Creativity and Power

Creativity as Strategy and Value in Modern Discourse

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Abstract

In this thesis I develop a discussion based on the view that creativity constantly finds, loses and reconstructs itself through historical conflicts over who knows what it is and who can authoritatively practise it.

My thesis is that creativity exists as a discourse—with all the instabilities that this entails.

The thesis is composed of six main chapters, each discussing moments of annexation, rupture and conflict over modern understandings of creativity:

* Psychoanalysis claimed a new understanding of creativity. Much of Freud's writing depended upon literary sources, but at the same time his ideas and projects aimed to replace the insights of artists with the interpretations of the analyst. This discussion follows the tensions, contradictions and disruptions over the understanding of creativity in Freud's writing and later in analytic practice.

* Surrealism took flight in France inspired by Freud's insights but dismissive of his understanding of creativity as a manifestation of neurosis. My argument is that Surrealism claimed for itself a version of the creative self as both Freudian and monstrously anti-Freudian. Though apparently reclaiming creative freedom from Freudian inhibitions, Surrealism remained in awe of notions of creativity as an ideally 'feminine' arena occupied by men. Thus Surrealism, like psychoanalysis, was a discourse of both revolution and restriction.

* Jacques Lacan sought creative freedom within a calcifying psychoanalytic movement and attempted a reconciliation between Surrealism and psychoanalysis. This involved him in the strange poetics of the short analytic session and in the contorted prose of his lectures on Borromean knots and elephant excrement. His discourse embodied contradictions and dilemmas in modern understandings of creativity.

* The heavy use of alcohol by (mainly male) American writers and artists in the 1930s and 40s can be understood as one resistant and ambivalent response to the new understandings of creativity, in particular creativity's relation to a Freudian unconscious and Freudian-Surrealist notions of the artist as mad or ill.

* In each of these chapters the presence of the author has been weakened, threatened or made more complex. Recent debates over the place of the author in relation to creative works are extended here to show how the problem of origin is replicated in critical and theoretical writing. The elusive problem of origin in our experience of creativity recurs in the very texts which set out to explicate these problems.

* Recently in Australia (and for some time in America and Britain) discourses of creativity have become involved in tertiary education institutions through creative writing courses. Issues of submission and control are inevitably highlighted when creativity claims a certain freedom within the necessarily confining practices of universities. In this section I argue for the importance of a continuing instability in the history of creativity—by involving creative writers in theoretical debates over creativity, and by integrating the study of literature and culture with the practice of creative writing.
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"Endings: Reproducing Originality." was presented at the Teaching/Writing/Writing/Teaching conference at Sydney University in October 1996. Another extract, titled "What did you learn from that?" is to appear in the Victorian Writers' Centre Newsletter Write On.

I declare that this thesis is my original work, unless otherwise noted in the text and footnotes. The thesis is less than 100,000 words in length.

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Introduction

Creativity has been the subject of many different forms of knowledge. It has been defined variously—and competitively—by the related discourses of art, literature, literary theory and criticism, neurology, experimental psychology, Marxism, feminism, psychoanalysis, Lacanian psychoanalytic thought, Surrealism, and the creative writing movement. Who knows what creativity is? Each of these discourses and many others in their own ways, according to the different criteria they set for truth, have claimed to know what creativity is. But in answering the question, "Who knows what creativity is?" these discourses demonstrate their answers to that other, more political and historical question, "Who knows what creativity is?" In other words, the question can be seen to have as much to do with contests over status, ownership, authority and the construction of knowledge as it does with a truth.

I do not seek any final definition or essential truth about creativity in this thesis. I seek, rather, to follow some of the ways discourses have divided off from each other, cohered together or manoeuvred for positions of prominence in disputes over the understanding and ownership of creativity. I am arguing in this thesis that creativity is always already entangled, constrained, and indeed made possible by tensions between discourses. It comes into existence (into its successive and even parallel existences) contingently—defined as value, style or model of production by competing discourses. Creativity, in this view, exists as a history of contests over its meaning. It is a history of differences which can never be settled.

Through following some of the modern disputes over creativity I aim to show that once knowledge of creativity is claimed there is a tendency for creative production (art and literature in all its forms) to become stylised, predictable and constrained by the interests of a particular dominating discourse. This contraction of meaning and practice then opens, as it were, a space for the re-creation of creativity in further contests over meaning and ownership. I argue that creativity does not survive despite history, but rather takes its shape in history.

Such a discussion of creativity has not been pursued in the past either because creativity has been assumed to have a presence (serene or troubled) within human nature and thus outside history, or because writers have held an allegiance to one fixed way of understanding creativity. Even an apparently open-minded scientific or psychological approach to understanding creativity arrives at its subject with the
assumption that creativity can be studied as if it were an object—in this case taking the
form of an innate attribute—apart from a social and artistic history.

In her recent work, *The Creative Mind*, Professor of Psychology and Philosophy,
Margaret Boden, for example, opens her discussion with the following remarks:
"Without a coherent concept of creativity, we cannot distinguish creative ideas from
uncreative ones. And if we cannot do this, we cannot hope to discover the processes by
which creative ideas arise. This chapter, then, tries to clarify what counts as a creative
idea. We shall see that computational ideas can help us to understand what creativity is
(as well as how it happens)" (29). One response to this might be: Who's counting?
Boden's discussion might indeed be valuable in coming to an understanding of
creativity but at the same time such a philosophical discourse has its own history
involving its adoption of apparently compelling computational or computer-suggested
metaphors for human processes. What "counts" as creative depends upon what counts
as knowledge. Summarising Foucault, the philosopher Gilles Deleuze has suggested
that "we always get the truths we deserve, depending on the procedures of knowledge,
the proceedings of power, and the processes of subjectification or individuation
available to us" (*Negotiations* 117). It is these aspects of the history of truths about
creativity which I wish to explore in the present work.

My focus on the contingent existence of creativity as a changing value or knowledge
in dispute between discourses is influenced by Foucault's histories of discourses and
by the work of writers such as John Bender (*Imagining the Penitentiary*) and Clifford
Geertz (*The Interpretation of Cultures*) who have argued that art forms generate and
regenerate the very subjectivity they purport to display.

My discussion is selective, not exhaustive. I have not pursued, for instance, Marxist
claims about the use and understanding of creativity, nor the many forms of
neurological, psychological, philosophical or science-based research into creativity. I
have chosen to focus on the discourses of psychoanalysis, Surrealism and Lacanian
psychoanalysis because they represent a series of transformations and divisions in
contest over questions of creativity crucially tied to that still reverberating period of
upheavals in artistic practice which has come to be characterised as modernist. The
discussion does not take the form of a history of the period, but rather highlights ways
certain phenomena can be understood as responses, resistances or manoeuvres
implicated in a field of competing discourses.

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1 In another recent example of a book-length study of creativity aimed at a mass market, *Probing the
Creative Mind: Discovering the Genius Within* by Thomas Ward and others, the authors are at pains to
emphasise that "it is in our nature to be inventive," (4) that all of us possess "latent creative potential"
(8) and that "the mind of every reader of this book is much more similar to Einstein's than to that of
the most creative member of the most creative nonhuman species" (12). Not only is creativity thus
granted a presence as an innate attribute, but there is the democratic claim that all of us can be trained
"to produce good, creative ideas" (15). From here the book becomes a manual of instruction in how to
produce these often entrepreneurial and commercially profitable ideas.
In the discussion of the relation between alcohol and writing, for instance, I propose that this can be understood as an ambivalent response to new modernist (psychoanalytically inspired) understandings of creativity. After discussing psychoanalytic appropriations of creativity, I am interested in following the strategies by which some artists reclaimed or reinvented creativity. I will argue that Surrealism is a discourse constrained by psychoanalytic principles and at the same time subversive of them. Surrealism can be understood as a discourse made possible—and made necessary—by its relation to psychoanalysis.

I will also be dealing with more contemporary discourses on creativity by examining the inclusion of creative writing in tertiary education courses. How might this development alter or throw new light upon questions of originality and authorship? Are the issues and controversies sparked by the meeting of institutional education and the practice of creative writing distinctive, or do they replicate similar, though perhaps more muted contests over the progress of other humanities disciplines? Does an institutionalised relation between creativity and education tend towards elimination of those anarchic, scatological, unpredictable styles of "unconscious" creativity as they were pursued through Surrealism and other discourses influenced by psychoanalysis?

Through an exploration of the notion of authorship I aim to develop an understanding of creative writing as a practice which offers opportunities to write and create outside the established forms of literature.

The separate sections of the thesis do not develop as a strictly chronological series. They operate as cumulative demonstrations of how this particular discussion of creativity can be developed. My aim has been to write each section as an independent discussion while allowing each section to draw upon and throw light upon the others.

The writing of this thesis takes place, as it were, from inside rather than outside. My point of view and my experience is largely that of a creative writer—a novelist and poet. A significant part of my income as a writer has been earned by teaching creative writing. My interest in discourses over creativity thus arises from an involvement in literature as both student-scholar and writer-teacher. In acknowledgement of the ways these experiences inform my questioning, and in acknowledgement of the conventionality of boundaries between objective/subjective academic/creative writing, I have not resisted interweaving stories with analysis or personal experience with critical discussion.

I hope that, rather than simply being written from the inside this work is also written from the side-lines. Simone de Beauvoir has made the point that effectively creative or even descriptive writing cannot be achieved if a writer is "totally immersed in a situation" ("Women and Creativity" 27). She suggests, "A soldier in the midst of fighting cannot describe the battle. But equally, if totally alien to a situation, you cannot write about it either. If somebody were to try to provide an account of a battle without
having seen one, the result would be awful" (27). Her observation provides a justification for the inclusion of my own experiences in the following descriptions of the battlefield, but equally these remarks indicate how important it is for the writing that I stand to the side of my selves, and to the side of the contests between discourses.

The reader will be the best judge of whether I have achieved this shifting and superimposing of positions in the following text which has become a kind of palimpsest.
I begin with a particular set of emphases. Among these are my understandings of the terms discourse and power.

By the term discourse I mean to indicate broadly what we might include under descriptions of a discipline or a school of thought or a practice. A discipline can be understood in three senses:

(a) as a scholarly or scientific pursuit,
(b) as a disciplinary institution such as a prison, a school, university, hospital, the welfare system or a religious order, and
(c) as a trade, craft or sport which requires an apprenticeship. This includes artistic pursuits which involve learning and practising craft skills, and a participation in the history of that pursuit (whether this be traditionalist or revolutionary participation).

In each of these senses each discipline produces partly shared and partly distinctive bodies of knowledge. One reason for speaking of discourses instead of disciplines is to emphasise the crucial and central functions of exchanges between disciplines or schools of thought and practice. They are in conversation and intercourse with each other. They hive off from each other, borrow (or appropriate) concepts, terms, practices from each other; they dispute the status of their particular truths and the worth of their practices. To speak of discourses is to emphasise their impurity, and their reliance for their very existences on the tensions and opportunities generated in contact with each other.

Gilles Deleuze provides an example of these tensions, appropriations, shifting boundaries and rhetorical gambits when, as a philosopher, he reflects on the current state of philosophy:

"The function of philosophy, still thoroughly relevant, is to create concepts. Nobody else can take over that function. Philosophy has of course always had its rivals, from Plato's "rivals" through to Zarathustra's clown. These days, information technology, communications and advertising are taking over the words "concept" and "creative," and these "conceptualists" constitute an arrogant breed that reveals the activity of selling to be capitalism's supreme thought, the cogito of the marketplace. Philosophy feels small and lonely confronting such forces, but the only way it's going to die is by choking with laughter." (Negotiations 136)

In August 1996 the advertising agency DDB Needham installed a poster on one of Melbourne's most prominent central city billboards on the Franklin Street corner at the North end of Swanston Street. Daringly there is no graphic—the poster is one sentence framed within quotation marks:

"Properly practised creativity can make one ad do the work of ten."
The philosophical pretensions of this statement, which seems to belong more properly in a manual for copywriters, resonates with Deleuze's observation and serves as a local example of how small, lonely and amused the largely unread and never-to-be-commercially-successful creative writer might feel when confronted by such forceful marketplace rhetoric.

Thus my interest in discourse does not indicate an interest in speech-act theory or linguistic analysis, nor in a sociological analysis of each discourse—but an interest in discussions of the tensions within and between discourses which constrain and enable discursive work to take place.

By the term "discursive work" in the above sentence I mean to indicate that all of the practices of a discourse can be regarded as "statements" to use Foucault's term (Archeology of Knowledge 80-82). Sculpture, photographs, meeting schedules, the furnishings in clinical consulting rooms, publishing contracts, texts of poems, prefaces (including notes on terms), paintings, exchanges between participants in a creative writing workshop, signatures—each can be understood as a manifestation of a discourse's rules for legitimating knowledge or for granting value to acts. The image of Salvador Dali signing nearly a thousand sheets of blank art paper in an hour might seem meaningless, mad, degenerate or even criminal to another artist but it might make supreme sense to an accountant who knows the monetary value of the signature; it might seem an act of inspired uncommonly subversive common sense to another Surrealist as it exposes and exploits the bizarre overvaluation of one convention for the making of Fine Art—the presence of a Master's signature.

All exchanges are in some way unequal. When I make my interest the tensions and contests between and within discourses I am regarding them in terms of power relations. In resisting each other, borrowing from each other, even in forming alliances these discourses are engaging in relations of power, that is of (a shifting) inequality. It is power in this sense that I am exploring in the following work. I am not meaning to indicate creativity's involvement in formal political structures, or the effects of power on creativity. Power in this sense can work in several directions at once, often unseen and often unintended in its effects. Again, this notion is influenced by Foucault's discussions of power as productive networks. In response to Foucault's approach to questions of power "dispersed into events," Simon During has used the image of judo wrestling: "Where power is dispersed it still operates against resistance, it works at specific times in specific places on subjects who return its pressure. And, just as in judo one's opponent's resistance is turned to one's advantage (a possibility that permits feints and ruses), the pressure back in power-relations rapidly crosses and re-crosses sides" (Foucault and Literature 134).
By drawing attention to the play of power within and between discourses I aim to open a discussion of specific events which will bring to notice elements which might otherwise remain unnoticed, silenced or concealed in favour of histories which argue for progressive, epochal or ideologically driven narratives.
1. Mapping the Territory

Endings
In March 1995 I was asked to talk to a group of Creative Writing students at Victoria University of Technology at St Albans, an outer suburb of Melbourne. I decided to travel there by bicycle from Brunswick because the weather was fine. Before leaving I checked a street directory and planned my route. As a precaution, knowing that my memory for details on a map are not reliable, I tore out the page with the last part of my journey on it and put this in my shirt pocket. Probably I would not need to use it, but having it there in my pocket would give me the feeling that I couldn't really get lost.

When I was less than halfway there, riding along Maribyrnong Road, I began to think that perhaps I hadn't planned out the most direct route. Not yet in the area mapped on the page in my pocket, I stopped at a service station and asked the attendant if I could look in one of their unsold directories. The directory I looked at was new, with more detail than my thirteen-year-old one at home. It showed a footbridge across the Maribyrnong and a bicycle track just beyond the turn-off I had been planning to take. From the map it looked as if I could ride down onto the footbridge, cross the river and take the bicycle track along the other bank until it met with a road running almost directly onto the St Albans railway line close to the university. I had plenty of time and the prospect of a ride beside a river was more attractive than my planned route along the Ballarat highway with its semi-trailers and peak-hour traffic.

I took in as much of the detail on the map as possible, noting the name of the street running down to the bridge, the place where I should leave the bicycle track, the name of the street I should find when I rejoined the world of traffic. It looked simple enough, and it was the sort of route I am fond of taking on my bicycle when I travel the parks and bicycle paths of the inner suburbs. The first problem I encountered was that at the end of A'Hern Street, where I should have been able to go onto the footbridge, there was a cliff-like fall covered in low scrub, grass, weeds and paddock fencing. I turned around and went back to the next side street but it ended in a neat cul-de-sac and a children's playground. The playground had a large sign installed at the front, detailing the names of organisations which had contributed to the cost of building its equipment. The play equipment was purchased with donations amounting to $15,000. While I read the sign a dog barked from one of the back yards next to the park. The street seemed to be one where strangers would be noticed and reported to police. I went down to the back of the playground to see if there was a track or steps to the river and bridge. But
my way was blocked by the same scrub and paddock fencing. The dog was barking loudly now. I returned along Maribyrnong Road to the main bridge over the river and found that I could get onto a dirt track under that bridge by lifting my bike over a fence. This track was wide and smooth, gliding along beside the grassy banks of the river. One of my fantasies is to take a canoe along this river and explore it, leisurely, back up towards its source and then down as far as the ships docked on the edge of Port Phillip Bay. As I rode beside the river part of me was there on the river in a boat, watching the cyclist push past, enjoying not having any particular destination. The part of me still on the bicycle began to resent having a destination and a time by which I had to be there.

The footbridge, I discovered, was blocked to all but pedestrians by a series of complicated steel poles. I considered abandoning the new route then, but I still had enough time to go this way, and besides, once across the river I could relax along the scenic bike track on the other side. I lifted my bike across the barriers at both ends.

On the other side the track which had been marked with the simple symbol of a bicycle in the street directory ran straight up a steep hillside and was scoured by gutters of erosion. I pushed the bike up the rise and then followed the track as it cut back towards the river, riding my bike in a braking wobble, dangerously slipping on the edges of washed-away sections of the track. By now I knew that if I went back I would almost certainly be late. But if I went on this way there was some danger of becoming lost, for if the map had been misleading in indicating that this was a bicycle track it might have been mistaken in even suggesting that the track did continue for the distance marked on the map. To me the track looked like petering out or coming to a halt where it might be washed away completely. When I saw up ahead a hillside of closely mown grass which seemed to rise to a suburban street, I decided to leave the track. The hillside was steep but I could push the bike up onto the street above me. When I reached the street I rode in what I hoped was the right direction, but knowing from experience that this inner conviction of a right direction can be hopelessly wrong. After passing some street signs which didn't fit with anything I had seen on either of the directories I turned into a road with heavier traffic. The next intersection looked vaguely familiar. It was the Ballarat highway. I was back at the very road I had intended to avoid by taking my alternative bike path. With some confusion and relief I pedalled as hard as I could to get to the university on time to talk to a class of Creative Writing students.

There were about twenty five students in a small mauve room inside a large mauve building. After reading aloud some poems and part of a story I asked what aspects of creative writing they would like to talk about. They were silent. I asked if any of them were writing poems. None of them admitted to this. They agreed that all of them were tackling short stories. I picked up a whiteboard marker and asked them again if there was anything about creative writing that they would like to discuss. "Endings," one
Mapping the Territory

student said. She told me I had once rejected a story of hers that she sent to a magazine I was editing. In my rejection note I had asked her why she had ended the story at the point she had chosen. She seemed to have some continuing resentment, or perhaps it was puzzlement over my reason for rejecting her story. I wrote "Endings" on the whiteboard and asked if there were any other issues they wanted to address in the next two hours. The next issue that was important to them was "Beginnings."

What they wanted, it occurred to me, was a map. They wanted to be able to set out on a route clearly marked all the way to its destination. All I could tell them, truthfully, was that the map in my pocket had been no more than a comforting but useless presence on my way to their classroom, and the maps I had consulted had been misleading approximations of the territory I had cycled and climbed through. But all the same it was the map of the bridge and the neat little track indicated by a dotted blue line that had encouraged me to head out into the weedy back blocks of Keilor where I had longed for a day's travelling without destination, and where I had almost got myself lost. In fact, when I arrived at the edge of the Ballarat highway I had realised that I had been lost for a time in the streets above the river and the track. Were they asking for beginnings and endings because this is what concerns new writers when they tackle their first short stories? Or were they asking for this because inside that mauve building they are students at a university who must learn something—something that can be set down and recognised as knowledge? What kinds of anxiety, and what kinds of understandings of creativity lay behind their requests for beginnings and endings? Were their requests dictated by an understanding that this particular creative activity constitutes a course they must pass by producing a certain number of 'completed' words?

For me it is still startling and strange to stand in a room with 25 students who have declared they want to be creative writers and can even name particular problems of their craft such as the problems of beginnings and endings. When I began to write I knew no one who thought of themselves as a writer. After ten years of writing I had met only one other person who called himself a writer. It did not occur to me to ask questions about how to begin or how to end a piece of writing. I wrote, blindly, from within the current of enthusiasm created in me by the books I had been reading. The writing itself seemed to be the point of it and the great pleasure of it—I had no place to get to by a certain time or within a certain number of words. The river took me. I suppose my map, if I had a map, was whatever book I had most recently been reading; but imagine trying to find your way along a bicycle path at the back of Keilor with a map of Dickens's London or Dostoevsky's Russian minds in your back pack.

In reflecting on this I am not wanting to pit my experience against these students' experiences in order to claim that my way of learning was more truly creative. It is to see that the activity we call creative, that kind of writing we call creative, can be
experienced and used very differently in different contexts, and that it carries within it certain contradictions.

The notion of creativity throws up a number of oppositions which highlight the way its presence shifts under our gaze or slips through our fingers or the way it takes us by surprise despite and because of our maps. Spontaneity/planning, original/copy, art/craft, new/old, uncanny/familiar, play/work, self-expression/chance, Dionysian/Platonic, personal/impersonal, are only some of the hierarchies and oppositions that immediately come into play when we approach a creative task (or approach a task creatively).

The students desired to write something which would be acknowledged as creative. What they write must then be new and original, but at the same time it must be a copy, that is a repetition of some formula of beginnings and endings—it must be recognisably creative. In 1920 at the Festival Dada in Paris, Breton wore a sandwich board which advertised Francis Picabia's Far-Sighted Manifesto: "In order for you to like something it is necessary for you to have seen and understood it a long time ago, you bunch of idiots" (Altshuler 119). Are we idiots because we mistake our recognition of something creative for an "original," or have we excluded the possibility of recognising anything truly original as long as we insist (idiotically) on admiring only copies of aesthetic formulae already established? Whether one or both meanings resonate in Picabia's manifesto it points to elements suppressed by the social, cultural and institutional value given to originality and creativity: the original, the creative, is fundamentally based upon the copy, the already-mapped-out grid. In *S/Z* Roland Barthes makes the point that realist writers do not even copy from an original nature. Their work is a copy of a copy. He writes, "... realism consists not in copying the real but in copying a (depicted) copy ... through secondary mimesis [realism] copies what is already a copy" (55). In seeking guidance on beginnings and endings creative writing students do not look to nature or 'life' for clues, but to other short stories, and other writers who have managed the trick of starting then stopping passages of writing.

During the week that I spoke to the students they were required to read Peter Høeg's novel, *Miss Smilla's Feeling for Snow*. It is a mystery crime thriller, a novel modelled on a genre which has certain conventions. Briefly the elements of the genre might be summed up as follows: the story begins with a violent episode, the hero/heroine becomes involved against her will, and proves through the course of the book that she has remarkable powers of deduction, extreme bravery and resilience in the face of thuggery, and finally there is an ending which unravels the book's mysteries. For most of its passage the novel does satisfy the reader on these scores, then towards the end

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2 I am indebted to Rosalind Krauss's essay, "The Originality of the Avant-Garde" for raising this issue of the relations between originals and copies in art (*The Originality of the Avant-Garde* 151-170).
when some of the mystery has been dispelled, but only by raising further mysteries and questions, the book finishes abruptly:

Tell us, they'll come and say to me. So we may understand and close the case. They're wrong. It's only what you do not understand that you can come to a conclusion about. There will be no conclusion. (410)

At the end, the conventions (those agreements with the reader) are broken teasingly. Taking Barthes' analogy of the narrative in such novels as corporeal striptease, our hope of a final uncovering has been denied (Pleasure 10). In Freud's terms the Oedipal desire to uncover (to shame) the father has been both thwarted and protected. The narrative is exposed as a game which must always mimic something that is beside the point. What was it I wanted to know at the end of this book anyway? It was something I would have forgotten (repressed) again almost immediately. Høeg's ending, like Picabia's manifesto, directs us back to our desires and the repressions so necessary to them. What Rosalind Krauss calls the "originality-effect" is dependent on a repression of the knowledge of the role of the copy in producing any "original" work (177).

To take another of the oppositions—spontaneity/planning—is to see again how one of these terms has been suppressed in the promotion of a certain image and value connected with creativity. Originality was confirmed as an ultimate value in art with the rise of the modern avant-garde, and its earliest art movement, Impressionism, is named for the quality of spontaneous 'impressions' in the paintings of this period.3 Monet became perhaps the most famous Impressionist. It would be a mistake, however, to consider his work was accomplished simply with spontaneity. It was in fact accomplished in a slow, painstaking manner which resulted in a surface that gave the impression of spontaneous brushstrokes. Famous as the painter of light and natural effects Monet boasted to journalists and critics about the extremes of weather he endured, obscuring the fact that he worked obsessively on his canvases in the warmth of his studio, sometimes unable to finish a painting for several years (House 9-26, Brophy Overland 17-20). He named his technique "instantaneity," and its far from instant production is described by Rosalind Krauss in the following manner:

The sketchlike mark, which functioned as the sign of spontaneity, had to be prepared for through the utmost calculation, and in this sense spontaneity was the most fakable of significeds. Through layers of underpainting by which Monet developed the thick corrugations of what Robert Herbert calls his texture-strokes, Monet patiently laid the mesh of rough encrustation and directional swaths that would signify speed of execution, and from this speed, mark both the singularity of the perceptual moment and uniqueness of the empirical array. On top of this constructed "instant," thin, careful washes of pigment establish the actual relations of color. Needless to say, these operations took—with the necessary drying time—many days to perform but the illusion of spontaneity—the burst of an instantaneous and originary act—is the unshakable result.

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3 Public debate over originality as a key to recognising artistic achievement can be traced back to Edward Young's iconoclastic work of 1759, Conjectures on Original Composition. Harold Forster has called it a "manifesto of Romanticism" (Edward Young 325).
To see how calculation is crucial to Monet's achievement of a spontaneous effect is not to expose him as a fraud, but to see again that creativity is never simple, that it operates with and through signs that have social, cultural and historical values. It operates as a language which is as compromised and contradictory as any utterance constrained and generated in the autobiographical moment of a self-justifying "I". It operates as a strategy, subtle or crude, in manoeuvres over influence, significance and ownership. Signs of spontaneity give Jack Kerouac's quintessential beat novel, *On The Road*, its particular sheen and its particular place as a work of modern prose. Kerouac took three weeks to write the novel in 1950, but then it was seven years in the rewriting (Gifford and Lee, also Kerouac 187, 326, 593-4).

To seek the codes of beginnings and endings as if they are natural or necessary to living or to writing is to bring, nevertheless, certain tastes, certain preferred rhythms, certain assumptions to creativity. In 1759 Edward Young commented elegantly and mournfully on how thoroughly enmeshed we become in our own cultural time: "Born originals," he wrote, "how comes it to pass that we die copies?" (42). In 1818 Jane Austen recognised manifestations of this process in enthusiasm among the cognoscenti for Gothic or Romantic effects. In *Northanger Abbey*, she has Catherine and the Tilneys take a walk around Beechen Cliff above Bath:

> They [the Tilneys] were viewing the country with the eyes of persons accustomed to drawing, and decided on its capability of being formed into pictures, with all the eagerness of real taste. Here Catherine was quite lost ... It seemed as if a good view were no longer to be taken from the top of an high hill, and that a clear blue sky was no longer proof of a fine day ... She confessed and lamented her want of knowledge ... and a lecture on the picturesque immediately followed, in which his instructions were so clear that she soon began to see beauty in every thing admired by him, and her attention was so earnest, that he became perfectly satisfied of her having a great deal of natural taste. He talked of fore-grounds, distances, and second distances—side-screens and perspectives—lights and shades— and Catherine was so hopeful a scholar, that when they gained the top of Beechen Cliff, she voluntarily rejected the whole city of Bath, as unworthy to make a part of a landscape. (127)

The first assumption is of course that the creative or aesthetic act finds its origins and inspirations in life or nature, and the second, as Austen makes clear, is to have a pre-existing set of aesthetic rules confirmed by what is "discovered" in nature. The Tilneys might be more ridiculous than Catherine, but not because they are less natural than her. The difference between them is that Catherine's code of understanding the picturesque is a simple one while theirs is elaborate and modern. Both imagine they learned their codes by looking at nature.

While writing creatively might seem to promise an open-ended and unpredictable experience, the anxiety over beginnings and endings alerts us to the presence of maps

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4 Monet also played interestingly with the notion of the original and the copy by working on up to one hundred canvases of the same landscape subject at once (House 25).
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(in the forms of assumptions, rules, craft or techniques). Creativity is always an act already mapped-out, already begun in imitation.

The modernist art of ready-mades and found objects, and the postmodern art of quotation do not constitute sacrilege or even revolutions against art, but rather they make explicit the shadow-side of creativity—its artificiality, we might say, or its presence as a repetition of copies even before it is "created."

Yet creativity can still be approached as a moment of anxiety and excitement because it holds out the possibility of throwing up the unknown and the unexpected. Both the writer and the reader want to be surprised by an unpredicted (though not, in hindsight, unpredictable) outcome. This activity must always find itself in some danger—for a degree of control must be relinquished if the surprises are to come. Not only does creative writing produce novels, but the history of the novel risks upheavals and unexpected developments under the influence of creative writing. When creative writing is established in university humanities courses, these institutions of education must then accommodate an activity which, while it wants to be assessed, still insists on a freedom to set its own criteria for success.

The introduction of Creative Writing courses to Australian universities in the past fifteen years might seem to be a fundamental challenge to their nature as institutions of strictly framed scholarship and research. What meaning will a doctorate have if it can be earned by writing a crime novel or a stream-of-consciousness manuscript? How might the discourse of research and academia be altered by this? At the same time the universities' absorption of creative writing might seem to be a form of control and distortion over acts of creativity. How creative can a student writer or an artist be who must achieve a certain score out of one hundred? There is no doubt that tensions and contradictions are present in this process, but whether they are new tensions and contradictions or an exposure to processes which have been repressed or ignored as long as creativity avoided these institutions is not clear. The students at Victoria University were correct—writers must face the question of finding an ending each time they write. But is this any different for the writer of an exploratory essay? The creative writing students seemed to experience this problem as a mysterious one, as a daunting and personally challenging task—as something particular to creative writing. I wanted to see it as something typical in an experience of a journey.

On the way home from talking with the Creative Writing students I kept to the main roads I knew well. Large trucks came dangerously close to the bicycle and one car with a trailer seemed to swerve deliberately towards me so that I had to move into the gutter to avoid it. At all times I knew where I was, and I knew what route was ahead, but I felt I was living too dangerously. I kept in my mind the certainty that I would return to that bicycle track by the river one day when I have nowhere in particular to go.
How thoroughly the progress of the following discussions need to be mapped out here at the beginning must remain uncertain. A map might be a comfort, but it must always be exposed as misleading once the journey has been undertaken. Neither the main road nor the bicycle track was as simple as the maps promised. And in any case it was not the maps which advised me on what route to take. They multiplied my choices. The following discussion will, as it were, take the form of a walk (or ride) through the landscape already mapped out briefly in the preface, a landscape with many possible pathways through it or across it. In the children's rhyme of the bear hunt ("We're going on a bear hunt/We're going to catch a big one ...") the story does not find its point or its end with the discovery of the bear, for it is the family's physical experience of a landscape which is celebrated in the rhyme, and it is their knowledge of this landscape which saves them from the foolishness of a too emphatically final ending. In the following sections of this work I do not seek conclusive endings or discoveries so much as a way of discussing—a way of moving through this particular landscape: How might a discussion of creativity develop, given the assumptions and emphases outlined in the preface?

One place of beginning is with the writer. Embedded in the oppositions personal/impersonal, original/copy, conscious/unconscious is the now-disputed presence of the author as originator or creator. In The Order of Things, Foucault considered the notion of the personal originator: "But this thin surface of the original ... is populated entirely by those complex mediations formed and laid down as sediment in their own history by labor, life and language so that ... what man is reviving without knowing it, is all the intermediaries of a time that governs him almost to infinity" (335). Is this depiction of the author as a thin (though nevertheless geological) surface

5 "We're going on a bear hunt. We're going to catch a big one. What a beautiful day! We're not scared. Uh-uh! Grass! Long wavy grass. We can't go over it. We can't go under it. Oh no! We've got to go through it! Swishy swashy! Swishy swashy! Swishy swashy!" The poem takes the children similarly through a river (splash splosh), mud (squelch squerch), a forest (stumble trip), a snowstorm (hoo woo) and into a cave where they discover the bear which chases them back through the landscape in reverse order (Michael Rosen 1989).

6 This mediated self, constructed out of history or out of language, has become either a commonplace in literary discussions, or the site of a battleground between humanists and post-humanists. In his essay on the textual self, Chris Wallace-Crabbe seems to assent to the self-evident constructedness of any self: "In the long, circuitous haul we are all—readers, writers or just plain lives—determined by a greater host of things than we can ever put a name to; and since we cannot put all the names to them we behave as though we had free will" (Falling 117). Here Wallace-Crabbe gestures towards a human infiniteness played out in the same sorts of mediations that so struck Foucault, but for Wallace-Crabbe their meaning falls away, or falls back into the personal. More prosaically Ian Hunter pursues a baldly Foucauldian line in an essay debating recent changes in teaching the humanities, "The modern humanities are inseparable from a technology of ethical formation aimed at producing the self-regulating and self-developing citizen" (444). In 1996 the reviewer and editor, Peter Craven took English professor, Simon During to task for trotting out this Foucauldian claim in a discussion of
or as a mere intermediary in a chain of intermediaries a reduction of the sweaty reality of the writing self or is it a bold unrighting of the vessel of the self so charmingly and convincingly constructed by the self-expressing author? Foucault's statement can be read as an attack on any claim to spontaneity or originality—and yet, in the striking phrase, "thin surface of the original," and in Foucault's biblical reminder of individual mortality within an endlessly revivifying humanity it is difficult not to respond to the peculiar movement of his vision (from the minute to the infinite) and the oddly poetic force of his phrasing. Something fails within the claims of the sentences even as their force and power impress themselves on us. Does the writing hint at the kind of resistance the poet and academic, Chris Wallace-Crabbe recognises in his own text-thin figure as he moves between "theory" and "literature":

In the last gasp, in the run home, I find that theory, however bracing, collapses. For what I want in and from literature is mystery: the withheld, the unexplained, the plangent, whose secret name is Death. And whatever it is that dances on the thin roof of Death's house. (Falling126)

Foucault's thin surface of the original becomes in his short passage a layered sediment of such complexity that it approaches infinity. He might not dance upon this thin surface but he does make of its paucity something mysteriously myriad. The images seem to move against the austerity of the insight offered. What kind of author is this?

By considering Foucault's essay, "What Is an Author?" in the following section, perhaps we can begin to see how both Foucault and his kind of author exist and write, how subjectivity and creativity might function in relation to each other—and how in his essay the function of Foucault as author uncannily replicates the situation of the creative author as he describes it.

What is A Foucault?

In its most accessible form, Michel Foucault's essay, "What Is an Author?" appears in The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow and published by Pantheon in 1984. This is the cheap, mass-produced paperback which most undergraduates and teachers use to study Foucault's influential essay. In 1996 it is available in the Penguin reprint of 1991. The acknowledgements at the front of the book express gratitude for permission to reprint this essay from Josué V. Harari's translation published in Textual Strategies by Methuen in 1979. Turning to Harari's translation, it is clear that Rabinow's text is almost a reprinted version of the Harari version. One brief footnote referring the reader
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to *The Order of Things* and one lengthy footnote attempting to elucidate the particular relationship Freud and Marx (as "authors") have to their texts have been dropped by Rabinow. Both these footnotes were apparently added by Harari, so they do not invalidate Rabinow's straightforward claim to have reprinted Foucault's text from Harari's translation. In the introduction to *Textual Strategies*, however, Harari remarks that he is grateful to Deleuze and Foucault for "giving me a free hand to edit their texts with an American readership in mind" (Harari 13). This raises an immediate issue: how different is this text then from the one that Foucault wrote, or at least from the version that Harari has edited with a free hand for American readers?

Harari acknowledges that there is another earlier translation of this essay in the book, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, edited and translated by Donald Bouchard and published in 1977. Bouchard's translation begins with a bibliographical footnote explaining that the essay was first delivered as a lecture in February 1969 and soon afterwards published as a journal article. The original work included introductory remarks from Jean Wahl, Foucault's response and a debate that followed the lecture. This additional material is not presented in Bouchard's translation. But even without this, there is more in Bouchard's version of the text than in Harari/Rabinow's. There are, for instance, two and a half pages of discussion before we reach the Harari/Rabinow opening sentence: "The coming into being of the notion of "author" constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, and the sciences" (Rabinow 101). In Bouchard's translation Foucault explains that the lecture is both a reply to criticisms of his previous book, *the Order of Things*, and an introduction to his next book, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. When we do find the phrases of the opening sentence to the Harari/Rabinow version, we find that this much-quoted sentence might not have been composed by Foucault at all. The sentence appears to be a construction of phrases lifted from several places and re-arranged to say, presumably, what Foucault was meaning to say. Not quite forgery, not quite plagiarism, not quite invention, not quite paraphrase, and neither translation nor copying, it is an editorialised sentence which is passed off as simply Foucault's opening move by the time the essay appears in Rabinow's extremely useful *Reader*.

Acknowledging that the French text and its translation by Bouchard are different from his version, Harari later describes the essay that appears in his anthology as "the second version of an essay which was published, under the same title, in the Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie " (Harari 43). Apart from the problem that this is really the third version, and the implication that this version supercedes previously published ones, it is unclear here whether the revision was produced as a result of Harari's free hand in editing or as a result of rewriting by Foucault, or as a combination of both processes. If there is a "second version" of the essay, is it written in French and
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is Harari's text a translation of it? It appears that there is no revised essay in French, only this translation of it, freely edited. The hold of the author on the text here becomes tenuous and seems to slip.

In raising a question about the authenticity of this essay's authorship, I am coming dangerously close to being faced with Beckett's objection, "What matter who's speaking?"7

Wanting to avoid the tiresome question of who is the real author of any text, Foucault proposes in this essay that an author is not so much an origin as a function of discourse. The author is constructed by a set of interpretative manoeuvres or procedures which are historically specific. The author is a strategy in the play of power relations over a text. So, rather than seek the real author of "What Is an Author?" I turn my attention to the manoeuvres which construct the Foucault of this essay, and as a consequence help to construct not only the readers but the meanings that are both delivered and withheld here.

With the fragility of Foucault's authorship in relation to this essay uncovered, the presence of A Foucault in the editing and publishing strategies comes more sharply into focus. The Foucault Reader is advertising itself, via its title, as the place where readers will meet the author—Foucault himself. On the cover of my 1986 Peregrine edition a photograph of Foucault looks straight out at the reader as if the man is about to speak: open the book and you will open my mouth. The extracts are presented, as I have noted, straightforwardly, without evidence of editorialising. What does this mean for the author-function in the case of this essay which begins to draw out a discourse about the author-function? As we have seen, the essay that we read in Rabinow's Reader has been edited with an American readership in mind. It has been stripped of both the formal and informal elements that would reveal it as a lecture and a discussion, a stopping-place along a chain of thought, a statement asking for responses, something open to question, an event in time. As well as this, Foucault's decision (at his lecture in February 1969) to introduce the question in a specific historical context, as part of his own responses to criticism and as one of his steps towards a new book, is obscured by the knowledgeable and authoritative rhetoric of the opening sentence as it now appears. The work as it appears in Rabinow takes on the tone and structure of a traditional essay. Despite the immediate emphasis on events as historically specific, the tone of voice in the first paragraph is impersonal and timeless in the accepted fashion of the essay writer as source of wisdom and knowledge. We are given facts rather than responses or arguments in a discussion. Perhaps Harari has decided that American readers need (or will only accept?) the relatively uncluttered and traditionally didactic form of the essay—and the particular Foucault that such writing constructs.

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7 Foucault quotes this statement in his essay. It is taken from Beckett's Texts for Nothing (16).
And who is this Foucault who is preferred for American readers? Some variations between the two translations might help us understand. Towards the end of the essay there is far more in the Harari/Rabinow version than in the Bouchard version—about one and a half pages more. Considering the importance of concluding statements in essays it seems again that a decision has been made about how to present Foucault, or which Foucault to present as FOUCAULT. The Foucault presented in the Harari/Rabinow version's concluding remarks can make statements such as, "... we must entirely reverse the traditional idea of the author ... the author is an ideological product ... " (Harari 159). In Bouchard's version no such rallying conclusions are present, and when, at the very end, the same sentence seems to be translated, the rhetoric and meaning are importantly different in the two versions:

Harari/Rabinow:8

Although, since the eighteenth century, the author has played the role of the regulator of the fictive, a role quite characteristic of our era of industrial and bourgeois society, of individualism and private property, still, given the historical modifications that are taking place, it does not seem necessary that the author-function remain constant in form, complexity, and even in existence. I think that, as our society changes, at the very moment when it is in the process of changing, the author-function will disappear, and in such a manner that fiction and its polysemic texts will once again function according to another mode, but still with a system of constraint—one which will no longer be the author, but which will have to be determined or, perhaps, experienced. (159-60)

Bouchard:

The author—or what I have called the 'author-function'—is undoubtedly only one of the possible specifications of the subject and, considering past historical transformations, it appears that the form, the complexity, and even the existence of this function are far from immutable. We can easily imagine a culture where discourse would circulate without any need for an author. (138)

The teasing, philosophical, open-ended "We can easily imagine," is a very different phrase to the political, prophetic and anti-bourgeois call for a revolution of sorts in fiction production. Is it that Harari considered American readers of such an important thinker needed an impressive conclusion calling for revolution rather than one of hints and possibilities? Is the appeal to an American readership as the reason for the editing of the essay a rationalisation under which Harari manages to paraphrase, summarise or extrapolate Foucault in a direction he would like to see him go? Aware of the differences between his version and Bouchard's, and the need for an explanation, Harari says that his version of Foucault's essay "reveals the shift from his [Foucault's]

8 Remembering that Harari claims to be translating and editing a "second" version of this essay, and that in the French journal article this paragraph does not have the force of a conclusion because it is immediately followed by a nine page discussion, the corresponding French passage reads as follows: "L'auteur - ou ce que j'ai essayé de décrire comme la fonction-auteur - n'est sans doute qu'une des spécifications possibles de la fonction-sujet. Spécification possible, ou nécessaire? A voir les modifications historiques qui ont eu lieu, il ne paraît pas indispensable, loin de là, que la fonction-auteur demeure constante dans sa forme, dans sa complexité, et même dans son existence. On peut imaginer une culture où les discours circuleraient et seraient reçus sans que la fonction-auteur apparaîsse jamais" (95).
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former fascination with phenomena of language to his more recent politico-historical work" (Harari 43).

Foucault, the writing subject, endlessly disappears and reappears in the openings created by translation, editing and publication.

In his biography *The Lives of Michel Foucault*, David Macey reports that this lecture was delivered at a time of transition in Foucault's life. He had just taken up an appointment at the new University of Vincennes. He was beginning to move away from artistic-literary circles to increasingly politicised contexts. In January 1969 he had been arrested during a violent occupation of the University of Vincennes, then in February he "reverted to being the philosopher" (Macey 209) and appeared before a distinguished audience to deliver his most celebrated lecture. Macey also observes that at this time there appeared to be a real possibility of revolution or at least civil war in France (210). The splitting of the texts seem to parallel these tensions—not necessarily tensions within the psychology of Foucault, but perhaps tensions in the late 1970s among editors and translators whose loyalties are to one or the other of these possible Foucaults manoeuvring for space in this small essay.

Whose tensions and contradictions are being expressed or exposed when, on the one hand, Foucault states that once authorship was established as a system of property, "the possibility of transgression attached to the act of writing took on, more and more, the form of an imperative peculiar to literature" (Harari 148), while on the other hand, at the end of the essay, the author-function takes an opposite role: "How can one reduce the great peril, the great danger with which fiction threatens our world? The answer is: One can reduce it with the author. The author allows a limitation of the cancerous and dangerous proliferation of significations ... " (Harari 159)?

When the text is presented as an unproblematic product of the author, indeed as an avenue to the author, as it is in the Rabinow Reader, then we have a case of the author's name acting as the authority not only for the text but acting in its own right in such a way that it is almost irrelevant which version of the essay is printed. As long as Foucault's name appears in capitals on the spine and on the cover one important Foucault-effect is achieved. This resembles the discourse of Medieval science (as Foucault characterises it in his essay), where the name of an author can vouch for the importance and authority of whatever will be said within the text (Harari 149). There are, however, important differences. It is not so much that whatever is said under Foucault's name must be believed, but that whatever is said under his name must become the glass through which any future discussions are viewed. The well-informed must first understand, or digest, what is said under his name. This is Foucault as initiator of a discursive practice. His essay is one of the texts to which we return "because it is the work of a particular author, and our returns are conditioned by this knowledge" (Bouchard 136). Foucault notes that one of the features of these returns is
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that "they tend to reinforce the enigmatic link between an author and his works" (Bouchard 136). Whose works? Even to quote the preceding statement from Foucault highlights further ruptures in the text because in Harari's version (omitted from Rabinow's) these words are included in a footnote which the editor claims as his own commentary (Harari 157). What matter whose works?

Discussing Nietzsche, Harari's Foucault warns that a theory of the work does not exist, "and the empirical task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of such a theory" (Harari 144). Is there some naivety here in the expectation that a theory would be an effective strategy for limiting or exposing the relatively unexamined freedom publishers, editors and translators have in deciding what is the work and what isn't? After fame, 'fundamental' authorship, originality and importance have been assigned, the editor-translator-publisher has the power of final choice over which Foucault, or which face of which author will be presented under which words. Against this freedom the reader can only remember that no version will be final, and each version becomes a stepping stone back to less neat, less smooth, less sure, more confusing drafts and texts increasingly in need of the attention of a canny editor.

Author-Function and Creative-Function

These problems over the provenance of Foucault's essay are produced by the text's complicity in an established system of authorship, and the almost impossible demands for an originary authenticity that this can involve.

Foucault presents the title of the lecture as a question about an object: "What Is an Author?" At the beginning he uses the word within quotation marks which remove it again from direct reference to a person by suggesting its immaterial or contingent existence: "To this day, the "author" remains an open question.... " This "author" is also described as a "principle" (Harari 151) or a "function" (Harari 148).

One of the particular roles of this author is to function as a creative origin for literary texts (Harari 150-1). When Foucault makes the claim that authorship is no longer important in scientific documents he is overstating his case in order to make a point about an historic reversal between ways of judging scientific and literary works. Foucault suggests that no longer is a name, that is, a particular authorship, enough to ensure a scientific document's truth, whereas "literary discourses came to be accepted only when endowed with the author-function. We now ask of each poetic or fictional text: from where does it come, who wrote it ... " (Harari 149). Though he is making a historical point, his claim can also be read back into the lecture he is delivering: do we ask, where does this text come from, who wrote it? Are his words authoritative because
they come from FOUCAULT (as his capitalised name appears in the title) or because they explicate historical truths? Does his historical point work, in part, to obscure the function of his name attached to his text? If his name is important to the authority of his text, does this then mean his work is more a work of poetry than one of history or philosophy? Or does his historical distinction collapse under the evidence of its own text? As we have just seen in later publications of this essay, attribution of the text to Foucault seems to be a crucial strategy for securing both a readership and an authority for the essay. Though it was published in Rabinow's 1986 Reader as part of Penguin's "Psychology/Psychiatry" series and reprinted in 1991 as "Social Science," (These categories, assigned by the publisher, appear on the back covers) the book covers and title pages have been designed to give his name the prominence accorded to famous novelists or poets.

If my previous discussion of the source of this essay throws doubt on Foucault being its author in any simple sense, then the legitimacy of the Foucault essay, and its worth as part of Foucault's oeuvre is put in question, despite Penguin's categories placing it well outside literary discourse. One important point to note here is that the author-function does remain effective outside literature, even in so-called scientific or theoretical discourse. To put it another way, no discourse is pure. Not only do discourses exchange and transform concepts, manoeuvre for territory and position, but they adopt, up to a certain point, attributes from other disciplines. The star-system of literary discourse is sometimes duplicated in the social sciences.

But in the social sciences this author-function works differently. In a famous recent case of scientific fraud Cyril Burt was accused of fabricating research assistants, subjects and results to prove his theories relating to inherited abilities. His eminence as a scientist protected his work from a sceptical scrutiny until five years after his death in 1971. Even then a string of academic books, articles and lectures critical of his work did not result in a scandal until the medical reporter for the Sunday Times used these criticisms to announce a scandal. As his name became discredited there was a tendency to dismiss Burt's character along with all of his work. This dismissal extended to those viewpoints, often characterised as politically conservative, associated with his name (e.g. support for selection of school children on the basis of ability, or belief in inherited differences in intelligence). The newspaper and television journalism surrounding the case along with the focus on Burt's devious personality as it was presented in Hearnshaw's 1979 biography indicated the importance of the author-function in this episode. In the case of a more physical science, Dr William McBride became a celebrity as the first medical researcher to link thalidomide to birth defects in the 1960s. At the head of the research organisation known as Foundation 41 he attracted millions of dollars of research money. His name helped ensure that 103 papers from Foundation 41 were published in international journals from 1971 until its forced
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closure in 1992 shortly before Dr McBride was convicted of scientific fraud. As a principal witness in court cases against multinational chemical companies his name was an important professional and scientific asset. McBride has claimed that the drug company Merrell Dow retained a private investigator to find "dirt" on him "in any way possible" (16).

The author-function in these cases works in specific ways. In the case of science there must be a particular kind of author. Cyril Burt or Dr William McBride as authors any respected science journal would publish became unpublishable once some of their work, and by association their characters, were shown to be unreliable. A scientific author cannot afford to become known as an unreliable author. In contrast, literary authors can be dismissed, in fact taken to court, if they can be shown to be uncreative, particularly if they are shown to be derivative to the point of plagiarising other texts. In 1994 lawyers acting on behalf of Stephen Spender threatened a lawsuit against the publishers of David Leavitt's *While England Sleeps*. The claim was that in his novel Leavitt mimicked too closely certain episodes from Spender's autobiography, *World Within World*. The novel has been withdrawn from sale and Leavitt has agreed to rewrite the work. Already there have been criticisms of Leavitt for not being the creative source of his own work. David Stretfield, for example, has written:9

If you pillage someone else's memoir for your source material, it tends to indicate a thinness of literary imagination. Leavitt's aura has been damaged, to state the obvious. *(Sunday Age* 8)

The best-selling novelist, Colleen McCullough, featured on the front page of Melbourne's *Herald* in 1988 when one of her novels, *The Ladies of Missalonghi*, was revealed to be a close copy of *The Blue Castle*, written in 1926 by L. M. Montgomery and still in print (Hill 1). Helen Garner was criticised by commentators and by the reading public for not being creative enough: after *Monkey Grip* was published in 1977, graffiti appeared in Carlton declaring, "Helen Garner distorts reality."10 In a recent case of alleged plagiarism, the prize-winning author Helen Demidenko (who later agreed her surname was in fact Darville) published a short story in the magazine *RePublica*, recounting childhood school episodes. Brian Matthews subsequently published an article which demonstrated that at least three passages in Demidenko's brief story were taken almost verbatim from a factual recollection of his own childhood which had been published three years earlier. Most strangely perhaps, Matthews reports that Demidenko-Darville had contacted him before her story was published, warning him that some passages in it might be similar to something he had written. She claimed an "intermittent capacity for uncontrollably photographic recall of unattributed material." In the phrase *unattributed material* there is the suggestion that the name of an author

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9 See also Susan Wyndham.
10 Private correspondence from the poet, Barbara Giles, to the author.
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decays more rapidly than do the words in a text prepared by that author—and further, there is in Demidenko’s description of herself the picture of an author who is indeed a thin surface-material of previously-absorbed texts. Brian Matthews received this as an "alibi" for the crime committed by a Demidenko who "simply took over my stuff and adapted it, fairly carelessly and very thinly ... " Matthews’ exposé of Demidenko-Darville’s borrowings brought her authorial credibility into question on two counts: not only is her work unoriginal, but she has been uncreative in the way she has used his text. 11

This apparent demand for the fictive—the unreliable, or the invented—in literary texts cannot ever be simple, for the boundary of the fictive must be feverishly and constantly rebuilt against fiction’s tendency to take autobiographical details, diaries, letters, historical documents and other texts into its writing. Fiction’s claims to significance are often based upon the notion that it does offer us the truth—in the forms of supposed moral truths, human truths, timeless truths, or historical truth—even as it asserts its textual world as make-believe and fundamentally unreliable.

There is a difference and a relation between literary authorship and creativity which need to be examined if we are to understand how the discourse surrounding the literary author relates to the phenomenon known as creative writing. We might say that alongside the author-function there is a creative-function operating within literary discourse and within those discourses which might be regarded as borderline.

Just as the author-function allows certain works to be grouped and categorised, this creative-function operates to include and exclude certain works. As we have seen, the author-function in scientific papers cannot afford to be associated with creativity of a certain kind, i.e. with invention of facts. Generally only a limited range of works have been accepted as creative in a way that enhances their worth. It is indicative of this tradition that participants in writing workshops and creative writing courses usually want to write poetry, stories, novels or scripts (for film or stage). They do not seek instruction to write advertising scripts, memorable graffiti, philosophy, pornography or

11 When accusations of plagiarism were levelled at Demidenko-Darville’s prize-winning novel The Hand the Paper, her publisher Allen and Unwin sought the advice of lawyers and a "post-modern expert" who declared that those passages, phrases, sentences and images in the novel which were appropriated from other works were not only examples of an "absolutely normal" post-modern literary practice in a "self-conscious novelistic tradition," but that this practice has a venerable history stretching back to figures such as Dickens and Shakespeare. This defence which pleads the book is both respectably traditional and respectably post-modern might smack of intellectual dishonesty (and indeed Louise Carbin reported in The Age that Michael Heyward made this accusation during Melbourne’s 1995 Writers Festival), but nevertheless it does bring to light the often hidden instability of the notion of an author as an original creator. Original authorship is a claim which must be constantly defended as a seeming ocean of past texts threatens to engulf the present. The sense of an enormous and myriad literary past seems to add weight to post-modern claims that the present is no more than a recycling or layering of past texts and past discourses. The individual author who resists this tide (of opinion/of the past) can seem quixotic. On the other hand the exploitation of past works by a writer such as Demidenko-Darville can appear to render the insights and practices of post-modernism ethically and artistically empty. (See Jopson 1, Jopson 5, Jopson 3, Fagan 3, Gibson 3, Morgan 19)
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letters, or for that matter essays. These forms have not generally carried status as creative work.

It is interesting that the letters of established authors can be published and recognised retrospectively as part of a creative *oeuvre*. Letters have not always been regarded as legitimate examples of a public writer's work or creativity. Ian Hamilton (51-3) has recounted the episode of Curll's publishing an unauthorised printing of some of Pope's private letters in 1726. Pope was outraged, but at the same time he noted that the book was an unexpected success. Curll subsequently advertised that he was willing to purchase more letters from anyone willing to sell them. Pope asked friends to return to him any letters they might have kept. He revised, polished and re-dated some of the letters for he could see how central they might be to reconstructing his public persona. Through an intermediary Pope arranged for Curll to purchase these doctored letters as an illegal coup. When Curll published the letters Pope was then free to publish them himself in a competing authorised edition without being accused of vanity, or being met with disbelief in the face of the prescient and humane Pope of the letters. Letters thus may not only be subjected to the kind of rewriting common in the production of creative texts, but as evidence of the creative writer's personality they can project an image back into the other texts—in this case, Pope's poems—which can then be reconsidered in the light of the letters (now established as an essential element in an *oeuvre*). This is not a simple shift, for it is complicated by the sleights of hand leading to the ambiguous relations such letters have to a creative-function. They cannot present themselves openly as writing framed with a view to public consumption, nor can they announce themselves as (even partially) fictional products. Yet, to reveal the letters as works of creative writing does not discredit them as legitimate elements in the lifework of Pope the public author. In this move away from a wider, authorless world of letters and letter-writers, Pope's documents are granted authorship but must continue to exist with many of the trappings of the non-literary or personal documents largely excluded from the cultural-political spaces generally reserved for creativity.

More recently a range of discourses normally not associated with the creative-function have begun to adopt it as an important element in redefining the ways their writing can be generated and discussed. Autobiography in some quarters has come to be seen as an essentially creative and even fictional act. Paul Eakin introduces *Fictions in Autobiography*, by stating, "I shall argue that autobiographical truth is not a fixed but an evolving content in an intricate process of self-discovery and self-creation, and, further, that the self that is the center of all autobiographical narrative is necessarily a fictive structure" (3).

Biographers now claim to be creative writers without apparently undermining the authenticity of their work. Deidre Bair, biographer of Simone de Beauvoir and Anais Nin, made the following comment in a recent interview on her working methods:
When I sit down to write a chapter, I know what I want to say but sometimes when I finish I find that I had no idea I was going to write it that way. I like to interpret cultural history but I like to think of biography as a creative act. It's the approach to scholarship with which I am most comfortable. I like to think of myself as a creative writer.

In her self-consciously reflective biographical study of Sylvia Plath, Janet Malcolm has noted that it is the fiction writer who can be believed in a straightforwardly simple manner while the biographer must always be doubted, cross-questioned, read between the lines. Biographers cannot avoid taking licence with facts or possible facts. They must, in some ways, be more creative than is possible for a fiction writer. Commenting on a passage in Anne Stevenson's biography of Plath where she uses the phrases "overreaction" and "in fact", Malcolm writes:

The source of her [Stevenson's] information about the girl from the University of Massachusetts must have been Hughes (it can't have been Plath), and is his account trustworthy? The questions raised by the passage only underscore the epistemological insecurity by which the reader of biography and autobiography (and history and journalism) is always and everywhere dogged. In a work of nonfiction we almost never know the truth of what happened. The ideal of unmediated reporting is regularly achieved only in fiction, where the writer faithfully reports on what is going on in his imagination. When James reports in *The Golden Bowl* that the Prince and Charlotte are sleeping together, we have no reason to doubt him or to wonder if Maggie is "overreacting" to what she sees.

(L54)

Literary theorists, sometimes under the banners of ficto-critical writing or deconstruction have adopted notions of themselves as creative writers. Derrida's ludic puns, split texts and digressions, Lacan's baroquely styled exercises, Blanchot's enigmatically poetic pronouncements, or Foucault's occasional prose flights are some of the ways recognisable strategies of creative writing have been appropriated for commentary and philosophy. Iris Murdoch has observed that the notion of writing as text permits the critic to bracket himself with the imaginative writer (206). In his introduction to *Deconstruction and Criticism*, Geoffrey Hartman provides an example of the way his discourse of commentary not only brackets itself with creative writing but enters into a contest aimed at mastery over the subject of its discussions. He writes that the collection of essays he is introducing manifests "a shared set of problems":

One is the situation of criticism itself, what kind of mature function it may claim—a function beyond the obviously academic or pedagogical. While teaching, criticizing, and presenting the great texts of our culture are essential tasks, to insist on the importance of literature should not entail assigning to literary criticism only a service function. Criticism is part of the world of letters, and has its own mixed philosophical and literary, reflective and figural strength.

(vii)

The qualities he claims for deconstructive criticism—philosophical, reflective and figural strength—are taken over from those qualities previous traditions have recognised in literature.

Some writers are so alarmed at such developments that they move to defend a place apart for creative writing. George Steiner, for instance, in *Real Presences*, writes:
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The primary text—the poem, picture, piece of music—is a phenomenon of freedom. It can be or it cannot be. The hermeneutic-critical response, the executive enactment via performance, via vision and reading, are the clauses dependent on that freedom. Even at the highest point of recreative or subversive virtuosity, their genesis is that of dependence. Their licence may indeed be boundless (the post-structuralist and deconstructive game-theories and play have shown this); but their freedom is strictly a secondary one.

It is revealing that the list attached to the description "primary text" is so restricted: the poem, picture, piece of music. For those who are committed to creative authorship as a career, an identity, or as a point of status it makes some strategic sense to keep this list to a conservative range of forms. The Victorian Writers' Centre offers short courses and single workshops mainly to creative writers throughout the State in response to demand. In 1995 70% of the Centre's workshop and course-time was devoted to poetry or novel/story writing. Another 10% was given to screen, stage or radio drama. Indeed, in the promotional material for a workshop by the playwright Sandra Shotlander, participants were informed that it was a workshop "for writers wanting to free up their creative energy and find new ways of expressing their ideas" and that it thus catered "to writers across all genres (prose, poetry and playwrighting)." This focus on a narrow band of traditional forms for creative expression might be in part a defensive move, like Steiner's, against the creative claims of other forms which are regarded as debasements.

The energetic accretion of more genres and types of writing to the discourses operating through a creative-function, along with resistances such as Steiner's, reveal "creativity" as desirable in modern Western literary-cultural-commercial life: to be creative is to be something-more; it is to acquire an aura denied to technicians. The conservativeness of the above genre-lists produced by defenders and promoters of creative writing might work strategically to keep creativity tied to particular kinds of authorship but their implied restrictions seem if not anti-creative then at least uncreative. Novels, poems and plays are the stuff of the modernist literary canon, in so far as it has survived. When attacks on the status quo of the modernist canon-genres can be perceived as attacks against an elitist system of self-flattery in literary circles, it is not clear why defenders of creativity outside mainstream literary circles are so reliant and so insistent on this limited range of forms. It would seem that many individuals and groups approach creative writing, at least in the first instance, with the intention of duplicating mainstream literary forms. One of my purposes in this discussion is to suggest that in practice creative writing can be an opportunity to free writers and writing from literary endeavours based upon the constricting templates of traditional or established forms.

12 These figures were compiled from notices of workshops and courses in the Centre newsletters for 1995. There are over 2,100 Victorian members.
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Moves by a range of 'outside' discourses to claim some creative territory for themselves can be appreciated as impulses arising from a post-modern interest in cultural gaps and in those moments which complicate or dissolve borders for texts and discourses—here the meaning of the differences, those borderlines drawn between creative and non-creative acts. Through the overrun of Derrida's dé-bordement old partitions not only collapse but become more complex and multiple. In "Living On: Border Lines" Derrida shows how his insistence on superimposing Blanchot and Shelley cannot be accomplished by the old rules: "This operation would never be considered legitimate on the part of a teacher, who must give his references and tell what he's talking about, giving it its recognizable title. You can't give a course on Shelley without ever mentioning him, pretending to deal with Blanchot, and more than a few others. And your transitions have to be readable, that is, in accordance with criteria of readability very firmly established, and long since" (87). When the gaps are inhabited, as it were, and we can look both ways, Janus-like, what are the relations between creativity and commentary, originality and mimesis, or, say, satire and reality? Where does satire begin, or reality find its edges, when we note that Hitler adopted his famous moustache after viewing an early Charlie Chaplin film?13

This post-modern incursion into modernist certainties, however, might also operate to undermine the force of its own critique. At a moment when the author as creative origin of a literary text has seemingly been undermined in favour of the text's existence as a cultural, political and historical artefact, as a production of language itself, or as inevitably subversive of its own assertions, this recent annexing of the creative-function to a widening range of discourses seems to breathe a paradoxical life back into the author as creative origin. There is a tension between Derrida's notion that an author cannot speak coherently or in any originary or original way, and his demonstration of a new (i.e. original) construction of the critical text as whimsical play-pen(ning).

My interest is to show that another tendency is possible for those who defend creative writing against its apparent dispersion into a multitude of discourses. This can take the form of a resistance to the narrowing of creative forms and to their link with authorship. In the pursuit of creativity some freedom from authorship and its claims can be experienced, particularly through the practice that has come to be known as creative writing. I want to approach this possibility through an understanding of the instability and helplessness of the "author" as Foucault has introduced this subject.

Foucault is not so much concerned with the author as a personal absence, or presence, but with the author as an object—a cultural, legal, historical object operating in the scission between the "real writer" (Harari 153) and the fictitious speakers of the text. The creative writer, specially privileged in a literary work, would be only one of

13 This claim was made in the documentary film, *Good Morning Mr Hitler*, directed by Berndt Feierabend, 1939. Broadcast on ABC television, 13 July 1994.
the authors or author-functions constructed by the discourse within and around a literary text. If we take, as an example, Frank Moorhouse's most recent novel, *Grand Days*, we can begin to see to what degree the author is split or splintered through a text. The size of the book at 572 pages immediately announces it as a significant departure by the Frank Moorhouse who has become known for his small books and short, disjointed narratives. The copyright notice reminds us of the legal status of an author, which, as Kelly has pointed out, is not simple, for in some circumstances an author can lose the legal right to use her/his own name. The expression of thanks at the beginning of the book is to the Australian people, the Australia Council and to the then Prime Minister Paul Keating. This is a book by a state-supported author. In declaring itself thus it will be judged in terms of whether the Australian people have spent their money well on this author, whether he justifies Paul Keating's faith in him, and whether he can in some sense speak for the Australian people who have given him this voice. An introductory note makes it clear that this book is a "reconstruction of real people" and that events depicted are "inspired by documentary sources." An organisational chart of the League of Nations, twenty pages of historical notes and a "Who is Who" list at the back of the book reinforce another image of this author as serious researcher and historian. At the same time, however, the author also insists "the book is, above all, a work of the imagination." With chapter headings summarising the characters' actions (for example, "How Edith Campbell Berry Ate Six Courses and Practised the Seven Ways in the Dining Car on the Train from Paris to Geneva") we are in the presence of the author as storyteller-novelist and as parodist of those nineteenth century novelists who preceded chapters with these tasters. The story itself is told mainly from the perspective of Edith Campbell who is herself split several ways: a once-living, historical person, a woman who is not Frank Moorhouse but is spoken by him, a character in a novel by Frank Moorhouse, a character moreover whose sexuality inhabits or constructs a territory somewhere outside heterosexuality but not recognisable under any of the rather clear-cut categories of sexual identity offered by newspapers, fiction, pornography or sex manuals of our society. This Edith Campbell is the avenue to a story where the reader will both share her experiences and come to some conclusions about her. The author, or author-function seems to take on this splintering into sometimes phantasmic positions with ease because it does operate outside the so-called real writer in an arena of public discourse where authors are multiple objects.

At the same time, however, as Foucault points out, the author-function operates to construct a certain rational or intelligible being we call the "author" (Harari 150). Texts coming under this author's name are then included in the author's oeuvre. Unifying elements expressed in more or less psychologizing terms are identified in the texts and in the author. The author's creative power, maturation, failure of nerve or fundamental worldview, for instance, can be read back into the texts of the oeuvre. Not only does
the author's name operate to group certain texts together, but the author operates as a principle of unity by virtue of the work being seen as an expression of the writer's personality, individuality, or creativity. Foucault makes the point that a "work" even in the structuralist sense, cannot come into existence or be recognized without an individual being first raised to the status of author. "What, for instance, were Sade's papers before he was consecrated as an author?" Foucault asks and then answers: "Little more, perhaps, than roles [sic] of paper on which he endlessly unravelled his fantasies while in prison" (Bouchard 118).

For the writer this means that the reception of present or past works depends first on whether the status of author has been accorded. Discussion then can always look backwards to works the writer might have left behind, perhaps preferring to forget them, or no longer seeing them as relevant. With the same name attached to the works, however, it becomes impossible to escape them. Frank Moorhouse will be asked to account for his change of direction in interview after interview. Helen Garner continues to be judged in the light of her accomplishment in her first novel, Monkey Grip.14 Philip K. Dick found it impossible to break away from his reputation as a popular science fiction writer when he attempted to produce what he thought of as more serious, literary works (Sutin 97-119).

The writer finds that boundaries of the self become unclear as the public author is split off into the many functions demanded of the author—fictional identities, legal identities, literary persona, media performer, figure of creativity, researcher, both reliable and unreliable reporter, both entertainer and source of wisdom—while on the other hand everything written is read back to them as evidence of one unified individual's success or failure. This leaves the author as both splintered object (or multiple, superimposed objects) and psychologically individual artist called to account.

This is a relatively helpless position despite the writer's freedom to contradict, rewrite, revise, fall silent, digress, or diversify. Either everything will be read back into the author (who might then, as we have seen, be punished if certain property rules or professional or ethical demands have been broken) or the (unified) author will be read out of the text even while the writing remains a text by virtue of the author’s name attached to it. This is to say no more than that it has entered a set of discourses where the author-function operates to establish not necessarily consistent rules of readability, rules for categorising texts, and for assigning status to them.

From within this general subjection, however, the "helpless" author and the text can operate as local resistances to the prevailing play of power relations. If we look, for instance, at the relations between a creative-function and an author-function we can

14 See Kevin Brophy, Australian Literary Studies. In another recent example, Peter Craven refers to Garner through the prism of her past oeuvre when he writes: "Well, times have changed ... Garner has discovered angels and apparitions and the resurrection of the adjective ... " (Meanjin Spring 1994: 567).
begin to see ways in which texts can slide past the psychologising readings of author-criticism, or announce themselves as creative without an author-function being attached.

But Where is The Writer?—Or, "What did you learn from that?"

In June 1994 I agreed to conduct a series of eight creative writing workshops at the Victorian Writers' Centre. We were to focus on writing longer prose works. I called the series, "Writing Into The Night."

On the first evening a husband and wife arrived early. The husband said he wanted to do "a course," and that the State Trustee would pay whatever the fee was. He said he had not written anything but he had a lot of ideas and anyway his wife was a better writer than him. She would help him, he said. His wife announced that she didn't want to be there and that he had talked her into coming with him. I was already anxious about how this first workshop would go, but I put caution aside and invited John to sit in with us and see if he thought it was the right "course" for him. Anne, his wife, sat outside in the Centre's waiting room. The new group of twelve writers sat in a circle with the door open to the area where Anne was pacing. Before I began speaking she shouted, "I don't want to be here!" I looked at John. He ignored her and waited patiently for me to begin. I talked about the sort of structure we might give to our workshops until John interrupted me with a question: "The people who write about books in the newspapers, are they writing novels?" he asked. Wanting to allow events to take their course while not letting the group become unfocused, I was caught by his question. Should I answer it, or should I impose some rules about question-asking? I decided to answer him. I thought he was asking if reviewers of novels were novelists themselves, but as I explained that of course they often are, he interrupted me and made it clear that he wanted to know if reviews are novels. I had no ready answer to this. "Not really," I think I said. Anne shouted through the wall at John, "What did you learn from that? Not much! I want to go home! If you don't come now I'm going to walk home!"

Not long after this John did leave. He did not return for the second or for any of the subsequent workshops.

Was John's question crazy, or did it make a kind of crazy sense? What kind of reader (or writer) cannot distinguish between a review and a novel? But then, why couldn't a novel take the shape of a review? Some novels do work in that way. Philip Roth's *The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography*, ends with a thirty-page reflection and revision on the meanings and deceptions of the 'life' reported in the previous one hundred and sixty pages. What is that? It reads like a review. And mightn't the review pages of a major newspaper look like a modern novel, a pastiche of unlikely
coincidences where reviewers and authors shift places unnervingly? In which genre is creativity more privileged? Where Frank Moorhouse provides references, dates, names and a copy of the constitution of the League of Nations, reviewers can simply write as they see fit, using a recently read book as a starting point. Without fear of being reviewed in their turn, reviewers can let their creative heads go.15 John's question, like Foucault's about Sade, highlights the inconsistencies, uncertainties and assumptions at the borderlines which define discourses. When we see that reviews can mimic novels and novels mimic reviews, the divisions between forms seem to operate more as institutionalised (or ritual) manoeuvres than as reflections of real differences. For me, concerned as I was with what the workshop would do, John's question pointed to those assumptions we tend to carry into a creative writing workshop. As I have already noted, only a limited range of writing is normally attempted in these workshops. Poetry, story or novel writing are the major forms. Though review writing might be a creative exercise, it would seem absurd to focus a workshop on developing a fictive creativity in reviewers.

Just as the author-function operates across the discourses of science and literature, as we have seen, the creative-function cannot be confined easily to a few select forms of writing. Anne was probably right, John probably did not learn much from that exchange, but in the disorientation his rogue question caused me, I was exposed to my own assumptions, the group's self-imposed silence about borderlines, and the possibility of a new, transgressive workshop series on fictive review writing.

In some largely unacknowledged ways creativity does already operate outside literary discourse where the author-function is still in practice so important. Indeed, the creative-function can operate independently of an author-function. For it is not necessary to be recognised as an author (or even to hope to be recognised as an author) in order to write creatively. This claim might be as anarchic and as freeing as John's question.

15 Occasionally literary or professional magazines will take on the reviewers, often with a view to exposing the creative license they claim for themselves. "Reviewing the Reviewers" is the theme of a recent issue of Australian Author (Winter 1994). Some reviewers even admit to not reading the books they review. Bernard Smith, for instance, tracked down one of his reviewers: "When the first edition of Australian Painting appeared the art critic Alan McCulloch said that it was substantially a rewrite of Place, Taste and Tradition, or words to that effect. Subsequently he admitted to me personally that he had not had time to read the book before he reviewed it" (Critic as Advocate 301-2). Sometimes readers cannot be sure whether they are reading a review or a piece of short fiction. The small press literary magazine, Brave New Word, for example, found it necessary to publish the following statement after a short prose piece appeared in their tenth issue (1989): "We must apologise if it was not clear in Issue 10 that Gerald Murnane was writing a review of Carmel Bird's latest book, Dear Writer, published by McPhee Gribble-Penguin in 1988" (Brave New World 11 (1989): 2). In the October, November and December 1994 issues of Australian Book Review, readers and editor took exception to a reviewer (Meredith Sorensen) for suggesting that one should piss on a certain book under review. It appears that there is a creative propriety expected of reviewers in some quarters, while others still see it as an opportunity not to be missed.
To be "creative" is often an individualising act in the sense that it can contribute to the construction of an individual's experience of her/himself as a subject. It can be part of a process of individuation, and in this way it can be involved in that disciplinary and "pastoral power" which Foucault has suggested characterises modern society (see "The Subject and Power" 214). Expressions of subjective truths or experiences place us in relation to the norms of our society, and in this way we can be judged, or we can judge ourselves in terms of whether we fit acceptable patterns, where our differences are revealed, whether these differences are 'normal', illusory, transgressive—whether they are resistances to existing power relations and cultural assumptions or whether they participate in them.

In practice it can be unclear how a particular act relates to these wider patterns. Just as the operation of power opens the possibility of resistance, those very resistances have the potential to become instances of the reproduction of previous patterns of power. For example, in June 1994, the Writers Union of Canada hosted a conference in Vancouver on "Writing Through Race." Only "writers of colour" were permitted to attend. This meant attendance was permitted for writers of Canadian-indigenous or Asian background. The conference was subjected to predictable criticism on the grounds that a racially based exclusion (of white writers) was offensive, and that the inclusion of Asian along with Canadian-indigenous writers was, in any case, arbitrary (Pybus 3). More to our point here, we might ask to what degree is an individual's voice and freedom relinquished when it is subsumed under an oppositional banner such as "writers of colour"?

Just as the construction of an individualising position might not at first clearly show how an act resists, plays into, mirrors or reconstructs power relations, with creative writing too, it can be unclear at first how the act relates to and participates in existing power relations.

I am proposing that creative writing can be a point of individuation which does not necessarily involve the construction of authorship. But where does this creative writing happen? How can we recognise it? Does a division between creativity and authorship offer opportunities for new power relations to emerge in literary, non-literary or academic practices? What can we learn from particular instances?

Creative writing is recognised partly through assertions of its presence and partly through certain contexts such as workshops, Creative Writing courses, community writing groups, literary magazines, school magazines, the "process writing" movement

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16 In Australia a similar debate has emerged over the categorising of some writing as migrant or multicultural. Robert Dessaix has argued in the Australian Book Review that this sort of categorising for critical discussion ignores the individuality of writers who might have non-English speaking parents while constructing 'Anglo-Celtic' writing as a monoculture. The next issue of ABR includes responses from affronted writers and academics. See also George Papaellinas, unpublished lecture presented at Melbourne University, "Writing and Culture in Australia," 29 August 1994.
in primary schools, Creative Writing tasks in Year Twelve English, public or private readings, unpublished private journals and manuscripts, or self-published writing. Though individual writers can attach their names to these writings (as authors do to their works), and though they have the same legal copyright protection as authors, this does not carry the same implications as it does in commercial or high-literary publishing. In 1992 the Melbourne poet, Myron Lysenko, was funded by the Australia Council to work as the first poet-in-residence at Melbourne's Zoo. As a result of his work with Years 8, 9 and 10 students Lysenko edited the anthology of student writing, Poets and Other Endangered Species, published by the Zoo Education Service. It is an anthology of creative writing which makes no claims to presenting the students as poets or as authors. To say this is not to comment on the quality of the poetry, but to place the book in a particular context which can go unrecognised—for the book would still be found in the "Poetry" section of a library, or under "Poetry Anthologies" in a bookshop, obscuring its role in those activities we might regard as primarily creative rather than literary or even poetic. The book exists as evidence and record of creative activity by these students, not primarily as a site for recognising the literary work of several dozen poets.

We have established at this point that creative writing has particular contexts or spaces within institutions, groups, social activities, or within the privacy of an individual's life. While it can be seen as part of an individualising experience related to normalising power relations, creative writers need never be recognised as authors, nor need they ever have ambitions to achieve authorship.

Along with its potential for relative independence from the author-function, creative writing shares enough similarities with literary writing to help reshape relations between an author-function and a creative-function. In high-literary texts the creative-function tends to follow from or attach itself to the author-function. However, when we focus on creative writing we can begin to see that the contexts and locations for its practice can undermine the assumption that creativity and authorship are only individual (or even individualising) acts. Most of the creative writing contexts listed above relate to collaborative, relatively public, educational, shared activities. The students who contributed poems to Poets and Other Endangered Species were assisted first by Lysenko offering them possible structures and devices: haiku forms, metonymy ("I see a fur coat/slung over a branch/and a lion rug/laid neatly/on the grass/in the lion cage."), rhythm (e.g. rap), or repetition (permutation poems). The students then worked in groups, reading the drafts to each other and finally publicly reading their poems back to the animals out in front of the enclosures. Similarly, in creative writing workshops and in writing groups the emphasis is often on showing others one's incomplete drafts so that the comments of other members can influence the final shape of a story or poem. Sometimes each group member is using a common beginning point, or the same
structuring strategy to develop a piece of writing. It can be difficult to know who, in particular, is responsible for the writing that emerges from these groups. Attaching one’s name, finally, to a piece of writing might indicate an editorial decision to announce the end of rewriting rather than to announce a conventional claim to authorship.

The practice of creative writing can thus serve to highlight the collaborative and social-political nature of much of that other (literary) writing which has come to be regarded almost exclusively through an author-function. The instabilities of authorship as discussed above, can thus become an opportunity for accepting that creativity has long been importantly a collaborative enterprise. What have the bohemian and artistic communities such as Provincetown near New York, Brunswick or Fitzroy in Melbourne, Montmartre or the Café Certa in Paris been but locations for discussion, collaboration and support through groups gathering together? Small Press magazines, in particular the specialist ones that focus on sci-fi, language poetry, concrete poetry, short prose, or performance poetry are in effect communities of like-minded artists finding a common publication-space. Home pages on the internet have the potential too to become sites for local discussion and support.

Creative writing in this sense can become a site for the development of that "way out" which Deleuze and Guattari have called "a minor literature" (16). They make the point that "a minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language" (16). A minor literature, they suggest, deterritorialises the major language by using or misusing it for strange and minor purposes: in an Australian context this could mean Aboriginals writing in an English derived from pidgin versions or mixed in with traditional Aboriginal speech; youth using their slang against literary English; the limited but intense language of the street or of family life transported into poetry; migrants bringing their words and concepts into English literary forms; or small regional groups simply supporting each other to keep working on creative projects. A second characteristic of a minor literature is its sensitivity to the political implications of any utterance. In the cramped space of the minority each individual voice takes on representative value for the others and is heard against the greater noise of the majority as a political act. This awareness of politics can increase a minor literature's resistance to any repressive status quo. A third characteristic which Deleuze and Guattari discuss is the collective value adhering to everything that takes place in a minor literature. In small groups, they suggest, there will be less abundant talent and thus less opportunity for one individual to become a "master" voice separated from the others. Indeed, a minor literature provides a

17 Louis Aragon remarked that the Surrealists in Paris chose the Café Certa as their gathering place because of their loathing for Montmartre (Paris Peasant 87). The choice of a place was not just a matter of ambience, style or accident, but it was a statement in opposition.
revolutionary opportunity for the emergence of something other than a literature of the masters. Deleuze and Guattari might be idealistic in hoping that minor literatures can be effective sites for revolutionary utterances, but it is nonetheless valuable to see how a collective (in a sense authorless) literature can become possible. One irony of their discussion is that they make this collective claim in a long essay on an individual author, Franz Kafka.

A number of recent commentators have pursued this authorless other-side of literary creation and have begun to tease out the implications of Foucault’s thinly surfaced author populated by complex mediations. They have explored the ways literary texts are produced out of other texts, out of relations between individuals, out of group activities, or through a series of political and social manoeuvres where the writer (later recognised and billed as sole author) is merely one among many crucial players in the construction of a particular work. Martha Woodmansee, for instance, has pointed out that much of Samuel Johnson’s biographical writing was direct and unacknowledged translation or paraphrase from other works. This does not indicate deception or deviousness on Johnson’s part for it was a common journalistic practice of the time. Johnson, in turn, could be generous in giving up claims to authorship when the purpose of a text was better served by attaching another’s name. In his efforts to save the Reverend Dodd from a death sentence for forgery he wrote letters and petitions under Dodd’s name to the Chief Justice and the King, and another from Mrs Dodd to the Queen. He wrote and published a sermon purportedly preached by Dodd in Newgate prison (Boswell 828-30). In business dealings too he wrote commissioned sermons to which he claimed no right of authorship once he had been paid (Woodmansee 19). Beyond this ghost-writing, as it has come to be called, Johnson worked collaboratively with the Reverend John Taylor to produce sermons, with Robert Chambers to write law lectures, and with William Shaw to question, ironically, the authenticity of the popular Ossian epics supposedly translated by James Macpherson. As Woodmansee comments, “Even as he helped to create the modern myth that genuine authorship consists in individual acts of origination, by orchestrating from behind the scenes this exposé of a fraudulent attribution of it, Johnson was himself participating in a mode of writing which puts this notion of authorship in question” (21).

Woodmansee goes on to note that modern, computerised texts can not only use facilities such as "hypertext" to establish an endlessly branching structure of digressions or alternative pathways through a work, but they can include invitations for readers to insert their own comments, notes and additions to a work, which can then be passed on via disks and bulletin boards to other users. A reviewer of Jay Bolter's book-on-disk,

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18 Digressions, of course, are not an innovation of the computerised text, for they have their own long literary tradition. Laurence Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* (published in 1760) remains one of the most
Writing Space, for example, reported that he had already modified his version of the text (26). Australian poet, John Tranter is collaborating with past literary texts via a computer program. Introducing a recent unpublished prose work, "Neuromancing Miss Stein," he describes it as "freely adapted from a computer-aided letter-group frequency analysis, a blend and regeneration of text samples from Gertrude Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas, and William Gibson, Neuromancer." The work could not exist without Tranter, but equally it would not be possible without the work of previous authors and the creative aid of the computer programmer. Similarly the Melbourne-based performance poet, Nolan Tyrrell has taken the texts of encyclopedia entries and altered certain words systematically by using a find-and-alter word processing command. Literary creativity here turns away from the notion of its origin in an individual. Tyrrell's and Tranter's computer-generated texts can work, like the Surrealists' automatic writing, as a comment on the myths that surround author-based literary discussion.

In the 1993 collection of essays edited by Chadwick and Courtivron, Significant Others, marriages and partnerships between either visual artists or writers are discussed. It becomes clear from these essays that assumptions of "heroic individuality" in artists and writers are misleading. Often the artistic and literary works from Anais Nin and Henry Miller, Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg, Leonora Carrington and Max Ernst, Lillian Hellman and Dashiell Hammett, were produced out of a relationship and its tensions, its inspirations, its history, rather than from any individual, solitary genius. This work and other similar studies by Perry and Brownley show how the myth of individual genius has worked to suppress the presence of women and emphasise men as creators, and creativity as a solitary, masculine endeavour. In the light of these past practices and current experiments, David Leavitt's "plagiarism" in adopting some details from the life of another writer seems hardly offensive or transgressive. Leavitt's fate might point rather to the historical context of a copyright law which endorses a possibly outmoded and always misguided (or narrow) notion of authorship, and more fundamentally to an easily outraged sense of ownership so important to a masculinist assumption of individual genius.

More broadly, Stephen Greenblatt has taken up Stanley Fish's suggestion that any literary text owes its existence to a community of readers by proposing we begin taking seriously "the collective production of literary pleasure and interest. We know that this outrageous digressively works in English literature. Sterne's diagrams of the structure of his book as it departs from the straight line preferred by cabbage planters and Christians are in themselves demonstrations of the importance of digressions for the vitality of all literature (347-8). Indeed, chapters eighteen and nineteen of Book Nine are blank pages where readers can insert their own contributions to the text (458-9). Melbourne novelist, Barry Dickins, is a contemporary writer who engages sometimes hilariously with the tradition of the digression. Similarly, in Parallel Lives, Phyllis Rose traces the ways individuals and their creativity are embedded in the social structures of marriage and family.
production is collective since language itself, which is at the heart of literary power, is the supreme instance of a collective creation. But this knowledge has for the most part remained inert, either cordoned off in prefatory acknowledgements or diffused in textual analyses that convey almost nothing of the social dimension of literature's power. Instead the work seems to stand only for the skill and effort of the individual artist, as if whole cultures possessed their shared emotions, stories, and dreams only because a professional caste invented them and parcelled them out" (4).

As we have seen in the case of Foucault's essay, "What Is an Author?", the work itself turns out to be a collaborative and multiple text taking on a series of existences in a variety of apparently authentic forms and contexts. The French language version is placed within a seminar discussion in the context of an ongoing debate. The English translations present the work as a self-contained essay, while they differ significantly on questions of the content and the boundaries of the text and its footnotes. The essay takes on a history of relations to translators, editors, publishers and to the cultures in which it is presented as the work of "Foucault." In the later texts, the Harari/Rabinow versions, we can see that they are presented through strategies aimed at establishing them as authoritative. The title Reader, the epigrammatic opening sentence of "What Is an Author?", the essay format itself, Harari's claim to be presenting a second (more up-to-date, more considered?) version—all these contexts and statements go towards constructing the authority of later versions against earlier ones. We are dealing not with Foucault but with a Foucault-function, that is with a Foucault who has certain uses.

Creativity can be used similarly in a variety of contexts to establish positions of dominance, authority or freedom. When creativity is linked to the author-function in literary discourse, the author's prestige as a literary figure can be enhanced. Further, the conventional and strategic aspects of this link can be exposed when critical writers adopt creative modes, or when reviewers, biographers and autobiographers begin to use creative codes.

At the level of creative writing in groups and courses which operate somewhat outside the literary world, all the literary forms of writing, and potentially many others, become available to people whose writing might otherwise remain unread, unwritten, never rewritten or never discussed. Through creative writing workshops and courses it is possible to experience a model of writing which helps to expose the illusions attached to the myth of the author as an original and individual source for texts. People who need never become authors can write, rewrite, discuss, negotiate, even publish on a small scale. Creative writing can be in one sense a quasi-literary world, and often it does take on a life as a pale imitation of the wider literary star-system or as a democratic protest against its elitism—but through a potential freedom from the figure of the author creative writing can become an alternative literary world.
Some observers and commentators take an opposing view that creative writing as practised in courses and workshops is inevitably stuck in the grooves of realist fiction and outmoded notions of individual authorship. In the final section I will take up the criticisms and reservations of these writers. However, whether creative writing subverts, reforms or participates in the strategies and conventions of literary discourse, it always serves certain purposes. We might see it as a territory over which disputes are fought. Or we might see it as a tool for defining one kind of activity against another. We might see it as a banner behind which a number of discourses align themselves—a banner promising a certain status, or perhaps a certain freedom from power relations. We might see it as a means towards therapeutic ends. Therapists who encourage children to play and draw, or adults to physically dramatise their psyches would claim to be using creativity as a means towards mental health. When we turn to the relation between psychoanalysis and creativity I want to pursue this claim and its implications in more detail. A further point I have been making here is that appropriations of the creative-function do not always have the outcomes intended. This point will be pursued in the following sections as well. What confusions and restrictions for example, might be generated by the claim that creativity leads to mental health?—or what anarchic freedom becomes necessary in response to the claim that creativity is a neurotic manifestation?

In the following sections I will discuss a number of crucial disputes and claims over the territory and uses of creativity. To reiterate and extend some of the questions raised in the preface, I intend to ask: What are the relations between psychoanalysis and literature? How has psychoanalysis altered discourses on creativity? Why is literature so important to psychoanalysis and at the same time so dangerous to it? What does psychoanalysis say about creativity? How creative (i.e. how fictional) is psychoanalysis itself? How does the Surrealist movement intervene in the discourses on creativity? Does Surrealism become an inevitable and necessary strategy for reasserting or redefining creativity against Freud? How does Lacan attempt to redefine the role of the unconscious in creativity and psychoanalysis in understanding creativity? Has creativity been used to bolster a masculinist and individualist view of artistic activity? What might be the links between creative writing, masculinity and alcoholism in the 1920s and 30s in the United States? How has the link between creativity and alcohol been perceived? Were the epidemic proportions of alcoholism among writers, and the myths built around the drinking writer yet another reaction to psychoanalytic exposures of motives behind creative work?

I wish to bring this work into the present by looking at the introduction of Creative Writing units and courses into universities and Colleges. Why, for instance, are these courses so popular? How do they alter power relations and practices within the academy? Does creativity pay a price in order to enter the academic system? Can
Mapping the Territory

creative writing be taught? Does its presence signal a return to humanist, author-based notions of literature or does it open possibilities for resistance to entrenched ideas about authorship, literature and creativity?²⁰ As pressure builds to introduce postgraduate courses in creative writing, how can current notions of research accommodate such activity?

²⁰ In response to this last question one reader commented, "I presume that, by now, this refers to the now-entrenched anti-humanist orthodoxies." Laurence Sterne wrote, "A man cannot dress, but his ideas get cloath'd at the same time" (454). If it is not clear what clothes I am wearing as I pose this question it is all the better for my purposes. Resistance can work in several directions. I hope to show, particularly in the final chapter of the thesis, that creative writing can operate in practice as a resistance to any fixed (cloath'd) idea about literature and creativity.
2. *Freud, Psychoanalysis and the Creative Arts*

**Politics is war by other means**

An artist is once more in rudiments an introvert, not far removed from neurosis. He is oppressed by excessively powerful instinctual needs. He desires to win honour, power, wealth, fame and the love of women; but he lacks the means for achieving these satisfactions. Consequently, like any other unsatisfied man, he turns away from reality and transfers all his interests, and his libido too, to the wishful constructions of his life of phantasy, whence the path might lead to neurosis.

But creative writers are valuable allies and their evidence is to be prized highly, for they are apt to know a whole host of things between heaven and earth of which our philosophy has not yet let us dream. In their knowledge of the mind they are far in advance of us everyday people, for they draw upon sources which we have not yet opened up for science.

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I turn to Freud's writings on art, and the relation of psychoanalysis to creativity, with the question: what are the disciplinary power relations operating between psychoanalytic writing and art? Freud made frequent use of literature and other arts both to demonstrate psychoanalytic concepts and to lend these concepts authority. However, despite this evident respect, Freud often dealt with art, and literature in particular, as a rival threatening to claim for itself a significant priority in uncovering ultimate and sublime truths about the human soul. This tension is taken to its extreme when psychoanalytic discourse attempts to displace literature as the pre-eminent discourse for speaking about the human psyche. More politically, this can be phrased in terms of psychoanalysis as a series of rhetorical manoeuvres: the early discourse of psychoanalysis has, at first, no secure or distinctive place among disciplines, and no clear precedents to indicate its constraints or the basis for its knowledge; thus it looks initially to literature for support for its assertions, usurps what it sees as literature's fundamental purpose (the understanding of the human psyche) and announces itself as the new, scientifically reliable authority on the human psyche—only to express itself

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This reversal of Clausewitz's assertion that "war is politics continued by other means" reflects Foucault's argument that the politics of institutions, including their discourses, can be understood through a military metaphor. Forces manoeuvre for dominance and authority in relation to other forces (Foucault *Power/Knowledge* 206).
ultimately through structures and techniques adopted from literary genres such as the psychological novel, autobiography, and the detective thriller.

In this drama of displacement we can either witness psychoanalysis developing beyond literature into a richer, more reliable discourse which leaves literature revealed as inferior and deceptive, or we can see psychoanalysis becoming in its turn a discourse living off (unacknowledged) literary models—a mélange of literary and subliterary genres masquerading as a science. My discussion will be informed by an understanding that underlying this discourse-war was Freud's need to establish psychoanalysis as a distinct and significant field of knowledge. His difficulties were not only medical, philosophical and psychological but they were also political.

Foucault names Freud as a particular kind of author. He locates Freud as one of the nineteenth century "founders of discursivity," along with Karl Marx (Foucault Reader 113-5). With this phrase he means to point to Freud as more than simply the author of the books and papers he wrote. Freud also produced "the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts," which inevitably refer back to Freud's own writing. In this way, Foucault wishes to distinguish a scientific text, such as Galileo's treatise, or a literary text such as a novel, from a psychoanalytic text. The psychoanalytic text is locked into a return to its origins in Freud's writings and thus to a project of protecting or transforming the meaning of psychoanalytic discourse. Any change or development, for example, must involve a reinterpretation of what is central or peripheral in Freud's writing. In contrast, "Reexamination of Galileo's text may well change our knowledge of the history of mechanics, but it will never be able to change mechanics itself" (116). Foucault has emphasised differences between these discourses in order to make a point, but in fact they do not operate hermetically because they negotiate their existences and their relative values in a context and history of power relations, particularly over issues of institutional boundaries. There are areas of overlap, close relationship, and disputed territory. I am interested in examining the particular ways psychoanalytic texts position themselves in reference to art as the relations between these discourses are played out.

The rivalry with the discourse of art, and anxieties associated with this are not always openly present in Freud's writing for they tend to be obscured by certain polite formulae of respect. The tentativeness or the hiddenness of Freud's attack on literature (and defence against literature) is, I suggest, partly a result of uncertainty through much of his writing about the kind of discourse psychoanalysis must become if it is to survive and prosper. Is psychoanalytic writing an art or is it science? Does it replace art (must it replace art)? How indebted is it to literature? Does it transform the content of art into a science? What kind of discourse is it—if it is not literary?

The desire for mastery which can be detected in much psychoanalytic writing is one key to understanding the way in which this rivalry has been negotiated. Often the desire for mastery is expressed simply as assertions of scientific status for psychoanalytic
discoveries. It can be more indirectly expressed as fear—in psychoanalytic terms, fear of castration—or as dramas projected onto the discourses of patients and creative writers. Indeed, the theory of the Oedipal crisis could be viewed as a projection of a psychoanalytic desire for mastery with its attendant fears for its own destruction. In seeking to supplant literature (the source/parent of its insights) psychoanalysis must blind itself to its own origins—while refusing to recognise this state of blindness/castration.

In claiming for it a status as science, Freud committed psychoanalysis to a fundamental determinism: even when discoveries were speculative or posed through novelistic case histories Freud maintained that in time strictly causal, even neurological explanations of the human psyche would be forthcoming. This assumption not only asserted a mastery over literature's versions of the human psyche but set psychoanalytic discourse at odds with any discourse of creativity which valued what was perceived as original or touched with genius, spontaneity, inventiveness or chance—touched, in other words, by elements outside a strict determinism. Creative acts in this sense became intolerable for psychoanalysis. Psychoanalytic discourse found it must demonstrate again and again what determined the creative act—how utterly determined are all acts of artistic creation. Thus despite possible confusions and denials Freud's rivalry with literature and art was handled at times with a canny rhetorical understanding of how he must proceed if he was to take from literature the insights and evidence he needed while establishing psychoanalysis as a distinct, new and revolutionary science/discipline/discourse.

At the same time, as we shall see, when Freud's writing is analysed from a rhetorical viewpoint it becomes clear how often psychoanalysis moves into the arena of literature where it (blindly?) uses the techniques of mythic, novelistic, poetic, autobiographical and even scientistic genres to create what is in effect a form of writing no less literary than the creative writing it seeks to displace.

From the second epigraph above, we see Freud acknowledge that artists can shed light on truths about the human psyche. They can know a deeper and more truthful reality than the rest of us. In the first epigraph, however, the work of the artist is described as a symptom of neurosis, as an expression of the artist's own crude, male wish fulfillments. The artist has lost touch with reality:

\[ \text{The creative writer does the same as the child at play. He creates a world of phantasy which he takes very seriously—that is which he invests with large amounts of emotion—while separating it sharply from reality ... We may lay it down that a happy person never phantasies, only an unsatisfied one. (SE 9: 144, 146)} \]

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22 See Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (Strachey's title): "The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science" (SE 1: 295-346). See also Bouveresse's discussion of Freud's concept of science and his commitment to a mental determinism (88-91).
There is a contradiction—or we might call it a reversal—in these views of the artist as unhappily locked into a predictable set of banal wish fulfillment phantasies, and at the same time as someone who has profound insights into the nature of humanity. Rather than seek some reconciliation in terms of logic or through an appeal to one view as Freud's authentic position, I want to examine why psychoanalysis might need the creative artist to take up both these roles.

I begin with some examples of those respectful utterances about the creative artist, those moments when Freud appeared willing to limit the extent and importance of what psychoanalysis could say about art. Analysis, Freud wrote, "can do nothing toward elucidating the nature of the artistic gift, nor can it explain the means by which the artist works—artistic technique" (SE 20: 65). On Dostoevsky, he commented: "Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms" (SE 21: 173). In such statements he seemed to be accepting that there are limits to the light psychoanalysis can cast upon literature, and that this leaves room for some respectful distance between the two disciplines. As we will see, at other times Freud perceived artistic techniques as mere devices for distracting audiences. They obscure what is really happening: they are the conjurer's tricks which hide the infantile nature of the artistic exchange between artist and audience.

In the phrase used to express respect for Dostoevsky's artistic gift, Freud employed an image suggesting military surrender: "lay down its arms." The image is symptomatic of the context of tension and conflict between psychoanalysis and literature. It is in just such images, and in the tones of frustrated desire that we find, again and again, the struggle with art implicitly dramatised even in psychoanalytic writing which takes a respectful or conciliatory approach to art. There is for instance a further connotation of sexual subjection in the phrase, "lay down its arms." We will see more explicit references to the idea that creative work puts its audience (and hence psychoanalysis) into a sexually passive (castrated?) position as we look more closely at Freud's writing on art.

Discussing artistic technique in Macbeth, Freud wrote, "The dramatist can indeed, during the presentation, overwhelm us by his art and paralyse our powers of reflection; but he cannot prevent us from attempting subsequently to grasp its effect by studying its psychological mechanism" (SE 14: 323). Here, artistic technique cannot be allowed to stand apart from psychoanalytic discourse, for Freud analyses it as a screen preventing understanding. The relation between art and its audience, or art and analyst ("us") is again characterised by militaristic struggle, for the psychoanalyst is in danger of being overwhelmed. In this instance, the implications of the struggle are widened by Freud's image of artistic technique as having the power to paralyse. It was not only military weapons that could paralyse, for the predominantly female illness of hysteria was often recognised by its symptoms of paralysis. Art can, in effect, bring us to mimic illness, in...
fact the very illness psychoanalysis exists to cure. Artistic technique places us (men) in
the passively feminine position of the hysterical if we do not subsequently attempt to
analyse it. Analysis becomes a male act of defence against the feminising, that is
castrating, influence of art.

Freud's 1907 essay, "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Gradiva," was the first
extended psychoanalytic treatment of a work of literature apart from literary references
in The Interpretation of Dreams. Here Freud used the double-handed strategy which
allowed him to align psychoanalysis with creative writers and then overwhelm them so
that they were relegated to partial and minor roles in discovering truth. In the
introductory remarks of this essay Freud sets himself against a scientific attitude which
sees dreams as the mere twitching of "the mental instrument," while he expresses
alliance with the ancients and the "superstitious public" who still believe that dreams can
be interpreted. Creative writers are the "valuable allies" of "us everyday people" in this
stand against science. Their evidence is prized highly. These ritual utterances of debt
and respect are followed by an exclamation of frustration: "If only this support given by
writers in favour of dreams having a meaning were less ambiguous!" (SE 9: 8).

Freud's complaint is that writers are not explicit in taking a stand on the meaning of
dreams. A critical reader could still interpret these dreams as mere twitchings of the
mental instrument. The project of the essay then becomes an uncovering of the
unconscious laws immanent in those dreams and symbols of Gradiva which serve to
illustrate and verify psychoanalytic claims.

But these are fictional dreams experienced by fictional characters created by Jensen.
How is it that the writer has behaved as if he knows the intricacies of psychoanalysis?
While Freud must acknowledge Jensen's creation of the symbolic network, he must
also claim that this is a kind of knowing without knowing.23 He achieves this by
treating the whole novella as a dream. If the work of art is produced in the same
unconscious manner as dreams are produced, then psychoanalytic interpretation
becomes the key to a real knowledge hinted at but obscured by works of art.24 Towards
the end of this essay Freud addressed the problem of the writer's apparent skill in
employing psychoanalytic motifs:

Our opinion is that the author need have known nothing of these rules and
purposes, so that he could disavow them in good faith, but that nevertheless we

23 See Sarah Kofman's The Childhood of Art 40-51 & 175-199 for a discussion of rhetorical
manoeuvres in the Gradiva essay which Kofman regards as a "pivotal text." For Kofman, Freud's
strategy of seeing works of art as a symptom to be interpreted is a result of a necessary
dissillusionment—the "killing" of the idealised father in order to replace him with a more realistic
(scientific) concept of greatness. My reading is more politically focused, for I am arguing that Freud's
strategy was necessary to the establishment of psychoanalytic discourse as a distinctive, original and
significant field of knowledge.

24 This move exposes a certain circularity in Freud's argument: literature serves to illustrate and
confirm the symbolism of dreams—but dreams then become the model for understanding literature.
have not discovered anything in his work that is not already in it ... He directs his attention to the unconscious in his own mind, he listens to its possible developments and lends them artistic expression instead of suppressing them by conscious criticism. But he need not state these laws or even be clearly aware of them; as a result of the tolerance of his intelligence, they are incorporated within his creations. We discover these laws by analysing his writings just as we find them from cases of real illness.

(SE 9:92)

Thus the author cannot stand as an authority on the meaning of his text; and the text reveals secrets the author would wish to conceal even from himself. Peter Collier has noted that Freud's essay is constructed in such a way that the writer's possible control and knowledge is obscured. The text of the novel (as Freud reports it) cannot afford to look too psychoanalytic—nor too deliberately symbolic in Freud's summation of it. As a result he avoids mention of Jensen's inclusion of slips of the tongue, the castration anxiety evident in a dream of a lizard's tail offered up to a bird, overtones of eroticism and violence in images of the half-dressed hero Hanold and his love Gradiva, a figure of mummified lovers, and lewd frescoes.

In a 1912 postscript to the second edition of the essay, Freud wrote of the whole novella in terms of its "manifest content" and "latent meaning," thus moving emphatically into a discussion of the work as if it is a dream. Emboldened apparently by the recent death of Jensen and rankled by Jensen's refusal to co-operate in "psychoanalytic research" when Freud contacted him shortly after the Gradiva essay was published, he declared a psychoanalytic interest in the ways writers' own lives are woven into their fictional texts:

In the five years that have passed since this study was completed, psychoanalytic research has summoned up the courage to approach the creation of imaginative writers with yet another purpose in view. It no longer merely seeks in them for confirmations of the findings it has made from unpoetic, neurotic human beings; it also demands to know the material of impressions and memories from which the author has built the work, and the methods and processes by which he has converted this material into a work of art. It has turned out that these questions can be most easily answered in the case of writers who (like our Wilhelm Jensen, who died in 1911) were in the habit of giving themselves over to their imagination in a simple-minded joy in creating.

(SE 9:95)

Freud goes on to suggest that, on the basis of recurring themes in other works by Jensen, his refusal to co-operate in psychoanalytic research might have been a defence against acknowledging the ways his incestuous desires directed toward a sister worked their way into the fiction. Jensen is thus reduced to yet another simple-minded, unpoetic, neurotic human being. In his later "Autobiographical Study" of 1925, Freud wrote even more dismissively of Jensen and by extension all writers: "I was able to show from a short story by W. Jensen called Gradiva, which has no particular merit in itself, that invented dreams can be interpreted in the same way as real ones and that the
unconscious mechanisms familiar to us in the 'dream-work' are thus also operative in the processes of imaginative writing' (SE 20:65). Not only does this conclusion have the attractiveness of neatness but it serves Freud's purpose of asserting mastery over literature.

One further manoeuvre in the double-handed strategy of praise and belittlement is encapsulated in the introduction to Freud's paraphrase of the novella in the *Gradiva* essay: "... for the benefit of those who have already read *Gradiva* I will recall the substance of the story in a brief summary; and I shall count upon their memory to restore to it all the charm of which this treatment will deprive it." Though this might seem to be a gesture of respect to the writer as artist, in fact Freud has demoted the role of artistic technique to "charm." It appears here in implication as a decorative element, and one with a passively feminine quality. One can more easily set this aside as insubstantial than be forced to lay down one's arms in the face of it.

Freud discussed the more general issue of suffering depicted in art with his essay, "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage" (SE 7: 303-10). How is it that the audience derives pleasure from witnessing tragedy? Before looking at Freud's answer to this, we might wonder why he needs to address this as a problem. It is an important question for psychoanalysis because on the face of it this evident satisfaction in witnessing depictions of suffering, death and tragedy seems to be therapeutic. People can leave such performances feeling relieved of personal griefs, enhanced and powerful in themselves—in short, it seems to do what psychoanalysis promises to do for patients. Freud's answer then must demonstrate in some way how the possibly cathartic effect of dramatic art is ultimately ineffective as a source of lasting relief or real insight. He does this by firstly proposing that audiences are engaged in a process of unconscious identification with dramatic heroes, and secondly through proposing that this identification is similar to the sorts of fantasies played out by children wishing to do what grown-ups do:

The spectator (like the child) is a person who experiences too little, who feels that he is a 'poor wretch to whom nothing of importance can happen', who has long been obliged to damp down, or rather displace, his ambition ... he longs to feel and to act and to arrange things according to his desires—in short, to be a hero. (SE 7: 304)

This identification is achieved in two steps. The hero must at first appear as healthy and admirable so that the audience will wish to identify with him; only subsequently can his psychopathic illness emerge or develop:

For the victim of a neurosis is someone into whose conflict we can gain no insight if we first meet it in a fully established state. But, *per contra*, if we recognize the conflict, we forget that he is a sick man, just as, if he himself recognizes it, he ceases to be ill. It would seem to be the dramatist's business to induce the same illness in us; and this can best be achieved if we are made to follow the development of the illness along with the sufferer. (SE 7: 310)
Thus, not only is the audience indulging a childhood fantasy of heroic proportions, but they are rendered ill by their identification with the conflicts of the hero.

If it is to achieve its effects this form of art must deny the audience insight into the nature of what is happening. The conflicts at the base of the psychopathic illness of the hero—impulses struggling for expression—must not be named, "so that in the spectator too the process is carried through with his attention averted and he is in the grip of his emotions instead of taking stock of what is happening." The events of the drama thus become "derivatives of the repressed material reaching consciousness, owing to a lower resistance, while the repressed material itself is unable to do so" (SE 7: 309).

In this way Freud hopes to show that for all its ability to stir feelings and perhaps release emotions in an apparently cathartic process, the experience of art remains fundamentally a misguided one because the true source of the drama's conflict is never named: of all the dramatist's skills, "the most important seems to be that of the diversion of attention" (SE 7: 310). Psychoanalysis alone has the key to unlock the mysteries of this diversion or sublimation.

Freud presents psychoanalysis in the role of saviour of critics and audiences in a reference to *Hamlet* in the opening paragraphs of "The Moses of Michelangelo":

> Let us consider Shakespeare's masterpiece, *Hamlet*, a play now over three centuries old. I have followed the literature of psychoanalysis closely, and I accept its claim that it was not until the material of the tragedy had been traced back by psychoanalysis to the Oedipus theme that the mystery of its effect was at last explained. But before this was done, what a mass of differing and contradictory interpretative attempts, what a variety of opinions about the hero's character and the dramatist's intentions! Does Shakespeare claim our sympathies on behalf of a sick man, or of an ineffectual weakling, or of an idealist who is merely too good for the real world? And how many of these interpretations leave us cold!—so cold that they do nothing to explain the effects of the play and rather incline us to the view that its magical appeal rests solely upon the impressive thoughts in it and the splendor of its language. And yet, do not those very endeavours speak for the fact that we feel the need of discovering in it some source of power beyond them alone? (SE 13: 239)

The first point to make in regard to this passage is that it is a vehicle for self-promotion. It was first published anonymously in 1914 in the journal *Imago*, as though written by a disinterested observer. The writer adopts the tone of one who has been converted to

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25 “After all,” Freud writes in the same essay, “the conflict in *Hamlet* is so effectively concealed that it was left to me to unearth it” (310).

26 Interestingly, Sterba reports Freud's anecdote about the origin of his concept of sublimation: in a travel book by the poet Heinrich Heine, Freud read the possibly apocryphal story of "a young man who, out of juvenile sadistic mischief, cut the tail off every dog he could get hold of, to the great indignation of the population in the Harz Mountains. This same person later became a surgeon, the famous Johann Friedrich Dieffenbach (1795-1847)” (*Reminiscences* 118). Thus Freud was indebted again to literature, to story-telling, for the evidence that suggested one of his most famous and basic concepts relating to the production of art.

27 In a letter to Abraham Freud claimed that he wrote anonymously "for fun" and because he was ashamed of the "obviously dilettantish character" of the essay (Kofman 204). He also persisted in calling the paper which had occupied him for two years in the writing, "a love child" (Gay 314). Freud
the psychoanalytic way of thinking through the force of arguments and demonstrations by others. The interpretation offered by psychoanalysis is, at last, an explanation which removes the mystery of the play's powerful fascination. Psychoanalysis thus stands as a final and fundamental truth about Shakespeare's play. More than this, its interpretation goes beyond the effects of the 'art' in the play, that is Shakespeare's splendid language and impressive thoughts. The evidence that compels us to accept the psychoanalytic interpretation is there in the statement that all other interpretations leave this writer cold. When we realise that this writer is Freud himself we are faced not only with this text as a deceptive and circular argument, as a political ploy and an ambivalent gesture, but with a sense of urgency in its determined bid to put Shakespeare's "masterpiece" behind it.

Freud presents the Hamlet of previous critics as sick, ineffectually weak, or idealist. It is the child who idealises, the feminine (or the castrated child) who is associated with weakness, and the hysteric who is sick. Freud has, as it were, restored Hamlet's virility to him by situating him in an Oedipal crisis, and restored the masculinity of the audience by rescuing them from the spell of the work's "magical appeal."

For Freud, preoccupied as he is with threats to masculinity, the presence of women in Hamlet's audience remains invisible.

Freud places psychoanalysis as a science in pursuit of the same goals as art, but now in advance of art because it takes those further steps to insight, and thus to the cure that comes from recognising one's unconscious conflicts. As critical commentary psychoanalysis manoeuvres to expose the limitations and indeed the duplicity of the exchange between artist and audience. But more than a commentary and more than exegesis, psychoanalysis tells us it is telling the openly truthful and more fascinating story which lies hidden behind the work of the creative writer. It is a discourse of demystification. Even while adopting the conventions of author-criticism psychoanalysis overwhelms and undermines the position of the author by representing the sick and infectious author as one who is incapable of insight, one who is locked into an endless toying with unrecognised childhood fantasies and, perhaps more dangerously, one who produces the symptoms of hysterical illness in audiences. The author is no better than a patient. Foucault's geological analogy of the author as a "thin surface" of infinite sedimentary layers resonates with Freud's image of the patient as an archaeological site which can only be reconstructed through the skill of the analyst.

did not admit to his authorship of the piece until 1924.

Richard Sterba helped secure this tone of mastery for psychoanalysis shortly after Freud's death in an article which summarised Freud's writings about art: "In the hallucinatory fulfilment of infantile wishes lies also the source of the pleasure of enjoyment of the work of art, that is to say, the secret of its effect on others" ("The Problem of Art" 263).

"His [the analyst's] work of construction, or, if it is preferred, of reconstruction, resembles to a great extent an archaeologist's excavation of some dwelling-place that has been destroyed and buried or of some ancient edifice. The two processes are in fact identical ... " (SE 23: 259).
Both images deliver the author as fragmented and unconscious into the hands of the scientist.

In the hands of a psychoanalytic commentary art is not only opened up like an archaeological site, but it is exposed as a dangerous site of infection for the unwary. This claim takes on the form of a denial based on a reversal of the real situation when we consider that psychoanalysis itself can be seen to act as a virus on the body of art. But before investigating the ways that psychoanalysis colonises art I wish to review a range of other responses to Freud's writing on art.

There have been a number of standard psychoanalytic responses to Freud's discussions of art, ranging from attempts to correct what are seen as mistaken emphases to declarations that Freud's relation to art is unproblematic. These responses illustrate Foucault's point about the nature of psychoanalytic discourse. If they are to remain within the discourse these responses must either appear to adhere to Freud's assertions, reinterpret them, or select from them those that are deemed significant. If the responses attempt to dismiss Freud's insights then psychoanalysis itself comes under threat.

Those writers such as Gombrich, Storr and Spence who 'correct' Freud's mistaken emphases do not recognise the strategic importance of the contradictory or inconsistent positions adopted by Freud. Freud's contradictions are not oversights, defences or failures of intelligence, but they are necessary manoeuvres for mastery over literature as a rival discourse.30

Gombrich, for instance, has attempted to correct Freud's treatment of artistic technique as mere cosmetic charm by showing that a balance must be achieved between aesthetic activity and regressive pleasure if a work of art is to avoid becoming repellent. In this way Gombrich hopes to re-instate an aesthetic reaction as equally central to an analytic appreciation of the exchange between artist and audience. But such a correction, if accepted, would undermine the project of annexation revealed in Freud's 'mistaken' over-emphasis on the symbolic content of artworks. In any case, Gombrich's 'correction' submits to the typologies of Freudian normality by characterising inferior aesthetic exchanges between a work of art and its audience as passive, while a satisfying one involves dynamism, reconstruction and projection. Gombrich's aesthetics become an exercise of male heterosexual normality—inviting Freudian recognition of the presence of a reaction formation.

In his 1972 study, The Dynamics of Creation, Anthony Storr describes Freud's psychoanalytic discussion of art as ambivalent (15-29). The first chapter of Storr's book is titled, "The Ambivalence of Freud." This reading of Freud's double-handed rhetoric pleads sympathy for a Freud who is faced with the difficult problem of distinguishing works of art from neurotic symptoms. We are thus prepared for another attempt to correct the psychoanalytic perspective. In this case, Storr suggests that Freud's emphasis on sexuality and aggression as basic drives underlying all human action is, in the case of creative work, inadequate. Once again such a correction fails to recognise what was in fact a necessary strategy for the emergence of the discourse known as psychoanalysis.

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In The Talking Cure (289) Berman psychoanalyses Freud's textual ambivalence by suggesting it reflects a deep "split" in his character. Such an approach deflects attention from the strategies required to establish psychoanalysis as a discourse distinct from, and superior to art and literature.

In an article published in 1985, Anthony Storr ("Psychoanalysis and Creativity" 38-57) has responded to Freud's suggestion that both artist and audience are locked into an essentially infantile, escapist fantasy by proposing that Freud was mistaken in his treatment of fantasy as always hallucinatory. Storr argues that fantasy can be a constructively adaptive force. He brings in evidence from science to show that progress and insights have arrived as a result of fantasy-like thinking. This attempt to correct Freud mistakes the purpose of the psychoanalytic response to art. My interest is not whether art is really an hallucinatory fantasy in the service of partially repressed impulses, but rather what rhetorical
Some commentators do not see any need to correct Freud, but rather misread the force and direction of his arguments. Writing at a time when, he says, he was still mourning the loss of Freud, Richard Sterba (1940) offers a glowing summation of Freud's "contribution" to art: "... even if only once the searchlight of his genius has been thrown in passing, its powerful beam has always been directed upon the most essential points of the field in question. Depth and enlightenment are to be found in every sentence" ("The problem of Art" 256). Sterba proposes that psychoanalysis reveals "the secrets of its [art's] effect on others" (263) but he does not pursue the question of how art is to survive the uncovering of a secret apparently essential to its effect.\footnote{Abraham Kaplan later writes that "art is the triumph of the pleasure principle and the reality principle acting in concert" ("Freud and Modern Philosophy" 213). The reader is not alerted to this as a statement contradicting Freud, but rather it is meant to reflect an orthodox psychoanalytic position.}

Others continue Freud's combination of combative rhetoric and respectful partnership in their applications of psychoanalysis to art.\footnote{In The Literary Uses of the Psychoanalytic Process, for example, Meredith Skura asserts the psychoanalyst's supremacy over literature, while characterising psychoanalysis as a practical tool for criticism: "The analyst always deals with more of the mind than does either the poet or the theoretician who makes maps of the mind ... what is unique about psychoanalysis is that it not simply identifies strange behaviour but also locates a source for behaviour in something besides current experience" (38-9). The analyst as literary critic is "open" and "particularly sensitive" to a text in a way other critics normally are not: The analyst is alert to the ways in which a text may serve a wishful, subjective function as well as an objective one; to the ways in which the text's mode of representation may work in a private and illogical fashion as well as in a public and logical fashion; to the ways in which a text's rhetorical function may be something other than objective, public communication; and to the way in which even the most sophisticated and self-conscious interpretive act has its own primitive dimensions and has roots in infantile curiosity, physical penetrations, and fantasies of omniscience. In other words, the analyst reminds us that there is always more in a text than we normally see, and much that would surprise us. (273-4)}

Skura glissades without comment from literature to texts in this passage, extending the territory for psychoanalytic penetrations and ignoring Freud's painstaking efforts at showing how literature is a particular kind of discourse which requires the special keys of psychoanalytic interpretation for its peculiar effects to be understood. If we can move so easily from literature to texts, then all texts become wish fulfilling fantasies, dream-work, mere manifest material—including any attempt at interpreting them. The risks of absurdity or endless complication are interesting ones, but are not discussed for Skura's book ends on this note without its own textual unconscious being excavated.
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beyond its origins in Freud so that it claims a kind of priority, for the poets were making use of it even before it had been elucidated by Freud. Thus, in a time-reversing flourish worthy of Kurt Vonnegut, it cannot be that Freud practised his art upon the stuff of the poets, but it was the poets who were raiding psychoanalytic theory all along. In passing here we might note that the qualities attributed to psychoanalysis—subtlety, complexity, tragic power—are the very qualities literature might previously have claimed for itself.

More recently Sarah Kofman has recognised the "double reading" Freud gives to literature and in turn the double reading we must make of his own writing about art and literature. Kofman has chosen to see Freud's writing in psychoanalytic terms as a necessary and progressive resolution to an Oedipal drama. She takes up Freud's speculative suggestion that the first individual to separate psychologically from the horde/group/family, and move to kill the father (even if only in imagination), was the first poet (SE 18: 136-7). Epic poetry was thus an early and primitive advance on a state of group psychology. Epic poetry (and all literature) achieves an incomplete resolution of Oedipal desire through the mechanisms of heroic myth:

The "murder" of the father by the artist is achieved by means of regression to the narcissistic stage. Freud's unmasking of this dynamic, however, consists in showing that the theological attitude of worship toward the artist is simply the other side of narcissistic identification. Both the religious and animistic phase must be surpassed by the scientific phase—that of adulthood—characterised by renunciation of the pleasure principle and subordination of object choice to reality. (Kofman 20)

Freud's attitude towards artists thus repeats the attitude towards the father: initial overvaluation, a reluctance to "kill" him, and eventually a revolution which ends illusions and marks the end of childhood. For Kofman art, like all cultural phenomena, is a reaction formation in response to the Oedipal complex: it is self-evident to her that "folklore, popular myths, legends, figures of speech, proverbs and literature ... are but so many dialects of the unconscious" (67-8). Psychoanalysis saves humankind from its unconscious and worshipful attitude towards art and artists. This neat model is not utilised, in its turn, to produce an explanation for the continuing reverence accorded to Freud and his words.

Janet Sayers is another recent writer who has achieved a seemingly serene partnership between literature and psychoanalysis in her discussion of a variety of neurotic defences. But tension remains embedded in her text for it is always necessary, finally, to tear therapy and literature apart:

Therapy has begun to do its job when—as in a play—we realise we were immersed in a drama, whose figures, however real their effects, were mere spirits. Only when we recognise these figures to be the invention of fantasy can we begin to test them against reality. (212)
This passage seems to suggest at first that art is an ally for therapy, but then it quickly becomes apparent that art—for example a play—is a misleading fantasy. Analysis alone remains bedded in reality.

It is instructive to turn to the work of Otto Rank at this stage because not only do his psychoanalytic statements about art faithfully mirror Freud's, they focus and extend them to a point where the strategic question can be asked: is art possible or even necessary after psychoanalysis? Rank's exhaustive study, *The Incest Theme in Literature and Legend*, was published in 1912 but not translated into English until 1992. Rank follows Freud in proposing that creative writing achieves its effects through disguised expression of unconscious impulses. He makes it clear that the author is unconscious of these unnamed impulses:

I characterize them (creative artists) as those who can compensate for the disturbances in their psychosexual development through fantasy activity, though it is below the level of consciousness. Such fantasy activity gratifies the infantile emotions still active in the unconscious of these artists while also gratifying the long-repressed infantile wishes of normal adults. (Rank 26)

Art, for Rank, is a method of controlling incestuous impulses by giving them expression while at the same time protecting this repressed material from reaching consciousness (549) by only allowing the expression in the form of unconsciously motivated fantasies. "The artist represents a regressive stage, a failure to pass beyond the infantile level" (570). The work of the artist is "a sort of neurotic turning away from life" (571). Rank even notes that without this abnormality in the artist, art in its current manifestations becomes impossible: "An individual gifted with technical ability, no matter how perfect will remain nothing but a craftsman unless he has psychological struggles and suffering to deal with ... We can no longer believe in inborn artistic talent ... talent is an expression of psychic need ... " (570-1). Here psychoanalysis has moved decisively beyond Freud's respectful laying down of arms in the face of "the artistic gift." Talent has been psychoanalysed out of existence.

This view of art raises a number of issues for Rank. One is how to deal with those writers who, instead of neurotically and unconsciously turning away from life, speak directly about normally repressed matters such as incestuous desires. Stendhal, for instance, in *Confessions of an Egoist*, wrote:

I was always in love with my mother. I always wanted to kiss my mother and wished that clothes did not exist. She loved me passionately and often embraced me in her arms. I kissed her with such fervor that she was to an extent obliged to

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33 Some commentators have regarded Rank as a magnificent exponent of a *reductio ad absurdum* for certain aspects of Freudian thought. The Marxist philosopher Volosinov introduced Rank to his discussion of Freudianism by writing, "It should be noted that Rank is Freud's favorite student and is considered the Freudian of greatest orthodoxy" (62).
withdraw. I despised my father when he approached and interrupted our kisses. I always wished to kiss her on the breast.  
(Rank 27)

Baudelaire, Strindberg and Rosegger are other writers Rank quotes in this respect. We could add Rousseau to the list. In The Confessions, published in 1781, he recalls being sensually aroused as an eight year old when his foster mother beat him. He makes a link between this and his later adult sexuality: "Who could have supposed that this childish punishment, received at the age of eight at the hands of a woman of thirty, would determine my tastes and desires, my passions, my very self for the rest of my life ... At the moment when my senses were aroused my desires took a false turn and, confining themselves to this early experience, never set about seeking a different one" (Confessions 26). Rank deals with such revelations by, first of all, calling this writing shameless, and then categorising these writers as exceptions: "Of course most authors are not so frank, and cannot be so" (27).34 He goes on to claim later that such frank writing is a mark of unsuccessful, ephemeral art. "It is works with undisguised sexual content that are renewed with each generation and disappear most quickly from the literary scene ... it is those works derived through the highly valued process of repression and sublimation that remain young and effective for centuries" (549).

A further issue involves the comparative roles of art and psychoanalysis in relation to incestuous impulses. If the role of literature is to allow some cathartic release but continued repression of these impulses, then what role can art serve for those analysts and patients who have brought their incestuous impulses into consciousness? Presumably no longer do they need to keep unsuccessfully repressing this material either as artists or as audience members. More immediately, what role is left for artistic activity now that writers like Freud and Rank have exposed the hidden impulses at work below the surface of art? Rank is convinced that he has uncovered the limitations of art: "Owing to its basically unconscious nature ... artistic creativity is incapable of adapting itself permanently to progressive changes in consciousness" (18). This is particularly critical for art if psychoanalysis is seen as a force for "fundamental shifts in the mental life of man" (18). Rank is forced to conclude that "the demise of our traditional forms of art is unavoidable, given the advancement of consciousness ... artistic activity may appear to be only a passing symptom in the course of general mental development" (17-18). From traditional forms of art Rank moves to artistic activity in general, and thus to the recognition of it as a passing symptom in the progress of civilisation away from neurotic illnesses. Brutal though it seems when

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34 Labelling these writers as exceptions is surely an evasion of the issue, as well as an offence against the principle of Occam’s Razor: Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. See K.R. Eissler’s Leonardo da Vinci: Psychoanalytic Notes on the Enigma (283-7) for another example of this willingness to create exceptional categories for cases which do not fit the psychoanalytic model.
presented here, this view is a faithful extension of some of Freud's less overt manoeuvres.

Nagera’s 1967 study of Van Gogh repeats these post-Freudian postures while managing to read as a parodic version of psychoanalysis-by-numbers:

Unconsciously he [Van Gogh] seems to think it is masturbation that has ruined him as a man ... Painting is a particularly suitable vehicle for Vincent because it can embody the essential components of his sexuality, not only his phallic creative strivings but also the strong anal components with which in his case they are contaminated. The media of oil painting form a traditionally well-known outlet for the gratification of otherwise forbidden anal impulses; the consistency, the strong smells, the messiness are highly enjoyable for the anal personality . . . Similarly, his perception that a more frequent and freer sexual life than the very methodic, at best once a fortnight sexual outlet that he allows himself, will drain him of his creativity and ability to paint, is quite correct. The energy for his paintings is modified sexual energy and if he expends it on the one activity it will not be available for the other. (Nagera 145-7)

Nagera is in effect suggesting that if Van Gogh had received psychoanalytic therapy to resolve conflicts arising from his unconscious impulses, or if he had been happily married his art would not have developed in the way it did, and in fact he would not have needed, nor would he have been able, to paint. At the moment of disclosing the hidden meaning of art such analysis implies the end of art. What enlightened audience would want to return to Van Gogh’s last paintings now that their infantile and phantasy-ridden secrets have been revealed? What artist will not now seek therapy to cure him of his anal impulse to create art?

Like Nagera, Rank not only diagnoses the illness of the artist-author but announces the death of art, and in particular literature. More widely still it is the death of the text as transparent medium of truth which is announced here. Psychoanalytic interest in the hidden—its interest in texts as symptoms, or as products of underlying lawful but irrational and usually destructive forces—prefigures the general structuralist and post-structural deconstructionist interest in the elusiveness of meaning.

Freud and in his wake, Otto Rank, thus become players in the history of thinkers who see that discourse has uses as well as content. The Freudian analysis of creativity helps provide a beginning for the task of dissipating the Romantic mystique of authorial inspiration. Freud is in a sense preparing ground for Foucault’s histories and analyses of discourse. Psychoanalytic engagement with this notion is, however, both insightful and blind, or once again double-handed for while Freud and others declare that the discourse called literature has its usefulness in repressing the unconscious "cauldron of seething excitement" within us as an essential strategy for the maintenance of social order in a Western society, at the same time psychoanalytic theory deflates art, renders its purpose outdated and in effect replaces it with psychoanalytic discourse.
But must psychoanalysis (despite its apparently revolutionary stance as the new interpreter of the human psyche) then become in its turn essential to the conservative task of maintaining social order? Indeed, this is a criticism which will later be directed at its institutions: their interest, it will be claimed, is merely to maintain the social status quo. And what role does repression play in this new discourse keeping our libido in civilised order? This question cannot be explicitly stated or investigated, for it is in the interests of psychoanalysis to maintain around its own texts not only a critical silence but an air of scientific objectivity. Psychoanalysis becomes the guardian of truths somehow beyond repression, interpretation or ambiguity.35

Freud's commitment to his method as the only avenue to art's real meaning and as the modern successor to art is encapsulated in his response to an invitation from André Breton when that leader of Surrealism asked Freud for a contribution to an anthology of dreams: "A mere collection of dreams without the dreamer's associations, without knowledge of the circumstances in which they occurred, tells me nothing and I can hardly imagine what it can tell anyone" (Ellenwood 139-141).36

On the surface, this position seems to assure psychoanalysis of a superiority, perhaps even a scientific superiority over literature. It seems to expose the triviality and the chaotic confusion of art. Art does not know what it is doing. And we should not be surprised if its days are numbered.

However, through exposing the hubris of literary texts, psychoanalysis in fact serves literature by offering it back to audiences and critics as an intricately, almost endlessly unravelling structure. Psychoanalysis has breathed a life back into literature by locating it as an origin for psychoanalytic interrogations. Wanting to replace literature psychoanalysis finds itself living off literature—and even confined to depending upon a certain kind of literature. D.R. Cox, for instance, has adopted a popularised notion of meanings-below-meanings as a paradigm for literary criticism in general, and uses it to 'explain' how Conan Doyle's writing is, after all, shallow:

Doyle is not "studied" today because there is no subtext there to study. One does not usually finish a Holmes story and ask what it "means," for the story that is presented overtly is the meaning; there is essentially no covert theme to be teased

35 It is unfair to Freud not to recognise his acceptance and awareness of moments of uninterpretable ambiguity in his psychoanalytic investigations. For instance during his interpretation of his dream of Irma's injection he inserts the following note in response to the highly charged moment when he dreams that Irma's friend "would then have opened her mouth properly": "There is at least one spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable—a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown" (SE 4: 111). Enthusiastic colleagues and followers of Freud have not as easily drawn attention to psychoanalytic limitations and possible repressions which make themselves felt at certain moments.

36 For anyone who has recorded their own dreams and then consulted Freud's Interpretation of Dreams it is striking that Freud gives so little attention to the dream as an aesthetic experience when so often the most striking quality of a dream can be its aesthetic quality as a visual, textual, aural or kinesthetic experience. At times, as we will see, Freud was acutely aware of his failure to render his book on dreams with an adequate sense of form.
out of the characters and the action. *Moby Dick* is a novel about a whale that is really not simply a whale: *The Hound of the Baskervilles* ... is about a dog that in the end is really just a dog after all. And although we can see in *The Hound of the Baskervilles* a touch of naturalism, a hint of symbolism, the suggestion of a philosophical message, most critics today would relegate the novel to the category of "subliterature," because it merely entertains and does not broaden our understanding of the human condition. (Cox 233-4)

This is the problem of boundaries. When does a text become uninterpretable, not worth interpreting, too consciously produced to qualify as literature, or so systematically analytical that it is really science, not literature? Psychoanalysis must attempt to confine our understanding of what literature is if it is to maintain its position as the successor and ultimate interpreter of literature. Psychoanalysis then becomes caught in a symbiotic relation to the very literature it aimed to render obsolete.

But on this question of boundaries, we might ask whether psychoanalysis is caught at a dangerous border-crossing when it insists that the incestuous unconscious is after all only an incestuous unconscious. Are we left with a possibly enthralling but nevertheless subliterary experience? We are not, perhaps, because we can heretically turn psychoanalysis back on itself to reveal it as its own dream, and see it as a remarkably intricate literary structure in its own right. The incestuous unconscious becomes its structuring device.

For Freud the discourse of analysis is saved by the assertion of its identity as a science. But even this assertion is never simple, for it is only ever foregrounded as a rhetorical move. At other times, when the debate is less intense, Freud can afford to express awareness of his work as an aesthetic structure. This is clear in several passages of self-criticism Freud wrote to Fliess in 1899 as he was sending proofs and manuscripts of *The Interpretation of Dreams* to his friend: "What I dislike about it [the manuscript of *Interpretation of Dreams*] is the style, which was quite incapable of noble, simple expression and lapsed into facetious circumlocutions straining after metaphors. I know that, but the part of me that knows it and knows how to evaluate it is unfortunately the part that does not produce" (*Letters to Fliess* 371); and again ten days later, "Somewhere inside me there is a feeling for form, an appreciation of beauty as a kind of perfection; and the tortuous sentences of my dream book, with their parading of indirect phrases and squinting at ideas, deeply offended one of my ideals. Nor am I far wrong in regarding this lack of form as an indication of insufficient mastery of the material" (373-4). A deep respect for the importance of aesthetic form

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37 Several months earlier Freud had made a similar comment to Fliess: "The chapter you have now is stylistically still quite crude and bad in some parts, that is written without much liveliness" (*Letters to Fliess* 312).
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in this instance links aesthetic perfection, for him, to notions of mastery. Form in this case is not a beguilement, a diversion from the truth, or a simulation of neurosis. In a more extended passage to Fliess several weeks earlier Freud’s discussion of the difficulties of his early chapters on past dream research and the status of his book as a contribution to science moves into a compelling image of the ideal form and narrative quality of his book:

Dear Wilhelm,

When are you not right? Once again you put into words what I had been dimly been thinking to myself, that this first chapter is sure to deter a lot of readers from going on to the following chapters. But there is little to be done about it—except for putting a note in the preface, which we shall construct when everything else is done. You did not want the literature in the body of the work and you were right, nor at the beginning and you are right again. You feel about it as I do; the secret probably is that we do not like it at all. But if we do not want to hand the "scientists" an ax with which to slaughter the poor book, we must put up with it somewhere. The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. At the beginning, the dark forest of authors (who do not see the trees), hopelessly lost on wrong tracks. Then a concealed pass through which I lead the reader—my specimen dream with its peculiarities, details, indiscretions, bad jokes—and then suddenly the high ground and the view and the question: which way do you wish to go now? (Freud Letters 365)

From such a passage we can see how creatively Freud worked on his material. Though he might have aimed to work with the rigour of a scientist, he still aimed to work with the sort of discipline that a novelist brings to a long book. It is difficult to know how to read the above passages 'into' psychoanalytic discourse. Do we trap Freud in an inconsistent view of the function of aesthetic or creative elements in a work? Do we see these statements as proof that, finally, Freud wished to be admired as an artist? His 'science' was, as it were, the diversionary tactic which served to conceal the power of his narrative over us. (Interestingly it would seem odd and irrelevant to psychoanalyse Freud himself by way of the forest leading back to his childhood in the beloved woods of Freiberg and on to an anxiety to successfully negotiate the forest of his mother's pubic hair.) Or do we turn psychoanalysis back on itself and see in this mastery of form, in this taking-us-by-the-hand through a forest, a desire to infantilise his readers? When, in 1975, Lacan told an American university audience, "I don't have a conception of the world; I have a style," (Turkle 232) he was insisting on highlighting and playing at those borderlines which have troubled psychoanalytic discourse from the beginning.

In the above discussion we have followed in some detail the double strategy of psychoanalytic discourse in relation to art. On the one hand art and literature are presented as avenues to otherwise inaccessible truths about the human psyche, while on the other hand they are revealed as regressive, even hallucinatory activities designed to
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maintain the civilised status quo by keeping unconscious urges repressed. I want to review now the reasons that both these strategies might be important to a psychoanalytic discourse.

Firstly, psychoanalysis needs literature. Because its clinical basis is in the pathological there is a need to demonstrate its general applicability if it is to become a credible psychology of the human personality. Literature can provide it with strategic support outside a clinical setting. In addition, the support is often in terms of psychological insights so remarkably similar to the claims of psychoanalysis that they can operate as confirmations. Of course, this debt cannot become too significant because psychoanalysis aims to assert itself as a distinct, original and superior discourse.

In 1965, Ernst Kris for instance can concede that analysts "turn gratefully, from time to time, to great creators in literature. The writer's vision has sifted what at first appears to the clinical observer to be an overwhelming mass of data" (Psychoanalytic Explorations 266). In proposing this, Kris echoes the many respectful and grateful phrases Freud used in his references to literature. The contribution of literature, however, remains limited and marginal to psychoanalytic knowledge because psychoanalysis is, above all, a science:

While this [the contributions of great creators of literature] is particularly suited for the purpose of illustration and demonstration ... psychoanalytic clinical research can only in exceptional cases be based on any evidence other than clinical data. (Psychoanalytic Explorations 266-7)

Literature can never rise above the status of supplementary evidence.

In this way, a debt to literature can be expressed and parallels with literature acknowledged, while at the same time a separate claim to scientific rigour and scientific truth can be made for psychoanalytic claims about a universal psychology. While clinical data remain the source of psychoanalytic insights, any priority literature might claim can be taken up as marginal confirmations of truths arrived at independently and rigorously. This appears as a factual claim, but it is a rhetorical manoeuvre.

Psychoanalysts' claims to factual status for their discoveries on the basis of rigorous clinical research are highly suspect;38 in fact these claims act more importantly as devices for positioning psychoanalysis in relation to literature than as introductions to any weight of clinical evidence.

38 See Allen Esterson's Seductive Mirage. Esterson proposes that not only were Freud's case histories sometimes constructed second-hand, that he obscured the crucial difference between patient reports or memories and his interpretations during therapy, but that at times he invented cases to suit a current theoretical position.

See also E.M Thornton, The Freudian Fallacy. Thornton notes the lack of evidence for many of Freud's contentions, and his stock response to criticism on this point: "my observations had led me to ..." (153).

For a more general inquiry into psychoanalytic practice, see Adolf Grunbaum's Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis.
In summary, when psychoanalysis uses the status and the assertions of literature to help confirm its interpretations and thus establish its credibility, this strategy leaves psychoanalysis as a discourse in a weakened position. It can appear to be in considerable debt to literature, particularly in terms of any claims to priority for its insights, and worse than this, it might appear to be no more than literature. In order to assert itself as a distinct and superior discourse the double-handed manoeuvres identified in the writings of Freud, Sterba, Rank, Kris, Skura, Bettelheim and others become important. With literature exposed as essentially delusional and socially conservative, psychoanalysis can afford to adopt for itself what it sees as the aim of literature—the pursuit of truths about the human psyche—and do this with claims to surpass any truth literature can offer. Psychoanalytic discourse's openly expressed desire to occupy the ground of science works to obscure this annexation of literature while inflating the status of the assertions of psychoanalytic discourse.

**Freud and the Case of the Decomposing Body**

"What a weight from my heart! But this is inconceivable—impossible! Mr Holmes, you are a wizard, a sorcerer! How did you know it was there?"

"Because I knew it was nowhere else."

(Doyle 887)

Tracing a hysterical symptom back to a traumatic scene assists our understanding only if the scene satisfies two conditions: if it possesses the relevant *suitability to serve as a determinant* and if it recognizably possesses the necessary *traumatic force*. Instead of a verbal explanation, here is an example. Let us suppose that the symptom under consideration is hysterical vomiting; in that case we shall feel that we have been able to understand its causation (except for a certain residue) if the analysis traces the symptom back to an experience which *justifiably produced a high amount of disgust*—for instance, the sight of a decomposing dead body. But if, instead of this, the analysis shows us that the vomiting arose from a great fright, e.g. from a railway accident, we shall feel dissatisfied and will have to ask ourselves how it is that the fright has led to the particular symptom of vomiting. The derivation lacks *suitability as a determinant* ... the experience lacks *traumatic force*.

(SE 3: 193-4)

We recognise the 'true' source of an hysterical symptom when, in response to the emergence of a possible origin, we can say, *I recognise this source because I knew it was nowhere else.* The work of analysis can only be completed when a suitably extreme experience (this was later to become a suitably extreme desire: the desire for incest) has been uncovered. In the same way, the detective thriller cannot begin without *its* suitable extreme—the dead body—and cannot end until the body's death has been explicitly remembered (that is reconstructed) as an event. Indeed, this pattern is at the heart of that ur-detective tale, Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex.*
It would not be enough to know who stole the corpse's pearls if we do not know who killed the victim. It would not be enough to know a rotting apple induced hysterical vomiting when behind this must lie some more ancient and more extremely disgusting event.

Freud makes explicit in the above passage some of the rules by which an analytic case history can proceed, and then can stop satisfactorily. The essential point is that the trauma must be fitting according to our sense of what would be fitting for a particular symptom. The suitability of the original traumatic event lies in our view of it as suitably shocking.

These are the laws of the detective or crime thriller (Todorov 42-52)—laws that can make such stories truly shocking to contemporaries but produce stories which can appear relatively quaint to future generations.39 Nagera's suggestion, for example, that masturbation ruined Van Gogh "as a man" seems now nearly thirty years later either quaintly naive or in need of severe buttressing with historically detailed evidence.

In both the case history and the detective story the therapist/detective is faced with present evidence of a crime (a traumatic and destructive episode) committed in the past. However, where the detective is usually confronted at the beginning with a dead body, it is the job of the therapist, as it were, to find the dead body. The initial evidence might be in the form of a 'guilty' neurotic manifestation symbolising an early repressed desire, or, at an early stage of Freud's thinking (1896), it might be evidence of damage caused to the person's psyche by an early sexual violation. The therapist's intellectual powers of analysis, observation, association and deduction are applied in a search for a particular equivalent of the dead body. It is a detection in reverse, but it still proceeds with conventional rules of plausibility as any story of detection must.

In aiming for a unique, yet convincingly plausible outcome, the case history is constructed according to the demands of what Donald Spence has called "Narrative Truth".40 Commenting on Freud as a master of both narrative complexity and narrative closure, Spence writes:

Freud, the first psychoanalyst, was also one of the first great synthesizers. He was a master at taking pieces of the patient's associations, dreams, and memories and weaving them into a coherent pattern that is compelling, persuasive and seemingly complete. (Spence 21)

The case history is built from apparently unrelated elements, and it is the therapist who makes sense out of this non-sense, in just the way that a detective must make sense out

39 For example, Brett Easton Ellis's murder-thriller American Psycho received headline reviews in Australia in 1991 with banners such as "Bleak Satire Shocks." It could only be sold sealed in plastic from under the counters of bookshops. Five years later it can be found displayed on the shelves of second hand bookshops.

40 Spence defines narrative truth in the following way: "Narrative Truth is what we have in mind when we say that ... one solution to a mystery must be true" (31; my emphasis).
of what the reader sees as an incoherent confusion of often contradictory details.\textsuperscript{41} Spence makes several points about narrative truth which can be extended and examined against Freud's case histories and against literature on the therapeutic experience of psychoanalysis. Spence notes that the act of interpretation must be framed in such a way that the patient finds it compelling and convincing. This is more important than any historical truth if the interpretation is to be therapeutically effective. In psychoanalytic literature, for instance, the timing of an analytic interpretation is emphasised because the interpretation must be given when the patient is ready to accept the solution offered (Arlow 46-7). If an interpretation is therapeutically unsuccessful this is because it does not carry its narrative truth into the heart of the patient. It fails at the level of "rhetorical appeal" (Spence 32).

As well as the crucial demand of timing (and the textual preparation of material for the patient/reader this implies), we can go beyond Spence's point to uncover other structuring devices common to the sort of narrative development and closure case histories/detective thrillers seek. Both forms, for example, foreground their existence as written reports, that is as texts. The case history reconstructs and reports on the past as best it can, establishing the life history of the client and reporting on the course of the therapy. In detective fiction the tale is often recounted by a friend of the detective, and the reconstructions of the crime must emerge from those accounts collected from others in the course of the investigation.\textsuperscript{42}

Another constructing device is the requirement that there be a single, final solution. The possibility of multiple, fragmented or even unidentifiable sources for a neurotic symptom cannot be tolerated within the traditional framework of the case history. In his brief reference to \textit{Hamlet} in "The Moses of Michelangelo" quoted earlier Freud makes clear his commitment to the notion that there is a single, fundamental truth about the meaning of the play/neurotic manifestation, and it is a psychoanalytic one. His pronouncement/discovery that dreams are always wish-fulfilments is another, broader example of this tendency to find through an investigation that there is indeed one (psychoanalytic) solution. He writes of tracing neurotic symptoms back to a traumatic scene. In this assumption of a singular originating event or desire the psychoanalytic case history is closer to the literary form of detective fiction than to the form of a scientific research paper. As a scientific rationalist, Peter Medawar has objected to the compelling solution offered in the typical psychoanalytic report by suggesting that such a report acts more as a text of comfort than of inquiry: "It ... hangs together, makes

\textsuperscript{41} It is not only strictly the case histories such as Dora, the Wolf-Man, etc. which can be treated as case histories, for many of Freud's anecdotes and asides use the model of the case history, as do his biographical studies. He has also noted himself that works of literature and even documentary texts can read as case histories. See for instance, "A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis" (SE 19: 67-105), which he calls "this demonological case history."

\textsuperscript{42} Todorov has remarked on this aspect of detective fiction (45).
sense, leaves no loose ends, and is never (but never), at a loss for explanation. In a state of bewilderment it may bring comfort and relief (15). This comfort I am suggesting is the aesthetic comfort of narrative closure/mystery revealed.

The trajectory towards closure takes a large part of its impetus from its beginning in mystery. And mystery requires ignorance—ignorance born of absence at the time of the crime, or born from clouded judgment (in psychoanalytic terms, from repression) in the face of the crime. In his discussion of the typology of detective fiction, Todorov points out that there is always a double story, the one that has already taken place (the crime) before the writing begins, and then the writing of the story of how those past events are reconstructed and resolved (44-5). Both the case history and the classical detective story follow this pattern. While the detective/therapist begins in ignorance and unquestioned innocence due to his absence at the time of the crime/primal scene, it is necessary for the case history's client to be in ignorance as well so that this client can be led out of confusion back into a world of justice, or at least to a world where guilt is appropriately located.

This creates particular problems for the psychoanalytic case study because its client is simultaneously the mystified victim, the guilty subject filled with illicit desires, and the witness to the primal scene which must be uncovered in the course of therapy. The symptoms the patient delivers to the therapist are both expressions of helplessness as victim and clues to the client's own criminal guilt. The proposed presence and power of unconscious conflicts allows the case study to proceed with the patient playing this double role. It is important to the case study that the patient is not only unaware of her guilt, but that she remains unable to discover her guilt without submitting to the procedure known as psychoanalysis. Towards the end of his essay, "Dostoevsky and Parricide" (SE 21: 173-194), Freud interprets a short story by Stefan Zweig in terms of its main character's unconscious desire for his mother to initiate him into sexual life in order to save him from the dreaded injuries caused by masturbation. To prepare the reader for this interpretation Freud makes two observations. Firstly, he remarks that "such an interpretation is so extremely obvious that it cannot be resisted" (SE 21: 191-2). This statement gives weight to what Spence has called narrative truth while seeming to argue for an irresistible historical truthfulness in the coming account. The fact that an interpretation cannot be resisted does not prove its truth, but rather might indicate a certain level of skill or even seduction in the presentation of this version of events. The statement works as one element in the text's rhetorical preparations for the revelations to come. Of course such prefacing of the interpretation could work in a contrary fashion and set up resistances in the reader. If this tendency is present, it seems to me that it is the twin forces or strategies of ingenuity in unravelling unconscious meanings and the culturally shocking nature of the revelations that tend to distract readers from any resistance so that they are carried along as fascinated and convinced onlookers to the
mystery's resolution. The second observation Freud makes is that the author, "who is a personal friend of mine, was able to assure me, when I asked him, that the interpretation which I put to him had been completely strange to his knowledge and intention, although some of the details woven into the narrative seemed expressly designed to give a clue to the hidden secret" (SE 21: 192). Here Freud is compelled to emphasise that the writer was as unconscious, and as guilty, as any patient—for his discussion here amounts to an analysis of the fictional unconscious of a fictional character. Zweig has managed to illustrate a psychoanalytic truth (that gambling is a repetition of masturbation fantasies together with a self-inflicted punishment for the guilty indulgence), but Freud must indicate that the truth comes unconsciously and only as a vestige from the writer.

Similarly, in his famous essay of 1896, "The Aetiology of Hysteria," Freud describes patients 'recalling' infantile sexual scenes:

They are indignant as a rule if we warn them that such scenes are going to emerge. Only the strongest compulsion of the treatment can induce them to embark on a reproduction of them. While they are recalling these infantile experiences to consciousness, they suffer under the most violent sensations, of which they are ashamed and which they try to conceal; and, even after they have gone through them once more in such a convincing manner, they still attempt to withhold belief from them, by emphasizing the fact that, unlike other forgotten material, they have no feeling of remembering the scenes. (SE 3: 204 emphases added)

Again, the patient is necessarily in confusion and ignorance, unable to see the hidden secret without the strongest compulsion of the treatment. What this phrase means in terms of psychoanalytic technique is not clear, but it does place the therapist in an indispensable role. Further, the patient (like the writers Zweig and Jensen) remains in a state of not-remembering even when the traumatic memories have been produced.

The double role of victim-criminal played by the patient brings the psychoanalytic case study into an uncanny territory where, at the point of the mystery's resolution, we cannot be sure who is remembering or who is confessing. If the patient and the artist insist that despite the presence of compelling clues or their own distressingly reluctant reproductions of infantile experiences, they still find the interpretations strange to their knowledge, or that they still have no feeling of remembering, we must ask: why then is the therapist so convinced that the mystery has been resolved? We are returned to the conventions of detection outlined by Freud and Sherlock Holmes at the beginning of this section: I knew the answer was there because it was nowhere else! Freud uses the image of the jigsaw puzzle in "Aetiology of Hysteria" to help us see how irresistible his solution is: "It is exactly like putting together a child's picture-puzzle: after many attempts, we become absolutely certain in the end which piece belongs in the empty gap; for only that one piece fills out the picture and at the same time allows its irregular edges to be fitted into the edges of the other pieces in such a manner as to leave no free
space and to entail no overlapping" (SE 3: 205). Again, we find in this image the commitment to the convention of the single solution and to the coherence of a closure which must answer all the questions raised by the text/jigsaw in the course of the narrative/puzzle. The solution becomes, as Freud goes on to say, "self-evident." The problem this raises is, whose solution has been discovered? It seems that in the last resort, if the patient cannot be convinced by the evidence or if the patient cannot recall a suitably primal scene, the force of evidence gathered by the therapist must become so overwhelming that the therapist's solution is so self-evident to everyone else that the patient's experience of not having arrived at a solution becomes inconsequential.

The uncanniness in the structure of this introverted detective thriller emerges more forcefully when we note that the symptoms, or those otherwise overlooked details, only become clues to a hidden secret because the therapist-detective has some prior knowledge of the primal scene-crime. Thus the knowledge of the crime must somehow exist in the therapist from the beginning. It then becomes this therapist's task to find the circumstantial evidence which will compel suspicion to fall so heavily on the client that he will confess. If not confess, then willingly go along with the strange knowledge of his own guilt. The decomposing body must, as it were, be removed from the therapist's theoretical baggage into the attic-basement-unconscious of the patient. Following this, the patient's alibis must be so convincingly deconstructed (interpreted) that it appears he has unwittingly confessed. The very structure of the case history begins to resemble a frame-up designed to protect the therapist against accusations that the decomposing body has been all along in his own possession.

The psychoanalytic case history never quite fits the rhetorical and logical structure within which it is conceived and delivered. In a Holmesian narrative of detection, the ending is achieved when the beginning is uncovered. Restating this in terms of Russian formalist narrative theory, the fabula is understood once we locate the beginning of the fabula: The plot and its meanings are only grasped at the moment we are able to see the story in terms of what-actually-happened. In their discussions of the narrative structure in Freud's case histories, Peter Brooks (273-4) and Ned Lukacher (36-9) have shown how the sjuzet and the fabula shift and switch their positions. The Wolf-Man's dream of the white wolves on the tree outside his bedroom, for example, is a fabula given to Freud who then offers us the primal scene as the rewriting, the sjuzet, of the dream story. However, this primal scene can also be regarded as the fabula which gave rise to the symbolic dream as its sjuzet.

As well as the shifting values and positions of these elements, the Freudian case history cannot quite rest with its revelation/interpretation as the key to events and motives that go to make up the narrative. Twice, for instance, in the course of the case study of the Wolf-Man, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis," Freud draws back from asserting the historical occurrence of the primal (sexual) scene which operates as a
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closure for the mysteries of the case history. He points out that the innocent elements of a remembered childhood scene might indeed have happened in a historical sense while the sexual elements (uncovered in analysis) might have been projected back into this scene as a later fantasy: "It was really on a summer's afternoon while the child was suffering from malaria, the parents were both present, dressed in white, when the child woke up from his sleep, but—the scene was innocent. The rest had been added by the inquisitive child's subsequent wish, based on his experiences with the dogs, to witness his parents too in their love-making ... We need no longer suppose that the parents copulated in the presence of their child" (SE 17: 58). The tendency of patients to remember their parents in coitus a tergo would tend to support the suggestion that the primal scene can be a projection of a later fantasy, relating the parents' sexual positions to knowledge gained from observations of animals.43 If this is the case then there is no originating primal scene, only its later construction in fantasy. Towards the end of this paper Freud writes, "... what analysis puts forward as being forgotten experiences of childhood (and of an improbably early childhood) may on the contrary be based upon phantasies created on occasions occurring late in life ... No doubt has troubled me more." He can do no more than present his arguments for the validity of his interpretation (in this case against suggestions made by Jung and Adler)—"arguments which I once again lay before my readers" (SE 17: 103). The case remains, in Freud's legal metaphor, non liquet (SE 17: 60).

When the Wolf-Man himself later recalled the dream of the white wolves in the walnut tree (SE 17: 29) and its interpretation, his comments highlight the weakness of Freud's reasoning method, the importance of some narrative truth in interpretations, and Freud's persistence in manufacturing a psychoanalytic solution:

W: In my story, what was explained by dreams? Nothing as far as I can see. Freud traces everything back to the primal scene which he derives from the dream. But that scene does not occur in the dream. When he interprets the white wolves as nightshirts or something like that, for example, linen sheets or clothes, that's somehow far-fetched, I think. That scene in the dream where the windows open and so on and the wolves are sitting there, and his interpretation, I don't know, those things are miles apart. It's terribly far-fetched.
O: But is it true that you did have that dream?
W: Yes it is.
O: You must have told him other dreams.
W: Of course, but I no longer remember the dreams I told him.
O: And that didn't impress you when he interpreted dreams?
W: Well, he said it doesn't matter whether one takes note of that or not, consciously. The effect remains ... The whole thing is improbable because in Russia, children sleep in the nanny's bedroom, not in their parents'. It's possible, of course, that there was an exception, how do I know?... I have always thought that the memory would come. But it never did.
(Obholzer 35-6 )

43 In the Kinsey samples of 1948 and 1953 only 15% of adults reported having tried rear entry coitus. A larger 1974 study found 20% of 18-24 year olds had used this method (Katchadourian 347), indicating that this practice might have been even more uncommon among married couples at the turn of the century when Freud was gathering his data.
A further structuring device (also present in detective fiction) for the analytic case study is a commitment to the importance of apparently irrelevant details. Freud again and again prides himself on arriving at the solution to a case by way of these overlooked details. Carlo Ginzburg has identified one source for this procedure in the "Morelli method" to which Freud pays homage in his initially anonymous essay on Michelangelo's Moses. The Morelli method is also close to the heart of Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories.

Between 1874 and 1876 a series of articles appeared in the German art history journal *Zeitschrift für bildende Kunst* under the name Ivan Lermolieff. These articles claimed that many paintings in public museums were wrongly attributed. A new method of attribution was proposed. Lermolieff, later identified as an Italian physician called Giovanni Morelli, suggested that one should not consider the obvious characteristics of a painting or a painter's style because these are the aspects most carefully imitated by copyists or forgers. Rather, it is in the apparently inessential details that artists leave unique signatures of their styles. Thus, Morelli identified the typical ears drawn by Fra Filippo, Signorelli, Mantegna and Botticelli (Illustrations Ginzburg 83, Wind 41). He conducted similar analyses of fingernails, shapes of fingers and toes. While artists reveal themselves in these minor details, imitators do not copy them diligently, and in fact sometimes are compelled to 'correct' the master as in the case of the exaggerated thumb of men's hands in paintings by Titian (Ginzburg 116 n61). At the time, the Morelli Method generated controversial interest in art circles for it was regarded by some as too materialist or mechanical, that is not aesthetic enough in its approach to art.

In the essay on Michelangelo's Moses, Freud comments on Morelli's method: "It seems to me that this method of inquiry is closely related to the technique of psychoanalysis. It, too, is accustomed to divine secret and concealed things from despised or unnoticed features, from the rubbish-heap, as it were, of our observations" (SE 13: 222). This method of inquiry soon became a 'scientific' model for the structure of detective fiction. Ginzburg notes that one of Conan Doyle's uncles, Henry Doyle, Director of the Dublin Art Gallery, was in contact with Morelli and used his methods in cataloguing works. The first English translation of Morelli appeared in 1883 and the first Holmes story in 1887 (Ginzburg 112 n9). Furthermore, Morelli's ideas were so widely disseminated in newspapers and journals that Doyle could not have remained unaffected by them. Indeed, in the Sherlock Holmes story, "The Cardboard Box," published in 1892, there is a discussion of the science of the shapes of ears which mimics Morelli's insights (Doyle 923-47).

A link between Freud and Doyle can not only be traced through a common enthusiasm for Morelli's method of detection. In an aside during an interview with Muriel Gardiner, the Wolf-Man remarked on Freud's interest in the Sherlock Holmes stories: "Once we happened to speak of Conan Doyle and his creation, Sherlock
Holmes. I had thought that Freud would have no use for this type of light reading matter, and was surprised to find that this was not at all the case and that Freud had read this author attentively. The fact that circumstantial evidence is useful in psychoanalysis when reconstructing a childhood history may explain Freud's interest in this type of literature (Gardiner 1971 146). When arguing for the significance of everyday parapraxes (slips of the tongue, forgetting names, misplacing keys, etc.) Freud was drawn to the detective genre as an analogy:

And if you were a detective engaged in tracing a murder, would you expect to find that the murderer had left his photograph behind at the place of the crime, with his address attached? Or would you not necessarily have to be satisfied with comparatively slight and obscure traces of the person you were in search of? So do not let us underestimate small indications; by their help we may succeed in getting on the track of something bigger. (SE 15:27)

The point I wish to make here is that while Freud declares himself to have adopted a scientific method of analysis, or to have called upon a scientific method to validate psychoanalysis, he reveals an attraction for the very method that offers an aura of objectivity to detective fiction. Its attractiveness lies in its promise to uncover previously hidden secrets (in fact crimes) with evidence that has all along been under our noses. The neatness, ingenuity and theatricality of this is irresistible for both the detective story and the case history, requiring as they do the flourish of the revelatory closure.

Again, though, the fit is not exact. Psychoanalysis is both served and subverted by this model. Freud does not give attention to the differences between the aims of psychoanalysis and Morelli's aims. Where Morelli's method attributes an artist's name to a work of art, Freud's method aims to look behind any name, to expose the decomposing body concealed under the rubbish-heap and behind the name. The psychoanalytic aim is subversive of Morelli's assumption that a painting is known when its painter is named. For Freud naming an artist can only be the opportunity for a commentary aimed at exposing our delusions about both art and artists. Along with all those assessments of art which privilege attribution, Morelli's method has also drawn objections from art historians and critics who claim to value style, aesthetics or poetics regardless of authorship. Attribution, the argument goes, has either a pedantically historical meaning or merely an economic meaning when it links works of art to saleable names of masters. For the matter of aesthetic value attribution might be misleading in the way it begs questions of artistic merit, or it might be no more than mildly interesting and in the end unimportant for questions about the real value of art.44

When a method of correct attribution is largely irrelevant or merely a beginning in the pursuit of knowledge that matters, we can reasonably ask how adequate is the modestly circumstantial method of Morelli as a model for the psychoanalytic project. Perhaps its

44 See William Grampp (124-130) for a discussion of the economic and aesthetic significance of attribution.
use in the field of art history gives psychoanalysis a rhetorical link to science of a sort, though this would be a dubious claim if pushed too far. While it provides psychoanalysis with a halfway respectable tool for investigation, it helps to shape and limit the procedure—and the case histories emerging from it—as near-conventional narratives of fictional detection.45

Sometimes the method is so limiting that it is abandoned. With this inspired method of detection seemingly (wishfully) ideally suited to the psychoanalytic project, Freud must fly in its face when he comes to discussions of literature where he takes up not the inconsequential but the central and apparently deliberate devices of writers. Hamlet's soliloquies, Mona Lisa's smile, the position of Moses's right hand, or the dreams in Gradiva are not Morellian irrelevant (unconsciously expressive) details. They are not pickings from rubbish heaps. If the logic of Morelli's and Freud's method is that the unconscious exposes itself as asides, irrelevancies, uncontrolled slips and dreams, while we manage to conceal such aspects of ourselves in our most deliberate and conventional actions, then the unconscious of the writer is not to be sought in a text's central devices. Yet these are the focus of Freud's textual and artistic analyses. In fact, it is difficult to see how one might distinguish between what is a revelation of unconscious impulses and what is a deliberate or functional device in a fictional text.46

Even if one focused on inconsistencies, repetitive images and themes, or underlying structures, the analyst must face the objection that fictions can be constructed with a view to deceive, circumvent, satirise, parody, or even to present ready-made opportunities for psychoanalytic interpretations. Freud can only counter this problem by proposing that all of literature is a kind of rubbish heap, produced as if in a dream. This is, as we have seen, the approach Freud has taken. Though he cannot make the proposition explicit, he has dealt with texts as though they are in their entirety merely the manifest content of dreams—vestiges of unconscious impulses: literature, like dreaming, "discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters traces of an old and precious communication" (SE 4: 135n).

45 This circumstantial-deductive method, or retrospective prophecy as Huxley has called it, does not originate with Morelli or in detective fiction, but forms the basis of investigations in other disciplines such as archaeology, palaeontology, astronomy, geology and some forms of medical diagnosis. Freud, Morelli and Doyle were all trained in medicine, and Doyle expressly pointed to the acclaimed surgeon John Bell as the inspiration for Holmes. According to Doyle, Bell was a man who "could diagnose people as they came in, before even they had opened their mouths. He would tell them their symptoms, he would give them details of their lives, and he would hardly ever make a mistake" (Blathwayt 50).

46 Roland Barthes has observed, "art is without noise." Like Freud he is claiming that there are no "irretrievably insignificant" details in a literary text. "This is what separates art from 'life'" (Image Music Text 89) Barthes suggests. For Freud, committed as he is to a belief in art's reference to human truths, this is what makes art so much like life.

In a lucid discussion of Morelli's method Edgar Wind has made the point that Morelli's "diagnostic preoccupation" with rapidly executed expressive aspects of art works is in part responsible for tinging our artistic sensibility with an absurd tendency to deplore any "encroachment" of craftsmanship and patient skill upon self-expression (51).
Because an act of interpretation must be convincing for the patient, and for the reader of the subsequent case history, style in all the aspects we have discussed becomes critical. The case history becomes a rhetorically highly wrought, literary text. As Freud notes in his demonological case history, it aims for "the most natural picture of the course of events" or the "most attractive reconstruction" (SE 19: 96). It is interesting that at this point in the analysis of a demonological neurosis, Freud writes that he has hit upon "the most natural picture of the course of events, even though once more the written evidence does not entirely fit in with it." For Freud the conventions of plausibility and narrative closure are powerful enough to make contrary evidence self-evidently unreliable. Interpretation becomes a kind of aesthetic experience (Spence 268) for the reader and patient. Towards the end of his life Freud seemed to have accepted the primacy of narrative truth in the therapeutic process over the status of recollections as historical reconstructions—without, however, giving up his assertion that beyond the analyst's construction lies a memory or a desire not yet captured:

The path that starts from the analyst's construction ought to end in the patient's recollection; but it does not always lead so far. Quite often we do not succeed in bringing the patient to recollect what has been repressed. Instead of that, if the analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him an assured conviction of the truth of the construction which achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory. (SE 23: 265-66)

Here, as elsewhere, Freud turns away from the patient as the subject of real concern in psychoanalysis. The aesthetics of resolution become all-important. In the last resort the therapist, like the artist, must "produce" rather than perceive. Foucault (Power/Knowledge 45-6) has suggested that detective fiction as it arises late in the nineteenth century is grafted onto the "murder-as-fine-art" tradition, exemplified by Lacenaire and perhaps in Britain by Wainewright. Oscar Wilde reported admiringly that when Wainewright was reproached with a murder he replied, "Yes; it was a dreadful thing to do, but she had very thick ankles" (Ellman 283). While this aestheticization of crime might resist normative stereotypes of criminality and alter power relations associated with classifications of criminals, it shares with the detective tale a tendency to give little heed to the victim, often a woman, and often off-stage. The victim is an opportunity for the main performance to begin. Similarly, the aestheticization of therapy in psychoanalysis also leads, inevitably, to the case history as a display of

47 See Roy Schafer's *A New Language for Psychoanalysis* (22-57) for an early discussion of the relations between literary models and a psychoanalytic vision of reality. Schafer suggests that adopting one or all of Frye's four mythic forms (tragedy, comedy, romance and irony) is crucial to a cure in psychoanalysis: e.g., "For the analysand, then, analysis represents a rise toward the possibility of tragic experience" (47). Like Spence, Schafer must then deal with the question of whether psychoanalysis creates a literary vision or a literal truth. Schafer's position hovers between the options: "I propose, therefore, that the analytically created life history, while not fictive, is also not what one might call the absolute truth" (49-50).

48 See Simon During's *Foucault and Literature* (163-4) for a brief discussion of the aestheticization of crime.
psychoanalytic intricacies with the analysand standing finally as a prop. Just as the detective story begins predictably with a nearly anonymous dead body (almost any murdered body will do, though some status might be attached to it, or in the absence of status serial (female) bodies can be required), a psychoanalytic case history ends with the predictable unconscious desire for incest and fear of castration. Despite the immensely intricate detail which establishes the psychoanalytic patient as an individual, in the end the patient-as-victim is almost as anonymous as that cipher of detective fiction, the dead body.  

While Spence, a psychoanalyst, accepts that Freud's case histories "possess an important literary quality that can best be defined as a masterful control of style and content," he goes on to note that, "following Freud we tend to conceive of clinical papers as being quasi-literary efforts... But the tradition can easily interfere with our role as data gatherers." Thus, in recognising the ultimate importance of narrative truth for analysis, Spence sees that psychoanalytic claims to scientific status are challenged. Commenting on the analyst's commitment to the truth of his constructions, Spence writes:

> It seems as if a similar claim can be made for the artist. He commits himself to a belief in the truth of his painting—by which we mean its artistic truth—but need say nothing about its truth as a representation of the real world. Nor would we expect him to provide supporting evidence of its truth; art, after all, is only loosely tied to reality. (Spence 274).

Graciously Spence puts psychoanalytic claims to scientific status aside and is content with what he calls a pragmatic solution. That is, if analysis constructs a rhetorically (and hence therapeutically) effective text out of the patient's associations and the therapist's analysis, that is enough.

Spence might seem to have restored some peace to the discourse of psychoanalysis by freeing it from the need to insist on the historical truths of its insights, but his pragmatic solution leaves psychoanalysis and art together as indistinguishable activities. What is the difference between a rhetorical effect and a therapeutic effect? How does an aesthetic experience of narrative closure constitute a cure in a therapy session but not in a creative writing workshop? Why pay to go to a psychoanalyst when one could read or write an autobiography, novel, poem? He puts aside the place of cultural specificity and the preparatory training involved in artistic activity (or, for that matter, the preparation needed to ensure the effectiveness of psychoanalytic interpretations). Can psychoanalysis then be seen as an art-historical movement which will pass away as

49 Those writers who wish to put psychoanalysis aside often turn to its generalising and clichéd conclusions as reason enough for being disappointed with it. See, for instance, Nabokov: "... I do not belong to the Freudian denomination with its borrowed myths, shabby umbrellas, and dark backstairs"(Lectures 350); and the Australian poet Andrew Taylor: "His [Freud's] pen decides the dream has many sources/but only one end. He bows, then takes his leave"(Sandstone 22).
others have? Spence’s solution does not give attention to where analytic discourse is placed in relation to art once/if its scientistic rhetoric is removed. For him it seems to be enough that analysis works, for the time being, within the therapeutic setting.

To take this further, the key to the link between an aesthetic and a therapeutic effect might be the setting, if we see the manifest rhetorical position adopted in a discourse as part of the setting. It is strategically short-sighted of Spence to give up scientific-historical claims in favour of an effective narrative truth, for in doing this he has denied psychoanalysis the particular place it has established for itself. Just as autobiography must at least masquerade as history or confession, psychoanalysis must present its insights and case histories as scientific truths. If, within or beneath the apparently factual history an autobiography can be seen to be structured by traditions of oral narrative, as Wendy Capper has shown for instance with Albert Facey’s *A Fortunate Life*, then this layering or interconnecting is what helps autobiography to emerge as a genre separate from both history and fiction. Similarly, psychoanalysis must present itself manifestly as science, history, biology and psychology while subduing though not eliminating the devices of quest narratives, detection tales, and psychological novels, including their commitment to aesthetic closure. It is from within the splitting, connecting and contesting of these forms that psychoanalysis finds its existence as a distinct discourse. Autobiography cannot exist without its impossible tensions, and neither can psychoanalysis. It is, perhaps, the particular tensions operating within psychoanalytic discourse which combine to provide some people with an aesthetic experience they can call a cure. In his willingness to remove psychoanalytic claims to a historical truthfulness, Spence is risking the very therapeutic effects he wishes to preserve.  

In connection with this, there are two ways we can read Freud’s response to Breton’s invitation to contribute a dream to a Surrealist book of dreams. Freud’s objection that dreams without their contexts and interpretations could hold no interest might be seen on the surface as a continuation of his stand that psychoanalysis as a science holds deeper, more useful and more interesting truths than art. However, it also reveals Freud’s aesthetic commitments. He cannot appreciate an art form which does

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50 In another recent book (*Freud and Cézanne*) the American psychotherapist Alexander Jasnow has proposed that psychotherapy is modern art: “For the artist, we accept the premise that creative transformation is a life project. This idea is congruent to the concept of psychotherapy art, an art form devoted to the goal of ongoing creative self-transformation” (152). This proposal is founded on the assumption that artists aim to tell the truth about themselves and in fact that modern art carries within it the ethical and therapeutic imperative to tell the truth about the self. One outcome of Jasnow’s idea is that psychotherapy can (or must) become, like art, a lifelong commitment. There is no cure, only this commitment to ongoing creative self-transformations. Another possibility he raises is that artists might come to realise that they do not have to produce works of art. Creative self-transformations are sufficient to maintain an artistic life. This rather breathlessly written book completes, in a sense, one psychoanalytic project: it announces the obsolescence of art. The project is completed, though, at the expense of abandoning psychoanalytic claims to healing or curing patients.
not offer the pleasure, or bribe, of an aesthetic closure. It is not so much the truth he seeks in interpretation, but the sense of completion that it offers. It is perhaps this impulse which leads to some of his odd responses to art. When he asks, "What is Michelangelo's Moses doing, and what will he do next?" he is seeking again not necessarily a truth beyond or behind the art work, but a sense of context leading to some promised aesthetic closure. As Malcolm Bowie points out, his questions are as troublesome, inappropriate and impatient with art as Ryle's pointed query, "What is The Thinker doing?" or the question, "How many children had Lady Macbeth?" (Bowie 77-8).

A certain oddness in response to art and literature has come to characterise the more devotional strands of psychoanalytic inquiry. In a recent study, Being A Character: Psychoanalysis and Self Experience, Christopher Bollas makes an attempt to understand "the psychic pain in certain homosexual men" (146) by supplementing his clinical findings with a reading of gay novels and diaries. "I did this," he writes, "because I thought it highly likely that some homosexual writers would describe the setting of the gay disco scene, explore the experience of being a participant observer there, and no doubt reflect on the psychology of the act. I was not wrong ... I have, I think learned more from their literature than from psychoanalytic writings on them; indeed their works ... reflect ... an exploration of the self through fiction that I am sure serves therapeutic aims" (146). Bollas joins with Freud in the long tradition of using literature as evidence somehow transparent to life. Like Freud he sees this literature as a neurotic outpouring, but unlike Freud he is so in awe of the truths uncovered by these writers (and so wary of offending anyone) that he accords their activity the status of therapeutic insights. Psychoanalysis is in effect, though unwittingly, discarded in favour of creative writing. It is enough to write novels. Bollas's confusion of the voice with the self who is writing, of fact with fiction, of apparent authenticity with lived experience, of writing with living, open him to a naive and gullible analysis of literature. How might a Bollas cope with the novel of a Ukrainian family history produced by one Helen Demidenko? In 1994 and 1995 three separate panels of judges regarded Demidenko's novel, The Hand that Signed the Paper, as searingly truthful enough to award it some of Australia's most prestigious literary prizes only to discover subsequently that the novel was partly copied from other works and that Helen Demidenko was a certain Helen Darville whose father was British, not Ukrainian as she had claimed.51 The Ern Malley hoax and controversies over the identity of the Serbian-Aboriginal writer B. Wongar have also been instructive in demonstrating the importance of not confusing the textual life of a voice in fictional or literary writing with a person.

51 See The Australian Book Review for August, September and October 1995 for a wide ranging discussion of issues important to this controversy. See also Quadrant 34 (September, October and November 1995) and Southerly 56 (Autumn 1996): 152-82.
who is living, with autobiographical records, or with a manifestation of personal neurosis. It is a kind of closure Bollas seeks, but one more simple-minded than even Freud could have accommodated.

Finally, Freud's tendency to move toward an aesthetic (in his terms a therapeutic or scientific) closure does not isolate his work as ultimately or merely literature, for it operates as an insistence on leaving the door ajar between life and art. Some context and interpretation around dreams, for instance, will always point them back at life as distinct from closing them off as poetry or art. Similarly, treating the statue of Moses as a moment in a cinematic series of moments psychologises the statue so that its details can represent an emotion expressed rather than, say, a technical solution to the original aesthetic task of placing six figures on a platform, or as carved gestures derived from traditions of plastic arts. Even though Breton will reject any approach to dreams which treats them as symptoms of neurosis, Freud's attitude is in sympathy with a broader Surrealist determination to avoid closing art off from life. Near the beginning of Nadja, Breton writes, "I insist on knowing the names, on being interested only in books left ajar, like doors; I will not go looking for keys" (18).

**Free Association and the Embrace of Complicity**

I want to look briefly at free association because while it provides the basic data for case histories, it is an ostensibly open-ended exercise which has parallels with creative writing, particularly with the automatic writing of the Surrealists. I wish to pursue in detail these connections with creative writing and automatic writing in a later section. For now, I want to review some of the implications of confidentiality applied to the method of free association in its clinical setting.

Interestingly, Ellenwood suggests that the method of free association might have its origins in an early creative writing manual: "Freud cherished a book by Ludwig Börne given to him as a present when he was fourteen ... in which Börne advocates writing down 'without fabrication or hypocrisy, everything that comes into your head'" (8). In 1909 Freud added a paragraph to *The Interpretation of Dreams* in which he suggested that poetic creation demands "an exactly similar attitude" (SE 4: 103) to that required during free association: reason (with its strictures) must be suspended while thoughts are allowed an uncritical flow. Free association was not Freud's first choice of method, though eventually it became the hallmark of psychoanalytic treatment. For some commentators it is a democratically liberal practice (Nelson 55), more democratic than

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52 See Jack Spector (130-132) for a discussion of art-historical influences on Michelangelo's construction of the Moses statue.

53 M. Guy Thompson (168-9) has suggested that Montaigne's autobiographical essays of self-examination might have been models for Freud's analytic method of free association.
than the tyranny of the hypnotic procedure Freud previously attempted. It was also a return to a more literal confessional mode—though in a secular, scientific and medical context.

In this it plays directly with relations between the individual and a society's norms, involving itself in the anarchies of childhood and the minutiae of control and surveillance. It is, though, like the Catholic Church's confessional, a fundamentally private account which cannot be recorded, filmed or transcribed. No verbatim or literal account of it is possible because, as Melanie Klein has pointed out, the intrusion of a third person, a machine or a recording method would disrupt the atmosphere of privacy so necessary to free association and the flow of feelings called transference (*Narrative Foreword*). This restriction might seem to separate the process from the individual's public roles and from artistic pursuits such as poetic creation. But just as the confessional would make no sense if its efficacy could not be judged by reference to public behaviour, the method of free association cannot untangle itself entirely from the world outside the consulting room.

Though Freud did not address the possibility of verbatim recordings of analytic sessions he did warn against a scientific attitude which involved keeping detailed and accurate written records. In one of his technical papers, "Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-analysis," Freud advised against taking notes during a session because it would detract from the "free-floating" attentiveness of the analyst: "Cases which are devoted from the first to scientific purposes and are treated accordingly suffer in their outcome; while the most successful cases are those in which one proceeds, as it were, without any purpose in view, allows oneself to be taken by surprise by any new turn in them, and always meets them with an open mind, free from dispositions" (SE 12: 114). Freud's emphasis here on psychoanalysis as an experience which cannot be practised as a strict science brings us once more up against the multiple play of positions so important to its discourse—on the one hand, psychoanalysis can be trusted where religion and art have failed because it is imbued with the scientific impulse of seeking and telling all of the truth, while on the other hand the need for confidentiality and rapport as part of the analytic experience means the analyst must be involved in ways which preclude the collection of strictly exhaustive or accurate data.

The words spoken in free association, however, do provide the basic data for any case history. Presumably then the truth of the case history's version of a person's life is attested in the record of the free association—a record which can never be produced. Published case histories are never presented in the form of a transcript.54 Taking into

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54 As noted previously, D.M. Thomas provides verbatim records of psychoanalytic sessions in his novel, *Pictures at an Exhibition*. They are far more banal, manipulative, meandering and incoherent than published case histories. Of course Thomas is presenting his verbatim record to make a particular point about what he considers happens behind the closed doors of a consulting room. This fictive account is remarkably close to the tenor of sessions as they are reported by Jeffrey Masson in his
account the pre-existing conventions for structuring case histories which we have examined above, the published case history is admittedly an intricate structure but we trust it has been woven from an earlier record of significant utterances by a patient along with the analyst's interpretations offered during analysis.

But even if a transcript of the patient's utterances was available, would this be a pure form of information? Another way of asking this question is to ask, how free is free association? Is the patient unaffected by the therapist's theoretical loyalties, the therapist's silences, perceptions of rapport or antagonism between therapist and patient, the occasional interpretations which reveal the therapist's assumptions and suggest areas of interest? Abram Kardiner, one of Freud's early patients, indicated in his memoir some of the pressures felt by an analysand:

I have yet to meet his equal as an interpreter of dreams. He had an uncanny feel about symbols ... Freud was not, however, a man who spent his attentionlavishly or gratuitously. One had to earn it ... one had to interest and engage Freud; otherwise one might put him to sleep ... If Freud felt sure of your interest and loyalty his generosity was unlimited. If, however, Freud had reason to distrust one, he could become very hostile ... (Nelson 51)

In the same memoir Kardiner quotes Freud's own reflections on his style as an analyst. "I have many limitations as an analyst," Freud noted. "In the first place I get tired of people. Secondly I am not basically interested in therapy, and I usually find that I am engaged—in any particular case—with the theoretical problems with which I happen to be interested at the time. I am also too patriarchal to be a good analyst" (Nelson 51-2).

The case history then is built up as much from traces of the (irrecoverable) data provided by the patient as from the theoretical assumptions of the therapist—and from what emerges out of the relationship between therapist and patient. If the progress of the sessions depends upon some loyalty on the patient's part to Freudian interpretations, then we cannot be surprised if the decomposing body unearthed as the solution to each case has a distinctly Freudian odour.

Though free association is an ever-present motif in psychoanalytic practice, we find that it exists uncannily as an "invisibly visible" knowledge (Breton Manifestoes 255-78). Its freedom is protected by the confidentiality of the clinical setting, but this freedom must always be under question for no accurate or literal record of its progress can be taken. It is manifested in case histories through a tension established between the past utterances of the analysand and the judgments of the analyst. It is, like creative writing (and all modern literature and art) already compromised by its history just as it is reified by appeal to an ideal. Creative writing and free association carry suggestions

memoir, Final Analysis.

55 For further discussion of Freud's analytic style see Guy Thompson 168-71, and Haynal.
of these ideals in their titles—as if by naming the ideals they can be called into existence.

**Writing Down the Talking Cure: The Stab In The Back**

When we read the case history as a rhetorical exercise it can become a literary text open to interpretation by its own analytic method. It can become yet another example of unrecognised wish fulfillment. When Richard Sterba, for example, writes in 1940:

> If the work of art springs from a daydream, we must expect that in it too, besides the actual causative material, there are also infantile unconscious wishes which will be represented therein as fulfilled. Analysis maintains that the immense dynamic effect of the work of art ... is produced through the fulfilment of the repressed infantile wishes; that the latent part, as Freud calls it, of the pleasure of art is in the opinion of psychoanalysis far greater than the manifest and aesthetic part. This opinion gave analysis the task of proving the presence of infantile wishes in the work of art, and it has fulfilled this task. ("The Problem of Art" 261; my emphasis)

Here, under the guise of exposing a wish fulfillment, Sterba enacts the fulfillment of an infantile wish for superiority, control and power. It is not enough to have proposed a possible interpretation of artistic creation, or even to have uncovered one aspect of artistic production. Sterba, Freud and psychoanalysis have, alone, encompassed the fundamentally powerful and important elements of artistic creation. And further, their case has been proven:

> As early as *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud proved that the profound emotional effect of Sophocles' *Tragedy of Oedipus* is caused by the peculiar content of the drama which brings about the fulfillment of an unconscious wish common to all mankind ... Freud has shown too that this same latent content is expressed in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. (261-2)

It seems not too psychoanalytically far fetched to see here the figures of Sophocles and Shakespeare as the giants/parents against whom psychoanalysis must struggle, under the threat of castration. Sophocles and Shakespeare have gone before Freud into the human soul, bringing back experiences and insights that psychoanalysis must cling to if it is to gain credibility, but which it must claim as its own if it is to become something more than—indeed if it is to replace—literature. In asserting itself as the discourse opening a door into the soul of humankind which literature kept locked, its interpretation exposes literature's hidden source as the filthy, murderous impulses of incestuous children—a Bluebeard's room of decomposing bodies. As we have seen, Freud characterises both artists and their audience as infantile. Art is a dream of disguised wish fulfillment, but this is not merely incestuous, for here too there is a dead body to be uncovered: "The distortion of a text resembles a murder: the difficulty is not
in perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid of its traces" (Moses and Monotheism, SE 23:43). The murder, of course, is against Moses as the figure of the father—It is in every text the act of patricide which Freud must expose. But in doing this he must, as Sarah Kofman has pointed out, commit his own murder. He must destroy the artist as a great man and a genius. By reducing the artist to his neuroses, Freud has in his turn murdered the feared father.

In this context it is significant that Freud pursued biographical links between artists' neuroses and their work while remaining largely silent on possible networks of repression operating between himself and his work. Sometimes, as with Goethe and Leonardo da Vinci, the biographical information is so scarce and so scattered that one begins to wonder why he is compelled to develop such virtuoso analytic performances around them. Though we might psychoanalyse such texts written by Freud, I want to pursue the notion that such moves are essential strategies in the power relations between the discourses of psychoanalysis and art. Both Freud's pursuit of illness in great artists and his silence over possible influences his own oedipal drama might have had on his discoveries are important, again, as manoeuvres for establishing the status of psychoanalysis as a scientific discourse which faces truths literature could not bring into the open. Even though Freud might have privately interpreted the repressed desires motivating and shaping his analytic writings, he was aware of the strategic importance of keeping a reflexive analysis at arm's distance from his scientific discoveries. When Fliess attempted to analyse his ideas Freud retorted that Fliess's analytic interpretations opened an abyss under his (Freud's) work. Regardless of truth, it was a matter of taking sides: "You take sides against me and tell me that 'the reader of thoughts merely reads his own thoughts into other people,' which renders all my efforts valueless" (Grinstein 305).

Another reason for this necessary silence is the requirement that a discourse be contained both by a professional practice and an outer limit of permissible statements. It is not permissible to begin interpreting the psychoanalyst's interpretation—and when this happens, either it is regarded as an illegitimate move or the particular psychoanalyst's professional practice comes under question.56

56 Cary Nelson has discussed a similar rule of discourse in literary criticism which allows only formulaic expressions of self-reflection into motives, agendas and experiences underlying professional literary critical writing (Hartman 45-62). In connection with this type of limit-setting, self-regulation has long been a problem and a source of scandal for the professional disciplines of medicine, law, religious ministry, policing—and psychotherapy (with recent scandals involving the "false-memory syndrome" and accusations of sexual misconduct with clients). The psychoanalyst Stanley Coen has also noted that we know "little about the mind of the critic at work, about the intermediate steps by which the critic derives her readings" (4) as he endorses a new emphasis upon self-observation among analysts in their practice. By immersing herself in the experience of the countertransference, Coen suggests, the analyst can use what has been formerly excluded from analytic discourse: the feelings, wishes, and defensive reactions of the analyst. "It is refreshing," he writes "and unusual when a well-known psychoanalyst discloses publicly that he learns certain negative aspects of the analysand when he imagines why his fantasied affair with the analysand

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These boundaries and relations between discourses become difficult to police when the creative writer introduces the case history into literature as autobiography, novel, play or poem. Some of the writers who have explicitly used psychoanalytic experiences in their fiction are Scott Fitzgerald, Doris Lessing, Marie Cardinal, Sylvia Plath, Joanne Greenberg, Philip Roth, Saul Bellow, Flora Rheta Schreiber, Peter Shaffer, Steve J. Spears, Brian Castro, Irving Yalom (an analyst who has written a novelised version of a hypothetical psychotherapeutic treatment of Nietzsche) and D.M. Thomas. The Wolf-Man, Freud's most famous patient, has written of his experiences, and been interviewed for publication, adding further spirals to perspectives on analysis. What kind of truth are we receiving when the case history is presented from the patient's viewpoint, or as part of a fiction?

Jeffrey Berman has attempted one answer in his 1985 book, *The Talking Cure*. His answer comes in the form of a complaint: when it is not fomenting "a full-scale war," literature generally misinforms the reader about psychoanalysis. Berman proposes that fiction writers tend to idealise their therapist and that they present themselves (i.e. the patient) as relatively guilt-free victims of experience. Creative writers are also constrained by a desire to preserve the confidentiality of their relationship with the therapist. In short, their versions of psychoanalysis are over-simplified and idealised. He takes up the interesting case of the novel, *I Never Promised You A Rose Garden*, written by Joanne Greenberg, because, he says, it is one of the most accurate and accomplished literary portrayals of psychoanalysis. This book also offers the rare opportunity of comparing its account to the psychiatrist's published case history of the analysis.

*I Never Promised You A Rose Garden* became a best-seller when it was published in 1964. It has sold more than five million copies and was adapted as a feature film. In 1967 the author was awarded the Frieda Fromm-Reichmann Award from the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, the first nonphysician to receive the honour. At first the book was published under a pseudonym, Hannah Green, but later Joanne Greenberg revealed herself as the author, and as a woman who was, like the book's heroine, Deborah Blau, a recovered schizophrenic. It became clear that the portrait of Dr Fried, the successful psychoanalyst in the book, was based upon Dr Frieda Fromm-Reichmann who had treated Joanne Greenberg at Chestnut Lodge Sanitarium in Rockville, Maryland. "What remains unknown, however," Berman writes, "is that long before the novelist wrote her story, the analyst had published accounts of it as a case study (though without disclosing the name of her patient) in her two medical textbooks: *Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy*, published in 1950, and *Psychoanalysis and...would be unsatisfactory" (4). This is of course no more than a formulaic bow to self-revelation, for its outcome is a diagnosis projected onto the patient. The limits of permissible statements have not been broached.
Psychotherapy, appearing posthumously in 1959" (155). This provides Berman with an opportunity to present sections of the novel side by side with Dr Fromm-Reichmann's case studies.

Before discussing Berman's assessment of the two accounts, I want to return to his claim that novelists tend to idealise their therapists in fictional portrayals. In Berman's view there are two reasons for this. One is connected to the process of transference. Berman explains that "the patient's affection for the analyst (assuming therapy was successful) culminates in the natural desire to pay him back through loving art" (175). A second reason lies in the unequal relationship between patient and analyst which leaves the patient in almost complete ignorance of the analyst's real self. Analysts typically refuse to talk about their private life or their feelings. This frustration of the patient's attempts to come to know the analyst is, Berman concedes, "in a sense, unfair, but the patient-analyst relationship is exempt from notions of social equality." It is worth placing these comments against Berman's earlier brief outline of Dr Frieda Fromm-Reichmann's innovations as a psychiatrist. He writes, "She helped to elevate the mental patient from the ranks of an object of therapy to a partner of the therapist, and she affirmed an attitude of respect and equality between doctor and patient—an attitude strikingly different from the inequality of earlier doctor-patient relationships" (161). How is it that when it suits Berman's argument equality is not possible between analyst and patient, yet when praising Dr Fromm-Reichmann an attitude of equality becomes a virtue she has introduced to therapy? Can we see here the intrusion of a tendency to idealise? Technical innovations pioneered by Dr Fromm-Reichmann are mentioned in Berman's following paragraph: the analyst is "thrifty" with interpretations, minimises free association, urges the patient to take an active role, and pursues multiple symbolic meanings of symptoms until the symptom disappears. None of these methods need to be interpreted as steps towards equality, certainly not in comparison to the earlier controversial suggestions of Freud's colleague Ferenczi who took notions of equality to the point of instigating mutual analysis with clients (Ferenczi Journal). Thus Berman's version of the 'real' Dr Fromm-Reichmann enacts the very idealising rhetoric he is at pains to show is a particular danger in fictional portrayals of analysts. This instability within Berman's text manifests as a tendency towards projection—seeing in the other what is contained unwittingly within.

With this in mind we can turn to some examples of the way Berman presents the two documents to us. The initial meeting between therapist and patient is presented in both the case study and the later novel:

A patient shouted at the psychiatrist during their first visit, "I know what you will do now! You'll take my gut-pains, and my trance, and my withdrawal states away from me! And where will I be then?" The psychiatrist first asked for a description of the three pathological states, the loss of which the patient allegedly feared. The patient's answer made it possible for the psychiatrist to demonstrate to her the
attempt at escaping anxiety, which all three of the states had in common. Subsequently, her anxiety regarding the psychiatrist's role as a foe rather than as a co-worker was labeled as such, and the historical roots for this interpersonal attitude and expectation could be scrutinized. After that the patient was told that her symptoms would not be taken away from her but that, in all likelihood, she herself would wish to dispose of them when she learned to understand enough about her anxiety to make it decrease. Also the patient's attention was drawn to the fact that she had made her symptoms known immediately to the psychiatrist. It was suggested that this seemed to indicate that, perhaps without realizing it, she was just as desirous of losing her symptoms as she was anxious, within her awareness, at the prospect of being deprived of them.

(Fromm-Reichmann *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy* 190)

They went into a sunny room and the Housekeeper-Famous-Doctor turned, saying, "Sit down. Make yourself comfortable." There came a great exhaustion and when the doctor said, "Is there anything you want to tell me?" a great gust of anger, so that Deborah stood up quickly and said to her and to Yr and to the Collect and to the Censor, "All right - you'll ask me questions and I'll answer them - you'll clear up my 'symptoms' and send me home . . . and what will I have then?"

The doctor said quietly, "If you did not really want to give them up, you wouldn't tell me." A rope of fear pulled its noose about Deborah. "Come, sit down. You will not have to give up anything until you are ready, and then there will be something to take its place." (Greenberg *Rose Garden* 23)

Commenting on these passages Berman notes, "The psychiatrist uses the patient's actual speech in the case study and then, several years later (at least 12, since this section of *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy* first appeared in a book published in 1952) the novelist repossesses the language for her own story" (164). This naive acceptance of the psychiatric text as a transparently accurate record ignores the role of quotation marks as a convention in both the novel and the case study. Analysts do not keep verbatim records of therapy sessions. What is written down is a recollection, an inevitably condensed and professionalised version. If we look at the speech quoted in Dr Fromm-Reichmann's text, it has a curiously psychiatric ring to it. Not only does the patient efficiently list her symptoms but with a term such as "withdrawal states" it seems we are more likely to have an echo of the psychiatrist's summarising notes than the accurate echo of an angrily shouted accusation. It is possible that the patient picked up psychiatric terms from her contacts with hospitals, asylums and other psychiatrists, but Dr Fromm-Reichmann uses the word "states" several more times in her text so that it becomes one of her own stylistic signatures. Once again, we witness in Berman's

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57 In her startling book, *Narrative of A Child Analysis*, Melanie Klein has provided perhaps the most detailed record yet of what happens in therapy sessions. She presents the notes and observations taken in the course of ninety three analytic sessions with a ten year old boy. In her preface to the narrative Klein addresses the issue of accuracy in such documents: "I took fairly extensive notes, but I could of course not always be sure of the sequence, nor quote literally the patient's associations and my interpretations. This difficulty is one of a general nature in reporting on case material. To give verbatim accounts could only be done if the analyst were to take notes during the session; this would disturb the patient considerably and break the unhindered flow of associations ... another possibility of obtaining literal accounts is the use of a recording machine ... a measure which, in my view, is absolutely against the fundamental principles on which psychoanalysis rests, namely the exclusion of any audience during an analytic session" (11).
assessment a manoeuvre which places psychoanalysis in a superior, more accurate, more truthful position in relation to literature. The case study becomes the primary document, the novel a secondary development. Chronological priority is established, as though this makes the case study's primacy self-evident.

We have already noted that if there is a primary document it is in the impossible-to-compile record of the free association. After this there is, presumably, the note taking of the analyst after the session. These notes, presumably faithful to what was said in the session, would be a primary document from which the case study would then be constructed. Though Freud's usual practice was to destroy these notes once a case study was published, some of the original records from which the case history of Dora was constructed were discovered among his papers after his death. Translations of parts of these notes, edited and expanded, were published in the tenth volume of the *Standard Edition* in 1955. Comparing these notes to the case history, Steven Marcus has found himself obliged to conclude, "They permit us ... to observe what, after due hesitation, I find myself resigned to call the creative process in Freud" (95). Marcus goes on to explain what he means by this:

I mean by this cliché to refer first to the observable movement back and forth between notes and case history being written for publication. But I mean also to refer to the reverse of this observable datum: to the fact that some things appear in the essay and not in the notes and vice versa; that the principle of selectivity pursued by Freud in this connection is not always consistent and is sometimes opaque if not incomprehensible; and that there is often no way to get from material in the notes to formulations in the essay. In other words, something mysterious is going on; the case history does not, as it were, simply emerge from the notes; nor do the history and the notes taken together make up an intelligible and coherent whole. (Marcus 95)

Without suggesting that Fromm-Reichmann's case histories are documents as mysterious in their construction as Freud's, it is clear from Freud's example that the case history is not a simple, primary record and that its status as a document is similar to the status of a fictional text: there is no record, fact or truth against which it can be checked.

Berman then goes on to list the differences between the two passages quoted above in terms of the novelist's treatment/enhancement of the event: "The novelist condenses the material, dramatizes the scene, and endows the psychiatrist with dialogue. The novelist also deemphasizes the pedagogical quality of the psychiatric case study without sacrificing the power of illumination. In the novel we have direct access to the patient's inner life ... " (164). If we reverse the direction of this projection we can see that the case study must also condense and dramatise its material, and that its pedagogical quality and impersonalised portrayal of the psychiatrist are the conventions which structure it within its particular genre of the case study.
Berman uses other parallel passages to show not only that the novelised version of analytic therapy is unreliable, but that the psychiatrist's version defeats literature at its own game. Berman contrasts Dr Fromm-Reichmann's "full and lively narration" to mere "fragmentary clues" in *Rose Garden*:

An eighteen-year-old schizophrenic girl complained about severe persecutory ideas, to the effect that she could not bear to have anyone standing or walking behind her. Something frightful would happen to her, perhaps a stab in the back or, at any rate, something terrible, the thought of which made her shudder ... Questioned about the actual experience which the patient might consider as the first one of its kind, she said that she could not remember. But she did volunteer the information that, as far back as she could remember, her father had warned her against men who might persecute her and rape her. This happened long before the patient knew what "rape" was and what men might "do" to women. Further investigation of and associations to her fantasies regarding rape and regarding her persecutory ideas were due neither to her fear of nor her secret wish for rape only, as one might have easily suspected. Eager to safeguard against therapeutic operations with any partial interpretive truth, the psychiatrist asked for further associative memories to the patient's delusions. The patient recalled eventually that at the time of Hitler's invasion of Czechoslovakia her father had condemned, with great affect, "the stab in the back" done to the Czechs. She was too young to know that her father was referring to people and thought he was talking about the checks in the tablecloth on the breakfast table. It was at the breakfast table and while reading the morning paper that her father had these emotional outbursts which were incomprehensible to the patient. Also during breakfast her father would scold the patient severely for various types of infantile misdemeanors about which he had just been told.

Another associative memory came from a later period of the patient's life. Her parents would find out that she had taken money from them, that she had bought hair ribbons or sweets against their wishes, that she had teased her baby brother or the dog, or that she had antagonized the maid. Her father would throw a temper tantrum and say that she was betraying her parents and the training they had given her. The use of the word "betraying" reminded her of her father's using the word "betrayal" in connection with the "stab in the back" to the Czechs.

As a result of a condensation of these memories, the patient experienced her persecutory delusions to the effect that she dreaded that someone behind her would "stab her in the back"—betray her, rape her—as she allegedly had stabbed in the back, that is, betrayed, her parents when she had stolen pocket money or when she had committed any of the other above-mentioned childhood sins. Father had reacted the same way, namely, with a heavy temper outburst, to both types of stabs in the back, hers and the one done by Hitler to the Czechs ... So the temper tantrums about the "checks," about her earlier and later childhood sins, together with the fear of rape with which her father had imbued her, were condensed into the patient's formulation of her persecutory delusion of being "stabbed in the back" by someone who was behind her.

(Fromm-Reichman *Principles of Psychotherapy*: 176-7)

Employing New Critical, author-based terminology, Berman comments: "The psychiatrist's artful narration is extraordinary in its thematic unity, compression, symbolic richness, and moral ambiguity" (166). Dr Fromm-Reichmann's account, full of "rich details", is compared to the following fragment—a passing reference to the "checks".

The instincts of these hating children [at camp] were shared, for Deborah heard sometimes that a man named Hitler was in Germany and was killing Jews with the same kind of evil joy. One spring day before she left for camp she had seen her father put his head on the kitchen table and cry terrible, wrenching men's tears about the "checks-and-the-poles." In the camp a riding instructor mentioned
acidly that Hitler was doing one good thing at least, and that was getting rid of the "garbage people." She wondered idly if they all had tumors. (Rose Garden 50)

Berman asks why the novelist omitted the rich material present in the analytic case study. He suggests that "the fictional changes in Rose Garden heighten our sympathy toward Deborah but also diminish the complexity of her character" (168). Deborah appears only as an innocent and passive victim in the novel, "almost Christlike in her suffering." This is important, Berman argues, to the novelist's purpose of presenting a sympathetic heroine to the reader, but by removing moral ambiguities the character is ultimately diminished. In contrast, Dr Fromm-Reichmann's patient is not only an innocent victim of her father's anger, but she too becomes the aggressor, the stabber, unconsciously imitating her father's (and Hitler's) acts of violence.

We might equally note that the analyst-writer works hard to establish the patient in an ambiguous and complex psychological predicament. In fact it is necessary to this genre for the patient to be unable to see either the solution or the crime clearly, and for the analyst to impress the reader with the density of her portrayal in her discovery of connections which can release the patient into a plausible narrative of cure.

Even so, despite the claimed intricacy and richness of her tale, Fromm-Reichmann really does no more than mention the "checks." They do not find a coherent place in her interpretation, and so this detail remains even less developed than in the novel fragment.

Berman offers his advice on how the novel might have been more successfully written: "The multiple meanings of Deborah's schizophrenic symptomatology would have strengthened the detectivelike quality of the novel. The reader would have been thrust into the analyst's position of tracking down the scattered and distant clues to the psychological thriller" (174). We can infer from this that Dr Fromm-Reichmann has written a successful thriller.

The thriller, as we have noted, relies upon the presence of some truly shocking event. Berman writes that Rose Garden is at its most powerful in its portrayal of the inner world of Deborah's madness, and seems less aesthetically powerful once Deborah tentatively embraces a healthy reality. "Certainly this is an old problem for artists," Berman reflects. "Evil appears more fascinating than good, sickness more interesting than health" (159). This is, of course, not only a problem for artists. Psychoanalysis has been criticised since Freud's 1896 paper, "The Aetiology of Hysteria," for being too shocking and needlessly sexualised in the insights it offers on the human psyche. Indeed, D. H. Lawrence's pamphlet of 1923, Fantasia of the Unconscious, is inspired with this complaint.

Berman's observation can also serve to alert us to the discomfort and ambivalence that artistic, creative activity can cause for the psychoanalyst intent on producing manifestations of cure in patients. As a young writer in Paris in the 1930s who was an
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enthusiastic follower of André Breton's "cult of the marvellous," and lover and artistic confidante of Henry Miller, Anais Nin was drawn to psychoanalysis. Nin went to René Allendy, a leading French analyst and founding member of the Paris Psychoanalytic Association. She made it clear to him from the beginning that her writing was central to her life, and that this took the form of a journal in which she wrote swiftly, honestly, and without censorship. Allendy quickly became infatuated with Nin. Their affair as well as details from their analytic sessions have been published in Volume One of her Journals and in the recently released unexpurgated journals of the period. Allendy disapproved of Nin's association with the bohemian artists and writers of Paris, calling Miller a barbarian (Nin Journals 185). Nin recounts one particularly revealing exchange where she reacts to the gulf between her writer's sensibility and his awkwardly transparent attempt at romantic flattery:

I was still examining some of the stories I had told Allendy, examining them for loopholes, defects. For he had demanded I never see Henry or his friends or June again.
I said I had broken with them. Could I deceive a professional analyst? ...
Allendy said, 'You had to do this, you were in great danger. I can tell you now that when I saw Henry at your brother's concert, he seemed a monster to me. It's your neurosis which made you associate with June and Henry and their friends. You, such an extraordinary woman, like a fleur sur du fumier.'
I laughed. Allendy thought I was laughing at the idea of a neurosis being the cause of my Bohemian life. Alas, it was not that. Allendy's phrase, 'a flower on a dung pile', belonged so much to the dime novels read by servant girls that the poet I am was offended by that, as another woman might be by a man talking with his cigar in his mouth and his hat on his head.  
(Journals 170)

He did not understand, and it seems for his purposes did not need to understand, the woman to whom he was talking. With Henry and his friends apparently removed Allendy could turn to her writing as the other threat to his position as life-giver and ultimate confidant:

Allendy asked me about the diary. Is he uneasy? He wants to see it. I tell him I have written much less in it.
'That's a good sign. You are able to tell me everything.'
(Journals 171)

These attempts to separate Nin from her artistic life and from her writing were not only the manoeuvres of a possessive lover ("An analyst in love is as blind as anyone else in love!" Journals 171), or the stereotypical prejudices of a bourgeois faced with an unconventional woman, but they represent the difficulties, uncertainties and ambivalence psychoanalytic practice both encounters and shies away from when it comes into contact with an artistic practice alive to a double psyche (conscious and

58 Nin titled these journals, from 1932-34, "Incest." There is much detail of the analysis in the earlier, expurgated version (Volume One of the Journals) which does not appear in Incest. Both books need to be consulted for the narrative of this relationship.
unconscious) and a multiplicity of voices. In her detailed history of psychoanalysis in France, Elisabeth Roudinesco remarks on Allendy and Borel becoming "specialists" in the treatment of creative artists. Anaïs Nin, René Crevel, Artaud, Leiris and Bataille were among their patients. Their professional specialising, however, was always in their eyes in keeping with the psychoanalytic tradition of the study of mental illness (Roudinesco 8-9). Nin recognised Allendy's desire to kill one part of herself in order to cure her when she brought the analysis and the affair to an end: "The period of dependence was sweet ... He freed me of guilt and fear. But when he became human, he used his power to separate me from my artist life, to thrust me again into the stifling, narrow bourgeois life" (Journals 202). And again, more emphatically: "The end of Allendy. Revolt against his lack of imagination, his practicality, his arrestive and stifling jealousy, the way he translates my poetical facts into facts, the way he scientifies, medicalizes" (Incest 124).

After the termination of Allendy's analysis/affair Nin went to Otto Rank for treatment. He took her diary from her at their first meeting and advised her to stop writing. Under his influence she did stop writing for four months. Within a year they too were lovers, with Rank so besotted that he wanted to give her the ring of initiation that Freud had given him. Rank's aim was to restore Nin's womanhood to her by removing her need to write:

I asked whether the artists whose art is a false growth, an artificial excrescence bearing a relation to their own personal truth, insincere artists, were greater than the sincere ones. Rank said this was a question which he had not yet answered for himself—"I may have to write a book for you, to answer it."

This statement gave me an unnatural, immense joy. I said, "That would please me more than if I finished my own novel."

"There's the woman in you speaking," said Rank. "When the neurotic woman gets cured, she becomes a woman. When the neurotic man gets cured, he becomes an artist. Let us see whether the woman or the artist will win out. For the moment you need to become a woman."

(Incest 301)

It seemed that a woman's fitting role was to serve and service a male artist-genius. Under the influence of such advice Nin reported to her journal, "The repercussions of this talk were magical. Suddenly I felt a great serenity. All striving and nervousness left me. The artist ceased to write. I was filled with a great feminine activity. I did more and more for Henry. I wanted to serve Henry, to live my deepest wish for the Thou, whoever he might be—and all I know is that he is definitely, distinctly the genius whose wife I wanted to be" (Incest 300). In Rank's promotion of himself as the artist we hear the same argument that Berman later makes for his psychiatrist, Dr Fromm-Reichmann. Whatever the artist can produce it pales when placed beside a psychoanalytic version.

Through these exchanges, seductions and struggles psychoanalysis works to repress the artist and in particular the woman-artist as if she represents the worst unconscious
impulses of psychoanalysts. When a woman is artistically creative it seems this act can only serve to remind psychoanalysis/men that its/his desire to create opens into a fecundly feminine world. As Nin saw so clearly at times the analyst mistakes what he sees when he talks to an artist—and the mistake is compounded when the artist is a woman. Given the history of relations between psychoanalysis and creativity as we have discussed them here, the analyst must systematically mis-recognise the artist.
3. Surrealism and Psychoanalysis

"... in the strange way two brothers resemble each other, or rather as a dream about someone resembles that person in reality."
— unpublished document by de Chirico, quoted by Breton in Nadja.

After using the new and radical free-association therapy of psychoanalysis in a French military hospital as early as 1916 against indifference or hostility from French medical writers to this "scientific Germanism", and after adopting the free-association method with Soupault to produce the first Surrealist examples of automatic writing published as Les Champs Magnétiques, Breton visited Freud in Vienna in October 1921.

It is not easy to gauge what took place at this meeting even though Breton published a short account of it in the March 1922 issue of Littérature. It seems that each person who reads Breton's report of this first meeting between the founders of psychoanalysis and Surrealism reads into it a differently coloured account. Historian Franklin Rosemont calls it "a rather jocular account" (22), Roudinesco says "Breton would spend years recovering from the disappointment he felt" (23), while Jacqueline Chéneix-Gendren refers to it as a "sarcastic account" (179), presenting it as evidence that no dialogue was possible between the Surrealists and Freud. The American Surrealist "insider" Wayne Andrews reports straightforwardly, "Breton found Freud a pretentious bore when he called on him in Vienna in 1921" (xii). Chiland describes it as a moment of disenchantment: "Whereas Breton anticipated finding a revolutionary in politics in someone who revolutionized psychiatry, he encountered a tranquil bourgeois" (56). William Ellenwood sees the interview as an embarrassing but perhaps maturing experience for Breton: "It is not at all an awe-struck testimony," he writes. "Clearly, the interview was a tremendous disappointment to Breton ..." (31). Ellenwood goes on to report that though Breton had looked forward to the interview with excitement, on his return he would not discuss it with his friends.

59 This xenophobic description of Freud's ideas is quoted (Oliner 27) from the 1914 book, La Psychoanalyse des Nervoses et des Psychoses by Régis and Hesnard—a work which is sympathetic to Psychoanalysis. Gibson reports that in the absence of French translations of Freud, this book was read by Breton (75). Ellenwood suggests that Breton took Freud for his mentor partly as a reaction against the elitism and obscurantism of French psychiatric medicine. Spector writes that Breton's endorsement of Freud was "in part a scandalous gesture ... at his French compatriots" (148) who associated Freud with the recent German enemy.

As an indication of the virulence of reactions to psychoanalysis, one prominent French psychiatrist speculated that Freud's interest in sexuality was caused by the morals of the Viennese, an over-sexed people (Ellenwood 25); Oliner reports that Yves Delage concluded that Freud's sexual theories were "the obsession of a brain stricken with erotomania" (27).

In appendix A at the end of this thesis the events, publications, and meetings which are important to the contact between Psychoanalysis and Surrealism are listed in chronological order.
In Breton's early commitment to Freud and in his enthusiasm for basing a new approach to writing on the method of free association, we can see that already in 1921 there is a dialogue between Breton and Freud; but it is not simple; it is not always between them as individuals, for their writings sometimes speak for them; and its silences and resistances are central to its meaning.

We can begin another reading of the dialogue between Surrealism and Psychoanalysis by translating Breton's "Interview Du Professor Freud".60

For young people and romantic spirits who, because the fashion this season is for psychoanalysis, need to imagine themselves as the most successful agents of the adventurously modern, the office of professor Freud with its apparatus for pulling rabbits from hats and its blue determinism for blotting paper, I am not sorry to tell you, the greatest psychologist of our time lives in a house of mediocre appearance, in a lost quarter of Vienna. "Dear Sir [he wrote me], since I have very little free time these days, I ask you to come and see me this Monday (the tenth) at three o'clock in the afternoon in my consulting room. Yours truly, Freud."

A modest name-plate at the entrance: Dr Freud, 2-4; a servant who is not particularly attractive, a waiting room with four feebly allegorical engravings: Water, Fire, Earth and Air, and a photograph of the master among his collaborators, a dozen consultants of the most vulgar sort; after the ringing of the bell, and some shouting off-stage, there is almost nothing to report. Thus, until the famous upholstered door gapes open for me. I find myself in the presence of a small, unimpressive old man who is at home in his shabby medical office. Ah! He is not fond of France, which is distinguished by its indifference to his work. He shows me, meanwhile, with some vanity, a pamphlet which has been published in Geneva, and it is nothing but the first French translation of five of his lectures. I attempt to talk with him, throwing the names of Charcot and de Babinski into the conversation, but, either I appeal to memories too dim: or he is silent out of a prudent reticence, for I can only draw from him generalities such as: "Your letter, the most touching that I have received in my life ... " or "Happily, we rely greatly on youth."

(Translated from Oeuvres Complètes 255-6)

This is indeed a strange note on a meeting which was apparently important to Breton, a meeting which might have carried some significance in the history of the early influence of psychoanalysis in France. After all, Breton was not only medically trained but he was a knowledgeable literary scholar and practising writer. Like Freud, his interests and his career spanned both the sciences and the arts—and he was young enough to bring Freud's ideas a modern audience. The images of youthfulness set against old age, and fame against anonymity hover over Breton's brief public note on his meeting with the famous and notorious father of psychoanalysis.61

At this time Freud was sixty five years old. Adler (1911) and Jung (1914) had already broken from the movement he founded, though there were vigorous training institutes in Berlin, Vienna and London; he was deeply involved in the long,  

60 This is my translation of "Interview Du Professeur Freud" which was re-published in Les Pas Perdus. Jeffrey Mehlman has translated the first sentences of the passage in his translation of Roudinesco's Jacques Lacan & Co (23).

61 Peter Gay reports that by 1920 Freud had become a household name in Europe (454). At this time Freud said his popularity was a "burden" to him and "must at best be considered a danger for more serious achievement" (Gay 455). In May 1926, when Freud turned seventy, there were worldwide tributes to him. Joseph Wood Krutch wrote in the New York Times of Freud as, "with the possible exception of Einstein, perhaps the most talked of scientist alive today" (Gay 458-9).
psychoanalytically illegitimate analysis of his daughter, Anna; the growth on his jaw would be diagnosed as cancerous within two years. Peter Gay has noted that at this time psychoanalysis was attracting mavericks in "uncomfortable numbers" (407). One of these, Georg Groddeck, the self-styled "wild analyst" had published a "psychoanalytic novel," The Seeker of Souls, through Freud's publishing house early in 1921. Ernest Jones and Eitingon had disparaged the book for being "bawdy" and "rancid" despite Freud's support for it. Within months it became clear that Groddeck saw himself as a more significant thinker than Freud, and in fact accused Freud of poaching his ideas (Gay 407-9). Freud's response to Breton can then be placed in this context of an ageing leader wary of the embarrassment his own judgments can cause him, particularly when he is subjected to the flattery of artists wishing to adopt his ideas.62

Breton, on the other hand, was twenty five years old, and on the threshold of revolutionary work in literature and art. If Freud was subject to a kind of vanity, then Breton too shows another kind of vanity in his sensitivity to Freud's reticence. Freud would not speak, though Breton obviously did. We might even wonder whether Breton left Freud any time to speak. Georges Bataille has provided a contemporary and unflattering portrait of a talkative Breton: "But it seemed to me that if Breton required silence from his listeners, he did not keep quiet himself. I therefore needed not only to be quiet myself but also to hear nothing except Breton's voice, measured, pretentious and swollen with learning" (Absence of Myth 37-8).

There is a sense of inevitability in the way Breton has constructed his report. He must be disappointed, for the famous doctor does not live in a palatial setting (and if he did, this would be the disappointment), at his age Freud cannot appear in his prime, and whatever he says can be selected and presented to allow Breton to adopt a tone of—bewilderment? disillusion? contempt? frustration? Even if Freud had spoken more, one feels Breton would have found only further evidence of emptiness. The deference, even devotion, impressed into the report by quoting Freud's inconsequential appointment note and off-the-cuff remarks, is undercut by a tone which satirises its own tendency to sycophancy.63 In warning off the young, Breton makes further play with the master-

62 Roudinesco has remarked in relation to this episode that during the same period, Freud "received quite warmly a popular and rather mediocre society novelist, Henri Lenormand, who brought him a box of chocolates" (23-4). Roudinesco suggests that in his relations with France Freud was concerned to establish a legitimacy for psychoanalysis through edifying literature and official institutions such as medicine.

63 Richard Sterba's description of meeting Freud in 1926 parallels Breton's in its attention to inconsequential details, indications of social class, Freud's physical stature, and his words: "Freud entered the room with his daughter, Anna, at the exact time. He wore a Stadtpelz (a fur-lined, rather lengthy overcoat with a broad collar of dark fur), a typical piece of winter clothing for gentlemen of the upper classes. He was smaller in stature than I had expected. I cannot say whether it was my preconceived idea of him or some aura that he radiated that made me feel that we were in the presence of an outstanding personality. His presence immediately dominated the scene although he uttered only a few words" (Reminiscences 102). The differences, of course, are that in Sterba's account Freud must
pupil elements of the meeting and the Oedipal tensions in his account of it. Freud, a man at the height of his worldwide fame, is left adrift at the end this report as a nondescript, vulgar bourgeois old man, possibly senile. The report does not suppress a note of satisfaction in being able to bring this news to the youth who have admired the famous man. Is Breton warning against the elevation of Freud to heroic status, or is he reacting to Freud as a rival—or are both these tendencies operating in the tensions of the report? The report is brief enough to keep the reader suspended between possibilities.

Pursuing the Oedipal motif in the meeting, we could propose that within the oppositions between fame and anonymity, youth and old age, lies the implication that Breton has journeyed to meet himself. Freud stands for Breton's own destiny and mortality, for the possible fame that awaits him and the possible emptiness of the fame he sees for himself. The report plays with each figure as an uncanny mirror revealing what these characters might have been or might become.

The report itself, as the only record of the meeting, must stand-in for the meeting now, though it is manifestly different from what happened—or from what Freud might have reported. But we cannot even see it as a distorted image, for we cannot know precisely what in it is distortion, or what elements are most and least distorted.

It is in the play of doubles, the play of differences between (distorted) mirror-images, that I wish to begin reading the tensions between psychoanalysis and Surrealism.

**Nadja: Opening the Door on a Double Act**

In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud writes of a particular set of anxiety-dreams:

Robbers, burglars and ghosts, of whom some people feel frightened before going to bed, and who sometimes pursue their victims after they are asleep, all originate from one and the same class of infantile reminiscence. They are the nocturnal visitors who rouse children and take them up to prevent their wetting their beds, or who lift the bed-clothes to make sure where they have put their hands in their sleep. Analyses of some of these anxiety-dreams have made it possible for me to identify these nocturnal visitors more precisely. In every case the robbers stood for the sleeper's father, whereas the ghosts corresponded to female figures in white night-gowns. (SE 5: 403-4)

At the beginning of his Surrealist anti-novel, *Nadja*, Breton asks, "Who am I?" Who asks this question? Who can ask such a question? We know who he is because his name is at the front of the book. But a name is not enough. The question is a kind of jolt. It alert us to the anxiety aroused by a writing that does not know who writes. Breton answers the question with an image: "If this once I were to rely on a proverb, then perhaps everything would amount to knowing whom I 'haunt.'"
Becoming his own ghost in order to enter himself, Breton writes: "Such a word means much more than it says, makes me, still alive, play a ghostly part, evidently referring to what I must have ceased to be in order to be who I am." The ghost must presuppose not only death, but it represents a return of the past, and in some sense brings with it "torment" and "punishment," as Breton notes in this dense opening passage.

How are we to understand this haunting? Is it that Breton has already abandoned, or condemned to death the Breton that he will "haunt" through his reminiscences in this book? In this recovery of the past, he writes, "I am doomed to retrace my steps under the illusion that I am exploring, doomed to try and learn what I should simply recognize, learning a mere fraction of what I have forgotten." Here, at the beginning he seems barely able to face the task ahead of him. How can he reconstruct what has ceased to be? We witness a heavy reluctance to even begin writing down his past ... Or is this the typical gothic manoeuvre of introducing a ghost story through a narrator almost too fearful, almost too close to death to apply himself to the task of recording his experiences— is Nadja a ghost story?

Or is this image of haunting a remnant of an anxiety dream? Though the book is titled Nadja, its opening passage announces the subject as Breton himself: "Who am I?" Nadja? Breton? Is Nadja herself the Surrealist Breton desires to be, but can never be? Is she his more-perfect double in this? We, the readers, are already slipping between double identities and doubled possibilities—male and female, ghost and self, past and present, the writer and the word left behind on the page, the life and the image of the life, memory and fact—the conscious self and its more mysterious double, the unconscious self. Is Nadja then the ghost who will haunt this book? Does she call up for Breton the two parts of himself, the bisexual elements of his being? Is this what he is hinting at, is this the source of anxiety in the opening images?

The opening ghost scene together with Breton's fear and immobility recall another ghost story, Hamlet. "Who's there?" becomes Breton's call as he prepares both to face himself and to be the ghost who revivifies his past self. "Is it not like the king?" Marcellus asks when he sees the ghost. "As thou art to thyself," Horatio replies. But Marcellus, pale and fearful, could not have been quite like himself at that moment. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud has suggested the ghost represents for Hamlet a double of himself, that Oedipal double who can neither be condemned nor accepted (SE 4: 264-6).64 At the false ending of Nadja, Breton asks, in an even more emphatic echo

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64 Freud further complicates the doubling of Hamlet in an aside: "... and if anyone is inclined to call him a hysteric, I can only accept the fact as one that is implied by my interpretation" (266). Suffering from a condition typical of women, Hamlet becomes both feminine and masculine. See the references to Hamlet in Freud's later essay, "Psychopathic Characters on Stage," where he suggests the play operates to induce the same illness (doubling?) in the audience.

For Surrealism in 1928 psychoanalysis has re-shaped the discourse on the individual as well as the notion of creativity. After psychoanalysis, the individual cannot be simply one: the unconscious will, convulsively, intrude into actions, words, illnesses, tastes, and art. After psychoanalysis the "I" is always (at least) doubled — the self one knows stands beside the self one can only witness and marvel at ... or interpret. These two selves are the same but not the same. Between them there is a strange transfiguration. Each is like a dream of the other.

This doubling in *Nadja* continues in the short, dream-like anecdote about Hugo and Drouet riding past the same two gates every day. Here, the image of the two gates, their names "bridle" and "pedestrian," and the solemnity of the ritual, all call out for interpretation, specifically a Freudian interpretation. Breton does move toward the question of interpretations when he declares, "Those two gates are like the mirror of his strength and his weakness, we do not know which stands for his insignificance, which for his greatness." In the image of the mirror which cannot answer a question, there is an echo of the ghosting of the self, of anxieties over images as unreadable doubles.

A central tension in the writing reveals itself here. It is a tension which will recur in many forms throughout *Nadja*. At this point it could be characterised as a tension between the dream as document and the dream as material. Breton does not pursue the possible unconscious or Freudian meanings which could be drawn from the symbolism of the anecdote about Hugo and Drouet. After noting the possibility of significance and an impulse towards interpretation, Breton turns from this approach in favour of seeing the event as a "marvellous, poignant ritual," attaching to it one of the key Surrealist terms in the word, marvellous. He admires the "supreme sense of proportion" (11-14) in this anecdote when it is viewed as a document. It is enough. We need go no further. "I should be privileged indeed to possess, in the case of each of the men I admire, a personal document of corresponding value" (14).

In fact he does express a desire for such a document from a particular man he admires, de Chirico. Reporting that he does have a document from de Chirico in front of him as he writes, Breton regrets his inability to find in it "the least consequential as well as the most disturbing details"(15) which would confide what once made him paint as he did. There follows two details from de Chirico's document. Firstly, de Chirico could paint only when "surprised (surprised first of all) by certain arrangements of objects"(15). From the italics in the above passages we can see that *surprise* and

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65 See, for instance, the passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams* where Freud makes the point that seemingly mundane dreams can "lead back on analysis to wishful impulses which are unmistakeably sexual and often of an unexpected sort" (SE 5: 397). In this passage he gives the example of a door opening into an inclining passage.

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proportion are both important to Breton, perhaps being more or less the same thing—or being aspects of the one experience. Then Breton quotes from de Chirico's document a passage which declares that the finished product is only like its surprising inspiration in "the strange way two brothers resemble each other ... a slight and mysterious transfiguration is apparent ... " Here, again, Breton is drawn not merely to images of doubling, but to their mysterious, not-quite matching qualities. 66 It is this which interests him rather than any psychoanalytic or psychological meanings. The value of these documents seems to lie in their suggestiveness. We can double and re-double the possible meanings of the Hugo and Drouet anecdote for example, and by resisting any final meanings we are able to live within the proportions of these mysterious transfigurations.

Breton appears to be asking for (or teasing us with the possibility of) psychoanalytic interpretations when he outlines what details he thinks are missing from de Chirico's document: "We have said nothing about de Chirico until we take into account his most personal views about the artichoke, the glove, the cookie, or the spool. In such matters as these, how much we could gain from his co-operation!" (16). He goes on immediately to make a statement which sets his purposes against any therapeutic or psychoanalytic approach: "As far as I am concerned, a mind's arrangement with regard to certain objects is even more important than its regard for certain arrangements of objects..." The psychoanalyst might wonder what unconscious significance artichokes, gloves, cookies and spools might have in de Chirico's mind. The Surrealist, on the other hand, will marvel at the list itself. Thus Breton declares his allegiance to the mind shaped and guided by the marvellous, by proportion, and by surprise. He is drawn to the mind arranged by objects rather than the mind constructing meanings from objects. But what can we say then of those objects, or texts, constructed by a Surrealist mind? David Gascoyne offers one answer when he remarks in his introduction to The Magnetic Fields, "The purpose of automatic writing is to discover the marvellous but not to fabricate it deliberately" (15). Almost any spectacle can induce this. I will consider the frailties and dangers of this method later, but for now I wish to note the element of resistance in an appreciation of the marvellous—a resistance to analysis, and specifically psychoanalysis. Breton goes on to describe his preferred state of mind, which he shares with Huysmans, as "tremulous ennui." 67

Through these manoeuvrings between influences and documents in the early pages of Nadja, Breton arrives at a statement of the kind of book he is writing. First of all it is not fiction: "I insist on knowing the names, on being interested only in books left ajar,

66 De Chirico was drawn to the ambiguities of doubling in his own work, for he produced "multiple originals" of several of his paintings — exact copies of for instance The Disturbing Muses and Piazza d'Italia. At the same time he was vigorous in prosecuting those who forged his work (Gimferrer 13).

67 Perhaps this is not too distant from the state of wavering attention Freud recommended for analysts as they listened to their patients.
like doors; I will not go looking for keys" (18). It will be like a "glass house" where we can witness Breton even under glass sheets at night in his bed. In his declaration of openness we might marvel at the choice of an open door as an image, for the door is mythically presided over by a two-faced god, Janus, and in Roman mythology the door is only opened in times of war. The statement is confrontational as much as it is confessional. It is two-faced. Already, anyway, hasn't Breton indicated that knowing names is not enough, for hasn't he asked of himself, "Who am I?" And isn't there in his image of the door left only ajar, an equivocation—an admission that no text can be properly open?

Secondly, Breton commits his book to a narrative which will proceed by a method very much like psychoanalytic free association:

... an almost forbidden world of sudden parallels, petrifying coincidences ... facts of quite unverifiable intrinsic value, but which, by their absolutely unexpected, violently fortuitous character, and the kind of associations of suspect ideas they provoke—a way of transforming gossamer into spiderweb (that is, into what would be the most shimmering, delicate thing in the world were it not for the spider in the corner); I am concerned, I say, with facts which may belong to the order of pure observation, but which on each occasion present all the appearances of a signal, without our being able to say precisely which signal, and of what. (Nadja 19)

The writing will be open to whatever direction, observation or association suggests itself. As with free association in analytic sessions, it will not baulk at the suspect, the dangerous or the violent. This is not quite free association, for the writing does not see itself as only one side of a process which remains incomplete until the other side, the interpretation, is given; Breton rather asserts here and in many other places in Nadja, interpretation is out of place. These signals exist in their appearance, and not by virtue of meanings which can be indicated by interpretation. Surprise, fascination, pleasure and a sense of freedom are the outcomes as long as interpretation can be resisted. "This is the case with those privileged sensations I have mentioned and whose share of incommunicability is itself a source of pleasures that have no equal" (23).

Asserting again the method of this writing as a kind of free association, Breton describes it in this way: "I shall limit myself here to recalling without effort certain things which ... have occasionally happened to me ... I shall discuss these things without pre-established order, and according to the mood of the moment which lets whatever survives survive."

This does not, of course, mean that the work will be unstructured, nor, perhaps more surprisingly, that the work will not incorporate devices of literary fiction writing. Already, for instance, in the image of Philemon and Baucis associated with the anecdote about Hugo, Breton has prefigured Nadja's act of mad love during their car journey from Versailles to Paris.68 The text will not even avoid becoming a roman à clef, for in

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68 See pages 152-3. Just as Philemon and Baucis wished to die together and found their fulfilment in
the final section we will meet his new lover only as "x". His vivid assertion of the text as a glass house is loaded with irony and rhetorical play when it comes after those opening paragraphs so burdened by the sense of an unrecoverable past, a dead self in need of haunting, and by a task almost beyond the writer.

There is one more point to make before he presents the first of his petrifying coincidences: the book is in part a polemical exercise. We are told that when the writer does express apparently random but nevertheless unbearably discomforting associations, the reader must not immediately suppose that Breton is "merely ready for psychoanalysis." After allowing psychoanalysis his respect, Breton warns, "We already do this method too much honor by conceding that it exhausts the problem of dreams or that it does not simply occasion further inhibitions by its very interpretation of inhibitions" (24). Here, at the climax of this opening section the central tension in the text recurs. Though the work owes its existence and its method to psychoanalysis (for it does use unconscious desires, the world of dreams, and the method of free association), it uses these in the service of a Surrealism whose aims are wilder, more dangerous, more uninhibited and more poetic than those of psychoanalysis. The text of *Nadja* is at once inspired and provoked by psychoanalysis. It is, as it were, a mysterious double of psychoanalysis—both adopting and transfiguring its forms.

*Nadja* becomes Surrealism's necessary response to psychoanalysis. Kenneth Wach acknowledges the debt Surrealism owes to psychoanalysis when he writes, "In its formative, early years, Surrealism has more in common with the psychological sciences than with any 'aesthetic' movement ... What we have in Surrealism ... are poeticised psychological insights ..." (170). Wach goes on to claim that the Surrealists were the first modern artists to make extensive mention of Freud and the first to incorporate his theory into their practice. 69 My argument here is that they were not only the first artists to use psychoanalysis, but that they recognised the importance, indeed the necessity of resisting and misusing psychoanalysis at the moment of allowing it to alter radically (or allowing that it had altered) creative practice.

For Surrealism psychoanalysis must be a disabling and threatening discourse because its therapeutic aim is to bring the unconscious back under the control of an ego; it characterises artistic activity as neurotic and socially conservative; it is aimed at replacing art, or making art redundant. It is, however, at the same time the ally of Surrealism in exposing and undermining art that seeks ultimate sanity and satisfying closure. Surrealism seizes art's opportunity to survive against the expectations of

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being transformed into intertwining trees, Nadja wished to die by slamming into a tree while making love to Breton, the driver of their car at the time. Breton himself expresses the desire to resume that nocturnal ride.

69 Franklin Rosemont accords Breton primary credit for this early notice given to Freud: "It is a mark of Breton's perspicacity that he was among the first in France to champion Freud's ideas (*André Breton and the First Principles of Surrealism* 12, 22).
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zealous analysts such as Ernest Jones who asked Jung "whether he thought the vogue of Dadaism, just then beginning in Zurich, had a psychotic basis. Jung replied, 'It's too idiotic for any decent insanity'" (Wach 249).

*Nadja: Case and Anti-Case History*

If psychoanalysis claims that unconscious symbolism must be analysed with a view to sane though shocking interpretations, and that the artist if not sick at least mimics sickness, then the Surrealists (who have adopted so much of psychoanalysis) can only save art for themselves by resorting to acts which will leave psychoanalysis at a loss for words. In fact in a strange statement which recognises a failure of communication—though on what side the failing falls is uncertain—Freud wrote to Breton in 1932, "I am not able to clarify for myself what Surrealism is and what it wants. Perhaps I am not destined to understand it, I who am so distant from art" (Breton *Communicating Vessels* 152).

Because psychoanalytic writing typically takes the form of case histories,70 the task for *Nadja* is to present a case history which will restore some uninterpretable region to writing/speech/literature.

In the 1963 preface to the revised version of *Nadja*, Breton claims, against much of the evidence in his text, that "the form adopted for the narrative models itself on the medical observation, particularly the neuropsychiatric report which can relate all that an examination and interview delivers up without burdening itself in the least with any affectations of style" (6).71 Ellenwood reports that Breton was familiar with case histories of Kraepelin, Flournoy and Janet, including one history by Janet called "Nadja" (55). He had also read Janet's work on symptomatology. In Breton's book, Nadja reproduces many of the symptoms of the "scrupuleux" described by Janet: vague and symbolic hallucinations, belief that thoughts are controlled by another, feelings of being isolated and unreal, losing contact with time. Breton, however, admires these very qualities in Nadja. They are what make her an ideal. This is not a traditional case history then, and not quite an anti-case history, but a surreal case history—one that

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70 Jacques Lacan makes the point that case histories (that is, narratives of individual's lives) are indispensable to a discipline which seeks truths that are constituted by myths—i.e. psychoanalytic truths which can be enacted or are in process, but cannot be easily defined. He makes the point that Freud's writings are often made up of fragments of analysis: "To be sure, one may say that they are all incomplete and that many of them are analyses broken off midway, fragments of analysis" (*The Neurotic's Myth* 408).

71 This is my translation of: "Le ton adopté pour le récit se calque sur celui de l'observation médicale, entre toutes neuropsychiatrique, qui tend à garder trace de tout ce qu'examen et interrogatoire peuvent livrer, sans s'embarrasser en le rapportant du moindre apprêt quant au style."
works without a psychoanalyst, without a diagnosis, one that endorses madness (or at least begins by doing this).

Against Breton's claim that he has written the book in a clinical manner, we find Nadja is determinedly discussed in aesthetic, Surrealist, marvellous terms. Nadja is a heroic figure, an ideal, not a sick person at all: as a reverse case-history the book follows her descent from acts of Surreal insight and Surreal daring into madness. It becomes a case history of disintegration, not cure. The shape of this Surreal case history is in the hands of one who is sometimes the subject and sometimes a bystander. There is no therapist. In these ways Nadja resists psychoanalysis and confounds it by reversing its truths and asserting values it cannot accommodate.

While the book might appear as an anti-case history when we follow Nadja's story, it re-appears (mirrors/haunts itself) as an almost conventional story of self-discovery for Breton himself. Nadja is, like Interpretation of Dreams, a self-analysis. As suggested earlier, Nadja becomes a device for Breton to identify his own ideals, and for Breton finally to find/recognise himself. Ellenwood remarks, "A good part of the poignancy of that story comes from Breton's gradual disenchantment with Nadja—his realization that she is not an ideal" (55). Ellenwood thus detects a therapeutic process in the telling—and in this it is like a case history, particularly in the way a reality-based perception becomes dominant over the magical, marvellous, petrifying beginning. Against this, Harold Wylie sees in the "spooky vampirism of Nadja," (100) evidence that Nadja was from the beginning showing schizophrenic symptoms and this book amounts to a tale of absorption of one being by another. Her "Lovers' Flower" (Nadja 117) drawing collapses their separate selves into the one image of a four-eyed flower in turn about to be devoured by a serpent. Her "symbolic portrait" (118) shows a powerful eagle-sphinx-fish-creature (representing Breton) wrapping her in its tail. Wylie points out that Nadja's art not only depicts Breton as a powerful, hypnotic presence, but it displays many of the characteristics typical of schizophrenic art: mixing of words and images, floating figures, dissolving worlds, unconnected fragments, loss of body-image to the point where only eyes remain, an abundance of twisted archetypal symbols. From this perspective, we might see Nadja as the absorption or annexation of madness as a style while Nadja herself is raised up only to be abandoned once her use has been served. In his abandonment of Nadja, though, Breton manages to condemn psychiatry, psychiatrists and "the imbecile code of good sense and good manners" (142) which, he holds, conspired to prevent Nadja's recovery. She remains, in her original state, an ideal; in her final state she is a victim of the sane, professional world of psychiatry. Nadja as self-analysis can only lead to an understanding of what has been lost. There is no sense of gain and no sense of achievement in Breton's sanity at the end of the book. This is not hopelessness, but rather it is resistance and defiance. It is a refusal to conform to the inhibitions of a bourgeois notion of therapy, cure or insight. Nadja
Surrealism and psychoanalysis provides an opportunity for Breton to show the psychoanalyst how a Surrealist responds to the presence of madness.

The Science of Surrealism

In their common, seemingly intuitive move to share in the status and power of modern science, Surrealism and psychoanalysis participated in a wider movement towards modernity in the first half of the twentieth century. By examining their relations to science we can pursue a discussion of the ways creativity was modernised and used in each discourse's struggle for position and power.

In a similar manner to the way psychoanalysis sought scientific credibility and respectability, borrowing the rhetoric of science to assert this, Surrealism adopts a scientistic rhetoric. It surrounds itself with an air of scientific endeavour and experiment. The title of Breton's 1932 work, *Communicating Vessels*, is taken from a chemistry experiment of the same name which involves the activity of gases in two vessels connected by tubes: no matter what shapes the vessels have, "communicating" gases will reach the same level in each of them. This marvellous and mysterious balance achieved in communication between unlikely vessels is for Breton an image suggesting the basis of Surrealist endeavour.

In a sentence which typically threatens to run out of sense, Breton uses another particular scientific image to explain Surrealism: "I hope it will be considered as having tried nothing better than to cast a conduction wire between the far too distant worlds of waking and sleep, exterior and interior reality, reason and madness, the assurance of knowledge and of love, of life for life and the revolution, and so on" (*Communicating Vessels* 86). In a later footnote Breton seeks to give this idea power and modernity by relating it in terms of biological chemistry and the discovery of fire:

> To compare two objects as far distant as possible one from the other or, by any other method, to confront them in a brusque and striking manner, remains the highest task to which poetry can ever aspire. Its unequaled, unique power should tend more and more to practice drawing out the concrete unity of the two terms placed in relation and to communicate to each of them, whatever it may be, a vigor that it lacked as long as it was considered in isolation. What must be undone is the formal opposition of these two terms, which resides in the imperfect, infantile idea we have of nature, of the exteriority of time and of space. The stronger the element of immediate unlikeness appears, the more strongly it should be surmounted and denied. The whole meaning of the object is at stake. So two different bodies, rubbed one against the other, attain through that spark their supreme unity in fire; thus iron and water reach their common, admirable resolution in blood, and so on.

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pose reproduces his and the way her head sits on his shoulder returns us to those images of doubling which provoke Freudian interpretations.72

Surrealism's adoption of modern scientific terms to describe its activity is characteristic of avant-garde art of this period. Timothy Steele has noted that since Zola identified himself as an experimentalist, modern poets moved to ally themselves with progressive science. Steele quotes a passage from a 1918 essay by Eliot which indicates the seriousness and literalness of the connection proposed between art and science with the general increase of interest in the modern:

A poet, like a scientist, is contributing toward the organic development of culture: it is just as absurd for him not to know the work of his predecessors or of men writing in other languages as it would be for a biologist to be ignorant of Mendel or De Vries. It is exactly as wasteful for a poet to do what has been done already, as for a biologist to rediscover Mendel's discoveries. The French poets in question have made "discoveries" in verse of which we cannot afford to be ignorant, discoveries which are not merely a concern for French syntax. To remain with Wordsworth is equivalent to ignoring the whole of science subsequent to Erasmus Darwin.

This passage reads strangely as it shifts from metaphoric "discoveries" encased in quotation marks to literal discoveries; as it moves from urges that poets know the past only to let them know they must now discard the past in the name of progress. Pound wrote, "Poetry is a sort of inspired mathematics, which gives us equations, not for abstract figures, triangles, spheres, and the like, but for the human emotions" (Steele 269). Throughout his 1911 book, Concerning the Spiritual in Art, Kandinsky used quasi-mathematical language to describe the emergence of the spirit in abstract art. The following is typical: "The life of the spirit may be fairly represented in diagram as a large acute-angled triangle divided horizontally into unequal parts with the narrowest segment uppermost. The lower the segment the greater it is in breadth, depth and area" (6).

The founding journal of the Surrealist movement, La Révolution surréaliste, did not take the typographical extravaganzas of Dada broadsheets as a model but rather modelled itself explicitly on the scientific magazine, La Nature. Rosalind Krauss describes this first Surrealist journal designed by Pierre Naville in the following manner: "The first issues ... carried two types of testimony: specimens of automatic writing and records of dreams. Sober columns of text carrying this data are juxtaposed with visual material, most of it Man Ray's photographs, all of it having the documentary impact of illustrative evidence" (98-9).

Surrealism's alliance with psychoanalysis—most explicitly acknowledged in Breton's manifestoes—serves to bring it into association not only with science, but with a new and revolutionary science which threatens to overthrow accepted

72 Beyond the issues of dual or uncertain sexual identity, questions of representation are raised by the photomontage: who is mirroring whom, which is the original and which the copy?
worldviews. In other words, it becomes associated with the power and modernity of science. In the passage from *Communicating Vessels* quoted above, Breton writes of power, vigor, strength and supremacy when he associates poetry with scientific processes. Surrealism thus becomes both an art of the modern (scientific) era and an art of triumphant masculinity. We might indeed wonder whether the discourse of modern science is desired for its promise of transfiguration and progress or for its assertion of a power to dominate through typically masculine strategies.

While at times the Surrealists vent intense misogynist views which are part of a triumphant masculinity, they can also inhabit that world shared by psychoanalysis where woman as outsider and ambiguous figure can stand in for man's locked-away alter ego/unconscious (as she is represented in Breton's photomontage self-portrait); through a further extension, or perhaps reaction formation, in figures like Nadja, Berton, the Papin sisters and Violette Nozière, woman can stand as an ideal of heroic Surreality. This aura of sainthood bestowed on the figure of woman is exemplified in the 1924 group portrait of Surrealists arranged around a woman, Germaine Berton, who was a left-wing assassin (reproduced in Figure 2 below). The ambivalence invested in such figures is encapsulated in the motto printed on the group portrait: "Woman is the being who throws the largest shadow or the greatest light on our dreams."

Surrealism finds some comfort, then, in an alliance with psychoanalysis as a discourse also desiring the status of science and equally at a loss over the meaning and inclusion of women in its movement and its theories. In her introduction to *Communicating Vessels*, Mary Ann Caws has pointed out the similarity between Freud's cry, "What does woman want?" and his response to Breton's *Communicating Vessels*: Freud wrote to Breton that he did not know "what Surrealism ... wants" (xviii). In throwing up his hands at both women and Surrealism, Freud has made a certain point which is underlined in the same letter when he declares himself, as a scientist, to be "distant from art." Not only does Freud thus condemn Surrealism to an existence as mere art, (despite the obvious philosophical, scientific and analytic pretensions of Breton's text, *Communicating Vessels*) but through it being as puzzling to him as the female psyche he identifies Surrealism as fundamentally feminine—an intuitively well aimed insult. Breton ends *Communicating Vessels* by expressing respect and admiration for Freud, but not for Freud as scientist, rather for Freud as fallibly human—a man of "diverse contradictions" which bear witness "to his ever vivid and marvelous sensitivity and bring me the very precious proof of his life" (155). The alliance in the name of science is recognised on both sides as a rhetorical strategy with limited use. It must be undermined in a contest over supremacy each time it is declared.
Scientific images survive and multiply in subsequent discussions of the Surrealist movement. See, for example, Franklin Rosemont's summation of the first Surrealist manifesto which highlights discovery and research: "Its originality and its great historic merit lie in its magnificent synthesis of psychological discoveries (especially Freud's theory of dreams) and specifically poetic researches" (23). Activity becomes research, originality is discovery. Balakian writes of Breton's Freudian "experiments" such as dream transcriptions, automatic writing and the simulation of states of abnormality (97). Kenneth Wach characterises Surrealism's products as "poeticised psychological insights" (170). In the fourth of his interviews with André Parinaud broadcast in 1952, Breton reflected on the experience of writing Les Champs Magnétiques, giving his experience an alchemical twist: "... we lived at that time in a state of euphoria, almost in the intoxication of discovery. Our situation was that of anyone who has just excavated a vein of precious metal" (quoted by Gascoyne "introduction" Magnetic Fields 11-12).

Whether Surrealism was involved in any essential acts of scientific discovery, psychological insight, or a new poetic method is not my concern here for I am focusing on how discourses establish themselves through these rogue borrowings and mutations. Why do they make these borrowings? Why are the scientific references so relentless in both psychoanalysis and Surrealism? Partly, as we have seen in the case of psychoanalysis, the aim is to share status with the discourse whose terms are borrowed, and partly these are responses to perceived attacks or attempted annexations.

There are alternative perspectives that might be developed in order to make sense of the tensions between Surrealism and psychoanalysis. In one view, we might see that Surrealism does take its impetus from psychoanalytic assertions of the dark, anarchic power of the unconscious in human life and it does adopt the method of free association; but as an art form rising out of the Dada movement, in response to a disillusionment with bourgeois, rational Western civilisation in the aftermath of the Great War and as a movement close to left-wing socialist revolutionary politics, Surrealism finds it must move against, or must move more radically than psychoanalysis. In 1928, for instance, Breton and Aragon declared that hysteria is "a supreme means of expression." In this, Chénieux-Gendron suggests, they were

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73 Each of these "experiments" can be seen as pointedly anti-Freudian even while they owe their assumptions to Freud.

74 See Foucault ("Politics and the Study of Discourse") for a discussion of discourse-mutation. McHoul and Grace also summarise and discuss these ideas (48-50).
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thumbing their noses at Freud (179). Their impulse was always to go further than any position which might be regarded as respectable.

Without discounting these broad historical influences or the importance of other discourses such as Marxism, my focus here is on a contest between the discourses of psychoanalysis and Surrealism which forced certain choices on a literary art which was informed enough about psychoanalysis to understand both the threat it posed and the opportunity it opened for art forms desiring to assert their cutting-edge modernity, their mystery, or their human and cultural importance. It is this perspective I have been taking in developing a picture of the discourse tensions between psychoanalysis and Surrealism over issues of scientific credibility and the understanding of creativity.

It was not only the Surrealists who wished to adopt psychoanalysis and Freud for the production of art. In an episode which might have been scripted by a Surrealist, Sam Goldwyn attempted to hire Freud as a script writer for Hollywood during a trip to Europe in 1924. Goldwyn told a reporter for the New York Times that Freud was "the greatest love specialist in the world." Freud was offered $100,000 to come to Hollywood to write scripts or advise on films. Goldwyn enthused: "Scenario writers, directors and actors can learn much by a really deep study of everyday life. How much more forceful will be their creations if they know how to express genuine emotional motivation and suppressed desires?" (Gay 454). We know at once that the suppressed desires of the Freudian unconscious would find no place in what Goldwyn and Hollywood understand by suppressed desires. Freud responded to Goldwyn's request for an interview with a one-sentence letter: "I do not intend to see Mr Goldwyn." Though psychoanalysis might have been crudely misunderstood in this instance, what we can recognise from Goldwyn's offer is the sense that an art form (in this case filmmaking) feels itself to be in danger of becoming outmoded by such new ideas and such new sources of creativity. For Hollywood the solution is to buy the man himself, while for Surrealism the answer lies in taking up the insights of psychoanalysis as a starting point for a new, even more experimental and unprecedented discourse.

In Communicating Vessels of 1932, for instance, Breton does analyse dreams, making claims to going further than Freud was willing to go. This claim is not wholly supported in the text, and Breton's analysis is idiosyncratic rather than psychoanalytic. The claim is more important as rhetorical strategy than as any real attempt to undermine or replace Freud—Psychoanalysis becomes an influence, even a source, but one far removed from Breton's more honest, more experimental, more thorough, more modern, more creative project. Breton sent Freud a copy of Communicating Vessels. After reading to page nineteen Freud sent two letters to Breton within 24 hours defending himself against Breton's aside about the omission of Volkel's 1878 study of
dreams in the bibliography of Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, despite the fact that, as Breton claimed, Freud had "taken over for himself Volkelt's ideas" (11). By publishing these rather breathless and self-justifying letters in the final pages of *Communicating Vessels* Breton adds to his case that Freud is defensive, even secretive, a man lacking in the candour or exhibitionism necessary to properly display his new method of dream analysis. In contrast Breton is, he tells us, open and frank about the sexual elements in his dreams and fantasies. But his revelations are nevertheless not without restraint or posturing for he draws back at any exposure of homoerotic or homophobic elements in his psyche.75

The Surrealist Unconscious: Strategic Rewriting?

"It is regrettable, we say, that nothing can enter into M. Breton's confused head except in poetic form."

Georges Bataille (*Visions of Excess* 41)

What is the Surrealist unconscious, and how does it differ from the Freudian unconscious? More specifically, how does the position of the subject in relation to the unconscious differ in these discourses? This question can help us move towards an understanding of the particular way Surrealism alters the insights of psychoanalysis in order not only to make room for its artistic practice, but to convince us of the significance of its practice. Franklin Rosemont translates from Breton's *Genesis and Perspective of Surrealism in the Plastic Arts*: "The surrealism in a work is in direct proportion to the efforts the artist has made to embrace the whole psychophysical field, of which consciousness is only a small fraction. In those unfathomable depths there prevails, according to Freud, a total absence of contradiction, a release from the emotional fetters caused by repression, a lack of temporality, and the substitution of external reality by psychic reality obedient to the pleasure principle and no other. Automaticity leads us straight to these regions" (21). Here, within the one short statement is a demonstration of Breton's alliance with Freud along with his need to contradict and go beyond psychoanalysis. Though the depths of the unconscious discovered by Freud are unfathomable, by the end of the sentence we are assured that the Surrealist method of producing texts will lead "straight to these regions."

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75 Breton typically would not allow even discussion of homosexual themes in his presence. In 1928, *Révolution surrealiste* published a report entitled "Research on Sexuality" which was the transcription of a discussion among poets chaired by Breton. When Aragon and Duhamel announced that they were pederasts, and that pederasty was a sexual habit like any other, Breton responded, "I am absolutely opposed to any further discussion of this subject. If this talk turns into an advertisement for pederasty, I shall abandon it immediately" (Roudinesco 17).
For Freud the unconscious can never be directly available to our experience or our gaze, not even in dreams. For this reason analysis will always be necessary as the hermeneutic tool which unlocks otherwise mysterious and unfathomable signs. For Breton the world is about to change now that Freud has established the presence and power of the unconscious. Surrealism becomes the direct experience and demonstration of this unconscious.

In the face of Surrealism, Freudian notions of artistic practice as sublimation become inadequate for describing creativity. In 1938 Freud was reduced to commenting in a letter to Stefan Zweig, that he was "inclined to look upon surrealists, who have apparently chosen me for their patron saint, as absolute (let us say 95 per cent, like alcohol) cranks" (Letters 449). Like Rank, Freud could not envisage a psychoanalytically knowing art. In fact, he goes on in the letter to Zweig to write of a visit from a young Spaniard, Salvador Dali, whose "undeniable technical mastery has impelled me to reconsider my opinion. It would in fact be quite interesting to study the genesis of a painting of this kind analytically. From the critical point of view, it might, however, always be said that the notion of art should not be extended when the quantitative relation between unconscious material and preconscious elaboration is not kept within fixed limits. We are faced there, in any event, with serious psychological problems" (449). The confusion over whether a work by Dali is art, and the suggestion that art must keep to fixed limits in its play with the unconscious arise from a case of practice breaking bounds set by theory. In her detailed study of Freud's relations to art, Sarah Kofman has followed Freud's lead by declaring: "For anyone who has perfect knowledge of his own history, it would seem that the work of art is neither possible nor necessary, even if the work is consciously fantasized" (78). This perfect knowledge was not only what the Surrealists claimed for themselves, but they regarded it as the source of their art. In this way psychoanalysis becomes merely a starting point, a context from which a new creativity proceeds, a method which is abandoned almost as soon as it is taken up. In deliberately looking like Freudian dreams (e.g. Magritte's bottle-carrot), Surrealist art defies psychoanalysis. The exhibitionism of the Surrealists turns on its head the psychoanalytic assumption that some wishes and impulses are unforgiveably shameful and cannot be directly expressed. In submitting to a belief in the unconscious, Surrealism aims to overcome this debt by constructing itself as uninterpretable.

For Breton the unconscious becomes a technique in the production of texts. The famous passage of the 1924 manifesto which instructs us, "After you have settled yourself in a place as favorable as possible to the concentration of your mind upon itself, have writing materials brought to you. Put yourself in as passive or receptive a
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state of mind as you can ... " (29), is meant to place the writer within the impersonal flow of the "inexhaustible murmur" of the unconscious. For Freud this kind of access is not only impossible, but it cannot make sense because the crucial technique of analysis must be employed if we are to know the unconscious in an undistorted manifestation. The analytic aim is to expose and subdue the neurosis-producing role of this unconscious within the social personality. For Breton the discovery of the unconscious is the discovery of a technique. His aim is to expose the unconscious, experience it, and give it its due as the fundamental source of human thought and creativity. In this way the world changes irrevocably.

Breton's use of the analytic discovery of the unconscious to announce Surrealism as a revolutionary change in the world—"Language has been given to man so that he may make Surrealist use of it" (32) is typical of the announcements in the Manifestoes of Surrealism—aids again to align this movement with modern science which breaks radically from traditional, religious and common-sense views of the world.

As a technique, however, it cannot remain simple or pure. Tensions must be acknowledged between apparently pure (or spontaneous) manifestations of unconscious process and those acts of calculation and control required for the production of works in words, paint or collage. In 1925 these tensions led to a debate over whether painting could ever be Surrealist because it is never truly automatic and is always re-touched (Short 97). This uneasiness over the place of painting in Surrealist activity was partly responsible for Breton's relegation of painters to a footnote in the first Surrealist Manifesto (Manifestoes 27). Nevertheless a door was left ajar to painting in Breton's first definition of Surrealism: "Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express—verbally, by means of the written word, or in any other manner—the actual functioning of thought" (my emphasis 26). The purity of automatism in any case always remains more an ideal than a practice, or more a value than a rule. Even after the early automatic writing experiments Breton at times wished to consciously rewrite the texts produced. He was uneasy enough about his rewriting impulse to comment in the first manifesto of 1924 that he should give credit to Soupault after those first experiments with automatic writing because "he [Soupault] constantly and vigorously opposed any effort to retouch or correct, however slightly, any passage" (24). Still unable to accept this as a simple rule Breton resorts, typically, to a footnote to make a subtle point at this place in his text: he justifies his desire to rewrite by appealing to the notion that the seeming imperfections, lapses and "obvious errors" of an unconscious text are due to distractions and hence can be eliminated without weakening the strength or authenticity of a Surrealist thought. André Masson, who collaborated with Breton on Martinique, Charmeuse de Serpents, reported to Ellenwood "his surprise that Breton would suggest striking out repetitious words and otherwise polish the texts" (76). In his Treatise on Style (1928) Aragon acknowledges tough-
mindedly that there are intellectual, aesthetic and revolutionary standards by which unconscious products can be judged: "If you write deplorable twaddle using Surrealist techniques, it will still be deplorable twaddle" (96).

By 1933 Breton allows that there is a play between intention and chance, between unconscious and conscious in the production of Surrealist art while he tries to maintain a priority for the unconscious: "One runs a great risk of moving away from Surrealism if automatism stops making its way, at least as an undercurrent" (Surrealism and Painting 70). Dali, Magritte and Delvaux by this time had produced powerfully Surrealist paintings which were meticulous products of realist techniques applied in the service of recalling or fixing Surrealist insights and experiences.

We can note in response to such developments that as Surrealism becomes a recognisable style in modern art and literature, its claim to directly represent and directly experience a volatile, unpredictably creative unconscious becomes tempered, attenuated, subdued. The Surrealist unconscious becomes equated with a Surrealist style.

To view Surrealism as a style is to claim for it some predictability, and to imply certain exclusions or repressions. For instance, the male-heterosexual fantasies exploited in Surrealism, as we have noted, indicate areas of repression and defence which severely limit the ways women can be represented. Explicitly misogynist elements emerge sometimes in the causes taken up by Surrealists and in their humour. The editorial of the October 1927 issue of La Révolution surréaliste, for instance, takes up the cause of Charlie Chaplin against his wife who wanted to divorce him for being "unfaithful":

She, supposed she was denouncing her husband, the stupid cow, whereas she simply occasioned the spectacle of the human greatness of a mind which, accurately conceiving so many deadly things in the society in which his life and even his genius confine him, has found the means of giving his thought a perfect and vigorous expression without betrayal, an expression whose humor and power, whose poetry, in a word, suddenly suffers before our eyes an enormous setback in the light of the little bourgeois lamp shaken over his head by one of those

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76 Roudinesco (25-6) and Oliner (24) record that Breton relinquished automatic writing somewhat in the manner in which Freud abandoned hypnosis. This came about in response to hallucinations, sleepwalking, attempted suicides and an attempted murder among those who were experimenting with a 'pure' automatism which seemed in practice to have affinities with séances and trance states. Breton's 1933 statement indicates his commitment to an attenuated form of automatism.

77 Perhaps the recognition of this development is not too different to the observation that patients of Jungian analysts tend to develop Jungian dreams while psychoanalytic patients tend to produce dreams suitable to a more Freudian analysis. The Surrealist produces recognisably surrealist texts, sculptures, paintings, collages. If this style is a corruption of an originally free or anarchically open-ended project, then the term 'surrealist' has become perhaps doubly corrupted through its adoption by commercial, official and popular culture as a convenience-word—in February 1995 Australia Post launched a series of Valentine's Day stamps designed by Kim Roberts and promoted as "slightly surrealistic" (Melbourne Times Feb. 8 1995: 18), the 1994 catalogue for Clifton Bricks includes a brick fired for those who desire a surrealist effect; Garry Emery, designer of Australia's twenty dollar plastic banknote has described his working method as an opposition between rationalism and surrealism: the chance conjunction of ideas (Age Dec. 5, 1994: 13). It would seem an ultimate irony (or triumph?) that Breton's Surrealist project has been instrumental in the design of a banknote.
bitches out of whom, in every country of the world, are made good mothers, good sisters, good wives. Those plagues, those parasites of feeling and love ...  
(Nadeau 139)

"You must beat your mother while she's young," was a Surrealist proverb written by Paul Eluard and Benjamin Péret (Nadeau 143). The rebel Surrealist, Georges Bataille (Visions 39) noted that the presence of the prefix 'sur' in Surrealism echoed Nietzsche's Surhomme (Superman). Bataille saw in the Surrealist celebration of what is low, vulgar and filthy, a typically Freudian resistance: "All claims from below have been scurrilously disguised as claims from above." By raising the low, the shabby, and the sinister to artistic and poetic forms Bataille claims Surrealism diverts us from the horror of what is really happening around us. Further, he claims Breton's own most extreme Surreal image is an exercise in projected repression:

In December 1929 M. Breton did not hesitate to make himself ridiculous by writing that "the simplest Surrealist act consists of dashing down into the street, pistol in hand, and firing blindly, as fast as you can pull the trigger, into the crowd." He adds: "Anyone who, at least once in his life, has not dreamed of thus putting an end to the petty system of debasement and cretinization in effect has a well-defined place in that crowd, with his belly at barrel level." That such an image should present itself so insistently to his view proves decisively the importance in his pathology of castration reflexes. (39)

Surrealism thus remains open to Bataille's sometimes bizarre Freudian analysis in terms of it being riddled with defences and repressions, or to a feminist analysis in terms of its justification of homophobic and misogynist views. While the Surrealist unconscious might be a giving-over of the self to certain unconscious associations and desires, it remains confined by its particular defences and its ideological assumptions. The Surrealist style operates as an armour—it is in effect a resistance against an anarchic unconscious. As Surrealism retreats from a 'pure' automatism, and as it allows for the inevitable play between conscious and unconscious elements, these resistances (and the emergent stylistic signatures of Surrealism) become more evident.

This criticism, however, cannot rest its case, because surrealism undermines the basis of literary and psychoanalytic heuristics in its attack on the notion of an author—or even of a person—exposed through texts and words. Surrealism plays irresponsibly with the idea of authorship.

Irresponsible Authorship: Free Association and Thought-Writing

Though automatic writing takes its name from Janet, it is essentially a modification of Freud's free-association method (Ellenwood 84). As a modification of free association it achieves that kind of doubling we found so prevalent and worrying for Breton in Nadja—it creates a form both like and unlike its predecessor. How then is it like free association, and how is it not like free association? Automatic writing is faithful to
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Freudian tenets in that it does not censor material and it allows a flow of words connected more by associations than by logic or narrative. The texts of automatic writing, however, do not read like material for a therapy session (though we cannot be certain how a psychoanalytic free association text would read, since psychoanalysts do not provide verbatim reports of free association in their case histories or case notes). *The Magnetic Fields* of 1920, an automatic text, begins, "Prisoners of drops of water, we are but everlasting animals. We run about the noiseless towns and the enchanted posters no longer touch us. What's the good of these great fragile fits of enthusiasm, these jaded jumps of joy?" (25). This writing touches on the epigrammatic, the poetic, the romantic, the symbolist and the gothic. It is intensely literary. In this, again, it both distinguishes itself from a psychoanalytic free-association procedure while it allies itself to this very same procedure. Freud noted in *The Interpretation of Dreams* that poetic creation demands an "exactly similar attitude" to that required for successful free association (SE 4: 102). It requires a suspension of critical judgment and a willingness to allow a dream-like state to emerge. Of course for Freud this opens an opportunity for his double-edged argument: not only is free association shown to be deeply creative (and in touch with the wisdom of poets) but creativity and thus literature can be shown to be close to the neuroses of his clients. For Breton it is the marvellous surface of the automatic text that must be valued.

In pursuing the question of differences and similarities between the two procedures we note that unlike clinical free association, Surrealist automatic writing makes itself publicly available. In fact it flies in the face of psychoanalytic notions that the freedom of free association would become impossible if the process was made public. Further, it is unlike psychoanalytic free association in that it is produced rapidly, as written rather than spoken text, and the recording of it is under the control of the subject. But like free association in therapy sessions it cannot sustain itself for long without coming to a halt. In analysis these are moments for interpretation based upon a common commitment to examining possible psychological resistances which have halted the flow of associations. In Surrealist practice the recommended way to begin again is to choose an arbitrary impetus, usually a word beginning with any pre-determined letter of the alphabet. "If silence threatens to settle in," Breton advises in the 1924 manifesto, "...
place any letter whatsoever, the letter 'I' for example, always the letter 'I,' and bring the arbitrary back by making this letter the first of the following word" (30).

The commitment for Surrealists is not to a therapeutic end or an analytic understanding, but to a continuation of this game, this art, this mode of expression, this arbitrary way of living. The method becomes its own end. The thought-writing of Surrealism proceeds through chains and labyrinths of imagery which are sufficient in themselves. The surface of the free-associational text is the focus of the activity, not an indication of a possible more prosaic, more novelistic/autobiographical truth lying 'below' this initial text. The commitment is to poetic expression.

To say that Surrealist automatic texts are under the control of the subject is in some ways misleading, for these texts are often not simply the products of one person's psyche or unconscious. Chance plays its part, sometimes an equal part, sometimes a greater part than the individual unconscious. The Surrealists see a connection between chance and the unconscious which Freud would not have been able to accept. Breton's disturbingly anarchic call to make the Surreal gesture of shooting indiscriminately in the street makes the point that there is a mad reason in unreason, that chance can act as a kind of surreal justice, that brute chance does have a human meaning—and that the impersonal is a profoundly significant aspect of each person's unconscious. The endorsement and deliberate introduction of chance also highlights and extends the modern process of breaking down an author's hold on a text.

Even in the production of literary images the meaning of authorship alters radically: previously the metaphor presented an image which was already conceived in a writer's mind; now, when outlandish metaphors emerge from those automatic or chance encounters between words extraordinary effects are created, impossible meanings suggested, meanings to which the author is as much a marvelling audience as are the readers (Balakian 120-1). When Breton writes of "the light of the image," this light is outside any premeditated meaning, for it is an effect of the image itself. He calls it a beautiful spark which is created by the striking (of) difference between two previously unrelated images. When he writes of "Poetic Surrealism" Breton holds, "I absolutely refuse to believe that, in Reverdy's work, images such as ... Day unfolded like a white tablecloth, or: The world goes back into a sack reveal the slightest degree of premeditation" (Manifestoes 37-41). Images arise from "fortuitous juxtaposition." Even a random assemblage of newspaper headlines and scraps of headlines can create Surreal poems:

\[
\text{on an isolated farm}
\]

\[79\] See, for instance, Thomas McLaughlin's common sense definition of figurative speech: "A sportscaster might call a football player a 'tiger on defense.' ... We realize that the phrase is being used figuratively to suggest the player's aggressiveness and speed" (81).
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from day to day

the pleasant
grows worse.

Max Ernst's method of automatic painting and drawing through frottage was another attempt to open the creative process to chance and the impersonal unconscious. Such work cannot be wholly understood as either the conscious or unconscious production of an artist, nor as merely the products of chance. Ellenwood describes the mix of elements in the production of these works in the following way: "It is the difference between the chance design made by Arp from dropped scraps of paper and an automatic drawing by André Masson. At the ambiguous mid-point between these extremes would be the word-games of Rose Selavy and the frottages of Ernst where chance, conscious control and unconscious impulses are interacting almost equally" (96-7).

The acknowledgement and exploitation of the unconscious in creative work allowed the Surrealists to step aside, as it were, from their creations; for the dominance of the unconscious in creative work heralds the death of the (conscious) personality—the artist and writer must enter a realm of impersonality. The importance given to chance provides one method of holding-back the involvement of the conscious personality. Reason's role is limited to "taking note of, and appreciating, the luminous phenomenon" (Breton Manifestoes 37) produced by the unconscious.

Along with chance, collaborations also work to produce texts which defy psychoanalytic or author-based interpretations. The folded-paper drawings ("The Exquisite Corpse" exercises) for instance diminish authorship as an individual responsibility. Mary Ann Caws introduces her book on Breton by noting that for the Surrealists, "Their work is at all times a work in common, their attitude is the attitude of a group, implying as that does, certain peculiar strengths and other peculiar weaknesses. For instance, on the positive side, their cooperation in creations which could not have been the result of one brain alone, in metaphors whose valeur secouante, or disturbing content, depends on their multiple origin" (18).

Automatic writing exposes what psychoanalysis suggests art is designed to hide. Surrealist authors shamelessly transcribe from an unconscious which is activated and enhanced by chance, anarchy and collaboration. In these ways the artist is able to express what has been most private and most shameful and most shocking while resisting any psychoanalytic accusation of unwittingly exposing mental illness or disguising unconscious impulses.

For Breton this is particularly true of the poet. In 1932 Louis Aragon was prosecuted for his revolutionary poem, "Le Front Rouge," which contained lines such as, "Wipe out the Police, Comrades!" and "Fire on the trained bears of social democracy." Aragon was facing a possible penalty of five years in gaol. Breton gathered a petition in protest
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and published a pamphlet, *Misère de la Poésie*, where he argued that the author of a poem cannot be held to account for the words in the poem. As a supreme manifestation of the unconscious, the words of a poem cannot commit the author. Breton was attacked by Communists for hiding behind the screen of art and refusing to accept responsibility for revolutionary acts (Nadeau 178-9, Caws 18-19).80

If the unconscious is to speak, as Breton desires it to do, then normal responsibilities must be suspended or destroyed. The Surrealists cannot express whatever arrives (or arises) if they must either act on their words or fear their meanings. This is the dilemma for the Surrealists unprotected by the professional confidentiality of an analytic consulting room. Their only recourse is to extend the psychoanalytic (and Dadaist) project of undermining or at least complicating the author-creator's control and responsibility. If this is confessional writing in the sense that Foucault speaks of it, it is a writing which operates both as a surreally amoral exposure of the difference between public and private selves and as a fundamentally disruptive convulsion against social norms (and the norm here is not only the law of orderly public behaviour, but the legally institutionalised assumption of a direct connection of responsibility between self, words and action). It seems to be a confession/convulsion of the text itself apart from any writer.

True to Freud in one sense, the Surrealist poetic text appears in Breton's hands to be as impersonal as Freud's unconscious. When Breton argues that "the poem is not to be judged on the successive representations it involves, but on its power to incarnate an idea" (Nadeau 179), he is insisting on the poem as a thing apart from ideas and intentions the author might have. It is interesting that Breton objects specifically to the precedent of a poem being put on trial: "Hitherto only prose texts had been subject to prosecution because prose is the expression of rational, discursive thought" (Nadeau 179). A poem, as an incarnation of the unconscious, is in a sense its own person, and just as God cannot be blamed for the frailties of his creation, the poet cannot be held to account for what the poem might say.

The legal attack on poetry (as Breton saw it) has had its parallel in the Australian trial of the avant-garde literary editor Max Harris who published the Ern Malley poems in

80 In fact, Aragon was persuaded later by his Comrades to renounce Breton's defence of him and abandon the Surrealists (Caws 19).

Breton's insistence that poetry is a special case in language and literature recalls the work of a very different critic, I. A. Richards, who was writing at the same time. Influenced in part by an evolutionary theory of linguistics Richards suggested in 1929 that in poetry "language tends to return towards a more primitive condition: a word like *iron*, for example, exciting, in poetry, a set of feelings rather than thoughts of the physical properties of that material" (*Practical Criticism* 353). For Richards poetry did not express meanings, but rather feelings. This disjunction between language and the extra-linguistic world championed by Breton and Richards prepares the way for later structuralist and post-structuralist projects—but importantly Breton and Richards insisted on poetry's connections with aspects of a reality outside of language and literature: for Richards it was the feeling-lives of author and perceptive reader, for Breton it was the core of the self—the unconscious.
1943. In the trial of obscenity charges following this publication it seemed that despite the absence of a 'real' author, and despite the existence of two actual authors—and despite their publicly avowed intention of producing parodic literature (in a kind of all-day automatic-writing session), the poetry was treated as if it 'meant' sincerely what it (apparently) said. Even more strangely Max Harris was held to be as responsible as the authorless poems for he was repeatedly interrogated as to the meaning of the poetry during the trial (Heyward 167-214). Harris, like Breton, was required to defend Surrealism itself against author-based literal readings of texts by the law. Surrealism becomes an intolerably enigmatic and revolutionary act in this context.

Through such encounters it shares with psychoanalysis the near-mythic status of an outlandish and revolutionary movement which alters once and for all outmoded ways of viewing the world.

The Aragon trial brings us back to those crucial shifts under way in Surrealism, and later in a wider modernism—shifts which privilege the creative process (here it is poetry as opposed to prose) and at the same time remove creativity from the conscious personality and even from the individual artist. As the poem becomes incarnate, the Surrealist author must dissipate. The author must become, as it were, anonymous. This anonymity, or namelessness, has its parallels in certain mental disorders which produce the absurd utterances of echolalia or, in Ganser syndrome, beside-the-point replies (*Manifestoes* 34-5). The madman confounds the doctor who seeks a personality or a name behind the utterances. Breton asks, "Does this mean that his [the madman's] thought at this point is the stronger? Perhaps. He is free not to care any longer about his age or name" (35). In other words, the madman and the Surrealist have removed their names from their words. They cannot be called to account, and in this their thoughts gain a strength and freedom not available to doctors, logicians, political activists or even bourgeois novelists. This justifies Aragon's poem and Breton's own famous incitement to Surrealists to become mass killers (*Manifestoes* 125). Far from claiming to be mentally ill, they are claiming a supremely "strong" and "free" form of expression.

But problems remain for the Surrealists because their texts are in the public realm. Unlike patients speaking (freely) to therapists, the Surrealists insist on publishing and distributing expressions which read, sometimes, as incitements to terrorism (or as attacks on women). Are they to be laughed at, resisted, admired, ignored, marvelled at, psychoanalysed or prosecuted? How can they not be called to account for these utterances? For Breton's Surrealists the necessary irresponsibility of creation could not be translated into political or murderous action in any simple way. Breton and others involved in the "hypnotic sleep" experiments of the 1920s were faced with surreal, but nevertheless real acts of violence among themselves when Desnos attempted to murder Eluard and a group under the influence of Crevel attempted mass suicide (Ellenwood 45). The Surrealists' response was to terminate their experiments. It seems that even
among the Surrealists there could be confusion over connections between utterance and act, between the idea of murder and an act of murder—or perhaps this confusion is itself a condition of participating in the Surreal. Breton sanely pointed out in a footnote to his passage urging indiscriminate shooting that the appropriately Surreal way of standing behind his extreme utterance was not to give bystanders the satisfaction of seeing him act on it. But how are we to read such a comment?

Breton's adoption of surrealist irresponsibility raises the immediate problem of how we are to know when an utterance is poetic Surrealism, when it is exposition, political statement, comment, simple reporting or whatever. His answer to this problem is typically absurd, strangely prophetic and still true to experience. Breton suggests that once practised Surrealism acts on the mind like a drug. "Like drugs, it creates a certain state of need" (36). Like hashish it can satisfy all manner of people, becoming "a new vice." Surrealist writers cannot tell anyone how to read their utterances beyond warning them that now everything might be tainted by the new vice.

In Nadja, for instance, the Surrealist attitude becomes a necessary strategy for presenting even a documentary account of his life. Nadja is in some ways a demonstration of how the author loses control of the text and its relation to the world it wants to remember, capture and describe. The juxtaposition of the text and its photographs provides us with a model of documentary literature which fails again and again to bring the text into contact with an ordinary world. The text is replete with the marvellous, the prescient, the petrifying, the intense, mad, bathetic, suicidal moments of a love affair while the photographs in contrast are coolly banal and documentary. The text and the photographs resist a relationship of direct illustration. We become aware of the effects a surreal mind must have on experience if such places are to become the world of Nadja and Breton. These photographs in any case are deliberate reconstructions, and in that they can only be approximations, echoes, suggestive illusions despite their seemingly literal truthfulness. Breton himself notes that the city's locations resisted his attempts at having them photographed "at the special angle from which I myself had looked at them" (151-2). Maintenance projects, additions, the ephemeral nature of film posters, and refusals of permission all work against the possibility of a text such as this being faithfully illustrated.

Despite the documentary stance of Boiffard's photographs, despite Breton's details of regretted exclusions and despite even his additions to the photographic evidence in

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81 The long footnote seems to operate in Breton's texts as a signpost to their most surreal moments. It is as though the text cannot contain the multiplicity of thoughts and emotions at such moments. See, again, his drop into a lengthy footnote in order to narrate the episode of Nadja's suicidal and homicidal act of mad love in their car (Nadja 152-3).

82 They are not, however, as grainy and ill-defined in the French language edition as they are in the Grove Press English language paperback. The English language paperback gives a misleading impression that the photographs are out of focus and lacking in tonal quality. Much care was taken with lighting, focus and print development.
the rewritten 1963 version of the book, text and picture continue to resist each other. This resistance is accomplished partly through obvious absences. There is, for example, no photograph of Nadja. In the 1963 edition a teasing collage of Nadja's eyes is included, only drawing more attention to both inevitable and planned resistances and distance between text and photographic images. Selection has been made, leading us to wonder why some drawings, for instance, are mentioned in the text but not illustrated. In the tensions between the devices of text and picture we become aware of the book as not quite in the author's control, perhaps even out of the author's control. He must rely on his photographer, the city will not stay still long enough for pictures to repeat what he saw, owners can refuse permission for objects to be photographed, a clairvoyant interferes with a project for photographing Nadja, some identities must be protected—and Nadja finally is protected by her absence from the photographs. His later lover is also hidden in the text by the mark, "x". The world will not go back into a photograph, or even into a text. Anything here might be tainted by the new vice—and everything is.

The images of mad person and drug fiend are appropriate company for the Surrealist poet as images of irresponsibility, images shocking and threatening to a bourgeois sensibility, images which suggest through a cocktail of neurological and chemical attacks on the mind the alarming, life-changing nature of the Surrealist revolution—and its dissipation of all normal concepts of responsibility.

In his polemical essay of 1968, "The Death of the Author," Roland Barthes enlists the Surrealists as part of the prehistory of postmodernity, as one moment when the Author was fatally weakened: "Surrealism ... contributed to the desacrilization of the image of the Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt disappointment of expectations of meaning (the famous surrealist 'jolt'), by entrusting the hand with the task of writing as quickly as possible what the head itself is unaware of (automatic writing), by accepting the principle and the experience of several people writing together" (Image Music Text 44).

Surrealism is uncannily a twin to psychoanalysis in the developments described here for these always mirror the psychoanalytic commitment to a free expression, to an impersonal unconscious, to an inner life of extravagant beauty, savagery and banality, to a fundamental irresponsibility in the self, and not least to a need for talk and more talk—as automatic as possible. But like a twin it stands apart from its sibling and even in competition with the Other, insisting on its differences and even its supremacy.

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83 There is a photograph of Blanche Derval. Marcel Marién has alleged that Blanche Derval was Nadja. The cover-up was for reasons of propriety and embarrassment, he suggests.
84 In December 1929, in La Rvolution Surréaliste Breton identified her as Suzanne Muzard. See Roger Cardinal (72).
Surrealism and Psychoanalysis

Through its public exhibition of the self and rejection of any cure for the artist it becomes in fact a rival psychoanalysis cannot afford to recognise.
Figure 1: André Breton, *Self-Portrait: automatic writing*, 1938 (Short 70)
Figure 2: Germaine Berton surrounded by Surrealists, 1924 (Short 71)
Figure 3 Hans Arp, *Torn Paper*, 1932 (Gooding 58)
Figure 4 Max Ernst, *Frottage* (Gooding 54)
Figure 5 Yves Tanguy, André Masson and two others, 1925 (Gooding 74)
Surrealism and Psychoanalysis

Figure 6 Lilo Klapheck, Joseph Beuys, Konrad Klapheck, Eva Beuys, Odysseus Scrutinising Circe, 1970 (Gooding 75)
4. Lacan, Psychoanalysis, Surrealism

I am not a poet, but a poem. A poem that is being written...

In 1973 Stuart Schneiderman visited Lacan in Paris. Schneiderman was an American English professor who had devoted himself to bringing Lacan's ideas to American thinkers and psychoanalysts. Schneiderman published a memoir of his time as an analysand under Lacan. His introduction to Lacan echoes Breton's report of *his* "interview" with Freud. Schneiderman writes:

The door to the building housing Lacan's office was like other entrances to other French buildings. A very large double door opened into a courtyard. Within that door a smaller opening was cut to permit visitors to pass... To reach Lacan's office you walked to the end of the courtyard until you found a door on the right. Through that and up a flight of stairs to a third door, a second buzzer; there was no sign to indicate who was within. This door was invariably opened by Lacan's secretary, Gloria, who escorted you into the waiting room. One does not need too much imagination to guess at the number of psychoanalytic fantasies in which Gloria played a part. Certainly her assistance was of major importance for Lacan. She worked with him tirelessly for over thirty years, which ought to qualify her for sainthood.

In 1973 the office and waiting room had an air of shabbiness. They had not been painted for some time and there were cobwebs everywhere. The carpeting was worn through in places, sign of the enormous traffic it had borne as well as of Lacan's inattention to his professional surroundings... The waiting room was small, with just enough room for a loveseat and two easy chairs. Over the fireplace hung a signed portrait of St. Joseph, a souvenir portrait as it appeared to be. Was he the patron saint of Lacan's analysands? The table on one side of the loveseat contained within its surface postcard-like pictures of Rome, and on the other side was a magazine rack always filled with the latest issues of the French art magazine, *L'Oeil*. Resting on the table was a piece of wood, which could have been driftwood or a sculpture, shaped precisely like an oversized phallus, the kind you would expect to find in a scene from de Sade. At other times this piece of wood resembled the trunk of an elephant raised as it would be were the elephant to talk. (129-30)

Here we have, as we did in Breton's report, the unremarkable door, the secretary-servant, a comment on her attractiveness, the art works in the waiting room, and the shabbiness of these bourgeois professional surroundings.85

85 Breton's and Schneiderman's descriptions of their entries into the world of a psychoanalyst are mirrored again in Anais Nin's description of her first visit to her analyst, Rene Allendy. The movement of these almost ritualistic descriptions—from the sentry at the door to an outer room and finally into the inner, secret place of the mind-reading analyst seem to act as recurring physical metaphors for the topography of the psychoanalytic mind with its conscious self (the outer rooms decorative with symbolic objects), the barrier (a maid-sentry) and finally the unconscious (the soundproof room of uncensored words and events). Nin writes: "Today for the first time, I rang the bell of Dr Allendy's house. I was led by a maid through a dark hallway into a dark salon. The dark brown walls, the brown velvet chairs, the dark red rug received me like a quiet tomb, and I shivered. The only light came from a greenhouse on which it opened. It was filled with tropical plants... Dr Allendy's office was soundproofed by a heavy black Chinese curtain, embroided in gold thread with a few papyrus branches. When the time came, he slid a door open and then lifted a curtain and stood there, very tall,
A great man is again brought down to the level of the mundane. Schneiderman's purpose, however, is very different to Breton's. Schneiderman works hard in this introduction to reassure us that the great man was, after all, extraordinary in being ordinary. It is not an exposé or an expression of disappointment. For Schneiderman, his arrival is a pilgrimage ended: the saint ("Gloria in excelsis") at the door ushers him in, the worn carpet attests to those who have gone before as well as to the unworldliness of Lacan, the image of the patron saint is hanging on the wall (Joseph, "the man of dreams" from the Book of Genesis, a man who won salvation by interpreting the dreams of a king), and the postcards associate Lacan with the holy city of Rome. It is at the same time the beginning of a journey into the phantasmagoric: a tiny door cut into a larger one, then a series of doors, the stagily gothic "cobwebs everywhere," a magazine announcing itself as an eye or inviting you to become an eye, the surreal phallus redolent of decadence and African animality. We are left not with the diminishment of a hero, but with a new Freud: "There was nothing to distinguish Lacan's office from that of other psychoanalysts, nothing to suggest the enormous stature Lacan claimed for his work, nothing, in other words, to distract you from your encounter with Lacan" (131). Schneiderman goes on immediately to compare the number of pillows Freud put under clients on his couch to the one small pillow Lacan provided.

It is here, with Lacan as the Other Freud, that I wish to begin. Lacan's struggle simultaneously to be another Freud, to be not-Freud, to be true to Freud, to be himself apart from Freud echoes and repeats the shifting perspectives of his central analytic motif—the moment of disclosure of libidinal dynamism, that source of "paranoiac knowledge," the mirror-stage (Ecrits 2). Just as the Lacanian child in its fragmented experience of itself, is faced with a mirror image apparently whole and apparently ideal—Lacan stands in the midst of his own fragmented, unpredictable life, and finds himself face-to-face with the completed life and image of Freud. In response to being expelled from the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) in 1964, Lacan turned to Freud as the sign and mirror of his own independence:

So one must take account of the analyst in psycho-analytic treatment. He would have no social standing, I imagine, if Freud had not opened up the way for him—Freud, I say; to call him by his name. For no one can call anyone an analyst and Freud did not do so. Handing out rings to initiates is not to call by a name. Hence my proposition that the analyst hystorizes [sic] only from himself: a patent fact. Even if he is confirmed in doing so by a hierarchy. What hierarchy could confirm him as an analyst, give him the rubber-stamp? A certificate tells me that I was born. I repudiate this certificate: I am not a poet, but a poem. A poem that is being written, even if it looks like a subject. (Four Concepts viii)

Despite his experience of himself in an uncertain state of being-written (and still untitled), he can be looked-at—and mistaken for someone (with a name/title). Poet?

his eyes the most alive part of his face, the eyes of a seer" (Journals 82).
Analyst? Freud? As he repudiates rubber-stamps and certificates (siding with himself as poem-being-written) Lacan makes the point that no one could rubber-stamp Freud, or confirm him as an analyst. But even as poem-being-written Lacan has become the subject of his own gaze, and he sees within himself the ghost of that other outsider, Freud. Even as he repudiates names, he invokes the name of Freud (a name that has become in itself a title). Is it his name, his title or his subjectivity he casts aside in the final statement of this short passage? There is a sliding and fracturing between the possible meanings of the word "name."86

Elizabeth Grosz points to the ways Lacan's mirror stage periodically returns when she writes, "the capacity of representing oneself to oneself, mirror-reversals, the obsession with symmetry, and the division of the subject into both subject and/or object are later reactivated in the dreams of adults or, in a more extreme form, in psychoses" (38). And, we might add, in those tension-filled moments of self-defence which become occasions of self-revelation. Breton's ghosting of himself at the beginning of Nadja can be read as a return to the obsessions of the mirror stage—the play with symmetries, the self as simultaneous subject and object. The opening passages of Nadja might be a dream or a psychosis. In this reading Breton's own madness becomes the point of departure for the book—or, rather than madness, we might see it as the Surrealist re-writing of sanity as a troubled and tense border territory, a position which "is not wholly inside, but whether it is outside is not known" (Four Concepts 3)—as Lacan described his own position after being excommunicated from the IPA.

As noted earlier, psychoanalysis is a discourse which can only be spoken from within. It cannot be transformed in the way a science or a proto-science might be transformed through contradiction or contradictory evidence. Jung, for instance, cannot replace Freud, he can only stand beside him or against him. Lacan can only replace Freud by standing, as it were, within Freud. Lacan speaks from within, though not "wholly inside" psychoanalysis (that more abstract and generalised body which also claims to stand in the place of Freud). Particularly in his state of excommunication after 1964 it becomes important for him to align himself with an original Freud and to show how the analytic bureaucracy which has inherited a psychoanalytic rubber-stamp is fundamentally inimical to this Freud. These are the arguments of religions. "I am not saying," he says, "though it would not be inconceivable, that the psychoanalytic community is a Church. Yet the question indubitably does arise—what is it in that community that is so reminiscent of religious practice?" (Four Concepts 4). Lacan

86 Lacan's brief meditation on names and rubber-stamps echoes uncannily Breton's musing in 1935 over whether the Surrealist movement, then fifteen years old, should institute a "seal" or "hallmark" which would assure the public that certain objects were authentic Surrealist objects. Breton and Man Ray objected to outsiders adopting the word without delivering truly Surrealist works of art (Manifestoes 257-8).
writes, he claims, to rescue a particular Freud from the "deterioration of analytic discourse." He sees a technique being handed on in a cheerless manner, reticent to the point of opacity, a manner that seems terrified of any attempt to let in the fresh air of criticism. It has in fact assumed the air of a formalism pushed to such ceremonial lengths that one might well wonder whether it does not bear the same similarity to obsessional neurosis that Freud so convincingly defined in the observance, if not in the genesis, of religious rites. (Ecrits 37).

His intent then is a return to the genesis, to the kicking life that other Joseph of the New Testament held in his hands—the original life which must ultimately justify and inhabit ritual observances.

A particular view of the ego is one of the reinstatements Lacan argues for. On the one hand Freud described an ego which mediates between reality and the drives of the id. This is the famous rider on horseback who, "if he is not to be parted from his horse is obliged to guide it where it wants to go; so, in the same way, the ego is in the habit of transforming the id's will into action as if it were its own" (SE 19: 25). This realist ego is motivated by principles of rational compromise (Grosz 25). Lacan considers that this realist view of the ego has been adopted by the neo-Freudian orthodoxy, particularly in America (Ecrits 38). For Lacan this version of psychoanalysis serves only to produce cures in terms of making better wives or better businessmen or children who "cope" (Ragland-Sullivan 119). It is consumerist and conservative. Lacan rejects a psychoanalysis which merely re-socialises its analysands. He prefers to rely on Freud's other, alternative account of the ego (which Grosz calls the narcissistic account). This ego, described by Freud in his 1914 essay "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (SE 14: 67-105), is more the product of familial and social experiences than biology, it is "an entirely fluid, mobile, amorphous series of identifications, internalizations of images/perceptions invested with libidinal cathexes. Where the realist ego stands out over and above the two combatants (reality and the id), the narcissistic ego cannot be readily separated either from its own internal processes (e.g. the flow of libido) or from external objects (with which it identifies and on which it may model itself). It is thus no more "rational" or "conciliatory" than any other psychological or social force. Narcissism, the ego's ability to take itself as a libidinal object, cannot be explained on the realist account (Grosz 28-9).

This move to the narcissistic ego (in the name of Freud) allows Lacan to step away from simple notions of cure or insight towards an emphasis on analysis. It allows him


88 Freud was still presenting both these views towards the end of his life. In two essays of 1938, "An Outline of Psychoanalysis" (SE 23) presents the realist ego while "The Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defence" (SE 23) presents the narcissistic ego.
to expose as crucial and even necessary the irrational and the insane which lie in wait even in the sanest expressions of the conscious self:

We have learned to be quite sure that when someone says "It is not so" it is because it is so; that when he says "I do not mean" he does mean; we know how to recognise the underlying hostility in most 'altruistic' statements, the undercurrent of homosexual feeling in jealousy, the tension of desire hidden in the professed horror of incest; we have noted that manifest indifference may mask intense latent interest. Although in treatment we do not meet head-on the furious hostility which such interpretations provoke, we are nevertheless convinced that our researches justify the epigram of the philosopher who said that speech was given to man to hide his thoughts; our view is that the essential function of the ego is very nearly that systematic refusal to acknowledge reality (méconnaissance systématique de la réalité) which French analysts refer to in talking about the psychoses.

("Some Reflections" 11-12)

With this more permeable, less rigid ego, Lacan can develop the subject who is formed by language, that is by the (Lacanian) unconscious—while maintaining that he is, after all, the one who has remained most faithful to Freud and most insightful in his readings of Freud.

The style of this ego is the style of the Surrealists. The obscene phallic sculpture resting on the postcards of Rome in Lacan's waiting room is a demonstration of his commitment to this surreal style. Catherine Clément has reported that by 1932 the young psychiatrist Lacan was publishing in Le Minotaure, a Surrealist review "ruled by the influential presence of André Breton" (55-6). André Masson was to become Lacan's brother-in-law. Lacan was to become a collector of modern and Surrealist art (Schneiderman 131). In 1932 he brought his "cases" to the Surrealist review where, Clément writes, he "told stories, all of which had this in common: they were stories of women, and they concerned the notion of style ... the incoherent, disturbed style of madwomen" (56). The Surrealists, Freud, and Lacan are conjoined in this hysterical knot—Nadja, Dora and the Papin sisters—but where Freud sees neurosis in contrast to the Surrealists who see a supreme form of expression, Lacan sees a way for psychoanalysis to re-align itself with Surrealism (and hence with artistic creativity): it is not the unconscious the Surrealists show us, but the narcissistic ego. "When Lacan came, somewhat later on in 1933, to discuss the notorious crime of the Papin sisters, he took the view that their criminal madness was not so much a disturbance as a "social masterpiece" (chef-d'oeuvre social)" (Clément 56). While Lacan joins his voice to the early Surrealist depictions of madness as a feminised ideal, a blessed state, of woman

89 André Masson joined Breton's Paris-based Surrealists in the 1920s. Along with Max Ernst his contributions were crucial to the acceptance of painting as a legitimate Surrealist practice. Masson developed automatic drawing techniques which were inspired by Breton's automatic writing (Altshuler 119; Short 97).

90 Christine and Léa Papin were housemaids who murdered their employer, Mme Lancelin, and her daughter. The remarkable aspects of the case were the violence of the crime, the banality of the incident sparking it (annoyance over unironed clothes), and the later bizarre behaviour of the sisters. The Papin sisters tore the eyes out of their victims and cut into the genitals of Mme Lancelin. Later Christine would hallucinate her future life as husband of Léa, and the sisters would converse in a dialect understood only between them (Roudinesco 124-8).
as convulsive beauty, he perfects in his own writing the art of the delirious text. Clément writes, "he learned a profound lesson from his paranoid female patients: in order to make oneself understood, it is sometimes necessary to play with a dangerously "open" language. Open, first of all, to invention, to words that do not yet exist. Open too to poetics—which comes to the same thing. Open, finally, where he was accused of being "closed," hermetically opaque" (59). Along with Surrealism, his style was for those who would listen, for those "open" to the poetic insights of the mad.

Given this position, Lacan must abandon any easy notion of psychoanalytic cure, insight or adjustment as the goal of analysis. In abandoning this, psychoanalysis is brought closer again to the spirit and activities of the Surrealists who take their lead from Freud but reject his emphasis on a superego (Breton Manifestoes 139), rejoicing instead in manifestations of the infestation of the unconscious in the self and in reality.

But how can Lacan bring Freud and the Surrealists together without lampooning Freud or analysing (curing) Surrealism? How can Lacan find himself as a poem/poet in his practice as an analyst without turning analysis away from its claim to status as a science and without transforming it into an act indistinguishable from a creative writing workshop? In 1975 at the age of seventy-four Lacan visited the United States for a lecture tour. He lectured to an audience of linguists, mathematicians and philosophers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology about Borromean knots made of complexly interlocking circles which, he said, represented the psyche. If one circle is cut the chain comes apart. The audience found him incomprehensible. Near the end of the session Lacan answered a question about the relationship between interior and exterior by stating that, as an analyst, he was not at all certain that man even had an interior:

"I don't have a conception of the world; I have a style," he told his baffled American audience. On the one hand there is the arcane science of Borromean knots, and on the other hand the Surrealist gift of excrement to the world. Lacan's style straddles the boundaries between poetry and science, or zig zags between them, or drags them so close together that they begin to mirror/distort each other. It is as if he is saying we need not, indeed must not abandon one for the sake of the other. Tensions over who is closer to

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91 See Sherry Turkle's account in Psychoanalytic Politics, 227-33 and Francois Roustang (123) for brief definitions of Borromean knots.
to the truth, who is more creative, or who understands creativity are both disarmed and intensified if we are prepared to practise in this style.\textsuperscript{92}

\section*{Some Reflections on "Some Reflections on the Ego"}

Lacan's "style" brings its contradictions with it. Even while he constructs his style from within the doubtful interiors of the Borromean knots which he cannot afford to unravel without undoing his very self, Lacan remains an analyst (unraveller) committed to practising psychoanalysis with clients and to publishing theoretical discussions in journals of the discipline. He is committed enough to be outraged when he is excommunicated from the International Psychoanalytic Association.

These contradictions lead us to the question: if the psychoanalysis he practises is created from both poetry and facts (art and science) while it uncovers both poetry and facts, how are we to know what it is doing at any particular moment? How is anyone to read it, understand it, practise it? This problem recalls the strange disjunction between poet and poem which Breton championed. Just as we cannot know with certainty when to read Breton surreally and when to read him politically, philosophically, historically or even psychoanalytically, with Lacan we find ourselves caught between the play of words and the meanings of words. Where Breton exploited such style to claim a wildly uninterpretable freedom for writing, Lacan exploits it to come closer to the meaning of psychoanalysis. It is, he claims, a strategy aimed at avoiding degeneration into the kind of totalising or dogmatic system which psychoanalysis had become in the hands of dogged disciples and psychoanalytic associations. But how are we to read this style, which sometimes \textit{does} develop conceptions of the world, and sometimes mimics the paradoxes of psychosis, and sometimes competes with the Surrealists in the production of marvellous images—but isn't clear about what it's doing at any one time? Can Lacan's style establish a new relationship between psychoanalysis and creativity? This

\textsuperscript{92} Oxford Professor of French Literature, Malcolm Bowie, for instance, struggles with the problem of arriving at a position in relation to Lacan when he is asked whether his criticisms are corrections from within a Lacanian framework, or are a critique from outside Lacanian theory. After expressing his reservations about the state of mind of discipleship, Bowie seems to declare himself a follower of Lacan's style, if not his more systematic theories: "Lacan's hesitation, like Proust's and Musil's, is a way of bringing a new kind of exactness into the picture. Being ironic about Lacan is, I think, a Lacanian thing to be, although it may be, as one twists and turns with him, that one finds oneself rejecting quite large swathes of his output. So all I'm saying here is that there's a way of being loyal to Lacan that has to do with adhering to his mobility of mind and to his powers as an ironist, rather than to the dogma that he sometimes also offers" (\textit{Psychoanalysis and the Future of Theory} 141-2). François Roustang, a former follower of Lacan, has been more emphatically dismissive of the Lacanian style, suggesting that Lacan's gnomic utterances are merely surrealist collages and impressive subterfuges (\textit{The Lacanian Delusion} 26, 49) aimed at obscuring the failure of Lacan's project to bring scientific rigour to psychoanalysis.
indeed seems to be the thrust of his style at certain points. How can it do this, though, while claiming to be a return to the core of Freud’s insights?93

Lacan’s paper, "Some Reflections on the Ego," delivered in 1951 to the British Psychoanalytic Association and published in 1953, opens with a discussion of that contradiction in Freud’s ideas mentioned above which served, in part, to spark his paradoxical play with the American audience in Massachusetts: "The development of Freud’s views on the ego led him to two apparently contradictory formulations" (11).94 Lacan’s project in this paper is to address analysts on how to read Freud so that the apparent contradiction disappears. For Lacan the key to reconciling the contradiction is to understand the contradictory presence of reality in our lives: "... while reality precedes thought, it takes different forms according to the way the subject deals with it" (11). Lacan goes on point out "the all too neglected fact" that verbal communication is the instrument of psychoanalysis—and that, in fact, in the experience of Freud and other analysts each patient’s reality is a verbalised construct even if this is a retrospective re-organisaton of earliest experiences: "Language has, if you care to put it like that, a sort of retrospective effect in determining what is ultimately decided to be real" (11).

Not only is language the instrument of psychoanalysis, it is a fundamental framework for bringing us into contact with reality. Lacan suggests that the structures of language can give us clues to the ways the ego functions. Not only does language assert the self as an object (a mirror-self), but in his experience as an analyst Lacan has observed, as we have seen above, that this expression of the ego is often for the purpose of denial. "It is so," must often be understood to mean "It cannot be so."

We can regard this denial, based in language, as a fictionalising move. It tends to create a narrative version of reality, a story—a roman à clef, an autobiographical romance, a hagiography of the self, a self-serving confessional tract, or repetitions of the heroic myths of a culture. It is an ironising move made unconsciously and in denial of reality. But what can this denied reality be when Lacan has already stated that there can be no reality except the form it takes according to the way the subject deals with it"? If reality must be a construction in language, a construction always constrained and shaped by language—and then if language itself constructs certain denials (e.g. the

93 To give another example of the way Lacan swings between scientist-researcher and poet-artist in his writings it is worth putting the scientific rhetoric of his discourses on Borromean knots against the following from a talk delivered in 1964: "... someone will say, psychoanalysis is a form of research ... I am a bit suspicious of this term research. Personally, I have never regarded myself as a researcher. As Picasso once said, to the shocked surprise of those around him—I do not seek, I find" (Four Concepts 7). This slide from research truths to artistic genius and its uncovering of truths is enormous and typical. Is he claiming a superiority over science here on behalf of psychoanalysis, or is he giving up the scientific pretensions of psychoanalysis in favour of the insights of a genius-figure?

94 After this article Lacan was not to be published again by the IPA until 1979. His expulsion on the grounds of his arbitrarily short analytic sessions meant he was effectively silenced for over twenty years within official psychoanalytic journals.
denial of the fragmented self replaced by a unified "I", or the denial of the unconscious by reifying it as noun so that it becomes thing, place, object), does this imply that there is a reality we can perceive which is unaffected by language? What does it mean to deny a reality which is already a fiction?

Like Freud, and in order to rescue Freud, Lacan immerses himself in apparent contradiction. One way of understanding Lacan's apparently contradictory position here is to see that the denial he speaks of is not a denial of a pre-existing or fixed reality, but a denial of the fictionalised character of any reality. In this sense then fiction (creativity, poetry) is a process open to the nature of reality because it makes explicit the reversals, denials, delusions, associations, symmetries and myths of the subject speaking. Even the illusion of unity in the "I" becomes immediately exposed when we know language as a fictionalising practice. "I" is split and shared between a person, an author, a fictional character who is never quite fictional and a reader who can enter into the empty "I" of a story.

Lacan can be seen in this way to be moving beyond the sort of anti-poetic psychoanalysis which so disappointed and amused Anaïs Nin in her experience with Allendy. This is a psychoanalysis which wants to share in and celebrate the ego as creative, culturally tangled, idiosyncratic, fecund producer of realities (i.e. of language).

To use the word reality in this context then is to play with contradictions. Both "reality" and "I" can be mistaken for unified objects. My argument here is in part that there is some consistency, even a kind of rigour, in the way that Lacan presents the ego as the denial of a reality which is always already a denial.

There is as well a surreally arbitrary side to the progression of his argument. His position is based, as he says, on the observation that verbal communication is the basic "instrument" of psychoanalysis—and the suggestion, for Lacan, that follows from this: that language, as an agent of distortion, is our reality. But there is no logical force compelling this suggestion. There is no necessity for us to conclude that the instrument of psychoanalysis constitutes the decisive structure of its subject, the analysand. There is only the persuasive force of the idea as Lacan takes it through its implications. He

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95 These incidents have been referred to above in the section on Freud, Psychoanalysis and Creativity. Nin's observations on the tensions between art and analysis (sometimes projected by Allendy as a hatred for that barbarian, Henry Miller) can be found on pages 127, 139-40, 170, 185, 202 of Volume One of her Journals (1975).

96 This manner of progressing with an argument and a proposition is itself typically psychoanalytic, as Wittgenstein has noted in his commentaries on Freud. There is often no logical necessity and no abundant and varied evidence leading to Freud's propositions. Their power and their status arise rather from the experience of those who adopt the suggested ideas and find them useful, comforting, insightful, or clarifying. "Take Freud's view that anxiety is always a repetition in some form of the anxiety we felt at birth," Wittgenstein wrote. "... when people do accept or adopt this, then certain things seem much clearer and easier for them." Lacan's proposition that the unconscious is structured as a language works in a similar way (Wittgenstein 43; see also Bouveresse 50-51).
Kristeva, Harwood and Motherhood Statements

does this both rigorously and unsteadily—and through a maze of paradoxes. Significantly, he does not abandon the word reality—and in any case, a fiction has no status and no symbolic fictional freedom unless it can set itself against a supposed reality. It will always be difficult for Lacan to maintain the balance between play and contradiction as he pursues this conception in this way.

In fact Lacan does proceed to fall into one of the language/reality-traps he has set when he goes on to make his notorious claim for the universal reality of the penis in each person's "imaginary anatomy." Lacan denies and reverses insights he has just offered in his article when he writes of a "genetic theory of the ego" to explain cases of anaesthesia or paralysis which follow patterns contrary to any known groupings of nerves and muscles:97

They follow the pattern of a certain imaginary Anatomy which has typical forms of its own... I would emphasise that the imaginary anatomy referred to here varies with the ideas (clear or confused) about bodily functions which are prevalent in a given culture. All the phenomena seem to exhibit the laws of gestalt; the fact that the penis is dominant in the shaping of the body-image is evidence of this. Though this may shock the sworn champions of the autonomy of female sexuality, such dominance is a fact and one moreover which cannot be put down to cultural influences alone. (13)

A long and dense passage follows this claim, evincing fascinating, sometimes quirky biological, physiological and behavioural evidence for the importance an image or a gestalt, in establishing the human ego. None of this amounts to evidence for the necessary dominance of the penis in the imaginary self.

Not only is this claim made in the context of the ego's systematic delusions and denials, but Lacan immediately goes on to point out the vulnerability of the body-image, illustrated by the fact that, typically, images of the body in bits and pieces arise in the early phase of analysis when a patient is bound up with the elucidation of the earliest problems of the ego. If cloaca appearing in the throat is a fantasy derived from issues of early ego fragmentation and development, then perhaps it is obvious that images of the body as penis, or of the penis as an organ dominating all bodies for all time are another breaking-up of the vulnerable gestalt of the mirror-image. To claim this as a reality beyond personal and cultural influences is, it seems, to participate in the sort of systematic denial Lacan has previously described. It is a symptom of the repressed vulnerability of one man's imaginary anatomy.

The biologism of Lacan's assertion here reminds us of the complicated relation between his own writing/poem-being-written and Freud's completed texts/poem. Lacan writes from within the discourse of psychoanalysis, but seeks to bring it back to life, or

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97 The gestalt law of Pragnanz (which is referred to in the extract quoted in the text) states: "Wholes tend to be as complete, symmetrical, simple, and good as possible under prevailing conditions" (Muller and Richardson 39). This is a law of perception, and comes into play at the mirror-stage. It need not indicate any genetic basis for the way the penis is integrated into the gestalt of the body image at the mirror stage.
nearer to life. While he might correct Freudian biologism through an emphasis on the instability of identity and its hallucinatory construction in language, he is never quite free of this biologism, for the phallus, no matter how symbolic, always recalls the presence or absence of the physical male organ.

Lacan's provocative word plays, contradictions and poetic flights are themselves a form of phallic performance. His style teases, flirts, shocks. The compulsive exhibitionist might at times be parodied but never ceases to reassert himself. The resort to biologism in statements about the imaginary anatomy seems to operate as a refusal to analyse this compulsive aspect of his own style.

The paper abruptly ends, as the talk at MIT did, with a teasing half-poetic, half-sociological revery which works as a note on the Borromean knots that constitute psyche and civilisation. He writes of the relations between civilised man and the motor-car:

We get the impression that his relationship to this machine is so very intimate that it is almost as if the two were actually conjoined—its mechanical defects and breakdowns often parallel his neurotic symptoms. Its emotional significance for him comes from the fact that it exteriorizes the protective shell of his ego, as well as the failure of his virility.

This passage sees a hardened image of the self as a failed and dispiriting prosthesis; it is as if Lacan wishes now to retract his insistence on one template for the imaginary anatomy. In contrast to the psycho-technical procedures that conjoin man and car, he proposes finally that a psychoanalytic dialogue aims "to re-establish a more human relationship," one where presumably more vulnerable, many-sided egos can be admitted.

With the image of the car as a protective, exterior shell we are made aware not only of the car as visual object (and hence phallic object), but of the dominance of visual terms in Lacan's discussions. Words and phrases such as gestalt, body-image, mirror-phase, and imaginary anatomy are all emphatically visual. Even when he speaks to his American audience of civilisation and its shit, he describes the problem in terms of space and size and visual evidence (cat shit on the streets, the size of elephant excrement). Indeed, even as he writes these words about the car the latest issue of the

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98 At times his project (in sympathy with Freud) is to bring psychoanalysis closer to science. Francois Roustang has explored this aspect of Lacan's work in terms of the rhetoric he employs: "Since Lacan wanted to found psychoanalysis as a science, it was enormously important for him not to deprive himself of Freud's authority, which is why he ceaselessly claimed to be merely following him and interpreting him as he was supposed to be interpreted" (58).

99 Pursuing this line of thought, it seems indicative of a deep ambivalence in our relationships with cars that this machine which provides a unifying outer shell as possible protector and compensatory image of the ego is also the frequent site of violent deaths through the physical tearing apart of the body into "bits and pieces" in road accidents. A Grand Prix race plays itself out on a threatening edge between the idealisation of the car as a beautifully brutal unit and the logical end of extreme speed which is the destruction of car and driver. We need not believe these suggestions and associations have the status of research truths to be strongly affected by their power as poetic insights.
French art magazine called *L'Oeil* (The Eye) is out in the waiting room in the hands of someone waiting to be seen in.

In a long footnote to *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud suggested that the erotic-visual is a reversal and denial of an earlier role played by menstrual periodicity and olfactory stimuli in the expression of human sexuality (SE 21: 99-100). In her lively discussion of this proposal in *The Daughter's Seduction*, Jane Gallop has remarked, "The penis may be more visible but the female genitalia have a stronger smell" (27).

When Lacan writes of man being conjoined in intimacy with the car, there is a splitting or doubling in this image: we see the man conjoined with his phallic apparatus the car, but equally we are made aware of man conjoined in intimacy with a sexual partner. Lacan's visual emphasis leaves the way open for us to turn to the importance of the interior of the car as a fundamentally olfactory experience. To be within a new, modern car is to be within an odiferous world of plastics, leather, rubber, glues, petrol, oil. We might add to this that the comfort and support men's bodies seek within the car only add to its presence as a symbol of female genitalia. To represent the car as a phallic symbol is to deny its presence as a symbol of female genitalia. To use Jane Gallop's terms, man is cuntjoined within the cuntfort of his car. Even that over-designed and over-analysed product, the car, thus cannot stand as a unified object secure in its meaning. In Lacan's phrase, "the failure of his virility," what do we hear? What do we see? What do we smell?

**The short session, free association and creative writing workshops**

Lacan continued to practise as an analyst, taking patients and conducting trainee analyses. He did not ask to be known primarily as a Surrealist or a poet. In the conclusion to "Some Reflections on the Ego" he plays the man of poetic insight when he discusses the motor-car, but finally returns to the justifications for psychoanalytic dialogue. Is it clear then to what ends his analytic practice might be conducted? The avowed aim of establishing more human relationships does not necessarily distinguish his practice from that consumerist psychoanalysis he abhorred, or indeed from any form of therapy. Lacan said in 1964 that the aim of psychoanalytic practice is "the elaboration of the notion of the subject. It poses this notion in a new way, by leading the subject back to his signifying dependence" (*Four Concepts* 77). This is not the language of cure, and it is in its way as modest as Freud's aim of enabling his patients to work and to love. For Lacan all certainties must be suspended until their mirages have been consumed in

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100 When, seven years ago, I bought a new car it arrived at the dealer's for me with a bunch of scented flowers on the front seat.
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discourse, and "even if it communicates nothing, the discourse represents the existence of communication; even if it denies the evidence, it affirms that speech constitutes truth" (Ecrits 43). Lacan describes the kind of listening the analyst does to this end: "He takes the description of an everyday event for a fable addressed to whoever hath ears to hear, a long tirade for a direct interjection, or on the other hand a simple lapsus for a highly complex statement, or even the sigh of a momentary silence for the whole lyrical development it replaces" (Ecrits 44). We can see here, again, his commitment to the notion that conscious speech—as well as silence—are systematic reversals and refusals. Beyond this, what is denied here—and "read" by the analyst who has ears to hear—is the text of the unconscious, the "inexhaustible murmur" of an automatic writing. The job of the analyst is, as it were, to expose this text—"the traces of an old and precious communication." When Lacan hears the patient's fable or lyric is he evoking a Surrealist text, reconciling psychoanalysis and Surrealism by accepting its text as the language of the unconscious/narcissistic ego?

Jean Starobinski took up this question in a 1968 article: "To say that "the unconscious is language" is in no way to reconcile Freud and automatic writing, since the Freudian unconscious was language only in the mode of the impossibility of speaking: it was language only for the interpreter who made it speak" (Roudinesco 26). Starobinski's comment makes it clear that if Lacan does move into an evocation and admiration of the marvellous in the patient's utterances, then he has moved away from what Freud understood as interpretation. If the unconscious is language, the question remains: does it require an interpreter?

Lacan does not call his method interpretation, but rather a "beneficent punctuation" which confers meanings on the patient's discourse. Punctuation interrupts, disrupts, organises, eliminates certain meanings and creates others, and finally brings to an end any spoken or written utterance. Punctuation brings words to a point. This punctuation extended to the notorious Lacanian "short session." The IPA had settled on an analytic hour as the standard time for sessions. This hour was 50 minutes long, and every patient could expect this much time. In his address to the Rome Congress in 1953 (Ecrits 30-113) Lacan pointed to the obsessional value for patient and analyst in refusing to vary the time of sessions. Freud did not stipulate 50-minute sessions, and if the analyst holds the right to interrupt a session with interpretations, then taking control of those interruptions or punctuations provided by the endings of sessions seems no more than a logical and useful move. Lacan notes that the fixed session time operates as a chronometric break in a patient's discourse, whereas in his practice he aims to use the

101 Freud quoted James Sully's description of dreams: "like some palimpsest, the dream discloses beneath its worthless surface-characters traces of an old and precious communication" (SE 4: 135n). Literature, as a dream, is reduced at times to worthless surface-characters. The products of free association in this passage by Lacan take on the forms of literature in order to be revealed as resistances and denials of what lies 'beneath.'
session-break as a "metric beat which has the full value of an actual intervention of the analyst for hastening the concluding moments" (Ecrits 44). To take this sort of control, Lacan suggests, would eliminate certain games of timing and time-wasting which are filled with empty talk: "The suspension of a session cannot not be experienced by the subject as a punctuation in his progress. We know how the patient reckons the passage of time and adjusts his story to the clock. We know how he anticipates the end of the hour, weighing the time as though he were hefting a sword, keeping an eye on the clock as on a shelter looming in the distance" (Ecrits 98).102

Lacan's sessions were not always short. They ranged in length from three seconds to an hour and three-quarters, with fees charged on a sliding scale (Clément 114). It is worth remarking that this does not leave the patient defenseless or without rights for the patient can always terminate the treatment by not returning for the next session. Though regarded at first with sceptical interest, this issue of session lengths became the public reason for Lacan's expulsion from the IPA. It thus became the source of a particularly painful punctuation in his professional life. As Clément says, this point/stop faced him with a choice of retiring from a public presence or adopting the role of prophet and shaman.

Though he saw the "stopping" of sessions as a punctuation which would ultimately give particular meanings to patients' words, just as punctuation gives meaning to texts, or line-endings to poems, these stops did not operate with any of the predictable decorousness of conventional punctuation. They were surreally unpredictable. They were themselves like excommunications. Schneiderman writes of his experience of these sessions:

So you begin the session with some introductory remarks and pass to the subject you want to elaborate, to analyze, to ponder, to understand. You want the analyst to hear this because it is really important. But no sooner have you broached the topic, no sooner have the words identifying it passed through your lips, than Lacan all of a sudden rises from his chair and pronounces the session to be over, finished, done with. And he did this unceremoniously with a total lack of the good manners to which one is accustomed. When it's over it's over, no appeal, no going back, no revising or reconsidering. Whatever remained to be said would have to wait. The ending of the session, unexpected and unwanted, was like a rude awakening, like being torn out of a dream by a loud alarm (One person likened it to coitus interruptus). (132)

Given the violence this unpredictability perpetrates on the patient's control of time, or peace of mind, and on the words spoken by the patient, we would expect these punctuations and the threat of them to inhibit and irredeemably disrupt the process of free association. In fact, Schneiderman reports, "the combined pressure of the shortness of the sessions and the unpredictability of their stops creates a condition that greatly enhances one's tendencies to free-associate. When things come to mind they are

102 The translation of most of this passage is by Arthur Goldhammer and appears in Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan by Clément (114). I have chosen to use this translation because it spells out the point of this passage more explicitly than Sheridan's translation.
spoken immediately, with spontaneity, for there is no time to mull them over, to find the nicest formulation. The analysand is encouraged, rather unsubtly, to get to the point ... Almost by definition the ego can never be the master of the short session" (133-4). This emphasis on speed, on hurrying-on slightly ahead of conscious censorship, moving along too quickly to be constructing something pre-determined, brings the practice of free association closer to the Surrealist practice of automatic writing as Breton described it in the first Manifesto: "Write quickly, without any preconceived subject, fast enough so that you will not remember what you're writing and be tempted to reread what you have written" (Manifestoes 29-30). In his annotations to the text of The Magnetic Fields Breton took pains to indicate the overall rapidity and the variety of speeds at which the book was written. Speed of production was essential to the text's authenticity as an unprepared and unpremeditated work (15-17). When Schneiderman tries to describe the outcome of this hurried process it as if he, like Lacan, is no longer only the poet but also the poem-being-written:103

Once a thought makes itself known, it is put to the side to open a space in which a new thought can emerge. The question of why A leads to D instead of B is not asked; the associations emerge disconnected in a series or chain. This process is not like what we usually think of as letting one's mind wander. It is not daydreaming or elaborating fantasies. Each thought in free association is a discrete unit, counted as one, and no effort is made to form these thoughts into a whole or a unity that would have coherence and consistency. The presupposition, drawn from experience, beginning with Freud's, is that the last element in the series or chain will link the others in a way that could not have been grasped before this last element emerges. This is another way of saying that we do not know the meaning of a sentence until the final term is pronounced and until the punctuation is placed. (135)

Schneiderman's description of the chain of free association swiftly laid down is similar to the way a Japanese linked-verse poem, the renga, is constructed. These poems consist of up to one hundred brief stanzas (every second stanza a haiku), with each stanza relating only to the one above it through wordplay, association, emotion, narrative, puns or almost any connection that occurs to the mind. Each stanza is written by a different poet. Four or five poets sit together to write a renga, and each writer is given only two or three minutes to complete a stanza.104 When Schneiderman writes of the way the chain can only make sense through its final term, his description again seems to relate not just to the chain of signifiers seeking meaning in a final punctuation, but also to some forms of poetry—the sonnet or the haiku for instance.

From my experience in some creative writing workshops the writing of haikus can involve just this juxtaposition of apparently unrelated elements, and then a waiting for

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103 There are other accounts of Lacan's unorthodox analytic behaviour which are sometimes complaints that his methods interrupted and prevented proper or complete analysis. See Turkle (1992 299), Oliner (123-4) and Roudinesco (420-7).
104 For a discussion of this poetic form, see Earl Miner and Robert Hass.
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the mind to bring a concluding, punctuating association to the surface. Writing a "Summer Haiku" for instance, I found the first two lines came to my mind:

Asleep over a book
While the trees do all the work

but a third line did not suggest itself. There were three possibilities at first: "reading the wind", "making more paper for me", "swaying for the wind." None of them brought the chain to the kind of conclusion a haiku seeks until they were read out loud, and the kind of wordplay characteristic of haikus emerged from the group's suggestions:

Asleep over a book
While the trees do all the work
Turning the leaves.

Later this version gave way to a briefer, more enigmatic, more verbally playful version:

Asleep over a book
Under a tree —
Leaves turning.

The point here is that the process Schneiderman describes is like a creative writing exercise—one that is aimed towards surreally unpredictable but particularly styled ends by the constraints of its technique. It is not suprisingly an experience in language as much as it is a psychological experience.105

In summary, it seems that Lacan's practice as an analyst, and his style as speaker and writer operate more as initiations into a certain way of being in the world (i.e. in language) than as therapeutic experiences or scientific discussions. This way of being serves to collapse distinctions between psychoanalytic insights and poetic reveries. Neither can claim for their utterances greater status as truths, and both must live off a playfully creative involvement with language (reality).106

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105 A number of commentators have pursued the parallels between the process of analysis and creative/literary writing. Peter Brooks suggests that the analysand's experience of dramas of power and desire which are resolved through the experience of transference or identification with the analyst, is in essence no different to a reader's identification with a character in a work of fiction. Both experiences lead the person through to a resolution and a realisation of the textual or fictive construction of the self (see Rimmon-Kenan 8-17). Lennard Davis has also suggested that the path to a resolution that is not angst-ridden and anxiety-provoking is the aim of both psychoanalysis and fiction (Resisting Novels). Lacan, however, seems not so much concerned to reproduce the structure (including closure) of a literary/therapeutic experience but to provoke an involvement in his sessions as a distinctively aesthetic and yet still unpredictable experience.

106 Stuart Schneiderman observes that Lacan's work is "somewhat disjointed, even fictional at times .... It corresponds in many ways to what Lévi-Strauss called bricolage in La Pensee sauvage. Bricolage is the work of a handyman, a jack-of-all trades" (161). For those who are followers of Lacan, criticism of his way provokes the defence that poetry and fiction have some importance in the experience of analysis: "Whether it is Lacan or Lévi-Strauss or Barthes or Foucault, there exists in the writings of postwar French thinkers an unmistakable poetic quality, a will to create myths and fictions, or to refashion those that had been, at least in part, discredited. Some people have found this quality annoying, and there are analysts who blithely quip that Lacan is a poet or a surrealist and not a psychoanalyst. I myself have always found such remarks mean-spirited, especially for their failure to recognize the importance of fiction making in the relationship people have with their social order and their language" (161). Catherine Clément takes a slightly less defensive, more exasperated position.
We have seen, however, that this collapsing of boundaries (like the establishment of them) is never quite successful. Distinctions are in practice still maintained, though perhaps more in the manner of temporary barriers than as permanent divides. The Lacanian analytic session, for instance, is not mistaken for a writing workshop, though we might wonder whether this division is now only a matter of etiquette or commercial good sense.

Lacan continued at times to keep artistic creativity at arm's length, as though it does exist in another territory. In his 1976 preface to the English-Language edition of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis he writes, "I shall speak of Joyce, who has preoccupied me much this year, only to say that he is the simplest consequence of a refusal—such a mental refusal!—of a psychoanalysis, which, as a result, his work illustrates. But I have done no more than touch on this, in view of my embarrassment where art—an element in which Freud did not bathe without mishap—is concerned" (ix). In such a passage Lacan shows his awareness of the tensions in Freud's relation to art, but perhaps more significantly in his use of language we are alerted to the sexual and gender-political aspects of this relationship as it is perceived by Lacan. We have the "embarrassment" at "touching" art, which he nevertheless finds he must touch. Art is both object of desire and forbidden object. The place that must but should not be touched. In Freud's "mishap" the image takes on further threatening (castrating), onanistic and feminising reverberations: art is an element of nature, it is the deep, dark flow of water which is penetrated by the male body at its own risk. On its surface this passage seem to be implicated in the same confused struggle that Freud pursued with art, creativity and women. Or is this a small joke at Freud's expense? Lacan does not go on to mention Joyce anywhere in the seminars transcribed in this book. The slightly subdued sexual imagery here is framed by two cruder jokes. Immediately after this passage he says he writes in order to be au pair (up to date/boarding) with his current cases. In the first seminar he teases out the punning possibilities of the word "fundamental" in the title of the book, associating it with the "pudendum" and the "bottom parts" of the body. It is important to Lacan's style that puns, jokes, images and wordplays leave us hovering between doubled readings and multiple tones. These jokes, puns, blasphemies and profanities keep reminding the reader that this this is not just a text for we read it as it is being written by a writer immersed (to take up again the image of bathing) in the dangerous language of the writing. The text becomes endlessly suggestive. Analysis becomes a context for disruptive utterances. The follower-reader-analysand cannot quite catch the meaning of the exchange with Lacan.

regarding Lacan's style when she writes that he was always careful to "walk the fine line between communication and non-communication" (58-9). Roustang, as we have noted, regarded Lacan's propositions as an "impressive array of subterfuges" (49).
There is no doubt that this is a distinctively Lacanian experience for those who come into contact with his texts, as it was for those who were his analysands, but it must remain pointedly unclear whether these manoeuvres resurrect Freud, surpass Freud, trivialise Freud, or make use of psychoanalysis to cultivate a Surreal science of the self. Lacan seems to have recognised very early in his development that psychoanalysis cannot define, constrain or even understand creativity without participating in its disruption of all definitions and constraints.

But to write about Lacan in this manner is to assume that there is a Lacan.

But What Is A Lacan?
When I write, "It is important to Lacan's style that puns, jokes, images and wordplays leave us hovering between doubled readings," I am constructing one version of Lacan out of his texts. Even if I write of his words as text apart from Lacan, I cannot escape the fact that they have been published and sold to me under the name of Lacan. The name Lacan, like Freud's and like Foucault's, stands for an author and a particular school of thinking/writing—in Lacan's case, it stands as much for a style as a set of propositions. When we look at the history of Lacan's texts we can see again how the author-function has become crucial to such work—perhaps more crucial than it is for so-called creative writing.

Catherine Clement has noted that Lacan "wrote little and published almost nothing" (13). Apart from his medical thesis, a few articles and reviews, and encyclopedia entries, the rest of his work is taken from the spoken word. His words were either recorded or directly transcribed, then sometimes rewritten for presentation as texts either by himself or by his son-in-law, the philosopher-mathematician Jacques-Alain Miller. When he spoke at the famous seminars he did so from hand-written notes, but he would improvise on these notes, rarely consulting them (Roudinesco 565-6). Often Miller and Lacan worked closely on writing down the texts from recordings or transcriptions, so closely that among some Lacanians there were suggestions that Miller interfered with Lacan's words. Roudinesco describes their working relationship as early as 1965 (when the text of Ecrits was being established) in the following manner:

In 1965, Miller's discourse [the application of Frege's mathematical theories to Lacan's ideas] radicalized Lacan's. In theory, that discourse pretended to be strictly Lacanian, but in practice, it brought to Lacanianism the pressure of a combative militancy. In that sense there thus existed, already at that time, a Millerian representation of Lacanianism which was not a mere translation of Lacanian doctrine. Whereas Lacan produced concepts open to a certain ambiguity, Miller tended to clarify or rationalize Lacanian conceptuality so as to make it more uniform and occasionally more coherent. The slippage is all the more difficult to grasp in that it was frequently not perceived as such by the two men. Miller was intent on being the loyal commentator of the master and did not notice that on occasion he was borrowing from the master reformulations.
elaborated from his own doctrine. Between the style of the brilliant young man, in a rush to act, and the utterances of the old master, subject to multiple interpretations, so powerful an osmosis occurred that one has the impression that the former was giving up his own writing in order to submit to the pronouncements of the latter, and that the latter was borrowing his statements from the former in the belief that they were his own. (403)

Apart from this work with Miller, Lacan had hired stenographers to produce scripts of his earlier talks. Several students of Lacan also produced transcriptions of his talks from recordings. Lacan was in the habit of giving copies of these stenographic transcriptions as gifts to certain disciples and women. "There thus began to form a veritable cult of the master's sacred words" (Roudinesco 566). Pirate editions also appeared in bookshops. One reason that none of these transcripts were officially published was that Lacan was unhappy with them because each transcriber-summariser imposed their own style on his words (Roudinesco 566).

Shortly before the relationship with Miller was established, Lacan had hired an official stenographer, Maria Pieracos, who could not understand a word of Lacan's prose. "Nobody wanted the job," Maria reported. "There are only about fifty stenographers in all Paris and everyone said, 'Above all, don't go there; he speaks Chinese ...' My role was that of a machine ... Lacan never spoke to me, except once at a congress. Speaking one day about the stenographer, he said: 'the typess' ..." (Roudinesco 567).

It was at this point that Miller was engaged. Miller described his work as "the establishment of the text" (Turkle 254, Roudinesco 567). This establishment generally involved removing a number of asperities and ambiguities, eliminating redundancies and inventing a form of consistent punctuation (the dash, for instance, was a useful device for the purpose of organising the text to make a particular sense). When he presented his work on Lacan's 1972 seminar to the master, Lacan wished to publish the work under the joint authorship of himself and Miller (Turkle 254, Roudinesco 691). Miller refused for in his view, "the intellectual and commercial value of the seminars was tied to Lacan's being the sole author" (Turkle 255).

Roudinesco makes her assessment of the outcome of this joint process in the following terms: "In brief, the established text conveys the content of a doctrine which,
although Lacanian, bears the trace of Millerism—that is, of a hyperrationalist tendency within Lacanianism" (567).

That Lacan's perception of this process was not the same as Miller's is clear from his suggestion that they stand as co-authors of the seminar. His acceptance of Miller's refusal does not in itself undo the knot between himself and Miller which he perceived in the text. When Séminaire XI (later translated as The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis) was published in 1973, Lacan again differed from Miller in his perception, calling it a "transcription" and not an establishment. In a note appended to the work, Lacan wrote, "What you have just read ... is thus not a written text. A transcription, there's the word I have come up with ... What is read moves through the writing while remaining unscathed ... But I should also credit the author of this work with having convinced me—and having borne witness to it throughout its duration—that what may be read of what I say may be read no less because I have said it" (Roudinesco 569). In this interestingly detached, paradoxical and confused statement Miller stands as both transcriber of the discourse and author of the work, while the work stands as a text in its own right and as a vehicle for the original oral discourse of Lacan's seminar. Against this, Miller's description of his work as "establishment" implies that it constitutes an original document of a seminar which otherwise would remain un-established, or dissolute. In a Notice at the end of Séminaire XI, Miller describes his understanding of the process:

The wish here has been to count for nothing, and in this way to achieve, from the spoken work of Jacques Lacan, a faithful transcription which in the future can stand for the original which no longer exists. Indeed, one could not accept in this way the version supplied by the stenographer where misunderstandings swarm and where nothing serves to make up for an absence of gesture and tone. Nevertheless, as the version sine qua non, it has been gauged, rectified word by word—the disposable residue coming to less than three pages.

It has been most difficult [scabreux] to invent a punctuation, since scansion—comma, full stop, hyphen, paragraph—is decisive in producing sense. But to obtain a readable text, this was the price, and it is according to the same principles that the text of each year of the seminar will be established.

Despite its tone of deference this notice announces the non-existence of any original, and gives Miller the credit for re-inserting (Lacan's?) gestures, tones, punctuation and meanings which had become virtually incomprehensible and invisible in the stenographer's account. It is ironic that Lacan who radically disrupted analytic practice by inserting the punctuation of the short session later became indebted to Miller for inserting that punctuation into the Lacanian texts which gave them (whose?) meaning.

The word transcription sits strangely at the beginning of this passage. On the title page the text remains établi by Miller.

109 This notice does not appear in the English translation of the seminar (Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis). In Roudinesco (569) some extracts from this Notice and Lacan's Postface are translated. The translation here is mine, taken from the French publication Séminaire XI.
Towards the end of Lacan's life, during the upheavals of his final psychoanalytic schools, his assistant Miller would be accused of composing Lacan's notes, directives and letters, and finally of forging his signature (Turkle 259-63, Roudinesco 666-8). Once Lacan had died, Miller was attacked for being less than faithful to Lacan's words when he "established" texts of the seminar. Miller's training analysis was terminated by Charles Melman because, he said, "Jacques-Alain Miller wrote Lacan's last seminars" (Turkle 286).

With the death of Lacan in 1981, Miller became the appointed executor of the oral and written work of Jacques Lacan. Miller thus had legal authority to transcribe, establish or reproduce Lacan's work as he saw fit. The "originals" in the forms of stenographic records, tape recordings, and for one seminar a video recording, could still circulate and could still be consulted in libraries, but any publications intended for sale had to pass through Miller. One seminar was published by Miller two months after Lacan's death, then from 1981 to 1986 no work appeared. Some articles were published in *Littoral* and *Le Discours psychanalytique* accusing Miller of censorship, elimination of Lacan's original words, or of merely summarising his words.

From these manoeuvres and disputes over Lacan's name we can see that despite the fact that he wrote very little, the assignment of his name to texts has had powerful functions. It has operated as a legitimising stamp; as a key to the commercial viability of a Lacanian text; it has operated to define an oeuvre out of which certain commentaries, divisions and schools can grow in a similar fashion to the way psychoanalytic commentary develops from and defers to Freud's published collected psychological works. Just as Lacan's work is subject to the controversies of "establishment," the authoritative collection of Freud's writing is in the form of the English translation which has its critics who see it as a distortion of the original versions. In this, Lacan continues to mirror Freud. The establishment of Lacan's texts has parallels too in the establishment of the canonical books of the Bible. The legitimising stamp of his name carries something of a sacred aura for those who are Lacanian.

In 1983 the magazine *Littoral* produced a booklet, *Stécriture*, which was a text of several unpublished sessions of Lacan's seminar taken from a stenographic version with the advantage of being more faithful to Lacan's words than Miller's texts, but with the problem of being less "written" (Roudinesco 692). Once this booklet was sold commercially Miller brought a lawsuit against the publishers for producing an illegal document under Lacan's name. During the court proceedings which lasted until the end of 1985, Miller's lawyer proposed that Miller "is the continuation of the author, he who

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110 See Bruno Bettelheim, *Freud and Man's Soul*. Bettelheim begins this book by writing, "The English translation of Freud's writings are seriously defective in important respects and have led to erroneous conclusions, not only about Freud the man but also about psychoanalysis" (1). See also Mahoney, Weber and Ornston for discussions of Strachey's translation.
prolongs him beyond death" (Turkle 293). Miller himself said he attempted to find "a position where when I write "I" it is the "I" of Lacan" (Turkle 293). These propositions uncover the strange volatility of the "I" not only in Lacan's writing, but in any text.

One of Lacan's favourite questions to analysts was, "When did you know that you were an analyst? How did this happen? Who authorised you?" (Turkle 235). This is a question, in part, of the excommunicant to the initiated, a question from the one who has been told officially that when he says "I" he does not speak as an analyst, regardless of what authorisation he has given himself from within. But it can never be an official certificate, or a ring of initiation, which finally authorises the "I" as an analyst. It is also a question asked by the poet who is aware that no official institution authorises a person to call her/himself a poet (or a poem being written), for the poet can only "put on" this "I" finally by their own inner authorisation.

Miller's statement and his lawyer's description of the process go beyond authorisation as a legal process to make claims about Miller's fusion of identity with the "I" of Lacan—that is, with the "I" in his text if not the "I" in the mind. This fusion in the past has been regarded as the art of the parodist or plagiarist, or as the illusion of the psychotic. Here, it becomes a necessity if Miller is to produce a "written" text (that is, writerly and readable) out of the (already corrupted?) flow of partly improvised speeches which have been reduced to audio recordings or stenographers' versions.

We might read Miller as Lacan's return to a mirror stage, where Lacan's death stands for the mirror-surface held between a disintegrating self and a whole image; the mirror becomes a division between impossible symmetries which will prolong, preserve and endlessly corrupt the identity: "Lacan."

While some creative writers move into the fields of computer-generated texts, unstable texts that readers can alter, novels made freely available on the internet, writing in groups, works composed of quotations from other works, even the team-writing involved in film and television work, it seems that in the realm of the psychological-philosophical-scientific discourse there is still a focus on establishing written texts under a particular author's name. This name has its own legal, commercial and sacred but still unstable existence. Just as with Foucault's authorship of his essay, "What Is an Author?", this name cannot arrive in a text or define an opus without bringing its particular narratives of division, fusion, masking, and even of extensions beyond death.

111 In January 1995 Time Warner 'published' the first novel on internet, serialising Delirium by Douglas Cooper via World Wide Web. New chapters are posted weekly featuring hypertext links to graphics, sounds and other texts. Eventually users will be able to download the entire novel at no charge. Time Warner have announced that their rationale for publishing in this way is to establish their presence on the Net without concern for income generation (Australian Society of Authors Newsletter. No. 2 February 1995).
From this discussion of Lacan's name in relation to his texts we can see, again, that scientific texts are subject to author-functions and resulting instabilities, just as so-called creative texts can be. In fact, scientific-philosophical texts seem to be tied to the controversies and contradictions surrounding texts dogged by *names* while creative texts, as we saw in the introductory section, are finding ways to move out from under a name. It is Lacan's name that threatens to ossify his texts into a canonical poem/a set of fixed discoveries—against his avowed aim of always still-being-written.

**Kristeva, Literature and Motherhood Statements**

Here, as a brief coda to this chapter, I want to note another post-Freud psychoanalytist's interactions with literature. I take up only two moments—two essays—where the French-Bulgarian psychoanalyst and linguist Julia Kristeva attempts some ways of understanding literature and some ways of participating in literature's enterprise. My aim here is to show not just that psychoanalytic 'discoveries' have been unable to contain creativity but that from within psychoanalysis new, more flexible and more ideologically self-conscious ways of understanding literature have become possible. At the same time, as we shall see, certain contradictions and tensions between these discourses persist.

In some ways Kristeva adopts the stances and the rhetorical devices of a traditional psychoanalytic discourse. She can claim for instance that "the reality of castration is no more real than the hypothesis of an explosion which, according to modern astrophysics, is at the origin of the universe: nothing proves it, in a sense it is an article of faith, the only difference being that numerous phenomena of life in this "Big-Bang" universe are explicable only through this initial hypothesis. But one is infinitely more jolted when this kind of intellectual method concerns our subjectivity than inanimate matter ...." (Kristeva Reader 197). Here, like Freud, Lacan, and the Surrealists she aligns her discourse with a progressive and powerful new science. But when we pause over the claim we can see how inflated it is. The "Big-Bang" theory of the origin of the universe must stand or fall on rigorous mathematical, astronomical and experimental testing. It can only survive as a theory if it is shown repeatedly to be not only plausible but necessary, predictive and exhaustive as a model of the universe's first moments of existence. No such rigour has ever been applied in establishing the claims of psychoanalysis. Unconscious fantasies of castration remain no more than possibly plausible and useful constructs. They have not been shown to be predictive, exhaustive,

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112 These essays are "The Adolescent Novel" and "Women's Time," both published in translation in *New Maladies of the Soul.* "Women's Time" is also translated in *The Kristeva Reader* edited by Toril Moi.
Kristeva, Harwood and Motherhood Statements

nor even the only possible explanations for neurotic discourse. Kristeva attaches her argument to one similarity between the "Big-Bang" theory and castration-fantasy theory: neither of these 'events' can be observed, remembered or experienced. But this similarity does not give them equal status as scientific hypotheses. Her argument here participates in a longstanding rhetorical tradition among psychoanalysts. It demonstrates this discourse's lingering desire for a certain kind of legitimacy and superiority.113

Along with Freud she regards the artist—in particular the writer—as one who is perversely immature. In her essay, "The Adolescent Novel," Kristeva moves towards the view that immersion in adolescence—a psychically "open structure" which need not be confined to teenage years—is central to the production of novels and indeed to all imaginary writing.114 The novelist, in her view, is motivated by opportunities to move freely in an "adolescent economy" which is characterised by depression, projection, pregenitality and narcissism. Writers, it seems, still face the sorts of psychotic dangers that Freud saw for them.

Yet Kristeva is uneasy with directly Freudian interpretations of literature. Like Freud she approaches literature with enthusiasm, interest and intellectual interrogation. But unlike Freud—and like Lacan—she maintains areas of indecisiveness and overlap between the discourses of psychoanalysis and literature. In asking, for instance, what a reader might find of any use in the open and incomplete structures of novels, Kristeva concedes that the novel can offer "a certain working-out that is not unrelated to the one inspired by transference and interpretation" (New Maladies 152). The novel can offer a kind of therapy to the reader. This is far from the Freudian view of art as fundamentally socially conservative and as symptom of neurosis. Kristeva takes her view to its natural conclusion and asks, must we choose then between sending an adolescent/neurotic "to an analyst or encouraging him to write novels?" (152). Or should analyst and patient write the novels together? Kristeva ends her discussion by noting that it is not only the writer who lives with the problem of perversion. The well-meaning listening of the analyst includes a degree of perversion—and perhaps novels can teach analysts how to approach perversion with empathy and without complacency.

It is not clear what such advice might mean in practice for an analyst, but Kristeva does encourage her patients to write and draw, and she continues to seek liberation and subversion, not simply evidence, from literature. In 1990 Kristeva published a novel

113 This tradition continues into the present. In July 1996 the secretary of the Australian Psychoanalytic Society, Dr Ron Spielman, responded to criticism by remarking, "To me, the exploration of inner space is as interesting and as important as the exploration of outer space ... the subject method is little different. We infer black holes. Nobody knows if there's a black hole out there. And we infer the unconscious. No-one has ever seen the unconscious but there's more than enough evidence that it exists than any reasonable scientist should require" (Barrowclough 38).

114 Kristeva writes, "Whether the novelist plays the role of an adolescent represented by an ego-ideal, identifies with the adolescent, or is himself an adolescent, the theme of the adolescent is one of the most salient characteristics of Western novels" (New Maladies 140).
drawn from (or departing from) stories told to her by patients: "My patients tell me about their emotional troubles and make sure they suffer from them" (*The Samurai* 2).

Psychoanalysts have been preoccupied with the question, "From where does literature come?"—and it is in the interaction between writing and the unconscious that they have found their answer. Kristeva, as an analyst, arrives at a more complex and more unstable answer to this question by acknowledging that writing and ideology interact as crucially as do writing and the unconscious. She calls the novel's mode—its polyphony, ambivalence and flexibility—*semiotic* (*New Maladies* 152). In the play between the semiotic and the symbolic orders, out of which, as Kristeva sees it, language and its discourses become possible, literature (and in particular the novel) operates predominantly under a pre-oedipal, maternal, diffused and rhythmic semiotic order. It comes from that "youthful" zone of language which first evolved under the influence of the mother and survives as a source of resistance and revolution in tension with the symbolic order.

In this way Kristeva allows literature to deny an assigned role as symptom and to refuse relegation as a merely (or threateningly) 'feminine' pursuit. Creativity can thus work as a conscious resistance to the symbolic order's tendency towards homogeneity and closure even while as an adolescent project it participates perilously with psychotic and neurotic possibilities.

But now, let us listen to another passage from Kristeva on an experience of true creativity:

The arrival of the child, on the other hand, guides the mother through a labyrinth of a rare experience: the love for another person, as opposed to love for herself, for a mirror image, or especially for another person with which the "I" becomes merged (through amorous or sexual passion). It is rather a slow, difficult, and delightful process of becoming attentive, tender and self-effacing. If maternity is to be guilt-free, this journey needs to be undertaken without masochism and without annihilating one's affective, intellectual, and professional personality, either. In this way, maternity becomes a true creative act, something that we have not yet been able to imagine. (*New Maladies* 219-20)

In Kristeva's essay, "Women's Time," this passage links two discussions: in the one leading up to this section she acknowledges that the wish to be a mother has been embraced by the present generation of feminists. "What lies behind this desire to be a mother?" she asks. Kristeva tempers the simply Freudian interpretation of this impulse as a desire to have a penis (without altogether denying that pregnancy is a dramatic "splitting of the [female] body") in her above quoted production of a lived maternity as a truly creative act. Following this description of motherhood Kristeva moves into a discussion of women's literary creation. "Why the emphasis on literature?" she asks—evoking those (already hoary) Freudian interpretations of the source of creative acts.
But she does not come any closer to Freud than this for she takes up more political, more discursive, more subversive possibilities: Perhaps it is because women desire a "more flexible discourse that is able to give a name to that which has not yet been an object of widespread circulation: the mysteries of the body, secret joys, shames, hate displayed toward the second sex ... women are writing. And we are eagerly awaiting to find out what new material they will offer us" (220-1). And what is more new and more secret than the experience of being a mother? But why does Kristeva deliver motherhood/creation to us in this particular light? Why the emphasis on motherhood as creativity—and, for that matter, on the mother's responsibility to perform—and to control the performance? What has happened to the ambivalence, the open-ended structure, the psychotic dangers and the sexual ambiguity of the adolescent state of mind which, she has suggested in "The Adolescent Novel," are fundamental to creativity? Why this perverse emphasis on the heroic altruism of motherhood—of creativity?

When the Tasmanian poet Gwen Harwood wrote one of her poems of motherhood, "In the Park," it was originally published under one of her male pseudonyms, Walter Lehmann:

She sits in the park. Her clothes are out of date.  
Two children whine and bicker, tug her skirt.  
A third draws aimless patterns in the dirt.  
Someone she loved once passes by — too late

to feign indifference to that casual nod.  
From his neat head unquestionably rises  
a small balloon ... "but for the grace of God ... "

They stand a while in flickering light, rehearsing  
the children's names and birthdays. "It's so sweet to hear their chatter, watch them grow and thrive,"  
she says to his departing smile. Then, nursing  
the youngest child, sits staring at her feet.  
To the wind she says, "They have eaten me alive."  
(Selected Poems 27)

Later Harwood was delighted to be told that only a man could have had the necessary self-detachment to write that poem. A woman would never have written that savage last line (Trigg 39). The revelation that it was her line has helped construct the poem's reputation as an emphatic statement of a woman's experience of motherhood. Does Harwood's poem reveal Kristeva's version of motherhood as a conventionally romantic portrait of the compensations women should find in motherhood—according to patriarchal tenets? Or is Harwood's poem an example of a needlessly masochistic reflection on motherhood? Or is motherhood like this—Is the man's "but for the grace of God ... " the recognition of a truly fortunate escape? On the one hand there is
Kristeva's joyful self-effacement and on the other Harwood's woman consumed alive. The shift is slight and the difference immense.

These views of motherhood do exclude each other, for in Kristeva's version there is control: one child arrives and a professional career and even erotic relationships are juggled successfully against the experience of motherhood. In Harwood's poem there are already three children under school age and all control, all erotic hope and any career must already be lost for that mother.

And yet, the poem does get written—and by a mother.115 This is the writing Kristeva celebrates and eagerly awaits in her essay. The two versions of motherhood serve in part to demonstrate her argument (and Lacan's) that "Woman" (or for that matter "Mother") does not exist as a homogeneous abstraction—at best only perhaps as a tendency, as a position of vulnerability and unease in relation to the symbolic order.116 These versions might also serve to remind us that Kristeva is herself a writer, that her paragraphs are constructed in hope, in perversion, under aesthetic as well as intellectual demands. Her intellectual commitment to a psychoanalytic framework, for instance, cannot easily be reconciled with her idealised version of creativity and motherhood.117 The two views of motherhood offered by these two writers are creative—small novels/autobiographies—but in different senses. One seeks to convey and dramatise an unpalatable truth about motherhood while the other offers an inspiration to the reader and is no less but differently creative for this.118

Kristeva's two versions of creativity—as "adolescent" language and as selfless maternal love—bring into sharp relief tensions within her psychoanalytic discourse as she attempts to bring it into a sympathetic relation with literature. Does her claim about motherhood indicate that the "adolescent novel" (made to stand for all literature) is after all an inferior form of creativity? If this is the case, then she is pursuing the Freudian project of exposing the neurotic in artists and their art. Is it only by becoming a "mother" that the "adolescent" artist can become truly creative? Perhaps these contrasting versions of creativity demonstrate simply that an assertion can always operate as an opportunity for reversal and resistance. Perhaps Kristeva's particular discourse requires these two versions to survive alongside each other. Her apparent inconsistency here might be nevertheless broadly consistent in bringing back the silenced or marginalised roles of adolescent and mother to re-present them as central to

115 Between 1946 and 1952 Gwen Harwood had four children, including twins (Trigg vii).
116 Toril Moi quotes Kristeva from a 1974 interview: "To believe that one 'is a woman' is almost as absurd and obscurantist as to believe that one 'is a man"' (Sexual/Textual Politics 163).
117 See Christine Delphy ("French Feminism: An Imperialist Invention") for a timely discussion of Kristeva's problematic relation to a broad spectrum of the feminist movement.
118 Harwood conceded the partial nature of her version of motherhood in a parodical poem published in 1992 which reads as a possible retraction or complication of the much anthologised earlier version: "She sits in the park, wishing she'd never written/about that dowdy housewife and her brood .. Eating you alive?/Look at me. I've lived through it. You'll survive" (Meanjin 10).
creativity. It is perhaps from within her category of the semiotic that motherhood and adolescence can become a common source of creativity. Her versions of creativity, like Lacan's, are indeed more open-ended, more complex, contradictory and up-in-the-air than Freud's science would want to have it.
5. Alcohol as an Aftermath of Surrealising Creativity

A Foul, Furred Tongue
When Freud declared Surrealists to be near-absolute cranks—"say 95 per cent, like alcohol" (Letters 449)—he might have wanted a knowing grin and a dismissive nod from those of us who know the oblivion alcohol brings. But he was also pointing, unconsciously perhaps, to that project often shared by practitioners of alcohol consumption, Surrealism and psychoanalysis: the search for a way through to the unconscious. Might Freud's joke reveal a tremor of uncertainty over whether his way through to the unconscious is the only way or even the best way? In the wake of Surrealism and psychoanalysis, through the 1930s and 40s the drinking writer (particularly in the United States) seemed to carry an aura of sophistication, of knowing, of access to creativity. In the following discussion I take up questions of the possible relations between drinking and naming oneself as creative (as in touch with a creative unconscious), between the power of alcohol and the power of creativity.

In a 1935 lecture on "the surrealist situation of the object," Breton argued that surrealist painting had emerged as a historical necessity (Manifestoes 255-278). He presented his account of this necessary art in terms of a confrontation between mechanistic science and a new science of "invisibly visible" knowledge. It was a historical narrative of revolution and succession whereby the ego gave way to the id—the reality principle being at last succeeded by the pleasure principle. According to Breton's narrative the art of painting had recently exhausted itself in increasingly unsatisfactory expressions of the relations between objects (the outside world) and the ego. Such painting could never get "to the bottom of man's perception-consciousness system" (272). The advent of photography had dealt this already weakened art a decisive blow by mechanising its mode of representation.119 "It was necessary for painting to beat a retreat so as to take up an impregnable position behind the necessity of expressing inner perception visually" (272). In this new project painting had an ally in Freud. Breton at first declared that in pursuing "the only domain left for the artist," the

119 Breton was so taken with the implications of the technology of the photograph that in 1920 he had promoted automatic writing as "a true photography of thought" (What Is Surrealism? 7). His claim that painting was made obsolete by photography was not unusual, but it was daring to make it so forcefully. No one took seriously the possibility that photography might usurp painting. In fact the idea had been proposed so frequently in the nineteenth century that less than half a century after the invention of photography in 1839 it was one of the "received ideas" parodied in the Dictionary of Received Ideas (Flaubert et al. 300, 321). Only recently has the idea been discussed in a more serious and scholarly manner in the light of the art of Rauschenberg (see Crimp).
new painting supported and affirmed the truth of Freud's insights: "The important thing is that recourse to mental representation (outside of the physical presence of the object) furnishes, as Freud has said, "sensations related to ... the deepest layers of the psychic mechanism" (273). Breton immediately pushed this point far beyond any proposals Freud had made, employing a typically quasi-experimental-scientific rhetoric which both announced and obscured a revolution in art. He wrote:

In art the necessarily more and more systematic search for these sensations works toward the abolition of the ego by the id, and consequently it endeavors to make the pleasure principle hold clearer and clearer sway over the reality principle. This search tends more and more to liberate instinctive impulses, to break down the barrier that civilized man faces, a barrier that primitive people and children do not experience. Given, on the one hand, the general disruption of sensibility that it brings on (through the communication of quite large psychic charges to the elements of the perception-consciousness system), and the impossibility of regression to the preceding stage on the other hand, the import of such an attitude is socially incalculable. (Manifestoes 273)

The commitment to Marx's injunction, "transform the world," and Rimbaud's "change life," are echoed here, and are made to seem not only inevitable but progressive by scientistic vocabulary such as: systematic ... principle ... barriers ... charges ... elements ... system (and later "the technical effort of Surrealism"). Freudian terminology further allies this 'experiment' to the new, progressive science of Freudian psychology.

But Surrealism's revolt against the Freudian unconscious is not so apparent. For Freud it was never possible to choose deliberately or even technically to "penetrate the deepest layers of the mental" and return to the surfaces of art—the canvas and the page—with direct and knowing images from these depths. For psychoanalysis interpretation must always stand between expression and meaning, or between meaning and its (obscured) source.

In a 1951 interview with André Parinaud, Breton was explicit about the combative relation between Surrealism and psychoanalysis: "Once more, psychoanalysis had no secrets for the Surrealist painters and poets from the start, such that on many occasions they have consciously played on the sexual symbolism attached to it" (Conversations 254). In the same interview Breton reiterated his confidence that Surrealists could make contact with those "inner" aspects of the self: "What the Surrealists in particular wanted," he said—supplying an answer to the famous query addressed by Freud to Surrealism—"was much less to create beauty than to express themselves freely, which meant expressing their inner selves" (254).

What then did the Surrealists discover in the deepest layers of the mental, that place beyond the reach of photography? Perhaps one way of approaching an answer to this difficult question is to ask: with what images (other than the image of darkness itself)
did they enter the inner self, and then, on returning from this inner self, what images were they compelled to employ to convey their experiences?

We have already seen that the image of science as a powerful, modern, progressive force was crucial in presenting the Surrealist project. It is not surprising that along with science, images of carnal desire marked and thus determined the nature of Surrealist encounters with the inner self: "As has been proved to me after the fact," Breton wrote, "the definition of Surrealism given in the first Manifesto merely "retouches" a great traditional saying concerning the necessity of breaking through the drumhead of reasoning reason and looking at the hole, a procedure which will lead to the clarification of symbols that were once mysterious" (Manifestoes 300). This hymeneal image, vibrating with militaristic and voyeuristic associations, directs us towards that which must be discovered within this black hole of the self: "Unlike the various disciplines which claim that they guide us along this path and allow us to forge ahead on it, Surrealism has never been tempted to hide from itself the element of glittering fascination in man's love for woman. It was all the less tempted to do so by the very fact that its first investigations, as we have seen, led them into a country where desire was king ... In Surrealism, woman is to be loved and honored as the great promise, a promise that still exists even after it has been kept" (Manifestoes 301). Woman is thus "the keystone of the edifice," and for those who can appreciate her as the Chosen Object, "carnal love is at one with spiritual love."

Breton depicts this passionate love as the way to a new Eden, a way to reverse traditional doctrines of passion as fall or sin. This leads him into a discussion of the way Surrealism's conception of the poetic image governs its attitude to nature—and, presumably to woman(-as-nature). In all its hierarchies, categories and varied manifestations, nature becomes a kind of cryptogram or hieroglyph which is alien to man's experience, but which he can understand by poetic intuition—by those sparks of association which constitute the surrealist poetic image. "Man must, in all humility, use the little that he knows about himself to reconnoitre what surrounds him" (Manifestoes 304).

To comprehend the image of woman as representative of this redemptive nature thus becomes a Surrealist ideal. Breton's fervid 1931 poem of free associations to his wife is a lexicon of the natural world. He finds in her "an otterlike waist between the tiger's teeth ... mouth like a posy of stars ... teeth like a white mouse's spoor on white earth ... tongue of incredible stone ... eyebrows like the rim of a swallow's nest ... fingers of mown hay ... armpits of marten and beechnut ... arms of sluice and foam ... belly of a giant claw ... platypus sex ... savannah eyes," and on and on through an inexhaustible nature uncovered in the body of his ideal woman (Poems 49-51).

With these moves, as in so many other ways, Surrealism both illustrates and discards psychoanalysis. But in moving against the formulaic inhibitions of
psychoanalysis, and in replacing interpretation with revelation, in suggesting an excessive economy of the psyche—an economy where the haptic and the unconscious are not only directly available, but become necessary means to acquire knowledge—Surrealism establishes its discourse as another formula for the production of images. We discover that Surrealism is the unconscious, that the unconscious is creativity, and that creativity is convulsive and passionate, and thus utterly feminine. Having broken through an already eroticised drumhead of reasoning reason it is not surprising that Surrealism returns from the deepest layers of the mind with images of a surrealised woman.

The Surrealist woman is idealised, veiled, shrouded, tortured, raped, stripped of flesh, fragmented, covered in the furs and feathers of wild creatures. She is the hieroglyph—the secret source and only subject of art. She is both subdued and elevated by a strategy marked with the ambivalence of those those who find this idealised Other at the centre of the inner self. Along with Breton's wife in the poem "Free Union," and along with his figure of Nadja, we find this Surrealist woman again and again in works such as Salvador Dali's *The Phenomenon of Ecstasy* (1933), Max Dupain's *Female Torso* (1936), Wilhelm Freddie's *My Two Sisters* (1938), Paul Delvaux's *The Call of the Night* (1938) where foliage grows from women's bodies, in Max Ernst's collages of the 1930s and in his bird-woman at the centre of *The Robing of the Bride* (1940). Though these and many other images of the Surrealist woman are astonishing, inventive, disturbing, enigmatic, even to some extent produced by chance encounters—they are nevertheless stylised, primarily for a consistent and insistent male gaze which unveils/veils woman as the ideal of a fashionable modernity, as the figure who stands between man and nature, between himself and his desires, alongside death—and as man's muse she mediates between himself and his art.

The Surrealists' vision of sublime woman was not only quickly recognised as a stylistic signature, but was chic enough to be taken up by fashion houses in the 1930s. *Vogue*, *Harper's Bazaar* and *Flair* were major fashion publications which used the Surrealist skills of Jean-Michel Frank, Jean Cocteau, Cecil Beaton and Man Ray to establish a stylistic revolution in graphic design for fashion publications (Martin 217-22). In March 1937 *Vogue* published three "photo-paintings" commissioned from Salvador Dali, Giorgio de Chirico and Paul Tchelitchew (Figure 11). As early as 1926 and again in 1927 Magritte was commissioned by the Brussels furrier Samuel to design their brochures in a distinctly Surreal style. Magritte was so pleased with these

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120 Reproductions of some of these images are placed at the end of this section.

121 Hal Foster argues in *Compulsive Beauty* that Surrealism obsessively restages the heterosexist fantasies of maternal plenitude and paternal punishment. He cites as evidence mainly the collages of Max Ernst, the repetitions of maternal mannequins in de Chirico's work and the broken dolls of Bellmer.
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brochures that he showed them to Breton and Aragon who reportedly approved of them (Sylvester 79).

As a further stylistic signature, the unconscious constructed in Surrealist art becomes recognisable through its disturbed and hallucinatory qualities. The world of dream is suggested by the way the art takes for granted its impossible or its strangely pastiche landscapes. It partakes in the traditions of excess in art and literature. Dali's early Surrealist explorations of his "paranoiac-critical" method whereby one image dissolves into another unlike itself, recalls the interest in synaesthesia among poets and writers using opium early in the nineteenth century.122 Surrealism takes up this Romantic interest in the unsettling of perceptions along with a reluctance to resolve the ambiguities thrown up by these excesses of the senses.

In Breton's embrace of creativity as feminine this excess takes the form of his exhortation to artists to incarnate within themselves tangible reconstructions of the "primordial Androgyne" (Manifestoes 302). It goes without saying for Breton that this impossible but necessary task is a task for men. With this ultimate image of the Surrealist artist as a man-become-androgyne, at one with his muse, at one with both his inner self and his art, Surrealism strangely mirrors in its one-sidedness the Cyclopian narrowness of that centrepiece of Freudian theory, the Oedipus complex.

Through the alliances and contests between the discourses offered by Surrealism and psychoanalysis creativity is darkened by an association with the unconscious, and as part of this shift its dark, veiled place becomes eroticised as feminine. For both Surrealism and psychoanalysis the place of the inner self is like a distorting mirror before which a man can no longer recognise himself. For both these discourses exposure to the unconscious through creativity operates as a kind of reverse mirror-stage, for it will undo the masculinity of the artist at the moment of his triumph. Psychoanalysis deals with this by linking creativity to neurosis and by resorting to the sanity (the determinism) of interpretation. Surrealism appears to revel in the possibility of transformation while constructing its own unexamined and unremarked poetics of defence against transformation. Images of a heterosexual male desire are rigorously applied and multiplied.

During the 1930s, with increasing popular interest in psychoanalysis and the sudden Parisian fashionableness of Surrealism, for many writers and painters creativity was self-evidently established as a product of the unconscious.123 In response to Joyce's

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122 See Hashish Wine Opium by Gautier and Baudelaire as an early text in this tradition. Arthur Symons and Edith Sitwell took up the synaesthetic image as did Rimbaud: "The star wept rose-colored in the heart of your ears" (Complete Works 121). See also Alethea Hayter's Opium and the Romantic Imagination. See illustrations at the end of this section for examples of Dalí's paranoiac method. In Australia recently we might see Brett Whiteley's gluing of a platypus, lyrebird feathers and birds' nests complete with eggs to his paintings as a painterly version of the synaesthetic image (mediated through a surrealist tradition).

123 See Altshuler 116-133 for a discussion of the popularity of Surrealist exhibitions in Paris,
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_Ulysses_ Jung turned literary critic in 1932 and published a long discussion of this modern, "cubistic" novel: "I had already taken up Ulysses in 1922 but had laid it aside disappointed and vexed. Today it still bores me as it did then. Why do I write about it? Ordinarily, I would no more be doing this than writing about any other form of surrealism (what is surrealism?) that passes my understanding. I am writing about Joyce because a publisher was incautious enough to ask me what I thought about him, or rather about _Ulysses_, concerning which opinions are notoriously divided" (115).

With the modern linked so closely to the surreal and with art enmeshed so intricately with the unconscious, it must have seemed natural to ask an eminent psychologist of the unconscious to comment on the most notorious modern novel of the time. Even in Germany where the government of the Third Reich condemned modern art as Jewish and degenerate, public interest in the new, scandalous art was widespread. From July to November 1937 a Reich-sponsored Exhibition of Degenerate Art in Berlin attracted over two million visitors, averaging more than 20,000 people a day. This exhibition of 650 works confiscated from museums across Germany was meant to demonstrate the waste of public money expended in buying such modern art, the degeneracy of the art, its Bolshevist tendencies and its Jewish nature. Nazi propaganda and condemnations were written on the walls around the works. Adolf Ziegler, Hitler's favourite artist, said to be "the master of pubic hair," was responsible for ransacking German museums of 16,000 works of art in preparation for this exhibition. Perhaps most surreally, Hitler ordered to be inscribed over the entrance to the exhibition the words: _Art is a Mission Demanding Fanaticism_. In 1939 nearly 5,000 of these degenerate works were incinerated in a yard of the Berlin Fire Brigade (Altshuler 136-145). The meticulous confiscation and the physical destruction of these works attests to the importance placed upon repressing the impulses—dark, unconscious, uncivilised and uncontrollably sexual—which produced such works.\(^{124}\)

From this context of a creativity made darkly unconscious and implicated with scandalous excess, the erotic-feminine, degeneracy, sophisticated fashion and the feminising of the artist—what choices for understanding and executing their work could writers, poets or painters make and what meanings would be found in their choices? In

particularly the 1938 Galerie Beaux-Arts exhibition.

\(^{124}\) See Dawn Ades et al., *Art and Power* (330-333) for another recent discussion of these events and Ziegler’s role. This book places examples of the officially approved German art against the "degenerate" contemporary modern art of the period—repeating the Nazi practice of publishing examples of degenerate modern art against medical textbook photographs of people suffering from disfiguring diseases. See also Jonathan Petropoulos, *Art as Politics in the Third Reich*. Petropoulos records that when Goebbels banned public art criticism in 1936, he called contemporary art "this crap" (53). Petropoulos also notes that a simultaneous exhibition of State-approved contemporary art in Munich in 1937 attracted an average of 3,200 visitors a day (57).
both the Surrealist and the psychoanalytic versions of creativity there were pressures on the artist either to succumb to analysis or to glory in Surrealist-inspired manifestations of the unconscious. The implications were that in resistance to either of these choices lay inevitable artistic failure.

Writers and artists could of course continue to write and paint as if the upheavals of psychoanalysis and Surrealism either had not happened or were utterly irrelevant to the production of serious art. This was the course adopted by the officially approved artists of Hitler's Germany and, eventually, Russian Communism—and it is not only psychoanalysts and Surrealists who later saw this path as a failure in creative terms. But what of those artists who might accept the modern roots of creativity in an unconscious stripped of romantic dreaming, but who do not want to be psychoanalysed or to be enrolled in a Surrealist endeavour? What resistant or alternative practice might be available to artists who sense in some way that the results achieved by the modern avant-garde might be trivial—or too daunting? For these artists there have always been many ways 'out', though none of them conclusively free of echoes of Freud or Breton. Some English novelists of the thirties such as Evelyn Waugh, Henry Green, Christopher Isherwood and Ivy compton-Burnett abandoned the stream of consciousness, the dream, and long passages of introspection by focusing their novels on dialogue (Lodge 81). The use of consciousness-altering drugs as integral to the creative process can be understood as one of these ways out. Indeed, the tradition of using drugs while/for writing leapfrogs the psychoanalytic and Surrealist revolutions, for it can be seen to have its roots among the Romantic opium-eaters. At the same time the use of such drugs accepts and accommodates some of the orthodoxies of psychoanalysis and Surrealism—that creativity comes from the anarchic, the confused, the uninhibited, the darkly unconscious side of ourselves; or that the artist is both eroticised and infantilised by his art.

A writer's consumption of alcohol might also be perceived as one of these ways out. The astonishing relationship between writing and drinking in America from the 1930s to the late 1940s can be understood as one response to the modern discourse on creativity. For some writers and artists of this period alcohol could make possible a

125 See Stephanie Barron's "Degenerate Art" for a discussion of this period.
126 See Jurgen Habermas's essay, "Modernity—an Incomplete Project," where he suggests that modernity is "addicted to a fascination with that horror which accompanies the act of profaning, and yet is always in flight from the trivial results of that profanation" (5). Habermas characterises the activities of the radical modernist avant-garde as "nonsense experiments" (11).
127 If this study focused on the 1950s, the drugs of interest might be barbiturates and sedatives, or if we moved to the 1960s and 70s marijuana and hallucinogens might be discussed. In the 1980s and 90s cocaine, heroin and "ecstasy" might be the drugs which initiate or colour particular discourses over creativity.
strategically ambivalent address to the emergent discourse and practice of creativity—an address which preserved for the writer some sense of resistance and individual assertion against the new orthodoxies while allowing importance and power to these new ways of understanding creativity.

With little discussion of possible connections between alcohol and the practices or discourses of artistic creation there seems to have been a widespread acceptance of spectacular alcohol consumption among writers in America particularly during the 1930s. After half a century of relative silence on this phenomenon three recent books have begun a discussion of the place of alcohol in the lives of American writers in the first half of the twentieth century. Thomas Dardis, for one, introduces his book by noting, "Of the seven native-born Americans awarded the Nobel Prize in literature, five were alcoholic" (3). These writers were Sinclair Lewis, Eugene O'Neill, William Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway and John Steinbeck. In his 1988 study, Alcohol and the Writer, Donald Goodwin comments on the two non-alcoholic Nobel Prize winners by suggesting Pearl Buck was not an alcoholic because she was a woman ("Women are less often alcoholic than men") and because she was raised by missionary parents in China. Saul Bellow was "protected" against alcoholism by his Jewishness, though he did write one of the definitive fictional studies of alcoholism in his novel, The Victim. It seems that any distinguished American writer could avoid alcoholism only by cultural or genetic luck.

Apart from the claimed 70% rate of alcoholism among these American Nobel Prize winners, what is the evidence that writers drank heavily during the first half of the century? Donald Goodwin considers that in the first half of the twentieth century alcoholism among American writers was so prevalent it could be described as an epidemic. He presents some anecdotal evidence, such as Upton Sinclair's list of the fifteen worst drunks he had ever met. Ten of of them were writers, and of the five others, all had done some writing (3). With stories like this we come up against not only the problem of how to define an alcoholic, but who is and who isn't a writer. Both these categories become problematic at their boundaries. In his introduction Goodwin composes, off the top of his head, a list of forty eight American writers who were considered alcoholic or at least heavy drinkers by their contemporaries or their biographers.\(^{128}\) He adds that Professor George Wedge at the University of Kansas,  

"probably the world's leading authority on drinking writers," has compiled a list of 150 famous American writers who were alcoholic or very heavy drinkers. Taking the opposite tack, but making the same point, Sinclair Lewis asked, "Can you name five American writers since Poe who did not die of alcoholism?" (Goodwin 1).

In *Equivocal Spirits*, published in 1987, Thomas Gilmore adds to the above list of forty eight the names of Dylan Thomas, Evelyn Waugh, Brendan Behan, Norman Mailer, James Dickey, Edmund Wilson, Allen Tate, Jack Kerouac, William Styron, Irwin Shaw, W. H. Auden and Malcolm Lowry (177). Other lists include James Joyce, Raymond Carver and Charles Bukowski. We could add Elizabeth Bishop and Anne Sexton as notable women writers to these lists of men, and indeed I will turn to Bishop's writing towards the end of this discussion. There seems to be no shortage of names for membership in these alcoholic writers' clubs.

Gilmore does not see the value in such listing (4). He sees it as a pointless "Head-shaking" exercise. They *are* meant to shock but they are also employed impress a truth on us by their weight of numbers and reputations: heavy drinking was remarkably widespread among writers. In addition to their value as scandal these lists indicate a recent interest in outing not just the heavy-drinking writer but those colleagues, critics and historians who have maintained a protective silence around him (or occasionally her). Along with such lists there are disapproving references to biographers who not only pass over the drinking of these writers but even when they record the episodes of drinking, blackouts, hospitalisations and illnesses, they refuse to recognise the presence of a disease or the effects and significance of alcohol in the writing. As well as being informal evidence of the presence of a phenomenon, the lists operate as blows against what is regarded as an unconscious (or bourgeois) cultural censorship.

The three recent books by Dardis, Goodwin and Gilmore each push the discourse of creativity's relation to alcohol in different directions. Dardis traces the effect of alcohol on the quality of writing. His thesis is that alcohol can only destroy creativity. A writer's faith in alcohol is deluded and his dependence on it misguided. For instance, Dardis takes on one of the gems of American popular literary culture, *The Old Man and the Sea*, written when Hemingway was 52 years old and in need of "at least a quart a day." Dardis writes of the work:

Telling people that the novella is a trite, sentimental tale often produces an effect similar to informing children that there is no Santa Claus and that they will get no Christmas presents. It is a self-conscious work brimming over with Christ and crucifixion symbols; it is fatally marred by its whimsical, folksy talk about the Indians of Cleveland and the Great DiMaggio ... What should be hard and taut about *The Old Man and the Sea* is instead soft and self-indulgent ... There was now a kind of boozy sentimentality running through his [Hemingway's] work, visible on many of the pages of *The Old Man and the Sea.*

(191-2)
Dardis places this assessment against Hemingway's "naive" reflections on his drinking: "I have drunk since I was fifteen and few things have given me more pleasure. When you work hard all day with your head and know you must work again the next day what else can change our ideas and make them run on a different plane like whisky? ... I would as soon not eat at night as not have red wine and water" (171). The division Dardis establishes between alcohol and a creatively rich literary culture echoes the views of the "Drys" in debates over Prohibition in the United States leading up to 1918. In 1917, on the first legally bone-dry day in Michigan an editorial comment in the Detroit News predicted that prohibition was "really a part of the inevitable and approaching movement to get for the worker a greater share of the wealth he produces. When the workingman spends his evenings at home or at the library, and has good books and a gramophone and an automobile, society will be better off" (Engelmann 30). In the view of Dardis, The Old Man and the Sea would not be one of the workingman's good books — in fact, it serves as proof that with alcohol the quality of the workingman's literature suffers.

Gilmore focuses on the presence of alcohol in the writing. He introduces his discussion by claiming to be prepared to see in the texts of modern literature what others have passed over: "In many dozens, probably hundreds of works of modern literature, heavy or alcoholic drinking is important in ways or for reasons almost too numerous to mention ... In spite of ... the ubiquitousness of drinking in modern literature, mine is the first booklength study of the subject" (3). Gilmore suggests that literary critics have neglected the presence of alcohol in literature because of the narrowness of their concerns and because literary critics know little about alcoholism. Presumably this means they drink less than writers do. He takes Stephen Spender to task for dismissing in a page the Consul's alcoholism in a long introductory essay for the Picador edition of Under the Volcano. Gilmore's book begins with a long essay on "The Place of hallucinations in Under the Volcano." It is not surprising, given this slant, that Gilmore comes to the conclusion that alcohol and alcoholism share in (and follow from) a modernist literary tradition. He argues, "If two of the leading characteristics of modernism are a radical dissatisfaction with commonplace reality and a consequent attempt to undermine conventional reality by greatly altering traditional states of consciousness, the fundamental challenges to and ruptures of these states offered by heavy drinking may seem desirable from a modernist viewpoint ... one could argue that just as early modernism is marked by a willingness to alter consciousness or perception by the use of opium, so late modernism is marked by a

129 So certain were the Drys that their arguments were self-evident and their victory permanent that sometimes their rhetoric gave itself up to flights of surrealism. In 1921 Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas was moved to assert that "there is as much chance of repealing the 18th amendment as there is for a humming bird to fly to the planet Mars with the Washington Monument tied to its tail" (Engelmann 189).
similar willingness to use alcohol" (170). Far from being a commentary of disappointment or disapproval, Gilmore's discussion celebrates and investigates the rich flavours and nuances of literature featuring the experience of alcoholic intoxication. Alcoholism thus participates in the modernist revolution for a time. This analysis fails to consider what an ambivalent response to modernism is posed by the drinking writer, or by writing about drinking.

Goodwin is concerned to discover the quantity of alcohol in the writer rather than in the writing. For instance, he attempts to diagnose whether Faulkner was, in a medical sense, an alcoholic. He applies the criteria established for a psychiatric diagnosis of alcoholism to Faulkner's biographical record (33).

At this point it is important to consider what is represented by the diagnosis: alcoholic. Though alcoholism is often given the status of a disease, it can be recognised initially only by social indicators, that is by the behaviour of the drinking person. In some respects alcoholism has the same status as a mental illness. In both cases we have the absence of clear physiological symptoms so that as a consequence the presence of a disease can only be recognised by a cluster of behavioural signs. Researchers such as Jeffrey Masson and Dorothy Rowe have proposed that a medical diagnosis of a mental illness such as Moral Insanity, a term coined by James Prichard in 1835, was used as a means of social control, particularly the social control of women (Masson 65-83). Though Masson's analysis is relatively crude, for it does not take into account the beliefs and needs of those women who sought a diagnosis for their condition, elements of social control cannot but operate in situations where psychiatrists and doctors are permitted, or indeed required to pass judgments on the behaviour of patients. Even the move to more medical and less morally informed definitions of alcoholism can be seen to operate within a social history of attitudes to alcohol. In her recent historical overview of drinking in America Maryon McDonald makes the point that the development of coherent disease theories of alcoholism can be viewed as important strategies for maintaining a degree of dignity and defence for those problem drinkers who hold some status in society. "In general," she writes, "the more the working classes (or 'Negroes,' Catholics, Irish immigrants and so on) were seen to drink, the more drink and drinking came to be defined as a problem; but the more the middle classes were themselves felt to have drinking problems, the more these problems became amoralistically defined" (4).

In 1994 the American Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders published definitive criteria for diagnosing alcoholism as a form of "substance abuse" (181). Seven indicators were listed and any person who displays three of them can be labelled alcoholic. They are almost exclusively based on observations and reports of behaviour or attitudes:
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1. tolerance, as defined by either: a need for markedly increased amounts; or a markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount
2. withdrawal, as manifested by either the characteristic withdrawal syndrome for alcohol; or the substance (or a similar one) is taken to avoid withdrawal symptoms
3. alcohol is taken in larger amounts over a longer period than was intended
4. there is a persistent but unsuccessful desire to cut down consumption
5. a great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain supplies of alcohol, drink it and recover from its effects
6. important social, occupational or recreational activities are given up or reduced
7. alcohol consumption is continued despite knowledge of its ill effects (e.g. ulcers from alcohol drinking)

Alcohol is here associated with a number of excessive and transgressive acts such as not turning up for work, not fulfilling obligations in the home, consuming a particular substance exclusively or in an open-ended fashion, acting against good advice, refusing involvement in a suitable variety of social and recreational activities. These are offences against orderly bourgeois life—though they are presented here in a scientific publication in language that attempts to strip the diagnosis of its place in history and of its role as history. Perhaps Freud would already have been two thirds of the way to a diagnosis of alcoholism if his observation of his own behaviour in a letter to Fliess in July 1899 was referred to a psychiatrist: "I cannot manage more than two hours a day [working on Interpretation of Dreams] without calling on Friend Marsala for help. "He" deludes me into thinking that things are not really so bleak as they appear to me when sober" (Letters to Fliess 359).

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is in its fourth revised edition, and these symptoms have been revised as viewpoints have altered. In the previous edition of 1987 for instance, there were nine indicators rather than seven. The fourth of these has been altered significantly in the 1994 version. In 1987 the fourth criterion read:

frequent intoxication or withdrawal symptoms when expected to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home (e.g., does not go to work because hung over, goes to school or work "high," intoxicated while taking care of his or her children), or when substance use is physically hazardous (e.g., drives when intoxicated).

(DSM 3rd ed. 168)

The 1994 criteria have removed some of the suggestions of moral and social irresponsibility as indicators of the presence of a disease. In the placement of tolerance and withdrawal at the head of the 1994 list there has been an attempt to give the disease a firmer physiological basis. This ambivalence over whether the act of drinking alcohol
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(or taking any psychoactive substance) is a social act or a chemical act, has been present in the literature on alcohol abuse throughout the century. In a 1902 manual for medical students the eminent Walter Herbert Barker wrote that dipsomaniacs exhibit ample evidence of innate weakness of will and absence of moral self-control. Interestingly, however, the signs of the disease of alcoholism were distinctly physiological: the presence of delusions and hallucinations, incoherence of speech, paralysis, epilepsy, palsy of certain involuntary muscles, insomnia and a "foul, furred tongue" (154-6).130

To see social and historical power relations at work in the particular behaviours chosen as 'diseased' is not to deny that alcoholism exists, nor that it is a disease. I am pointing out that other symptoms might have been chosen, other boundaries might have been drawn and described in order to separate out the diseased from the healthy in the matter of alcohol consumption (e.g. aggressiveness when drinking, coherency of speech, blood alcohol levels over a period of time, types of drinks consumed, insomnia, hallucinations, changes in sexual interest, incidences of blackouts, other memory losses, lying and fabrication, family history of drinking or alcohol-related diseases, evidence of abnormal physiological processing of alcohol, drinking alone).

Writing, we could propose, is a similarly 'diseased' behaviour, for it can be as open-ended as drinking; it can be an obsessive, isolating activity which diminishes the writer's participation in sports, hobbies, social engagements, or even productive work. Goodwin quotes Boswell's observation of the intimate and insidious rhythm which can be generated between drinking and writing: "Writing upon Drinking is in one respect, I think, like Drinking itself: one goes on imperceptibly, without knowing where to stop" (Goodwin 1). The writer often persists in this activity of writing despite it being economically destructive for the writer and the writer's family. Many writers will attest to withdrawal symptoms when deprived of opportunities to write.131 Writing itself, as we have seen, has been long regarded as a symptom by psychoanalysts—and even before Freud, Mallarme confessed, "I have been afflicted by some highly disturbing symptoms caused by the mere act of writing."132 It is, like drinking, a narcissistic (or self-stimulating) occupation. Paul Fussell highlights this narcissism when he plays with the oddness of the notion that writing is work. In The Boy Scout Handbook, Fussell writes, "No-one is obliged to become an author. Every author is, in a sense, showing

130 In general texts on mental disorders over the following twenty years the presence of hallucinatory delusions was typically a central feature of alcoholism (Ballard 69-70, Barnes 163-4).

131 Recently the relatively social writing act of participating in Internet exchanges has been identified as addictive because of its compulsive, open-ended nature and the evidence of withdrawal symptoms. In a report from London which appeared in the Melbourne Age, Fran Abrams has reported that "a psychologist from the university of Plymouth" is studying addiction to the Internet. One Internet user is quoted as complaining, "I have tried to cut down. I get so angry when people tell me I spend too much time on the Internet. I sometimes feel guilty about my time on it. I sometimes log on the net in the morning to steady my nerves" (Age 26 July 1995. 12).

132 Mallarmé is quoted by the psychoanalyst, Julia Kristeva in her essay, "Joyce 'The Gracehoper' or Orpheus' Return," published in New Maladies of the Soul (172).
off; and in the view of the world he has elected a very easy job: he works at his own pace and on his own schedule, supervised by no boss and under no obligation to be nice to people he doesn't like ... The writer has it soft, and his moans must strike the more active part of the world as funny. The news that few authors earn any real money is not likely to strike the great audience as a very sad thing" (102). To claim to work at writing might be as absurd or as surreal as to claim that one is working at drinking.

Though writing shares diseased features with drinking it has not been included in the Diagnostic Manual as a self-abusive behaviour. Writing has a status denied to drinking, and this status is closely tied to writing's link with notions of creativity. Through the widening influence of psychoanalytic ideas and awareness of Surrealist adventures in literature and painting, creativity by the 1930s had become entwined, as we have seen, with the unconscious, and through the unconscious it had come to signify either the disease psychoanalysis labels neurosis, or that erotic-feminine which Surrealism discovered in the unconscious. Alcohol might offer the writer another, perhaps easier avenue to this creative unconscious, for the expectation of the drinker is that inhibitions will be dissolved, self-expression will be released and sexual potency or at least enhancement of sexual pleasure will be achieved (Doweiko 19-20). In the flow of drinking and the flow of words there is a shared metaphor for the opening of the self to a process, in this case the process of creation—the self is opened to invasion by a muse who transforms that "starveling of life," the non-artist, into a genius. To drink insanely or to drink to insanity becomes a fitting act for the creative self who must risk being close to his own unconscious insanity/surreality.

Standing between the Romantic and the modern notions of what kind of a beast creativity is, Nietzsche declared in Twilight of the Idols: "For art to exist ... a certain physiological predisposition is indispensible: intoxication. Intoxication must first have heightened the excitability of the entire machine: no art results before that happens ... the man in this condition transforms things until they mirror his power—until they are reflections of his perfection" (71-2). For Nietzsche this intoxication, this swelling-up with abundance and energy, is most primitively a sexual intoxication—and through its metahoric life (as with Breton) it is most clearly a male sexuality that is exalted here. Alcohol as an intoxicant offers the male writer a defence of his masculine sexuality even while it opens him to the possibly neurotic and surely feminine flow of creation.

133 In her study of opium and the Romantic imagination Alethea Hayter has noted the similar influence of expectations for the opium user: "Despite the addicts' reports that their senses of touch and hearing are heightened immeasurably, a 1941 American medical report concluded that after morphine injections hearing was dulled and tactile sensitivity sometimes diminished" (44-5). Mandelbaum's famous anthropological statement on alcohol makes the point that a substance's effect varies according to the cultural context in which it is placed: "When a man lifts a cup, it is not only the kind of drink that is in it, the amount he is likely to take, and the circumstances under which he will do the drinking that are specified in advance for him, but also whether they will induce affection or aggression, quiet or unalloyed pleasure. These and many other cultural definitions attach to the drink even before it reaches the lips (McDonald 11).
Drinking to excess provided an aura of sophistication and machismo to the writer of the 1930s.\textsuperscript{134} Dardis reports that drinking in the era of prohibition was what intelligent, individual, free-minded people did—and they did it to get drunk (3-10). This drinking took on such legendary proportions that in the 1950s travel guides to Europe included Hemingway in their indexes. Turning to the pages listed one discovered that in Venice Hemingway drank at Harry's Bar, in Paris at the Ritz Bar, in Madrid at Chicote's Bar (Goodwin 58).

When Dardis asks if "some link exists between alcoholism and creativity" (3), one link he suggests is the importance of alcohol to images of masculinity. Writing, Dardis observes, is a feminine (i.e. sensitive, solitary) activity—and drinking could thus help re-establish manliness in the writers' own eyes and hopefully in the eyes of others. Dardis sees the drinking then as a compensation for loss of male status, not as a delerious avenue to creativity. The threatened loss is that the writer might be seen as more feminine than masculine (despite the fact that overwhelmingly most artists and most writers were men), and such loss would be unbearable. Oblivion becomes preferable to an awareness of the loss. The loss is all the more painful for the writer because it is public. This heavy-handedly psychoanalytic explanation is careful to avoid crediting alcohol with any creative influence, or the writer with any ability to live and work in unresolved ambiguity—and it does not account for those women who were both writers and legendary drinkers. In contrast to the Surrealists' embrace of the psychoanalytic opportunity, Dardis sees the American male writer as one who is ultimately defeated by the ramifications of his creativity. Dardis is at pains to point out that "these writers, and many others who've been alcoholic, tend to bum out—into silence or increasingly feeble work after the age of forty" (3).

Goodwin defends the alcoholic writers of his study against accusations that they might be not quite male. In the case of Fitzgerald, for instance, he observes, "Part of his [Fitzgerald's] attraction to the rich apparently was his conviction that the rich never sweat ... With this squeamishness went a feminine strain which Fitzgerald himself remarked on: "I'm half feminine—at least my mind is." Women told him that he understood women and he conceded that this was true. Most of his memorable characters were women, as was the narrator of his last novel. Fitzgerald was not effeminate, however, and so far as the record shows, was normally sexed" (45-6). Goodwin's desire to protect Fitzgerald from the possibility that he was not normal in his masculinity extends to uncovering Fitzgerald's mother as the most likely culprit when origins are sought: "What was the origin of these traits? To some extent his mother may have been responsible for his vanity and high expectations of himself" (46). In this suggestion, of course, Goodwin has the backing of a body of

\textsuperscript{134} See Engelmann 172, Goodwin 202 ("With prohibition, drinking was the most accessible form of prestige for would-be sophisticates").
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psychoanalytic theory, and centrally the Oedipal drama proposed in psychoanalysis. Once suggested, the mother becomes an easy target for blame.

There is a *mélange* of the threatening, the shameful and the complimentary in these sentences about Fitzgerald. The feminine strain in Fitzgerald is firstly associated with his squeamishness about bodily odours—an odd twist, for his squeamishness could be read more plausibly as a defence against any association with menstrual periodicity or genital odours. Instead it becomes a sign that he *is* somehow too feminine. It is furthermore apparently a weakness to have this feminine strain. Women's comments to Fitzgerald about understanding them was, presumably, meant to be a compliment, and one that many fiction writers would work diligently to deserve. However, Goodwin has Fitzgerald only *conceding* that this is true, as though the writer has given something up by going across to the feminine. Then immediately there is the defence of Fitzgerald's heterosexuality as though associating himself with women's sensibilities could involve him in homosexuality. This confusion or elision between understanding women and loving men is a curious one. The quote from Fitzgerald seems to be defensive on these grounds too. He is willing to concede an androgyny to his mind but not to his body. The implication seems to be that if a man is to be truly heterosexual he must not come too close to understanding women. If he does understand women so completely that he takes on a kind of androgyny he is threatened with becoming a passively feminine homosexual man—far removed from women and presumably any possibility of understanding women. This is a curiously illogical fear—one that did not, at first, trouble the Surrealists as they sought their own androgynous perfection—for it is a fear which arises from ambivalence over the meaning of creativity for men.

This fear of loss in the act of creation is not simply a sign of the writer succumbing to a psychoanalytic discourse, for it might also be read as a sign of these writers' involvement with the modern complexities of the "invisibly visible" author of texts which will eventually replace their lived lives. The discussions of alcohol and writing by Goodwin, Dardis and Gilmore generally abide by the conventions of discourses governed by an author-function. Whether the writer is incapable, inspired or obsessed the author remains present and his biography remains decisive for a reading of his works. But what absence or emptiness might alcohol suggest—as a moment so late in the modernist debate over creativity, that it exists in a gap (or within tensions) between the modern and the post-modern?

For alcohol is most powerfully symbolised, most powerfully present, in the image of the empty bottle. Hemingway was hospitalised in Milan in 1918 after being struck by mortar fragments. Soon after he was discharged the nursing staff were apparently appalled by the number of empty bottles discovered in his clothes closet (Dardis 159). All discussions of alcoholism eventually refer to the unseen, the invisible drinking that must be happening. In Elizabeth Bishop's "The Prodigal," published in 1951, these
hidden bottles appear in a parenthesis: "(he hid the pints behind a two-by-four)" (Complete Poems 71). Hemingway's aphoristic boast, "I like to see every man drunk. A man does not exist until he is drunk" (Dardis 158) can be heard as the cry of an invisible man, or perhaps of Lacan's fragmented self in search of the uncracked mirror. In The Crack-Up Fitzgerald chronicled an alienation once handled so deftly by Borges in the short story, "Borges and I" (Labyrinths 282-3). Fitzgerald wrote of himself, "For a shy man it was nice to be somebody except oneself again: to be 'the Author' as one had been 'the Lieutenant.' Of course one wasn't really an Author any more than one had been an army officer, but nobody seemed to guess behind the false face ... So there was not an 'I' any more—not a basis on which I could organise my self-respect ... It was strange to have no self—to be like a little boy left alone in a big house ... " (88, 79). Fitzgerald's account of this splitting is more confused and more desperate than Borges's for at its end is emptiness, vast as a house around a small child.

In the last pages of the posthumous volume of Fitzgerald's writing, Crack-Up, Glenway Westcott's valedictory essay is included. Immediately after lamenting Fitzgerald's hack-writing towards the end of his life, Westcott records the following gossip: "I was told last year that another talented contemporary of ours had grown so modest in the wage-earning way, fallen so far from his youthful triumph, that he would sign a friend's stories and split the payment. Under the friend's name it would have been hundreds of dollars, and his a thousand or thousands" (325). Whether or not this is veiled gossip about Fitzgerald, the reduction of author to signature can appear either pathetic or logical—just as the empty bottles might seem to be appalling evidence or impressive proof. The author's signature can take on the strange logic of the surreal gesture. Lee Catterall has documented Salvador Dali's exploitation of his signature during the last years of his life in her sensationally titled book, The Great Dali Fraud. "The artist learned that his signature at the bottom of a blank sheet large enough for a print was worth forty dollars. With aides at each elbow, one shoving the paper in front of Dali and the other pulling the signed sheet onto another stack, it was claimed that Dali could sign as many as 1,800 sheets an hour for $72,000. The practice provided a quick way to generate payment for a hotel or restaurant bill" (43-4). When later a disputed

135 The hidden bottle makes a brief, comic appearance in Brett Millier's biography of Bishop: "Also included in this conspiracy of silence was any reference to Elizabeth's alcoholism. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary—visits with friends to Trader J's, the Polk Street bar and artists' hangout; Elizabeth's collapse at a party in Patrick Humble's Mill Valley studio—the pretence was that Elizabeth was a teetotaller. Cass Humble tells the story of a visit she, her husband, and her mother-in-law made to the Pacific Avenue apartment for dinner in late March 1969. Elizabeth served her guests small glasses of wine but poured none for herself. When they seated themselves on the sofa in the living room, a liquor bottle clattered through the couchsprings and rolled out onto the tile floor. The unflappably British Monica Humble kicked the bottle back under the couch, and conversation continued as if nothing at all had happened" (401-2).
print was presented to Dali and Gala he whispered his judgment into her ear and she reported,
"Dali says the picture is good, the signature is good but the work is a fake."
"Why is it a fake?" Delcourt [publisher of the print] asked.
"The answer: Because Dali has not been paid" (361).
Where Dali's act drips with opportunistic satire at the expense of those who profit from art, or at the expense of those who use it to acquire exclusivity, Westcott's anecdote is an epitaph for the survival only of an absence within the name of the artist-writer.

Perhaps, rather than continuing in that earlier tradition of enquiry and synaesthetic frisson initiated by Romantic opium-eaters, alcohol for the mid twentieth century writer signified a step towards the authorial emptiness later recognised in post-modern texts. When the drinking writer becomes an image of himself he has in this a surface which can be called upon as proof of an existence only through style. In 1950 Hemingway was asked to pose as a Man of Distinction for an agency advertising a brand of whisky. He reported, "I told them I wouldn't drink the stuff for $4,000. I told them I was a champagne man" (Goodwin 56). Recognising the game, Hemingway pits style against style—stylishly. This existence as style, as a kind of surface tension, though, must suggest itself as a defence against an engulfing underside. Perhaps in his resistance to an apparently dark, erotic-feminine unconscious, and in his simultaneous compliance with the demand that inhibitions be overthrown, and inevitably caught in the requirement to pay for the next drink, the drinking writer's only way out (or through) is to give his name (his surface, his trademark, his bank of good will) to those who will pay. Pathetic though this scenario seems to be, it might also merely underline the inevitable end of a modernism which both raised its authors to the status of geniuses and left them stumbling against a powerful and ultimately impersonal unconscious self.

Perhaps in the drunken mumble which might (or might not) be Nietzsche's intoxicated inspiration we can hear a promise and a weight of history on the writer's words. With the final cry of Lowry's hallucinatory novel, and the theatrical banality of its dead dog, Beckett's mise en scène is put in place:

Suddenly he screamed, and it was as though this scream were being tossed from one tree to another, as its echoes returned, then, as though the trees themselves were crowding nearer, huddled together, closing over him, pitying . . .
Somebody threw a dead dog after him.
(Under the Volcano 375)

Thirty years later we can hear an echo this scene when Elizabeth Bishop writes of her doomed "Pink Dog":

Oh, never have I seen a dog so bare!
Naked and pink, without a single hair . . .
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Startled, the passersby draw back and stare.

Of course they're mortally afraid of rabies.
You are not mad; you have a case of scabies
but look intelligent. Where are your babies?

(A nursing mother, by those hanging teats.)
In what slum have you hidden them, poor bitch,
while you go begging, living by your wits?

Didn't you know? It's been in all the papers,
to solve this problem, how they deal with beggars?
They take and throw them in the tidal rivers.

Yes, idiots, paralytics, parasites
go bobbing in the ebbing sewage, nights
out in the suburbs, where there are no lights.

If they do this to anyone who begs,
drugged, drunk, or sober, with or without legs,
what would they do to sick, four-legged dogs?

(Complete Poems 190-1)

In her communion with the dog, in her identification with its colour and sex, with its
status as low as the beggar or drunkard, the poet shares with it the danger of being
discarded. Against these elements of threat and degradation, the poem's gaily inventive
Tercet form and the Rio de Janeiro Carnival setting introduced after the above section
add a slightly desperate bravura impression:

Carnival is always wonderful!
A depilated dog would not look well.
Dress up! Dress up and dance at Carnival!

The expressions of fear and pity are as much for the self as for the dog. Elizabeth
Bishop was an alcoholic and a poet—a pink dog (the phrase sounds like the name of a
dangerous cocktail)—intelligent but diseased, sometimes so inebriated she is legless or
four-legged, in danger of being tossed aside, in need of a Carnival fantasia to restore
her or to give her drinking an anonymity.

Given the confusingly but emphatically gendered discourses on creativity in
psychoanalysis and Surrealism, and considering the masculine focus of discussions
around alcohol and writing, how does Bishop find her self (or a self) as a drinking
writer? What place might alcohol take in her writing? Can it take a place which is
subversive or alternative to what we have seen thus far?

Bishop had a strong early interest in Surrealist art. While living in Paris in the 1930s
she met some Surrealist painters and became particularly interested in the work of Max
Ernst (Mullen 65, Goldensohn 118, Millier 151). She experimented with Ernst's
frottage technique to produce Surrealist drawings of her own (Goldensohn 122, Mullen
63-80) and she acknowledged that her poem, "The Monument," was constructed in
response to Ernst's collage-frottage technique. By 1946, however, she wanted to
distance herself from these influences, particularly in public discussions of her work (Goldensohn 123).

One of her early poems, "Chemin de Fer," (published in *North & South* in 1946; also Complete Poems 8) places her as a poet distanced from but still working in reaction to Breton's call for Surrealists to shoot randomly in the street:

Alone on the railroad track  
I walked with pounding heart.  
The ties were too close together  
or maybe too far apart.

The scenery was impoverished:  
scrub-pine and oak; beyond  
its mingled gray-green foliage  
I saw the little pond

where the dirty hermit lives,  
lie like an old tear  
holding onto its injuries  
lucidly year after year.

The hermit shot off his shot-gun  
and the tree by his cabin shook.  
Over the pond went a ripple.  
The pet hen went chook-chook.

"Love should be put into action!"  
screamed the old hermit.  
Across the pond an echo  
tried and tried to confirm it.

Her ambivalence over possible connections between love, violence, politics and madness are encapsulated in this scene—The scene cannot but attract her as a poet, and yet when it comes close it is too close: she reiterates smallnesses and hence her distance from this place of the little pond, the lone tear, the cabin and the pet hen. The French title of the poem distances it again from a merely or brutally realistic scene—and suggests its Surealist inspiration. In the final lines we can read her refusal or inability to take up the convulsive manifestoes of Surrealism.136

In the 1960s her main reservation about Surrealism was expressed in terms of its lack of tact: "Is surrealism just a new method of dealing boldly with what is embarrassing?" she wrote in her notebook (Goldensohn 124). Rather than the bold-facedly surreal, Bishop preferred to notice and include in her writing what she called in a letter to Anne Sexton, "the always-more-successful surrealism of everyday life ... I can't believe we are wholly irrational" (Mullen 64). Her pink dog is a bizarre,

136 The poem's stance is typically tense and complex, for the poet in her aloneness at the beginning of the poem is also somewhat identified with the hermit who emerges from his cabin. His exclamation might well be Bishop's. The poem takes on further dimensions when Bishop's private lesbian sexuality is considered as a possible context of the call to put love into action. For other discussions of this poem see Parker (54-6) and McCabe (63-7).
embarrassingly nude and degraded creature, but it is nevertheless a creature noticed, presumably, in her everyday life. The poem is not so much a display of surreality as an exploration of why this odd but everyday sight has so affected her, so enlivened her sympathies and imagination. The strictly rational villanelle-like form works strangely to distance the poem from its embarrassing images of drunks, beggars, and a sick, dancing dog-mother—but it also works to make the tone of the poem possible: a tone aware of the Carnival as both degenerate mask and absolute (practical) necessity.

In the passing reference to the drugged and drunk, we are presented with drunkenness as embarrassment. The drunk is one who is stripped bare and made ridiculous like the depilated dog. The "sensible solution" is to wear a fantasia—a Carnival costume. The heightened desperation indicated by the quickening of exclamation marks towards the end, brings the dog and the poet together in a conspiracy for survival. In this conspiracy the naked pink dog must be hidden in a costume while their shared desire for a Carnival of excess must be satisfied. The poem is about embarrassment. The sparks of surrealism ("dog in mascara this time of year") arise from the poem's troubled awareness of its plight as detailer and dramatiser of truth, and as Carnival costumier. Far from being a compensatory image-builder, or an avenue to the creative self, alcohol here takes a more complex and socially involved role as the only partly hidden source of the poem's knowledge of embarrassment and degradation.

Bishop wrote that she was touched by the spirit of her times, and alcohol during the Prohibition era did attach itself to a romance of sophistication. She recalled, for instance, her spirited campaign against the college establishment at Vassar in the winter of 1932:

"It was during Prohibition and we used to go downtown to a speakeasy and drink wine out of teacups. That was our big vice. Ghastly stuff! Most of us had submitted things to the Vassar Review and they'd been turned down. It was very old-fashioned then. We were all rather put out because we thought we were good. So we thought, well, we'll start our own magazine."

(Millier 49)

By the late 1940s, however, drink and drunkenness were for her less associated with youthful sophistication or intellectual rebellion and more closely tied to questions of embarrassment, absence, exile and guilt.

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137 Bishop's sense of the self as wildly performative resonates with Bakhtin's notion of the Carnival in literature and with Kristeva's later use of psychoanalysis to suggest that women can often operate at the uncertain boundaries between conscious and unconscious, between the semiotic and the symbolic, between the pre-oedipal genderless self and the patriarchal public self.

138 See also Kalstone: "Elizabeth began to talk about her own drinking in college, indeed, at the "age of twenty or twenty-one," when she and her friends drank wine in speakeasies just before the repeal of Prohibition and brought each other bottles of bourbon and scotch as house presents in the summer" (149).
The pink dog which is a nursing bitch discarding its brood recalls another pink mother-animal, the "sow that always ate her young" in Bishop's "The Prodigal." This poem is also contructed around a brief image of drunkenness.

The brown enormous odor he lived by
was too close, with its breathing and thick hair,
for him to judge. The floor was rotten; the sty
was plastered halfway up with glass-smooth dung.
Light-lashed, self-righteous, above moving snouts,
the pigs' eyes followed him, a cheerful stare—
even to the sow that always ate her young—
till, sickening, he leaned to scratch her head.
But sometimes mornings after drinking bouts
(hide the pints behind a two-by-four),
the sunrise glazed the barnyard mud with red;
the burning puddles seemed to reassure.
And then he thought he almost might endure
his exile yet another year or more.

But evenings the first star came to warn.
The farmer whom he worked for came at dark
to shut the cows and horses in the barn
beneath their overhanging clouds of hay,
with pitchforks, faint forked lightnings, catching light,
safe and companionable as in the Ark.
The pigs stuck out their little feet and snored.
The lantern—like the sun, going away—
laid on the mud a pacing aureole.
Carrying a bucket along a slimy board,
he felt the bats' uncertain staggering flight,
his shuddering insights, beyond his control,
touching him. But it took him a long time
finally to make his mind up to go home.

This poem, like "Pink Dog," is one of photographically intense observations. But true to Breton's vision of Surrealist painting as an inner extension of mere photographic exactitude, Bishop's visible details direct us to the "invisibly visible" knowledge which is given-away in an accumulation of fractured detail. There are the synaesthetic dislocations of "the brown, enormous odor ... with its breathing and thick hair," the "burning puddles," hay clouds and the prodigal's staggering bat-flight on slimy boards—giving the poem a hallucinatory and childlike vividness. There is the embarassment of hidden bottles and the hiddenness of the prodigal's insights touched only in darkness. The primitive impulses of childhood are suggested by the sty wall of plastered dung, and like the sewage in "Pink Dog" this brings us close again to a degradation which is felt as embarrassment. The poem moves strangely against its suggestions of excess and hopelessness with its controlled and elegant double-sonnet form and the intricate web of rhymes only broken at the last couplet. As in "Pink Dog" colour and tension are heightened by these dislocations. We hear, disconcertingly, the tone of the poem. Though we read that he hid the bottles, we hear the identification of
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the poem with its prodigal. In an early draft the title was "The Prodigal Son" (Kalstone 124). The final more brief but more inclusive title makes it possible to hear the poem as a strategy in handling embarrassment.

Drunkenness in "The Prodigal" is associated with loss, absence in exile, and guilt. If his exile is to end he must give up the staggering and the shuddering beyond his control—the drinking bouts. Drunkenness, like exile, is a loss of time—a homeless absence which is an existence out of time. Bishop wrote in her journal:139

I think when one is extremely unhappy—almost hysterically unhappy, that is—one's time sense breaks down. All that long stretch in Key West, for example, several years ago—it wasn't just a matter of not being able to accept the present, that present, although it began that way, possibly. But the past and the present seemed confused, or contradicting each other violently and constantly, and the past wouldn't "lie doon." (I've felt the same thing when I tried to paint—but this was really taught me by getting drunk, when the same thing happens, for perhaps the same reasons, for a few hours.)

(Kalstone 162-3)

In 1948 she sent a note of apology to Carley Dawson after drinking, alone, in Dawson's apartment until she was hospitalised for five days: "I didn't even have so very much to drink (fortunately there wasn't much there). I'm so overcome with remorse even before I get drunk" (Kalstone 147). Here again is the sense of being out of joint with time, of drunkenness as an act in exile, and of the remorse of the prodigal.

And the poem, of course, is an exquisitely timed and co-ordinated artefact. It does not stagger. What Bishop most admired in Gerard Manley Hopkins's work was its timing (Vassar Review 5-7). For her, poetry was the "timing and repeating of the movement of the mind according to ordered systems" (Schwartz 273). Drink then becomes the silence of not-writing, of not ordering time in a poem. Drink is the pain which is simply pain. Bishop wrote to Lowell in 1948: "I think it [suffering in solitude] is so inevitable & unavoidable there's no use talking about it, & that in itself it has no value, anyway—as I think Jarrell says at the end of "90 North," or somewhere. [Pain comes from the darkness / And we call it wisdom. It is pain.]" (Kalstone 123).

Drink becomes not only a sign of the death of writing but the death of the name of the author: after a drinking bout at Yaddo in 1949 Bishop confessed to her doctor, Anny Baumann: "I cannot drink and I know it ... I shake so I can't sign my name" (Millier 228). To drink can be to lose even the promise and opportunity left in the name of the author.

139 See also Millier: "In her most cogent and persuasive statements about her use of alcohol, she said she drank to lose that dizzying sense of time rushing past. But the stepping out of time that being very drunk seemed to allow was itself frightening. When in 1960 Robert Lowell sent her a draft of his poem, "The Drinker," which begins, "The man is killing time—there's nothing else," she responded with empathy, identifying first with the man's need to escape time. "The sense of time is terrifying—have hours gone by, or one awful moment?—How long have the cars been parked?" She commended the "release" of the poem's ending, "a sense ... that only the poem, or another fifth of Bourbon, could produce" (151).
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Tensions over drunkenness in these poems are not aspects of a style which makes use of the sophisticated or street-wise aura of a "drinking writer." "The Prodigal" and "The Pink Dog" stand as resistances against the unco-ordination and the silence of alcohol even while they are revelations of these consequences. Perhaps Bishop's place as a woman-drinking-writer made it important to hide the drinking (just as so many women writers and artists have hidden their gender behind masculine-sounding names—embarrassment might be a talismanic experience for the artistically creative woman) and then to reveal the drinking only as glimpses of degradation. I am suggesting that in Bishop's poems alcohol's relation to writing is made complicated and uneasy through associations and manoeuvres that are unlikely, perhaps impossible for the male drinking writer.

There is still of course the connection between alcohol and sexuality in Bishop's poems, a connection many men have pursued. The dog "naked and pink," and the prodigal staggering, shuddering and touching invite sexual associations along with the hiddenness and the embarrassment in these poems. Sexuality however is re-invented in Bishop's poems (against the more postured sexuality of male writers) as vulnerable, contradictory ("The ties were too close together / or maybe too far apart.")—even as repulsive though it remains undeniable. Bishop's emphasis on vulnerability, silence, exile and complexity are distinctive and alternative arguments in understanding creativity's encounter with alcohol.
Figure 7 Paul Delvaux *The Call of the Night*, 1938
Figure 8 Paul Delvaux *The Sleeping Venus*, 1944
Figure 9 Max Ernst *The Robing of the Bride*, 1940
Figure 10 William Freddie *My Two Sisters*, 1938
Figure 11 Dali, de Chirico, Tchelitchew: three photo-paintings commissioned by *Vogue*, 1937.

Note the way the gesture of the man with a child echoes the shape of the forked stick in the background. This is an example of Dali's paranoiac-critical method.
Figure 12 Max Ernst *The woman with an hundred heads opens her august sleeve*, 1929
Figure 13 Salvador Dali *Drawing for 'Nuits partagés' by Paul Eluard*, 1935. This includes another example of the paranoiac-critical method: the distant belfry echoes the archway with the skipping girl in the foreground.
6. Creative Writing and Institutions of Education

Recently in Australia (and for some time in America and Britain) discourses of creativity have become involved in tertiary education institutions through creative writing courses. Issues of submission and control are inevitably highlighted when creativity claims a certain freedom within the necessarily confining practices of universities. In this section I argue for the importance of a continuing instability in the history of creativity—by involving creative writers, including Creative Writing students, in theoretical debates over creativity, and by integrating the study of literature and culture with the practice of Creative Writing in educational settings.

Strange practices: anxiety, power and assessment in teaching creative writing

There wasn't much pleasure in it. In this my memories of school are probably typical. And in any case, schools are not there to provide us with pleasure—are they? Nevertheless, in the course of those long, dutiful mornings and even longer drowsy afternoons at school I was introduced to two pleasures: the pleasure of listening to a teacher read a story aloud and a second, related pleasure of being asked to write a "creative composition."

When a teacher opened a book and read to us I was transported into even the silliest of them (Sir Percy Fitzpatrick's *Jock of the Bushveld* I loved). I would have gone to school happily every day if they had read to us all the time. The second pleasure was, in a sense, the reverse of this, for when I sat down to write a creative composition the teacher became my audience. To sit in front of a blank page and not know what I would write down—and then look back on it two or three hours later, not knowing where my story had come from—was an exciting and probably addictive process for me. Added to this was the curious guessing game going on with the reader who was to be won over by the writing not just as reader but as a teacher who assigns a mark to the work. I was never sure how the grades were arrived at, and I didn't want to know. I suspected that the teacher would not be able to say clearly anyway. Part of the excitement and the fun of each creative writing project was to make it excellent according to the way its particular existence emerged.

Looking back, I suppose these writing exercises worked as long as I was able to please my reader-teacher and so receive grades that flattered me. For the child who didn't achieve this reward the process might have been yet another of those distressing
tests that education imposes on us. Perhaps one lesson here is that education works best when we are asked to do what we would choose to do anyway.

Pleasure requires a loosening or sharing of power. I was lucky to have those few hours each week, but such pleasures were not, we knew, the core of our educational experience. They were moments of relief from the more important ongoing drudgery of school.

Now these pleasures—and confusions—are taking hold in Australian university English departments and higher education institutions where creative arts or professional writing are being taught. Creative Writing subjects are presently offered at the University of Technology Sydney, Curtin University, Edith Cowan University, University of Western Australia, Wollongong University, Frankston, Holmesglen, Casey, Box Hill, Loddon Campaspe, Wangaratta, Warrnambool and East Gippsland TAFE Colleges, Deakin University, Monash University and Australian Catholic University, University of Queensland and at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology.140 Melbourne University's English Department, situated in one of the oldest, largest and most traditional of the Australian universities, now offers Creative Writing subjects up to third year undergraduate level and has allowed creative work to form part of a Master's thesis in a handful of cases. As well as this the English Department offers a Graduate Diploma of Arts (Creative Writing). With the grip of the critical essay on literature courses weakened by the presence of folios of creative writing a number of issues have arisen which require a re-thinking of the purposes of an education in the arts and a reconsideration of the meaning of research in the humanities.

In this time of economic dryness which requires financially pragmatic rationales for higher education, courses in literature might be expected to fade towards the personal-development or esoteric end of the educational spectrum. Literature cannot be expected to compete with courses in computer programming, computer technology, genetics or business management. Surprisingly, however, at Melbourne University the English Department is turning away nearly 50% of undergraduate students who want to enrol in their modest offering of second and third year Creative Writing subjects.141 The

140 See Appendix B for a list of Creative Writing courses provided at Victorian tertiary institutions.
141 This apparent demand for creative writing subjects can be seen in a wider context of declining demand for humanities and social science courses. In the decade to 1994, total higher education enrolments at Australian universities rose by 55.5% while arts, social sciences and humanities only increased their intake by 44%. In contrast the intake for Law courses was increased by 77% over the same period. Fewer secondary students are pursuing humanities subjects, and fewer of those who do study humanities are enrolled in traditional subjects areas such as history, geography or English. They are more likely to have studied composite subjects such as communication studies, Australian studies, psychology or cultural studies at secondary school. English at university might not correspond with any subject they have studied at school. In an atmosphere where funding relies partly on enrolments, and where departmental or faculty offerings must compete in attractiveness with other (often more vocationally focused) disciplines, there is pressure on English Department to consider developing those aspects of their courses which students wish to pursue. These departments are at the same time
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English Department is unexpectedly inundated with students wanting to do these subjects and finds itself thrown into a series of intense debates. Some of the issues can be listed as follows:

* What is the purpose of students' creative writing, and how does this relate to the practices of an English Department?
* How can creative writing be assessed?
* How are such courses best taught? What might be their content?
* Who should teach creative writing?
* What is the relation of writing to reading? Of the 'creative' to the 'critical'? Of art to theory? Of writing to writing-about-writing? Of creative writing to the production of literature?
* Is this a radically new direction for English in universities, or is it a "last bastion of defence for traditional humanism against postmodern critical theory" (Zavarzadeh and Morton 17)?
* Can creative work be legitimately recognised and assessed as research?

To take up first one of the broadest issues here, we can note that there is some uncertainty about what Creative Writing means for the direction English departments are taking. Those who object to Creative Writing as too radical or too alien for an English course at university make statements such as, "You can't train creativity," or "Do we invite the sheep to wool-growers' conferences?" Both these comments were made by academics at a seminar promoted under the title "The Future of Creative Writing," held at Melbourne University in the English Department on 3 June 1992. The wool-grower question echoes the story of Nabokov's experience in 1956 when he was proposed for a university chair in English. The proposal was defeated in a debate where the possibly apocryphal question was put: "Gentlemen, even if one allows that he is an important writer, are we next to invite an elephant to be Professor of Zoology?" (Field 11).

On the other hand there are those who regard Creative Writing as a tactical manoeuvre by traditional (humanist) forces. These critics point out, for instance, that Creative Writing courses privilege what they regard as outdated notions of the author by their heavy emphasis on aesthetic experience, on style (as the signature of the subject) and on such notions as 'genius'/?'inspiration'/?'author'/?'authority'. The prevalent anti-intellectualism and conservatism of these courses give them a retrograde role in most humanities programs. Emphasis on 'realism' in these programs, for example, is a means of reifying the status quo, since, as we have already indicated, realism is a mode of encoding the cultural reality that is located inside the familiar frames of intelligibility and that is thus respectful of the limits of understanding set by the dominant ideology. Inside these limits, realism represents such cultural practices as racism, sexism, and heterosexism as the 'way

inevitably drawn into debate over whether their offerings should be determined by demand. Geoff Maslen has reported these statistics in Campus Review.
things are,' and by such a representational move it legitimizes the prevailing economic order. (Zavarzadeh and Morton 17)

This is, of course, a caricature of what happens in Creative Writing courses and in the workshops that constitute these courses. Nevertheless, this picture presents creative writing as an ally, and extension, of the traditional models for teaching literature which have dominated schools and universities for most of this century. Elsewhere Zavarzadeh and Morton have complained that realism (as promoted through the creative writing workshop), "the most oppressive of contemporary textual orthodoxies," has marginalised critical theory in English departments ("The Cultural Politics of the Fiction Workshop" 170). They refer to an unpublished essay by William Spanos which recounts how at the State University of New York a proposal for teaching critical theory to undergraduate students was defeated by an alliance of creative writers and traditionalists ("Cultural Politics" 169).

Though the contemporary American situation might be as Spanos, Zavarzadeh and Morton and others have described, a model of literature as set texts or Great Works which entrenches a white male bourgeois-capitalist version of reality and which stifles possible debate could in fact be challenged rather than buttressed by a practice which opens discussion between students and teachers, especially in workshops where a teacher's automatic authority is diffused. Why could not workshops become opportunities to demonstrate the limitations of such fixed notions as the centrality of fictional realism to truth or to beauty? This is not to say that workshops should be transformed into centres of Marxist or post-structuralist orthodoxies, but that their practice could be informed—made unstable—by critical theory. One of the complaints made most commonly about the creative writing programs in American universities, as we will see, is against what is perceived to be their complacency.142

The broad point made by Zavarzadeh and Morton, however, does seem to be valid when some teachers of creative writing discuss their methods and rationales. As a British teacher of creative writing, Nick Rogers has contributed a chapter to a recent international collection of discussion papers, Teaching Creative Writing, in which he

142 Offering a useful counter-canon of core writers, Zavarzadeh and Morton suggest their preferred program for creative writing students and do not in the process hesitate critically over their own slogans: "The creative writing student who knows theory and who has read Marx, Lacan, Foucault, Lenin, Kristeva, Derrida, Gramsci, Heidegger, Cixous, Deleuze, Althusser, Luxembourg, Adorno will not approach the workshop with the same naïveté or accept its orthodoxies as will the student who has read the traditional syllabus of the literature department, which is entirely composed of poems, novels, and stories ... Such a student will realize that realism is an ideological project and that the dominant fiction workshop is an ally of the ruling class and a supporter of the status quo ("Cultural Politics of the Fiction Workshop" 169-70). There is a complacency in the way their prose returns to such slogans (the dominant order of the symbolic ... the dominant social class and its texts ... the regime of realistic signification ... ). There is no impulse towards critically examining for example the notion of power which is being purveyed by these slogans: they ignore the argument of Foucault, for instance, that power does not operate in a simple downward stream of dominance over 'lower' classes. While their argument for theoretical sophistication among creative writing students seems to me to be sound, their rhetoric seems to aim for the replacement of one orthodoxy by another.
explains some of his workshop exercises. Rogers divides these exercises into those which aim to develop technical competence and those which aim to develop what he calls "material" for writing. Examples of the latter are: pick a partner and tell a story of a significant experience from your past, or write fast and continuously for five minutes. Though it is presented as a practical strategy, this division between technical and inspirational exercises appears to bring the creative writing workshop into line with a traditional humanist model for literature—the Romantic notion of the author as an origin for what is creative or great in the text. The implication is that personal inspiration can be recognised and developed through these exercises. The second implication in this division of tasks is that the "technical" aspects of writing are merely technical and thus do not require analysis in terms of their historical, cultural and political assumptions.

This need not be the case, however, because after the event, that is after the production of these open-ended inspirational texts, or those "technical" texts devoted to the "craft" of writing, their relations to genre conventions, sexual politics, racial and class codes, historical assumptions, mythic patterns, narrative principles and codes of character construction can be exposed for examination and discussion. Perhaps the falsity of an essentially pre-linguistic inspiration can be demonstrated in the context of the workshop in a manner more direct and powerful than in any critical commentary.

John W. Aldridge, professor of English at the University of Michigan, considers that creative writing courses are the cause of another but still related kind of decline in contemporary literature. He is not concerned over supposed allegiances in these courses to outmoded humanist models for the production of literature but rather he sees the graduates of creative writing programs as bland clones usually based upon the feeble contemporary models of Raymond Carver or Ann Beattie. In 1992 he published *Talents and Technicians*, a book which singled out a number of recently successful young American writers such as Brett Easton Ellis and Jay McInerney. These newer writers, Aldridge says, "belong to the first literary generation in American history—or, for that matter, in any history—ever to be created almost exclusively through formal academic instruction in creative writing" (15). They belong to what he calls "a professional aristocracy or guild made up of young writers like themselves and their instructors" (20). Graduates from these programs are published, promoted, and even celebrated on university reading circuits, on the strength of very little undistinguished work. They are encouraged by democratic processes and peer pressures in the workshop process to avoid taking risks with their writing and to avoid developing a critique of the wider contemporary society. Uniformity is made to seem a virtue. Most creative writing students, Aldridge claims, "appear to be nice, well-adjusted, rather conventional, not particularly literary young people who might be equally competent as students of law or dentistry and, therefore, should by all means be students of law or dentistry" (28). His
concern over an apparently uncritical uniformity fostered through creative writing workshops links his protest to that of Zavarzadeh and Morton.

The hint of snobbery in Aldridge’s above suggestion that lawyers and dentists cannot also be real writers is confirmed for us when he offers his version of the way things once were and should still be: Writers in the 1950s and before, he suggests, were (appropriately) isolated and psychically turbulent. "The process by which a young person traditionally awoke to the discovery that he had somehow become a writer was until now almost always a mysterious, painful and lonely one ... over the last hundred years in America writers have in the main been highly individualistic ... and adversarial in their attitudes towards the established culture. As a rule they have been self-taught and self-motivated, working alone or in only brief proximity to one another and finding little imaginative sustenance in American life." (16). He praises the "subversive clarity" of these writers' vision. The writers he lists as admirably individualistic are Mailer, Heller, Vonnegut, Gaddis and Styron—apparently unaware of the social, cultural, racial and sexual homogeneity of his assembled subversive individuals. In his appeal to this pantheon of recent male modernist writers Aldridge becomes in turn one of those retrograde anti-intellectuals Zavarzadeh and Morton rail against. It would seem that the creative writing workshop can offend both the committed modernist sensibility as well as a postmodern stance.

Protests similar to Aldridge's have been made about the state of poetry-writing in America. Poets and commentators such as Dana Gioia, Donald Hall, Vernon Shetley, Henry Taylor, Charles Altieri and Joseph Epstein have debated the decline of poetry in America over the past decade. In 1991 the poet andtranslator Dana Gioia published a long article in The Atlantic Monthly announcing that poetry had become the occupation of a relatively small and isolated subculture. "Decades of public and private funding [for university Creative Writing programs] have created a large professional class for the production and reception of new poetry, comprising legions of teachers, graduate students, editors, publishers, and administrators. Based mostly in universities, these groups have gradually become the primary audience for contemporary verse. Consequently, the energy of American poetry, which was once directed outward, is now increasingly focused inward. Reputations are made and rewards distributed within the poetry subculture" (95).

Similarly, in 1984 Charles Altieri blamed the influence of "the poetry workshop" for an emphasis on craft, an avoidance of ideas and a highly inbred professionalism among poets (Self and Sensibility 205). As long ago as the early 1970s Diane Wakoski identified "the workshop poem" as the one with no obvious flaws, a simple formula of construction and metaphor, and with nothing finally to excite or arrest the reader. She complained that whole books of these poems are being published from poets who have
been encouraged by workshop teachers (Toward A New Poetry 62-3). Thus, according to Gioia and others, the migration of American literary culture to university creative writing programs has contributed to poetry's enfeeblement and its disappearance from public view.144

Others have attacked Creative Writing as evidence not only of a lowering of traditional standards in literature but of wider ills in society. John Rae, Headmaster of

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143 Hinting at an interesting argument against a too-supportive approach to teaching creative writing, Wakoski observes: "... these books are the sad desperate outcome (and problem) of all of us who teach writing workshops in colleges where it is unfair, bad teaching, poor sportsmanship, and foolish of us to condemn these learning poems. In fact the misery of seeing the horrible chaos that actually precedes the creation of really first-rate work is so unnerving that most teachers of workshops would rather see the neat imitative poems" (Towards a New Poetry 62-3).

144 Gioia's account of poetry's demise takes up and repeats arguments from Joseph Epstein's incendiary 1988 essay, "Who Killed Poetry?" Epstein blamed the "poetry professionals" cloistered in universities for the state of poetry. Gioia reports that more than thirty writers have responded in print to Epstein's critique. See Donald Hall's "Death to the Death of Poetry" in his book by the same name for a particularly lively response to Epstein (18-26). Vernon Shetley (After the Death of Poetry) offers an overview of the debate that followed Epstein's essay. Gioia's essay is reprinted in his book, Can Poetry Matter? (1-26).
Westminster School and a columnist in the *Times Educational Supplement* expressed the view that "the overthrow of grammar coincided with the acceptance of the equivalent of creative writing in social behaviour. As nice points of grammar were mockingly dismissed as pedantic and irrelevant, so was punctiliousness in such matters as honesty, responsibility, property, gratitude, apology and so on."

This brief survey of varied and contradictory protests is indicative of the presence of an unsettling and strange practice in educational institutions. Even in the United States where undergraduate creative writing courses have been present for nearly fifty years there is continuing unease over the meanings and consequences of these programs.

One of the issues among those listed above—the question of how creative work might be accepted as research in a university setting—has become a source of recent debate in Australia. By following some of the discussions over this issue we can begin to appreciate tensions over the contemporary place creative writing occupies in institutions of higher learning—and the opportunities or threats it represents.

Among those in Australia who argue for the presence of creative arts in the academy there is recognition that this relatively new practice requires a rethinking of categories, in particular the notion of research. Julie Bailey who is professor of film and media at Griffith University in Queensland recently made the point that research for a practising artist "often involves newspapers not books, telephones not archives" (Bailey 10). It can mean collaboration with other artists or with technicians; and it can mean experimenting with both form and technique without predictable methodological rules. Professor Bailey's attempt at redefining research is a direct challenge to that academic understanding of research which dominates funding and approval decisions for higher degree work at Australian universities. Recognition of the link between concepts of research and institutional avenues to funding has given some urgency to such discussions. Creative work, for instance, does not have access to funding from the Australian Research Council, the main avenue through which competitive research funds are distributed to the university system.

In 1993 the Queensland Art Gallery hosted a seminar series on the relation between the visual arts and academic research. In the opening seminar of this series David Throsby outlined what he saw as the accepted paradigm of academic research: "It proceeds according to the generally agreed principles of scientific method—the formulation of theories, the drawing out of hypotheses, the testing of these hypotheses against observations of the real world, and the reformulation of theories that are found to be false" (34). In response to this model it can be argued that artists (including creative writers) are developing and testing hypotheses each time they produce a creative work. But this testing does not often follow the paths of logical or empirical
reasoning laid down for research by a restrictive model of scientific method. The artist's testing can be (in fact sometimes must be) an irrational, anarchic, associational, emotional, unpredictable and even unconscious process. Furthermore, such work cannot be subjected to the criterion of repeatability so important to the strictly scientific understanding of research and its findings.

It seems then that while creative work satisfies some of the criteria for being understood as research, it cannot but undermine other narrower, more science-based understandings of research. It poses a threat to the accepted definitional boundaries of research, and to the universities as institutions promoting intellectual rigour ... or does it? How real is this threat? Whose purposes does it serve to frame understandings of academic research in such a way that artistic practice falls outside its boundaries?

Though creative projects might be excluded from some curricula or from postgraduate funding on the grounds that they do not amount to research or do not indicate a rigorous enough intellectual practice, such exclusion seems to be based upon convenient myths about what constitutes research. How often does research follow the path David Throsby has outlined as academic? In the humanities and even in some of the pure sciences it seems this is not the case. Stephen Knight, Professor of English at Melbourne University, has described the typically "circuitous" path of creative and critical research across all disciplines in an essay protesting against recently centralised Commonwealth Government research funding policies which privilege those projects whose outcomes are identifiable and preferably marketable:

The new funding system has no apparent concept of how real research works, how good researchers are led from curiosity into interest, then into involvement, then into introspection about the whole matter, and only then into formulating the method of inquiry and perhaps even the true topic of inquiry. That pattern holds across all research, even into physics, medicine and other allegedly hard-edged, reified research areas. The best sorts of arts research are not merely formalist, do not merely pretend to discover facts, but analyse the social meaning of cultural phenomena, as Plato did, and as all major thinkers have done since. Those sorts of research will be made very hard indeed. (Meanjin 1989 461)

Knight's description of the best sorts of arts research is not simply a description, for it takes place in the context of a debate over the politics and practice of research funding decisions. The arts researchers Knight wishes to endorse are associated in this passage with great thinkers like Plato and they are assigned the roles of being creative and critical. Those researchers currently holding the inside running on acquiring grants, the ones who "discover facts," are seen to "pretend" much of the time. Knight's outrage and his question-begging (Why is it necessarily or self-evidently creative to begin a project without a formal plan?) are instructive in terms of the hierarchies and dichotomies established and accepted here. The creative and the critical are linked while the creative and the factual are opposed. Creativity is linked with freedom and with organic research processes. Knight suggests that not only creativity but Great Thinking
will be destroyed by a dominance of accountability procedures, formal planning requirements and commercial considerations. Creativity, it seems, has been enlisted in a debate over research methodology and funding priorities.\textsuperscript{145} Knight is not intending to promote the practice of art (including Creative Writing) as a legitimate research activity here, but his description of an alternative model for research can more easily include the practice of art than can David Throsby's summary of the academic model. Knight's description of the typical path of much research is supported by Ian Hunter in the same issue of \textit{Meanjin} and by Simon During in \textit{Arena} in 1990.\textsuperscript{146}

In his article, "Humanities and Research Funding," During objects to the recently centralised control of funds under the government organisation known as the Australian Research Council (ARC). The ARC, he claims, harnesses funds to "national productivity and cultural identity under the vague sign of 'excellence'" (29). The ARC tends to support proposals which comply with a traditional research paradigm. During points out that the word 'research' has always played a divisive role within humanities disciplines. There have always been those scholars whose work is based on the recovery and circulation of information while there have also been those whose work "does not [adhere to the traditional paradigm], being interpretative, critical, theoretical—the product of 'thinking' and writing rather than of information retrieval and transmission" (31). During argues that by supporting only those projects which are narrowly scholarly the ARC acts to stifle creative tensions and splits within humanities which are crucial to its current vigour and attractiveness. He notes that, "in my department [Melbourne University English and Cultural Studies] three out of the seven projects currently funded are on medieval topics (two involve editions of old manuscripts) and this in a department in which, the students being free to choose the courses they want, it is almost impossible to get the numbers up for any medieval course that does not have a modern or theoretical aspect" (31). During's argument from popularity could be extended as an argument for the importance of supporting the development of creative writing courses and opportunities in such a department.

I want to take up for a moment During's suggestion that fragmenting within humanities, typified by its contest over research paradigms, constitutes a vital defining practice. The inclusion of creative writing as another (an 'other') practice within the humanities discipline called English might create opportunities for further splitting,

\textsuperscript{145} This debate continued in the following issue of \textit{Meanjin} (1989: 777-784) between Knight and Don Aitkin, Chair of the Australian Research Council. In his reply to Aitkin, Knight put aside the appeal to certain research as creative in favour of a defence of humanities research as a source of social critique (783).

\textsuperscript{146} This debate over acceptable models for research practice in academic institutions is an instance of a wider philosophical debate over the notion of 'reason' or rational inquiry. Must legitimate scientific-academic research exclude all reference to emotional, personal and even psychological processes? The philosopher Mary Midgley has noted that "it is the admission, not the ingoring, of the part played by feeling in thought that still alarms the academic mind" (quoted in Webster 495).
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further debate and further tensions which might further ensure the vigour and attractiveness of the discipline. The discipline of English might then be defined by three contradictory/alternative/interrelated/nested practices: an information-based practice of scholarly research; a practice based upon interpretative, critical and theoretical thinking; and finally the production of creative texts in response to literary history and contemporary textual practices.

Opportunities for this increased tension and vigour are largely deflected when separate Expressive Arts or Creative Arts courses (and even departments) are established away from a critical-theoretical or scholarly practice of English. In his discussion of the contemporary state of poetry in America, for instance, Vernon Shetley has remarked on the development of university creative writing departments separate from literature departments: "In the past twenty years creative writing programs, granting MFA (Master of Fine Arts) degrees, have multiplied to the point where they can offer a counterweight to literature departments and offer their own standards, strategies, and paradigms of reading" (17). The creative-writing counterweight Shetley goes on to identify seems to be the sort of entrenched realism Zavarzadeh and Morton bemoaned. Shetley suggests that approaches fostered by academic literature departments are sceptical, highly politicised, theoretically sophisticated and "postmodern," while creative writing programs put aside larger questions in favour of a focus on the "craft" of writing and the expression of personal feeling. He quotes Altieri's contemporary litany of the standards inculcated in creative writing programs:147

Craft must be made unobtrusive so that the work appears spoken in a natural voice; there must be a sense of urgency and immediacy to this 'affected naturalness' so as to make it appear that one is re-experiencing the original event; there must be a studied 'ardlessness' that gives a sense of spontaneous personal sincerity; and there must be a strong movement toward emphatic closure. 

(Shetley) After the Death of Poetry 19

Shetley notes that work produced by poets who teach in these courses tends to display much rhetorical skill along with a disturbing complacency and narrowness of scope. Marjorie Perloff has similarly described the typical stand-off between "the Creative Writing Workshop" and "the Graduate Seminar in Theory" in the following sports-call: "The A Team accuses the B Team of writing impenetrable jargon and pseudo-Marxist double-talk: in return the B Team accuses the A of being soft and naive, and of failing to understand that all language is mediated ... A wants poetry to be more what it has always been; B insists that 'you can't say it that way any more'" (45). My point here is

147 Altieri (Self and Sensibility 10) is in fact quoting Jonathan Holden (Rhetoric of the Contemporary Lyric) who has suggested that one way of discovering basic assumptions dominating poetic practice and the teaching of creative writing is to specify those reactions most commonly evoked when we ask a poetry workshop to suggest revisions for a poem written in the past. The quotation in the text above claims to report the values most commonly expressed in poetry workshops given such a task.
that if creative writing is not included within English/Cultural Studies departments and within general literature/cultural studies courses then entrenched positions such as Shetley and Perloff describe can result. It would be preferable to see a continuing exchange between these ways of encountering the discipline of English—exchanges energised by continuing intra-disciplinary tensions.

To return to the question of models for understanding research, it is clear that the myth of scientific orderliness in academic research practice does serve political and economic purposes. This particular myth helps secure boundaries against incursions from discourses which might drain resources from established academic practices. In a reply to Knight's essay, Don Aitkin, chair of the Australian Research Council, makes the point that research funds are scarce and this is the reason researchers must apply for funds competitively and must be able to demonstrate the worth of their research proposals (*Meanjin* 777-83). If much worthy research is fuzzy in its beginnings and does follow those circuitous, unpredictable paths that creative work follows, not only is such research then disadvantaged when competing for funds, but the very model by which it progresses threatens to dissolve boundaries established between the creative and the academic, between research and practice. It becomes politically important to subdue these competing models of research.

Where does this leave the practising artist or teachers of creative writing working in Australian higher education colleges that have been annexed to multi-campus universities during the rationalisations of the past decade? In universities staff are promoted and appointed partly on the basis of their research publications and partly on the basis of their academic standing. It would not be appropriate to require teachers of creative writing to acquire higher degrees in traditional research areas when it is often the teachers' creative works which qualify them to teach creative writing. Further, it would not be appropriate to ask of these teachers that they establish a body of published theoretical or research articles when their profession might be writing poetry or short stories or novels.

Some universities have accepted creative work as submissions for Ph.D. qualifications by separating out such work as submissions for Creative Arts awards. The Ph.D. award is then qualified as a Ph.D-in-Creative-Arts. Sydney University of Technology has pioneered such postgraduate courses in Creative Writing in Australia. Murdoch University, the University of Queensland and Deakin University are also developing postgraduate courses in this field up to Ph.D. level. Other institutions, such as Melbourne University, La Trobe and Monash have been reluctant to allow creative work to be submitted for a doctorate because the doctorate is considered a research qualification. At the same time the presence of undergraduate courses (and graduate

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148 See for instance, Wayne C. Booth's *PMLA* article, "Where have I been and where are 'we' now, in this profession?"
diplomas) in these universities creates a demand for higher degree opportunities in this field, and not just from students, but from the hierarchical nature of the university system: if students are to be taught creative writing then universities will require well credentialled creative writing tutors and lecturers. A Ph.D. qualification is frequently a minimum requirement for lecturing in any university course. How can those who wish to qualify from, say, Melbourne University, as teachers of creative writing (or musical composition or painting) compete for jobs with applicants who have elsewhere been awarded Ph.D. qualifications through creative theses?

These disturbances around the presence of creative writing in universities have much to do with the presence of pleasure, the same pleasure I experienced when teachers asked me to write whatever came into my head, and write it to the best of my ability. The commitment of commentators such as Knight, Hunter and During to more diverse and less controlled (less operationally defined) models for research is in part an assertion of the importance of pleasure in education and thought. This pleasure has relations to power as well as to notions of what education is. Pleasure, it might go without saying, carries a potential for enhancing a sense of individual experience and individual difference; it is fundamentally ludic and is pursued through an enthusiasm which often dictates the kind of institutional support or institutional setting to which it gives rise. It is, in a sense, a foreign practice in the territory of higher education and research. But it is not a new practice, for pleasure (in the forms of enthusiasm, pursuit of individual interests and assertions of joy in esoterica) has long been present in the academy albeit in a muted manner. Education and research cannot work without it. But funds are not easy to attract from public bureaucracies on the basis that a practice is pleasurable to pursue. It is not advisable to attempt to legitimate a tertiary education course on the grounds that it is pleasurable. It becomes strategically essential for creative writing to find a way to be included under wider understandings of the word research.

I want to pursue here in detail some of the issues faced by Melbourne University's Ph.D. Sub-Committee in relation to proposals to present creative work at this level. Melbourne University is not a typical case, but because of its conservative traditions and its status as one of Australia's leading tertiary institutions certain issues are more emphatically articulated than they might be at other institutions less committed to tradition and reputation. Melbourne University's Ph.D. Sub-Committee has recently

149 These pursuits in fact can be the impetus for establishing new institutions. The Victorian Writers' Centre and other State Writers' Centres are examples of institutions established in response to and directly out of the enthusiasms of creative writers. In fact, university-based creative writing courses are to some extent competing with such responsive institutions.

150 The Ph.D. Sub-Committee has responsibility for the University's Ph.D. program. It is concerned to encourage completion of Ph.D. theses of the highest possible standard within the three-year time limit set for them. See University of Melbourne, The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (5).
been faced with a request to allow Doctorate degrees in creative composition from scholars in the Music Department. Without some credentialed recognition of their achievements as creative composers these graduates cannot go on to apply for positions as teachers of composition. In fact, without this recognition the university's graduates would be disadvantaged in competing for work. The solution at present has been to permit these students to complete both a traditional academic research thesis along with a folio of creative compositions.\footnote{See Standing Resolution of Council R3.60 amended in December 1993. Reprinted in University of Melbourne, \textit{The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy} and in the \textit{University Calendar} and \textit{Standing Resolutions of Council}.} Both the thesis and the folio must be judged satisfactory if the candidate is to be awarded the Ph.D. degree. Since the Ph.D. is still regarded as a research degree in the traditional sense at least two thirds of the period of candidature must be devoted to the preparation of the research thesis. It is arguable that this leaves insufficient time for a creative composition to be drafted, revised, completed and performed to a high standard. Inevitably students will have to consider extending their candidature to allow sufficient time to complete both tasks or place themselves under considerable pressure to work long hours at both tasks. In effect then these candidates are required to do perhaps as much as twice the work—and research—of other candidates. It seems clear that the question of redefining notions of academic research has been postponed at this level.

When the Ph.D. Sub-Committee was considering the proposal for a Ph.D. by Music Composition in 1993 a number of questions were raised in a circulated memo which in themselves highlight the blocks, ambiguities, puzzlements and difficulties, both political and institutional, faced by the sub-committee.\footnote{This and subsequent information is based upon a draft discussion paper prepared in August 1993 by Philip Mead for the English Department at Melbourne University while he was Lockie Lecturer in Australian Writing. It is entitled, "Creative Writing: undergraduate and postgraduate studies." It has been used with his permission.}

The questions of the Sub-Committee, aimed at clarifying how creative work might be included as part of a submission for a Ph.D., are marked by italics in the following discussion:

\textit{What would be the nature of the thesis presented and how should it be linked with the folio of creative work?}

Within this request for a link is the assertion of a division between thesis and folio, between the academic and the creative. With the question of how a suitable (or safe) link might be achieved between folio and thesis there is a suggestion of possible contamination. Would the "nature" of the thesis be disrupted or contaminated by the presence of a folio? Further, there seems to be a plea for reassurance here: reassurance that there will still be a recognisably research-based thesis submitted by such a candidate.
How would the creative work be assessed, and would it be assessed by the same examiners as the thesis, or by different examiners?

The puzzlement here is over both the criteria for assessing creative work and the suitability of academically trained scholars to be assessors of the creative work. The link, or the division, between folio and thesis (between academic and artist) remains a source of anxiety. An assumption has been made that even if creative work is accepted at Doctorate level there will still be a requirement to produce a thesis which is not a folio. In the matter of music composition, as we have seen, Standing Resolution 3.60 (established in December 1993) stipulates that in addition to the supervisor and examiners appointed for the thesis, another supervisor and two other examiners must be appointed for the folio of compositions. All four examiners must be satisfied that a pass standard has been achieved if the candidate is to be awarded the qualification. This solution has the effect of not only maintaining a degree of distance between academic and creative work, but it emphasises and entrenches divisions between these areas. For the student it means an increased uncertainty over assessment for four examiners rather than two must be satisfied by the work presented.

In an English Department discussion paper which responds to the questions of the Ph.D. Sub-Committee, Philip Mead has written:

The thesis would be conceptualised and written as one piece of work, however disparate its elements. A thesis that fell into two entirely discrete parts, one critical and the other creative, wouldn't have fulfilled the requirements. Our experience in English at the MA level is that there are a small number of people in academic positions who are well placed to mark Creative Writing theses, although there is the danger that in the short term these people may be overused for such marking.

Resisting the assumptions and anxieties of the question, Mead declares the integrity of any Ph.D. proposal. Where the questions of the Sub-Committee seem to be based on an assumption that thesis and folio will be kept separate, Mead is asserting the ultimate unity of any project at this level even when it has separate elements within it.

Mead's comment also points to the problem of a possible shortage of credentialled examiners who are recognised for their creative work. This is likely be only a short term difficulty as Doctorates in creative arts become more common in Australia, or as academics become more confident, experienced and skilled in assessing creative work. The multiplication of assessors and the multiplication of tasks required of candidates seem at best temporary measures.

What would be the role of the supervisor?

Implicit in this question is the suggestion that it might not be appropriate for the supervisor of creative work to perform in the same manner as the supervisor of a traditional thesis. Melbourne University's Standing Resolution regarding postgraduate supervision stipulates that the supervisor must have appropriate experience and a continuing active participation in the candidate's field of work. Guidelines published by
the University propose that a supervisor should be able to meet regularly with the candidate, that the supervisor should share an interest and intellectual investment in the area of the project, that the supervisor be familiar with the student's possible limitations regarding the project so that advice can be offered at an early stage; the supervisor should assist with time estimates and frameworks for planning the project; the supervisor is expected to read and examine carefully any drafts submitted prior to supervision sessions: "It is vital that criticism is given in a constructive, supportive and sensitive fashion. The supervisor needs to recognise that doing a research degree is an emotional as well as an intellectual commitment; students will be discouraged by continual harsh criticism" (University of Melbourne *The Degree of Doctor of Philosophy* 18).

None of these regulations or guidelines appears to be incompatible with the supervision of a creative project. One inference we might take from the Sub-Committee's question is that supervision as an ongoing critical discussion and assessment might not be an appropriate way of fostering creative progress. Creativity intersects most forcefully and most problematically with institutional practices at these sites of assessment. In a discussion of Creative Writing in higher education settings in England, John Singleton has recorded the frequent objection that creative work cannot be properly measured or assessed (Monteith 66-70). He makes the obvious point that the existence of an English Literature canon, or more lately World English canons, is evidence that teachers and scholars have been assessing creative work for many years. More particularly Singleton highlights the importance of assessment in Creative Writing courses as a form of support and encouragement:

Assessment was a matter of evaluating, diagnosing and improving performance and only sometimes of converting these processes into numerical or literal equivalents for grading purposes. Assessment was a continuous process, emphatically positive and constructive ... a process primarily concerned with enhancement and development. (Monteith 68)

This description is strikingly similar to the University of Melbourne Guidelines which recommend supervisors be constructive and sensitive, and be involved in their students' concerns.

If the supervision of a creative project fits so well with existing guidelines for academic supervision, why is such a question posed by the Sub-Committee? The question alerts us again to the temporary problem Mead mentioned in the passage above: there are relatively few academic staff familiar, experienced and active enough in the fields of creative arts to be suitable for assessing or supervising such work. Beyond this, it reveals perhaps a reluctance or an inability to imagine how such supervision would progress. The question seems to be a call, yet again, for reassurance that institutional structures and practices won't be radically challenged by such an innovation.
How would the University ensure that adequate materials, facilities and resources for the project were available?

This apparently practical question indicates some anxiety over the open-ended aspects of creative work. Academic research can, presumably, be restricted within budgets, and generally fits with existing institutional resources which have developed over time to suit its pursuit in a university setting. Historically universities have not developed or acquired painting, sculpting or clay-firing studios, banks of personal computers, video production studios, recording facilities or other possible resources creative artists might want and need for their projects. This institutionalised division between university education and vocationally oriented training or artistic practice has now been broken down, however, with the amalgamation of a range of higher education institutions into multi-campus universities. The Victoria College of the Arts, for example, with its facilities for creative practice in music, drama, dance and painting is now one campus of the University of Melbourne. The question posed by the Ph.D. Sub-Committee does not seem to take into account this radical dissolution of institutional boundaries and its educational implications (and opportunities).

Would candidates for the degree of Doctor of Creative Arts be eligible to apply for the APRA and MUPS scholarships?

The Australian Postgraduate Research Awards and the Melbourne University Postgraduate Scholarships are competitive awards with the purpose of funding mainly full-time research theses. This question raises the possibility that if doctoral programs in Creative Arts were established there would be a continuing division between strictly research-based theses which are eligible for support from research awards and the creative folios which are excluded from avenues to research funds. This question hinges, as we have seen, on the wider debate over what constitutes legitimate research. In a practical sense, one of the implications hovering here is the fact that if creative work is to become eligible for research funds, not only must universities accommodate and oversee this practice, but the bureaucratic structures of the Commonwealth Public Service must also find mechanisms for understanding and assessing such research proposals.

In general then, the questions raised by this Sub-Committee indicate both the tensions between institutional power and creative activity, and the difficulties experienced in articulating these tensions clearly. The practical tenor of the questions (most of them begin with "How ... ") seems to indicate an acceptance of the likelihood or necessity of including creative work in Doctoral qualifications. At the same time the questions make it clear that the Sub-Committee sees many real obstacles to accommodating creative work. The continuing division between thesis and folio in the rhetoric of the questions indicates an unwillingness or an inability to consider the possibility of redefining the understanding of the term 'research'.

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Other tertiary institutions in Australia and overseas have moved towards resolving these tensions by developing Doctorates in Creative Arts. This particular debate over the meaning of academic research, however, points to continuing areas of ambiguity, difficulty and disputed status. Do universities treat creative Doctorates as a soft option? Do they support their Creative Arts Doctorates with funding and scholarships to the same level as other equivalent research areas? What is the relation of an English Department to a Creative Writing course? Does the establishment of Creative Arts Faculties or Departments indicate a lively heterogeneity in the arts or a move towards containment and institutionalisation (against the scepticism of much critical theory)?

By turning now to a broad discussion of experiences in the United States and Britain we can see how some of these issues have already developed in these countries.

The international experience: continuing tensions

These debates and the contemporary explosion of interest in creative arts among students follow a pattern already played out in other contexts in Britain and the United States twenty years and more ago. In the United States now there are over a thousand undergraduate creative writing courses offered by universities and about 200 graduate courses. Since 1970 Creative Writing courses have also burgeoned in British universities.

A recent and unique British-American publication, *Teaching Creative Writing*, is both a handbook for Creative Writing teachers and an apologia for the legitimacy of these courses because they are still subject to attack (an attack of such longstanding that it has come to be seen as a backlash) despite their flourishing presence in humanities courses and creative arts courses. The survey at the beginning of this chapter of the "Death of Poetry" debate in America is one instance of the continuing criticisms of creative writing courses. The focus of much of *Teaching Creative Writing* is on the mesh between the purpose of creative writing and the teaching of it. Assessment is part of this problem—because, as we have seen, a number of critics believe creativity is something we can theorise about, but not something we can routinely assess like essays.

In his contribution to this book, George Marsh (Creative Writing teacher at Portsmouth Polytechnic) makes the point that the encouragement and sympathetic responses necessary for development in creative writing are difficult to maintain in an environment where the tutor must ultimately award a grade of, say, 43% to a student.

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153 See Dana Gioia "Can Poetry Matter?" (95).
154 See Malcolm Bradbury's review "The bridgeable gap" (TLS).
Marsh attempts to spell out the possible goals for creative writing and their implications for teaching. The possible goals he identifies and some of his comments are summarised below:

* to train professional writers

With this as a goal it would make sense to simulate the environment of the publishing industry and at some point bring students' work into contact with publishers, editors, reviewers and other writers. In such a course it would be appropriate to withhold assessments until the writer and the teacher are satisfied that any work has been redrafted to its potential.

It is interesting that Malcolm Bradbury specifically discounted this as a possible aim for the first postgraduate writing program established at the University of East Anglia in 1970. He saw the university setting as an opportunity to provide an antidote and relief to the tendencies and demands of a commercial publishing world. Instead of simulating the conditions of a publishing house, he aimed to give writers of ability an opportunity to develop work which might not conform to commercially dictated formulae. For the first trial year of this M.A. in Creative Writing Ian McEwan was accepted as their one student (Bradbury Times Literary Supplement).

In any case, regardless of the pedagogical approach, it would be absurd to expect the thousands of students doing these courses to become professional writers—as absurd as it would be to expect all students in English departments to become scholars or critical theorists.\(^5\)

* to illuminate criticism by learning experientially about the construction of a text

This is not writing for its own sake. The students might produce outstanding creative work, but if the aim is to illuminate criticism then such a course is likely to highlight technical competence (metre, verse forms, direct speech, imagery, etc.) or involve lengthy theoretical reflections which will be the focus of assessment rather than the so-called creative writing.

* to develop communication skills

Again this might be a useful outcome for the creative writer but if it is the aim it is unlikely to lead to the most interesting writing. In assessment a focus on clarity for example will excuse the teacher from making judgments about literary or artistic merit.

* to do literary writing because it is intrinsically worthwhile

This has the virtue of focusing on what the students write even though it is at first a vague statement open to arbitrary assessment. Marsh makes the point that such an aim will only work for students who have taken on the course voluntarily. These students

\(^5\) There is a further twist to this possible aim of producing professional creative writers, for as we have seen from John Aldridge's criticisms of creative writing programs, the term "professional" becomes in his lexicon a dismissive description of the worst kind of creative writing graduate (Aldridge Talents and Technicians).
can then work to refine and define what 'literary writing' means for them so that assessment can be guided and predictable. (One can envisage the debate over what constitutes literary writing becoming a dominant and constant source of theoretical debate in such a course—defeating its purpose?) Marsh also makes the point that in his experience double marking becomes an important element in avoiding purely personal assessments. Realistic and detailed feedback from participants as well as the teacher becomes a crucial element for these students.

* to teach literary writing

"To 'teach' writing implies that there is a body of knowledge called writing which we can teach" (Monteith 52). Assessment becomes a simple matter if there is a body of knowledge to organise, present and then test. There is of course the field of rhetoric, or the study of genres which might provide a body of knowledge about the craft of writing against which work could be assessed. Marsh holds that such an approach must narrow rather than broaden the kinds of writing a student might attempt. He suggests it is a paradigm which could not work in this context.

* to develop imagination and creativity in the student

The difficulty of knowing what these broad terms mean can be a political liability for any course attempting to justify its practices to an unsympathetic institution. Assessing the presence of creativity and imagination in a student's performance can be a fraught exercise. Nevertheless these terms can sometimes have a strategic use, for the promotion of creativity and imagination is often included among the ideal aims of education. Marsh comments that there is no clear indication that such qualities applied to solving problems in the writing of a poem or a short story can be transferred to work places where different sorts of problems must be tackled.

To take Marsh's point in a slightly different direction, there is no strong evidence that creativity and imagination are fostered only (or even especially) in that activity called creative writing. Cannot essay writing, critical theory, or even philosophy, psychology and physics be approached creatively? throughout this work I have been arguing that once a claim to creativity and imagination is made for a particular discipline or discourse, boundaries and constricting definitions are established which must inevitably be disputed. Psychoanalytic and Surrealist discourses have been two examples of how this must happen.

It would seem that creative writing is caught in something of a dilemma here. For what sense then do we make of the term creative in "creative writing"? Is it a term that begs a question—or makes an ambit claim? It seems that often it is, or should be (as Marsh suggests); but it has also become a term with a use rather than a meaning—we think we know what it refers to but we don't make the mistake of giving the phrase a too-literal meaning. It is in its way as odd and misleading as the term "English" applied to what English Departments do. We are stuck with it for the time being.
* to prepare school teachers for teaching creative writing*

As secondary English curricula emphasise the importance of involving students in some creative writing it becomes important that teachers in training have experience of drafting creative work, rewriting it and workshopping it. In the current Australian context, the Victorian Certificate of Education (VCE) requires students to include some creative writing in their senior Year Eleven and Year Twelve English Writing Folios. This includes creative responses to set texts, creative pieces written in response to the genres they have studied, personal writing and poetry or fiction.

As writer-in-the-community for the Dandenong Valley Region of Melbourne from May to August in 1995 I visited nine secondary schools and participated in a day of Creative Writing Workshops for 130 Year Twelve students. In nearly all of these schools teachers were reluctant to encourage senior students to write poetry because they felt uncertain of the process themselves. A considerable number of teachers attended the day of workshops for Year Twelve students because they felt a need to gain some experience in introducing creative work to the classroom. This reluctance to engage in creative writing (particularly poetry) with students extends back through the secondary and even to the primary school system. In 1996 Myron Lysenko who has been a visiting poet to schools throughout Australia for a decade, compiled and edited an anthology of student writing, *I Thought It Was Safe*. Introducing this collection he remarks, "Some teachers steer clear of poetry because they are not confident about their ability to stimulate and encourage students in the writing of poems" (3). He goes on to offer teachers ten informal exercises aimed at stimulating children to write.

But the poets and other writers who go into schools and universities to stimulate creative efforts do not usually have to stay to evaluate students' work. Along with a lack of experience in writing creatively, many teachers are, it seems, not confident that they can assess creative writing by students. Marsh suggests that methods of assessment need to be based upon operationally defined criteria so that students can understand how grades are determined. Though this approach to assessment runs the risk of reducing creative elements to a formula, it would have the benefits of reducing teacher and student anxiety, and requiring teachers to think through their reasons for making judgments and assessments.

Here, once again, we have come up against the problem of pleasure in education—its role in the 'work' students must show they have done. Paul Fussell, as we have seen, noted the absurdity of writers claiming they work hard for little reward, when, he suggests, what they are doing is pursuing a personal interest. Unease over creative work in the final, decisive years of secondary education highlights the incongruous place creative writing holds in modern society: We revere creativity as the source of Great Art and Great Literature, we see it as an invaluable liberating, sensual and aesthetic activity, and we want to see our students experiencing this practice or at least
attempting it. But we ask them to do it in the context of the highly disciplined, closely supervised, carefully examined and cruelly competitive final years of schooling. It is not surprising that teachers feel uneasy with an activity that threatens to be too open-ended for them to confidently grade the resulting work, and too playful for them to be sure it is work.

Marsh's analysis points to the continuing tensions between so-called critical-theoretical writing and creative writing, a tension that might have been defused for some by recent explorations in factional or ficto-critical writing. When creative writing happens in the context of a literature course its relation to the critical essay remains unsettled over questions of whether the creative writing serves to illuminate the critical, or exists in its own right as literature of a kind, or constitutes itself as a hybrid form. This tension is sometimes dramatically present when outside writers are invited into university English departments. In *The American Writer and the University*, Ben Siegel has suggested that, "What the writer inevitably attracts is his academic colleagues' envy and hostility ... the regular faculty members are reacting to what they interpret as this scribbling interloper's genial contempt and his conviction that he alone possesses a creative or imaginative mind" (9). In the American context this has not stopped writers such as Heller, Barth, Roth, Carver, Oates, Bellow and many others from taking teaching positions at the universities—and then writing scathingly about academics. Professor Bailey of Griffith University points to similar tensions in Australian universities as they amalgamate with campuses that have a more vocational and commercial emphasis: "Some academics have problems with popular art forms and commercial success, believing that commercial success and academic rigour are not appropriate bed-fellows" (10).

Some observers wish to defuse this tension by bringing the separate discourses of creativity and criticism into sympathetic contact. In a 1989 interview with Liam Rector, the American poet and anthologist Donald Hall made the following observations:

Separating creative writing from the regular English department is a disaster. "Here are the people who can write." Wonderful. Specialization is a curse, especially for poets. Separate departments divide old poetry from new. Some places have literature departments within creative writing departments, where writers teach reading to would-be writers. But the value of writers to English departments lies not in the teaching of creative writing; it's their teaching of literature classes for regular undergraduates or graduates. Of course most Ph.D.'s are dopes; so are most poets. Undergraduate English majors—or engineers and nurses taking an elective—suffer because they never get to be taught by a writer. The faculty suffers because separations make for complacency. Nobody's challenging you with an alternative. But the teacher of creative writing suffers most. When you teach literature you spend your days with great work—reading it, talking about it, reading papers about it. Great literature rubs off and you learn by teaching, by encountering what you don't know well enough, teaching it to people who know it even less.
This separation makes for narcissism, complacency, and ignorance. It's the worst thing that has happened with the creative writing industry. People spend their whole lives talking about line-breaks and the New Yorker.

(Death to the Death 49)

In 1992 the American poet Alan Shapiro suggested that two-year Masters writing programs should be extended to five years with a curriculum redesigned to integrate literary study with creative writing. Five years would give students time to study literature of the past in intimate detail. For Shapiro a knowledge of the history of an art is indispensable to the practice of the art. It is not only the isolation of creative writers from critics and scholars that concerns him, but the tendency of writing programs to ghettoize prose writers from poets. He recommended requiring students to work in more than one genre in order to avoid what he regards as premature specialisation ("Horace and the Reformation" APR 12-13).

Billy Collins's poem, "Introduction to Poetry" (The Apple 58) is one immediate example of the way a poet might break into the discourse of literary analysis in a classroom with his own discourse on how creativity engages with criticism:

I ask them to take a poem
and hold it up to the light
like a color slide

or press an ear against its hive.

I say drop a mouse into a poem
and watch him probe his way out,

or walk inside the poem's room
and feel the walls for a light switch.

I want them to waterski
across the surface of a poem
waving at the author's name on the shore.

But all they want to do
is tie the poem to a chair with a rope
and torture a confession out of it.

They begin beating it with a hose
to find out what it really means.

Both Hall and Collins are aware of, and wary about, the antagonisms between writer and critic-reader, or between writer and teacher-of-writing, but both show an eagerness to be involved in the vigour and freshness made possible when these discourses come into contact with each other. Shapiro's measured suggestions for reform arise in response to isolation as a solution to the tensions. As I have argued earlier, perhaps it is in the very generation of tension from within the discipline of English that Creative Writing can find a dynamic place not just in English departments but in universities.
Some recent Melbourne University students' reactions to their experiences of Creative Writing support the notion that new perspectives become possible when students can experience both theory and practice: "Creative writing becomes less precious in some ways. It's more direct and practical." "Being encouraged to write in imitation of these styles takes away their mystery more than studying them does" (Mead 4). Such outcomes contradict the claims of Zavarzadeh and Morton that humanist and idealist notions of the author are merely reinforced when students are permitted to write creatively. As Hall suggests in the extract above, the relations between these areas (or arenas) can become opportunities for stimulation by keeping boundaries permeable rather than confrontational.

Tension has been experienced not only between academics and writers, but between the discourses of creativity and education. Some writers have found the classroom or workshop setting inimical to their understanding of what creative writing is. Poet and critic Louis Simpson, for instance, has been pessimistic about the usefulness of bringing creative writing into the classroom. In an interview with Peter Stitt, Simpson voiced some of the same reservations expressed by Donald Hall and others: "I think it is better to be writing your own stuff than telling other people how to write; it takes away from your own writing to be vicariously writing. It is also much more difficult to teach writing than it is to teach literature. You're more involved with the students' personalities, and when their feelings get hurt, you have problems on your hands. Then there's the old question of whether writing can even be taught. You cannot teach a nonwriter or a mediocre writer to be a good writer. About the best you can do is show good writers where they're making mistakes, where something can be improved. But at least half of the students in creative-writing classes have no real talent. All you can do is pat them on the head and try not to hurt their feelings. Even for the potentially good writers, the creative-writing programs present certain dangers. In my experience, these programs tend to make the students rather self-conscious in the wrong way ... I think a real poet has to find out certain things for himself, grope his own way a lot of the time. That's what makes his poetry different and original" (Stitt 145).

Simpson's reservations about creative writing courses repeat many of the common protests over the practice, such as the suggestion that creativity cannot be taught, or that the teaching of it will take away from a writer something crucial. The difficulties of such teaching—partly due to the involvement of emotions—might discourage Simpson, but it seems to enliven others. On the question of talent, it is worth noting, once again, that not many students show signs of originality or talent at essay-writing. Even fewer go on to become literary essayists and critics. Nevertheless teachers, lecturers and tutors persevere, with no question of mediocre students being excluded from essay-based courses simply because their talent is limited.
In his rejection of the worth of creative writing courses Simpson appeals to certain beliefs and myths about both writing and teaching. He suggests, for instance, that emotions are confined to supposedly creative work. But critical and historical literature courses can become sites of intensely emotional exchanges—as recent debates over feminist theory, the literary canon and the proper field of study for English Departments have demonstrated. Simpson’s desire to protect the individual writer’s difference, originality and solitude seems to be a defence taken against those elements of the education experience which are imitative, group-based and hierarchical. Students are often required to accommodate their work to models of supposed excellence; they do work with each other and often make progress through discussions and peer appraisals; a teacher does occupy a place of power when a student’s progress depends on a pass being achieved. This might at first sight seem to threaten the difference, originality and solitude of the young poet or novelist. But don’t all writers submit to hierarchical systems when they present their work to competitions and publishers—or to colleagues they respect? Don’t artists and writers who are working in apparently original or avant-garde forms seek each other out in informal and formal salons, movements, gatherings, schools, cells or clubs without at the same time doing away with their opportunities for solitude? Isn’t imitation a long-respected practice for beginning artists? The particular fears seem to be more manufactured than real when they are placed in the context of the practices artists have chosen to follow through history.

Elizabeth Bishop proposed arguments similar to Simpson’s when she was asked if she approved of creative writing classes. "I try to discourage them!" she declared. "I tell students they’d be better off studying Latin or Greek. They are useful for verse writing. I have a feeling that if there is a great poet at Boston University or Harvard now, he or she may be hiding somewhere, writing poetry and not going to writing classes at all ... I think the best one hopes for is that after students graduate they’ll continue to read poetry for the rest of their lives. What can you teach, really teach?" (Schwartz 323). Bishop at least accepts that for many students the modest outcome of creative writing courses might be an ability and willingness to continue to read if not to write. Elizabeth Jolley, the novelist and teacher of creative writing at Curtin University in Perth, has made a similar point in a 1988 article for *Curtin Gazette* where she wrote that though the knowledge gained in a creative writing course might not lead a student to becoming a writer, it "may help in some way to dissipate the monstrous cosiness of suburban apathy" (10).

James Wright, American professor of English and Pulitzer Prize winning poet, has also spoken dismissively of his one dismal experience of teaching creative writing: "I tried it once and failed at it completely because all I could do was sit and talk to the class. And someone would ask me a question, how I worked on something, and all I could do was grunt" (Stitt 198). Wright’s failure here might be due more to a poverty of
models for teaching creative writing or to a lack of theoretical reflection on the process than to some necessarily crippling threat to any writer who teaches others how to write. There is in Wright's anecdote that sense of a writer reluctant to give-away or give up something deeply personal, inchoate, perhaps secret and precious, possibly ineffable. Later in the same interview Wright asks, rhetorically, "Don't you have to learn every essential thing by yourself? Stanley Kunitz said to me once: *You've got to get down into the pit of the self, the real pit, and then you have to find your own way to climb up out of it. And it can't be anybody else's way. It has to be yours*" (Stitt 198). In this outburst Wright subscribes to a notion of the writer as one who has plumbed some dangerous darkness within the self—indeed to the notion that it is only in solitary struggle that writing becomes worthy. Both Simpson and Bishop appeal to the same belief in writerly solitude. Apart from a romantic notion of creativity that this view promotes, Wright fails to explain how it does not remain possible or even necessary for students in Creative Writing courses to go down into their various individual pits to learn every essential thing for themselves.

These protests and grunts-in-opposition to teaching writing seem to come, at least in part, from the notion that creativity is so directly linked to individual unconscious processes that its workings cannot be examined in the daylight of a classroom discussion. The idea that creativity cannot be trained or even discussed articulately is perhaps one of the legacies of the Freudian-Surrealist discourse on creativity during the first half of this century. These protests indicate a reluctance to admit those suggestions of more recent critical theory that culture, history, ideology and social practices might inform creative work as much as any individual's dark unconscious.

**Intellectual Property?**

In a general way, without expressing it clearly, perhaps Simpson's apprehensions are pointing to a quite real and quite political and economic threat the author faces in an educational setting. Who owns the writing produced in an educational institution? There are both formal and informal elements to this threat. Students, even students of Creative Writing courses, must fit their work to the requirements of curriculum and teacher. Time limits are set for projects. Sometimes group projects are required. In workshops, as I have noted earlier, it is often difficult to know who has been responsible for a final version of a piece of writing. There is almost certainly far more critical appraisal, rewriting, and suggestions for rewriting during a series of workshops than there would be if a writer worked in relative solitude. In these ways the author's control and ownership of a text can become uncertain. This is a matter for alarm if an author wants
to retain a sense of being the sole originator of a text, though for many other writers it can be a welcome opportunity for experiment and development.

Recently I have been involved in a series of meetings with writers who have become interested in the instability of translations. For instance, we looked at a number of wildly variant translations of the same poem by Mayakovsk. One image in translation could read, "... like an Eskimo gapes at a train" while another translator rendered the same image as, "... like a savage staring at a switch." We decided to try translating each other's poems from English into variant readings but still in English. A member of our group asked the question, "Who will own these 'translations'?" We could not clearly say, because the writing was coming from a process constructed by the group and between individual writers. The question of ownership became less important than the interest we had in pursuing the exercise. In this context there was an interest in giving up our claims to original authorship and to originality in order to write creatively in a new way.

Recently in Australia the question of the author-student's ownership of work produced in educational courses (including academic research) has taken a legal and economic turn. In August 1993 Melbourne University enacted a new Intellectual Property Statute (University of Melbourne Postgraduate Handbook 66-7; University Calendar Statute 14.1). Under the terms of this statute the University held ownership of all intellectual property produced as part of a person's studies at the University. This included ownership of copyright in artistic, literary and dramatic works, sound recordings, films, television broadcasts or sound broadcasts. For the University this ownership meant the institution had a royalty-free licence to use all works including literary works produced by research students for the University's purposes and a further right to recover from any income the work might earn the costs incurred in supporting production of the work. The "originator" of an intellectual property was entitled to a "fair share" of proceeds earned by commercial exploitation of the work. This statute operated in a strangely contradictory fashion. It proposed that there can be an individual "originator" of intellectual property while it diminished the responsibility and rights of this "originator" by claiming the University's prior right to ownership of works produced. It is interesting that the statute did not set out to share ownership with students but took ownership out of the hands of the originators. The purpose of this move for the University was clearly to devise a means of recovering costs and of ensuring a return to the University from commercial exploitation of intellectual work. An unintended effect of such a statute might well be to inhibit the

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156 The Australian Research Council (ARC) has made it a condition of Individual Grants to universities from 1997 that they develop intellectual property policies which ensure commercial exploitation:
The ARC wishes to encourage and support the realisation of the full benefits to Australia of research that it supports. Accordingly, for all Individual Grants commencing on or after 1
ambitions and willingness of some students to produce significant or completed work during postgraduate study. In the Statute's phrase "intellectual property" there is an assumption that what a student has produced in a postgraduate course will be not only valuable but relatively simple to identify. But who would own a novel which was drafted first as a thesis then subsequently rewritten by the so-called originator and later edited by a publishing house? Students do complete courses with incomplete works or works-in-progress. Sometimes these works were begun before enrolment and can continue well after a course has been completed. Will the University then want to calculate its percentage of ownership over the project? And how would this be calculated? What would be the consequences if a student-originator claimed that the (perhaps commercial) value of a project deteriorated during the time of a postgraduate course? Could she claim compensation for damage to intellectual property?

I want to note that though these moves by a university to claim for itself the commercial potential of creative works might have been a particular challenge to authors who are enrolled students, it was not a situation new to authors. In their relations with editors and publishers authors have long had to defend their claim to a share of the commercial value of works and have formed their own professional bodies such as the Australian Society of Authors to protect their interests and what they regard as their property. The particular threat this Statute posed was its claim to sole ownership and free use of students' works. It was always unlikely, however, that the University would become entangled in attempts to collect the commercial proceeds from creative projects, for the statute was clearly designed to exploit the far more lucrative area of technological innovations arising from students' research (and from research conducted in partnership with international companies). Nevertheless, the statute offended against that artistic sensibility so forcibly expressed by Simpson: "It has to be yours." The Statute became controversial.

In May 1996 Melbourne University took the advice of the 1995 Australian Vice Chancellor's Committee (AVCC) discussion paper on ownership of intellectual property in Australian universities. The AVCC suggested that universities make no "ambit claim" to all intellectual property generated by students, but rather focus on patentable inventions (AVCC Ownership of IP 20). The new statute adopts this model, and is now silent on all matters relating to literary, musical, artistic or dramatic works. At a July 1996 panel discussion of this new statute at the Graduate School of January 1997, the Conditions of Award accepted in respect of a grant, will require that the researcher's institution has in place an intellectual property policy, which has as one of its aims, the maximisation of the benefits arising from research. The creation, management and exploitation of intellectual property need to be considered in the wider commercialisation context if benefits are to be maximised. (ARC Guidelines 12) See also the August 1995 report from the National Board of Employment, Education and Training which sets out to offer advice on how to ensure intellectual property protection is directed to "the wealth creation process" (7).
Melbourne University the secretary of the Intellectual Property Committee, Noel Ryan, explained that the new statute has been drafted to accommodate the protests and distress caused in some quarters by the previous version, and in acknowledgement that the statute is aimed primarily at exploiting patents which are potentially sources of significant profit.

From a broader perspective this process indicates a difficult but perhaps typical confrontation between discourses: the education institution with its own bureaucratic, business and government policy pressures leading to a need to exploit its outcomes finds itself in opposition to the desires of writer-students to claim for themselves an undisputed ownership and authorship over their words/creations. There is a tendency, as we have seen, for the discourse of authorship to disintegrate under the pressures of history, technology, commercial priorities and politics. The history of this Statute has been another example of the difficulties authors face in their attempts to remain, as it were, alive. In this case, it is worth noting, the university’s new Statute does not actively endorse the rights of literary author-researchers to their words, but has chosen to remain silent on this issue. Silence might not have put the issue to rest.

One wonders how those who drafted the Intellectual Property Statutes arrived at the term, "originator." At first it might seem so close to "author" that the difference does not matter, but the term does work to erode (and erase) the presence of an author. An originator occupies a place only at the beginning of a process, and perhaps cannot be expected to comprehend the potential of a project. The originator can seem a distant and relatively powerless figure. An originator might be equivalent to a technician—nothing like the figure of an Author.

**Assessment: issues and opportunities**

Along with pressures generated by the conflict/meeting between education, creative practice and literary analysis, and the threat to assumptions of individual ownership of creative works produced in educational settings, there are tensions arising from the institutional imperative for teachers to arrive at assessments. In the following pages I want to examine in detail some of the arguments and issues around this often fraught process.

Assessment becomes more problematic as the focus on the creative in writing becomes more open-ended. Double marking, removing deadlines and sampling (taking only the student’s 'best' work for assessment) are checks Marsh suggests. These are, like the checks and balances in a modern democracy, unwieldy and perhaps more symbolic than real. They avoid the historical and theoretical issues raised by an emphasis on *creative* in Creative Writing. The problem of assessment in creative writing
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courses is in part a problem of the relations between pleasure and power again. While the workshopping process necessary to creative writing courses tends to offer a significant degree of authority to every participant-author and tends to allow for the importance of pursuing pleasure in learning, any imposed grading reinserts the authority of the teacher and the institution.

Once again, however, this involvement with power and authority repeats a process long familiar to artists. It is important to remember, here, that creative writing in almost any context is to some degree constrained or determined by the judgments of authority figures: friends, mentors, colleagues, publishers, critics, traditions, religions, and the imagined reader in the mind of the writer. The teaching institution formalises a process that the writer seeks out, even when the aim is to write against the judgments of others.

In this formalising though, the relations of power become emphatically hierarchical in the educational setting, for a student cannot receive a certificate until the teacher grades the work as satisfactory. In other settings a writer can adopt alternative models, seek new friends or another publisher, or simply file that work away. For an enrolled student the unacceptable alternative to receiving a pass is to accept a fail grade which will remain as part of a permanent record.

For the teaching institution this process raises the issue of criteria for judging creative work. How is this relatively personal, open-ended, sometimes exciting, and often humbling process of creative writing to be assessed? Indeed, how does such a relatively unpredictable task survive the normalising pressures involved in passing a university subject? This is the question at which, as we have noted, some writers throw up their hands and depart from the classroom.

One answer, though, is that creative writing does survive. It thrives, in fact, and students are queueing to do it, apparently confident that creative work can be assessed. There is some evidence that the enormous degree of interest in creative writing, along with the desire to have it assessed, is a relatively recent phenomenon. In a 1985 survey for the National Endowment for the Arts, 25% of American adults were discovered to believe they write fiction or poetry (Monteith 63); the new Victorian Writers' Centre in Melbourne has more than 2,500 members who want, most of all, programs of creative writing workshops and assessments of manuscripts; in reflecting on forty years of teaching creative writing at American universities Theodore Weiss has observed an "eruption" of poetry-writing beginning in the sixties and continuing to the present in prodigious proportions. A typical poetry competition in the United States is likely to receive as many as 1,600 book-length manuscripts (Siegel 158); in his 1989 essay of protest, "Death to the Death of Poetry," Donald Hall declared, "More people write poetry in this country—publish it, hear it, and presumably read it—than ever before" (22); as editor of the small press literary magazine, Going Down Swinging, in Australia for fourteen years (1980-1994) I have also experienced an eruption of poetry-writing.
over the last five years of my editorship to the point where we received somewhere between eight and ten thousand unsolicited poems a year. Recently the small press literary magazine, SCARP, published from Wollongong University, promoted a New Poets Program, seeking manuscripts for six chapbooks. Sixty manuscripts were submitted.

One way of understanding this phenomenon of creative writing and the confidence that it can be assessed is to place it within the power relations of the modern state as a late extension of the use of the technology of the confessional. Foucault has pointed to the confessional as a technique of power in any modern society (Sexuality 63). We are rewarded, professionalised, flattered, punished, and controlled by submitting to the compulsion to tell the truth about ourselves. Foucault has suggested this is one of the ways we construct ourselves in submission to the myriad systems of surveillance central to the organisation of a modern society. We do our truth-telling to doctors, lawyers, police, counsellors, teachers, parents, lovers, social workers—and, I want to suggest, to readers. Fiction writers know that what they are doing is making the most private and the most individual experiences public. It should not be surprising that many people want to write like this. With some awareness of the social, political, religious and public health role played by opportunities to speak of the private, to speak the truth, to utter with pride or regret what cannot be normally said, the French writer Laumonier expressed the view in 1925 that psychoanalysis was not needed in France because the French had the Catholic confessional (Ellenwood 25-6). We might now suggest that a formally religious confession is not needed in the late modern state because we have creative writing (though of course writing offers no guarantee of absolution!). The practice of literature is in this view enmeshed with the power relations of surveillance techniques, though at the same time it can become an avenue for subverting the normalising goal of all surveillance.

Adopting this view we could suggest that Creative Writing at universities helps legitimise the modern state's technology of the confessional by offering its workshops as a reward to those prospective professional citizens who have gained university entrance. Students can then earn the particular reward of high grades if they can please their teacher-confessors with their revelations.157

If it is an exercise which rewards a relatively passive acceptance of many assumptions supporting the status quo, how then could creative writing ever become a source for subversion? How might it work to overturn generally held values instead of merely reflecting them? It might, as we have noted, give rise to the expression of

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157 Creative writing need not be literally autobiographical or confessional, but it is often constructed with textual conventions we recognise as indicating a personal, individual, private and open-ended process. This work does not have to be realist in its conventions; often its direction will be influenced by the theoretical stance of a department or teacher.
individual truths which, in their difference, challenge the *status quo*. If creative writing is part of the technology of the modern confessional then the pleasing of a teacher-reader must, as in all confessionals, have an ethical dimension which includes a shared commitment to telling the truth. It is here, in creative writing's complicated commitment to truth(s) that its possibly merely passive role as yet another technology of control becomes doubtful or dangerously unstable. For creative writing does not *only* aim to tell the truth. It does share the aim of truth-telling with other discourses, such as science and philosophy, but it does not give the same meanings to its truths. Creative writing seeks to beguile, enchant, amuse, horrify, tease, transport, or puzzle its reader as much as it seeks to impart important truths. Creative writing often seeks ambiguity and ambivalence in its effects so that readers will not be able to settle on one meaning or one truth. When we consider these ways creative writing can refuse to participate in a normalising discourse of truth-telling we can see its potential as a place where the individual has opportunities to play with the unsayable and the (im)possible instead of being tied to narrow or conformist versions of truth. The attraction of creative writing might be that (even while it participates in technologies of surveillance) it offers some relief from and opportunities for resistance to the truths we are so compelled towards in our other encounters with knowledge.

This complicated relation to the truth can create problems for those institutions and teachers setting out to assess creative writing. Creative writing projects can be so varied that their texts do not suggest criteria by which they can be judged or compared. Assessors can find that their judgments of work are either constrained by a focus on the crafted aspects of texts or they are drawn to ethical or aesthetic judgments about the 'importance' or 'significance' of a work. The latter path opens them to the charge of making arbitrary or merely fashionable assessments of creative writing. Even assessments which involve double-marking, as Marsh suggests, can serve to highlight the shared and public nature of certain norms, ideologies, truths and ethical views which are applied in assessing creative work.

Moving away from the university setting to literary prizes, we might note in connection with this issue that these prizes are usually assessed by panels of judges under the assumption that this form of double-marking protects writers from merely personal or wholly ideological judgments of their works. In the recent Australia-wide controversies over Helen Darville's 1995 Miles Franklin Award winning novel, *The Hand That Signed the Paper*, accusations have been made that the judges as a group arrived at decisions based upon shared ideology, fashion and prejudice. Melbourne *Age* columnist, Terry Lane gave voice to this element in protests against the book and its awards with the following jibes: "So when I see a headline like "Call to sack Darville judges," I am amused. Why should they be sacked? They chose a book that has all the hallmarks of a fashionable work of art. It is written by a young (score one extra point)
woman (move close to the top of the queue) of "non-English speaking background" (home and hosed) and it is a book without real plot, not much in the way of interesting characters and not a joke in the whole thing. When you finish it you want to slash your wrists. In a word, it is the height of literary fashion." More damningly perhaps, the judges of the Miles Franklin Award have been accused of giving a prize to an anti-Semitic and anti-Ukrainian work. Executive Director of the National Book Council, Tom Shapcott, Robert Manne the historian and editor of Quadrant, Southerly editor Ivor Indyk, David Bernstein from Australian Jewish News, poet Barry Hill, Dr Marko Pavlyshyn senior lecturer in Ukrainian at Monash University and Stephen Wheatcroft who is an historian of the Ukraine and Soviet Russia, are among those who have made this accusation. Barry Hill quoted one of the Miles Franklin Award judges, Jill Kitson, from a radio interview. She said, "We were much more concerned about its [the book's] literary qualities and so that the fact that it was anti-Semitic or not anti-Semitic was taken as read. It was not something that we felt should come into our discussions." Hill responded to this defence of the judges' decision by remarking, "It shows that something drastic is lacking in an individual or our culture or both that someone with literary authority (the power to judge) can defend the proposition that it is desirable to read without a moral sense. In fact, of course, it is an illusion to think it is possible to do so, even if 'literary' judgment ruled that it was necessary" (Hill 5).

Why does the award of literary prizes to a possibly anti-Semitic and relatively crudely constructed novel generate the wide and impassioned debate that it has? In part, I would suggest, because creativity (perhaps particularly in the form of narrative fiction) is so closely and so problematically linked to notions of moral and historical truth-telling. At a panel discussion held by the History Department at Melbourne University in September 1995, Joy Damousi made the point that with only one out of ten VCE students studying history, more and more often the past is understood through popular representations in novels. "What is it we come to understand better or more fully after we have read The Hand that Signed the Paper?" she asked. In a discussion from the floor, a lecturer from the English Department suggested, "It's not just pleasure and beauty that novels offer, but instruction."

The accusation against this novel seems to be that it has disappointed the reader's desire for some moral and ethical engagement with its subject matter. Though modernism might be marked by an overwhelming move towards scandalous art, its justification has always been the desire to uncover what is (truly) within or what is deeply true—usually by escaping the artificiality of past conventions. When the links between creative work and personal or public ethical judgments are acknowledged it becomes impossible to fix once and for all the criteria for assessments of creative work, or to ensure a process which is free of prejudice and personal or shared preferences. In my work as editor of Going Down Swinging, the most frequent question asked of me
at meetings, talks, panels or informal gatherings was, "How do you decide what will be published and what won't be published?" This is of course a reasonable question, and any answer to it would be useful to a writer submitting work to the magazine. I could point to a number of criteria—vividness and freshness in the writing, some focus or topic that galvanizes the interest of a reader, willingness to take risks with literary conventions—but ultimately I would have to point out to the questioner that it was a process of personal bias based upon my experience as a reader, my own ethical judgment and my preferences. What then interested me was that so many poets and prose writers were willing to submit their work to my judgment as editor-reader-confessor. The furore over Helen Darville's novel has exposed the enmeshment of literary judgments (and creative writing itself) with our ethical practices, with our truth-telling impulses, and with the many pressures towards normalising our values and beliefs—and with pressures towards scrutinising them.158

As noted above, while creative writing might be allied with the technology of the confessional as one of the myriad and dispersed techniques of control in the modern state, its practice can give rise to subversions of the goal of normalisation. In order to make creative writing subjects work effectively teachers have found they must move away from authority and control to allow a relatively free production of writing and flow of responses around groups of students. This is usually achieved through the practice of workshopping, either on a one-to-one basis or with groups. Just as Pierre Rivière's documenting of his own experience undermined contemporary scientific accounts of his crime of parricide, the creative writing process has potential to highlight the individuality or specificity of each person's truth and each person's distance from norms.

I am arguing that students are attracted to creative writing because it is a process we are familiar with in modern society and it is at the same time an experience which promises to allow enough freedom or looseness—and enough tension—in the movement of power relations for subversive, transgressive and unexpected outcomes to emerge.

This experience can place literature in a new context for students. Literature can become part of the historical struggle for individuals to find ways to construct themselves outside, or to the side of, those objects our culture tends to venerate:

What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art?
(Foucault Reader 350)

158 I am reminded of Jane Gallop's brief exhortation in response to her recognition of the tendency for any identity or belief to cramp and bind those who hold to it too rigidly: "Identity must be continually assumed and immediately called into question" (xii).
Of course one doesn't need to be Foucault or a Foucauldian to make this kind of protest or embark on this project. I have seen it emerge as students respond to creative writing opportunities. Creative writing for this reason is one of the more valuable and interesting experiences the study of literature can provide. It is one of the points at which literature is revealed, not as a site for self-expression nor as the exercise of genius, nor as a history of great books, but as a process close to the flow of power relations in a modern society, a process central to our experience and construction of our selves.

Foucault recalls this process, which he sometimes terms "subjection" when he asks could not all our lives become works of art. They are of course already works of art if we accept that the modern state's art in wielding power-techniques creates and re-creates us according to certain frameworks which involve aesthetic dimensions (whether these be brutal, slick, sexual, sophisticated, decadent, grand or whatever). Creative writing can perhaps draw our attention to the process and to its moments of inefficiency or its reliance on objects (such as authors).

But can it always free us from the predictable, the controlled, the acceptable? Of course it cannot because creative work always aims in some way to achieve predictable, controlled and acceptable outcomes even when it might at the same time aim to be lawless and outrageous. Like the pastoral power of the modern state, creative work seems to move us towards a certain normality even while it opens opportunities for re-creating and re-examining ourselves as individuals. If all our lives became works of art we might be more conscious of how we have come to be the subjects that we are, but we would not be freed from a world of objects (and thus of unequal power) simply through this awareness.

What Foucault hints at in the above quote, though, is the experience of uncertainty, of almost limitless possibilities when we embark on a creative endeavor—and the possible importance of this experience to everyone. At the beginning of a creative task we face the dramatically open-ended question, what am I capable of? We face the possibility of radical change. When Foucault sought some way out—some avenue to radical change—for the contemporary individual at the end of his essay, "The Subject and Power," he made the following suggestion:

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind," which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures. ("The Subject and Power" 216)

In this word "imagine" (Foucault wrote the essay in English) there is an echo of John Lennon's utopian protest song. It is a call to creativity—to originality—to an impossible ideal and a contradictory practice as we saw with the class of creative writing students.
who wished to find a beginning-point and an ending-point for their creations. What is it to imagine? It is to make images of what is absent or what is possible or even impossible. In Foucault's "imagine" there is a further echo of Wordsworth's belief in the moral and eternal force of the imagination for all people, no matter how humble:

I had stood
In my own mind remote ...
Like a lone shepherd on a promontory
Who lacking occupation looks far forth
Into the boundless sea, and rather makes
Than finds what he beholds.
(The Prelude Book III 513-9)

... the mind of man becomes
A thousand times more beautiful than the earth
On which he dwells, above this frame of things
(Which, 'mid all revolution in the hopes
And fears of men, doth still remain unchanged)
In beauty exalted, as it is itself
Of quality and fabric more divine.
(The Prelude Book XIV 447-454)

It is the "mind of man" (including the mind of the shepherd) not only the poet or the poem which makes rather than finds. Foucault's call to the individual—the shepherd—to "imagine and to build up" is a call that repeats these Romantic hopes but significantly it's now taken up with less flourish, less theology and less certainty. Foucault's hope for "new forms of subjectivity" is left broad and deliberately suggestive: the kind of relation one has to oneself should be creative.

In her long study of philosophical approaches to imagination, Mary Warnock has suggested that imagination is the faculty by which we ascribe meanings to objects and impressions. Through imagination we can render the world (including ourselves) familiar and manageable; we can also use it to render this same world mysterious and unfamiliar. We can in this way glimpse what we do not yet know about ourselves or the world. Putting aside Warnock's reification of the imagination and the implication of an essential human nature, her "imagine" seems to work in a similar fashion to Foucault's. It can be a way 'out' or a step to the side. When Carl Sandburg writes "Wanting the Impossible" he is playing with the way literature allows this step to the side—away from reason and away from the possible:

Suppose he wishes balloon routes
to five new moons, one woman,
and a two-acre bean farm with
bean poles and waltzing scare-
crows wearing clown hats:
 Ah-hah, ah-hah, this to God,
 this to me, this is something. 
(Voices 167)

This nonsense-work is a triumph of imagining the impossible against a conventional Christian God who has only ever been able to create the possible. To make this does seem to be something.

In the evidence of the students who find a voice they did not suspect existed, and a self which feels liberated, in Foucault's call to an open-ended and Romantically populist creativity there does seem to be opportunities to step at least to the side of an otherwise compulsive and unreflective/unreflected existence when we act creatively. But why then do Creative Writing courses and their students involve themselves so directly in the "pastoral" power structure of educational institutions? Why do they seek a home in institutions which work at totalizing their populations as skilled workforce bodies for the advancement of technology and knowledge, or privileged career professionals? Why do they seek to be part of these structures which work to control and channel the individualization of students towards "chosen" careers, into a climate of civilised debate, research and personal industry so closely tied to the status quo? We might answer this by asking how can creativity not attach itself to a variety of powerful institutions? Like a virus it requires a host if its colonies are to prosper. Like all discourses it seeks the legitimation institutions can provide, and like all discourses operating in the flow of power relations, its creative resistances can only come into effect at specific, local sites. In turn, the institutions see opportunities for expansion and resistance (to perhaps a perceived unruliness in creative acts?) in their associations with creative arts.

This understanding of Creative Writing's place in the play of power relations might help us understand its present attraction and even its importance to an academy which wishes to remain relevant (for relevant we might understand: connected to the real flow of power in society either through opposition or influence), but we are still faced with the question of whether the assessment of such work is a technical matter, an esoteric judgment made by experts, a subjective/ideological reaction, or an arbitrary response. Though such questions about assessment might seem urgent and confronting in the context of assessing creative work, they are nevertheless frequently unacknowledged presences in all humanities and social science disciplines. Perhaps the complexities involved in assessing creative work can operate to demonstrate how close education in general has always been to indoctrination, or (to make the claim more moderately) to persuasion; these complexities can help us see how many assumptions and how much belief is required to establish assessment in any humanities discipline, and how the play of relations between freedom and control, between conformity and difference, between
license and responsibility are always like a landscape flitting past us—difficult to picture, but needing to be scrutinised if we are to know where we are. Or where, for now, we wish to stop.

This issue of assessment in creative writing courses must remain a sore point, a place of debate and uncertainty if these courses are to retain some commitment to the unpredictability and open-endedness of creative projects. In turn, I am suggesting, this uncertainty can serve to highlight unexamined assumptions about assessment in other humanities/cultural studies courses. This might seem to be an unsatisfactory destination for those seeking a finally valid assessment method, or an argument that will put anxieties to rest. It is an unsatisfactory stopping-place, but only perhaps because there is no secure stopping-place.

I am still, in my mind, about to take that cycling path along the Maribyrnong Creek, to glide past the kayaks and row boats, lean into the curves of the path, and lose my sense of direction as the river winds into the landscape. But I have not returned to that route I took to the creative writing class at Victoria University because I am still, in my mind, on the return journey dodging that truck on the Ballarat Highway, or finding myself at the end of a dirt path which has eroded into the river. It is difficult to begin without knowing the ending. It is difficult to put aside the map even when I know that its bright colours and simple symbols are deceptions. Creativity seems to be enacted in the loose play of the bad fit between map and landscape, in that beginning-pause—which holds for a moment some tension between attraction and repulsion, desire and fear, the known and the unknown, the self and possible selves. If the experience we seek in creative acts is the experience of being outside-the-normal, it does not mean we have failed when we find that the creative is embroiled in the everyday relations of commerce, power, influence, ideology or precedence. In the various essays, stories and reflections that have made up this work I have wanted to show that though creativity and its discourses might take unpredictable turns the directions are always tied to a particular history of contests, alliances and conflicts. The creativity I have been discussing takes it forms and indeed its existence from a history of those discourses that have raised it as a value.
Coda

We have moved, in one view of this journey, from Freud's perception of creativity as expression-of-illness to an institutional view of creativity as educative and healthy. We have followed some of the ways creative practices can falter, expand, align with other disciplines or give rise to wholly new discourses under the pressure of history. To call it a journey is of course misleading because the beginning has not been left behind at the point of ending. The semi-official promotion of creativity through tertiary courses, State Writers' Centres and the Australia Council as a practice which "enriches the quality of life throughout the community" (Australia Council Literature 1995 Programs 1.4) still contains within its sunny view the darker version of creativity which Freud perceived. One does not necessarily negate the other, for if we create art out of our illnesses (our neuroses) then a possible implication is that we can become healthy (relieved of unconscious pressures) through our creativity. If creative acts produce enriched and healthful citizens, it might be that our artists, unhealthy as they are, would be even worse—even more infective—without opportunities to practice their art. But this is not what Freud meant. Mallarmé's sickness was not cured by writing but produced by writing: "I have been afflicted by some highly disturbing symptoms caused by the mere act of writing" (quoted by Kristeva in New Maladies 172). For Freud the artist was at best one who simulated neurosis. In the rhetoric of support for art as a public health measure or as an intellectual education we might perceive an unexpressed alarm at the possible presence of an anarchic Freudian unconscious or a Surrealist fascination with psychosis. Those who see creativity only as healthful or educative must refuse to consider its possibly darker origins or its empathy with, as Kristeva puts it, perversion. As creative practices come to participate in the procedures and the cultures of large educational institutions these tensions must become progressively more emphatic if Mallarmé's sickness (writing) is to maintain its dangerous connections—its life.

Through the discussions developed in the various chapters of this work, I have aimed to demonstrate a particular way of understanding creativity. This discussion has focused on some of those moments of change in the modern history of literature, art and writing-about-art in order to show how creativity has been a practice in dispute, in fact a practice brought into existence and shaped by disputes over its meaning. Creativity must, at all times, be compromised by these disputes between discourses, and it is these compromises that constitute its history, and take its history in new
directions. Surrealism recognised the exploitation of literature and art by psychoanalysis and in response took artistic creation in directions psychoanalysis dictated but could never condone. Similarly the experiments with alcohol among American writers of the thirties and forties can be read as resistances to Surrealist and psychoanalytic dictates about the nature of creativity even while they capitulated to these discourses' notion of the feminine unconscious as the source of creativity. The stylised rigidity of Surrealist sexualising and feminising of creativity opened in turn a possible feminist critique of its approach to creativity. Lacan's hybrid prose was made possible and gained some sense of urgency from the tensions between psychoanalysis and Surrealism which he attempted to reconcile. He became the analyst Surrealism could not have imagined and the poet psychoanalytic institutions could not tolerate.

With creative writing courses established in tertiary education institutions, disputes between discourses have moved into the academy. Much of the debate over the presence of creative writing in universities has been connected with conflicts over notions of the author: Do these courses aim to produce "professional" writers? How can their focus on the individual writer be reconciled with post-modern deconstructions of the figure of the Author? Is the focus on craft in writing a defence of outmoded humanist or New Critical assumptions? How conformist are the writers produced through these courses? In response to these questions I have aimed to show in the cases of Foucault, Moorhouse, Johnson, Fitzgerald and Lacan that the author is always a complex social, commercial, linguistic and literary construct often not under the control of the person writing (or in some cases not-writing). For this reason it is important that creative writing students remain informed and engaged with theoretical analyses of literature. I have also suggested the potential for creative writing workshops themselves to demonstrate and explore the divided nature of writers and writing. Creative writing workshops do not have to be havens for a narrow or merely craft-oriented approach to writing. They have the potential to be sites for literary writing which is outside of a canonical history, limited genres, or modernist ideals of genius. They can be responsive and unpredictable in ways that are not possible for courses structured by detailed curricula. Authority can be diffused and subverted in new ways.

I have further argued that if creative writing students are to maintain a level of sophistication—and insecurity—important to resisting rigidity in their approaches to writing then they should be integrated with departments and courses focusing on literature and cultural studies. They share too much with these disciplines to be usefully divided from them. Separate schools, departments or faculties of creative arts would, I suggest, eventually result in the debilitation of their discourse on creativity. If teachers and students are insulated within unnecessarily small areas of "expertise" then loyalties will develop which prevent a vigorous and real exchange of views and experience. This
Coda

seems to have been the case in the United States where many participants in the "Death of Poetry" debate have directed blame at insulated creative writing programs.

The ending of a document draws attention back to an author. Who decides on the fitness of an ending place? Though a name might be attached to the end of a document it is not always clear what this means: does it indicate a claim to ownership, or is it still a part of the document's textual or fictional world, does the name stand outside the document or within it, and who requires the name anyway—with how much cynicism do we read a signed confession? At the end of his autobiography, *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, Roland Barthes signs off with a doodle which apparently resists a claim to authorship because it only looks like a signature—but don't most signatures in their almost uniform illegibility merely look like signatures?—as though each name's rhythm across the page tells us more than any mere letters could. Barthes' signature-like doodle asks the question: how far can we withdraw from the marks we put on paper?

Is this the moment when someone steps back—the "real writer" as Foucault calls this presence, "that someone" as Barthes says, or "the originator" as the Intellectual Property Statute proposes—and reminds us that the worth of any writing can only be judged in the silence that comes after the reading of it?

The writer does indeed insist on stepping back—into and out of sight.
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| Illustrations |
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| 1 | 110 | Breton, André. *Self-Portrait: Automatic Writing*, 1938. Published Short 70. |
| 2 | 111 | *Germaine Berton Surrounded by Surrealists*, 1924. Published Short 71. |
| 4 | 113 | Ernst, Max. *Frottage*, date uncertain. Published Gooding 54. |
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| 12 | 173 | Ernst, Max. *The woman with an hundred heads opens her august sleeve*, 1929. Collage on paper, 30.5 x 14 cm. Collection D. and J. de Menil. Published Short 94. |
Appendices

Appendix A
Surrealism and psychoanalysis: a chronology of publications and events

1900: Freud, Sigmund. *Interpretation of Dreams* (German)

1914: Régis and Hesnard publish *La Psychanalyse des Nervoses et des Psychoses*. Breton is influenced by their summation and escription of the Freudian method.

1916: Breton practises psychoanalytic free association with patients at the neuropsychiatric centre of the Eleventh Army at Saint-Dizier.

1918: Tzara, Tristan. *Dada Manifesto*. Tzara denounces the notion of a common psychic base as a myth. Dada automatism is a chaotic, visceral spasm.

1919: Breton and Soupault experiment with automatic writing.

1919: Breton and Soupault publish the results of this work in *Littérature* under the title, *Les Champs Magnétiques*. Generally regarded as the first example of Surrealist automatic writing.

1921: In October André Breton visited Freud in Vienna, accompanied by his new wife, Simone, and Paul And Gala Eluard.


1922: Breton publishes an account of the visit to Freud in Vienna in *Littérature* (March issue) along with Freud's note to him. The article was reproduced in *Les Pas Perdus* (1924).

1922: Breton, Robert Desnos, Benjamin Péret and René Crevel experiment with hypnotic states and automatic speech.

1923: Freud, Sigmund. *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. Translated and published in French.


1924: Breton publishes the *Surrealist Manifesto* (October).


1926: Breton meets Nadja in October. By the end of the year he has lost touch with her. He learns she is interred in a mental hospital.
1927: Breton writes most of *Nadja*, while staying at the Manoir D'ango in August. A lengthy extract is published in *Commerce* (Autumn issue, no. 1).


1928: Breton: *Nadja* published

1933: Breton: "Le Message Automatique." This is Breton's most important theoretical statement on automatic writing.

1962: Breton rewrites *Nadja* in considerable detail, adding new photographs and a preface. This remains untranslated.
Appendix B
Creative Writing courses at Victorian tertiary education institutions

TAFE & Registered Private Providers

*Advanced Certificate in Media (Foundation Studies)*
Holmesglen College of TAFE (COT)

*Certificate IV/Diploma of Arts (Professional Writing & Editing)*
Box Hill COT
Casey TAFE
Frankston TAFE
Holmesglen COT
Loddon Campaspe COT
RMIT
Victoria University of Technology
Wangaratta COT
East Gippsland COT
Warrnambool TAFE
Wangaratta TAFE
Council for Adult Education

Higher Education

*Bachelor of Arts (Journalism & Communication)*
Deakin University
Monash University
RMIT

*Bachelor of Arts (Professional Writing)*
Deakin University
Victorian University of Technology

*Graduate Certificate Children’s Literature*
Australian Catholic University

*Graduate Certificate Professional Writing*
Deakin University

*Graduate Diploma of Arts (Creative Writing)*
University of Melbourne

*Graduate Diploma of Children’s Literature*
Australian Catholic University
Deakin University

*Graduate Diploma of Editing & Publishing*
RMIT

*Graduate Diploma of Journalism*
Deakin University
RMIT
Graduate Diploma of Professional Writing
Deakin University
Swinburne University of Technology
Victorian University of Technology

Professional Development/Short course Providers

Australian Writers Guild (Victorian Branch)
Council for Adult Education
National Book Council
The Society of Editors (Victoria) Inc.
Victorian Writers' Centre
Stott's Correspondence College

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Title: 
Creativity and power: creativity as strategy and value in modern discourse

Date:  
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