two years of Marshall-Hall’s life saw the outbreak of the First World War. These years were marked at a personal level for Marshall-Hall by difficulties in
producing operatic works in London and by his return to the Ormond Chair of Music. Radical changes in his thinking were brought out by the combination of these events, principally a return to a radically leftist political position, the rejection of his Nietzschean views on war, and a rejection of idealist, particularly German, philosophy. In these final stages of his life, Marshall-Hall embraced “idealism,” a nationalist mysticism reminiscent of his earliest Wagnerian beliefs.

Prior to his return to Melbourne, in London Marshall-Hall turned away from the conservative cultural elites for artistic and philosophical inspiration. Nine months after “corruptly” begging for an introduction to Reid, Marshall-Hall wrote to the violinist Franz Dierich:

I find myself here in London just as much a Radical, as I was Conservative in Melbourne. The fact is the people at the top of the tree are always selfseekers and rascals, whether they are Socialists or Conservatives. In Australia it was the former; here, it is the latter. (Letter to Franz Dierich 23 Oct. 1913).

From London he wrote to James Barrett, the businessman and progressive vitalist who managed the finances for the Marshall-Hall Orchestra, that

[t]he classes who are satisfied with their weekly wage, and have no wish to become wealthy, are the only people really worth knowing. Here again one finds men interested in Art, philosophy, everything in fact, and even finance. And, thank heavens, they include the vast majority of mankind. (Letter to Sir James Barrett 19 Aug. 1913).

Marshall-Hall’s return to leftist thinking was brought out in a letter to Barrett that the latter would no doubt have found humorous, considering Marshall-Hall’s response to the May Day request:

Don’t be surprised if you read in the papers: “Fearful London atrocities” 200,000 working-men marched to-day on the West-End of London, sacking the mansions of the bloodsuckers—the wealthy West-Enders, the corpses of many of whom were seen hanging to lampposts and chimneys at the head of the procession a once well-known Melbourne musician, Prof. M-H. was to be seen, egging his followers

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75 See Roe.
on to rapine and slaughter, while his son played stirring tunes on the fiddle. (*Letter to Sir James Barrett* 19 Aug. 1913)

Marshall-Hall found himself in mainland Europe upon the outbreak of the Great War, undertaking a walking tour in Switzerland (Radic, *G. W. L. Portrait* 32). In Zürich the news reached him that he had been offered the Ormond Chair of Music for a second time, an offer that he accepted as he escaped Zürich at the last minute (Radic, *G. W. L. Portrait* 32). The First World War caused a change of heart in the composer, second-hand knowledge of War leading him to disassociate war with a healthy “instinct” or “will.” On 9 August Marshall-Hall recounted his escape from Zürich:

I was lucky in making up my mind, five minutes after the mobilisation order was known, to leave Zürich. As it was I got through—having to stand 10 hours in the corridor of the train—without food or drink for 15 hours. Others could not get through under 3 days, & with all luggage lost, & in a starving condition. I managed to look after a lot of poor ladies too, who would have been stranded. (*Letter to Sir James Barrett* 9 Aug. 1914)

A letter to Dierich composed eleven days later relayed Marshall-Hall’s shock and anger at the atrocities of war, the sheen of the “grand” life of war quickly tarnishing. Marshall-Hall’s response may be a reaction not necessarily to war itself, but to the scale and facelessness of the First World War, which evidently brought out Marshall-Hall’s ire against both German and British forces. Marshall-Hall evinced dismay at the rumour of “[f]ive German big warships . . . sunk in the mouth of the Humber” in which he claimed “[n]early all hands—about 3000 men—drowned, the rest prisoners—many horribly mutilated” (*Letter to Franz Dierich* 20 Aug. 1914).76 Though it is not evident from the major literature on the naval history of the First World War that anything of the sort occurred in the Humber estuary,77 the rumour chillingly foreshadows the Battle of Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914,78 in which five German ships were sunk with approximately 1,200 German casualties (“The Sea Fight”).

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76 The *New York Times* reported a similar event on 9 August 1914, though the news, apparently appearing first in German newspapers, was that four British ships were sunk in the Humber estuary, and no date was given as to when “German Story.”

77 See Massie.

78 See Osborne.
Marshall-Hall nevertheless attempted to enlist for service in the First World War, but was rejected on account of his teeth. Barrett recalled that “he tried to enlist in the British Army in London in 1914, after he had been reappointed to the Ormond Chair,” on account of “what he regarded as his duty” (6). Marshall-Hall’s letter to Barrett indicates not a triumphant sense of duty, but resignation and disillusionment: “It is absurd to send out youngsters” (Letter to James Barrett 30 Aug. 1914) writes Marshall-Hall, though he did not express regret at his son’s intention to enlist.

The death blow to Marshall-Hall’s long-term love affair with German culture came with the storming of the town of Louvain. Seemingly as a justification of his son’s enlisting, Marshall-Hall wrote, “I only hope to see the day of merciless retribution!—German culture!—Phew!—I only lately saw the wonderful Townhall [sic] of Louvain—of what was Louvain” (Letter to Sir James Barrett 30 Aug. 1914). It is not clear whether Marshall-Hall was beholden to the British propagandists’ attribution of the storming of Louvain to Nietzsche’s philosophy. The Times reported the atrocity as “the physical counterpart to the intellectual atrocities committed by Treitschke, Bernhardi, and Nietzsche” (Martin 373), an opinion that Marshall-Hall may begrudgingly have accepted. Upon meeting returned soldiers, Marshall-Hall reevaluated the views professed by his 1898 self. Ending on a cynical note, Marshall-Hall recounted his encounter with returned soldiers to Barrett:

I have had interesting chats with one or two wounded, from the front. They are all keen as mustard. Killing men seems the real primal natural keenest instinct of man,—the joy and fascination of it overweighs all else in civilisation. How the world improves! (Marshall-Hall’s emphasis) (Letter to James Barrett 6 Oct. 1914)

By the time Marshall-Hall returned to Melbourne he had, possibly for the first time, embraced Australia as a place in itself that could harbour its own culture, both musical and philosophical. This cultural autonomy could be won, in Marshall-Hall’s mind, at the cost of severance with its cultural ties with Europe. Underpinning the hope that wilful ignorance of European culture might revive local culture, Marshall-Hall also hoped that averting his eyes from the war would “make it go away.” At a speech given at Melba Hall upon the opening the University Conservatorium’s year in 1915, Marshall-Hall spoke what may have been his last public words on war:
Yes, European civilisation bears on its brow the shameful brand of realism—and is not ashamed. And Europe today is atoning her desertion of hope-crowned idealism for the cold, cruel, pitiless creed of the realist, by the wholesale slaughter of her youth, the destruction of her precious monuments, the massacre of entire populations—by famine, disease, and universal ruin. Realism has brought a once noble people under domination of a faithless, merciless horde of barbarians, and converted Europe into a butcher’s shambles. Let’s turn away our eyes. (“Ideal”)

By turning his eyes away from Europe, Marshall-Hall separated music from the Schopenhauerian and Spencerian philosophy that had held him in thrall for so long. His new creed was in part a retreat into dreamy idealism, or a lording of idealism over the scientific discourse that he previously championed. Marshall-Hall saw the new Australian music in the work of the young Australian composer and performer Percy Grainger, described by Marshall-Hall as an “anarchist, but an anarchist with definite principles” (“Ideal”). He praised Grainger for learning and then shedding his “German methods” to “realise that something which is to be found in no other country but [his] own” (“Ideal”).

Though war no longer held Marshall-Hall’s interest, the connection between sexual desire and art was still strong in his mind. His unpublished essays held at the University of Melbourne Archives include an undelivered address for the Brown Society.79 “A Literary Prelude” was to be read before a performance of works by Beethoven, Schumann, Chopin, and Brahms on 30 July 1915 (Program). The prelude begins with the description of a winter’s train trip from Paris to Switzerland. Marshall-Hall recounts sharing his compartment with a man reading Tolstoy’s The Kreutzer Sonata who occasionally beats the pages in agreement with the author that “musicians and their music should be all together burned at the stake” for their amoral, intoxicating effect on society (“Literary Prelude”). Marshall-Hall’s chance meeting with the stranger mirrors the chance meeting of the narrator and the wife-murderer Basile Posdnicheff at the beginning of Tolstoy’s novella. The audience would have no doubt noticed the reference to Marshall-Hall’s 1898 scandal, which included the charge that he recommended The Kreutzer Sonata, “a very dirty and disgusting

79 The work was eventually read at a special meeting of the Society after his death Brookes “Note.”
diatribe against marriage,” to a class of female students (Potter). Marshall-Hall’s response came by proxy, that he had recommended the text at the end of an Interpretation class dedicated to Beethoven’s sonata of the same title, and had very little recollection of the book, having not recently read it (Masson). Revisiting the book in 1915, Marshall-Hall openly satirises the book’s moral that both music and erotic love are fatally morally degrading (Tolstoy 137–40).

Through this, possibly Marshall-Hall’s last written work, his late vitalist ontology may be read most clearly. He claims that in his traveling antagonist,

with a nervous system wound up to such a degree of tension, so morbidly hyper-sensitive, there is stored a superfluous quantity of life-energy. And this life-energy we see in everything around us. It is revealed not only in human life, but in the whole organic and inorganic world. And wherever we see it we see it in action, or potentially active. Everywhere nature is at war with herself, assimilating, disintegrating, force striving with force. And man himself, with his faculty of reason, which some have called sublime, what sort of existence does he lead? A thousand impulses urge him this way and that – impulses which he cannot but obey. And in his adventurous career whom is he not compelled to trample under foot? What suffering does he not cause, and what does he himself not suffer? (“Literary Prelude”)

Music, rather than inspiring people to war, should be used so that “with no pain, for the illusory pain of the artist is akin to the highest joy, the dreadful energy of nature can expand itself harmlessly” (“Literary Prelude”). Alternatively, a sexual outlet may do:

Many years afterwards I met my Tolstoite again. He introduced me to a massive, masculine, buxom woman, the lines of whose mouth and chin were firmly chiselled. It was his wife. With them was quite a large family of sturdy youngsters. He had evidently found another solution to his problem. (“Literary Prelude”)

Though Marshall-Hall touched upon a mystic and vitalist ontology in his “Literary Prelude,” he still quoted Schopenhauer and Spencer in their more poetic and whimsical modes. He evidently sought beyond philosophy for a vindication of his musical practice. Of Beethoven’s symphonies he asks, in Shakespeare’s terms, “[w]ho can not hear the Scherzi of the Fifth or Seventh Symphonies without becoming aware
that there is more in heaven and earth than is dreamed of in our philosophy?” (“Literary Prelude”).

With Marshall-Hall’s sudden death of peritonitis on 18 July 1915 (Radic, G. W. L. Portrait 33), his prolonged reaction to the First World War and the subsequent rise of European fascism was precluded. Marshall-Hall did not see the how vitalist readings of Nietzsche and Wagner’s works were used in support of Hitler’s Germany (13), nor reflect upon how his own philosophy, shorn of philosophical idealism, could be used to support such a result. Having ultimately rejected the European philosophical traditions that he had engaged with throughout his life, the question of a uniquely Australian music was opened by shearing his vitalist beliefs of their idealist counterparts. The views of “A Literary Prelude” reflect Brookes’ observation that Marshall-Hall was “[a] being red-running with good human blood, and withal a mystic” (Brookes, In Memoriam).

Conclusion

Marshall-Hall’s written works register many of the key philosophical, scientific, and political questions of English and Australian intellectual life 1888–1915. They reveal that the idealist strategies of individuation, reason, and empirically informed judgment were equally important and sometimes employed directly in opposition to vitalist appeals to undifferentiated life and energy. These strategies were reflected in philosophical speculation on the role of art and artists, theories of evolution, and political debates around nationalism and class. By building a social and intellectual history based on the close analysis of textual sources including marginalia, this thesis has provided grounds for further research into the reception of Wagner, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche’s works, particularly in connection to the development of criminal anthropology, Protectionism and labour politics in Australia.

The first chapter of this thesis showed how Marshall-Hall’s London writings challenged the discursive divisions of English periodicals by providing one of the first significant engagements with Spencer’s evolutionary theory of music in Wagnerian journal, staking a claim on the growing idealisation of Wagner’s works started by editor of The Musical World, Francis Hueffer. This contribution was traced to his early
education and his family’s scientific background. His antagonism against newspaper journalists and their musical hero, Sullivan, was shown to delineate the vitalist literary culture of the concert-hall gallery from the idealist literary culture of the stalls. While Marshall-Hall’s Spencerism recommended him to the selection panel for the Ormond Chair of Music, his Wagnerism hurried him out of England. Marshall-Hall’s unique application of Spencer’s theories in nineteenth-century London music writing delineates vitalist from idealist Wagnerism, a distinction that could be explored further in studies of nineteenth-century English Wagnerism.

In Australia, Marshall-Hall’s literary works divided his audience between the idealist progressives of Table Talk who were willing to overlook the elitist conclusions of Marshall-Hall’s Wagnerism and those represented by the conservative editorship of The Age who were not. As a social experiment, his Spencerian theory of the emotional signification of music returned a negative result in Australian and English papers. Rather than tempering his views, Marshall-Hall appealed to Schopenhauer’s idealism during his lectures for the University of Melbourne’s Extension Scheme to justify his doctrines of musical signification and the artist’s role in society. Marshall-Hall’s critique of Spencer’s theory of education with Schopenhauer’s idealist metaphysics during the Extension Scheme provided Marshall-Hall with an essentially dogmatic, because unfalsifiable, foundation for his views. In doing so, Marshall-Hall took part in the legacy of Schopenhauer’s philosophy in Australia, including such eminent Schopenhauerians as David Irvine (Sessa 67), that is yet to be explored.

Chapter two explained how the radical, fateful, though short-lived shift in Marshall-Hall’s thought evident in his 1 August 1898 Liedertafel address was the effect of Marshall-Hall’s engagement with key contemporary texts and figures. Marshall-Hall was influenced in his adoption of vitalist, Nietzschean terminology through the editorial preface to the volume by Tille. This study highlights the importance of Tille as an international mediator of Nietzsche’s works, reasserting the need to consider individual works and editors in evaluating the history of ideas.

Beyond reacting against Melbourne’s religious community, many of whom agreed with his views on war, Marshall-Hall’s Nietzscheanism was a reaction against Melbourne’s progressive professional class, in particular his marginal interlocutor Lyle. While Lionel Lindsay and Lyle’s idealist readings of Nietzsche offered Marshall-Hall
an alternate reading of the text, Lyle’s exploitation of personal contacts in his research on behalf of Lombroso may have exacerbated Marshall-Hall’s conservative views. Lyle stands out in this thesis as a much-neglected figure of history. His instrumental role in the development of Australian criminal anthropology, as well as a variety of political and humanitarian projects throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries begs to be examined further. There is also a thesis to be written on Marshall-Hall’s use of German and English poetic and dramatic literature. As appendix one shows, Goethe and Shakespeare maintained pre- eminent positions in Marshall-Hall’s turns of reference throughout his life.

As the Australian colonies approached federation Marshall-Hall appealed to his doctrine of German musical supremacy in suggesting music for the first sitting of the Australian Federal Parliament. He also mythologised Australia’s white migrant population in his “Australian National Song.” Along with his communication with Deakin, these two events form grounds on which to explore the aestheticisation of Marshall-Hall’s political views and their similarity to Deakin’s Protectionist nationalism leading up to, and shortly after, federation.

Marshall-Hall’s philosophical idealism was contrasted with the political idealism of Australia’s growing labour movement in chapter three. Retreating into his philosophical idealism, Marshall-Hall’s use of Schopenhauer’s philosophy changed from direct application in political and social matters to poetic figuration. Reevaluating Wagner’s works on the basis of his Spencerian views, Marshall-Hall turned to the music of Puccini. With his Nietzschean comment that “not Wagner, but Wagnerism has killed musical individuality in Germany” Marshall-Hall presented a critique of the composer similar to Nietzsche’s critique of Bismarck, suggesting that Marshall-Hall adopted an idealist reading of Nietzsche not unlike Lionel Lindsay’s “art with edges.” With the outbreak of the First World War, radical changes were brought about in Marshall-Hall’s thinking. He returned to a radically leftist political position, rejected his Nietzschean views on war and finally, on return to Australia, rejected German philosophy. In rejecting his philosophical idealism Marshall-Hall embraced the idealism that he had earlier criticised, opening the possibility of an Australian national music, but also a nationalist mysticism reminiscent of his earliest Wagnerian beliefs. The legacy of Wagnerism and Nietzscheism in National Socialist Germany leaves
question marks hanging over any study combining the former two terms, especially when nationalism, socialism, and the sort of Napoleon-worship propagated by Marshall-Hall are thrown in the mix as well. It is my hope that these question marks will fall and bear elaborative fruit in the field this thesis has tilled (no pun intended) in the future.

A new letter or a rediscovered annotation always threatens to revise our picture of a historical figure. Arthur Streeton’s 1892 portrait of Marshall-Hall, scrawled on the front of an envelope to Tom Roberts (see fig. 1), includes a bar of music containing a note with a fermata or pause.80 “Mark the pause!” Marshall-Hall wrote of the opening motif of Beethoven’s symphony no. 5 in 1888, appealing to his Spencerian theory of the emotional signification of music, “[s]eldom are these bars sustained for the necessary time, or with sufficient loudness” (“C Minor Symphony” 29.5: 69). Marshall-Hall coupled his vitalist doctrine of the emotive understanding of music with an appeal to idealism, paradoxical as it seemed at times. As he quoted Schopenhauer in 1899 on the pause of the individual will in moments of profound artistic experience:

Art . . . is everywhere at its goal. For it plucks the object of its contemplation out of the stream of the world’s course, and has it isolated before it. And this particular thing, which in that stream was a small perishing part, becomes to Art the representative of the whole, an equivalent of the endless multitude in space and time. It therefore pauses at this particular thing; the course of time stops; the relations vanish for it; only the essential, the (Platonic) Idea, is its object. (“Essential in Art” 4.3: 25)

But finally, in his undelivered lecture for the Brown Society on The Kreutzer Sonata Marshall-Hall had enough of philosophy, tainted as he saw it with the “butcher’s shambles” of Europe. Within the wider context of the relationship of music and philosophy, Marshall-Hall’s literary works show the persistence of idealist and vitalist modes of thought in the presentation and reception of music in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As such, this thesis shows how the intellectual history of music deserves attention for its profound ability to register wider intellectual debates, social configurations, and historical events.

80 The clef appears similar to be an old-fashioned baritone clef, while the note is either crotchet or a semibreve and a bar-line.
Works Cited

Journal Articles


*Newspaper Articles*


*Manuscripts*


Non-Periodical Published Material


---. *The Pen Drawings of Norman Lindsay*. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1918.


**Online Sources**


**Dissertations**


**Visual Art Works**


**Musical Works**


Appendix One: Chronological List of Literary Works by G. W. L. Marshall-Hall

The following table of literary works by Marshall-Hall is annotated with lists of the authors to which he refers. Marshall-Hall’s references are divided between “direct” and “indirect” references. Direct references have been identified where Marshall-Hall has named or quoted the author. Indirect references have been identified where the author has been alluded to but not named. The latter are more difficult to identify and many more may be found. The titles of works have been kept as close as possible to their original form. In the case of lectures, the date given is that of publication. In the case of unpublished lectures, the date of the lecture is given and publications that refer to the lecture are given in a note. The acronyms “GM” (Grainger Museum) and “UMA” (University of Melbourne Archives) have been provided to identify the locations of exemplars.
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<td>Debate No. 5: What Progress has England Made in Music During the Last Ten Years? Are the English Musical? What Particular School of Music has had the Greatest Influence?</td>
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<td>Professor Marshall Hall [Letter to the editor]</td>
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<td>Professor Tucker (direct)</td>
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<td>1892. 5 September</td>
<td>Music and Pessimism. [“Music and Art” lecture series. Hibernian Hall. 2/6]</td>
<td>6 September 1892: 5</td>
<td>Mentioned in <em>Argus</em> 6 September 1892: 5......................................................................................................................................</td>
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<td>The Emotional Significance of the C Minor Symphony of Beethoven. [“Music and Art” lecture series. Wilson Hall. 5/6]</td>
<td>4 October 1892.</td>
<td>Shelley (direct) Goethe (direct) Shakespeare (direct) Darwin (indirect) The <em>Argus</em> summary suggests that this was a repeat of “The C Minor Symphony.”</td>
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<td>1892. 9 November</td>
<td>Philistine Melbourne [Interview]</td>
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<td>Professor Marshall Hall on Art Criticism [Address at the Victorian</td>
<td>Argus: 11</td>
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<td>1893. 12 May</td>
<td>Press Criticism Versus Art [Address at the Victorian Artists’</td>
<td>Table Talk: 8–9</td>
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<td>Émile Zola (direct)</td>
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<td>1893. 24 July</td>
<td>Orchestral Concert in The Town-Hall</td>
<td>Argus: 7</td>
<td>Ibsen (direct)</td>
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<td>1894. 24 March</td>
<td>How to Listen to Music</td>
<td>Argus: 4</td>
<td>Matthew Arnold (indirect)</td>
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<td>1896</td>
<td>To Irene</td>
<td>Sydney: McLardy</td>
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<td>Hymn to Sydney</td>
<td>Melbourne: The Atlas Press</td>
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<td>1897. 9 January</td>
<td>Franz Schubert. [Speech delivered at a concert at the University of Melbourne]</td>
<td>Argus: 15</td>
<td>Goethe (direct)</td>
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<td>c. 1898. 26 July</td>
<td>Marginalia in The Case of Wagner</td>
<td>London: Henry and Company, 1896.</td>
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<td>1898. 5 July</td>
<td>Hymns Ancient and Modern</td>
<td>Melbourne: The Atlas Press. [For precise publication date see <em>Argus</em> 8 August 1898: 5]</td>
<td>GM</td>
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<td>1898. 2 August</td>
<td>Much Ado: Professor Marshall Hall: Relieves his Feelings: A General Onslaught. [Address at the Melbourne Liedertafel concert of 1 August]</td>
<td><em>Argus</em>: 6</td>
<td>Alexander Tille (indirect) Nietzsche (direct)</td>
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<td>1898. 6 August</td>
<td>Professor Marshall-Hall in Reply. [Letter to the Editor of <em>The Argus</em>]</td>
<td><em>Argus</em>: 9</td>
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<td>1898. 8 August</td>
<td>Mr. Marshall-Hall and his Critics. [Letter to the Editor of <em>The Age</em>]</td>
<td><em>Age</em>: 5</td>
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<td>1898. 11 August</td>
<td>To the Chancellor and Council of Melbourne University</td>
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<td>GM</td>
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<td>1899. 11 August</td>
<td>The Essential In Art. [Account of the last of six lectures at the Athenaeum Hall]</td>
<td><em>Argus</em>: 6</td>
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<td>Schopenhauer (direct)</td>
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Spencer (direct)  
John Frederick Rowbotham (direct) |
James Sully (direct) |
Shakespeare (direct)  
Robert Burns (direct) |
| 1900. May         | The Essential in Art. VI.    | *Alma Mater* 5.2: 61–64 | More Schubert and Goethe in the reading room  
The Harper’s songs in Wilhelm Meister.  
Goethe: “the feeling of themselves in others” (12). |
Darwin (direct)  
Goethe (direct) |
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<td>Aristodemus: A Tragedy</td>
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<td>1900</td>
<td>Extracts from the Published works of Professor Marshall-Hall.</td>
<td>Carlton: Ford and Sons.</td>
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<td>1900. 25 June</td>
<td>To the Vice-Chancellor and Members of the Council of the University of Melbourne.</td>
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<td>GM</td>
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<td>1901. 28 February</td>
<td>Mr. Marshall-Hall on Art [Summary of a public lecture at the Conservatorium of Music]</td>
<td>Argus: 6</td>
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<td>Extended form of the 28 February 1901 address. Cesare Lombroso (direct) Henrik Ibsen (indirect)</td>
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<td>1905. 6 October</td>
<td>The Joy Life [Address for the Victorian Artists' Society]</td>
<td>Argus: 6</td>
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<td>“Music in Berlin”</td>
<td>Argus: 6, 6</td>
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<td>Music in Berlin: “Doings in Berlin”</td>
<td>Argus: 6</td>
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<td>1907. 16 March</td>
<td>Music in Berlin: “Musing in Berlin”</td>
<td>Argus: 6</td>
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<td>Charles Lamb (direct)</td>
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<td>Music in Berlin: “Three Great Musicians”</td>
<td>Argus: 4</td>
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<td>1907. 20 April</td>
<td>Music in Berlin: “Musical Musings”</td>
<td>Argus: 4</td>
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<td>Music in Berlin: “Last Days in Berlin”</td>
<td>Argus: 6</td>
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<td>Commercialism and Art. Views of Professor Marshall Hall</td>
<td>Argus: 9</td>
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<td>1908. 25 July</td>
<td>Ethics and Bootblackening</td>
<td>Argus: 6</td>
<td>Frank Tate (direct)</td>
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<td>1908. 20 April</td>
<td>May Day Songs. [Open letter to May Day committee]</td>
<td>Argus: 4</td>
<td>Goethe (direct)</td>
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<td>1910. 29 March</td>
<td>Madame Butterfly. First Performance in Sydney.</td>
<td>Argus: 5</td>
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<td>1910. 9 April</td>
<td>The Orchestra: Its Mystic Voices. [reprinted in Analytical Programme 5 August 1911]</td>
<td>Argus: 7</td>
<td>Schopenhauer (indirect)</td>
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<td>1911. 1 April</td>
<td>Schubert’s Symphony in C Major [Lecture for first meeting of the Victorian Orchestral Association]</td>
<td>Argus: 21</td>
<td>Material from “The Form of a Symphony.”</td>
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| 1911. 3 June, 24 June | The Form of a Symphony  | Marshall-Hall Orchestral Concert: Analytical Programme: 14–17, 14–17 | GM | Shakespeare (direct)  
Spencer (indirect)  
Gabriele D’Annunzio (direct)  
Lord Byron (direct) |
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<td>1911. 5 August</td>
<td>The Orchestra</td>
<td>Marshall-Hall Orchestral Concert: Analytical Programme: 19–24</td>
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<td>1911. August</td>
<td>Against Ideals and Idealists</td>
<td>Australian Musical News 1.2: 32–33</td>
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<td>Grand Opera at Covent Garden.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1542: 16</td>
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<td>1914. 30 April</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1543: 12</td>
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<td>1914. 7 May</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1544: 16</td>
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<td>1914. 14 May</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1545: 12</td>
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<td>1914. 21 May</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1546: 12</td>
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<td>1914. 28 May</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1547: 12</td>
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<td>1914. 25 June</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1551: 25</td>
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<td>1914. 2 July</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1552: 29</td>
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<td>1914. 9 July</td>
<td>On Music and Musicians.</td>
<td>British Australasian 34.1553: 12</td>
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GM: Schopenhauer (indirect). Reprint of “The Orchestra: Its Mystic Voices.”

Thomas More (direct) Plato (direct) Coleridge (direct) Schopenhauer (direct) Isaac Taylor (direct)

Oscar Wilde (direct)

Spencer (indirect) Nietzsche (indirect)

George Grove (direct)
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<td>1914. 30 July</td>
<td>On Earless Souls and Soulless Ears.</td>
<td><em>British Australasian</em> 34.1556: 41</td>
<td>Robert Burton (direct)</td>
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<td>1914. 30 July</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td><em>British Australasian</em> 34.1556: 12</td>
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<td>1915. 18 May</td>
<td>Art in Australia [Inaugural Address for the conference of the Music Examination Board]</td>
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<td>c.1915</td>
<td>Unfinished Essays</td>
<td>N.P.</td>
<td>UMA</td>
<td>Unfinished essays sent from Hugo Wertheim to Herbert Brookes. 7 September 1915. Heraclitus (direct)</td>
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Appendix Two: Transcript of Marginalia by G. W. L. Marshall-Hall and Marshall Lyle from *The Case of Wagner*.

The following transcription of G. W. L. Marshall-Hall and Marshall Lyle’s marginalia in *The Case of Wagner* utilises typographic markers to approximate the authors’ pencil and pen annotations. The vertical bar | indicates that a section has been marked out with a vertical line on the left or right hand side of the page, depending on whether it is placed at the beginning or end of a passage. Underlining indicates that the words have been underlined. Asterisks * are the marginalists’, unless indicated otherwise. Italics indicate an annotation in Marshall-Hall or Lyle’s hand, unless provided within the text, in which case the emphasis belongs to the edition. Titles of book sections are given as headings, in 14 point font to distinguish them from the text, as they appear and if the section contains marginalia. Aphorism numbers are given in parentheses after page numbers. Descriptions are given in square parentheses. Occasionally the text surrounding an annotation is given to provide context, but it is expected that the reader will consult this transcript with a copy of the work. If extended quotation is given, a second vertical bar will be included to mark the end of the marked text. With the growing importance of digitised collections, this transcript should provide scholars with a searchable archive of Marshal-Hall and Lyle’s reading.
Note the flat contradictions of himself contained in this volume regarding the question of criminals.
Note the inability (apparently) to continue logical reasoning, and sentences started but not finished about which asylum inspectors can tell you a lot.
Note amidst clever witticisms the most palpable errors as to accepted fact.
Note the egoism.
If Nietzsche be a sane guide, why keep thousands of equally sane in our asylums? Yet, society must protect itself, or try to.

Marshall Lyle

Does Nietzsche in this volume expose religious superstition more effectively than the measured reason of Voltaire, Ingersoll or Bradlaugh? Yet subtract his attack on religion and what philosophy does he leave? I fail to see that Nietzsche has any philosophy. Whatever decadence there may be in this age, as in every age “as it was in the beginning”, it is surely a sign of decadence to imagine that this volume is a specimen of anything triumphant in human reason. The idea that this insane one overthrows Herbert Spencer! Put on the fiddles!

M.L.
It is very possible that I am insane or if not insane exceedingly stupid. I am not prepared to dispute such an issue, vague and trashy as it is in the legal realms. But assuming presumptuously that I am sane (an indefinable term), I am inclined to submit not arrogantly but humbly that this volume bears evidence of insane mental exaltation such as alienists recognise today.

Marshall Lyle
20/8/00

See Hack Tuke’s Dictionary of Psychological Medicine for an explanation of egotistic exaltation as found amongst the insane and found alas in this volume, I at least submit.

M.L.

[in pencil, sideways in the only free space on the page]

Well! M. Lyle, whether you are insane or Nietzsche I don’t know, but he’s damned good reading and you’re not!! Ha! Ha!

Introduction

xiv

Huxley said in his Romanes lecture on Evolution and Ethics (1893), “Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical progress of society depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from it, but in combating it.” And although he calls it an “audacious proposal thus to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm” he yet calls man’s ends higher [xv] ends than the ends of nature and hopes “that such an enterprise may meet with a certain measure of success.”
The Case of Wagner

Postscript

There is nothing fatigued, nothing decrepit, nothing dangerous to life and derogatory to the world in spiritual matters, which would not be secretly taken under protection by his art

Bosh

Wagner, both in his life & music, represents to us a type of the Italian Renaissance period,—is perhaps the most singularly forcible type of the man in whom healthy instinct surmounts all life-hostile environment. Intellectually he seems to have often fallen into serious error, hence his weak plots—which are redeemed by the splendid subjects, & strong music, to which he was instinctively attracted. — Nietzsche does not distinguish between the mere accidental transition-stages of his intellectual life, & the sure instinct which always remained healthy & vigorous.—Hence the muddle and confusion of his criticisms.

Second Postscript

Mostly absolute nonsense

[Printed text crossed out with an “X”]
“Wagner was complete; but he was complete corruption—of what import, then, is Johannes Brahms! ... His good fortune was a German misapprehension: he was taken for Wagner's antagonist,—an antagonist to Wagner was needed!—That does not produce indispensable music, it produces in the first instance too much music!—If you are not rich, be proud enough for poverty!”

Nonsense

[about Brahms] “He has the melancholy of impotence”

Bah!

“there remains, as his most striking peculiarity, the *longing mood*.

*absent in his greater works almost entirely.

“*He is especially the musician of a class of unsatisfied ladies”

*women seldom will even listen to him.

_Brahms is a fine strong masculine individuality.—His best work is [illegible] and sensuous, & always healthy & vigorous—ie chamber music. Schicksalslied. Requiem etc etc_
One might well ask, has Nietzsche ever heard a work of Brahms?—or is he deaf?—or has he a physical defect of the ear?—or — — — — ?

The Twilight of the Idols: Or How to Philosophise with a Hammer

Apophthegms and Darts

99 (§2)

||Only the boldest of us have but seldom the courage for what we really know. ||

100 (§7)

|How is it? Is man only a mistake of God? Or God only a mistake of man?

(§10)

||Would that we were guilty of no cowardice with respect to our doings, would that we did not repudiate them afterwards!—Remorse of conscience is indecent.||

(§12)

|When one has one’s wherefore of life, one gets along with almost every how. Man does not strive after happiness; the Englishman only does so.
§13

[Man has created woman—out of what do you think? Out of a rib of his God,—his “Ideal”…]

§26

I mistrust all systematisers, and avoid them. The will to system is a lack of rectitude.

§42

Those were steps to me, I have climbed up beyond them,—to do so, I had to pass them. But it was thought I would make them my resting place…

The Problem of Socrates

§2

I recognised Socrates and Plato as symptoms of decline, as agencies in Grecian dissolution, as pseudo-Grecian, as anti-Grecian (“The Birth of Tragedy” 1872).

§6

We must by all means stretch out the hand, and attempt to grasp this surprising finesse, that the worth of life cannot be estimated. It cannot be estimated by a living being, because such a one is a party—yea, [109] the very object—in the dispute, and not a judge; it cannot be estimated by a dead person for a different reason.]
We choose dialectics only when we have no other means.

It is necessary to have to *extort* one’s rights; otherwise one makes no use of dialectics. The Jews were therefore dialecticians; Reynard and Fox was a dialectician: what? And Socrates was also one?—

113 (§9)

||”The impulses are about to play the tyrant, we must invent a *counter-tyrant* stronger than they. . .” When the physiognomist had disclosed to Socrates who he was||

(§10)

|When it is necessary to make a tyrant out of *reason*, as Socrates did, there must be considerable danger of something else playing the tyrant.|

114

the moralism of Greek philosophers, from Plato downwards, is *pathologically conditioned*  

115 (§11)

|The fiercest daylight, rationality at any price, the life clear, cold, prudent, conscious, without instincts, in opposition to instincts: this itself was only an infirmity, another infirmity and, not at all a way of return to “virtue,” to “health,” or to happiness. ||To have to combat the instincts—that is the formula for *decadence*: *as long as life ascends, happiness is identical with instinct.* ||

117 (§2)
Heraclitus also did injustice to the senses. They neither deceive in the way the Eleatics believed, nor as he believed,—they do not deceive at all. What we make out of their testimony, that is what introduces falsehood; for example, the falsehood of unity, the falsehoods of materiality, of substance, of permanence …

‖The “seeming” world is the only one; the “true world” has been deceitfully invented merely …‖

123 (§6)

‘That the artist values appearance more than reality is no objection against this proposition. For here “appearance” means reality once more, only select, strengthened, and corrected reality … The tragic artist is no pessimist,—he rather says yea, even to all that is questionable and formidable; he is Dionysian …”

How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable

124

[asterisk next to above title]

Morality as Anti-Naturalness

126 (§1)

Formerly, people waged war against passion itself, on account of the involved in it, they conspired for its annihilation,—all old morality monsters are unanimous on this point: ”il faut tuer les passions. The most notable formula for that view stands in the New Testament, in the Sermon on the Mount, where, let us say in passing, things are not at all regarded from an elevated point of view. For example, it is there said with application to sexuality, “if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out.” Fortunately no Christian acts according to this precept. To annihilate passions and desires merely in
order to obviate their folly and its unpleasant results appears to us at present simply as an acute form of folly.

*In the original; “only it’s not exactly the eye that is meant.”*

[See 311 “It is not quite the eye that is alluded to”]

127

It may be acknowledged, on the other hand, with some reasonableness that, on the soil out of which Christianity has grown, the notion of a “spiritualisation” of passion could not at all be conceived.

The Church fights against passion with excision in every sense: its practice, its “cure” is castration. It never asks, “How to spiritualise, beautify, and deify desire?”

[But to attack the passions at the root means to attack life itself at the root: the praxis of the Church is inimical to life…]

128 (§2)

Weakness of will, or to speak more definitely, the incapability of not reacting in response to a stimulus, is itself merely another form of degeneration.

129 (§3)

People are productive only at the cost of abounding in contrarieties; they only remain young provided the soul does not relax, does not long after peace …

One has renounced grand life, when one has renounced war …

[Without circumlocution and prejudice let us take a few cases. “Peace of soul” may, for example, be mild radiation of a rich animality into the moral (or religious) domain. Or
the beginning of fatigue, the first shadow which the evening—every sort of evening—
casts. Or a sign that the air is moist, that southern winds arrive. Or [130] unconscious
gratitude for a good digestion (occasionally called “charitableness). Or the quieting
down of the convalescent to whom all things have a new taste and who is waiting in
expectancy. Or the condition which follows upon a full gratification of our ruling
passion, the agreeable feeling of a rare satiety. Or the senile weakness of our will, of
our desires, of our vices. Or laziness, persuaded by conceit to deck itself out in moral
guise. Or the attainment of a certainty, even a dreadful certainty, after long suspense
and torture through uncertainty. Or the expression of proficiency and mastery in doing,
creating, effecting, and willing, tranquil breathing, attained “freedom of will.” …
Twilight of the Idols: who knows? Perhaps also just a modification of “peace of soul”
… |

130 (§4)

|—I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, i.e., all healthy morality, is ruled
by an instinct of life,—some command of life is fulfilled by adopting a certain canon
of “thou shalt” and “thou shalt not,” some hindrance and inimical agency on the way
of life is thereby removed.”

131

|Saying that “God looks on the heart,” it negatives the lowest and the highest vital
desirings, and takes God as the enemy of life … The saint in whom God finds his
highest satisfaction is the ideal castrate … Life is at an end where the “Kingdom of
God” begins… |

(§5)

We would have to have a position outside of life, and yet have to know it as well as
each and all who have lived it, to be authorised to touch on the problem of the worth of
life at all: |
It follows therefrom that even that *anti-naturalness in morality* (which takes God as the counter-principle and condemnation of life) is but an evaluation of life,—[132] of *which* life? Of *which* kind of life?—But I have already given the answer; of declining, weakened, fatigued, condemned life, Morality, as it has hitherto been understood—as it was last formulated by Schopenhauer as “denial of will to life”—is the actual *decadence instinct* which makes out of itself an imperative: it says, “Perish!”—it is the valuation of the condemned…

131 (§6)

[Let us consider in the last place what naiveté it manifests to say, “Man *ought* to be so and so!” Reality exhibits to us an enchanting wealth of types, the luxuriance of a prodigality of forms and transformations; and some paltry hod-man of a moralist says with regard to it, “No! man ought to be different!” | He even knows how man ought to be, this parasite and bigot: he paints himself on the wall and says “*Ecce Homo!*” … | But even if the moralist directs himself merely to the individual and says, “You ought to be so and so,”, he still continues to make himself ridiculous. The individual, in his antecedents and in his consequents, is a piece of fate, an additional law, an additional necessity for all that now takes place and will take place in the future. | To say to him, “Alter thyself,” is to require everything to alter itself, even backward also … And in reality there have been consistent moralists; they wanted man to be otherwise.

133

We others, we immoralists, on the contrary, have opened our hearts for the reception, of every kind of intelligence, conception, and approbation. We do not readily deny, we glory in being *affirmative*. Our eyes have always opened more and more for that economy which still uses and knows how to use for its advantage all that is rejected by the holy delirium of the priest, of the *diseased* reason of the priest; for that economy in the law of life which even derives advantage from the offensive species of bigots,
priests, and the virtuous,—what advantage?—But we immoralists ourselves are the answer…|

The Four Great Errors

136 (§2)

The Church and morality say that “a family, a people, is ruined through vice and luxury.” My re-established reason says that when a people is perishing, when it degenerates physiologically, vice and luxury follow therefrom (i. e., the need of continually stronger and more frequent stimulants, such as every exhausted nature is acquainted with).

My higher politics say that a party which commits such errors is at its end—its instincts are no longer to be relied upon. Every error, whatever it may be, is the result of degeneration of instinct, disgregation of will: we thereby almost define the bad. Everything good is instinct—and consequently, easy, necessary, free. Trouble is an objection, the God is typically distinguished from the hero (in my language: the light feet are the first attribute of divinity).

138 (§3)

Will no longer moves anything, consequently also it no longer explains anything,—it merely accompanies proceedings, it can also be absent.

What follows therefrom? There are no spiritual causes at all!|

139

And even your atom, Messrs. The Mechanists and Physicists, how much error, how much rudimentary psychology, yet remains in your atom!—Not to speak of the “thing
in itself,” the *horrendum pupendum* of metaphysicians! The error of spirit as a cause, confounded with reality! And made the measure of reality! And called *God!*—|

140 (§4)

|Most of our general sensations—every sort of check, pressure, tension, or explosion in the play and counter play of organs, especially the condition of the *nervus sympathicus*—excite our causal impulse; we want a *reason* for feeling *so and so,*—for feeling ill or well.

(§5)

*Psychological explanation.*—To trace back something unknown to something known, relieves, quiets, and satisfies, besides giving a sensation of power. There is danger, disquiet, and solicitude associated with the unknown,—the primary instinct aims at [141] *doing away with* these painful conditions. First principles: any explanation whatsoever is better than none. Since, after all, it is only a question of wanting to get rid of depressing ideas, people are not specially careful about the means for getting rid of them;”!

142 (§6)

*The whole domain of morality and religion comes under this conception of imaginary causes.*—|

[italics in volume]

|They are determined by conduct not to be approved of (the feeling of “*sin,*” of “*sinfulness,*” foisted on to a physiological unpleasantness—one always finds reasons for being discontented with one’s self)
They are determined as consequences of inconsiderate actions, which turn out badly (the emotions, the senses, assigned as cause, as “guilty;” states of physiological trouble explained as “deserved” by means of other states of trouble).—Explanations of pleasant general feelings:—They are determined by the consciousness of good conduct (so called “good conscience,” a physiological condition sometimes so like a good [143] digestion as to be mistaken for it). They are determined by the successful issue of undertakings (a naïve fallacy: the successful issue of an undertaking does not at all produce any pleasant general feelings in a hypochondriac, or in a Pascal).| They are determined by faith, hope, and love—the Christian virtues.—In fact, all these presumed explanations are resulting conditions, and as it were translations of pleasant and unpleasant feelings into a false dialect: we are in a condition to be hopeful, because our fundamental physiological feeling is again strong and rich; we trust in God, because this feeling of fullness and of strength gives us peace.

143 (§7)

Error of free will.—Now we have no longer sympathy with the notion of “free will”: we know only too well what it is—the most disreputable of all theological devices for the purpose of making men “responsible” in their sense of the word, that is, for the purpose of making them dependant on theologians…

144

Men were imagined to be “free”, in order that they might be condemned and punished,—in order that they might become guilty: consequently every activity had to be thought of as voluntary, the origin of every activity had to be thought of as residing in consciousness] (whereby the most absolute false-coinage in psychologis was made a principle of psychology itself…).

145 (§8)
He [a man] is not the result of a special purpose, a will, or an aim, the attempt is not here made to reach an “ideal of man,” an “ideal of happiness,” or an “ideal of morality;”—it is absurd to try to *shunt off* man’s nature towards some goal. *We* have invented the notion of a “goal: “ in reality a goal is *lacking* …

*We are necessary, we are part of destiny, we belong to the whole, we exist in the whole*—there is nothing which could judge, measure, compare, or condemn our being, for that would be to judge, measure and compare, or condemn being, for that would be to judge, measure, compare, and condemn the whole … *But there is nothing outside of the whole!*—*This only is the grand [146] emancipation: that no one be made responsible any longer, that the mode of being not be traced back to a *causa prima*, that the world be not regarded as a unity, either as sensorium or as “spirit;”—it is only thereby that the *innocence* of becoming is again restored… The concept of “God” has hitherto been the greatest *objection* to existence… *We* deny God, *we* deny responsibility by denying God: it is only *thereby* that we save the world.—|

*The “Improvers” of Mankind*

147 (§1)

It is known what I require of philosophers—namely, to take up their position *beyond* good and evil, *to be superior* to the illusion of moral sentiment. This requirement follows from a principle which I formulated for the first time,—namely, *that there is no such things as a moral fact*. Moral sentiment has this in common with religious sentiment: it believes in realities which do not exist. Morality is only an interpretation of certain phenomena, or, more definitely, a misinterpretation of them.

148 (§2)
They are weakened, they are made less mischievous, they become sick by the depressing emotion of fear, by pain, wounds and hunger.—It is precisely the same with tamed man whom the priest has “improved.”

And now he lay there, sick, miserable, ill-disposed towards himself; full of hatred against the vital instincts, full of suspicion with regard to everything still strong and happy. In short, a Christian… Physiologically explained: in combat with the animal, the only means for making it weak can be to sicken it. The Church understood this: it ruined man, it weakened him,—but it claimed to have “improved” him...

From this point of view the Gospels are documents of the first importance, and the book of Enoch even more so. Christianity springing out of a Jewish root, and only comprehensible as a growth of this soil, represents the movement counter to every morality of breeding, of race, and of privilege: it is anti-Aryan religion par-excellence: Christianity, the transvaluation of all Aryan values, the triumph of Chandala values, the gospel preached to the poor and lowly, the collective insurrection against “race” of all the downtrodden, the wretched, the ill-constituted, the misfortunate,—undying Chandala revenge as religion of love...

Expressed in a formula one might say that all the measures hitherto used for the purpose of moralising mankind, have been fundamentally immoral.—

All spiritlessness, all vulgarity rests on the inability to offer resistance to stimulus—people are obliged to react, they follow every impulse.
“vice,” is merely that physiological inability not to react

Roving Expeditions of an Inopportune Philosopher

164 (§1)

Liszt, or *the school of running—after women.

* Leichtigkeit – nach weibern. (nimbleness in allusion to his marvellous piano technique)

Music by Offenbach.—Zola, or “the delight to stink.”

(die freude zum stinken)

167 (§5)

In England, for every little emancipation from divinity, people have to re-acquire respectability by becoming moral fanatics in an awe-inspiring manner.

170 (§8)

a preliminary psychological [171] condition is indispensable, namely, ecstasy. Ecstasy must first have intensified the sensitiveness of the whole mechanism; until this takes place art is not realised. All kinds of ecstasy, however differently conditioned, possess this power; above all the ecstasy of sexual excitement, the oldest and most primitive form of ecstasy. In like manner the ecstasy which follows in the train of all great desires, of all strong emotions; the ecstasy of the feast, of the contest, of a daring deed, of victory, of all extreme agitation; the ecstasy of cruelty; the ecstasy in destruction; the ecstasy under certain meteorological influences—for example, spring ecstasy; or under the influence of narcotics; finally, the ecstasy of will, the ecstasy of an
overcharged and surging will.—The essential thing in ecstasy is the feeling of increased power and profusion. Out of this feeling we impart to things, we *constrain* them to accept something from us, we force them by violence;—this proceeding is called *idealising*. Let us here free ourselves from a prejudice: idealising does *not* consist, as is commonly believed, in an abstraction or deduction of the insignificant or the contingent. An immense *forcing out* of principal traits is rather the decisive characteristic, so that the others thereby disappear.

172 (§9)

|In this condition we enrich everything out of our own profusion; what we see, and what we wish for we see enlarged, crowded, strong, and overladen with power. He who, in this condition, transforms things till they mirror his power,—till they are reflections of his perfection. This *constraint* to transform into the perfect is—art. Everything that he is not, nevertheless comes for him a delight in himself; in art man enjoys himself as perfection.

In fact, history furnishes us with abundance of such anti-artists, persons with starved lives, who must necessarily lay hold of things, drain them, and make them more emaciated.

This is the case with the genuine Christian, Pascal, for example; *a Christian, who is at the same time an artist, is not to be found.* ||Let no one be childish enough to refer me to the case of Raphael, or to any homoeopathic Christian of the nineteenth century. Raphael said yea he did yea; consequently Raphael was no Christian… ||

*Splendid!*

175 (§12)

I read the Life of Thomas Carlyle, that unconscious and unintended *farce*, that *heroic-moral interpretation of dyspeptic conditions*.—Carlyle, a man of strong words and
attitudes, a rhetorician from *necessity,* who was continually irritated by the longing for a strong belief and the feeling of incapacity for it (in that respect a typical Romanticist!). The longing for a strong belief is *not* evidence of a strong belief, rather the contrary. *When one has this belief,* one may allow one’s self the choice luxury of scepticism; one is sufficiently sure, sufficiently resolute, and sufficiently bound for doing so. Carlyle deafens something in his nature by the *fortissimo* of his reverence for me of strong belief, and by his rage against the less stupid; [176] he *requires noise.* A constant, passionate *insincerity* towards himself—that is his *proprium:*

|After all, Carlyle is an English atheist, who aspires to honour for *not* being one.

177 (§13)

His mind always finds reasons for being contented, and even grateful; and now and then verges on the cheerful transcendence of that worthy man, who, returning from a love appointment, *tanquam re bene gesta,* said thanfully, “*Ut desint vires, tamen est laudanda voluptas*”. —|

(§14)

*”Darwin forgot the intellect (that was English!); *the weak have more intellect*,… One must need intellect in order to acquire it; one loses it when it is no longer necessary. He who has strength *rids himself of intellect* (“let it go hence!” * is what [178, people think in Germany at present, “the Empire will remain”…)]

*An allusion to Luther’s song, Eine feste Burg ist unser Gott!” [the second asterisk and this accompanying note belong to the volume]

*Surely Nietzsche is mistaken in attributing *any theory* on this matter to Darwin. By the “fittest to survive”, he described no sort of moral attribute, but merely the fact that certain species could over-live certain others—the world is not yet at an end, & the instinct will have its time again!"
A great deal of so-called virtue is included under mimicry.*

*Again: intellect itself is merely an outcome of instinct. Hence the absurdity of inculcating mad tendencies through the former. It is man’s physique & physical environment which should occupy the attention of all “improvers”, statesmen, etc.—as his [179] instincts (& consequent intellectual tendency) depend entirely uppon [sic] the healthiness or source of these.—It requires us great observation of life to perceive that the intellect is altogether without permanent influence uppon the life-course of men. It merely carries out more or less cunningly the imperious demands of instinct.

179 (§16)

That other thing I do not like to hear is a notorious “and:” the Germans say “Goethe and Schiller;” […] There are still worse “ands;” I have heard with my own ears, “Schopenhauer and Hartmann;” to be sure, only among university professors…

(§17)

The most intellectual men, provided they are the most courageous, experience by far the most painful tragedies; but they reverence life just on that account, because it places its most powerful hostile forces in opposite to them.]

181 (§19)

A little suspicion may in fact whisper the question into a sceptic’s ear—Is the world really beautified, just because man thinks it is?]?
His sense of power, his will to power, his courage, his pride—they decrease with the ugly, they increase with the beautiful.

183 (§21)

**“Schopenhauer.—**Schopenhauer, the last German who comes into consideration (who is a European event, like Goethe, like Hegel, like Heinrich Heine, and not merely a local, a “national” occurrence), is a case of the first rank for a psychologist, as being an ill-natured, ingenious attempt to bring into the field, in favour of a general nihilistic valuation of the whole of life, the very opposite instances, the grand self-affirmations of “will-to-life”, the exuberant forms of life. He has interpreted in turn art, heroism, genius, beauty, grand sympathy, knowledge, will for truth, and tragedy, as phenomena resulting from “negation,” or from the need of negation of “will,”

*It is merely Schopenhauer’s reductions with which Nietzsche quarrels.—indeed his own really form the fitting conclusion of the former’s observations of life.

184 (§22)

Schopenhauer speaks of beauty with melancholy ardour […] in beauty he sees the generative impulse negatived”*

*Only during the moment of “pure contemplation”—when this is over he counts that the “will” re-asserts itself with increased strength (an instance of the [185] honesty which prevented Schopenhauer from allowing his “system” to interfere with his facts)*

What evolves the display of beauty? Fortunately a philosopher contradicts him also: no less an authority than divine |Plato (Schopenhauer himself calls him divine) maintains another thesis: that all beauty incites to procreation.—that this is precisely the proprium of its operation, from its most sensuous, up to its most intellectual manifestations…|
Plato goes further. He says, with an innocence for which one must be Greek and not “Christian”, that there would be no Platonic philosophy at all, were there not such handsome youth in Athens; it was only the sight of them which put the soul of the philosopher into an erotic ecstasy and gave it no rest until it had implanted the seed of all high things in such a fine soil.

In short, *l’art pour l’art*—a serpent which bites its own tail. “No end at all, rather than a moral end!”*

“Art is the great stimulus to life, how could art be understood as purposeless, as aimless, as *l’art pour l’art*?”*

*A misunderstanding. Art for art means: The presentation of life as mirrored, in the individuality of the artist (ie. As felt by him) uninfluenced by extraneous opinions, ideas, or aims.—

What of his own personality does the artist communicate to others in tragedy? It is not precisely the fearless state of mind in presence of the frightful and the questionable which he exhibits? This state of mind is highly desirable in itself; whoever knows it honours it with the highest regard. He communicates it, he is obliged to communicate it, provided he is an artist, a genius of communication.| Bravery and self-possession in presence of a powerful enemy, an awful calamity, or a problem which awakens dread—it is this *triumphant* condition which the tragic artist selects and glorifies. In presence of tragedy the martial spirit in us celebrates its Saturnalia; he who is
accustomed to affliction, he who seeks affliction—*heroic* men—extols his existence with tragedy,—to him alone the tragic artist offers the draught of this sweetest cruelty.—|

190 (§31)

|Another problem of regimen.—| The expedients with which Julius Caesar protected himself from sickness and headache—prodigious marches, the simplest mode of life, uninterrupted living in the open air, and constant military exercise—are, on the whole, the measures for maintenance and protection from extreme liability to injury of that complex machine working under the highest pressure and called genius.

191 (§32)

If it were possible, a philosopher would be a nihilist, because he finds nothingness behinds all human ideals. Or not even nothingness,—but only vileness, absurdity, sickness, cowardice, and fatigue: all sorts of dregs out of the *drained* goblet of his own life…|

195 (§35)

The best is wanting, when selfishness begins to be deficient. To choose instinctively what is *self*-injurious, to be *allured* by “disinterested” motives, furnishes almost the formula for *decadence*. Not to seek one’s *own* advantage: “that is merely the moral *fig*-leaf for quite a different thing, for the physiological fact,—”one does not know any longer how to *find* one’s own advantage”…|

|Instead of naively saying, “I am no longer of any account,” the moral falsehood in the mouth of the *decadent* says, “nothing is of any account,—*life* is of no account” …

196 (§36)
To die proudly when it is no longer possible to live proudly. Death selected voluntarily, death at the right time, consummated with brightness and cheerfulness in the midst of children and witnesses: so that an actual leave-taking is possible where he is yet present who takes his leave, as also an actual appraisement of what has been realised and aspired after, a summing up of life—all in opposition to the pitiable and horrifying comedy which Christianity has practiced with the hour of dying.

197

[On Schopenhauer] Pessimism, let us say in passing, notwithstanding its contagiousness, does not on the whole increase the infirmity of an age or race: it is the expression of infirmity. One succumbs to it as one succumbs to cholera; one has to be morbidly enough disposed for it. Pessimism itself cannot make a single additional decadent:

198 (§37)

I permit myself, as an answer, to raise the question, whether we are really become more moral. That all the world believes it is already an objection against it.

199

[...] this realised unanimity in forbearance, in helpfulness, and in mutual trust is positive progress, and that we are thereby far above the men of the Renaissance. Every age, however, thinks in this manner, it is obliged to think thus. It is certain we could not pace ourselves in Renaissance conditions; we could not even conceive ourselves places in then: our nerves would not stand that reality, not to speak of our muscles. No progress, however, is demonstrated by this incapacity, but only a different, a later condition, weaker, tenderer and more readily injured, out of which a considerate morality necessarily evolves. If we were to think of our tenderness and lateness, our physiological ageing, as absent, our “humanising” morality also would forthwith lose its value (no morality has value in itself); it would even let us despise it. Let us
not doubt, on the other hand, that we modern men, with our thick wadded humanity, which will not by any means strike against a stone, would furnish a comedy to the contemporaries of Caesar Borgia to laugh themselves to death over. In fact we are extraordinarily amusing, though involuntarily, with out modern “virtues” … |

200

[Under such circumstances people mutually assist one another; to a certain extent everybody is sick, and everybody is a sick-nurse. That condition of things is then denominated “virtue:” among men who knew a different mode of life, fuller, more prodigal, more profuse, it would have had a different name, perhaps “cowardice,” “pitiableness,” or “old woman’s morality” …

[Vigorous eras, noble civilisations, see something contemptible in sympathy, in “brotherly love,” in the lack of self-assertion and self-reliance.]

201

Our virtues are determined, are peremptorily called forth by our weakness… |

["Equality,” as an actual approximation to similarity, of which the theory of “equal rights” is but the expression, belongs essentially to decadence: the gap between man and man, between class and class, the multiplicity of types, the will to assert itself, to stand out in contrast, that which I call pathos of distance belongs to every vigorous period. The power of stretch, the width of stretch between the extremes, becomes always smaller at present,—the extremes themselves finally merge into similarity.* All our political theories and state constitutions, the “German Empire” by no means excepted, are consequences, resulting necessities, of décadence: the unconscious operation of décadence has gained the ascendancy so far as to affect the ideals of some of the sciences. My objection against the whole of the sociology of England and France is that it only knows decaying types of society by experience, and quite innocently takes its own instincts of decay as standard for sociological valuations. Deteriorating life, the decline of all organising power [202] (i.e. separating, gap-
making, subordinating and superordinating power) is formulated as the *ideal*, in the sociology of the present day, Our socialists are *decadents*; Mr. Herbert Spencer, however, is also a *decadent*,—he sees something admirable in the triumph of altruism.

[201] *The English “great man”, and the “great class” he truckles to, are not inaptly characterised by the following incident. In Spain or Italy, the incident would have been avenged with the stiletto—but they are not democracies.*

[Newspaper article glued in corner of page “Mr. Reid as a ‘White’ Man.” *Argus* 26 July 1898: 5.]

This sally was greeted by loud laughter, in the midst of which the Premier was hit on the chin by a flour-bag. The crowd roared, but Mr. Reid took the assault in good part, kissing his hand and bowing repeatedly to the people, who became still more convulsed at the grotesque spectacle of the Premier standing with his face and waistcoat smothered in flour and making no attempt to wipe it off.

Mr. Reid (continuing) said that even his opponents made him look whiter than ever, and all could now see that a white man he was.

202 (§38)

*My concept of freedom.*—*The worth of a thing lies sometimes not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it,—what it costs us.*

Liberal institutions immediately cease to be liberal, so soon as they are attained; afterwards, there are no more mischievous or more radical enemies of freedom than liberal institutions. |One knows well enough what they accomplish: they undermine the will to power, they are the levelling of mountain and valley exalted into morality, they make people small, cowardly, and voluptuous,—with them the herding animal always triumphs.

202
And warfare educates for freedom. For what is freedom? To have the will to be responsible [203] for one’s self. To keep the distance which separates us. To become more indifferent to hardship, severity, privation, and even to life. To be ready to sacrifice men for one’s cause, one’s self not excepted. Freedom implies that manly instincts, instincts which delight in war and triumph, dominate over other instincts; for example over the instincts of “happiness”?

203

The man who has become free, how much more the spirit which has become free, treads under foot the contemptible species of well-being dreamt of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, women, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.

The people who were worth something, who became worth something, never acquired their greatness under liberal institutions: great danger made something out of them which deserves reverence,]

204

[Those great forcing-houses for the strong, the strongest species of man that has hitherto existed, the aristocratic commonwealths of the pattern of Rome and Venice, understood freedom precisely in the sense in which I understand the word: as something which one has and has not, as something which one desires, which one wins by conquest…

205

The entire western world no longer possesses those instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which futurity grows; perhaps nothing is so much against the grain of its “modern spirit.”]
Witness modern marriage. All rationality has evidently been lost in modern marriage; that does not however furnish an objection against marriage, but against modernism. Rationality of marriage—it lay in the sole legal responsibility of the husband| marriage thus possessed gravity, while at present it halts on both legs. Rationality of marriage [206]—|it lay in its indissolubleness on principle| it thus acquired an emphasis which, opposed to the accident of sentiment, passion, and momentary impulse, knew how to make itself heard. Rationality of marriage—it lay likewise in the responsibility of families for the selection of the spouses. By the increasing indulgence in favour of marriages for love, the basis of marriage, that which first of all makes it an institution, has been almost eliminated. An institution is never, and never will be founded on an idiosyncrasy: marriage, as we have said, cannot be founded on “love,”—it is founded on sexual impulse, on the impulse to possess property (woman and child as property), on the impulse to rule, which constantly organises for itself the smallest type of sovereignty (family), which needs children and heirs to maintain physiologically an acquired measure of power, influence and riches, to prepare for long tasks, and for instinct-solidarity from one century to another. Marriage, as an institution, already involves the affirmation of the greatest and most permanent form of organisation: if society cannot as a whole pledge itself to the remotest generations, marriage has no meaning at all.—Modern marriage has lost its meaning,—consequently, it is being done away with.

207 (§40)

|But what do people want? Let it be asked once more. If they want to realise an end, [208] they must also be willing to use the means; if they want to have slaves, it is foolish to educate them to be masters.|—

(§41)
The very reverse happens: independence, free development, and laisser-aller are claimed the most vehemently precisely by those for whom no restraint would be too severe—this is true in politics, it is true in art.

210 (§44)

My notion of genius.—Great men, like great periods, are explosive materials in which an immense force is accumulated

211

And because Napoleon was of a different type, the heir of a stronger, more enduring and older civilisation than that which vanished into vapour and fragments in France, he became master, he alone was the master here.

212

The great man is a close; the great period, the Renaissance, for example, is a close. The genius—in work, in deed—is necessarily a squanderer; his greatness is that he expends himself.

People call this “sacrifice,” they praise the heroism of genius, his indifference to his own welfare, his devotion to an idea, to a great cause, or to his country: it is all misunderstanding however … He outflows, he overflows, he uses himself up, he does not spare himself—fatefully, portentously, involuntarily, as a river involuntarily overflows its banks. ||But because people owe much to such explosives they have, on the other hand, bestowed much upon them; for example, a sort of higher morality… For that is the mode of human gratitude: it misunderstands its benefactors.—

214 (§45)
But almost all modes of existence which we at present signalise, have formerly lived in this semi-sepulchral atmosphere,—the scientific man of character, the artist, the genius, the free spirit, the actor, the merchant, the great discoverer… As long as the priest passed for the highest type, every meritorious variety of human being was depreciated…

215

Almost every genius knows the “Catilinarian existence” as one of his developments, a hateful, revengeful, insurrectionary feeling against everything which already is, which does not any longer become… Catiline—the pre-existent form of every Caesar,—

216 (§47)
| Supreme rule: we must not “let ourselves go,” even when only in our own presence.—Good things are costly beyond measure, and the rule always holds, that he who possesses them is other than he who acquires them. |

217

It is on that account that the Greeks are the leading event in the history of civilisation: they know, they did what was necessary; Christianity, which despised the body, has hitherto been the greatest misfortune for the human race.—

218 (§48)

Never make the unequal equal

| I see only one who regarded it as it must be regarded, with disgust—Goethe… |

(§49)
*"Goethe.—No mere German event, but a European event; a grand attempt to surmount the eighteenth century, by a return to nature, by an ascension to the naturalness of the Renaissance,"

*The best summary of Goethe yet written.

219

|Goethe conceived of a personality robust and high-cultured, skilful in all physical accomplishments, keeping himself in check, and maintaining his self-reverence, who dares to allow himself the whole realm and riches of naturalness, and is strong enough for that freedom; the man of toleration, not out of weakness, but out of strength, because he knows how to use advantageously what would cause the ruin of average constitutions; the man to whom there is nothing pro-[220]hibited—unless it be weakness,—whether it is designated vice or virtue… A mind thus emancipated, stands with a cheerful and confident fatalism in the midst of the universe, in the belief that only the single thing is rejectable, that, on the whole, everything is saved and maintained: he no longer denies… But such a belief is the highest of all possible beliefs: I have christened it with the name of Dionysos.—|

221 (§50)

‖But we misunderstand great men when we look at them from the narrow perspective of public utility. That we do not know how to derive advantage from them—that itself perhaps belongs to greatness…

(§51)

I have given mankind the profoundest book it possesses, my Zarathustra: I shall shortly give it the most independent one. !!!!!!
Je me verrai, je me lirai, je m’extasierai, etc. etc. See pp188—there is a touch of the literary woman in our friend!

[Page 188: ”This likeness is charmingly beautiful!” [from Die Zauberflöte] — Literary woman, discontented, agitated, desolate in heart and bowels, ever listening with painful curiosity to the imperative which whispers out of the depths of her organisation, “aut liber aut libri;” literary woman, cultured enough to understand the voice of nature even when it speaks in Latin, and, on the other hand, conceited enough and goose enough to speak secretly with herself in French, “je me verrai, he me lirai, je m’extasierai et je dirai: Possible, que j’aie eu tant esprit?”…]

My Indebtedness to the Ancients

223 (§1)

all that is Roman, and, if you will believe me, it is noble par excellence. All other poetry becomes somewhat too popular in comparison with it,—mere sentimental loquacity.*

*Nietzsche does not quite understand his own well-marked limitations!—he is almost essentially inartistic, in a deep sense.

(§2)

We do not learn from the Greeks: their mode is too foreign, it is also too unstable! to operate imperatively or “classically”. Who would ever have learned to write from a Greek!

Ha!! But the artist will reverse this verdict.

226 (§3)
I saw their strongest instinct, the will to power, I saw them quake in the presence of the intractable force of this impulse,—I saw all their institutions evolve out of protective measures to secure themselves mutually from their innate explosive material. The enormous internal tension then discharged itself externally, in dreadful and reckless hostility: the city communities lacerated themselves in conflict with one another, in order that the citizens of each might find peace within themselves. People required to be strong; danger was close at hand,—it lurked everywhere. The magnificently supple physique, the daring realism and immoralism which belonged to Hellene, were an exigency, not a “temperament.”

* Yet unattainable without the temperament!

And the Greeks desired naught else but to feel themselves [227] dominant, to show themselves dominant with their festivals and arts:

227

To judge the Greeks by their philosophers in the German manner, to avail one’s self perchance of the affected virtuousness of the Socratic schools for disclosures as to what is fundamentally Hellenic!... For philosophers are the decadents of Grecianism, the counter-movement against ancient, noble taste (against the agonal instinct, against the polis, against the worth of the race, against the authority of tradition). Socratic virtues were preached because they had been lost by the Greeks:

229 (§4)

What did the Hellene pledge himself for with these mysteries? Eternal life, eternal recurrence of life; the future promised and consecrated in the past; the triumphant affirmation of life beyond death and change; true life, as the universal continuation of life by generation, by the mysteries of sexuality. On that account, the sexual symbol was to the Greeks the symbol venerable in itself, the intrinsic profundity within all
ancient piety. Every detail in the act of generation, in pregnancy, and in birth, awakened [230] the most exalted and solemn sentiments.

230

*It is only Christianity, with its resentment against life at the bottom, which has caused sexuality to be regarded as something impure; it cast dirt on the commencement, on the pre-requisite of our life…*”

*Hence the feeling of inadequacy, or partial-impotence, & the enervating smack of old—unanimous in such poets as Wordsworth and Tennyson—they voluntarily castrated [231] themselves,—& their poetry. Milton attempted the same self-abuse, but only in part succeeded (ie. Paradise Lost & Regained in which occur a castrated God the Father & God the Son—he castrated his angels too; but was good enough to leave Satan alone)—But the Christian operating-knife was not strong enough for his tough muscle! —Hence his escape.—All our modern poets (if we can call them so) suffer from the same mutilation.

The Antichrist: An Essay Towards a Criticism of Christianity

Preface

239

The conditions under which a person understands me, and then necessarily understands,—I know them only too accurately. He must be honest in intellectual matters even to sternness.

He must have become indifferent, he must never ask whether truth is profitable or becomes a calamity to him…
New ears for new music. New eyes for the most distant. A new conscience for truths which have hitherto remained dumb. And the will for economy in the grand style: to keep together one’s power, one’s enthusiasm... || Reverence for one’s self; love to one’s self; unconditioned freedom with respect to one’s self...||

242 (§2)

[The following passage is boxed by double lines.]

What is good?—All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself, in man.

What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness.

What is happiness?—The feeling that power increases,—that a resistance is overcome.

Not contentedness, but more power; not peace at any price, but welfare; not virtue but capacity (virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, virtue free from any moralic-acid).

The weak and ill-constituted shall perish: first principle of our charity. And people shall help them do so.

What is more injurious than any crime?—Practical sympathy for all the ill-constituted and weak: Christianity...”

243 (§4)

The European of the present is, in worth, far below the European of the renaissance; onward development is by no means, by any necessity, elevating, enhancing, strengthening.

244 (§5)

We must not embellish or deck out Christianity: it has waged a deadly war against this higher type of man, it has put in ban all fundamental instincts of this type, it has distilled evil, the evil one, out of these instincts:—strong man as the typical reprobate,
as “out-cast man. Christianity has taken part of all the weak, the low, the ill-constituted, it has made an ideal out of the antagonism to the preservative instincts of strong life: it has ruined the reason even of the intellectually strong natures, in that it taught men to regard the highest values of intellectuality as sinful, as misleading, as temptations.]

245 (§6)

I call an animal, a species, an individual, depraved, when it loses its instincts, when it selects, when it prefers what is injurious to it.

where the will to power is wanting there is decline.

(§7)

|Christianity is called the religion of sympathy.—Sympathy stands in antithesis to the tonic passions which elevate the energy of the feeling of life: it [246] operates depressively.

246

|It preserves what is ripe for extinction, it resists in favour of life’s disinherited and condemned ones, it gives to life itself a gloomy and questionable aspect by the abundance of the ill-constituted of all kinds whom it maintains in life].

247

|To be a physician here, to be pitiless here, to apply the knife here—that belongs to us, that is our mode of charity; thereby we are philosophers, we Hyperboreans!— — —

248 (§8)
as if submissiveness, chastity, poverty, in a word holiness had not hitherto [249] done unutterably more injury to life to life than any frightful things or vices… Pure spirit is pure lie…

249 (§9)

I make war against this theological instinct: I have found traces of it everywhere. Whoever has theological blood in his veins is from the very beginning ambiguous and disloyal with respect to everything.

252 (§11)

|What destroys faster than to work, think, or feel without internal necessity, without a profoundly personal choice, without pleasure? As an automaton of “duty?” it is precisely the recipe for decadence, even for idiocy … Kant became an idiot.*

*So did Nietzsche. ‘from overwork’. What does that prove?—If anything, that all forms of philosophy are forms of idiocy!—There is some truth even in this!

254 (§13)

| We have had the entire pathos of mankind against us,—their concept of that which truth ought to be, which [255] the service of truth ought to be: every “thou shalt” has been hitherto directed against us. Our objects, our practices, our quiet, prudent, mistrustful mode—all appeared to mankind as absolutely unworthy and contemptible.—In the end one might with some reasonableness ask one’s self if it was not really an aesthetic taste which kept mankind in such long blindness:| they wanted a picturesque effect from truth, they wanted in like manner the knowing ones to operate strongly on their senses. Our modesty was longest against the state of mankind… Oh how they made that out, these turkey-cocks of God

255 (§14)
We have counter-learned. We have become more modest in everything. We no longer derive man from “spirit,” from “godhead,” we have put him back among the animals. We regard him as the strongest animal because he is the most cunning: his intellectuality is a consequence thereof.

"Pure spirit" is a pure stupidity; when we deduct the nervous system and the senses, the “mortal coil,” our calculation is wrong—that is all!...

(|§15|)

[The following passage is boxed by double lines]

In Christianity neither morality nor religion is in contact with any point of actuality. Nothing but imaginary causes (“God,” “soul,” “ego,” “spirit,” “free will”—or even “unfree will”); nothing but imaginary effects (“sin,” “salvation,” “grace,” “punishment,” “forgiveness of sin”). An intercourse between imaginary beings (“God,” “spirits,” “souls”); an imaginary science of nature (anthropocentric; absolute lack of the concept of natural causes); an imaginary psychology (nothing but self-misunderstandings, interpretations of pleasant or unpleasant general feelings, for example, the conditions of the nervus sympathicus, with the help of the sign-language of religio-moral idiosyncrasy,—”repentance,” “remorse of conscience,” “temptation by the devil,” “presence of God,”); an imaginary teleology (“the kingdom of God,” “the last judgement,” “everlasting life).
unpleasurable feelings over pleasurable feelings is the *cause* of that fictitious morality and religion: such a preponderance, however, furnishes the *formula* for décadence…||

(§16)

*A people which still believes in itself has withal its own God. In him it reverences the conditions by which it is to the fore, its virtues;*

259

What would a God be worth who did not know anger, revenge, jealousy, scorn, craft and violence?]

He now becomes a sneak, timid and modest, he counsels “peace of soul,” an end of hatred, indulgence, “love” even towards friend and foe.| He constantly moralises, he creeps into the cave of every private virtue, he becomes everybody’s God, he becomes a private man, he becomes a cosmopolitan. |Formerly, he represented a people, the strength of a people, all that was aggressive and thirsty for power in the soul of a people; now he is merely the good God…

261 (§17)

When the presuppositions of *ascending* life, when everything strong, brave, domineering, and proud have been eliminated out of the concept of God, when he sinks step by step to the symbol of a staff for the fatigued, a sheet-anchor for all drowning ones, when he becomes the poor people's God, the sinners' God, the God of the sick *par excellence*, and when the predicate of Savour, Redeemer, is left as the sole divine predicate: what does such a change speak of? such a *reduction* of the divine?

—To be sure, the kingdom of God has thereby become greater.|

he remained a Jew, he remained the God of the nooks, the God of all dark corners and places, of all unhealthy places throughout the world! … *His world-empire—is still, as*
formerly, an under-world empire, a hospital, a subterranean empire, a Ghetto empire...

They spun round about him so long, until, hypnotised by their movements, he became a cobweb-spinner, a metaphysician himself. Henceforth he spun the world anew out of himself—*sub specie Sinozae,*— henceforth he transfigured himself always into the thinner and the paler, he became “ideal,” he became “pure spirit,” he became “*absolutum,*” he became “thing in itself” ... *Ruin of a God:* God became “thing in itself” ...

(§18)

God degenerated to the *contradiction of life,* instead of being its transfiguration and its eternal *yea!*

264 (§20)

||Buddhism is the only properly *positivist* religion which history shows us, even in its theory of perception (a strict phenomenalism)—it no longer speaks of a “struggle against *sin,*” but, quite doing justice to actuality, it speaks of a “struggle against *suffering.*”|| It has—this distinguishes it profoundly from Christianity—the self-deception of moral concepts bead it—it stands, in my language, *beyond* good and evil. —The two physiological facts on which it rests and which it has in view are, on the one hand, an excessive excitableness of sensibility, which expresses itself as a refined capacity for pain, and, on the other hand, an over-intellectualising, an over-long occupation with concepts and logical procedures through which the personal instinct has received damage to the advantage of the “impersonal” (both are conditions, which at least some of my readers, the “objective,” will know, like myself by experience). On the basis of these physiological conditions a depression has originated against which Buddha takes hygienic measures. He applies life in the open air as a measure against it, wandering life; moderation and selection in food, precaution against all intoxicants;
similarly precautions against all emotions which create bile, or heat the blood; no anxiety either for self or for others. He requires notions which either give repose or gaiety;—he [265] devises means to disaccustom one’s self from others. He understands goodness, benignity, as health-promoting.

266 (§21)

|The prerequisite for Buddhism is a very mild climate, great gentleness and liberality in usages, *no* militarism,—and that it is the higher and learned classes in whom the movement has focus.

|In Christianity the instincts of the subjugated and suppressed come into the foreground: it is the lowest classes who here seek their goal.

Here the body is despised, hygiene is repudiated as sensuousness; *the* Church resists even cleanliness (the first Christian regulation, after the expulsion of the Moors, was the closing of the public baths, of which Cordova alone possessed 270).

267

The deadly hostility against the lords of the earth, the “noble”—and at the same time a concealed, secret competition with them (one leaves them the “body,” one *only* wants the “soul”)—are Christian. |||The hatred of *intellect*, of pride, courage, freedom, *libertinage* of intellect, *is* Christian: the hatred of the *senses*, of the delights of the senses, of all delight, *is* Christian...|||

269 (§23)

Christianity has some refinements at its basis which belong to the Orient. Above all, Christianity knows that it is quite different if aught is true, but of the highest importance *so far as* it is believed to be true.|
(Just on account of this capability of keeping the unfortunate person in suspense, hope was regarded among the Greeks as the evil of evils, as the peculiarly insidious evil: it remained behind in the box of evil.)

270

| The requirement of chastity strengthens the vehemence and internality of religious instinct—it makes the worship warmer, more enthusiastic, more soul-breathing.—Love is the state in which man sees things most widely different from what they are. Illusory power is there at its height.

| So much concerning the three Christian virtues, faith, hope, and charity: O call them the three Christian shrewdnesses.

272 (§24)

| To be able to negative all that represents the ascending movement of life on earth, well-consitutedness, power, beauty, self-affirmation, the instinct of ressentiment, developed to genius, had here to devise for itself another world, from which the affirmation of life appeared as the evil, as the repudiable in itself.

| Placed under impossible conditions, voluntarily out of a most profound policy of self-maintenance, it took the art of all decadence instincts,—not as ruled by them, but because it divined in them a power by which to get along in opposition to “the world.” They are the counterpart of all decadents: they were compelled to exhibit them to illusion, they have, with a non plus ultra of theatrical genius, known how to place themselves at the head of all decadence movements (as the Christianity of Paul), and have created something out of them which is stronger than any [273] party affirmative of life. Décadence, for the class of men who aspired to power in Judaism and Christianity (a priestly class), is but a means; this class of men has a vital interest in making mankind sick, and in reversing the concepts “good” and “bad,” “true” and “false” into a mortally dangerous and world-calumnating signification. |
Their Javeh was the expression of consciousness of power, the delight in themselves, the hope of themselves: in him they expected victory and prosperity, with him the had confidence in nature, that it would furnish what they needed—above all, rain.

The concept of God becomes an instrument in the hands of priestly agitators, who henceforth interpret all good fortune as reward, all misfortune as punishment for disobedience to God, for “sin:” that most falsified manner of interpretation of all pretended “moral order of the world” with which, once for all, the natural concepts of “cause” and “effect” are turned upside down.

What does “a moral order of the world” signify? That there is once and for all a will of God, as to what men have to do and what they have not to do; that the value of a people, or of an individual is determined by how much or how little the will of God is obeyed; that in the destinies of a people, or of an individual, the will of God is demonstrated as ruling; i.e., as punishing and rewarding in proportion to obedience.

they call a condition of things, the “kingdom of God;” they call the means by which such a condition is attained or maintained “the will of God;” with a cold-blooded cynicism, they estimate peoples, ages, and individuals, according as they were serviceable to the priestly ascendancy, or resisted it. Let us see them at work

From henceforth all the affairs of life are so regulated that the priest is *everywhere indispensable;*
Disobedience to God, *i.e.*, to the priest, to “law” now gets the name of “sin;” the means for a person “reconciling himself again to God,” as is only fair, are means by which the subjugation under the priest is only more thoroughly guaranteed: the priest alone “saves”…]

279 (§27)

It was an uprising against the “good and just,” against “the saints of Israel,” against the hierarchy of society—*not against its corruption but against caste, privilege, order, formula, it was the unbelief in “higher men,” the denial of all that was priest and theologian.

280

This brought him to the cross: the proof of it is the inscription on the cross. He died for his guilt,—all ground is lacking for the assertion however often it has been made, that he died for the guilt of others.

281 (§28)

[280] I confess that I read few books with such difficulties as the Gospels. These difficulties are other than those in whose indication the learned curiosity of [291] German intellect has celebrated one of its most memorable triumphs. The time is far distant when I with the sage dullness of a refined philologist, like every young scholar, tasted thoroughly the work of the incomparable Strauss. I was then twenty years of age: I am now too serious for that. Of what account are the contradictions of “tradition” to me? How can legends of saints be called “tradition” at all? The stories of saints are the most ambiguous literature that exists: to apply scientific methods to it *when no documents besides have reached us*, appears to me condemned in principle—
mere learned idling.

283 (§30)

||The instinctive hatred of reality: consequence of an extreme liability to suffering and excitement, which no longer wants to be “touched” at all, because it feels all contact too profoundly.||

||The instinctive exclusion of all antipathy, of all hostility, of all sentiment of limits and distances: consequence of an extreme liability to suffering and excitement, which feels every resistance on its own part, every necessity for resistance as an intolerable displeasure, (i.e., as injurious, as dissuaded by self-preservative instinct), and which knows blessedness (delight) only in no longer offering opposition, to any one either to the ill or to the evil,—love as sole, as final possibility of life…||

285 (§31)

Finally let us not undervalue the proprium of all great veneration, especially sectarian veneration: it extinguishes the original and often painfully alien characteristics and idiosyncrasies in the venerated being—it does not see them itself.|

286

|one knows well the unhesitatingness of all sectaries to shape their master into an apology of themselves.

(§32)

|I resist, let it be said once more, the introducing of the fanatic into the type of the Saviour: the very word imperieux which Renan used annulled the type. The “good tidings” are just that there are no more antitheses; the kingdom of heaven belongs to children; the faith whose voice is heard here is not a faith acquired by struggle,—it is
there, it is from the beginning, it is, as it were, the childlikeness which has flowed back into the intellectual.

288

Dialectics is similarly lacking, it lacks the notion that a belief, a “truth,” could be proved by reasons (his proofs are internal “lights,” internal feelings of delight, and self-affirmations, nothing by “proofs of force”).

290

The profound instinct for the problem how to live in order to feel one’s self “in heaven,” to feel one’s self “eternal,” while in every other relation one feels that one is not in the least “in heaven:” this alone is the psychological reality of “salvation.”—A new mode of conduct, not a new faith…

291 (§34)

If I understand anything of this great symbolist, it is that he only took inner realities as realities, as “truths,”—that he only understood the rest, all that is natural, temporal, spatial, histrical, as signs, as occasion for similes. The concept of the “Son of Man,” is not a concrete person belonging to history, some individual, solitary case, but an “eternal” fact, a psychological symbol freed from the concept of time.

294 (§37)

Reversely: the history of Christianity—and, of course from the death on the cross onwards—is the history of the gradually grosser and grosser misunderstanding of an original symbolism.

296 (§38)
Even with the most modest pretensions to uprightness, it must be known at present that a theologian, a priest, a pope, not only errs, but lies, with every sentence he speaks—that he is no longer at liberty to lie out of “innocence,” out of “ignorance.” Even the priest knows as well as any one knows that there is no longer any “God,” any “sinner,” any “Saviour;” that “free will” and a “moral order of the world” are lies:—seriousness, the profound self-surmounting of intellect, no longer allows anyone to be ignorant of these matters…

297

| Whom then does Christianity deny? What does it call the “world?” To be a soldier, a judge, a patriot; to seek one’s advantage; to be proud… All practice of every hour, all instincts, all valuations realising themselves in deeds are at present Anti-Christian: what a monster of falsity must modern man be that he nevertheless is not ashamed to be still called a Christian!— — |

298

“Belief”—I already called it the peculiar Christian shrewdness,—people [299] always spoke about their “belief,” but always acted merely from their instincts…

302 (§41)

|—And from that time an absurd problem came to the surface: “How could God permit that!” With respect thereto the deranged reason of the little community found quite a frightfully absurd answer: God gave his Son for the forgiveness of sins, as a sacrifice. How it was all at once at an end with the gospel! The sacrifice for guilt, and just in its most repugnant and barbarous form, the sacrifice of the innocent for the sins of the guilty! What a horrifying heathenism! 

303 (§42)
Buddhism gives no promise but keeps every one, Christianity gives any promise, but keeps none.—The “glad tidings” were followed closely by the worst of all, those of Paul. In Paul, the antithetical type of the “hearer of glad tidings” is personified, the genius in hatred, in the vision of hatred, in the relentless logic of hatred.

Paul willed [305] the end, consequently he willed also the means... What he himself did not believe, was believed by the idiots among whom he cast his teaching. |—His requirement was power; with Paul the priest strove once more for power.

306 (§43)

| has equal rank with everyone else, that in the universality of beings the salvation of every individual can lay claim to eternal importance, that little hypocrites and half-crazed people dare to imagine that on their account the laws of nature are constantly broken—such an enhancement of every kind of selfishness to infinity, to impudence, cannot be branded with sufficient contempt. And yet Christianity owes its triumph to this pitiable flattery of personal vanity,—it has thereby enticed over to its side all the ill-constituted, the seditiously disposed, the ill-fortuned, the whole scum and dross of humanity.

|”Immortality” granted to every Peter and Paul, has hitherto been the worst, the most vicious outrage on noble humanity.

307

At present nobody has any longer the courage for separate rights, for rights of domination, for a feeling of reverence for himself and his equals,—for pathos of distance… Our politics are morbid from this want of courage! |—The aristocracy of character has been undermined most craftily by the lie of equality of souls; and if the belief in the “privilege of the many” makes revolutions and will continue to make
them, it is Christianity, let us not doubt it, it is Christian valuations, which translate every revolution merely into blood and crime! Christianity is a revolt of all that creeps on the ground against what is elevated: the gospel of the lowly makes low…

309 (§44)

One must not be misled: “judge not,” they say, but they send everything to hell which stands in their way. In making God judge, they themselves judge; in glorifying God, they glorify themselves; in demanding those virtues of which they happen to be capable—yet more, which they need in order to get the better at all,—they assume the grand airs of a wrestling for virtue, of a struggle for the triumph of virtue. “We live, we die, we sacrifice ourselves for the good” (“truth,” “light,” “the kingdom of God”): in fact, they do what they cannot leave undone.|

310

wretched monsters of hypocrites and liars began to claim for themselves the concepts “God,” “truth,” “light,” “spirit,” “love,” “wisdom,” “life.”

311

“And whatsoever place shall not receive you, and they hear you not, as ye go forth thence, shake off the dust that is under your feet, for a testimony unto them. Verily, I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city.” (Mark VI.II)—How evangelical!...

“And whosoever shall cause one of these little ones that believe on me to stumble, it were better for him if a great millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.” (Mark. IX. 42.)—How evangelical!...

“And if thine eye cause thee to stumble, cast it out: it is good for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, rather than having two eyes to be cast into hell: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.” (Mark. IX. 47.)—It is not quite the eye that is alluded to.
“Verily I say unto you, there be some here of them that stand by, which shall in no wise taste of death, till they see the kingdom of God come with power.” (Mark. IX. I)—Well lied, lion…]

“If any man would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me. For”…[Remark of a Psychologist. Christian morality is refuted by its fors: its reasons refute,—thus it is Christian.) Mark. VIII. 34.—]

|”Judge not, that ye shall be judged … with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured unto you.” (Matthew VII. I.), it shall be measured unto you.” (Matthew VII. I.) What a conception of justice, of a “just” judge!...

|”For if ye love them that love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans the same? And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? Do not even the Gentiles the same?” (Matthew v. 46.)—Principle of Christian love: it wants to be well paid in the end…

|”But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.” (Matthew VI. 15.) Very compromising for the “Father” referred to…

|”But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all other things shall be added unto you.” (Matthew VI. 33.) All other things: namely, food, clothing, the whole necessaries of life. An error, modestly expressed … A little before, God appears as a tailor, at least in certain cases…

|”Rejoice in that day and leap for joy: for behold, your reward is great in heaven: for in the same manner did their fathers unto the prophets.” (Luke VI. 23.) Impudent rabble! They already compare themselves to the prophets…

|”Know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and that the spirit of god dwelleth in you? If any man destroyeth the temple of God, him shall God destroy, for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are." (Paul I. Corinthians 111. I 6)—such utterances cannot be sufficiently despised …|

“Or know ye not that the saints shall judge the world? And if the world is judged by you, are ye unworthy to judge the smallest matters?” (Paul:1. Corinthians VI. 2.) Alas, not merely the talk of a bedlam… This frightful deceiver continues as follows: “Know ye not that we shall judge angels? How much more, things that pertain to this life?”
“Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world? For seeing that in the wisdom of God, the world through its wisdom knew not God, it was God’s good pleasure through the foolishness of the preaching to save them that believe… not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called; but God chose the foolish things of the world; and God chose the weak things of the world, that he might put to shame the things that are strong; and the base things of the world, and the things that are despised did God choose, yea, and the things that are despised did God choose, yea, and the things that are: that no flesh should glory before God” (Paul: I. Corinthians I.20 ff.)

Out! This Paul stinks!

314 (§46)

—What follows therefrom? That one does well to put on gloves when reading the New Testament

There is nothing in it free, gracious, open-hearted, upright. Humanity has not yet made its beginning here,—the instincts of cleanliness are lacking…

|All in it is cowardice, all is shutting of the eyes, and self-deception. Every book becomes cleanly, when one has just read the New Testament.

315

|But even the Pharisees and scribes have an advantage from such antagonism: they must surely have been worth something to be hated in such an indecent manner.

316
|To take a Jewish affair *seriously*—he will not be persuaded to do so. A Jew more or less—what does that matter?... The noble scorn of a Roman before whom a shameless misuse of the word truth was carried on has enriched the New Testament with the sole expression *which has value,*—which is itself its criticism, its *annihilation:* “What is truth!”…

317 (§47)

|For a philologist looks *behind* the “holy books,” a physician *behind* the physiological depravity of the typical Christian. The physician says “incurable,” the philologist says, “fraud”…|

318 (§48)

Has the celebrated story been really understood which stands at the commencement of the Bible,—the story of God’s mortal terror of *science*?

The old God, entire “spirit,” entire high priest, entire perfection, promenades in his garden: he only wants pastime. Against tedium even Gods struggle in vain.* What does he do? He contrives man,—man is entertaining… But behold, man also wants pastime. The pity of God for the only distress which belongs to all paradises has no bounds: he forthwith created other animals besides. The *first* mistake of God: man did not find the animals entertaining,—he ruled over them, but did not even want to be an “animal.”—God consequently created woman. And, in fact, there was now an end of tedium,—but of other things also! Woman was the *second* mistake of God.—”Woman I in her essence a serpent. Hera “—every priest knows that: “from woman comes *all* the mischief in the world”—every priest knows that likewise. *Consequently, science* also comes from her…

319

|it is at an end with priests and Gods, if man becomes scientific!*—*Moral; science is the thing forbidden in itself,—it alone is forbidden. Science is the *first,* the germ of all sin,
original sin. This alone is morality.

320

| man has become scientific,—there is no help for it, he must be drowned!...

(§49)

|—I have been understood. The beginning of the Bible contains the entire psychology of the priest.—The priest knows only one great danger: that is science,—the sound concept of cause and effect.

321

the priest rules by the invention of sin—

322 (§50)

|How is it established for all the world that true judgments give [323] more enjoyment than false ones, and have, necessarily, according to a pre-established harmony, pleasant feelings in their train?—The experience of all stern, profoundly constituted intellects teaches us the reverse. |Every step towards truth has had to be fought for and there has had to be abandoned for it almost whatever otherwise human hearts, human love, human confidence in life, are attached to. Therefore greatness of soul is required: the service of truth is the hardest service—| What does it mean, then, to be upright in intellectual matters? To be stern with regard to one’s heart, to despise “fine feelings,” to make one’s self a conscience out of every yea and nay!—Belief makes blessed: consequently it lies...

324 (§51)

the “highest” states which Christianity has hung up over mankind as values of all
values, are epileptoid manifestations—

We others, who have the courage for healthfulness and also for contempt, how we are permitted to despise a religion that teaches us to misunderstand the body! […] that persuaded itself that a “perfect soul” could be carried about in the corpse of a body, and for that purpose needed to formulate a new concept of “perfection.” [325] A pale, sickly, idiotic—visionary essence, so-called “holiness”—holiness itself merely a series of symptoms of a body impoverished, enervated, and incurably ruined!

325

Christianity has at its basis the rancune of the sick, the instinct opposed to the healthy, opposed to healthfulness.

326

—God on the cross—is the frightful concept behind this symbol not yet understood? All that suffers, all that hangs on the cross is divine… We all hang on the cross, consequently we are divine… We alone are divine… Christianity was a victory, a nobler type of character was destroyed by it,—Christianity has been the greatest misfortune hitherto of mankind.—

327 (§52)

“Belief” means not-wishing-to-know what is true.

328

| God as a domestic servant, as a postman, as an almanac-maker,—after all, a word for the simplest kind of accidents…

329 (§53)
The inference of all idiots, women and mob included, to the effect that an affair for which any one lays down his life (or which, like primitive Christianity, even produces death-seeking epidemics) is of importance,

What! Does it alter anything in the value of an affair that somebody lays down his life for it?

331 (§54)

Convictions are prisons. Such men do not see far enough, they do not see below themselves: but to be permitted to have a voice concerning value and not-value, one must see five hundred convictions below one’s self,—behind one’s self…

332

mankind prefers seeing postures to hearing reasons…

333 (§55)

Not wishing to see something which one sees, not wishing so to see something as one sees it: that is what I call falsehood:

335

“Truth is here:” that means wherever it becomes audible, the priest lies…

337 (§56)

“Because of fornications let each man have his own wife, and let each woman have her own husband… for it is better to marry than to burn?” And is it allowable to be a Christian as long as the origin of man is Christianised, i.e. befouled with the concept of
immaculata conceptio?

340 (§57)

Only the most intellectual men have the permission to beauty, to the beautiful; it is only with them that goodness is not weakness.

|The most intellectual men, as the strongest, find their happiness in that which others would find their ruin: in the labyrinth, in severity towards themselves and others, in effort, their delight is self-overcoming: with them asceticism becomes naturalness, requirement, instinct.  

341

They are the most venerable kind of man. That does not exclude their being the most cheerful, the most amiable. They rule, not because they will, but because they are; they are not at liberty to be second in rank.—The second in rank are: the guardians of right, the keepers of order and security, the noble warriors, the king, above all, as the highest formula of warrior, judge, and keeper of the law. The second in rank are the executive of the most intellectual, the most closely associated wit them, relieving them of all that is coarse in the work of ruling, their retinue, their right hand, their best disciplines.|

342

The Socialist mob, the Chandala apostles, who undermine the working man’s instinct, his pleasure, his feeling of contentedness with his petty existence,—who make him envious, who teach him revenge…The wrong never lies in unequal rights, it lies in the pretension to “equal” rights…

344 (§58)

|The Christian and the anarchist […] both incarnating the instinct of mortal hatred of
whatever stands, whatever is great, whatever has durability, whatever promises futurity to life.

347 (§59)

What we have now won back for ourselves with unspeakable self-vanquishing (for we have still somehow bad instincts, Christian instincts in our nature)—the open look in presence of reality, the cautious hand, patience and earnestness in details, all the righteousness in knowledge,—it was already there! Already, more than two thousand years ago! And added thereto, the excellent, refined tact and taste! Not as brain drilling! Not as “German” culture with boorish manners! But as body, as bearing, as instinct,—in a word, as reality… ||

the great yea to all things visible

348

|— — One has but to read any Christian agitator, Saint Augustine for instance, to be able to smell that dirty fellows have thereby got uppermost.

349 (§60)

Christianity, alcohol—the two great means of corruption…

350 (§61)

Is it at last understood, is it desired to be understood what the Renaissance was? The transvaluation of Christian values, the attempt, undertaken with all means, with all instincts, with all genius, to bring about the triumph of the opposite values, the noble values…
Luther saw the *depravity* of Popery, while the very reverse was palpable: the old depravity, the *peccatum originale*, Christianity, no longer sat on the throne of the Pope! But life! The triumph of life! The grand yea to all things high, beautiful and daring!... And Luther *restored the Church once more*: he attacked it…|

352 (§62)

The Christian church has left nothing [353] untouched with its depravity, it has made a worthlessness out of every value, a lie out of every truth, a baseness of soul out of every straightforwardness.

353

To *do away with* any state of distress whatsoever was counter to its profoundest expediency, it lived by states of distress, it *created* states of distress in order to perpetuate itself eternally…|

The “equality of souls before God,” this falsehood, this *pretence* for the *rancunes* of all the base-minded

To breed out of *humanitas* a self-contradiction, an art of self-violation, a will to the lie at any price, a repugnance, a contempt for all good and straightforward instincts!

|the cross as the rallying sign for the most subterranean conspiracy that has ever existed,—against healthiness, beauty, well-constitutedness, courage, intellect, *benevolence* of soul, *against life itself*…|

354

The eternal accusation of Christianity I shall write on all walls, wherever there are walls,—I have letters for making even the blind see… I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct of revenge for which no
expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, *mean*,—I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind…

THE END

*Bravo!*

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