Being Secure in our Differences:

Lucia Bianca Pietropaoli

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Abstract

Contemporary literature on threats to our security, covering everything from Islamic fundamentalism to environmental disaster, appears on the shelves of mainstream bookstores with increasing fervor. Mass consumption of this material exposes an increasing number of people to security issues that dominate the global agenda. However, despite increasing popular and academic interest in security, the thinking has not changed substantially since the Cold War. Political elites, policy-makers and many academics remain confined within the disciplines of realism and neo-liberalism when devising solutions to security dilemmas. This results in a continued reliance on state-centric and militaristic solutions to security problems that often arise because of marginalisation and socio-economic hardship.

There is a pressing need to broaden our approach to security beyond the protection of states and interstate systems to focus on people and process. The thesis critiques modern security and explores possible ways in which the term can be reconceptualised through movement and diversity. It calls for more imaginative forms of political analysis and intervention that take fuller account of the fate of individuals and human collectivities in the pursuit of security.

In the current climate, people across the globe are encouraged to form solidarity with other people on the basis of sameness and within the borders of a particular nation state. But what if people were encouraged to relate to each other on the basis of difference, both within and beyond the territorial state? In reality, the majority of political communities comprise individuals who share the condition of mutual estrangement. The thesis calls into question the assumption that fixity and homogeneity are guarantors of a secure society. Re-thinking security requires a fundamental shift in the way that individuals relate to each other. It is only when we are secure in our differences that we can pursue an inclusive approach to security, centered around people and their diverse strengths, needs and aspirations.
Declaration

This is to certify that:

1. The thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD;
2. Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used; and
3. The thesis is fewer than 1000,000 words in length, exclusive of table, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Lucia Bianca Pietropaoli
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Introduction

In the current political climate, there are few words that command the same power and influence as ‘security’. Modern security politics is pre-occupied with the protection of the state and the pursuit of security through military means. This approach to security benefits a select few and marginalises large numbers of other individuals and groups. There is a pressing need to broaden the study and practice of security beyond the protection of states and interstate systems. The thesis will critically evaluate the theorisation and practice of modern security and explore possible ways in which the term can be expanded to address the needs of a wider range of individuals. The project aims to conceive of more imaginative forms of political analysis and intervention that take fuller account of the fate of individuals and human collectivities in the pursuit of security.

Any critical analysis of security must begin with three important questions: Whose security? For what purpose? By what means?¹ Nation states claim to provide protection to all of their citizens on an equitable basis. However, there are certain individuals and groups that are simply left out of the current approach to security. Across a range of nation states, the needs and aspirations of marginalised peoples are ignored or disrespected by political elites. Political minorities are often conceptualised as security threats; as the objects and not the subjects of security. Consequently, a false dichotomy is established between the security of the dominant and the insecurity of the marginal.² I will call this binary into question and argue that we must move away from the view that our own security is premised on the insecurity of others. Throughout the thesis the individual will be brought to the forefront of the security discipline; a discipline that has previously been preoccupied with the state, and to a lesser extent, the citizenry. This thesis will focus on the relationship between security and identity as one possible way to develop a more inclusive and realistic approach to security.

Security saturates the language of contemporary politics. According to Michael Dillon, “our political imagination is confined by [security]”.³ In a modern society, individuals seek security through rationality, faith, sovereignty and any other ‘system’ that appears to provide

² A. Burke, In Fear of Security: Australia’s Invasion Anxiety, Port Melbourne, Victoria: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.2
structure and order. However, more often than not, these systems repress, domesticate and control the individual rather than provide a sense of meaning and protection.\(^4\) The modern individual is encouraged to place their trust in the military, the police, bureaucracies, experts and technologies to keep them safe. However, as scholars such as James Der Derian and William Connolly point out, this blind faith in modern security and instruments of the state is misguided.\(^5\) For example, recent initiatives in United States policy demonstrate the failure of modern institutions to keep the population safe. Prior to 9/11 national borders were considered to be necessary and sufficient to keep the other at bay— in this case, however, the threat came from within. The invasion of Iraq and the use of war as a tool of foreign policy was considered the best way to bring peace to the Middle East. Both of these security measures have proven to be ineffective in establishing internal and external stability for America. Despite this evidence, when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect certainty and competence from our national homeland security experts.

There is no general consensus over the meaning of the word security. It remains a hotly contested term in academic and popular discourse. The concept of security is invested with a plurality of meanings that vary across place and time.\(^6\) Indeed, it is the slipperiness of the term that makes it open to manipulation. In contemporary political debates about security, it is often assumed that there is an overarching consensus over what security means, who and what are its major subjects and what methods can be justified in the pursuit of security. However, a closer examination of the ways in which security is theorised and practiced across the globe reveals that there is no national, regional or international consensus.\(^7\) Despite this variance, the modern conception of security is the dominant frame through which nation states pursue security, both in the West and in former-colonised nations. In modern political theory, security is conceptualised as a public good that relates to the physical protection of certain objects and, to a lesser extent, people.\(^8\) This thesis will argue that the dominant conception of security that is currently pursued by political elites does not reflect the myriad


\(^5\) ibid., p.282


\(^8\) ibid., p.2
of security practices that exist on the ground and the multiple and complex security needs of individuals.

The security of states is rarely separated from the security of people in mainstream political discourse. States are identified with a distinct people so strongly that the possibility of divergence in the interests and needs of the two is largely obscured. In the fields of international relations and strategic studies, security relates primarily to the physical protection of the state and citizens. The pursuit of security is commonly conceived of as protection from tangible threats to a territory, a person or property. The conventional understanding of security suggests that the use of military force, the police, and intelligence and other instruments of state authority are the best ways to defend the nation and the citizenry against such tangible threats. As a result of the conflation of the security of the state with the security of people the majority of literature on security is dedicated to threat analysis including military, strategic, economic and environmental threats to the state.

The modern state is conceptualised as a fixed and permanent entity with clear boundaries. This is consistent with the structure of modern political thought which is based on dualisms and the differences between things. Modern security constructs boundaries between safe and threatening places, processes, people and behaviours. According to Michael Dillon, modern political thought is dependent upon what is considered to be the limit of political order itself; namely the limit proscribed by the sovereign state. The strong emphasis placed on boundaries that define the parameters of political existence means that there are limits to what is allowable to think as reasonable and realistic in political thought. The dominant conception of security is confined by the boundaries that define political existence. Dillon suggests that we need to reconfigure the concept of security, and politics more broadly, as a plural ‘how’ rather than a singular ‘what’. A part of this process involves acknowledging that borders are fluid and that the state itself is an entity that is created and re-created through the pursuit of security. The thesis will critique the link between security and fixity and develop the argument that people need to be able to move within and between states in order to be secure.

Fixity is proclaimed to be a defining feature of a modern security state, however, the current political order, at a domestic and international level, is characterised by unprecedented levels

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9 P. Digeser, 'The Concept of Security', p.1
11 ibid., p.6
of mobility and diversity. These two key features of the contemporary order are ignored or downplayed under the current approach because of the link between fixity and security. Mobility and diversity will be the two key themes through which the subjects and methods of security will be expanded. The increased mobility of people, goods, services and ideas has resulted in societies being more diverse and cohesive than ever before. Although most societies have always been heterogeneous to some degree, the conditions of globalisation have changed the composition of many political communities. Re-thinking security in this context, I will argue that allowing for greater mobility both within and between states and by embracing the diversity that results from that movement, we can enhance the physical and psychological security of political communities.

The dominant approach ignores the fact that states preside over diverse and unequal societies and they are generally not representative of all segments of the population that live with its boundaries. States today are characterised by unprecedented levels of ethnic and cultural diversity. Despite this reality, national security policy often revolves around the protection of a singular cultural group and ‘way of life’. In the dominant approach to security, homogeneity is considered to be a feature of a secure society. In order to achieve this degree of uniformity, nation states build into their security frameworks practices that restrict the mobility of certain individuals and groups and policies that promote cultural assimilation. The means by which a state pursues security may involve the repression of a part or all of its population as well as other individuals and groups that reside outside of the state. Consequently, under the current security arrangements there are marginal individuals and entire communities who, because of their own characteristics and circumstances, or circumstances that are imposed upon them, suffer particular problems of insecurity.

The preoccupation with the state under the current approach ignores that fact that the state itself can often be the primary source of people’s insecurity. The actions of states can exacerbate or create new conditions of insecurity for minority groups. For example, in instances of domestic or international conflict, the closure of international borders in the name of security inhibits vital economic and social mobility for some sections of the population.\(^\text{12}\) However, it is not only in times of war or conflict that states jeopardise the security of certain segments of their population. In the process of state-creation and in the

ongoing operation of modern governance, the state creates conditions of marginality and insecurity for some individuals and groups. The thesis will explore how and why some minority groups are left out of the current security equation and will explore some possible directions for bringing the security of marginalised group into the foreground.

There is an international dimension to the creation of conditions of insecurity for minority groups. Global economic forces combine with state-building and state-securing initiatives to produce alienation and marginalisation for some groups. Economic policies and practices, in particular the spread of neo-liberalism, threaten certain cultures and established forms of socio-economic and political order. In some cases, this results in the disintegration of particular local cultures. However, in other cases cultural groups that are marginalised by the current global order engage in practices of resistance and rebellion.\(^\text{13}\) The international character of insecurity owes to the fact that its sources are not unique to individual states; rather they are attributed to system-wide influence at the international level and to the very division of people into political hierarchies that constitute the international system.\(^\text{14}\) The relationship between the international system and the states that constitute it is not passive; rather the international system promotes certain forms of domestic political organisation and practice. The thesis will acknowledge the relationship between the domestic and the international in creating conditions of security and insecurity. Consequently, the study will not be confined to a singular nation state. It will draw from a number of cases studies and consider how local practices relate to the international with respect to the security/insecurity paradigm.

Modern security regimes are entrenched throughout the West and the non-Western world as a result of the impact of the colonial legacy. In many colonial nations the conservative approach to security based on fixity, homogeneity and the primacy of the state is even engrained in the national psyche and domestic and foreign policy. In countries such as India security doctrines are underpinned by the realist principles of militarism, externalisation of threats and the protection of territorial borders, often at the expense of the security of people. State policies are justified and reinforced through think tanks, academic departments and the development industry that send consistent messages about the primacy of the state and modern systems of governance.

\(^\text{13}\) M. Dillon, Politics of Security, p.9
\(^\text{14}\) ibid., p.16
Under the mainstream approach security refers exclusively to the protection of the state and to a lesser extent the citizenry, against physical and tangible threats. In the thesis I development the argument that security has two related but distinct components: it relates to *being* secure as well as to *feeling* secure. The psychological aspect of security has not been given adequate attention in the literature on security. The condition of *feeling* secure relates to the ability of individuals to confidently express a sense of identity and to be able to identify with one or more cultural communities. It also relates to the extent to which an individual feels that they belong in the social world they inhabit. In essence, security is intrinsically linked to an idealised sense of feeling and being at home. The project will bring to the forefront the relationship between security and identity.

While there have been significant ideological shifts in international relations, the study of security remains heavily influenced by the discourse of realism. The volume of literature on security has proliferated since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In particular, considerable attention has been paid to the role of non-state actors and transnational movements in effecting change at a local, national and international level. However, for all the academic and popular attention it has received, security is still for the most part conceptualised with a narrow framework that limits the range of permissible thought and action. The link between security and identity has been explored by some critical theorists such as Roland Bleiker, James Der Derian and Anthony Burke.\(^{15}\) Studies such as these provide a valuable critique of the theorisation of security in the Western canon. However, for the most part, the postmodern critique of security has not impacted significantly on the approach to security and foreign relations pursued by the majority of states. Domestic and foreign policy remains influenced by anachronistic assumptions about what security is; who are its primary subjects and what are effective and legitimate means to pursue it.

The thesis will broadly be divided into three inter-related parts. The first section will reflect on the dominant theories and practices of security that have developed throughout the modern period. National security is the specific frame through which security is primarily conceived of in the current climate. This conception is based upon the equation of the security of the

state with the security of the people. In order to strengthen this link, the metaphor of home is used to connect the fate of the people to the fate of the state. The first section of the thesis will explore the link between the modern conceptualisation of home and the deployment of modern security. The homeland, as a metaphor in national security discourse, naturalises the idea that security is about enclosure, fixity and familiarity. I argue that the values that underpin this link contribute to conditions of insecurity for certain sub-groups within the nation. The first section of the thesis argues that security and home are linked to modernity in the majority of nation states today. However, the second section of the thesis suggests that it is possible to conceive of home and security through an alternative lens.

Can the modernist notions of home and security that are critiqued in the first section be reconceptualised to take into account the needs of a wider range of groups? In the second section of the thesis I will explore alternative conceptions of home based on the acknowledgement that the condition of mobility is a feature of the current political age and a feature of ‘home’ for an increasing number of people. The second section will focus on the relationship between security and mobility. Here, I will explore the increased flow of people, goods and ideas across nations and the implications this has for the dominant conception of security. The concept of home can be expanded beyond its links to modernity. There are multiple and varied conceptions of home that reflect the diverse ways in which individuals and groups work to establish a sense of belonging and security in a mobile world.

The result of the increase in the movement of people, within and between nation states, is that many homeplaces are characterised by diversity and disunity. This last section of the thesis will develop the argument that diversity and security are not at odds. I will argue that we need to feel secure in our differences and in the differences of others to feel at home in the current political climate. Chapters Five, Six and Seven will examine the conditions under which cultural pluralism can be developed as a feature of a political community. I draw from the work of scholars from a range of disciplines including social theory, geography and anthropology to develop a case for cultural pluralism as a means for a wide range of individuals and groups to express a sense of identity and security.

In order to situate the contemporary debate on security it is necessary to contextualise the term and examine its links to systems of modern governance. Chapter One will trace the

epistemology of the concept of security in modern political thought. The dominant conception of security is strongly influenced by the intellectual tradition of realism that privileges the state as the primary subject of security.\textsuperscript{17} By linking the survival of individual citizens to the survival of the nation, national leaders enforce a form of vigilance among the population. Individuals are compelled to make certain sacrifices and to accept the increased militarisation of society, often at the expense of certain civil liberties.\textsuperscript{18} Chapter One will provide an analysis of how modern security is a form of political technology that is central to the operation of modern power and the preservation of the nation state. Following on from the work of scholars such as Benedict Anderson and Zygmunt Bauman, I will argue that the nation state is an artificial construct that relies upon the production of ‘others’ and the collective resentment of difference in order to define the boundaries of the political community.\textsuperscript{19} Chapter One will examine the role of security discourse in constructing and managing social categories and in determining what rights the members of each social group have.\textsuperscript{20} In the literature review I will also consider the initiatives in the fields of postmodernism and critical theory that have made the case for a new approach to security. In particular, the group of scholars who can loosely be referred to as human security theorists have made an impact in this area.\textsuperscript{21} Although these are important contributions, to date, they have had a limited impact on mainstream International Relations.

Chapter Two will explore the links between nation, home and security. In the popular imagination, the national homeland is presented as a site of safety and familiarity for citizens. The homeland is a space in which citizens can predict the behaviour of fellow citizens as a result of their shared cultural characteristics, values and common historical experiences. Chapter Two will examine the extent to which the protection of the homeland relies on the exploitation and discrimination of minorities. Within the national homeland, some individuals and groups feel more at home than others. As a result of the various social and political hierarchies that exist in the nation, making a home in the nation is easier for politically dominant groups. The process of home-making is intrinsically linked to the pursuit

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} B. Buzan, \textit{People, States, and Fear}, p.36
\item \textsuperscript{18} J. J Pettman, ‘National Identity and Security’ in G. Smith and St. John Kettle (eds.), \textit{Threats Without Boarders}, N.S.W: Pluto Press, p.54
\end{itemize}
of individual and collective security. Although the desire to feel at home is a shared need among human beings, there is great variation in the way that individuals engage in home-making practices. Despite the wide range of conceptions and practices of home, there is one version of home that is most commonly associated with national security. The prevailing conception of home that features in security discourse is linked to modern notions of privacy, familiarity, enclosure and fixity.\textsuperscript{22} Home is a powerful metaphor that is used to consolidate the abstract bonds of nation community.\textsuperscript{23} The metaphor of home is used to enforce certain norms of domesticity and power asymmetry that naturalise hierarchies within the nation.

Chapter Two will argue that it is difficult and at times impossible for minority groups to feel secure when the national homeland naturalise practices and beliefs that privilege the interests of the politically dominant group.

Chapter three will begin by asking the question: how do patterns of mobility and processes of globalisation, which are characteristic of the contemporary era, challenge the dominant understanding of what makes a political community secure? The dominant conception of security posits that human territoriality realised through the framework of the nation state is the most effective way to achieve a secure and cohesive society.\textsuperscript{24} However, Chapter Three will contend that, in some cases, the enjoyment of prosperity, safety and freedom is enhanced through mobility. Territoriality is considered to be a key feature of individual and collective security.\textsuperscript{25} However, in a historical and in a contemporary setting, many individuals engage in a range of non-territorial forms of behaviour as a part of their search for security and a sense of home.\textsuperscript{26} Chapter Three will argue that the practices of people on the move, both within and between nations, suggest that security can be pursued in ways that by-pass the authority of the state. It is in this context that I will re-cast the concept of home as a process rather than an endpoint. Home-making is an ongoing process that is difficult to sustain when it is linked to the pursuit of enclosed spaces and homogenous cultural sites.\textsuperscript{27} Using the theoretical

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item C. V. Chang, \textit{Territoriality and the Westernization Imperative: Antecedents and Consequences}, Landham, University of America, 2008, p.10
\item D. Massey, ‘A place called home?’, \textit{Space, Place and Gender}, 1992, p.157
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
framework of Martin Heidegger, in Chapter Three I explore the concept of homemaking as a process that is fundamental to the articulation of identity and community.\(^{28}\) When home is re-cast as a process of building and becoming it can be linked to the way in which humans dwell to secure their place in the world. The ability to move is crucial to this pursuit.

In Chapter Four, I examine the homemaking practices of migrants as one form of security practice that is based on the ability to move. Migrant groups that re-settle either permanently or temporarily are often political minorities in their host countries. Consequently, migrants must look beyond the nation (both the home and the host nation) to establish a sense of home and security. Migrant communities (re-)construct their homes with reference to multiple sites, people and processes. I will take the diaspora as a particular form of group identification that can enable migrants to resist marginalisation and insecurity through a form of transnational activism.\(^{29}\) Transnational migrants build their homes using resources from their new place of origin, but also from the diaspora and their homeland. Throughout this chapter I will argue that forms of extra-state community such as the diaspora can operate to reduce the reliance of individuals on the state as the sole provider of protection. Furthermore, it can enhance the security of groups that are marginalised in a national context through participation in transnational and sub-national networks.\(^{30}\) The practices that members of a diaspora engage in to establish a sense of home and security demonstrate that homemaking is a process that goes beyond territorial and temporal limitations and that mediates between the global and the local. In Chapter Four, I will also look back to indigenous traditions of cultural and economic exchange to demonstrate that connections between differently situated cultural communities were strong and sustained prior to the consolidation of the modern nation state. These connections relied on the ability to move and the fluid nature of political and cultural boundaries.

In modern political theory, the key source of the political identity of individuals is the nation state. However, for groups who rely on extra-state communities such as a diaspora to establish a sense of identity, political identity cannot be defined exclusively with reference to the state. This project aims to unsettle the notion that security is best achieved through


uniformity and the homogenisation of the cultural identities of groups living in a political community. Chapter Five will develop the argument that individuals have fractured and multiple identities that intersect with multiple communities. The chapter begins with a discussion of the theory of cultural assimilation and the implications it has for the security of marginalised groups. In the majority of nation states there are some individuals and groups who cannot identify with the culture and ideology of the dominant group for a variety of reasons. Chapter Five will advance the argument that it is possible to establish common ground in a multi-ethnic society; however, it is vital to recognise that the bonds between individuals will always be contestable and temporary.\textsuperscript{31} Marginalised groups have political needs and aspirations that relate to the ability of members of those groups to construct a sense of home and security. Chapter Five will explore some of those distinct needs of marginalised groups and examine the features of a political society that must be in place for the society to be sensitive to those needs.

Chapter Six focuses on the everyday practices that facilitate cultural pluralism within a political community. I begin the chapter with a discussion of cosmopolitanism as a theory and set of practices that can foster pluralism and allow a wider range of individuals and groups to pursue security. The chapter will explore the conditions under which cultural groups can co-exist in a peaceful environment based on mutual dependence and respect for each other’s differences. Drawing from the work of Julia Kristeva on the concept of ‘mutual estrangement’, I argue that individuals find common ground by recognising the other within and by extending hospitality to others who are differently situated.\textsuperscript{32} In Chapter Six, I argue that the local knowledge of people on the ground should be privileged over the knowledge of security experts. Creating resilient communities is linked to the ability of individuals to be able to ‘self-secure’ and to work together with others in their communities to build security frameworks over time.

In the final chapter of the thesis, I analyse the relationship between spatiality and security. Traditionally, in the liberal public sphere of social and political action, individuals are discouraged from expressing their differences. In the most extreme cases, the differences of the other are characterised by the dominant group(s) as a threat to the security of the

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society. In Chapter Seven, I argue that attempts by the state or the politically dominant group to control the use of public space hinder the ability of some groups to feel secure in their political community and to establish a sense of belonging. The organisation of public space has a direct bearing on the ability of individuals to express a sense of identity and to feel at home in both a public and a private setting. A comparison will be made between two competing trends that are emerging in modern cities in response to increased mobility and diversity. On the one hand, there is a trend in some cities among elite and middle-class groups to isolate themselves from the encounter with difference through social segregation. On the other hand, there is a trend in some urban settings to facilitate the integration of diverse cultural groups within a defined geographic area.

In Chapter Seven, I will specifically examine the phenomena of ‘gated communities’ as a manifestation of the modern pursuit of security that is played out in an urban setting. Another form of spatial segregation that should be considered in re-thinking security is the division between rural and urban populations. I will argue that it is important not to neglect those who stay behind as well as those who move in pursuit of social and economic opportunities. In Chapter Seven, I argue that some marginal groups employ strategies of resistance by inhabiting the margins of public space—the borders—and exerting influence on the majority group from that position. Drawing from the work of bell hooks and R.B.J. Walker I will suggest that the border provides a good starting point for theorising the politics of difference.

It is impossible to critique modern security without challenging the very foundations of modern politics. According to Dillon, security is concerned with the very grounds of the political itself; it is a foundation of the modern political order. William Connolly agrees with Dillon that we need to reflect upon the normative boundaries of theory and to pluralise our approach to the understanding of the political and to its practical application. My task,
therefore, is to not only address key security dilemmas but to critically reflect upon the entire project of modernity that is, in part, created and sustained through the operation of security. I aim to demonstrate that a political culture based on the celebration of difference can provide more scope for the achievement of individual and collective security than the approach adopted by the majority of nation states.

The methodology of this thesis will draw from the important work of postmodern and post-structural scholars who have critiqued the project of modernity and highlighted the divergence between the key ideals and their practical implementation. However, I also aim to provide a substantive way forward that recognises the need to theorise and to develop new frameworks for thinking about security. This thesis will critique the current practices of modern state-creation and state-preservative. However, my aim is not to replace the state with another uniform ideal of political community. Rather, my aim is to argue for change in approach to security that may lead to the development of more imaginative forms of political community that may fit within or outside of the current framework. I aim to open up the field of security studies to include theories and practices from outside the familiar disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies. In adopting this interdisciplinary approach I will be guided by scholars such as William Connolly and Michael Dillon who combine philosophical critique, political insight and empirical examples to produce a strategic intervention into the security debate.  

A number of scholars have cautioned that we must be careful about what is taken for granted in political theory and practice, especially in relation to those myths of origin, such as security, which are linked to other base concepts such as freedom and democracy. The thesis will sit firmly within a postmodern framework that acknowledges the subject position of the author and the impossibility of an objective and scientific approach to complex world dilemmas. In his critique of positivism and humanism, Richard Rorty argues that projects like philosophy, which aim to see how language relates to the world are ultimately “impossible attempts to step outside our skins—within which we do our thinking and self-criticism—and compare ourselves with something absolute”. Throughout the thesis I will adopt an

39 J. Der Derian, ‘Becoming Connolly’, p.276
41 ibid., xix
approach that is based on the recognition that our understanding of the world is inseparable from the languages we employ to describe it.\textsuperscript{42}

Modern disciplines of knowledge establish the rules of intellectual exchanges and define the methods, techniques and instruments that are considered appropriate for the pursuit of knowledge about the political. Consequently, the modernist approach to security aims to neatly separate security from the study of other socio-cultural and political phenomena. Such disciplinary structures limit the range of what can be thought, talked about and written. The study of security needs to be opened up to allow a wider range of permissible ideas and actions that can be linked to security. This thesis will draw from a range of academic fields including anthropology, cultural studies, critical theory and literature. I will also draw from a broad range of source material including fiction and popular culture. It is often in these unconventional sources that the stories of marginal political actors who are living and doing security differently can be found.

By changing the way we approach the study and practice of security it becomes clear that there is a need to reflect critically on our entire approach to the study and practices of politics. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to understand the political phenomena and then address the complex dilemmas that emanate from them.\textsuperscript{43} This requires a reorientation of thought and action and a shift away from the harmonious ‘common sense’ imposed by a few dominant faculties. In re-shaping our approach to security, Robert Cox suggests that it is important to focus not on the limiting structures of the past but rather on key current and future issues.\textsuperscript{44} Cox argues for an issues-based approach rather than a structural/historical approach to the study of security that includes priorities such as assuring protection for the most vulnerable and effective arrangements for negotiating and avoiding conflict.\textsuperscript{45} An issues-based approach encourages us to understand the world “as people are making it”, rather than attempting to apply historical theory to new and complex problems.\textsuperscript{46} It is important to recognise that political structures are the result of human creation; therefore they are historical, not natural, structures. Throughout the thesis, I argue for an approach that reflects upon the emergence of new issues as well as the acknowledgement of historical

\textsuperscript{42} R. Cox, ‘The point is not just to explain the world but to change it’ in C. Rev-Smith and D. Snid, \textit{The Oxford Handbook of International Relations}, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.86
\textsuperscript{43} R. Bleiker, ‘Forget IR Theory’, \textit{Alternatives}, 22, 1997, p.61
\textsuperscript{44} R. Cox, ‘The point is not just to explain the world’, p.87
\textsuperscript{45} ibid., p.87
\textsuperscript{46} ibid., p.87
structures and the extent to which these affect configurations of power. As Roland Bleiker adeptly states, in adopting this approach, “the inherently contingent nature of political life is revealed”. 47

There are remarkable similarities in the way that nation states theorise and practice national security in the late modern period. I aim to question the base assumptions that fixity and stability are guarantors of a secure society. While a number of nation states continue to promote cultural homogenisation as a desirable feature of the national homeland, in reality, the majority of national populations comprise of individuals who share the condition of mutual estrangement. 48 Mutual estrangement will be discussed in the thesis as a concept that can be linked to co-existence and social stability. The practitioners of modern security rarely acknowledge the diversity that exists within and between their political communities. Furthermore, there is a reluctance to acknowledge that there individuals are engaging in practices at a sub-national and transnational level that challenge the dominant approach to security.

The thesis will argue that in order to extend security to a wider range of individuals and groups a shift in the mindset of academics, policy-makers and citizens is needed. It is only through the acknowledgement that we are all strange and foreign in some way that societies themselves can become plural rather then merely being plural in their composition. We need to challenge the knowledge formations that ‘prove’ the necessity of a singular approach to security simply because there is a widespread mythical belief in it. My purpose is not only to critique the dominant approach to security but also to reflect more broadly on the way that politics is theorised and practiced. The link between security and identity is key to developing a new approach that places people rather than states at the forefront. By examining the forces that are constitutive of political identity we may discover innovative ways to confront the dilemmas of world politics.

We need to look within national boarders and beyond them to find new possibilities of association and solidarity. 49 When one looks beyond the conventional disciplines on International Relations and Strategic Studies, it is evident that some individuals and groups are already engaging in alternative security practices. Throughout the thesis I will argue that

47 R. Bleiker, ‘Forget IR Theory’, p.61
48 J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.192
mobility and diversity are the two key pillars upon which a new approach to security should be based. We live in a world in which increasing numbers of people find themselves living with others in societies with constantly changing populations. Our response to the everyday conditions of mobility and diversity must acknowledge that every individual has a need to express a sense of identity and to feel a part of a community. Political identity is key to the individual and collective pursuit of security. This project is an attempt to explore just some of the ways in which a conceptual and practical change is possible.
One Situating modern security: Whose security? At what cost?

Security is undeniably the catch—cry of the current political age— it saturates the language of modern politics. However, a number of crises since the end of the Cold War have demonstrated the insecurity of ordinary people and the inability of states to protect them. The term security has universal appeal, yet it labels very different types of order, conflict and political community. Political elites identify security threats and propose solutions to eliminate these threats with a degree of certainty and surety that is far removed from the reality on the ground. Indeed, part of the power of the term ‘security’ lies in the very slipperiness of its definition and the lack of clarification around its application. As Helga Haftendorn notes, there is “no common understanding of what security is, how it can be conceptualised or what its most relevant research questions are”. Contemporary debates over what security is and how to achieve it cover a wide spectrum of assumptions and deeper theoretical issues relating to what and to whom the term refers. Across a range of political positions, the object of security and the means of achieving it remain diverse and contested.

One of the key problems with the modern security discourse relates to the way that it is theorised and studied both in the West and in former colonial countries. In academic literature, the concept of security has not been subjected to the same level of intellectual scrutiny as other fundamental concepts in modern political theory such as justice, freedom, equality, representation, and power. This neglect is due, in part, to the presumption that the pursuit of security is a necessary and natural practice of statecraft and that it is human need. Consequently, the term is often used uncritically and imprecisely. There is no scholarly or popular consensus on who and what constitute the security subjects that require the protection of the state and its institutions. Conversely, there is little agreement over who or what constitute the objects of security policy— the people and things that are considered to threaten the subjects of security. There remains immense variation in the interpretation of the term and in the identification of threats and dangers within the academy. Despite this variance, the dominant approach to the study of security has narrowed the concept down to a singular interpretation as part of the attempt to apply scientific vigour to a range of phenomena that cannot be rationalised or objectified. Contemporary practice and thinking on security reflects

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50 A. Burke, *In Fear of Security*, p.15  
51 H. Haftendorn, ‘The Security Puzzle’, p.15  
52 P. Digeser, ‘The Concept of Security’, p.1
the broader influence of modern political philosophy over alternative philosophies of life and politics. Consequently, a dominant approach to security has emerged in the West and in former colonised countries based on the primacy of the nation state as the key subject and the key provider of security. Throughout the thesis I will argue that viewing security through a modernist frame stifles the debate on security and limits the range of subjects that are considered within the security paradigm.

This chapter will provide a context for the current theory and practice of modern security. I will critically examine the dominant modern conception of security with reference to four key themes: the state, identity, territoriality and insecurity. In each category, a dominant ideas and practices of security has emerged that privileges the state and the interest and needs of particular groups living within modern states. Chapter One will examine the links between the consolidation of the modern state with its fixed borders and boundaries, and the use of security as a political tool of modern statecraft. This analysis will suggest reasons why the modern conception has spread throughout the West and the ex-colonial countries with such fervour. Chapter One will outline some of the consequences for marginalised groups of the pursuit of one particular approach to security over all others. Throughout the discussion I will suggest avenues for exploration of alternative ways in which security can be studied– these areas of inquiry will be explored in later chapters.

**Security and the modern state**

*There is no security outside the state; no state without security.*

The association between security and the state is a legacy in the contemporary political climate that can be traced back to the very origins of the modern state and liberal political philosophy. There is a close link in early modern political thought between security and political community. In the work of early modern theorists such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, security is considered to be constitutive of rights-bearing subjects, including individuals, the state and the nation. Without security, according to Hobbes, there can be no political subject and no conception of what rights those subjects have. According to Hobbes anarchy is a natural state and human must artificially construct peace through the creation of

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54 *ibid.*, p.10
governments and military forces.\textsuperscript{56} Survival, self-preservation and security are, according to realists, achieved by having a strong military and preparing for war whether it comes or not.

In the contemporary climate, security is commonly associated with the discipline of International Relations—the body of thought that provides meaning and justification to the system of international states. The ‘international’ is characterised by conflicts of power and interest among nations who exist in a state of natural anarchy. Consequently, the most important aspect of security for states is the pursuit of their self-interest and the defence of their borders through the actual and threatened use of force. E. H. Morgenthau argues that:

\begin{quote}
Being a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realised....[Political realism] appeals to historic precedent rather than abstract principles, and aims at the resolution of the lesser evil rather than the absolute good.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

Contemporary scholars draw from the work of classical realists including Hobbes and Morgenthau by employing the Hobbesian view of the state of nature to current security dilemmas. Kenneth Waltz states that:

\begin{quote}
The state amongst states, conducts its affairs in the shadow of violence. Because some states may use force at any time, all must be prepared to do so.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

This quote sums up the realist approach to security as it references the state and declares that the violent and anarchical nature of the international system is the basis a militaristic approach to security. Realists see power as being crucial to security. The power of the state is derived from having a strong military and pursuing some sort of military capacity as a method of defence or to expand.\textsuperscript{59} Waltz goes so far as to say that

Although there is some variation in International Relations theory, the state remains the key referent of security and political authority in the majority of the literature. Sovereign states

\textsuperscript{58} K. Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1979, p.102
are conceived of as the principal actors in the international system, operating in an anarchical environment in which no overarching authority exists. To ensure survival, states cannot rely on international institutions or on the good-will of other states. The absence of an authoritative, global government forces states to act in their own self-interest in order to survive. States must actively engage in self-help arrangements that are manifested in the development and deployment of military power. Consequently, in inter-state relations, the actions of states are determined by their comparative level of power. This power is derived primarily from their military and economic capabilities of states.

Knowledge, in modern political thought, is structured according to a system of binary opposites in which concepts are constituted as essential and self-present by virtue of something they expel: rationality by superstition, truth by opinion, facts by values and objectivity by subjectivity. The concept of security in modern political philosophy has been analysed through an empirical lens. Consequently, a scientific body of knowledge about security has emerged that theorists claim can be applied objectively to the ‘real world’. The history of security or strategic studies is characterised by critical theorists as an academic search for an objective, scientific endpoint at which the laws governing the realm of security are eventually uncovered. Realist scholar Stephen Walt locates security studies within the discipline of the social sciences – a knowledge discipline based on the search for timeless, objective laws and truth that explain human phenomena. As a consequence of the epistemological foundation of security studies, the discipline is based on a series of foundational claims. These are presented as facts that remain central to the current pursuit of national security.

61 M. Dillon, Politics of Security, p.14
61 ibid., p.10
61 T. Hobbes, On the citizen, p.4
61 H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.16
64 K. Krause, M. C. Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security’, p.37
The conventional approach to security assesses the security of a state in terms of its capacity to defend its borders based on measurable indicators such as weaponry, the size of the armed forces and the amount and quality of intelligence gathering. It is assumed that those states with greatest military capacity are the most secure and provide the highest level of safety for their citizens. National militarisation, the development of conventional and nuclear weapons and the strengthening of state intelligence-gathering mechanisms are considered to be effective methods to guarantee the security of the state. However, throughout this thesis I will question whether militarisation enhances the security of the state and its people. Sources of insecurity for the state and the citizenry originate from a range of phenomena influenced by socio-cultural, geo-political, ideological and environmental factors. Many of these sources of threat are non-military in nature and, in some cases; they can be aggravated and sustained by the use of force. However, there is general consensus within the field of International Relations that the pursuit of national security is concerned primarily with developing military solutions, even to those problems that arise from non-military sources.

In International Relations theory, states have a monopoly over the use of force within a defined jurisdiction. Force is considered necessary for states to protect themselves from other states and non-state threats. The use of force by states is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international diplomacy according to realists. It is considered to be a legitimate and necessary tool of foreign policy and diplomacy for states. As Carl von Clausewitz famously stated: war is "the continuation of politics by other means". Within this framework, states are awarded the ability to use force to defend themselves against other states and non-state actors that are seen to threaten their security. The use of military force, when viewed as diplomacy by other means, is considered to be a stabilising and peace making force in International Relations because it can be used to restore the equilibrium between competing states.

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When security is defined through a realist framework, the range of questions that can be asked about security threats and the solutions that are proposed to counter them is limited.\textsuperscript{71} The state-centric and militaristic worldview of security forecloses the possibility that there are other zones of belonging and forms of protection for individuals and communities beyond and within the nation state. In later chapters of the thesis I will explore forms of extra-state and sub-state belonging that can create conditions of security for individuals and groups. In conventional security discourse, the state is considered to be the most deserving referent of security. This tradition dates back to the very beginnings of states and it is reflected in contemporary international law and International Relations theory.\textsuperscript{72} This state-centric view tends to neglect the insecurity experienced by individuals, groups and communities at the sub-state level.\textsuperscript{73} The security of citizens is identified as being synonymous with the state, and by definition, those who stand outside it are considered to be potential threats to the state and the citizenry. It is often implied that there is an organic unity between the people and their state to the extent that the state is able to represent the views and the interests of its population.\textsuperscript{74} In popular, and even some academic discourses, the terms ‘country’, ‘nation’ and ‘state’ are used interchangeably. Consequently, the security of the state is often conflated with the security of the people.

State security policies do not serve or represent all their citizens equally. Consequently, the impact of security policies and practices falls unequally and disproportionately on minority communities within states. We see this most clearly in openly divided societies where political power is competed for among leaders of rival groups or where class divisions are so pronounced that the security of the rulers and ruled does not define a common interest.\textsuperscript{75} However, the uneven distribution of the economic and social burden of state security across populations and regions is relevant to the large majority of states.\textsuperscript{76} Even in most democratic states, security debates are opaque and lend themselves easily to distortion and manipulation if they are communicated to the general public.\textsuperscript{77} The national security portfolio has a privileged position in public policy and political debates because of the view that it is highly

\textsuperscript{71} A. Burke, \textit{In Fear of Security}, p.26
\textsuperscript{73} A. Linklater, \textit{Beyond Realism and Marxism}, p.3
\textsuperscript{74} S. C. Nolutshungu., ‘Introduction’, p.3
\textsuperscript{75} S. C. Nolutshungu., S., C., ‘Introduction’, p.3
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{ibid.}, p.4
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{ibid.}, p.3
secretive and should be confined to debate among experts. Citizens are asked to ‘trust’ their
governments rather than understand or critical evaluate national security policy.\textsuperscript{78} In re-re-
thinking our approach to security we need to seriously question the assumed “unity” and
“representativity” between state and people, rather than assuming it is a given.

In the international system of states individuals are provided with various degrees of
protection through the framework of national citizenship. Citizenship is designed to protect
the individual from external and internal threats. However, the assumption that the state is the
most efficient and appropriate provider of security obscures the ways in which citizenship is
at the heart of many structures of insecurity and how security in the contemporary world may
be threatened by dynamics far beyond the parameters of the nation state.\textsuperscript{79} The range of rights
and benefits associated with citizenship are generally not granted to all inhabitants of the
territory of the state. For example, new migrants, guest workers and ethnic minorities are
sometimes excluded from citizenship frameworks.\textsuperscript{80} In this case, the state systematically
ignores the security needs of some minorities living within its borders. Furthermore, it is
important to note that some individuals experience forms of discrimination and disadvantage
despite the fact that they hold citizenship to a particular nation.

The political apparatus and the official and unofficial institutions of power in many states are
often dominated by members of a particular cultural or ethnic group who constitute the
political majority.\textsuperscript{81} Consequently, the security of minorities may be endangered as a result of
the actions and attitudes the national majority, or indeed, by the state itself. The politically
dominant group within a nation are often but not always the numerically dominant group in
the territory; they are usually economically privileged and have significant control over the
public and civil institutions. As a result of the concentration of power and privilege within
nations, some cultural groups are systematically excluded from political, economic and
cultural institutions. Their exclusion from political institutions and civil society has profound
effects on their ability to express a sense of identity and community and to establish a sense
of belonging in the nation. A central argument running throughout the thesis will be that
individuals and groups are unable to establish a sense of security if they are not able to

\textsuperscript{78} ibid., p.3
\textsuperscript{79} J. Hyndman, ‘Conflict, citizenship, and human security: geographies of protection’ in D. Cowen and E.
\textsuperscript{80} S. C. Nolutshungu., ‘Introduction’, p.23
\textsuperscript{81} S. C. Nolutshungu., ‘Introduction’, p.18
confidently express their identity and to feel part of one or more cultural communities. In later chapters, the thesis will carve out a revised role of the state in the provision of security for minorities and explore the potential of extra-state security frameworks for minorities.

**Identity and Security: The Making of the Modern State**

The constitution of social identities is highly influential in defining which groups of people are the *subjects* of security policy and which groups form the *objects* that are the targets of security policy.  

As the previous section of the chapter established that the dominant approach to security identifies the key *subjects* and the *objects* of security policy based on the primacy of the state and the presumption that members of the dominant cultural group must be protected against threatening nonnationals. The key subject in the pursuit of national security is the national homeland—the territorial and ideological space that provides protection, safety and familiarity for those individuals who hold citizenship in the nation. The protection of the national majority refers in part to the physical security of citizens and their right to live without fear of violence, destruction of their property or war. However, national security is also concerned with the protection of a set of cultural values, practices and ideas that the majority group consider to be integral to their sense of identity, community and home.  

Identities are often represented as natural and fixed. However, postcolonial and post modern scholars have highlighted that all identities are contingent on the external environment and are subject to continuous re-definition and challenge. Identities are never static or natural, consequently, the categorisation of security subjects and objects changes over time and across locations. Post-structuralist scholar James Der Derian demonstrates this point with reference to America’s use foreign policy to construct security subjects and objects that change according to the political dynamics of the time. Der Derian argues that any analysis of security should begin with the question: whose security? The question of whose security is being prioritised by the state can only be answered through an examination of the discursive practices and linguistic structures that determine which individuals and groups form a part of the political majority and which others remain on the margins.

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82 M. Dillon, *Politics of Security*, p.14  
83 B. Buzan, ‘Introduction’, p.2  
84 J. Der Derian., *On Diplomacy*, p.12
The discourse of modern security presents the nation state and the international system as natural, timeless and politically cohesive entities. However, a number of critical theorists have worked to historicise these categories and to inquire into how and why such concepts appear ‘real’ and natural in the disciplines of International Relations and Security Studies. There is an emerging body of literature which suggests that the identities of states and the nature of relations between states are fluid and temporary processes rather than objective realities. The nation state is an entity that is enacted through the use of practices that systematically disguise the complexities and contradictions that brings that state into being. As R. B. J. Walker highlights, “the very language in which we speak about the state is scarcely separable from the practices through which the state has been constituted historically.” The purist of security by political elites is one such political discourse that operates to constitute a political community and the state rather than to merely defend its borders. Advancing a similar claim, William Connolly views the discourse of International Relations as being in a constant state of construction through discursive and performative acts of diplomacy, statecraft and intervention. From this perspective, modern political theory cannot be separated from the very production of sovereignty and the identity of the state.

The pursuit of modern security assists in consolidating the identity and the borders of the state through the construction of a safe inside and a threatening outside. Security is fundamental to the consolidation of modern sovereignty and state identity because it assists in the establishment of the physical and metaphysical boundaries of the nation state. The discourse of national security does not merely function to protect a state’s identity and interests; rather, it is constitutive of its character and identity. Poststructuralist scholar Judith Butler suggests that the nation state has no originary or sovereign presence but rather is the result of performative constitution. The identity of the state is legitimated through the concepts of foreign policy, national security and state sovereignty, which involve the repetition of certain ideas and practices. According to Butler, the state can be more accurately

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85 R. Bleiker, *A Divided Korea*, p.10
88 J. Der Derian, ‘Becoming Connolly’, p.279
89 D. Campbell, and M. Schoolman, ‘Introduction’, p.9
understood as “tenuously constituted in time…through the stylised repetition of acts.”

Modern states are contingent on recognition by other states. The contemporary international order is not a natural, ahistorical condition. Rather it is a system of states that are products of a long history of violence and contestation for political power associated with the consolidation of modernity and colonialism. Recognising the historical contingency of the modern state allows for the possibility of moving beyond the narrow conception of the political community and ‘the international’ offered by realists in favour of a more historically accurate and nuanced understanding of the contemporary system of nation states.

It is important to critique the logic that creates modern identities and organises them in a hierarchical fashion. Poststructuralist scholars Butler and Joan Scott present a powerful critique of modern identity that is useful for examining the role of national security in the constitution of the modern state. Butler and Scott argue that identity is a deceptive and potentially dangerous construct of discourse. Its effect is to categorise people into groups that determine their access to political power and social capital. Categories such as “woman” or “worker” do not refer to pre-existing groups or natural entities. These categories have meaning only by virtue of the system of differences that make up our language. Butler and Scott argue that the distinctive ways in which these identities have been defined in our culture is a product of the discursive logics that govern our language and our everyday practices. When such discursively defined identities are perceived as natural and incontestable, they serve a disciplinary function that regulates individual behaviour, influences social policy and shapes our own perceptions of ourselves. The poststructuralist critique raises the question: what discursive mechanisms underlie our presuppositions about what constitutes security and what counts as “politics”?

When political elites speak of ‘the nation’, ‘the national interest’ and the national ‘we’ they do so as if these categories are self-evident and natural. However, in the same way that national boundaries and state identities are constructed as a result of performative acts, the political identity of the members of a nation is crafted through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an ‘inside’ from ‘outside’, ‘Self’ from ‘Other, and ‘home’ from

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91 D. Campbell, *Writing Security*, p.9
94 J. W. Scott, ‘Experience’, p.32
‘abroad’. Different ways of categorising individuals and groups bears directly on the constitution of national identity and on the construction of the subjects and objects of national security.\textsuperscript{95} The discourse of national security assists in the consolidation of the boundaries of the national community by characterising certain types of people as subjects in need of protection and others as potential threats to their security. Threat construction provides the basis for a generalised experience of Self and Other in a domestic and an international setting.\textsuperscript{96}

As a part of the consolidation of the state, the politically dominant group, which is formed on the basis of one or more of the categories of race, ethnicity, class, religion and sexuality, will attempt to normalise their own identity, culture and interests through controlling the means of knowledge construction about themselves and others.\textsuperscript{97} In this process ‘others’, minority nations, races, ethnicities and sexualities are routinely absent so that their exclusion is considered natural. Minorities become visible only through a form of difference that is constructed as deviant and threatening to the dominant majority group.\textsuperscript{98} It is important to note that the politically dominant group does not always constitute the largest numerical group living within a nation state. They are the group with access to the largest amount of political power and socio-economic capital. Consequently, the culture/value-system and the specific expressions of identity and community linked to the dominant group are naturalised within the national community and are promoted by the state as values that all members of the nation should hold. The dominance of the political majority in public and civil institutions leads to the creation of marginalised groups within the nation, some of which may be numerically larger than the majority.

The process of defining ‘who’ and ‘what’ belongs to each sovereign state in the international system is fundamental to the construction of the subjects and objects of national security. Within the modern system of states it matters where one belongs— not only for the purpose of individual self-identification but also in the context to which it is gainful to belong. In this competitive environment, individuals struggle to be recognised as security subjects primarily through the discourse of citizenship. In the majority of states there are marginal populations whose integration to the society and the state is markedly incomplete so that their

\textsuperscript{95} J. J. Pettman., ‘National Identity and security, p.53
\textsuperscript{96} J. Der Derian,, On Diplomacy, p.12
\textsuperscript{97} J. J. Pettman, ‘National Identity and Security’, p.54
\textsuperscript{98} S. Dalby, Environmental Security, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p.9
participation is partial, intermittent or subject to special qualifications or restrictions.\textsuperscript{99} Marginal groups are often individuals from the same ethnicity; however, they may also be drawn together as a result of caste, class, religion, geography, and ecology. Although marginality implies discrimination, the problem cannot be reduced to one of ethnic or racial discrimination alone.\textsuperscript{100}

Marginal groups are distinguishable from the larger population by their shared characteristics (culture, language, religion) and/or their situation (social, economic, geographic). However, it is important to note that such characteristics are not unequivocal or objective. The boundaries between groups are often blurred and shift according to political priorities. Indeed, the unicity of the marginal population is usually an ideological and political construction.\textsuperscript{101} Of greater importance than its own characteristics is what distinguishes a group’s relationship to the state and to other groups as ‘other’, ‘alien’ or ‘recalcitrant’ and as the objects of security policy. How do people understand the marginal group and their social existence? There are no unique characteristics that determine marginality. The differentiating features around which people are marginalised in one society may not have the same significance in another society. Types of marginal community include: cultural and ethnic minorities, indigenous groups, diasporas, communities of displaced peoples, labour migrants and economic underclasses in industrialised and industrialising countries.\textsuperscript{102} Through this study I hope to demonstrate that these groups and others are currently left out or victimised under the dominant approach to security.

Marginal groups generally feel excluded from the national community at large, in part, because they are unable to identify with the national community and the dominant national culture of a state. A number of scholars have attempted to arrive at an objective definition of the nation or at least to develop an inventory of traits that a group must possess in order to be considered a national community. This approach assumes the ‘reality’ of the nation and the national community and ignores the contingency of the nation’s precarious existence.\textsuperscript{103} The search for an objective definition of the nation legitimises the claims made by nationalists that by sharing a set of natural characteristics and attributes individuals can be integrated into

\textsuperscript{99} S. C. Nolutshugn, ‘Introduction’, p.18
\textsuperscript{100} \textit{ibid.}, p.18
\textsuperscript{101} \textit{ibid.}, p.18
\textsuperscript{102} \textit{ibid.}, p.23
the spatial and temporal unity of the nation. However, the forms of being-in-common that constitute a national community are always an artefact of boundary setting, established through glossing over the points of difference between members of a group.\(^\text{104}\)

In nationalist discourse the differences of non-members are represented as powerful and decisive separating factors. Individual members of a political community will always have certain attributes, beliefs or characteristics that differentiate them from other members of the political community. Nationalism, however, is an ideology that masks the differences between members and suggests that homogeneity is a basis for membership to a political community. In this sense it is the “ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses”.\(^\text{105}\) Individuals within a nation are usually a part of more than one community; they may belong to a nation, a religious group, a local community organisation and a political lobby group all at the one time and feel different loyalties to each community in different contexts. A number of these forms of community that individuals identify with are voluntary and are weighed differently by community members. The requirement of being a part of a national community however is generally not presented as a form of community that citizens can opt out of if they choose to.\(^\text{106}\) Those who do not show a willingness to be a part of the national community are often considered as potential threats to the cohesiveness of the nation.

At a general level, nationalism can be thought of as one of the large groups of *we-talks* in which identities and counter-identities are conceived and through which they are sustained. The term refers to the discursive field of ‘knowledge’ about the nation that is used to distinguish a community by its difference from other communities.\(^\text{107}\) Nationalism tends to promote binary divisions between friends and enemies, familiar/strange and domestic/international. Despite the certainty and clarity with which identities and communal loyalties are articulated, national identities are almost always contested, fragile and unsure. This is largely because the concept of the nation stands and falls by the security of its borders, and the borders are often impossible to fully safeguard. The ‘we’ formed on the basis of inclusion, acceptance and confirmation is the realm of gratifying safety cut out (never very

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\(^{104}\) J. J. Pettman, ‘National Identity and Security’, p.54


\(^{107}\) Z. Bauman, ‘Soil, Blood, Identity’, p.680
securely or absolutely) from the threatening wilderness of the outside inhabited by ‘them’. It is for this reason that the desire to feel part of community seems to be one of the most universal human needs. The safety of being part of a community is not felt unless the ‘we’ are trusted to possess the binding power of acceptance and the strength to protect those already accepted. In this sense, national identity is secured only when the powers that have certified it seem to prevail over the enemies constructed in the process of their self-assertion.

The link between being secure and being a part of a national community is sustained through the discourse of national security which is based on a homogenous and unified conception of community, security and belonging. National security is the vehicle through the cultural and personal subjectivity of members in defined in opposition to the threatening other.\textsuperscript{108} National security doctrines not only appeal to existing conceptions of threat and danger beyond the nation, they expand upon existing conceptions and create new sources of insecurity and threat to the nation.\textsuperscript{109} Consequently, conceptions of what makes the nation and its people secure are not objective assessments of tangible threats; rather they are products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, and of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit nation states. In the next section I will explore the fundamental link between security and insecurity in security discourse.

\textit{Security/Insecurity: A Janus-faced Relationship}

The security paradigm relies on production of images and tropes of ‘insecurity’ in order to define its own meaning and purpose. Security and insecurity are binary categories that operate to naturalise certain assumptions about what constitutes safety, order and protection. The deployment of national security involves the identification of subjects and objects of security that are seen to threaten the coherence and existence of the national homeland. This process of identifying threats to the nation is fundamental not only to the operation of the security discourse but also to the definition of the nation state itself. Difference, danger and otherness play an integral role in constituting the identity of the nation state and in naturalising the categories and practices in our political imaginary that operate to protect the state.\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{109} J. Der Derian, \textit{On Diplomacy}, p.30
\textsuperscript{110} J. Der Derian, \textit{On Diplomacy}, p.30
\end{flushright}
Fredrick Nietzsche provides a genealogy of the integral relationship between security and insecurity. He argues that the history of the politics of security is tied to a fundamental fear of insecurity. It is a history of individuals seeking an impossible ideal ‘state of security’ from the most radical “Other” of life, the terror of death. This Other is generalised and nationalised to trigger a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others—who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees.\(^{111}\) According to Nietzsche, security is based on fictional identities and myths of the past that have been created out of fear. Such images portray the state as patriarchal and protective and provoke feelings of safety and security. However, these tropes of security are also references to individual compliance and submission to state authorities.\(^{112}\)

Insecurity is a condition that humans generally seek to eliminate using various strategies to create conditions of security. The pursuit of security is a common human attribute. However, this project will also highlight that there are many alternative approaches to security beyond the nation state and the modernist conception of security that provide scope for a wider range of individuals and groups to pursue security. There are multiple conceptions of what it means to be secure and what methods and strategies should be employed to reach that state that provide scope for a wider range of individuals and groups to pursue security. The Enlightenment search for universal truth, common humanity and the dominance of man over his natural environment has played a powerful role in consolidating the modern conception of what it means for individuals and groups to be secure and the way that insecurity is viewed in the popular imagination.\(^{113}\)

In modern political thought, security is associated with the human desire to inhabit a familiar environment in which individuals have control over the natural world and one is placed in a hierarchy with other individuals. In modern life, the fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which rationality becomes the highest sign of a sovereign self and the strongest protection against contingent forces. According to Nietzsche, the desire for security manifests in humans as a form of xenophobia—the collective fear of that which is not certain, knowable or predictable.\(^{114}\) Throughout the thesis I

\(^{113}\) A. Burke, *In Fear of Security*, p.10  
will demonstrate that xenophobia underlies the majority of modern security policies and results in the fear and suspicion of difference.

According to Michael Dillon modern political thought can be conceptualised as a ‘security project’ because it is concerned with establishing a set of foundation claims “on which we can safely rest and from which we can set out without fear.” It is for this reason that security has become a value that many political theorists have put beyond question. It has come to be viewed as a part of the search for metaphysical truth itself rather than a political construct. According to Neitzche, the modern Enlightenment man:

*not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particular selected and preferred kind of explanation— that which most quickly and frequently abolished that feeling of the strange- the most habitual explanations.*

When the Enlightenment quest for rational knowledge is applied, the unknown and strange become identified as evil and hostile, which reiterates the idea that achieving security is to be premised on a vulnerable sameness. Modern political thought is pre-occupied with securing the boundaries of the political; making it certain and unquestionable. As long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable in the modernist tradition, they are considered to be secure. There is a close alliance between security and knowledge in the sense that the pursuit of knowledge in the humanist tradition is about the need for the familiar and the will to uncover everything strange and usual.

The concept of danger in the discourse of national security is not an objective condition that simply exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. This is not to imply that there are no real dangers in the world, rather, it is to recognise that dangerous situations are constructed and represented in a way that shapes the identity of both the threat and of those who are considered to be at risk. The process of interpreting how dangerous and threatening a particular phenomenon is does not depend on the existence of empirical

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115 M. Dillon, *Politics of Security*, p.20
117 M. Dillon., *Politics of security*, p.21
Rather, the articulation of danger in nationalist discourse is related to the capacity for a particular risk to be marked and framed in terms considered threatening to the nation. For example, the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick has been fundamental to the articulation of danger in the modern experience. Certain people, things and practices are labelled as security threats to the nation. This identification of threat and enemies is also linked to the power of different cultural groups within the nation. As a result the culture, values and lifestyle of the politically dominant group are often presented as the official ideology and culture of the nation as a whole. Others of the nation, such as migrants, homosexuals, religious minorities, among others, are constructed as threats. Their security is often pitted against the security of the politically dominant group.

The manipulation of the human characteristic of fear is fundamental both to the operation of modern security and to the consolidation of the identity of the nation. Ghassan Hage postulates that national identities are based on a combination of feelings of worrying and caring which closely correspond to the binary relationship between security and insecurity. Worrying and caring are emotions that result in a range of contrasting cultural practices and views on security. Worrying denotes the predominance of the emotion of fear about the fate of the nation and its inhabitants. Caring for the nation refers to the ongoing cultural practices that affirm the composition of the national group and the kinds of cultural characteristics members of that group share. Worrying is associated with individuals feeling that the nation is unsafe and under threat, while caring suggests that the nation is secure and stable.

The presence or absence of a threat to the nation is often the factor that turns national caring into worrying. When something or someone is threatening what we care for, the general sentiment of the national population can shift from an ethnic of caring to an ethnic of worrying. In this case, the sentiment of worrying becomes the unifying feeling that brings people within the nation together. In all nations there are cycles of worrying and caring in which national members move between states of fear and comfort and security and insecurity. However, according to Hage, in a number of nation states, worrying has become a dominant

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120 D. Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 2
121 *ibid.*, p. 2
122 *ibid.*, p. 5
124 G. Hage, ‘On Worrying’, p. 2
part of the national psyche rather than re-occurring sentiment that arises occasionally in relation to specific threats and enemies. National worries such as migration, illegal immigrants, crime and drug trafficking, are often based on threats that are located, either literally or symbolically, outside the boundaries of the national community.

In cases where national worrying is a dominant sentiment among the national population certain people, places, objects and process are perceived as on-going problems that necessitate constant worrying and justify stringent national security policies. In the current climate a number of threats such as terrorism, asylum seekers, nuclear weapons, rogue states, diseases and piracy are viewed as new threats to the nation. While many of these problems have historically been characterised as threatening to the nation, arguably, these threats occupy a larger role in the national security landscape than ever before. National worrying discourages individuals from conceiving of alternative modes of belonging to the nation. It also allows political elites to use the politics of fear to place increasing burden on citizens to uphold their commitments to the nation. In a political climate when citizens are worried and anxious they are more likely to support policies that restrict individual freedom. The introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005, which included a ‘shoot to kill’ clause and increased the powers of Australian authorities to search and detain potential terrorists, demonstrates the ability of political elites to introductive restrictive laws at a time when Australians were particularly worried about the threat of terrorism following a series of attacks overseas. Cultures of worrying and caring do not necessarily reflect the existence or absence of ‘real’ threats to the nation; rather they reflect the quality of the relationship between the nation and its citizens and the extent to which the dominant group tolerates the difference of a minority group. Modern security perpetuates a culture of national worrying by presenting the nation as a vulnerable space which is continuously redefined in opposition to sources of insecurity.

The balance of worrying and caring significantly impacts upon the way in which politicians access political power and legitimise the introduction of more stringent security measures. The degree to which worrying becomes dominant over caring relates to territoriality and the perceived security of state borders. The territory inside the state boundary is an imagined safe and familiar space where order reigns and others are controlled, while the outside is seen as

125 ibid., p.3
126 ibid., p.3
beyond community, a place of anarchy and danger. National security discourse is premised on a distinction between a safe inside and threatening outside, however, the constructions of security and insecurity are also based on the premise that there are potential threats from within the borders of the nation. There will always be others of the nation who dwell both within and outside the territorial boundaries of the nation state. Thus, an important part of the on-going struggle to actualise the ideal of the nation involves discouraging or preventing new others from settling in the territory as well as controlling the minorities that already exist within national boundaries. The pursuit of modern security is reliant on a constant threat and source of insecurity. Consequently, there must always be a new other that becomes the object of security policy.

**Territoriality**

Modern security relies upon the innate character of ‘the boundary’ in order to construct the state as the primary subject in need of protection and to establish a safe inside from the threatening outside. The territorial boundaries of a nation state are generally considered to be stable, sharp and timeless. Achille Mbembe, in his analysis of sovereignty and territoriality in Africa, presents an alternative view by drawing a distinction between Africa as a ‘place’ and Africa as a ‘territory’. A place is a site that has a degree of stability and physicality, even if this stability is not permanent. Places can be conceptualised as an instantaneous configuration of positions and relationships that are based around a particular site. A territory, by contrast, is an intersection of moving bodies and processes and goods that are defined primarily by the set of movements that take place within it and between territories. In this sense, territory is a set of possibilities that actors who are historically situated resist or realise. It is useful to conceptualise territory as a process rather than an object in debates about security because it highlights the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the study of security that incorporates people, identity and historical context.

In the context of Africa, Mbembe argues that over the past two centuries the visible, material, and symbolic boundaries of the continent have constantly expanded and contracted in a way

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127 M. Dillon, *Politics of Security*, p.20
130 A. Mbembe, ‘Edge of the World’, p.260
that has changed the territorial body of the continent. From this perspective, the territorial boundaries of a nation state can more accurately be described as socio-cultural boundaries which become meaningful only when the inhabitants of a national territory distinguish themselves from members of neighbouring territories. The securitisation of these boundaries is a process that is highly dependent on the degree to which inhabitants of a territory view themselves as part of a sovereign state. This demonstrates the power of security discourse in constructing national identity and the identity of the state. It is important to note that in some states, particularly in Africa, the sovereignty of the state is weak and whilst political elites may claim that the boundaries of the state are sharp. Populations living at the margins may not share the same view. In later chapters of the thesis I will refer to illustrative examples of communities that live between states and take advantage of the fluidity of state boundaries in their pursuit of security. Such examples suggest that the modern conception of territoriality is not attuned to the realities of everyday life at the border.

The history of boundaries is often reduced to a purely instrumental account of the connection between the state and a territory and the ability of the governing authority to control that land mass. Territoriality, as it is conceived of in modern political thought, is a concept that describes the exercise of state sovereignty and self-determination of a given political community. The principle of territoriality gives legal authority for a state to exercise jurisdiction within a defined geographical boundary that must be internationally mandated. Boundary-setting in modern political theory is often reduced to the question of how the restructuring of a space or territory affects the state and its sovereignty. There is a preoccupation with the state in much of the literature on territoriality. However, it is vital to remember that prior to the consolidation of modernity in Europe and its extension into the colonies the attachment to the territory and to the land was entirely relative and detached from the idea of the nation state. As Mbembe highlights, some political entities were not delimited by territorial boundaries in the modern sense of the term, but rather by an “imbrication of multiple spaces constantly joined, disjoined and recombined through wars, conquest and the mobility of goods and persons”. In other cases, mastery over spaces was based on controlling people or localities, and sometimes both together. Prior to the consolidation of modernity in Europe and later in the colonies, expansive areas often existed

133 A. Mbembe, ‘Edge of the World’, p.261
between distinct peoples, and veritable buffer zones were not subject to direct control, exclusive domination or close supervision. Thus the key connection between boundaries and state sovereignty is a relatively new way of conceiving of the relationship between territory and group identity.

In other cases of boundary setting in primordial situations, the spatial dynamics that created the boundary as a physical limit were associated with the principle of dispersing and deterritorialising allegiances. Foreigners, slaves and subjects could be under the control of several sovereign powers at once. These multiple allegiances and jurisdictions corresponded to the plurality of the forms of territoriality and political community. The result was often a complex superposition of rights and an interlacing of social ties that were connected to particular forms of locality, but also transcended them.  

Numerous centres of power had authority over a single place to the extent that whether a boundary was a state boundary or a boundary of some other kind it was meaningful only though the relationship it maintained with other forms of difference and of social, and jurisdictional and cultural discrimination. In this context political communities were created as a result of overlapping spheres of influence that were capable of infinite extension and contraction. The introduction of the modern state in Europe and the establishment of colonial regimes in other continents involved an attempt to replace the fluid, temporary and overlapping boundaries of primordial forms of social and political order with the sharp and inflexible boundaries of the nation state.

The consolidation of modern boundaries between nation states was ceremonious with the ‘Age of Empire’, in which colonial powers differentiated their own borders as well as the borders of their colonies. These internal and external processes were closely linked, as state in part defined their identity and territoriality in Europe with reference to their activities in the colonies. It was no coincidence that the birth of the modern nation corresponded with the most intensive period of colonial expansion. Early modern nationalism in Europe was a process that involved internal consolidation as well as external differentiation of the peoples of a state on a global scale based on the spatial separation between Europe and the colonies. The spatial and categorical distinction between Western nations from their colonies provided the poles along which an axis of extraction and accumulation was constructed such that net economic values flowed from the colonies to Europe and the identity of the West was

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134 A. Mbembe, *On the Postcolony*, p. 6
contrasted against the rest.\textsuperscript{135} It was onto this spatial and economic distinction that social and cultural differences were inscribed and political majorities and minorities were created. The colonial system was structured based on the separation of peripheral production and extraction of value and knowledge as raw materials from consumption and transformation in metropoles such that they could be invested back into the colonial project.\textsuperscript{136}

In the post-imperial period, states have continued to develop new disciplines to control their territorial boundaries and the cultural constructions upon which they are predicated. However, the idea that boundaries between various political communities and their territories are sharp and permanent is anachronistic. The reality is that the living situations of many political communities around the globe today suggest that borders are porous and political authorities have overlapping jurisdictions over political communities. Some scholars argue that the task of resolving the construction of differentiation and unity within the state is becoming increasingly difficult as a consequence of globalisation and the movement of people. The increased migration from the South to the North and the transnationalisation of labour, media and crime are all examples used to highlight the porous nature of many national boundaries and political communities.\textsuperscript{137} The impact of globalisation will be assessed in greater detail in later chapters. However, it is also important to acknowledge that there are numerous historical examples that demonstrate the fragility of state boundaries and suggest that the modern preoccupation with creating clear and distinct bounded communities and territories has always been an ideal rather than a reality. Despite the acknowledge by some scholars that borders are porous there remains reluctance within the field of security studies to acknowledgement that borders are constructed and that international politics takes place at the border as well as either side of it. The potential of borders as progressive sites of security politics is a theme that will be developed later in the thesis.

The nation state, its territory and its people, are demarcated by boundaries that have always been fluid and contingent on other states. Despite this reality, the theorists and practitioners of security continue to operate on the basis that national boundaries are secure when they are clear and defensible and that porous boundaries pose a threat to the security of the state and

\textsuperscript{135} M. Kearney, ‘Borders and boundaries of state and self at the end of empire’, \textit{Journal of Historical Sociology}, vol.4, (1), March, 1999, p.53
the political community. The extent to which political elites can control the physical and metaphysical boundaries of their nation is limited to varying degrees in different nation states. The ideal espoused by nationalists of a fixed and clearly demarcated national community and territory is challenged by the realities of migration, territorial disputes, transnational economic and cultural flows, and separatist movements within and across nations. Although national boundaries are challenged by pattern of movement, the pursuit of national security involves an on-going attempt to formalise boundaries and eliminate overlapping conceptions of political community. In this sense it is anachronistic and detached from contemporary political realities.

According to Michael Dillon, modern politics often involves the suspension of human freedom in the effort to secure it. The dominant mode of security configured in terms of modern sovereignty, territoriality and national identity has proven to be extremely resilient from the early modern period to the present. Its deployment continues to wield tremendous power over individuals and groups within the nation state. The hegemony of the modern conception of security over primordial or other conceptions can, in part, be explained with reference to the links between security and modern systems of governance and power.

The deployment of policies and practices undertaken in the name of security demands from citizens a certain complicity in thinking and acting in order to eradicate the apparent sources of danger within and outside the state. Nationalist ideals of loyalty and sacrifice encourage exemplary docile and subservient behaviour from citizens. In the case of security, nationalism is used to construct ‘us’ and ‘them’ and enforce the idea that compliance is a way to keep the nation safe. In later chapters I will argue that the operation of modern governance often endangers the security of those citizens who do not, or cannot, identify with the ‘nation writ large’. Governments frequently call upon their citizens to make certain types of sacrifices in order to preserve the ‘sovereignty’, ‘integrity’ and ‘stability’ of the state. When an enemy from outside or within national boundaries threatens the state, its citizens are expected to contribute greater resources and effort to national defence. Whether these contributions entail a military draft, higher taxes, or a curtailment of civil rights, individuals

138 M. Dillon, Politics of Security, p.5
139 ibid., p.20
140 ibid., p.11
and groups are expected to modify their own everyday practices and to sacrifice certain rights and political opportunities in the name of national security. As a result of the commonplace equation between the security of the nation and the security of the citizenry, people often willingly vote for policies that strengthen the state’s control over their everyday lives.

There are ways of thinking and living security beyond the state and beyond the limited group of people that are considered to be deserving subjects of security under the dominant approach. The modernist conception of security is articulated from the privileged position of the state and the political elite. Consequently, opposing perspectives can be easily dismissed as unreasonable or unrealistic. We need to challenge the knowledge formations that ‘prove’ the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there happens to be a widespread mythical belief in it. Roland Bleiker argues that innovative solutions to existing problems are not taken seriously in an environment where our efforts at understanding the international remain confined to a set of rigid and well-entrenched disciplinary rules.

The task of re-thinking security must begin with the acknowledgement that modern disciplines limit the potential for intellectual exchange. Modern disciplines constrict the methods, techniques and instruments that are considered to be appropriate for the pursuit of knowledge about the political. Such regulatory norms delineate the limits of what can be thought, talked about and written. The debate surrounding the definition of security and the parameters of security debates is one aspect of a more fundamental debate about politics generally. Academic debate needs to be expanded beyond its modernist origins and beyond the top-down, narrow Anglo-American definition of international politics. As Bleiker suggests, we must move towards a broader understanding of the international that encompasses the everyday and that acknowledges the diversity of political communication that takes place at an institutional and everyday level. This thesis will argue that the issues surrounding the construction of individual and collective identity—who I think I am, who they think they are, what makes us believe we are the same and them different—are inseparable from security.

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144 R. Bleiker, *Divided Korea*, xxxiii
146 R. Bleiker, ‘Forget IR Theory’, p.60
147 R. Bleiker, ‘Forget IR Theory’, p.85
This chapter has traced the link between modern political theory and security and examined the deployment of modern security in a historical and contemporary context. Through four key themes— the state, identity, security/insecurity and territoriality— I have argued that the theory and practice of modern security is premised on the construction of ‘the other’— this can range from other nations to other people to other values and cultural systems. The operation of modern security assists in the consolidation of the power of the dominant national group and the subsequent marginalisation of other groups to the nation. This process has more to do with the degree of political power and influence that a cultural group possesses and less to do with the population demographics. The chapter has also examined the construction of difference, danger and otherness as concepts that enforce the binary distinction between security and insecurity. This chapter has focused on the key frames through which security is theorised and practiced in modern systems of governance. In the next chapter I move on to look at the metaphors through which individuals experience modern security— namely ‘the home’ and ‘the nation’. In Chapter Two, an argument will be develop that the nation— as a form of home writ large— provides safety and protection for some groups at the expense of certain minority groups living in the nation. It is through the metaphor of home that individuals formulate a particular view of security and engage in particular practices that consolidate the power of the modern state.
Two Homeland Security and the Defence of the Nation

To be ‘at home’ is to feel safe and secure in one’s environment. Home is commonly conceived of as a place of comfort within which individuals can express their sense of identity and feel a part of a community in the absence of fear or threat. The pursuit of home, therefore, is ceremonial with the pursuit of security. In the discourse of national security, home is used as a powerful metaphor that links the fate of the people to the fate of the nation and the state. The metaphor of home is used to conjure sentiments of familiarity, freedom and comfort. The nation is conceptualised in modern political regimes as a home *writ large*. As a metaphor, the home is used in the discourse of modern security as a tool to invoke certain feelings and to encourage certain practices among a national population. It is, therefore, vital to unpack the modern notion of home and to examine the ramifications of its deployment. This chapter will provide an analysis of the link between home and national security. I will detail some of the ideas and practices that are built into the pursuit of security and suggest that they are transmitted and preserved through the home metaphor.

Chapter Two will argue that the modern conception of home functions to normalise the exclusion of particular individuals and groups from the national body politic. The use of the modernist conception of home promotes a specific set of ideas about ‘who’ and ‘what’ should form the basis of the national community—the security subject that is to be protected. In theory, modern nationalism is an ideology that provides scope for a wide range of disparate individuals to gain a sense of identity and establish a sense of belonging. The nation also provides citizens with protection through the framework of citizenship. However, in reality, in the majority of nations some individuals and groups feel more ‘at home’ than others. This chapter will discuss the extent to which national homemaking practices contribute to the security of individuals living within the nation. Throughout the chapter I will argue that the use of the modern home metaphor has severe consequences for the security of minorities. The resilience of national community as the primary form of community in the national security discourse hinders the ability of minority groups to express an alternative identity and to establish a sense of home in the nation.

Home as a Metaphorical Device

The conception of the nation as a ‘home’ *writ large* is one of the most powerful metaphors used in the pursuit of modern security. The concept of home is referred to in nationalist ideology as a part of the attempt to fortify the ideological and the territorial boundaries of the
national community. The national homeland has both physical and psychological dimensions. In part, the homeland refers to a fixed, bounded space and a defined geographical area. However, the homeland is also an abstract community— it refers to a group of people who inhabit a geographical area, who are perceived as a family *writ large* and who share a common culture and often physical attributes. The metaphor of the family creates a link between ‘being at home’ and ‘being in the nation’. As Benedict Anderson argued in his seminal text *Imagined Communities*, the nation is comprised of strangers who will never all meet face-to-face; however, they develop strong social bonds and a loyalty to each other. The rapprochement between nation, family and home assists in consolidating this community through local experiences at the level of the home, family, village or neighbourhood. By using the home metaphor, national governments encourage citizens to view their fellow patriots as members of the same home with familiar cultural attributes.

The homeland features in security discourse as a bounded space that protects citizens from external threats and enemies, in the same way that the family home is conceptualised as a unit of protection and safety. Angelika Bammer suggests that home, nation and family can all be located within the same imagined metaphorical field. Home is created through a process whereby our habits are gradually normalised over a long period of time so that they eventually appear to be natural and organic. The habitual and predictable nature of home makes it a space in which safety is equated with ideas, objects and practices that are familiar, predictable and comprehensible to the inhabitants. Home is considered to be a special kind of place, more significant for an individual than any other place, and one in which an individual or a social group experiences strong social psychological and emotional attachments. The concept of home, therefore, is the most prominent sight in the modern panorama of the normal and the safe. Foreign or unknown people, objects, ideas or practices are assumed to originate from outside of the home and are often considered to threaten the security of home and its inhabitants. When perceived threats arise, the unknown and the strange become

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149 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.3
hostile and threatening, which reiterates the need for home to be constructed on the basis of familiarity, homogeneity and enclosure.\textsuperscript{154}

The homeland is based on a binary distinction between a secure inside and a threatening outside. The concept of home in the English language is most commonly understood by invoking concepts of fixedness, familiarity, and of being inside an enclosed space or a container.\textsuperscript{155} Consequently, the national homeland is connected to security through a discourse that creates home as an enclosed and fixed place of safety.\textsuperscript{156} Despite its appearance as a natural pre-existing object part, it is a metaphor which is used for specific political functions in the operation of modern governance. Metaphors develop in political discourse over time and are employed strategically to achieve political outcomes. They are useful for conveying abstract or inventive concepts by using more concrete ideas or more familiar domains of experience. Although metaphors may be a universal cognitive process, each metaphor is actualised and interpreted differently depending on the socio-political context. The socio-political context is important because a metaphor can create common ground between a speaker and a listener based on the appeal to established cultural norms and shared experiences.\textsuperscript{157} The impact on the creation of individual attachment, collective sharing and construction depends upon wider structures of power.

The entity of the state is difficult for everyday citizens to connect with, by the very nature of its abstractedness. However, with the use of a familiar container metaphor the state can appear ‘real’ in the population imagination. One of the most potent container metaphors is the house. The physical structure of the house and the shelter it provides are used to conceptualise the state because they relate to human experiences of safety and security.\textsuperscript{158} The house metaphor is effective in the deployment of security politics because it generates support for particular ideas and practices such as increased militarisation and restrictive migration policies. Practitioners of security policy use the idea of home, in variegated contexts and forms, to avoid direct reference to political realities. The metaphor appeals to shared cultural frames and experiences to legitimise the introduction of new security policies.

\textsuperscript{154} P. Chilton, M. and Ilyin, ‘Metaphor in political discourse, p.9
\textsuperscript{155} ibid., p.10
\textsuperscript{156} ibid, p.9
\textsuperscript{157} ibid, p.10
\textsuperscript{158} ibid., p.6
In the practice of modern governance, political elites and other stakeholders employ a range of representation strategies in order to garner support for specific security policies. Representation strategies are political metaphors that are used to the construct of security objects and subjects through language, images or physical actions.\(^{159}\) The language and images associated with national security construct certain individuals and groups, usually those in the national majority, as the subjects in need of protection.\(^ {160}\) Representation strategies also construct the source and nature of threats to that group’s security, as well as the actors most capable of addressing those threats. These representations normalise a ‘common sense’ version of what security is and how it may be attained. It is important to analyse the nature of interactions between political elites and the majority of the population in order to ascertain how some metaphors come to prominence while other ideas of security are marginalised. What home is about and what home means are questions that should be explored within the context of wider social and spatial configurations.

The meaning of home and the use of the home metaphor varies substantially across cultures. It is important to acknowledge that the mental aspects of the relationship between people and their residential environment inform the use and appreciation of home places. According to Leeke Reinders and Marco Van Der Land, “mental geographies” of home inform the motivations and attitudes of residents. What people think and feel about their social and physical environment can have a strong effect on how places develop.\(^ {161}\) A brief comparison between the meaning of the word home in the English and the Russian languages demonstrates that the word has a different meaning depending on the cultural and linguistic setting. The English meaning of the word ‘house’ generally refers exclusively to a physical structure that is an enclosed and permanent structure.\(^ {162}\)

The house is generally conceptualised in the English imagination as a physical structure with a single entrance, and inhabited by a single family isolated from other individuals and families.\(^ {163}\) By contrast, the Russian word for house, dom, refers not only to the house as a building but also to the household. The word for home refers to the inhabitants of the dom

\(^{160}\) J. Der Derian, ‘Becoming Connolly’, p.276
\(^{163}\) P. Chilton, M. Ilyin, ‘Metaphor in political discourse’, p.14
including the family and all other living things, such as pets and livestock. The *dom* commonly refers to an apartment block rather than an individual house. For Russian speakers, the most common image of the *dom* is a building containing a large number of individual apartments; the building is also likely to have more than one entrance and to be a communal space that is relatively open. This suggests that houses are stereotyped in different ways from culture to culture – there are variations as to the size, shape, layout, surrounding space, rules about coming and going, visiting and receiving, cohabiting and so forth. Socialised individuals have a preconceived mental image of what a house looks like. Furthermore, they have specific scripts for establishing rules and behavioural norms that apply within the house such as greeting visitors and the use of particular rooms for set purposes.

The mental frames of reference are used frequently by politicians to influence socialised individuals. For example, the metaphor of the house has been used extensively by Russian historical figures as part of the attempt to implement political policies or regime change. The concept of *perestroika* (rebuilding) the Russian house was a catch-cry for a number of political elites including Alexander the Liberator, Stalin, Gromyko and Gorbachev. During the height of the Cold War in 1985, Gorbachev and the media introduced the metaphor of the house into the public discourse of Western Europe. As the Cold War vision of a divided Europe faded, the house metaphor increasingly featured in public discussion on the future shape of Europe. Gorbachev attempted to use the metaphor of the house to reunite Russia and Europe in a singular space of familiarity, loyalty and security. However, it is important to note that this metaphor had limited impact because it was received and interpreted differently across European countries, given the different cultural meanings of the house metaphor in European languages. Gorbachev attempted to use the house metaphor to present new policy positions that would shape the post-Cold War European community. However, outside of Russia, the metaphor of the house referred more specifically to individualised and private living arrangements – images that do not necessarily relate to cooperation and unification.

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164 P. Chilton, P. and M. Ilyin., ‘Metaphor in political discourse’ p.14
165 *ibid.*, p.13
166 N. Papastergiadis , ‘Home in modernity’, p.8
168 *ibid.*, p.14
169 *ibid.*, p.14
Today Europe presents itself as a more united region and this is acknowledged formally through the European Union. However, there remain major differences in the way home is conceptualised and in how it is deployed as a metaphor in relation to security. For Western Europeans the home is most commonly associated with a single-family detached structure. The home is isolated from other houses, often through physical barriers such as a garden, veranda or surrounding fence. The European house is a structure that sharply separates the private world of the inhabitants from the surrounding public. The modern/European conception of the home is centred round the physical structure of the house as a container that protects private individuals from the outside world.\textsuperscript{170} However, in a number of Eastern-European cultures, the home is commonly conceptualised as a communal space which links the individual to the outside world and which is not directly separated from public space or from houses belonging to other people. The concept of neighbourhood in this particular context refers to a set of houses that are loosely, and sometimes not at all, separated from each other and in which there is a high degree of interaction and interdependence between residences.\textsuperscript{171} The modern conception of home is based on a particular conception of public and private and urban lifestyle. A specific form of separation between individual families in the community is created through the development of suburban streets and housing blocks with private front yards, large houses with verandas and fences to act as barriers of separation between public and private life.\textsuperscript{172} In the contemporary discourse of national security, it is this Western European conception of home that remains dominant in popular and academic representations of home.

\textit{Modern Home/Bounded Nation: The Link between Home and National Security}

The modern conception of home is based upon a sharp division between the private space of the home and the public space of the community. The outside world is characterised as dangerous and incomprehensible whilst, by contrast, the interior of the home is conceptualised as a privileged space for intimacy, familiarity the nurturing of family members. Children are socialised from a young age to believe that home is an environment of absolute safety and protection that is situated in a dangerous and unfamiliar outside world.\textsuperscript{173}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} P. Cohen, ‘Home rules’, p.6
\item \textsuperscript{171} A. Burton, \textit{ Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India}, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p.3
\item \textsuperscript{172} M. Daechsel, \textit{The Politics of Self-Expression: The Urdu Middle-Class Milieu in Mid-Twentieth-Century India and Pakistan}, London: Taylor and Francis, 2006, p.173
\item \textsuperscript{173} J. Hollows, \textit{Domestic Culture}, Maidenhead, England; New York : Open University Press, 2008, p.22
\end{itemize}
The figure of authority (the father) within the modern home is responsible for defending the home against outsiders and ensuring that it remains a space of familiarity and protection. Individuals enjoy a high degree of personal freedom inside their home; however, this freedom is mediated by the actions of other household members. Furthermore, the behaviour of individuals inside the home is also shaped and controlled by socio-cultural norms and the state. In reality, the interior of the home is in many ways a public space that is scrutinised by neighbours, the community and the state. For example, the watchful eye of the neighbour in a suburban setting can influence everything from the design of the house and garden to the use of household security systems to guard against crime. At the micro level, within the home, the performance of banal tasks such as taking out the rubbish or sharing a garden or nature strip with a neighbour highlights that the boundaries between inside and outside the home are fluid. Thus, the sanctity of privacy at home that is idealised in the modern metaphor is far from guaranteed in the real world.

The home metaphor is used in nationalist discourse to construct a sense of community between disparate individuals. The national home is defined by carving out national citizens from other national communities and enforcing sharp territorial boundaries. A number of scholars of modern nationalism, most prominently Benedict Anderson, have pointed out that individuals within a nation will never all know each other. However, as a result of the power of the discourse to manufacture a sense of community members of a nation are more likely to trust and to feel more secure and at home with members of the same national group. Anderson argues that this solidarity between strangers based on shared attributes and values can be, in part attributed to industrialisation and the rise of the mass media and other forms of communication. The abstract bonds of national community can be potent and resilient, however; all forms of community whether they are formed at a national, regional or neighbourhood level are characterised by internal diversity and fragmentation. In later chapters of the thesis, I will argue that heterogeneity and cultural diversity as features of all political communities should be celebrated and directly linked to the security and resilience of those communities.

174 N. Papastergiadis, ‘Home in modernity’, p.7
175 B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.10
176 *ibid.*, p.10
The consolidation of the national identity involves the unification and the promotion of cultural conformity. In many cases, this is based on a bid for exclusive rights to a territory by a dominant political group. The promotion of cultural homogeneity is complemented by the effort to brand, segregate and even evict those ‘aliens’ who are converts of another nationalism with different cultural traditions. Nationalists focus their self-defence on locating, segregating, disarming and banishing *strangers* whose differences help strengthen bonds between an abstract group of national citizens who are supposed to share the same traits, characteristics and value system. Nationalism involves a quest for a uniform community comprised of members who are culturally, morally and politically similar. While official historical and contemporary accounts of nation are often described as the natural evolution of a unified group of people, in reality the majority of nations were created as a result of conflict. Internal diversity continuous to exist in the majority of nations to the extent that some nations are often at war not only with external others but also with others that reside within their borders who are seen to threaten the dominant culture. Members of a nation group are required to be vigilant against the strangers in their midst who are considered false pretenders who claim the soil and blood that are not their own and who resist assimilation and disrupt processes of national homogenisation.

The metaphor of the modern home is used in nationalist discourse to frame national security in ways that emphasise the primacy of the state, and secondarily the citizenry, as the subject of security. The use of the metaphor in security discourse serves a dual function. On the one hand, it legitimates the idea that the governing authority is conceptualised as the head of the national homeland. This head of power is the father figure who bears primary responsibility for its defence. On the other hand, the home metaphor promotes the idea that security is a private good that individuals must pursue themselves by defending their own homes, their neighbourhoods and their nation. The idea that every household must be vigilant against external threats such as global terrorism naturalises the view that the best way for individuals to pursue security is to isolate themselves from other households and minimise their encounters with differently situated individuals. Whilst individuals must be vigilant with regard to their own personal security, the government is also awarded exceptional powers and

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177 Z. Bauman, ‘Soil, blood, identity’, p.684
178 G. Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, p.10
is able to justify a range of policies that curtail individual freedom in the name of national security.\textsuperscript{179}

Individuals invest a significant degree of their physical, mental and affective energy in trying to secure to themselves a place in a nation. Nationalism can be characterised as a sentiment of yearning, nostalgia and imagination rather than a condition that is related to real past and present events. It is rarely descriptive of daily life within the nation or an accurate description of the way people in the nation relate to each other. The nationalist project involves an attempt to create a society in which everyone is familiar, or at least the behaviour of other nationals is predictable, by virtue of the fact that they share the similar cultural and political values and they share a common heritage. However, there are always groups of people within the nation that are characterised as ‘other’ such as: migrants, criminals, youths, homosexuals, and the homeless, which make the achievement of a homogeneous national community unattainable.\textsuperscript{180} The nationalist project, therefore, is an ongoing process with an unattainable endpoint. The pursuit of the ideal national community is an ideal not a reality. However, the success of the nation building project hinges upon the ability of nationalists to compel members of the political community to actively pursue this ideal. Members of the national groups must believe that the national project is possible and desirable.

Nationalists engage in a continuous process of nation-building and homemaking in which they are always in search of others of the nation to domesticate and/or exterminate. There are always others of the nation who dwell both within and outside the territorial boundaries of the nation state. Thus, an important part of the ongoing struggle to actualise the ideal of national community involves discouraging or preventing new others from settling in the territory of the nation, whilst controlling the others within the nation to the extent that their difference is not a threat to the national majority.\textsuperscript{181} Nationalists, by linking their being to the very existence of the nation, live in constant fear that their personal and collective security is at risk. The equation of individual security with national security is sustained through the use of the house metaphor that constructs a safe inside and a threatening outside and that provides a very personal connection to the abstract community. The metaphor of home has become ingrained in the language and popular vernacular of modern nationalism. Using this

\textsuperscript{180} G. Hage, ‘Nation-building, dwelling’, p.97
\textsuperscript{181} \textit{ibid.}, p.97
metaphor helps to justify the promotion of national values based on cultural and moral conformity, and even physical conformity in some nations.

The pursuit of national security in Australia has relied strongly on the use of the metaphor of the homeland. As a result, everyday Australians have been encouraged to view security through a binary framework—inside/outside, friend/foe, domestic/international. These binaries have become ingrained in the Australian psyche. The Australian anti-terrorism kit, launched in 2003 as part of Australia’s counter-terrorism strategy, provides a good example of the extent to which particular ideas about security and how to achieve it are embedded in Australian culture to the extent that they are perceived as apolitical.\textsuperscript{182} The kit, which was distributed to all Australian residences, aimed to inform all Australians of what was being done to protect Australians from terrorism. The kit also contained information about what everyday citizens could do to prevent and protect them against terrorist attack.\textsuperscript{183} The kit emphasised the role of the state as the primary provider of security for Australian citizens and the importance of building military strength as a tactic to fight terrorism. At the same time, however, the kit also encouraged everyday Australians to be proactive in the fight against global terror. In his letter accompanying the information pack, John Howard stresses the need to "strike the right balance between sensible precaution and unnecessary alarm".\textsuperscript{184} However, the information in the package was clearly designed to present terrorist attack as the most likely threat to Australian security.

The booklet referred to military interventions, including the Western intervention in Iraq, as examples of sound foreign policy that would reduce terrorism and enhance the security of Australian citizens. The kit also revealed that Australian health authorities had an action plan in place and that they had stockpiled antibiotics, vaccines, anti-viral drugs and chemical antidotes in case of biological or radiological attack.\textsuperscript{185} In addition to the state-based security initiatives, the kit also emphasised that every Australian needed to secure their own private homes from terrorist threat. The rhetoric suggested that the success of the fight against terrorism depended, in part, on the loyalty of individual citizens to their nation and on their

\textsuperscript{182} E. Abetz, \textit{Let's look out for Australia: Protecting Our Way of Life from a Possible Terrorist Threat}, Canberra: Attorney General's Dept., 2003, p.1
\textsuperscript{183}ibid., p.14
\textsuperscript{185} E. Abetz, \textit{Let's Look out for Australia}, p.10
attempts to identify fellow nationals from threatening non-nationals. The types of strategies that were suggested in the kit to protect the home enforced the modern conception of the home as a site of enclosure, isolation and stability. The booklet encouraged citizens to watch out for ‘suspicious behaviour’ including the ways that potential terrorists use, rent or buy accommodation on a temporary basis and move more frequently than other neighbours. The assumption that people with a mobile lifestyle were suspicious appealed to the modern conception of home as a permanent, tangible site. The booklet listed possible suspicious behaviour that might indicate a terrorist attack being planned in Australia, including “a lifestyle that doesn’t add up” and “suspicious vehicles near significant buildings or in busy public places”. Furthermore, by officially promoting the public reporting of ‘suspicious behaviour’ the government enhanced feelings of endemic nervousness among the citizenry based on the equation of cultural difference with threat and danger.

The kit was used in part to reinforce existing conceptions of threat and security. However, it was also used to construct new threats and justify the introduction of new counter-terrorist legislation. There was nothing natural or inevitable about the Australian security agenda requiring the intervention in Iraq or the induction of exceptional laws that suspended certain civil liberties, such as the introduction of stricter sedition laws. The depiction of Australia as a nation under threat from ‘new’ and unpredictable non-state actors served to justify the introduction of unprecedented anti-terrorism laws as part of the pursuit of security. The kit emphasised that Australia was vulnerable to terrorist attack by presenting the world outside Australian borders as insecure and disordered. However, the material also suggested that threat and danger was ‘everywhere’, including within the borders of Australia and among everyday citizens. Representations of security, such as the anti-terrorism kit, are central to the legitimacy of, and support for, political leaders and their policies – they serve to define who is in need of being protected, from what threats and through what means. The anti-terrorism kit built upon existing conceptions of the Australian homeland and what it means for Australians to feel at home in order to legitimise an unprecedented security framework.

The use of the modern metaphor of the home naturalises the idea that home must be a familiar space in which the behaviour of other individuals is predictable. In other words, the

186 E. Abetz, Let’s Look out for Australia, p.10
187 K. Walsh, ‘Be calm, but here’s your ‘terrorist kit’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 February 2003, p.6
188 E. Abetz, Let’s Look out for Australia, pp.7–9
home is conceptualised as a place characterised by conformity and homogeneity. When this metaphor is applied to the nation it promotes the idea that the national population share certain cultural, moral and even physical attributes that enables them to be collectively defined as a nationality. In the aftermath of the Bali bombing, the Australian government launched a $15 million ‘National Security Public Information Campaign’ to garner support for Australia’s anti-terrorism policies. The first part of this campaign involved a series of television announcements that informed Australian citizens of the need to protect Australia’s ‘way of life’ from potential terrorist threats. The nature and substance of the Australian lifestyle was never clearly defined in the advertisements; however, the advertisement was designed to invoke a particular sense of home and security based on cultural conformity. The advertisement asserted that there was a clear sense of ‘being Australian’ that could be contrasted against cultures that were considered to be ‘un-Australian’. The Australian ‘way of life’ is a nebulous concept that is contested among political actors. However, defining what type of person subscribes to this lifestyle and, by extension, by defining those who are un-Australian, the government constructed a particular image of the Australian homeland that justified the introduction of exceptional security policies.

The Other of the Nation

In the discourse of national security, the distinction between self/other, inside/outside and order/chaos is presented as natural. These distinctions revolve around the prior construction of the home as the position from which these values can be discerned. However, the concepts of nation, ethnicity and state are not natural; rather they are imagined and constructed through the use of language and metaphor. National homelands are often ridden with tension, often produced in the dialectic between what belongs to the home place and what does not, what is mentally near and what is mentally distant, what feels like “inside” and what feels like “outside” and who we call “we” and who call “others”. Jan Jindy Pettman argues that ‘the national interest’, ‘Australia’ and even the pronoun ‘us’ are not stable categories; rather, they are socially constructed categories that must be historically situated. In a historical and in a contemporary context, Australian identities have been constructed through the exclusion of others outside of the nation and demonisation of ‘others’, including women, immigrants and

189 A. Burke, In Fear of Security, p.240
190 L. Reinders, and M. Van Der Land, ‘Mental geographies’, p.5
Aborigines within the nation. Pettman argues that we need to make ‘explicit’ our mental maps of Australia, of our region, of the West and of the world to challenge the so-called natural identities categories, definitions and values that inform political contests.

David Campbell advances a similar argument in his analysis of the historical construction of national identity in the United States based upon the exclusion, dispossession and defeat of the other. He examines the history of othering in the United States— from Native American tribes and Mexicans to Communists, terrorists and drug traffickers and concludes that American security policy is reposed on otherness. Campbell references key foreign policy texts, representational strategies and pieces of rhetoric, such as the political and popular discourse on the American ‘War on Drugs’ against Columbia and other American states. The War on Drugs is a campaign that strategically identifies certain nations, peoples and processes as security threats in a manner that complements the foreign policy aims of America. This analysis demonstrates that “the boundaries of the state’s identity are secured by the representation of danger integral to foreign policy.”

Nationalist discourse involves two modes of imagining community. The first relates to the homeland and the national community as a geographical and social space that exists for its inhabitants, and that constitutes a ‘home’ or ‘homeland’ for individuals. The second relates to the perception of the nation as a unified subject that exists on the international scene only in relation to other national bodies. These two imaginings of the nation, as a tangible home and as an external international subject, are related. Both modes of imagining the nation are critical because in order for a nation to be recognised as a coherent whole on the international scene it must have a degree of bodily integrity. This is established through recognised borders and a reasonable degree of internal law and order. In order for the people to identify as part

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194 D. Campbell, *Writing Security*. p.1
195 ibid., pp.1–2
196 G. Hage, ‘Nation-Building, dwelling, being’. p.78
197 ibid., p.85
of a national community there must be some common understanding of the features that unify the people. However, in order for this people to become a nation state, there must be international recognition of their unity as a people and the difference from other nations.\textsuperscript{198} The conception of the nation as a domestic object and as an international subject relies upon the figure of the other as a comparison for what the nation is not. Nationalists perceive the uncontrolled presence of the other as a threat that undermines the very capacity of the nation to exist, either as a domestic homeland or an actor in the international arena.

The trope of the homeland, as a space of safety and comfort, is presented as a site that must continuously be defended. Consequently, the nationalist project is an unfinished project that involves a constant struggle to identify and isolate external and internal threats. From a nationalistic point of view there are always potential threats to the nation from the world ‘out there’, which must be eradicated or controlled. As Zygmut Bauman aptly expresses, nationalism breeds an “endemic nervousness” that makes nationhood a task always to be struggled for and never to be fulfilled. Nationalism promotes a form of vigilance and loyalty that capitalises on the paranoia and xenophobia among the citizenry. Advancing a similar argument, Karl Deutsch argues that it is anxiety and uncertainty of national citizens that results in their constantly worrying whether they are contributing enough to the nation effort to protect both their individual homes as well the national homeland.\textsuperscript{199} In an attempt to keep themselves safe, national citizens commit to the nation their own time and resources, and must comply with various disciplinary regimes, in order to protect themselves against threatening others. National members often willingly agree to such restrictions to their personal freedom because the state claims to offer its members a stronger sense of security, belonging and affiliation than any alternative form of political community.\textsuperscript{200}

National identity is premised on a common history and heritage that is, in part, built and sustained through the collective resentment of difference.\textsuperscript{201} It is through the externalisation of other, from within and outside of the nation, that particular people, processes and ideas are

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{198} G. Hage, ‘Nation-building, dwelling, being’, p.85
\item\textsuperscript{199} K. Deutsch, Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory, New York: 1967, p.217
\item\textsuperscript{200} ibid., pp.217–218
\end{itemize}
constructed as security problems requiring militaristic solutions. Individuals and groups who live inside the nation but who cannot or will not assimilate into the national majority are considered to be external threats to the nation because their difference is perceived as a threat to the political majority. Therefore, threat construction has less to do with geography and more to do with the socio-cultural traits of the national group. This powerful dynamic of fear and resentment of otherness upholds the security imperative and the nationalist project. The metaphor of the modern home is used to promote the link between safety and cultural homogeneity. Home is conceptualised as a site where people and things are familiar and predictable. This metaphor has become ingrained in the national psyche to the extent that national identity is premised on a vulnerable sameness.

The ‘Tampa Crisis’ of 2001 demonstrates how the values that are disseminated through the home metaphor impact upon the construction of national identity. This ‘crisis’ involved 433 asylum seekers who were denied the right to enter Australia on the basis that they constituted a threat to Australian security. In August 2001, the Tampa, a Norwegian cargo ship carrying 433 asylum seekers entered Australian waters from Indonesian waters and was immediately occupied by ‘Australian Special Forces’—a force that had stronger military capacity than standard border control police. The Howard government unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the governments of Indonesia and Norway to take responsibility for the asylum seekers. After a week of political and popular debate over what to do with the asylum seekers, political elites and the majority of the Australian community had reached a consensus on the fate of the Tampa. An AC Nielsen poll, published in an Australian newspaper, reported that seventy-seven per cent of respondents supported the government’s decision to refuse the asylum seekers entry. Seventy-one per cent of the respondents supported the continuation of the government’s policy of keeping refugees in indefinite detention at the offshore detention centre. The popular support for the policy was, in part, a reflection of the government’s use of nationalistic rhetoric based on an abstract notion of ‘Australian values’.

203 Hage, G., ‘Nation-Building, dwelling, being’, p.79
204 M. Gratten and H. McDonald, ‘Howard’s Tampa-led recovery’, Sydney Morning Herald, 4 September, 2001, p.1
Throughout the crisis, Australia’s political elite emphasised the need to protect Australia’s ‘sovereignty’, ‘territorial integrity’ and ‘national interest’. This rhetoric entrenched the image of the Australian homeland as an insecure, vulnerable subject that was under perpetual threat from the disorder and uncertainty surrounding the presence of others in the nation (in this case, asylum seekers). The language used to describe the asylum seekers – as if they were a weapon pointed at Australia – seemed more appropriate to describe a military strategy rather than the plight of vulnerable human beings. It was important for the government to dehumanise and objectify the asylum seekers and in order to capitalise on the fear of the public, to garner support for the militaristic approach, and to present the Australian people as a unified, homogenous group. The asylum seekers were denied access to legal representation and advice. They were also denied mobility once the Special Forces had intercepted the boat. The use of the Australian Navy was evidence of the fact that the government sought to locate this problem within a military rather than humanitarian framework. The bipartisan and broad popular support for the policy demonstrated the power of the realist security discourse in Australia.

According to Burke, in supporting the government’s response to Tampa, the Australian people identified with a form of national identity that was “secured by the insecurity and suffering of the Other”. The government successfully pitted the security of existing Australian citizens directly against the security of asylum seekers. This was achieved primarily through the use of rhetoric and hyperbole rather than through any references to real threats. On arrival to Australia, the asylum seekers were dehumanised and viewed as individuals without legal rights or recourse. In this sense, John Howard’s promise of security and the protection of ‘home’ was premised on “setting the homeless adrift”. By legitimating this approach, the government was also able to propagate the view that the suffering and pain experienced by asylum seekers in detention were necessary to ensure that detention centres “are not an incentive for people to come in the first place”. Burke argues that the political and popular response to Tampa was a part of a repressive image of security that was rooted in Australia’s Anglo-Saxon culture and the historical evolution of Australian

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205 J. King, ‘At the Beach’, *Weekend Australian*, 8/9 September, 2001, p.3
206 ibid., p.3
207 A. Burke, *In Fear of Security*, p.324
208 ibid., p.325
209 ibid., p.325
210 ibid., p.329
211 ibid., p.325
nationalism. The perceived threat of boat people in this case was in their difference and in their status as an unassimilable excess that the Australian nation could not accept.

The home and the homeland as sites of social control
The modern home is commonly conceptualised as a place of safety and refuge for all of its inhabitants. Similarly the nation is conceptualized as a site of protection for people that reside within the national boundaries. However, the home and the national homeland are not sites of protection, safety and comfort for all. There are a number of hierarchical relationships within the household that are characterised as egalitarian and non-oppressive relations with the home metaphor. Essential to the maintenance of the serenity inside the modern home and the nation is the misrecognition of relations of power and subjugation as familial and natural. Varying degrees of violence, both physical and discursive, can occur within the home. For example, some people smack their children to discipline them and to maintain order. Pierre Bourdieu suggests that the refusal to wield domination and to recognise violence in the home is a way of taking violence to a “higher degree of denegation and dissimulation, a means of reinforcing the effect of misrecognition and thereby of symbolic violence.”

For example, when marital rape is not acknowledged in the home, the victim experiences physical violence as well as discursive, symbolic violence, which makes the violence so much worse. Developing a similar argument, Joshua M. Price constructs the home as a central place of terror and danger in which the security of particular household members is not guaranteed. The dominant conceptualisation of home as a place of safety and serenity makes it more difficult to view violence against family members as a common occurrence.

The conception of the home as a safe space is transposed to the image of the national homeland as a space of safety and comfort for citizens. The trope of the national homeland is strengthened because it is given a gendered identity as the motherland—a site of protection and nurturing. This association refers partly to the identification of the mother with the notion of the ‘caring community’, which is a label for the caring work done largely by women in both domestic and national settings. The motherland is imagined as a habitual and natural space where our needs for security, peace and plenitude are fulfilled. The

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212 P. Bourdieu, *Invitation to a Reflexive Sociology*, p.100
214 G. Hage, ‘Nation building, dwelling, being’, p.81
215 *ibid.*, p.81
motherland prescribes a specific role for women in the maintenance of the nation as a site of familiarity and protection in which the needs of (male) citizens are cared for. Women are also responsible for securing the physical and psychological boundaries of the nation. Not only do women bear children, they also play a primary role in transmitting national culture and socialising children of the nation from a very young age. From childhood, individuals are taught to adopt the moral values and practices of the dominant national group, which helps them to integrate into the national community and develop a loyalty to the abstract community. The extent to which women actually fulfil this role in the nation varies across time and context, however, the trope is a powerful characteristic of most nationalisms.

A significant amount of domestic labour is carried out by women and children that is fundamental to the production and maintenance of the home. While this labour is generally not recognised as ‘work’, it is important to acknowledge that the work that produces and preserves the peaceful home is often produced under the real or threatened use of violence. The ideological scripting of home as a safe and intimate space makes domestic violence, both physical and discursive, difficult to recognise. Domestic violence is often under reported and misrecognised because women and children feel a sense of failure or defeat to countenance violence in the home, even if violence is at the core of certain constructions of the home. In short, the conceptualisation of home as a space of security and serenity can operate to mask practices of physical and discursive violence as well as the labour that is carried out in a patriarchal family unit.

The trope of the home as a space of safety and serenity is also extended to the level of the nation. This trope is used to justify forms of physical and discursive violence including violence carried out by the state. In a modern nation state, physical and symbolic violence is used to ensure that politically marginalised groups are subservient to the political majority and that they carry out the necessary labour to sustain the homeland. Hage argues that the maintenance of the national homeland relies on the subjugation of minority groups. The metaphor of the home is used to naturalise the subjugation of particular groups within the nation. The national home is commonly conceived of in popular and academic discourse as a site of cultural homogeneity and familiarity, as a space with fixed and permanent boundaries.

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216 T. Mayer, ‘Introduction’, p.10
218 G. Hage, ‘Nation building, dwelling, being’, p.81
where the other is absent. As I argued in Chapter One, the construction of national identity and the national homeland is a never-ending process based on the extermination of others from the territorial space of the nation. Some scholars, such as Phil Cohen, suggest that a core feature of nationalism is the attempt to eradicate the other from the national homeland. Consequently, the ideal nationalist home is a space in which there is no place for the other.219 Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman argues that nationalism promotes a particular form of community that defines a realm of safety that is cut out from the frightening outside world.220 However, for the majority of nation states, the pursuit of an ideal, culturally pure homeland is a fiction not a reality.

Nationalist ideology, in its most extreme form, is built upon the attempt to exterminate the other from the borders of the nation and to prevent others from entering the homeland. In reality, however, nationalists live with and rely on others. The national homeland is a site where a certain kind of otherness is tolerated because others are crucial to the preservation of the national homeland. Hage rejects the view that safe national spaces are constructed only through the expulsion of the others from the physical and metaphorical space identified as the homeland.221 The consolidation of the homeland involves a process whereby the others within the national space are subjugated to meet the needs of the politically dominant group. According to Hage, the forms of cultural difference that are tolerated in the nation are those that are not visible to the public and do not threaten the hegemony of the dominant cultural group(s). The others that are more likely to be allowed to reside within the national space are those who can suppress their cultural differences as a part of their subjugation to the majority. Others within the home often work as labourers, either paid or unpaid, to complete tasks that contribute to the construction and maintenance of the national home. Indeed, others such as new migrants often perform tasks that members of majority are unwilling to do. In short, certain categories of cultural difference in the majority of modern nation states have always been tolerated as part of the private and the national home because they do not threaten the power of the dominant national group.

Women are a significant group of others who feature in the discourse on the national homeland and who personify the national space. Women have always been present in the

219 P. Cohen, ‘Home Rules’, p.6
220 Z. Bauman., ‘Soil, blood and identity’, p.676
221 G. Hage, ‘Nation building, dwelling, being’, p.85
nation and they have been employed to service the needs of the political majority. Women were historically denied the full benefits of citizenship such as the right to vote and own property.\(^{222}\) Although women in a number of states have formal equality with men, they are often still perceived as others with a specific function and form. The figure of ‘the other’—be it a woman or some other minority—shares with the dominant national group their general nature as bodily, dependent subjects. However, the other is someone who is perceived as a subject with a different body, and who has different habits and different ways of satisfying its needs.\(^{223}\) Others of the nation are perceived as objects to be controlled and domesticated by the majority. The precise meaning of the word ‘domestic’ is ‘of the home’. To domesticate is to make a part of the home and to position certain objects and subjects to suit our needs.\(^{224}\) Thus, others within the national home such as women are subjected to a power that shapes and positions them to service the needs of the domesticator. In the majority of modern nation states women are relied upon to carry out the majority of the domestic work to preserve the home in addition to their duties in the formal labour market and the public sphere.\(^{225}\) The history of modern nation-building can therefore be viewed as a history of domestication — as a form of struggle by the ruling class, whose aim is to build a safe national home and preserve their position of privilege, to subjugate the working class. As Bauman points out, nation-building involves a struggle of the elite to tame and domesticate “obstreperous or indifferent masses”.\(^{226}\)

Within the national home, there exists a complex set of power relations between the national majority and the domesticated, subjugated others. Gender is a fundamental dynamic that impacts upon the relations between majority and minority groups. A part of the process of nation building involves creating places and spaces where the other is subjugated to the rule of the father (the patriarchs in control of the family and the nation).\(^{227}\) The national homeland is constructed in nationalist discourse as a feminine object in need of protection. At the same time the nation is also conceptualised as a patriarchal structure in which political elites need to exert a degree of force to maintain order and stability and to defend against external threats. In nationalist discourse, the individual must continuously ask the question: Can I be

\(^{222}\) T. Mayer, ‘Introduction’, p.20
\(^{223}\) G. Hage, ‘Nation-building dwelling being’, p.86
\(^{224}\) P. Cohen, ‘Home rules’, p.6
\(^{225}\) T. Mayer, ‘Introduction’, p.20
\(^{226}\) Z. Bauman, ‘Soil, blood, identity’, p.683
\(^{227}\) G. Hage, ‘Nation-building, dwelling, being’, p.88
sure that my mother will nurture me (that everything in my nation will always be suited to my needs) without the presence of my father? This mentality naturalises the hierarchical relations between dominant and submissive groups within the home and the nation writ large. The patriarchal structure that underpins the nation also justifies the view that oppressing others within the nation is a necessary form of order and control.

In political regimes that are underpinned by a far-right nationalism the link between patriarchy and nation is most clearly exemplified. For example, the need for a strong father to protect the motherland is dramatically exemplified in the German Heimat movement and the rise of the Nazi party. Celia Applegate refers to the exclamation ‘at least we are safe’, which accompanied Hitler’s accession to power, as a reflection of the search by Weimar men and women for a national home, a place of belonging in a society of shifting values and ambiguities. In this case, ‘safety’, a lost quality of the motherland, is recaptured through the re-emergence of the strong father and a security regime characterised by violence and coercion. The metaphor of the motherland is used to create an image of the homeland as a site of domesticated otherness exemplified by the mother and secured by the father. The most extreme examples of ultra-nationalism have involved the attempt to exterminate others from the national space. However, in the majority of modern nation states, others have been domesticated and are relied upon to preserve the homeland; they have not been exterminated through a policy of cultural genocide.

If we accept the view that others are a fundamental part of the maintenance of the national homeland it is important to examine their attempts to build homely spaces inside of the nation and to construct a sense of security. T. D. Goldberg describes the spaces occupied by the other in the nation as ‘marginal spaces’—spaces that are inhabited by those with limited access to power, rights and to goods and services within the nation. As long as marginal groups remain confined to their marginal and private spaces in the nation, they pose no threat to the authority of the father. The others that are not accepted in the motherland are those that disobey the rule of the father and those who attempt to transgress their designated marginal

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228 G. Hage, ‘Nation-building, dwelling, being’, p.89
229 ibid., p.90
space in the nation.\textsuperscript{232} It is this group that is often constructed as a security threat to the nation and that is discouraged from entering the space of the nation. The individuals who constitute this group are viewed as people with intractable differences who cannot be domesticated.

Ultimately, nationalism is an ideology that domesticates others, suppresses their cultural differences and conceals their visibility in the public sphere. The process of domestification confines the other to the private sphere of the house where they service the needs of the dominant political group in a manner that does not threaten the hegemony of the political majority. As Hage suggests, there have always been others living within the nation (women, ethnic minorities, homosexuals) who do not conform to the public (national) culture. Such others play an important role in constructing the national home as a safe, habitual and familiar space in which the needs and desires of national citizens are met.\textsuperscript{233} Although cultural minorities form an indispensable part of the home and the nation writ large, their presence in public is not tolerated by nationalists. Thus, the presence of others within the national homeland depends on their productivity in the private sphere and their invisibility in the public sphere. The relationship between the public sphere and the security of marginal groups will be explored in later chapters.

\textit{Re-thinking the Home}

The modern metaphor of home is the dominant frame through which the national homeland is imagined. So far this chapter has argued that the hegemony of this metaphor results in certain kinds of ideas and practices becoming a part of the national psyche. The ideal of the modern home reflects the three basic concepts of fixity, enclosure, and territoriality. However, the real world contemporary situations in which individuals and communities find themselves rarely live up to this ideal. Is it possible to reconceptualise the concept of home to more accurately reflect contemporary modes of dwelling? The prototypical modern house has clearly delineated boundaries (walls, roof, fences and locks), and is designed to isolate the family from the surrounding social world and to demarcate the private property of homeowners.\textsuperscript{234} When this is projected to the national level it is used to justify modern security policies and our approach to otherness in the nation.

\textsuperscript{232} G. Hage, ‘Nation-building, dwelling, being’, p.92
\textsuperscript{233}ibid., p.90
The conventional modern home is designed as a structure that aims to isolate families from the outside world and create a sharp division between the public and private. It creates a barrier between the household and the neighbourhood. Architectural traditions in the West reflect this convention. While the barrier between public and private is broken down at times as a result of social and cultural norms, the distinction between public and private is a dominant feature of domestic life in the West. There are distinct differences between the modern/European conception of home and other non-Western and primordial conceptions. Non-Western building structures generally presuppose neighbours and a conception of community and interdependence. For example, the idea of home in many African cultures is based on the reality of living with neighbours in a situation of co-dependence. In her study of the construction of home in Northern Ghana, Ann Cassiman illustrates alternative conception of home. In the traditional Ghanan village, houses are built with clay and are connected to each other by paths. The clay homes are located in clusters that make it difficult to distinguish where one house ends and the next begins. Cassiman observes that the connecting paths are like “nourishing veins”, used to circulate food, goods and family members between houses. The surfaces of the clay house are smooth and neutral in colour to blend into the natural landscape. Cassiman argues that these houses are bodies in motion that are continuously remoulded by the daily movements and flows of the inhabitants. The connection between the houses creates a gradient in intimacy and accessibility between outside and inside as well as between public and private spheres. In the traditional Ghanan village, some modern homes that are detached from the others have emerged in response to the influence of migration to the city. However, these detached dwellings are not considered to be homes, rather they are conceptualised as provisional shelter. These single dwellings are constructed by migrants who return to the village on a temporary or permanent basis. Importantly, however, for any significant family ritual or event, the family compound home is considered to be a more appropriate location for home making. This example, demonstrates that there are non-Western conceptions of home that can be starkly contrasted against the modern conception.

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235 N. Papastergiadis, ‘Home in modernity’, p.6
237 ibid., p.16
238 ibid., p.15
There are also historical examples from Europe that suggest that the current conception of home has not always been dominant. The villages of pre-industrial Europe and even some early industrial towns accepted neighbourliness as a normal and desirable condition. In these townships houses were not sharply separated from one another through the use of features such as fences, verandas, front yards. According to Rykwert, the consolidation of modernity has resulted in the construction of houses that are fortresses, designed to defy neighbours and shelter each individual family from the outside world. The modern concept of the home is defined in sharp opposition to the space beyond. However, in reality, between the inner space of homely order and the outer space of chaos and the unknown there is a continuum of intermediate spaces.

Non-Western and primordial conceptions of home recognise these intermediate spaces. For example, the notion of a casita as a metaphor of home used among Puerto Ricans migrants, relates both to domestic dwelling spaces and the national homeland. J. Sciorra describes the building of a casita as “a concertive action of collective reminiscences” or a politicised memory. In this context home stretches beyond the residential environment and connects with both functional as well as affective relations in other settings than the place where people actually reside.

In order to broaden the concept of home beyond the modernist framework it is important to consider the intermediate social space that surrounds the home as equally important to the exclusive site of the house itself. In order to feel ‘at home’ individuals need to feel secure in the social environment that encases the home. Consequently, it is impossible to evaluate the safety of the private house without evaluating its socio-cultural surroundings. Rykwert argues that a house, whether it is located in a rural or urban setting, can only be considered a home when it is placed in the context of a neighbourhood. The importance of the neighbourhood is downplayed in the modern conception of home. However, in non-Western and primordial settings, the neighbourhood is considered to be inseparable from the private home. Modern modes of dwelling are generally constructed with design features such as high fences and a veranda and complex security systems that are designed to minimise interaction.

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239 N. Papastergiadis, N., ‘Home in modernity’, p.6
240 ibid., p.6
between neighbours and isolate individual families. Fences provide an obvious physical barrier between the household and the outside world, while verandas create a further spatial separation between the visitor and the inhabitants of the house. The isolationist features of the modern home do not contribute to individual or community security. Consequently, in re-thinking the concept of home we need to find new ways to design and build homes that aim to contribute to, rather than detract from, neighbourhood life and the security of the neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{243} Home cannot be seen in isolation; it is at the centre of a complex web of social networks, access to essential services and community facilities.

Dorine Massey problematises the view that home is a fixed and enclosed site and suggests that the identity of all places are, in part, constructed as a result of encounters with other places, people and processes.\textsuperscript{244} The identity of a place is derived, in part, from the shared experiences of history and culture of a people that inhabit a particular place. There is a prevailing assumption that such relations must be founded on a binary distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, with the former being superior to the latter.\textsuperscript{245} However, the identity of a place is developed through continuous interaction between the local and the global and it is subject to continuous change and revision.\textsuperscript{246} It has been accepted in a number of schools of political thought that identities are a product of discourse, language and socialisation. However, there has not been a similar recognition that places are constructed and not natural pre-existing sites. The home, as a place, is commonly conceptualised as a pre-given site rather than a process that is a product of language and discourse. Places are conceptualised as real sites that can be clearly differentiated from other sites using binaries such as inside/outside, domestic/international, local/global. However, in examining the history of various places and how they are conceptualised in the popular imagination, it becomes apparent that it has always been difficult to distinguish the inside of a place from the outside.\textsuperscript{247}

At the level of the everyday, home places are constructed out of movement, communication and social relations that stretch beyond a given geographical area and beyond physical and social boundaries. For example, most modern cities are places that have developed as

\textsuperscript{243} J. Rykwert, \textit{The Necessity of Artifice}, p.100
\textsuperscript{244} D. Massey, ‘Place called home?’, p.13
\textsuperscript{245} W. Connolly, \textit{Identity/difference}, p.45
\textsuperscript{246} A. Appadurai, \textit{Modernity at large: cultural dimensions of globalization}, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p.30
\textsuperscript{247} D. Massey, ‘Place called home’, p.14
‘meeting places’ and sites of interaction and interdependence. Modern cities have no internal sense of history that defines the identity of the place; rather, the identity of the city is continuously being refined as a result of interactions with the outside. A number of scholars such as Doreen Massey and Stuart Hall argue that globalisation has shifted the balance dramatically from internally focused social relations to externally connected relations. This is certainly true in some parts of the world as a result of the increasing political and economic interdependence between nation states, as well as the increasing ease with which people, goods and ideas move across national boundaries. However, it is also important to recognise that external influences have always affected places. These influences have always defined places in terms of their relationship to other places and other people – many of the effects of such interactions are not new. In short, the identities of places are not static and cohesive; rather, they are changeable and fluid precisely because the social relations and identities out of which they are constructed are themselves dynamic.

Conceptualising the concept of place in terms of openness and interconnection is useful for exploring alternative conceptions of home and belonging that go beyond the modernist frame. Social theorist and feminist, bell hooks reconceptualises the notion of home by suggesting that home refers not just to the one place, rather, it refers to many places that enable varied and temporary perspectives on belonging, community and security. hooks suggests that under such conditions “one confronts and accepts dispersal and fragmentation as part of the construction of a new world order that reveals more fully where we are, who we can become”. It is possible to conceive of many home places that are a product of the ever-shifting geography of social relations of the past and the present.

The process of homemaking includes an attempt on behalf of the individual to secure a space of comfort and familiarity. This often, but not always, involves carving out a private space in which private individuals isolate themselves from the outside world. However, homemaking also involves an attempt to locate the house in a broader socio-cultural environment in which the individual can participate in public as well as private experiences of homemaking and

249 D. Massey, ‘Place called home’, p.14
250 S. Hall, ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, p.50
251 D. Massey, ‘Place called home’, p.13
252 b. hooks, Yearning, Race, Gender, p.149
253 ibid., p.149
dwelling. In order for an individual to develop a sense of security and home a positive relationship must be developed between the home and the community in which it is placed.\textsuperscript{254} This is true at the level of the individual household and the surrounding neighbourhood. At a larger level, it is also the case that nations need to be placed in an environment of trust and safety in order for their national populations to feel secure. Cultural anthropologist Tim Ingold suggests that what constitutes a home is not merely the physically of a house but also the way that it is located in wider political and social contexts.\textsuperscript{255}

The home functions as an important symbol of individual identity and as a reference point that is used to situate an individual in their socio-cultural community. It is for this reason that the concept of home can be more accurately theorised as a social process based on the relationship between the individual and their social surroundings.\textsuperscript{256} Anders H. Stefansson’s ethnographic study of Banja-Luka—the main city in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serb Republic in 2003, illustrates some of the difficulties displaced populations and refugees face in establishing a sense of home.\textsuperscript{257} The process of re-establishing a sense of home in a post-conflict situation presents specific challenges for individuals and families who have been forced to leave their homes during or after a conflict. The return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (RDPs) is regarded at an official level as an essential part of the peace process in war-torn Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the level of the everyday, the interviews conducted by Stefansson reveals that the repossession of pre-war houses is a priority for Bosnians. The majority of RDPs believe they have a moral and legal right to reclaim their property.\textsuperscript{258} A number of RDPs have attempted to return to live permanently in Banja-Luka. The study reveals that the sustainable return of refugees to Banja-Luka is dependent on factors other than the ability of RDPs to legally and officially repossess their houses.

In order to understand the complexity of the re-homing process for RDPs it is necessary to explore the pre-war significance of the concept of home in Bosnian culture and society. In pre-war Yugoslavia, the home acquired a specific socio-cultural meaning. It was a focus of considerable economic investment, family life, social status and culture.\textsuperscript{259} The majority of

\textsuperscript{254} A. Quiney, \textit{House and Home}, p.48
\textsuperscript{255} S. Hall., ‘Cultural identity and diaspora’, pp.57–80
\textsuperscript{256} A. Quiney, \textit{House and Home}, p.50
\textsuperscript{257} A. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the making: property restitution, refugee return, and senses of belonging in a Post-war Bosnian town’, \textit{International Migration}, vol.44, no.3, p.116
\textsuperscript{258} \textit{ibid.}, p.115
\textsuperscript{259} \textit{ibid.}, p.116
Bosnians lived in houses that were separated from each other with a degree of privacy and isolation from the outside world. However, inhabitants of these homes were connected through various public activities. The local life-world of Banja-Luka prior to the war was characterised by trust, openness, inter-dependence and security. In this environment, the home functioned as a connection between the public and private worlds and facilitated a high degree of interaction and inter-dependence between neighbours. During the war, individual Bosnian homes were transformed from sites that welcomed others into sites that were fortresses designed to keep the enemy out and secure the inhabitants from the threatening outside.\textsuperscript{260}

Throughout this chapter I have argued that in any cultural setting the specific meaning of home is not static or uniform; it changes in response to broader societal and political developments. In the Bosnian context, Tonya Bringa notes that “for many (if not most) people building a new house was a life project….it often took ten to twenty years to finish a modern house.”\textsuperscript{261} Bringa emphasises that the \textit{process} of building the home is just as important as the finished product. Constructing a house and the process of homemaking was also an important way to improve one’s social status and moral standing in the community. Consequently, the home served as an important symbol of Bosnian identity and culture in the pre-war period. Homes were not merely physical constructions, they achieved their own “life histories” that reflected the “life histories of the inhabitants and the society at large”.\textsuperscript{262} The possession of Bosnian houses by Serbian soldiers during the war caused mass dislocation of different groups of Bosnians and contributed to the irreversible effects of ethnic cleansing that involved not only taking away people’s houses but destroying their sense of home, security and belonging.

The destruction of homes, as a tool of war, not only jeopardised the physical security of individuals it was also a symbolic attack on their sense of culture and identity. Looting and the occupation of other people’s property were an intrinsic part of the attack on Bosnian cultural identity and their sense of security and community.\textsuperscript{263} When displaced Bosnians were

\textsuperscript{260} A. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the making’, p.116
\textsuperscript{263} A. H. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the Making’, p.120
successfully able to legally reclaim their occupied houses it was assumed that they would automatically be able to restore their sense of personal and collective security in Banja Luka. However, the interviews conducted by Stefansson reveal that Bosnians who have chosen to reclaim their property titles as part of an attempt to re-establish a sense of normality and familiarity in Banja-Luka have encountered significant obstacles that prevent rehoming. Refugees reveal that many have experienced feelings of estrangement, dislocation and anxiety on return to their town. Such experiences of dislocation on return highlight that there is a clear distinction between ability to legally repossess a “house” and the ability to rebuild a “home”. In a post-war setting, where ethnic cleansing was a feature of the conflict, radical transformations in the community and society beyond the confines of the house have created a discontinuity between house and home for most Bosnians, and indeed, for some Serbians on the other side of the conflict. The experiences of Bosnian returnees suggest that although a majority of returnees have been able to reclaim their houses, very few have successfully rebuilt their “homes” or rebuilt a sense of security and community in the broader socio-cultural environment.

Bosnians who have chosen to permanently settle in Banja-Luka generally live in isolated and marginalised ethnic enclaves in the city. The interviews reveal that many Bosnians feel more comfortable living in areas of social marginality alongside other RDPs because the society beyond the protective walls of their house is perceived as a “Serb” dominated, unhomely place. The house is perceived by the returnees as providing the only site of protection for Bosnians in the same way that houses were conceptualised as the only site of safety during the war. Such feelings of estrangement and insecurity have changed the way that Bosnians relate to their social environment and the way they define home. A number of interviewees expressed that they have a general distrust of strangers and that they are highly conscious of locking the doors of their houses and employing other methods to secure their houses. This attitude can be starkly contrasted with the traditional attitudes and practices of pre-war Bosnians that were based on extreme hospitality, and intense neighbourliness. This shift represents a move from viewing security and home as public concepts that should be pursued

264 ibid., p.120
265 A. H. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the making’ p.119
267 A. H. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the making’, p.125
268 T. Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian way, p.67
by the entire community to a view of security and home that is based on an individualistic approach.

The experience of return, for many Bosnians who have chosen to permanently resettle is characterised by a sense of ambivalence. On the one hand, they have recouped their *houses* and been able to restore their attachment to their house, and to a lesser extent, to the neighbourhood. On the other hand, they have not been able to restore their *homes* as the social structures beyond their houses have been radically transformed in a way that is perceived as unhomely and unsafe by Bosnians.269 This example demonstrates that feeling at home is a condition that cannot be established through the mere provision of accommodation or a legal property title. Thus, the lack of housing structures in many societies forms only part of a larger problem relating to the real plight of dwelling and the need for all individuals to feel at home.270 This plight involves the human desire to create a sense of home based on inhabiting comfortable spaces and locations. The case of Banja-Luka demonstrates that there is a significant difference between housing, which can be legally repatriated, and the sense of home that can only be established with reference to the surrounding social and cultural environment. For many Bosnians the option of “going home” is, in practice, a path to renewed marginalisation and insecurity. Homemaking is an ongoing practice linked to human dwelling that lies at the heart of notions of individual and collective identity and security.

This chapter has argued that the home contributes to the creation of a secure environment through the provision of physical protection and shelter as well as through the performance of habits and routines that establish familiarity and comfort. However, there is also an intangible link between home and identity and human security. It is not the mere existence of a housing structure that provides individuals with a sense of security. Rather, it is the very process of homemaking and the practices associated with the creation of homely spaces that are fundamental to individual identity and security. Homemaking and dwelling are human practices that are elementary in the establishment of individual and collective security. John Berger captures the character of human dwelling in his statement that “home is not a dwelling but the untold story of a life being lived”.271 In this sense being at home refers to the

269 A. H. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the making’, p.126
270 T. Ingold, ‘Building, dwelling, living’, p.76
psychological state of feeling comfortable, secure and safe in the environment in which one lives.

Home is used as a metaphor to link the security of the nation state and its borders to the security of individuals living in its territory. This chapter has explored the metaphor of house and home in relation to the theorisation and practice of modern security. The prevalence of the modern metaphor of home enhances xenophobia among the national population based on a fear of cultural difference and the belief that the world ‘out there’ is inherently threatening. The modern metaphor of home is also used to enforce certain norms of domesticity and control that allow the politically dominant group to subjugate minorities to serve the needs and desires of the national majority. This chapter has provided a critique of the use of the modern metaphor of home and suggested that its deployment has consequences for the security of minority groups within the nation. This critique begs the question: can security only be achieved through the attempt to isolate oneself from the encounter with cultural difference both between and within nation states and to sharpen the borders of home as a site of enclosure?

The condition of being at home means very different things for different groups of people. Despite the dominance of the modern home metaphor, individuals engage in homemaking practices in a wide variety of ways. It is important to acknowledge that while one particular conception of home is associated with the practices of modern statecraft and the discourse of national security there are a number of alternative theories and practices of home. In the next chapter I ask the questions: Can we reconceptualise the notion of home beyond its modernist origins? How can we re-theorise home to more accurately reflect the ideas and practices that individuals engage in to establish a sense of security in the contemporary age? In the next chapter I argue that home needs to be analysed in the context of the dialectic between permanency and movement and between inside and outside in order to take into account the wider structural forces that impinge on feelings of comfort and security traditionally associated with the homeplace. Chapter Three will explore the concept of human dwelling in the context of globalisation and suggest that the pursuit of human security is closely linked to mobility.
Three Expanding the metaphor of home: Home as process, movement and dwelling

In the previous chapter it was argued that the Western metaphor of home is used in security discourse to naturalise the idea that the nation is an entity with fixed borders and uniformity. The use of this metaphor has consequences for the pursuit of individual security and the security of minority groups within the nation. Does this mean that we should abandon the metaphor of home entirely? Can the concept be expanded to more accurately reflect the diversity and contingency of contemporary life? The modern concept of home has a prominent position in conventional thinking on security and the development of the national psyche. However, this particular conception is only one way of approaching security and it is only a part of the individual psyche. Nationalist ideology has a limited influence over everyday actions of individuals and the meaning that they attribute to those actions. The particular construction of the homeland that is promoted by nationalists is just one of many competing ideas of home. This chapter will argue that an open-ended and flexible approach to the concept of home allows for a multitude of ideas and practices of security. Being at home and feeling secure can be achieved in a diverse number of ways; the metaphor of home needs to reflect this diversity.

The ability to move, both within and between the borders of the nation state, is an important part of the pursuit of security in the contemporary world. The speed and frequency with which people, goods and ideas move around the world has increased as a result of globalisation. This has implications for the dominant conception of home and security. Processes of Globalisation do not do away with the human need to establish a sense of home, however, they do change the conditions under which individuals and groups attempt to establish their security. In an environment in which people, goods and ideas are continuously moving, the definition of home is contestable. In this environment, individuals must constantly find new ways to feel at home and to feel secure in the face of continuous change.

The modern conception of home is fixated on the physical structure of the house and on the attempt to create an isolated and private environment. This site of isolation is considered “safe” because it is free from the influence of others. However, the chapter will argue that the home metaphor should be centred on the connections with community in recognition that individuals can only feel safe when they are located in a secure socio-cultural environment. Modern assumptions about home are contradictory. On the one hand the process of
urbanisation and capitalist consolidation promote the individual journey away from home and from locally bound experiences because of place and identity.\textsuperscript{272}

Yet on the other hand the modern metaphor of home enshrines the permanence of house and promotes an ideal of home as an enclosed site in which an individual can dominate over other and control his/her environment. If we were to interpret this modern lifestyle literally then it may be assumed that the experience of modernity eschews the architecture of the house entirely because there is no guarantee of a fixed or permanent home. According to Nick Papastergiadis, modernity is underpinned by the promise of return and stability. Maternal statements such as: \textit{home is where the heart is} remind us that despite the geographic migrations, social upheavals and cultural differences that occur as a result of urbanisation there is one privileged place where origin and destiny intersect, a place where security and familiarity are never compromised.\textsuperscript{273} However, the modern aspiration of freedom and adventure sit alongside a more restrictive interpretation of home as an enclosed site. It is the association between the individual life journey and home making that I want to highlight throughout the chapter. Home is a process that is continuously subject to re-definition in response to external and internal changes. The home-making process is inseparable from the pursuit of security.

\textit{Security through movement: A historical perspective}

Throughout the modern period, resources have primarily been secured through the exercise of territoriality. However, a historical overview of the dwelling practices of humans reveals that a wide variety of strategies and approaches are employed by humans to secure access to resources. A number of anthropological and sociological studies assert that the capacity for territorial behaviour in human beings is related to their cognitive ability to secure resources over time.\textsuperscript{274} In such accounts, territoriality is characterised as a natural and universal human trait. However, being territorial is not the only way that humans, in a historical and a contemporary setting, secure access to resources that meet their basic needs. Throughout the modern period, the securing of resources has been linked to the ability of individuals and entire communities to have a fixed geographical address and reliable source of resources.\textsuperscript{275}

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\textsuperscript{272}N. Papastergiadis , ‘Home in modernity’, p.2
\textsuperscript{273}ibid., p.2
\textsuperscript{275}ibid., p.320
\end{flushright}
However, some groups have always relied on obtaining resources from a variety of geographic locations because the availability of some resources may change depending on a range of factors. In this context, the practice of mobility can be conceptualised as a resource used in the pursuit of security. Maintaining flexibility is vital for some communities to ensure access to resources and to make optimal use of those resources to maximise security.\textsuperscript{276}

The modern system of states that defines political communities and their access to resources operates to secure permanent access to resources for populations who are primarily sedentary. However, there are a number of studies of peripatetic or nomadic communities suggesting that local resources can be secured and access guaranteed over time by populations who are themselves only temporarily localised.\textsuperscript{277} The nation state promotes fixity and stability as the best way to guarantee access to resources over time. The mobile lifestyle of nomadic groups is hindered by practices of modern statecraft to the extent that it has often resulted in the impoverishment of nomadic and peripatetic groups.\textsuperscript{278} A fundamental resource for peripatetic or nomadic groups is the maintenance of ongoing relationships with clients and customers. Aparna Rao argues that in addition to the ability to move, human relationships are an important resource for peripatetic or nomadic groups.\textsuperscript{279} In this context, the ability to move between numerous locations as well as social and economic relationships and are considered more important for the guarantee of security than the practice of territoriality.

The assertion of territorial sovereignty and the enforcement of internationally mandated boundaries can have consequences for the economic well being and the lifestyles of nomadic peoples. For example, the Tuaregs who are a nomadic people in the Sahel have found themselves at odds with a number of states (Mali, Niger, Bukina Faso and Algeria) to which they were assigned at the end of colonial rule in Africa.\textsuperscript{280} The creation of modern states with sharp boundaries was a part of the process of decolonisation. In the African context, the boundaries were considered to be a product external influence. The introduction of modern boundaries produced an antagonistic relationship between the Tuaregs and the sedentary

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\textsuperscript{276} R. B. Bechtel, \textit{Environment and Behaviour}, p.320
\textsuperscript{278} ibid., p.3
\textsuperscript{280} S. C. Nolutshungu, ‘Introduction’, p.4
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populations. This division also provoked an internal crisis within the Tureg population because the population was spread across a number of states and the extent to which the group could move between those states was inhibited with the advent of the modern boundary.\textsuperscript{281}

Other nomadic peoples such as the Roma in Eastern Europe are affected by rigid territoriality. The Roma are divided among various states in Europe and they face hostility within states for the itinerancy. The re-structuring of European states following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-World War II security order has increased the anxieties for this population.\textsuperscript{282} The creation of modern nation states has hindered the ability of the Roma to move in order to secure a livelihood and to pursue economic opportunities. In addition, the Roma people struggle for rights and recognition in a number of European states and in some cases the state itself has become a source of their insecurity. Indeed, the transformation of the imperial state system into a system of nation states has been at the heart of the problem of security.\textsuperscript{283}

The consolidation of the modern nation state, with its clearly defined body politic and territorial jurisdiction was not an evolutionary or peaceful process. A number of postcolonial scholars have highlighted the physical and discursive violence that is characteristic of the historical consolidation of the nation state.\textsuperscript{284} The consolidation of the physical and metaphysical borders of nations in Europe, and later in the colonies, involved the control of peripatetic or nomadic groups as part of the attempt to create manageable and quantifiable political communities.\textsuperscript{285} Peripatetic groups can be loosely defined as communities that have no fixed place of dwelling or territorial homeland and that rely on the ability to be able to move to ensure their economic, social and cultural subsistence.\textsuperscript{286} The approach of the state taken toward peripatetic peoples is often ambivalent and sometimes, contradictory. However, the history of the modern nation state suggests that peripatetic groups have generally been persecuted and marginalised from the body politic and identified as targets under modern

\textsuperscript{281} S. C. Nolutshungu, ‘Introduction’, p.4
\textsuperscript{282} ibid., p.5
\textsuperscript{283} ibid., p.6
\textsuperscript{286} A. Rao, ‘Strangers and Liminal Beings’, p.273
security regimes. In short, nation-building in the modern period has generally occurred to the detriment of peripatetic peoples.\textsuperscript{287}

The early modern period in Europe marked the beginning of a long history of intolerance and discrimination against nomadic groups. Historically, peripatetic groups constituted an important part of many primordial societies around the globe and contributed to the consolidation of international trade and intercultural exchange. In numerous primordial and non-Western historical narratives, societies have embraced the difference of foreigners and acknowledged their value as individuals with a unique insight and skills.\textsuperscript{288} Nomads and travellers who were unknown to society served important social and economic roles in certain primordial contexts. In the early modern period, the customs and lifestyles of peripatetic groups were seen to defy the norms and values of modern society; namely industrialism, individualism and territoriality.\textsuperscript{289}

The ideology of nationalism, requiring individuals to be loyal to one particular territory and political community, casts the peripatetic as an undesirable outsider whose mobility and difference from the majority group is a source of threat. The idea that peripatetics were “professional criminals” and who earned their living through illegitimate means gained popularity in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Prior to the consolidation of modernity, nomads were generally valued as members of multiple communities with a unique set of resources and attributes to share. By the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, nomadism in Europe was considered synonymous with vagrancy and criminality, which in turn was associated with poverty, disease and danger.\textsuperscript{290} The peripatetic, from early modern Europe to the present, has been reduced to an objectified other who is the target of hostility, xenophobia, racism and even genocide. The contemporary position of peripatetic communities illustrates that they continue to be victims of the practices of modern statecraft.\textsuperscript{291}

\textsuperscript{288}ibid, p.10
\textsuperscript{291}J. C. Berland and R. Aparna, ‘Unveiling the stranger’, p.14
Modern societies place a high priority on the possession of land as a sign of prosperity, personhood and security. However, in nomadic and some primordial communities, the formal ownership of land is less important than having strategic access to numerous sites of land. Historically and in a contemporary setting, individuals who possess no land or have no formal proof of that possession, are stigmatised within the nation and are considered to be disempowered and insecure. Such individuals are considered to be threatening strangers because they are typified as people whose ancestors and descendants are not apparent and whose origin is not identifiable. In a nomadic society both land and resources are generally distributed through a tenure system that is often based on kinship and other communal networks. Cynthia Chou explores the concept of tenure and territoriality through her study of the Orang Suku Laut people of Indonesia. The Suka Laut are a nomadic people with a highly organised system of land tenure. They have significant emotional attachment to multiple geographical sites around the country. The Indonesian government does not recognise their tenurial rights because they are not formally documented and individually divided. Consequently, the Orang Suku Laut are viewed as landless strangers who have no proper place within the nation and no legal basis upon which they can assert a claim for resources. This example demonstrates that the systems of modern governance do not recognise that security can be established through nomadic practices.

For nomadic groups mobility acts as a resource to ensure access to new locations, resources and client/consumer opportunities. Nomadic peoples rely on spatial mobility to ensure their livelihood and well-being. Furthermore, mobility is a practice that has spiritual significance for some nomadic groups and it is definitive of their sense of identity and their conception of home. The idea of movement itself and/or re-location are believed to have tonic effects on social and physical well-being of the individual and the community as a whole. This view can be starkly contrasted with the official view that nomadic communities are “dirty”, “polluting”, “wasteful” and “criminal” by many sedentary communities and the state. Subsistence activities that involve movement, flexibility and

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293 ibid., p.12
296 J. C Berland and R. Aparna, ‘Unveiling the stranger,’ p.18
resourcefulness are essential for the survival of nomadic groups as they are a part of their process of homemaking.

The consolidation of the modern nation state in Europe, and its exportation to the colonies, has naturalised a conception of security based on fixity, territoriality, and cultural homogeneity. Under this model, citizens of a nation are encouraged to be sedentary and to pledge their loyalty to a singular community. This approach hinders the ability of alternative ways of being and dwelling in the nation that are based on mobility, temporality and strategic identification with more than one community. In re-thinking the conceptualisation of home in a contemporary context, it is useful to look back at the homemaking practices of nomadic groups that incorporate multiple geographical sites and that are continuously subject to adaptation and change. The remainder of the chapter will suggest that in a contemporary context we need to move beyond the modern conception of home and security and return to an open-ended view of the pursuit of home and security.

The Link between homemaking and human dwelling

The concept of home is more than a synonym for the physical structure of the house in which humans reside. The modern metaphor of home focuses primarily on the function of the house as a container that isolates individuals from the outside world. However, home means a great deal more to people then the provision of shelter. Joseph Rykwert suggests that the most important function of home is that it provides a central base that forms the starting point for an individual’s life journey. The experience of home is of vital importance for the construction of identity especially for children in their formative years. Home is more than a place of shelter; it is a physical space that becomes a home because of the regular doings of its inhabitants. The repetition of acts and the meaning attributed to those acts creates a sense of security through routine. Home emerges out of the social processes that relate to the architectural container of the house. Within the home, personal and social meanings are consolidated through the expression of specific cultural values, the development of unique cultural traditions and the display of certain states of emotion. While the space of the house

298 J. Rykwert, The Necessity of Artifice, p.100
299 Ibid., p.100
may be defined by its material structures, the home is divided by symbolic boundaries rather than physical boundaries.\(^{300}\)

Feeling at home is a condition that is created through the association with homely space and places. Martin Heidegger identifies this process as a process of human dwelling.\(^{301}\) Heidegger has written extensively about the human need to dwell in order to establish a sense of identity, home and security. In his influential essay ‘Being, Dwelling, Thinking’, Heidegger asks two fundamental questions. First, what is to dwell? and secondly, how does building belong to dwelling?\(^{302}\) The process of building is generally associated with the construction of a physical structure that is used by humans. Building is traditionally conceived of as a means to dwelling— when dwelling is viewed as an endpoint. Dwelling is the activity or state of being that occurs after a structure is built.\(^{303}\) The conventional view of dwelling links fixity and stability to security. When humans dwell in their homes they are considered to be safe because the house is a solid, enclosed structure and a familiar environment. However, it is important not to exaggerate the significance of the permanence and materiality of the house in the construction of individual and collective security. In reality, the majority of individuals move house at least once in their lifetime and most are able to reconstruct a sense of home in response to change in their built and social environment.\(^{304}\) Heidegger’s conception of human dwelling adds weight to the argument that home is a process rather than a fixed physical site.

The process of building is generally conceived of as a transitional process with an endpoint. However, Heidegger asserts that dwelling is not merely the endpoint of the building process; rather, he suggests that “to build is in itself already to dwell”.\(^{305}\) Thus, it is the process of building that contributes the human pursuit of security and the need to feel at home. Heidegger asserts that an important meaning of the word building— to dwell— has been lost in our contemporary understanding and use of the term. He refers back to the original Old High German use of the word for building, *baun*, which means to dwell, to remain and stay in a place.\(^{306}\) Today, we commonly refer to the term dwelling as an activity that humans

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\(^{301}\) M. Heidegger, ‘Building, dwelling, thinking’, p.321

\(^{302}\) *ibid.*, p.322

\(^{303}\) *ibid.*, p.321

\(^{304}\) M. Douglas, ‘The idea of home’, p.290

\(^{305}\) M. Heidegger, ‘Building, dwelling, thinking’, p.322

\(^{306}\) *ibid.*, p.324
perform alongside many other activities; we work in one place and we dwell in another. Dwelling is used primarily to refer to the site where one lives. However, Heidegger argues that dwelling refers to the whole host of activities that humans engage in to establish a secure social environment and a sense of belonging. In this sense building as dwelling refers to the everyday human experience of habitation. According to Heidegger: “we do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is because we are dwellers”.

The individual subjects, as he/she is theorised in liberal political philosophy is a figure that stands apart from other humans and objects and can be distinctly separated from the surrounding social world. The modern conceptions of security and home are based on the ability of individuals to be able to carve out a space of isolation from others. The difficulty with the liberal humanist approach is that it removes the self out of the world, placing it before the world, as a spectator stands before a picture. The presumption that this is possible and desirable informs the logic of the pursuit of modern security. Postmodern scholars including Heidegger argue that to be the self is to experience the things of the world from within the world. This is a diversion from the liberal conception of the individual because individual identity is embedded in, and inseparable from, the social world.

Heidegger refers to humans as “being in” the world to emphasise that human beings dwell in the world. He suggests it is this “average everydayness” and participation in our social surroundings that should form the started point for inquiry into the nature of the self. From this perspective, our first and our most usual encounter with things is not a detached observation of the facts around us. Rather, we are involved with things and in relations with other people from the moment life begins. William Connolly also supports this line of argument; he suggests that individual identity is formed through social interaction. Furthermore, he rejects the idea that philosophers must be able to prove that an individual subject can break out of its isolation and make contact with independently existing things. The postmodern critique suggests that expanding the concepts of home and security must

307 M. Heidegger, ‘Being, dwelling, thinking’, p.324
308 ibid., p.236
311 W. E. Connolly, Identity/Difference, p.67
begin with an acknowledgment that humans are embedded in their social world and that identity is formed from the experience of dwelling in the world.

Throughout the history of political ideas, philosophers have grappled with the question: what is man’s place? This question is also fundamental to the security debate because establishing a sense of belonging is key to being at home and feeling secure. Heidegger concludes that there is no definitive answer to the question: what is man’s place? However, he argues that the quest to find one’s place in the world forms a part of the process of human dwelling.\textsuperscript{312} The desire to establish a sense of belonging is a characteristic that is definitive of human existence. Humans create a sense of belonging based on experiences of the everyday. Habitual routines and everyday practices that relate to home, work, family and leisure, help to locate and ground humans in a social environment. These practices form part of the on-going process of homemaking.

In \textit{Being and Time}, Heidegger conceives of human existence as inherently groundless and unstable. The groundlessness of human existence is an authentic state that can be placed in opposition to security, which is the mark of unauthenticity. Heidegger argues that the nature state of the world and the humans that dwell in it is a condition of insecurity.\textsuperscript{313} If the most authentic and natural condition for humans to exist in is insecurity, then the security project is unlikely to ever be complete. Although insecurity is a natural condition it is not one that most humans feel comfortable with. Individuals attempt to alleviate insecurity from their lives with reference to the everyday. Humans create a sense of belonging and security by remaining within the domain of the everyday and the familiar and by following the routes proscribed to them by society.\textsuperscript{314} Heidegger argues that individuals allow others to tell them their place in the world, whilst deliberately ignoring the voice of nothingness within them that suggests that their identity is ultimately fragile and insecure. Embracing one’s insecurity allows individuals to exist in an authentic state, however, this also leaves the individual feeling isolated and marginalised from society. Thus, the pursuit of security can be viewed as a process of orientation and of findings ways of living and being in common.

\textsuperscript{312} M. Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p.179
\textsuperscript{313} K. Harris, ‘Fundamental ontology’, p.75
\textsuperscript{314} M. Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, p.176
The articulation of individual security must involve affirmation of oneself as part of a community. Although humans have a need to express their individual identity this need does not override the desire to belong to a community and dwell with others in the world. An important part of the dwelling and homemaking process is the belief that home and security are obtainable even though, in reality, the journey has no endpoint. Humans employ practices of homemaking and dwelling to build a sense of security and it is important for them to believe that this security is meaningful. This is not to imply that that this conception of security is fixed or permanent. Rather it is to suggest that security cannot be separated from place, locality and the social world. Heidegger’s insight allows for a broader conception of home and homemaking that is not tied to one place or epoch. This approach is particularly pertinent in an age when current levels of mobility are rupturing the assumed link between places of origin and the construction of home. Within the climate of mobility, both architectural and ancestral homes come to assume new meanings and the process of homemaking moves beyond a singular place or reference point.

**Home and security in a globalised world**

The age we live in is characterised as a period of increased movement and fluidity and it is often contrasted against the fixity and stability of the past. According to social theorist John Urry, for example, the current social order is now defined by mobility rather than by presence or place. Other social theorists such as Dorine Massey and M. Castells argue that there has been a transformation of the social world that has resulted in the destabilisation of identity and the detachment of identity from the concept of place. It is difficult to ignore the changes in the frequency and form of human movement that have occurred in the last fifty years and it is vital to acknowledge the effect of these changes on modern conceptions of home and security. However, the accounts of globalisation that analyse spatial tropes and metaphors that privilege movement over attachment are often not sensitive towards the continued importance of place. Processes of globalisation do not eliminate or reduce the need for individuals to secure their identity or orientate themselves in a habitual space of belonging and safety. Consequently, the home as a physical and ideological site remains an important part of the individual pursuit of security. In many ways ‘place’ still serves as a

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317 D. Massey, *For Space*, p.6
primary basis on which individuals build a sense of solidarity with others and establish sites that are considered secure and homely. In a globalised world characterised by mobility and fluidity, humans still find places and spaces in which to dwell as part of the pursuit of security.

Processes of globalisation have impacted upon the composition of political communities and on the places and spaces that those communities refer to as home whether that be the village, the city or the nation. A number of scholars have highlighted that globalisation has produced fear and disorientation within some communities. This sentiment is reflected in some of the literary accounts of globalisation that describe the increasing feelings of dislocation and anxiety experienced by individuals and entire societies in the face of global change. However, the view that globalisation has destroyed traditional notions of place and the attachment people have to those places is contestable. It assumes that the social geography of a place is only constructed through internal experiences of history and culture and external influences have only been used to create a negative counter-position to define a place. It is difficult to deny that globalisation has challenged pre-existing notions of home and has forced communities to adapt in the face of demographic change. This change has been particularly pronounced in places that have historically been inhabited by one cultural group. Changing demographics complicate the pursuit of home, when home is conceptualised as a space of familiarity and fixity. However, perhaps the modern metaphor has never really captured the reality of everyday life. There is significant evidence to suggest that their history of homemaking and human dwelling has always involved confrontation with otherness and interaction with the outside world.

The literature on the ‘new’ globalised world makes reference to ‘global cities’, global visions of hyperspace and borderless hubs of communication and exchange. Massey argues that a degree of hyperbole is used by some scholars of globalisation in their description of the space-time compression. The degree to which globalisation is a new phenomenon is exaggerated in the literature. Massey asserts that while globalisation has provided some opportunities for people to travel and relocate, many groups are not at liberty to travel freely from one location

318 D. Massey, *For Space*, p.5
319 M. Miles, *Cities and Cultures*, Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2007, p.15
to the next or to pursue the opportunities created as a result of globalisation. Massey questions the newness and uniqueness of global cities and cosmopolitan hubs that are attributed to changes that have occurred in the period of late capitalism. Global cities have a history that long pre-dates the emergence of information technology and other forms of communication. For centuries, certain urban spaces and industrial hubs have placed differently situated individuals in close proximity with each other. It has long been the exception, not the rule that place can be simply equated with community and the construction of individual identity. In this sense much of the openness and fluidity that characterises contemporary international political and economic relations is not new. This analysis suggests that in a historical as well as a contemporary context, the metaphor of home does not reflect the interaction between differentially situated individuals in local, national and global settings.

In cities such as London, certain parts of the city have for centuries been complex locations where numerous different communities intersect and where the influence of other places and peoples are visible in the culture and everyday operation of city life. The connections that cultural communities maintain across and within nation states indicates that communities do not have to be spatially concentrated in order to survive. In London, for example, South Asian communities have a strong connection to communities in the birth countries as well as South Asians across the UK. Individual and communal definitions of identity that are based on a whole range of factors including religion, gender and nationality are powerful because they cut across time and space. Face-to-face interactions and local experiences do play a role in the construction of communal identities, however, many communities survive through the maintenance of bonds that are not geographical or spatial.

The impact of globalisation on conceptions of national identity and the national homeland present a specific set of challenges for the modern security paradigm. Kevin Robins writes “globalisation, as it dissolves the barriers of distance, makes the encounter of colonial centre

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322 D. Massey, For Space, p.8
and colonised periphery immediate and intense”. Globalisation makes the task of separating inside from outside, friend from foe and self from other complicated and at times impossible. In the contemporary climate, global flows of information and goods appear to travel seamlessly across state boundaries. This makes it difficult for national elites to have a monopoly over the identity construction of their citizens and the information they receive. However, social theorist Zygmunt Bauman argues that the increase in global flows of information and the spread of global culture are unlikely to materialise into a homogenous ‘world’ culture. The cultural heterogeneity that remains a feature of the contemporary period suggests that globalisation has not resulted in the emergence of a monoculture or a singular global political community.

Local culture serves as the raw material from which personal and collective identities are formed. Local cultures are impacted to varying degrees by global and external trends. Some local cultures are resilient in spite of globalisation as they can serve as orientation points or labels for group integration. In this context, the articulation of cultural difference is often a defensive response to globalisation. However, global processes impact significantly upon other local cultures and on local understandings of history, language and community. In this context, a local culture may be substantially modified or may disappear entirely to suit the demands of the global economy and an increasingly mobile population. Global or external cultural trends are never written onto a tabula rasa or received passively by the populations they penetrate. Consequently, various forms of hybrid culture emerge as a result of the intersection between the global and the local. In the final chapter of the thesis I will explore in greater detail the development of hybrid cultures that can be linked to personal and collective security.

It is important to recognise that globalisation has not provided opportunities for everyone on an equitable basis. For some it has presented opportunities for economic and political empowerment beyond their local or national origins. Whilst for others, globalisation has

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329 Ibid., p.25
provided no opportunities for increased autonomy and socio-economic empowerment. In fact, in some situation, globalisation has exacerbated political and socio-economic inequalities.\textsuperscript{331} For both the groups that can move and for those groups that cannot move, globalisation has affected their definition of identity, community and home. For those individuals and groups that can move, the definition of what it means to be at home and to feel secure is more likely to be influenced by non-territorial factors and subject to continuous revision and modification. However, even for those who stay at ‘home’, identities and the pursuit of security are more likely to be fragile and contingent upon external influences because of the increasing impact of migration, cultural commodification and exportation and transnational political and economic movements.\textsuperscript{332} Thus, for all individuals and groups it is necessary to revisit the modern concepts of home and security in light of globalisation.

As I established in the previous chapter, the modern concept of home refers primarily to the physical structure of the house. However, in a mobile world, a disjuncture is created between one’s home place of origin and one’s sense of ‘being at home’. In a mobile world, one’s sense of home is not a geographical given; rather it develops out of various building and dwelling activities that create homely spaces. These practices include: how we respond to strangers with whom we come to be proximate, the ways we orient ourselves in unfamiliar places, the things we assemble to make ourselves comfortable and the habits we engage in to create an environment that is familiar.\textsuperscript{333} The social process of homemaking and the routines that take place in and around the home has always been more important than the physical structure of the houses in determining an individual’s sense of being at home. However, for migrants that do not reside in their country of birth the process of homemaking is particularly adaptive and changeable. The experience of permanent migration or of living between a number of nation states makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible for individuals to articulate their sense of home with reference to a singular place or architectural structure.\textsuperscript{334} This is not to imply that migrants never feel at home or that they are unable to establish a sense of security away from their traditional places of origin. The homemaking experiences

\textsuperscript{331} D. Massey, ‘Global sense of place’, p.30
\textsuperscript{334} ibid., p.165
of migrants, and indeed of many others individuals and groups that are exposed to external forces, is that home refers to a series of locations and experiences.\textsuperscript{335}

The dominant modern conception of home is based on a binary distinction between the ‘safe’ interior of the home and the ‘threatening’ exterior. However, the interior and the exterior of the home cannot be neatly separated between the public and private, rather they are interrelated processes that contribute to the overall experience of feeling at home.\textsuperscript{336} Anne Buttimer argues that home should be conceptualised with reference to two reciprocal movements: an inward-facing concept of home, and the ‘horizons of reach’ that extend outward from that home.\textsuperscript{337} Buttimer explores the continuity between the public and the private through the concept of ‘reach’. Reach is not conceptualised as an opposite force to the home, rather it is a constitutive force in the construction of home.\textsuperscript{338} The concept of reach encapsulates the everyday practices that individuals engage in with others and with their surrounding environment to establish a sense of home and security through routine. It is by reaching out to the social world that surrounds the house that the individual experiences a sense of being at home.\textsuperscript{339} The home is established through spatial, affective and sociological efforts that confirm one’s sense of being at home and feeling secure.\textsuperscript{340} Being at home is an active process of becoming that stretches across complex spatialities that reflects more expansive relational ranges.

The increased interdependence and opportunities to move that have been created through globalisation mean that more and more people are choosing or are forced to live between two or more locations and to travel frequently between many locations. The increase in movement of people, goods and ideas is transforming the relationship between the house and the home. Anges Heller, in her article ‘Where are we at home?’, suggests that there are two representative kinds of home-experience: the spatial home-experience and the temporal home-experience.\textsuperscript{341} The spatial home experience is a “geographically monogamous” experience that is associated with a sense of one familiar place and one fixed location. This

\textsuperscript{335} P. Werbner, ‘Introduction: the mentality of diaspora—between aesthetic and ‘real’ politics’, \textit{Diaspora}, vol.9, no.1, 2000, p.8
\textsuperscript{337} A. Buttimer, ‘Home reach and the sense of place’ in A. Buttimer and D. Seramon (eds.), \textit{The Human Experience of Space and Place}, London: Croom Helm, 1980, p.170
\textsuperscript{338} ibid., p.171
\textsuperscript{339} ibid., p.171
\textsuperscript{341} A. Heller, ‘When are we at home?’ \textit{Thesis Eleven}, 41, 1995, pp.1–18
experience is based on a maximum level of transparency, familiarity and predictability for the individual. By contrast the temporal home is a “geographically promiscuous” experience that is likely to be had by the person who travels regularly, staying in hotels, who speaks many languages, and is familiar with many cultures. This experience is based around the inevitability of constant change in one’s social environment and the ability of the individual to make adjustments based on the encounter with unfamiliar spaces, people and processes. In the context of increased movement of people, many scholars have pointed to the increased importance to the temporal conception of home based on movement and adaption rather than fixity and familiarity.

Transnational Communities as home

In a world where more and more individuals are living away from their homelands, non-territorial communities are an important reference point in the pursuit of home and security. Individuals who migrate to a new country or city, whether on a permanent or temporary basis engage in homemaking practices to create spatial attachments to their new environment. However, they generally maintain both material and psychological connections to their place of origin. Both spatial and temporal conceptions of home are relevant to identity in a mobile world. The modern conception of home is preoccupied with an attachment to a singular geographical site which is a private site isolated from the remainder of the community. However, in reality, contemporary experiences of home can be more accurately theorised in terms of movement, interaction and openness. The temporal experience of home is particularly relevant to the experiences of people who live transitional lifestyles and engage in activities in the diaspora.

Transnational communities serve an increasingly important role in the construction of home in a mobile world. Transnational communities refer to groups of individuals who live in different geographical sites who feel related to each other in some way and who actively engage in social relations with each other. Individuals that make up a transnational community have one or more connections based on familial, linguistic, political or religious similarities. Members of a transnational community may sometimes travel back to their

342 A. Heller, ‘When are we at home’, p.1
343 ibid., p.2
original homeland and maintain close connections with kin back home. However, this kinship may also be reflected in a desire to be part of a global network without longing for actual return to a homeland. The term transnationalism can be used to refer both to short-term migrants and migrants that permanently resettle in another country. Both categories of migrants are actively involved in the politics and society of their homeland and provide support for family members and friends. Members can remain active in the politics of their homeland, and in the transnational community, without actually returning back to their place of origin. Second generation migrants who are born in the host country can also develop a strong affiliation to the country of the parents’ birth to the extent that they are active members in a cultural diaspora and rely on the transnational community to construct a sense of home.

Participation in a transnational community or network can provide migrants with an environment of safety, familiarity and continuity and assist them in building a home and an identity that straddles old and new locations even though there may be no geographical focal point for the community. The process of homemaking for migrants can be hindered by the lack of family members or friends in the host country and the lack of cultural and material resources that are needed to establish a sense of comfort and safety. Additionally, migrants are often victims of various forms of discrimination in their host nations and they are resented and marginalised by dominant cultural groups. It is in this context that the transnational community plays an important role in the provision of support, comfort and familiarity for migrants. Although migrants rely on non-territorial forms of community to construct a sense of home the house itself does retain some significance in the overall construction of home and security.

The process of migration involves interaction with a number of architectural sites such as: the ancestral (original) home, the departure lounge, the vehicle of passage, the temporary shelter and the new house. All these sites contribute to migrants’ sense of location and to their ability to re-build their sense of identity and community. Migrant houses are created and maintained with reference to a variety of geographical sites, styles, rituals and practices that

347 *ibid*, p.36
349 J. M. Jacobs., ‘Too many houses’, p.167
reflect the origin of the family, their experience of migration and their encounter with their new society.\textsuperscript{350} Although the temporal experiences of home are important for migrants, the material aspects of home making are also important. At the point when the migrant attempts to settle in a new place the architecture of the house plays an important role in reinstating a sense of being at home and establishing a sense of security.\textsuperscript{351} Migrants will often select houses that reflect the architectural style of houses from their home country, or they may attempt to modify a house to more closely resemble a prototypical house back home. The process of using both temporal and geographical references is fundamental because it is the beginning of the complex process of renegotiating their identity and sense of community.

For many migrants home ownership is an important signifier of status and security as it serves as a symbol of their success in their new country and a symbol that the family has established permanent roots. In Australia, for example, high rates of home ownership are recognised as a defining feature of many migrants groups, in particular post World War Two migrant groups.\textsuperscript{352} The desire to own a home suggests the connection to a specific geographical site remains a fundamental part of the re-homing process. This is not to suggest that migrants who do not own a house can never feel at home in their new place of residence. The house serves as an important focal point from which migrants can orient themselves, not simply to their new neighbours, new nation and new society, but also to their old ancestral home and their responsibilities to family left behind.\textsuperscript{353} For some migrants, the house as a geographical site is less important than engaging in other homemaking practices such as the preservation of certain cultural and linguistic traditions, the ability to engage in religious worship or to associate with members of a cultural diaspora.\textsuperscript{354} Thus, the migrant home cannot be categorised as either a vernacular home or an ancestral home, rather is it a mobile home, which calls into being flexible architectures of inhabitation. The homemaking process that migrants engage in requires us to move beyond monogamous modes of dwelling, authentic vernacular architectures and ideas of lost ancestral, “authentic” homes.

The physical structure of the house plays an important role in helping a migrant to construct a sense of home and security in the face of change. However, it is difficult to establish an

\textsuperscript{351} J. M. Jacobs., ‘Too many houses’p.167
\textsuperscript{352}ibid., p.167
\textsuperscript{353}ibid.,p.168
\textsuperscript{354} S. Gunew, ‘The home of language’, p.110
overall sense of home if the house is located in a social environment in which an individual does not feel safe and comfortable. There are a number of affective assemblies necessary to sustain a meaningful mode of dwelling. Being at home is a social rather than a material condition. Consequently, it is necessary to examine the socio-cultural surroundings of the house as well as the significance of the physical structure. A complete sense of home based on safety, trust and openness can only be established when a positive relationship develops between an individual and their surrounding local and national environment. Although the physical structure of the house provides migrants with a space of safety and enclosure, the boundaries of the home is also formed in part through its relationship to neighbouring homes. Consequently migrants, just like any other group, can only experience a genuine sense of being at home when they feel comfortable and confident not only inside their physical houses but also in the broader socio-cultural environment.

In the previous chapter the nature of human dwelling was explored with reference to the housing repatriation process in post-conflict Bosnia. I would like to return briefly to this example to demonstrate how the transnational community can function as home for certain groups of migrants. A small number of elderly Bosnians have chosen to resettle permanently in Banja-Luka; however, the majority of returnees chose to maintain a purely symbolic connection with their hometown. A number of repatriated refugees travel to the town for short periods over the summer to visit their original houses and meet with other refugees who live similar transnational lifestyles. A number of younger and middle-class Bosnians who have settled elsewhere chose to maintain their houses in Banja Luka, despite the fact that they remained uninhabited for most of the year. The sense of community that is established between individuals who have re-claimed their houses but choose to reside elsewhere demonstrates that the physical structure of the house retains significance for Bosnians as a symbol that is associated with their overall conception of home and belonging. However, it is the affective bonds of community that are established between members of this community that form the basis of their contemporary experiences of home and security.

The empty transnational houses constitute a powerful symbol of the Bosnian moral defiance, ethnic pride and economic success abroad. Furthermore, these houses are sites in which

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357 *ibid.*, p.119
Bosnian refugees can gather together to share their transnational connections, resources and experiences. In the aftermath of the war, many Bosnians have rebuilt a sense of community and home, based on securing an economic livelihood and a sense of social belonging that is not territorially bound. It is important for Bosnians to be able to reclaim their houses because they provide a symbolic and material connection to the homeland. However, in a mobile world, increasing numbers of migrants rely on the transnational community to provide them with protection and to provide support and services that their national or local community is not able to provide. The diaspora, as a specific kind of transnational community, plays a particularly important role in the provision of cultural security for migrants.

**A new approach to home and security through the diaspora**

‘The diaspora’ is an important form of community as it is a locus for analysing transnational practices, and the impact of the globalisation of capital, people, and cultures. Diaspora theory is linked to theories of globalisation and transnationalism in the sense that “diasporas are the exemplary communities of the transnational movement”. The diaspora is a socio-political framework through which migrants and minority groups can articulate an alternative security politics. Diasporic communities take many forms and engage in a diverse range of activities. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish a set of generic characteristics or universal features that define a diasporic group. Diasporas are not unified or monolithic communities; they are complicated because of the influence of factors such as class, caste, gender, and religion. In general terms, the concept of diaspora refers to participation in an ongoing transnational network that is centred around a real or idealised homeland that provides refuge for all of its members. It is characterised by living in one place while simultaneously remembering and/or participating in the political community of another place. Diasporic groups invoke conceptions of homeland and community that are not territorially bound or confined to one nation state. In this sense, diasporic communities challenge modern notions of geographic and political boundary.

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358 A. Stefansson, ‘Homes in the making, p.120
361 *ibid.*, p.3
In the dominant approach to security, national identity is assumed to be the most powerful and legitimate expression of political community. It is assumed that individuals have a political identity that is distinct and separate from other factors that influence identity construction. It is also assumed that feeling a part of a national homeland that is protected by the state is the primary determinant of individual security. Diasporas disrupt the clear-cut view of the relationship between nation, narration and belonging.\(^{363}\) Throughout the modern period, national identity has featured as a primary form of identification for inhabitants of a nation state. However, diasporas predate the Post-Westphalian international system of nation states. Various forms of transnational community based on religion, ethnicity and clan have existed for centuries.\(^{364}\) Therefore, we must be cautious not to automatically associate the common experience of longing for home, community and security with an inherent connection to the nation state. In order to examine the various influences that impact upon identity construction Paul Gilroy encourages us to go beyond nation-bounded geographies of inquiry toward a much larger analytic space that relates to the geography of movements of goods, economies, people and identities.\(^{365}\)

The term diaspora is traditionally associated with a politically marginalised group that has been forced to go into exile or flee their homelands. Pablo Bose suggests that the ‘refugee diaspora’, as a group of people forced by conflict or persecution to flee their homeland, poses a specific challenge to the assumption that home and nation are one the same and that the nation is the primary security provider.\(^{366}\) As a community in exile, a refugee diaspora is often defined by the nationality of its members, yet this does not imply that the connection to “home” is predicated on the nation. In many cases, the nation itself forms the threat to an individual’s sense of home and identity and endangers the security of minority communities. In a contemporary setting the term diaspora can be used to refer to a much wider range of groups than refugees.

The significance of diaspora politics to the contemporary global system has largely been ignored or downplayed by scholars of International Relations and Security Studies. This reluctance, in part, can be attributed to the processes of disciplinary isolation, containment

\(^{363}\) R. Cohen, *Global Diaspora*, p.5  
\(^{364}\) P. Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic*, p.13  
\(^{365}\) *ibid.*, p.15  
and theoretical abstraction that underpin IR theory. Traditional IR theorists claim that the study of diaspora politics is subject matter of sociology or cultural studies. However, given the increasing role of transnational communities in the constitution of identity and community it is impossible to conceive of the diaspora as apolitical. Experiences of diaspora do not fit comfortably within the traditional framework of IR because they challenge the state’s monopoly over the constitution of political identity and disregard the geographical boundaries of the state. Consequently, there remains an important distinction between “authority-defined” conceptions of national identity and the actual lived experiences, cultural tendencies and identification of ethnic communities. The homogeneous nature of national culture and identity does not reflect the multiple and complex sets of identities and loyalties expressed by diasporic communities.

The earliest academic studies of diaporas related primarily to the study of displaced communities that have migrated through force, such as the Jews. These communities of victims needed protection and refuge to avoid persecution and exile in the countries from which they were fleeing. Traditional representations of diasporans have focused on their status as persecuted victims who are forced to flee their home countries and who have little or no power or opportunity in the nation states from which they flee. ‘Victim diasporas’ such as: Jewish groups, Africans scattered by slavery over the Americas and the Caribbean, or the Armenians and Palestinians, dominate our view of diasporic experiences.

In the contemporary political climate, there are a large number of diaporas that exist not as a result of victimhood and persecution but as a consequence of various individuals and groups choosing to adopt a transnational lifestyle.

The category of diaspora can be expanded to refer to other migrant groups who have flourished away from their original homelands and retained strong economic and political ties to their places of origin and often a distinct cultural identity. The term can also be applied to a vast range of groups that have emerged as a result of politically motivated uprooting and moving of populations and voluntary migration. In referring to modern diaporas, Gabriel

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367 S. Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, p.240
369 P. Bose, ‘Dilemmas of diaspora’, p.38
Sheffer proposes that “diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin— their homelands”. Thus, a more contemporary definition of diaspora recognises that it is a multifaceted social network that results in part from colonial legacies and experience of oppression and war; but also from emerging trends towards cultural, economic, political and social globalisation.

There is a general consensus among scholars that being part of a diaspora involves sharing a common history of dispersal, myth/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return (often an idealised rather than real return), ongoing support for the homeland, and a collective identity characterised by common experience. Members of a diasporic group may share one or many of these things in common. Diaspora is a social construct founded primarily on affective—expressive components such as consciousness, memory, history and narrative, all of which contribute to the establishment of a diaspora experience. A diaspora culture is maintained by selectively preserving and recovering traditions from the cultural community’s place of origin with the aim of creating a contemporary identity with far reaching historic, cultural and political processes. The feature that distinguishes diasporas from other types of migrant communities is that a sense of longing for the homeland can occur or re-occur after several generations, even when the groups’ members are themselves no longer immigrants. In some cases migrants may develop loyalty to a particular diaspora long after they have settled in their new countries. Even some second generation migrants whose parents have little connection with their home countries choose to involve themselves in diaspora politics in an attempt to overcome situations of exclusion and oppression and to gain recognition as a group that is distinct from the national majority.

A myth of return is central to the sense of community that is established within a diaspora. The “return” of diasporans to their homeland is based on a belief in an eventual return to their place of origin. However, the belief is often an idealised virtual home rather than a real

373 J. T. Shuval, ‘Diaspora migration’, p.43
374 ibid., p.43
375 ibid., p.43
377 J. T. Shuval, ‘Diaspora migration’, p.46
Although diasporans are unable to return to their homelands, the idealised conception of home provides a sense of belonging and security for members of a diaspora who experience difficulty in building a sense of home in their new place of residence. The ability to identify as part of a “people with historic roots” who exist independently of the time/space of a host nation provides a sense of power and legitimacy to claims of oppressed or disadvantaged migrants.

In Chapter Two the homeland was discussed with reference to the nation state and in relation to territoriality, fixity and homogeneity. However, in order to make the home metaphor relevant in the context of migration and globalisation it is necessary to broaden the scope of the term. The homeland can refer to a real or idealised space that may or may not be bound to a particular geographic space. Members of the diasporic community feel a historic and ongoing connection with a homeland. However, this homeland may not fit the conventional definition that is linked to modern nationalism. For members of diaspora the homeland is constituted, in part, from common historical experiences and a shared place of origin. However, the creation of the homeland is also an active process that must also be imagined and (re)-imagined as space that provides safety and comfort for members in the present and into the future. Migrants who consider themselves part of diaspora maintain ongoing connections with their place of origin and with members of the same ethnic, religious or cultural group in their new place of residence. In addition, they make cultural connections and build relationships with different cultural groups in their host nations. Thus the homeland is an ideal place of safety and connection that must be continuously re-defined and re-negotiated.

To demonstrate that the ideal of the homeland need not be bound to one geographical site or one community I would like to refer to an illustrative example. An examination of the construction of home for Bangladeshi migrants demonstrates that home is a complicated process that straddles local, national and global sites of reference that are both real and imagined. In contemporary Bangladesh articulations of identity, community and home are closely tied to the geographical origin of individuals and groups. Place is influential in determining identity, community and socio-economic status. However, in a contemporary context...
context definitions of identity, community and home are also strongly informed by the interaction between the local peoples and places and the outside world. Images of ‘home’ and ‘abroad’ impact upon the construction of the home for both those who move and those to stay. These images reflect the inequality between Bangladesh and the former colonial powers as well as the local social and environment conditions in Bangladesh. The cultural conditions of migration from Bangladesh are strongly influenced by the dependency of the country on foreign aid and the lack of domestic economic opportunity and the social perception that working abroad leads to economic and social empowerment. Working abroad is linked primarily to material and economic prosperity and secondarily to social status and political capital.

In a study of the impact of migration and globalisation on contemporary definitions of Bangladeshi identity and homeland, Kay Gardner examines the dynamics of power that are attached to certain localities in Bangladesh. In this study Gardner focuses on rural villages in Sylhet, in Northern Bangladesh, a region in which large numbers of individuals and families have migrated to the United Kingdom and the Middle East. The focus of Kay’s study is on the reactions of local Bangladeshis to the migration of their compatriots and the impact on the definition of the homeland for both groups. Local perceptions of the benefits of migration are informed by the distant, imagined localities of foreign lands and foreign power rather than actual experiences. Particular places and localities overseas are associated with different forms of power, which is exercised through the connections between those who migrate and those who stay. The desire to migrate and participate in the international economy is fuelled by a belief that migration is the only way for Bangladeshis to access economic power.

From the early days of migration to the United Kingdom, when single men travelled to the West without their families and returned every couple of years to their villages, patterns of migration have changed dramatically in Sylhet. Bangladeshi children are now born in Britain and entire families choose to apply for British citizenship. The Bangladeshi community is often portrayed in the Western media and academic literature as a community

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382 *ibid.*, p.1
384 K. Gardner, ‘Desh-Bidesh’ p.1
385 *ibid.*, p.2
386 *ibid.*, p.2
387 *ibid.*, p.2
plagued by poverty, social marginality, and oppression.\(^{388}\) In their homeland, by contrast, migrants are perceived as successful and prosperous individuals who have integrated into British society and maintained a sense of their Bangladeshi and Sylheti identity and built relationships in the host country.\(^{389}\) Despite the perception that Bangladeshis are the poorest of the migrant groups living in Britain, Gardner concludes from her research that many migrants living in Britain are able to secure economic and social livelihoods using resources that are not available to them in their home country. A number of migrants own property and small profitable businesses in Britain and the majority of migrants enjoy standards of living that are higher than in Bangladesh.\(^{390}\)

The prosperity of migrants has a direct effect on the village-life in Sylhet as a result of the substantial amounts of money that are remitted back to friends and family in Bangladesh. There are visible differences between households with access to foreign wages and those who are reliant on the local economy. Villages with high levels of migration have more stone houses rather than mud and thatch huts which are the most common form of houses in the village.\(^{391}\) This demonstrates the tangible impact that migration has on the construction of the individual houses. However, migration also contributes to the stability and prosperity of the broader community as remittances are used to build schools, mosques, and local businesses.\(^{392}\) In Talukpur, the small village that forms the primary subject of Gardner’s inquiry, many households are referred to as Londoni bari. Londoni bari households are easily identified because they are bigger houses with more elaborate decorations and features. This title is a reference to social status associated with migration to London.\(^{393}\)

Sylheti villagers explain the local economic differences and variations in social status of the residents with reference to two closely related concepts; bidesh and desh.\(^{394}\) Bidesh, the word used to describe foreign countries, is associated with success, power and prosperity. By contrast, statements relating to the desh are part of a discourse about the insecurity and instability of life in Bangladesh and the continuous economic struggle faced by

\(^{388}\) K. Gardner, ‘Desh-Bidesh’, p.2
\(^{390}\) K. Gardner, ‘Desh-Bidesh’, p.3
\(^{391}\) ibid., p.3
\(^{392}\) ibid., p.4
\(^{393}\) ibid., p.6
\(^{394}\) ibid., p.2
villagers. The dominant perception of the Bangladeshi homeland (the *desh*) is that it can no longer serve the basic needs of the majority of the population—in this sense it cannot provide them with a sense of security. Consequently, *bidesh* is also linked to the image of the *desh*, as Bangladeshi refugees are increasingly forced to rely on external support for their economic and social livelihood. The *desh* is also linked to another set of metaphors and images that relate to the core cultural identity of Bangladeshis. The *desh* is associated with spiritual and religious power. A sharp contrast exists between the economic and political potential of the *bidesh* and the fertility and spiritually of the traditional *desh*.

The two conditions of *desh* and *bidesh* are not polar opposites, with the former representing economic power and opportunity and the latter representing powerlessness and deprivation. According to Gardner, the mental maps of the Sylhet are based on a geography of power relations, in which domestic and international locations are related points along a continuum. The *desh* refers, in part, to the original birthplace of Bangladeshis, and in part to the locus of one’s social group that is a more fluid concept that changes according to employment and living circumstances. *Desh* refers to the location where an individual’s kinfolk are from; however, it also refers to the social group that one identifies with, which changes according to individual circumstances. In short, the *Desh* can be used to refer to a number of locations and communities both national, regional or village-based. This demonstrates that the traditional conception of home in Bangladesh is based on a number of geographical sites and social processes and that it is changeable not fixed.

The view that the *desh* land is ailing in physical and environmental terms is a reflection of the economic and political dominance of *bidesh*. While *desh* remains central to one type of power and sustenance, *bidesh*, has become the source of a more materialistic power, upon which the *desh* now depends. Bangladeshi migrants in Britain engage in transnational practices in order to establish a sense of home in the *bidesh* that involves maintaining close links with the *desh*. One cultural practice that is particularly important to the maintenance of link to the homeland is the burial ritual associated with Bangladeshi culture. Traditional burial remains an important practice for Bangladeshis because the landscape of Sylhet derives its religious and spiritual meaning and significance from the graves and shrines scattered

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395 K. Gardner, ‘*Desh-Bidesh*’, p.2
396 ibid., p.4
397 ibid., p.5
398 ibid., p.6
across it. Migrants move away from Sylhet and other parts of the country primarily because the land has failed to provide them with opportunities for prosperity and economic security. However, that land remains an important part of the Bangladeshi identity and cultural—this is reflected in the importance of migrants being buried in their traditional place of birth.

The idea of consuming produce from the desh is also central to maintaining a sense of Bangladeshi identity and home for migrants. Implicit in attitudes expressed about food, particularly rice from the homeland is the notion that through eating foods from the desh one is linked to one’s particular village and homestead and to the social group that inhabits it. The consumption of the food of the desh is not only viewed by Bangladeshis as more nutritious, it is also an important sign of belonging and socialisation. The food of the desh is exported to the UK and eaten by migrants to ensure that they maintain their connection to the homeland and they are nourished by consuming what they consider to be the best possible produce. These two examples emphasise that both traditional and contemporary influences as well as local and global influences are important in the overall construction of home and security.

For the residents of Sylhet, elements of desh and bidesh are co-dependent conditions that both contribute to the construction of home, community and security. Also for Bangladeshis who live abroad the desh remains an important part of their diasporic identity and their connection to the homeland. Through continuing a relationship with the desh, migrants receive the spiritual and religious guidance they need in order to reconstruct their identities and sense of security and home in London. Practices such as the consumption of food imported from Bangladesh are important in a symbolic and material sense for maintaining the cultural identity of migrants in their new societies. Bangladeshi homes are constructed as a result of the interplay between the local, the national and the global. This example illustrates that the home, and the sense of security created from being at home, is shaped and moulded by processes of mobility and through relations with other people and places.

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400 ibid., p.7
Home as a site of diversity: Living as other with others

The rapid increase in the speed and intensity of the movement of people has resulted in different national groups permeating into each other’s homely spaces. This has resulted in the mixed of socio-economic and political regimes as well as a scattering of cultural inheritances. It is not only migrant groups that must come to terms with the reality of living with difference as migration patterns affect established political majority groups as well as new minority groups. The existence of transnational communities within a nation state forces both migrants and the majority national group to recognise that there are always encounters between strangers with the national homeland, not just external to it. The process of confronting changes to one’s socio-economic and cultural environment in response to migration and other external forces can be referred to as a process of ‘re-homing’.

Migrant groups engage in a process of re-homing on arrival to a new country. The degree to which migrant groups attempt to assimilate their differences to blend into the dominant political culture varies greatly between migrant groups. However, even for those groups that go to great lengths to assimilate the dominant national ideology will still typecast them as foreign and different. In personal accounts of migration, exile and re-settlement, migrants express a determination to come to terms with themselves as foreigners who must live as other in a foreign territory. Julie Kristeva argues that an important part of the re-homing process for a migrant is learning how to live with others and to be “reconciled with [oneself] to the extent that they recognise [oneself] as a foreigners”. The attempt to come to terms with one’s own difference reflects a kind of “aloofness” which is the “foreigners shield”. According to Kristeva, the foreigner is “intensive, aloof….and beyond the reach of attacks and rejections.” Kristeva argues that a degree of agency can be exercised by migrants when they recognise that they do not have to conform to the existing culture. In this context, the experience of migration can create new forms of spatio-temporal duality and allow individuals to move freely between many sites they refer to as home. Migration can enable individuals to move beyond the restrictions that are sometimes imposed by a traditional

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403 B. Zhang, ‘Politics of re-homing’, p.104
404 J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.7
405 ibid., p.8
society with reference to a set of cultural and moral norms. It is important not to glorify the experience of migration or to ignore the challenges and trauma that can accompany migration. However, many migrants are able to successfully re-home and overcome feelings of estrangement and dislocation.

National majority groups must also engage in a process of re-homing when changes to the demography of a national population occur. The encounter between established ‘local’ groups and migrant and transnational groups can result in a realisation on behalf of the political majority that the other is not different to the self and there are many similarities between differently situated individuals that are not acknowledged in an official national ideology. The encounter with foreign groups can also highlight the internal differences within a national majority group and expose the fiction of national homogeneity. The recognition of our own difference, in Kristeva’s opinion, transforms foreignness into a form of commonality by “promoting the togetherness of those foreigners that we all recognise ourselves to be.” In this sense, it is the recognition of togetherness that paradoxically brings dispersed individuals together with the realisation that they are all different and foreign.

The experience of migration and in particular of being a part of a diaspora is often associated with exile. The figure of the exile is someone who has been rejected by a community and they are, in effect, homeless. However, according to Salman Rushdie being part of a diaspora, even if that diaspora has been formed because a community has been rejected from a nation or place, does not imply that all of its members are homeless. Although the memories of migrants may be fragmented and partial, it is precisely the fragmented nature of these memories that makes them so evocative. Rushdie argues that “the strands memory acquire greater status, greater resonance because they are remains”. Through these remains home is relocated somewhere between memory and longing, a space that exists between past and present. Rushdie converts the position of exile from one of disempowerment and loss to a position of insight and difference from which one has a unique view of the world.

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407 G. Hage, *Against Paranoid Nationalism*, p.3
408 J. Kristeva, *Strangers to ourselves*, p.109
409 J. Berger, *And Our Faces*, p.4
411 ibid., p.12
The home is an open and changeable conception for migrants; in this sense it is both absent and present. Thus, the power of home lies in its function as a paradoxical image; on the one hand it expresses process, becoming and plurality. On the other hand is represents connection relation and belonging. Diaspora poet, Joy Kogawa, encapsulates this paradox in her symbolic poem:

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\begin{align*}
I & \text{ stand on the edge} \\
If & \text{ I enter the forest I am not} \\
If & \text{ I enter the clearing I am still lost} \\
I & \text{ move in a direction} \\
\text{Chanting a creed. \textbf{"We belong. We belong"}}
\end{align*}
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As this poem suggests, the construction of home for transnational migrants is a complicated process. It is a process by which different cultures conflict with one another but are also converged and are changed to produce new homes around the axis of mobility. In Kogoawa’s work, the pursuit of home is a process that goes beyond territorial and temporal limitation.

The literature on the experiences of being a part of a diaspora often makes reference to a paradoxical feeling of both ‘homesickness’ and ‘belonging’, as the movement between multiple locations of cultures suggest a sentiment of co-belonging which intensifies both the desirability and the impossibility of a fixed home place. Although many migrants experience feelings of homesickness and a longing for their original home, it should not be assumed that members of a diaspora never feel a sense of being at home and being secure. The condition of homesickness can be described as the physiological disturbances that humans experience when they leave a particular place or site of personal significance. The cause of this feeling can be attributed to a range of complex personal factors such as: loss, role-transition and a radical change in one’s socio-cultural environment.

\[\text{412 N. Papastergiadis, ‘Home in modernity, p.6} \]
\[\text{413 J. Kogawa, A choice of Dream, Toronto: Women’s Press, 1974, p.18} \]
\[\text{414 J. Kristeva, Strangers to ourselves, p.30} \]
\[\text{415 B. Zhang, ‘Politics of re-homing’, p.103} \]
\[\text{416 S. Ahmed, ‘Introduction’, p.103} \]
Homesickness is associated with personal and collective insecurity because it hinders the ability of individuals and groups to express a sense of identity. Many migrants experience feelings of homesickness on arrival to a new country because their sense of community and home are unsettled. However, homesickness is a condition that can also be experienced by individuals who have not moved but whose socio-cultural environment has undergone significant change. This can occur as a result of political regime change, economic crisis, conflict, natural disaster or a change in the demography of the political society. This condition of homesickness is one that humans attempt to alleviate through a process of re-homing. It is important to note that homesickness is not territoriality or geographically bound, nor is it restricted to those who move. It is a condition that any individual or group can experience and will attempt to combat through the process of homemaking.

The increased mobility of people, ideas and goods around the globe suggests that we need to rethink the context for thinking about where we belong and when we are at home. In a historical and contemporary setting, many communities rely on the ability to move and to identify with multiple communities and geographical sites in order to secure their identity, community and livelihood. Although current political ideologies such as nationalism refer to modern definitions of home and security, I have argued that practices on the ground suggest that a much broader interpretation is required. In the context of globalisation, the relationship between house and home must be re-defined to reflect the fact that greater numbers of people live between two or more nations and draw from a number of transnational resources to build their homes.

This chapter has argued that existing literature on the relationship between home and security has focused too narrowly on the material house as the primary signifier of security and not sufficiently on the practices and processes of human dwelling. Academic and literary accounts of migration and transnationalism display a central impulse to perform home around the axis of movement rather than fixity. For members of a diaspora, for example, home must be performed as a process of trans-relation and connection among fragmented memories and multiple geographical sites. As the discussion of migration from Bangladesh demonstrated, transnational networks impact not only upon the lives of those who move but also those who

417 S. Ahmed, ‘Introduction’, p.103
remain in their original homelands as well as those societies affected by the influx of migrants. For many migrants, home is a condition that can only be established when it is possible to maintain ongoing relationships with their home country or with members of their cultural group who meet in transnational space. The following chapter will examine the practical strategies employed by migrants to construct a sense of home and security in a mobile world.
The ability to move both within and between states is an important part of the pursuit of security for everyday citizens. In the contemporary climate, the securitisation of migration is impacting directly on the ability of certain groups of people to move. The association of human migration with insecurity is not new; this connection has been made throughout history dating back to biblical times. As early as the seventeenth century, fears over the movement of people prompted the construction of different types of boundaries—from the erection of town walls to the creation of passports to control migration. The modern state engages in space-management and boundary-setting activities as part of the attempt to define ‘who’ and ‘what’ should reside within their borders. Some groups are awarded the right to move within and between countries whilst other groups are not permitted to move because they are objects of security policy. Migration is often linked to security in a negative context; however, it is rarely linked to the pursuit of security and the practice of human dwelling. The dominant security narrative downplays the role that migration has played in building and maintaining strong societies and economies in the large majority of modern states. This chapter will explore the political consequences of the securitisation of migration—both for migrants and for citizens in the countries that receive migrants.

The modern state’s concern over the movement of people has prompted a range of responses, from international agreements covering migration, to the expansion of supra-national organisations such as the European Union to the rise of far-right anti-immigrant parties. Migration has been an issue of global significance since the end of the First World War, however, in the post-September 11 world the link between migration and security is stronger than ever before. Throughout the West, we have become accustomed to thinking of threats to national security as emanating from outside and in particular from the developing world. International Relations theory reiterates the popular perception that ‘the international’ or the world ‘out there’ is a dangerous and unfamiliar space that can be contrasted against the safety of the homeland. Theorists of international relations point to the relative peace in the West since the Second World War compared with cycles of violence in former colonial countries

as an example of the insecurity that exists in the world ‘out there’. However, the attacks on
the Twin Towers in 2001 represented a turning point in the way that American, and other
Western nations, viewed the major threats to their individual and collective security. All of
a sudden, the major threat to national security came from inside state borders—this was a
sign that the enemy has infiltrated the American homeland. The realisation that home was no
longer safe from terrorist attack promoted an aggressive shift in the restriction of the
movement of certain kinds of people into the United States and other nations.

Migration and security have been linked in a variety of ways: from contributing to violent
crime and environmental degradation, to producing a backlash and disunity in migrant-
receiving states. Migrants form an indispensable part of the economic and social fabric of
developed nations as well as an increasing number of developed nations. The contribution
that migrants make to the stability of an economy and a society is acknowledged to varying
degrees depending on the country. Despite this fact, the security needs of migrants are often
neglected by the state. Worse still, through the securitisation of migration, the security of the
national population is pitted against the security of migrants.

Patterns of movement

For several centuries the growth and consolidation of modern capitalism has relied on various
forms of transnational labour migration. In the early modern period, mechanisms for the
appropriation of labour from subaltern groups revolved around national markets, slavery, and
colonialism. Today, however, the form of migration which is characteristic of the global
economy involves communities of transnational workers who move around the work to take
advantage of opportunities in a range of domestic economies. As a result of shortages in
certain labour markets or for particular kinds of workers, especially in highly industrialised
countries, foreign labour has become incorporated into the structure of national economies. In
Western liberal states, such as Britain, France and Germany, the shortage of workers in
particular industries has prompted governments to encourage guest workers. These states

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Terror, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.3
423 S. D. Watson, The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration: Digging Moats and Sinking Boats, Oxon,
Canada: Routledge, 2009, p.15
425 M. Burawoy, ‘The functions and reproduction of migrant labour: comparative material from southern Africa
426 B. Jordan, B and F. Duvell, Irregular Migration: The Dilemmas of Transnational Mobility, Cheltenham: E.
Elgar, 2002 p.46
have made various political and legal adjustments to ensure that these workers have a limited
degree of legal protection and recognition in their host countries.\textsuperscript{427} However, it is important
to note that the economic opportunities for migrants that exist in Western nations are often
not accompanied by the benefits of citizenship. Even in cases when migrants are officially
recognised as having rights and entitlements there is no guarantee that they will be able to
establish a sense of home or security in the host nation.

The movement of workers, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, poses a specific set of
challenges to the conventional security paradigm. Migrant workers are presented with
many opportunities in the international labour market yet they often still feel alienated from
public and social institutions and struggle to establish a sense of home in their host nation.\textsuperscript{428}
Furthermore, it is rarely acknowledged that migrant workers need to express their own sense
of cultural identity and be a part of a cultural community in order to feel secure in their host
nation. Too often, labour is viewed merely as a commodity and the labourer—the human
person with a distinct cultural and political identity—is neglected. The movement of workers
into countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States suggests that the admission of
working class people from different cultural backgrounds does not produce social breakdown.
Indeed, Western governments often reference this history of migration to justify the large-
scale migration programs that bring in workers or that permit the temporary entrance of
poorer migrants such as guest workers.\textsuperscript{429} However, migrant labourers are also constructed as
potential threats—they are often represented as ‘aliens’ who are desired for their labour
power but not for their cultural attributes.\textsuperscript{430} It is widely acknowledged that they make an
important contribution to the economy but rarely acknowledged that they also make a
contribution to society and the political culture.

The capacity of nation states to engage in cultural crusades to construct a singular political
identity for their citizens is decreasing as a result of the increasing number of people on the
move.\textsuperscript{431} The increased movement of people on a temporary and a permanent basis has
resulted in radical changes to the demography of the majority of nation state. Such changes

\textsuperscript{428} S. C. Nolutshungu., ‘Introduction’, p.12
\textsuperscript{429} S. D. Watson, \textit{Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration}, p.6
\textsuperscript{430} S.D. Houston and R. Wright, ”’It's just that people mix better here’: household narratives of belonging and
\textsuperscript{431} Z. Bauman, \textit{Globalisation}, p.59
have made it impossible for state authorities to ‘shelter’ their populations from the encounter with difference and to enforce a sharp conception of national boundaries. As a result of the increased movement of people there is an increasing divide between the ‘administrative reach’ of the state and the ‘cultural/ideological’ reach of the state. Michael Kearney suggests that an important distinction needs to be made between ‘boundaries’ as legal spatial delimitations of modern states and the ‘borders’ of nations which are geographic and cultural zones or spaces.  

In the contemporary climate, the link between the borders and boundaries of the nation state is strained and sometimes non-existent. Many migrant groups live within the boundaries of a particular nation state, however; they are not incorporated into the borders of the nation. This occurs when migrants are not considered to be legitimate members of the body politic by the state and/or the society. The degree to which migrants themselves identify with the nation also impacts upon whether they fit within the cultural borders of the nation. In this context, sociologist Paul Gilroy encourages us to go beyond nation-bounded geographies of inquiry toward a much larger analytic space that relates to the geography of movement of goods, capital, people and identities in a globalised world. 

There are a variety of reasons why migrants choose to uproot their lives and move to a foreign country: economic opportunity, family ties, religion, and political freedom are among the most common. In most cases, migrants are motivated by a complex combination of factors. The experience of living in one foreign country, or living between countries, creates a disjuncture between the place where one lives and the place where one feels at home and secure. In this case mobility is a crucial resource used by individuals and groups to establish a sense of home and security with reference to a number of sites. Large numbers of migrants reside in countries where they do not have citizenship or any form of legal protection. Consequently, an increasing number of people are forced to live between more than one country to ensure their legal protection; they may hold citizenship in one country, work and own property in another country and originate from yet another location. These trends suggest that re-thinking our approach to security in the contemporary climate should start by examining the reasons why more and more people are living between nation states and reflecting on what the role of the state should be in this mobile environment.

433 ibid., p.52
434 P. Gilroy, The Black Atlantic, p.60
435 B. Jordan and F. Duvell, Irregular Migration, p.7
The emergence of refugees and migrants as a ‘global problem’

In the current climate, it appears that one set of priorities—associated with protecting national security—has come to dominate over the discourse on humanitarian migration. The securitisation of migration takes the issue out of a right-based, moral framework into a pragmatic realm in which policies can be justified in the name of the national interest. At the time when refugee law and the supporting international institutions were developed, the issues associated with refugees were viewed primarily as humanitarian issues rather than security issues. In the Post-War period, institutional arrangements were established to manage the flow of refugees. At this time there was some acknowledgement that nation states had a moral responsibility to accept refugees and that the individuals who were made stateless as a result of war or conflict should have rights.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1951 to assist Europeans displaced by the War. In the same year, the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was signed by UN members to document the legal definition of a refugee and set out the rights that should be accorded the people granted asylum. The convention also detailed the responsibilities of state that host refugees to uphold their rights and assist in their return or resettlement. The UNHCR was originally intended to be a temporary body with a three year mandate. However, the unprecedented numbers of displaced people from the Second World War, followed by the decolonisation of Africa in the 1960’s resulted in general consensus that the UNHCR needed to be a permanent structure.

Sixty years after the advent of the UNHCR and Refugee Convention, the legal and political protection of refugees remains mired in contradictions. Millions of people have used the international refugee protection system to seek safety from persecution and conflict. Yet despite the value of the existing refugee protection scheme as a function of international law, its underlying reality suggests that the security of refugees is not always enhanced. The legal, political, and bureaucratic dynamics underpinning the operation of the UNHCR ensure that

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436 1951 Refugee Convention, sited at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49da0e466.html
the major players—host state governments, industrialised countries, and the UNHCR—routinely fail to mitigate violence and conditions of insecurity for refugees. Over time the role of the UNHCR has shifted from a legal advocacy body to a relief agency that manages a range of humanitarian concerns associated with conflict, political persecution and natural disaster. Refugees and asylum seekers are linked to the wide range of institutions and organisations associated with the development profession. This shift has reinforced the view that refugees are primarily a Third World problem that Western nations can shelter their populations from. Mariano Florentino Cueller argues that throughout the UNHCR’s history, UN bureaucrats, host countries and non-governmental actors have not done enough to mitigate violence against refugees in the short term or provide resources to build long term security. This argument is clearly demonstrated through examining the experiences of refugees in camps. The UNHCR system routinely places the bulk of refugees in camps in the developing world, where they face chronic threats to their physical security from crime and disorder, coercion, and military attacks. Refugee camps are intended to shelter uniquely vulnerable populations from violence and persecution, however, the susceptibility of refugees to physical coercion can turn these encampments and their residents into resources that prolong armed conflict. Refugee camps are almost exclusively located in Third World countries, allowing people in the West to be sheltered from the kinds of people and places that are assumed to threaten national security.

When it comes to the management of refugees, developing countries have a limited degree of control over who enters and on what terms. More often than not, those terms are set by developed countries the UNHCR or other international institutions. As a result of the power asymmetry between states at the table of international institutions and policy forums, developed states have successfully pushed a substantial component of the ‘refugee problem’ onto developing nations. This allows Western nations to tackle the problem ‘out there’, in the otherness of the former colonised world in a manner that shelters their own populations from the encounter with refugees. Comparing the numbers of refugees in the developing and the developed world demonstrates the disproportionate distribution: Asia has 8 million; Africa has 5.5 million; Europe has 5.6 million; North America has 1 million. Australian and New

439 ibid., p.584
440 ibid, p.584
Zealand together have only 76,000. One of the most recent examples of the attempt to push the refugee problem onto developing nations was the attempt by the Australian Government to negotiate an asylum transfer deal with the Malaysian Government. Australia was willing to accept 4000 ‘legitimate’ refugees from Malaysia and in return Malaysia had to agree to accept 800 asylum seekers who had arrived by boat to Australia. The Australian Government also offered to provide financial assistance to Malaysia and other regional nations for the processing of refugees. In the 2011–2012 Australian Federal Budget the asylum seeker transfer deal was described under the heading ‘Maintain the Integrity of Australia’s borders’. This is a clear illustration of securitisation of migration and the Government’s intent to frame the issues as a security issue rather than a humanitarian priority.

The United Nations is a forum in which powerful states exercise a disproportionate amount of influence over major decisions including high-level decisions regarding the movement and treatment of refugees. As Ali Mazrui argues convincingly Western powers as the principle authors of the UN Charter, crafted the document to ensure security and peace are primary objectives and the promotion of human rights is a secondary objective of the UN. Using this framework, states can argue that the security threat posed by refugees should be assessed and prioritised over the rights of those individuals. In this context, the majority of developing nations find themselves wedged between the UN, development agencies and Western states, in a position where they have little power to influence the refugee agenda or assert any degree of self-determination. The impotence of Third World countries on the international stage is compounded by the popular view the developing world has produced the refugee problem through endless civil wars and poor governance and that the West is acting with benevolence when offering any form of assistance.

There are numerous historical and contemporary examples to illustrate the power imbalance between the First and Third world regarding the management of refugees. In the 1970s and

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445 *ibid*, p.135
1980s there was a large exodus of refugees from Indo-China fleeing war and political persecution. The Southeast Asian nations of Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia colluded with Australia to curb the flow of refugees arriving in boats to Australia.\textsuperscript{446} The majority of boats were deflected to Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Hong Kong where refugee camps were established. Only 50 boats containing around 2,000 people managed to reach Australia. The majority of refugees remained in refugee camps, some for many years in appalling conditions, while governments heckled over who would take responsibility.

It appears that little has changed since the 1970’s with regard to Australia’s power to coerce countries in the region to take responsibility for refugees. The Australian Government’s response to the Tampa Crisis of 2001 resulted in the establishment of detention centres on small Island nations in the Pacific Ocean to prevent boats from landing on Australian soil. ‘The Pacific Solution’ preyed on impoverished countries who have no real choice whether to accommodate the Australian government. The Australian government lured small nations including Nauru, Christmas Island and Papua New Guinea with financial incentives and the promise of support to accommodate the asylum seekers. In reality, refugees arrived on Manus Island and Nauru before the facilities were ready and even when they were established conditions in the facilities did not meet standards set out in international agreements. At the same time Third World nations are encouraged to take on the responsibility of processing asylum seekers even if they lack the resources to accommodate them. The policy was abandoned by the Rudd Labor government in 2007. However, the announcement by the current Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, to establish a regional processing centre in Papua New Guinea, suggests that Australia will continue to use its economic and political power to collude with developing nations as part of its refugee and security policy.

Reflecting on the history of international engagement on the question of refugees, it is evident that different states have taken varying degrees of responsibility for assisting refugees and upholding their obligations under the UNHCR. In the current climate, a number of Western liberal states are progressively restricting access to migrants and asylum seekers, even though these states have signed international agreements and made various commitments to human rights and humanitarian principles.\textsuperscript{447} At the same time, Third World nations are encouraged to take on the responsibility of processing asylum seekers even if they

\textsuperscript{446} P. Darby, ‘Security, spatiality and social suffering’, Alternatives, 31, 2006, p.457
\textsuperscript{447} S. D. Watson, The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration, p.2
lack the resources to do so. The global refugee problem is characterised as an issue of national security, a problem of border control, and a problem of sovereignty. This stance is captured in the words of Australia’s former Prime Minister John Howard who stated: "We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come." Political elites in the West are downplaying the moral dimension of the refugee problem by blurring three issues of border control, immigration policy and the treatment of refugees. According to Australian human rights lawyer Julian Burnside, QC, these should all remain distinct problems that require different solutions.

**The Architecture of Control**

In the majority of states, migration policy has varied over time, with periods of open migration policies and periods of restrictive policies. In the majority of Western liberal states, there has been a gradual shift away from a broad immigration criteria, which includes people from a wide range of backgrounds and different circumstances, toward a restrictive criteria based on family reunification and the economic requirements of the receiving nation. This trend can be observed in a range of highly industrialised nations for example: the response of the United States to Muslim immigrants post September 11, the rise of anti-immigrant parties in the European Union or the use of off shore detention and naval interception in response to boat people arriving in Australia. In the developing world, nations have also enacted varying policy responses and methods to control migration. However, given the political pressure placed on developing nations to accept migrants on terms dictated by the highly industrialised nations, migration policy has been less subject to the political whims of the government of the day.

Securitisation is a process whereby political elites justify emergency measures and break the normal rules by which they are otherwise bound by persuading an audience that a particular development represents an existential threat to the security of the state and the society. Some scholars argue that the securitisation of migration is essentially an expression of new racism based on the concept that cultural difference leads to social breakdown. The

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448 J. Burnside, J., ‘Refugees: Australia’s moral failure’, p.1
449 *ibid*, p.1
450 S. D. Watson, *The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration*, p.2
451 *ibid*, p.2
452 Buzan, B, ‘Introduction’, p.11
generalised fear of cultural difference has played a role in legitimising more restrictive immigration policies in Western liberal states. Western liberal states use a wide variety of policies to keep asylum seekers out and to restrict some migrants from entering. These policies include: ‘off-shore processing’, visa requirements, ‘non-arrival zones’, mandatory detention, safe third country agreements, carrier sanctions and the withdrawal of socio-economic benefits to asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{454}

The securitisation of migration is based on a broad range of issues of which xenophobia is just one. Migration is portrayed by political elites as threatening along a cultural/identity axis but also along a socio-economic and political axis.\textsuperscript{455} The premise for linking security to migration is not built solely on the concept that all migration leads to social breakdown. Rather, it is based on the claim that uncontrolled migration leads to social breakdown. In the majority of Western liberal states concern over protecting the physical and cultural borders of the state is the most prominent discourse legitimising restrictive migration policies.\textsuperscript{456} While there remains a generalised fear of difference in most of these nations, it is a fear that manifests in particular groups of people and particular modes of migration. This generalised fear of political difference is exploited by political elites and the media to advance certain political priorities.

Migrants are motivated by a complex combination of factors that impact upon their journey. This makes it difficult to categorise them by their motivations for migrating. However, as part of the process of accepting migrants national governments attempt to place them in well-defined categories as a part of determining who can enter and on what terms.\textsuperscript{457} These categorise are used to simplify the complexities of migration to allow the state to make certain assumptions and judgements about whether migrants are ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving’ or whether they are ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’. These categories are also used to determine whether the migrants are ‘subjects’ of security policy—in need of protection.

There are three broad categories of migrants—economic, family and humanitarian—that are commonly used by Western liberal states to manage flows of migration.\textsuperscript{458} While the state seeks to place migrants into categories as a way to govern over them at times the state also

\textsuperscript{454}S. M. Low, ‘A nation of gated communities’, p.1
\textsuperscript{455}B. Buzan, ‘Introduction’, p.15
\textsuperscript{456}S. D. Watson, \textit{Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration}, p.6
\textsuperscript{457}\textit{ibid.}, p.3
\textsuperscript{458}\textit{ibid.}, p.3
benefits from blurring these categories. For example, in popular and political discourse on migration most migrants even those that apply as refugees, are attributed with economic motivations for moving.\textsuperscript{459} Consequently, the burden rests on the migrant to demonstrate his or her non-economic motivations and to demonstrate which category they fit. In order to be considered legitimate refugees, asylum seekers must demonstrate his or her need for compensation and protection and downplay their identity as labourers with economic motivations. However, emphasising that asylum seekers are exclusively victims can also enhance the social perception that they provide little to no economic benefit and will be a drain on economic resources.\textsuperscript{460} On the one hand asylum seekers are constructed as people who are threatened by a state; on the other hand they are also presented as people who pose a threat to the receiving state. The use of these two polar modes of configuring the asylum seeker has narrowed the range of policies deemed acceptable to deal with their arrival.\textsuperscript{461} Asylum seekers are depicted either as victims in need of protection or as security objects that threaten the state. Successfully portraying the asylum seeker in one fashion over another determines the policy options deemed acceptable. For example, off-shore detention and restrictive migration policies are legitimised if asylum seekers are viewed primarily as threatening rather than under threat.

The state attempts to manage the unease and uncertainty associated with migration by reassuring the population that migration, if properly controlled and managed by the state, can benefit the state and the citizenry. Thus, the key securitising discourse in countries such as Australia has been controlling the access to the state for certain migrant groups and about the modes of entry used by those groups.\textsuperscript{462} In Australia, the popular and political debate over defining the level of migration that is ‘appropriate’ for a nation includes arguments about the economic threat posed by migrants as well as the physical and socio-cultural threat to the security of the existing population. The idea that migrants will take away jobs from deserving locals or that they will ‘drain’ the welfare system, features prominently in the Australian discourse on migration. Migrants who arrive in a host country without legal documentation are perceived as the greatest threat to their host nations. However, it is not self-evident that

\textsuperscript{459} S. D. Watson, \textit{Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration}, p.4
\textsuperscript{460}ibid, p.4
\textsuperscript{461}ibid., p.8
\textsuperscript{462}ibid., p.6
states face a threat from unauthorised humanitarian migration based on any objective criterion.

The securitisation of migration is linked to the broader fear of the other that underpins the construction of national identity in Western nations. The discourse on the mode of entry is clearly racialised as concerns about class and cultural difference feature prominently in the practice of migration control.\footnote{G. Bigo, and E. Guild, \textit{Controlling the Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe}, Burlington: Ashgate, 2005, p.44} Scott Watson analyses the development of policies on detention, naval interception and the provision of visas and passports in various Western liberal states and suggests that they are underpinned by the categorisation of risk based on nationality and class.\footnote{S. D. Watson, \textit{Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration}, p.7} In the current climate, states are able to disguise this xenophobia and cultural racism as a necessary part of managing patterns of movement to protect the national interest. Although groups such as terrorists and asylum seekers are presented as new threats the approach of keeping the other at bay has not changed substantially since the Cold War. Political elites in Australia have successfully introduced restrictive policies towards asylum seekers through constructing periods of national ‘crisis’. National crises are socially constructed, and the extent to which they are powerful depends of the level of attention generated by the issue within the political community. This is illustrated by the level of media attention, parliamentary debate and public commentary.\footnote{B. Buzan, B., \textit{Introduction}, p.24} Watson suggests that the debate around mandatory detention and the naval interception of asylum vessels in Australia is an example of a constructed national crisis and a securitised policy response.

The politics of asylum in Australia serve as a pertinent example of the securitisation of migration. Australia is geographically isolated from refugee-producing states and is also separated from its less stable neighbours by sea.\footnote{\textit{ibid.}, p.9} Given these conditions it is difficult to prove that Australia faces an ‘objective’ threat from asylum seekers. However, Australia has implemented some of the most restrictive asylum policies in the world. Australia requires the mandatory detention of asylum seekers until their status as refugees is determined. It also provides fewer protections than most Western states for claimants who are successful in proving their refugee status. It is important to note that Australia has not always had restrictive migration policies—it is a settler nation that has historically relied on large—scale
immigration to sustain the population and the workforce and to foster economic growth. In addition, Australia has demonstrated some commitment to taking in refugees, evident in its substantial refugee settlement program and its commitments to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organisations.

The use of detention as a part of the architecture of control is a relatively recent introduction to Australia’s immigration history. I established in Chapter Two that security threats change over time and are politically constructed. Asylum seekers have been constructed differently at points throughout Australian history, which has influenced the political appetite for detention. The detention of asylum seekers was strongly rejected in the late 1970s when refugees from Indo-China arrived in unauthorised boats. In response to this early group of ‘boat people’, the government granted entry permits and accommodation and aid was provided in migrant hostels. In the late 1970s people fleeing Indo-China were perceived to be refugees deserving of protection and compassion. By contrast, the refugees that arrived just ten years later in late 1980s were constructed as illegal immigrants rather than as refugees — as such they were seen to need a different solution to earlier groups of refugees. Political actors in the late 1980’s constructed the asylum seekers as illegal immigrants who were a threat to the state sovereignty, because they were seen to undermine the integrity and control of the state’s borders. This view is evident in the response of then Prime Minister Bob Hawke who in 1990 referred to boat arrivals as illegal economic migrants despite the fact that they had asked for asylum and their claims has not been determined. By the early 1990’s referring to boat arrivals as illegal migrants was standard and largely uncontested in Australian political and popular discourse.

The asylum seekers fleeing Indo-China that arrived by boat the 1980’s and the 1990’ were the first group of migrants to be detained and linked directly to national security. At the time, there was nothing in Australian law stating that unauthorised asylum seekers had to be detained. Consequently, the Immigration Minister of the day had a great deal of discretion regarding whether to detain new arrivals. Illegal migrants who overstayed their visas and migrants who claimed asylum after arriving on a legally valid visa were never detained even

467 J. Jupp, From white Australia to Woomera: the story of Australian immigration, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, ii
469 ibid., p.53
470 S. D. Watson, Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration, p.82
though they vastly outnumber asylum seekers arriving by boat. Under law the Minister had the power to detain all unauthorised arrivals, though in reality it was primarily boat people who were detained.\(^{471}\) This was primarily due to the association of border control with national security. The loose legislative framework allowed the government to define the level of risk posed by categories of migrants and the appropriate policy responses. Boat arrivals in particular have been singled out as a greater threat than other forms of unauthorised arrival or overstay, despite their historically much lower numbers.\(^{472}\) A 1990 document on Australia’s regional security captures the sentiment of the day. It states there is a danger of “new flows of boat people on a massive scale—beyond the ability of military authorities to prevent.”\(^{473}\) The hyperbole used in this government document is reflective of broader fears of ‘Asian invasion’ that is a recurrent theme in Australia’s history.

There are many examples throughout Australia’s history of the government’s attempt to justify restrictive measures by appealing to public fear about ‘boat people’. For example, in 1992, 56 asylum seekers arrived on the northwest cost of the Australian mainland. Unlike previous boat arrivals they had landed on the coast of the Australian mainland without the government’s knowledge.\(^{474}\) The asylum seekers survived in harsh outback conditions for over two weeks and they were only discovered when some of them were seen at a remote outpost. The Australian Government issued an intensive rescue effort that was successful in finding all 56 of the Chinese asylum seekers. While this rescue mission was originally cast as a humanitarian effort, political elites and the media quickly re-cast the rescue as a defensive security mission.\(^{475}\) The news media’s coverage of the event reinforced the dominant representation of asylum seekers as illegal immigrants by contrasting them with ‘genuine’ Chinese refugees. This group of asylum seekers were labelled as ‘working people’ from villages and not ‘Beijing intellectuals’ and/or students.\(^{476}\) At the time, ‘genuine’ refugees from China were considered to be those from the pro-democratic intelligentsia and not working class people.\(^{477}\) The emphasis on the identity of the asylum seekers emphasises that

\(^{471}\) M. Crock, *Protection or punishment?: the detention of asylum-seekers in Australia*, Sydney: The Federation Press, 1993, p.32
\(^{472}\) *ibid.*, p.32
\(^{473}\) S. D. Watson, *Securitisation of Humanitarian Migration*, p.83
\(^{474}\) *ibid.*, p.83
\(^{475}\) *ibid.*, p.84
\(^{476}\) *ibid.*, p.84
\(^{477}\) *ibid.*, p.84
certain kinds of differences and cultural characteristics are perceived as more threatening than others.

The state uses a range of policies, including detention and other militaristic responses, to attempt to control the means by which migrants arrive and to assess the risk individual migrants pose to the social cohesion and security of the nation. In the majority of Western liberal states, it is not the fear of migration *per se* that leads to the marriage of migration and security. Rather, in these states there are certain kinds of people who are categorised as a security threat to the state and the citizenry. Cultural difference, nationality and class are not only important categories that are relevant on entry into a host nation. These categories are considered to be a constant source of threat to the host nation. In the next section I will analyse the methods that are employed by the state to contain the ‘risk’ of migrants through containing difference.

Modern nationalism establishes a link between the security of the nation and the strength of the cultural and moral bonds between its members. In Chapter Two I argued that nationalist discourse is based on the assumption that members of a national community must share certain cultural, moral and even some physical attributes in order to feel secure and ‘at home’. In theory, modern nationalism is based on the pursuit of a secular/civic political community, which is neutral with regard to culture and religion. However, in practice, the strength of a nationalist movement within a defined geographical area is dependent upon shared historical experience and a degree of cultural uniformity between members. Consequently, a part of the pursuit of security involves keeping the other at bay and encouraging cultural confirming within the national homeland.

As I established in Chapter Two, the national homeland is a space in which specific cultural practices, routines and habits are associated with the identity of the nation. It is these cultural idiosyncrasies that national elites are referring to when they speak of the protection of “our values” and “our way of life” and “our patch”. The construction of cultural difference as a threat to the national population justifies attempts by the national majority group to assimilate

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national minorities.\textsuperscript{480} The protection of a national culture and national values is considered to be just as important as the physical protection of the nation. Critically, however, within the dominant discourse there is no corresponding acknowledgement that minority groups must also preserve their culture and value system in order to create a sense of security and construct a sense of home.

The dominant view is that in order to create a cohesive and secure society, migrants must embrace the values and the culture of the politically dominant group to some degree and must decrease their cultural and political connections to their home country.\textsuperscript{481} The state uses a range of direct and indirect policies and discursive measures to encourage migrants to reduce their identification with their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{482} These policies have ranged from coercive segregation, conquest and colonisation; to federalism, self-government and special protective rights for minorities.\textsuperscript{483} Advocates of assimilation claim that it is beneficial for migrants and their host societies if migrants replace their culture and values system with the culture and values of the national group.\textsuperscript{484} In reality however, the process of resettlement is one in which both the stream of migrants and the society into which they move, impact upon one another. Over time both host and immigrant cultures begin to reflect each other. In some cases this can develop to the point that hybridity becomes a feature of the political community.\textsuperscript{485}

In a society in which a number of groups impact upon the political culture, there are no ‘original’ or ‘pure’ cultural identities and no authentic or original cultural group. Migrating to a new country involves various forms of adjustment and negotiation that relate not only to the encounter with a new geographic space but also the encounter with new people, practices, value-systems and languages. For migrants, the choice to move to a particular country is not based on the wholesale acceptance of, or a desire to be a part of, the national cultural and value system.\textsuperscript{486} The expectation that migrants adopt the ideological and behavioural traits of

\textsuperscript{481} G. Hage, \textit{Against Paranoid Nationalism}, p.10
\textsuperscript{486} S. D. Houston and R. Wright, ‘It’s just that people mix better here’, p.75
‘locals’ can enhance the trauma and feelings of estrangement associated with migration.\textsuperscript{487} This contributes to the sense of insecurity they feel in their host nation.

The degree to which migrant groups can establish a sense of security in their new society is influenced by institutional receptivity to ethnic difference in the public sphere as well as the willingness of the existing population to embrace the group. In a number of migrant-receiving nations, the networks of formal and informal institutions that serve the public, (the media, businesses and community organisations) are designed to promote cultural uniformity.\textsuperscript{488} The criterion for national membership that is promoted through these institutions is based on a set of defined cultural and moral traits and shared experiences.\textsuperscript{489} Thus, the consolidation of national identity draws in part, from pre-existing social practices, behavioural patterns, and forms of social and cultural authority. In addition, community groups such as charities, clubs and interest groups in the public sphere rarely take into consideration the varied religious requirements and cultural habits that need to be accommodated in order for minority groups to be able to confidently express a sense of identity and security. For example, whether prayer, dress, dietary and burial requirements are respected by schools, hospitals, workplaces, community facilities and other public spaces is an important measure of the extent to which migrants are able to integrate into their new society.\textsuperscript{490} In order to develop a sense of community in the host country, migrants must be able to confidently identify themselves as both members of a specific cultural group and members of the national community at large.

In addition to the official institutions of the state, the political culture of a nation also reinforces the values and practices of the politically dominant nation group. Political culture is defined by Lucian Pye as “the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments” that inform the political process and provide a base for its underlying assumptions.\textsuperscript{491} Political culture includes the character of a nation’s political institutions as well as the procedures, decisions

\textsuperscript{487} R. Berns McGown, \textit{Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Communities of London and Toronto}, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1999, p.50
\textsuperscript{490} R. Berns Mc Gown, \textit{Muslims in the Diaspora}, p.55
and interests of the society. The political culture of a nation is indicative of the level of respect—or legitimacy—that migrants are accorded in their host country as well as the extent to which migrants are required to assimilate into the majority group. The political culture of a nation gives a distinctive advantage to cultural groups in the nation with the largest amount of political and economic power. It can alienate and disadvantage others. The distribution of material and political power between culture groups varies substantially in different nations. In some nations, the politically dominant group holds a firm grip over the apparatuses of political power and civil society to the extent that their cultural/religious beliefs and practices are preserved over others. In other nations, political power is spread more evenly between cultural groups which generally results in greater security for a wide range of groups. Political culture has a substantial degree of influence over the private lives of individuals because it determines the nature and scope of their political involvement in the nation. Even if individual members of the majority national group are receptive to the needs of migrants, the overall position of migrants is unlikely to change unless the political culture of the nation is receptive to this change. Migrants make choices, on an everyday basis, based on their own personal experiences and influences from both their birth cultures and adopted cultures. Even the most private of those choices has its public aspect and is influenced by the political culture. Migrants will inevitably weave together aspects of their birth and their adopted culture. However, the extent to which elements of their birth culture can be preserved depends on the extent to which the political culture promotes uniformity.

Migrants are often faced with a difficult choice: expressing one’s religious identity may be at odds with protecting oneself against discrimination and marginalisation in their host society. Migrants are aware that expressing elements of their birth culture may have political implications and increase the level of discrimination they face in their host society. For example, a woman deciding whether to wear the *hijab* is aware that she will be regarded

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493 *ibid.*, p.15
495 R. Berns Mc Gown, *Muslims in Diaspora*, p.203
496 *ibid.*, p.58
differently in major Western cities such as London or Paris if she does so. The woman may choose to wear the *hijab* despite anticipation of hostility, or sometimes precisely because of the anticipation of hostility. Conversely, she may decide not to wear the *hijab* even though it is fundamental to her sense of identity and community. She may also choose to limit her movements and avoid certain public spaces to avoid discrimination and hostility. This demonstrates the power that political culture has in shaping the everyday choices of migrants, especially when those choices create visible differences between migrants and existing national populations.

To illustrate the extent that Western governments and their citizenries go to keep the other at bay, even when they are within the homeland, it is useful to examine the political culture in France. In France, the dominant cultural group has an overwhelming influence over the definition of national culture and the extent to which cultural and religious minorities are able to express their difference in the public sphere. Religious minorities such as Muslims and Sikhs do not have the right to freedom of worship in public institutions and public spaces. Furthermore, they suffer from unofficial discrimination in employment and other fields because of their difference. In France, the political tradition of cultural uniformity includes the implementation of polices that aim to assimilate Muslims. Muslims are tolerated in France, provided that they practice their religion in private and provided that the religious and cultural difference is not visible in the public sphere. Consequently, many French Muslims have limited the expression of their religion in an attempt to fit into the secular state and society.

In 2004, the French parliament made a decision to ban the wearing of visible religious symbols in public institutions. This is the most overt example of the attempt to control the difference and the movements of religious minorities, however, there are numerous other subtle forms of religious discrimination that accompany this law. The legislation affected individuals from minority religious groups such as Muslims and Sikhs whilst the religious

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501 Bowen, J., R., *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, p.3
identity of Catholics remained intact because their religious symbols could be concealed.\textsuperscript{502} The law, which forbids “signs and dress that conspicuously show the religious affiliation of students,” has been identified as a violation of the rights to freedom of religion and expression. Groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty spoke out against the introduction of the policy.\textsuperscript{503} Under international law, states can only limit religious practices when there is a compelling public safety reason, when the manifestation of religious beliefs would impinge on the rights of others, or when it serves a legitimate educational function (such as prohibiting practices that preclude student-teacher interaction).\textsuperscript{504} Muslim headscarves, Sikh turbans, Jewish skullcaps and large Christian crosses—which were among the visible religious symbols that were prohibited—did not pose a threat tangible threat to public health, order or morals; they did not affect the fundamental rights and freedoms of other students; and they did not undermine a school’s educational function. This policy was difficult to justify under international law, however, because as it was couched within a security framework it was presented as a necessary practice of statecraft.

The presumption that visible differences between school children would lead to disunity and conflict between religious groups was a reflection of a broader culture of xenophobia in France. At the time when the law was debated, far-right nationalists used the headscarf issue as a pretext for voicing a more general attack against immigrants and Muslims in the parliament and the media.\textsuperscript{505} One of the arguments advanced by the far right was that the Islamic faith should be restricted because it is a religion that oppresses women, or that women and girls who choose to veil do not understand women’s rights. Public debate at the time also touched on other significant social and political issues such as: the link between terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, the use of religious symbols for political purposes and levels of immigration.\textsuperscript{506} Surveys conducted at the time indicated that the majority of French people were in favour of the ban (some polls suggested up to 70%) and the general public were swayed by the argument that the legislation was in the interest of public safety and would enhance national security.\textsuperscript{507} Political leaders of the day set up an artificial dualism

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{502}J. S. Fetzer and J. C. Soper, \textit{Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany}. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p.123
\bibitem{503}A. Duval-Smith, ‘France divided as headscarf ban is set to become law’, \textit{The Observer}, 1 February 2004, p.3
\bibitem{505}J. R. Bowen, \textit{Why the French don't like headscarves}, p.11–12
\bibitem{506}\textit{ibid.}, p.12
\bibitem{507}A. Duval-Smith, ‘France divided’ p. 3
\end{thebibliography}
between those who supported the law because they were in favour of cultural integration, national unity and secularism, and those who did not support the law as being in favour of religious fundamentalism and separatism. For example, Bernard Stasi, the state ombudsman said: “Those who are against the law are against the integration of Muslims.”

In a review of the law one year later, the French government claimed that the law had successfully stemmed the Islamic fundamentalist tide and brought calm to the nation’s public schools. The success of the law was judged by how many Muslim students abandoned their headscarves in public schools. This act of compliance was viewed as a sign that Muslims accepted that integration involved a sacrifice of their religious freedom. What was ignored in popular debate about this issue was the fact that the Muslim community was being denied the right to express a different cultural/religious identity in public. Ironically in the same year that Jacque Chirac pursued policies such as the ban of hijab under the banner of security, he also lobbied at the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) for a worldwide charter to protect cultural diversity that would enable France to implement exceptional laws to protect the French ‘way of life’. The history of cultural protectionism in France suggests that there is an implicit acceptance that the preservation of culture and religion is an important part of the pursuit of security and community. However, there remains a reluctance to acknowledge that cultural minorities living in France should be awarded the same rights.

By and large migrants have not assimilated into their new society to the extent envisaged by political elites. Heterogeneity remains a feature of most nations despite the various policy initiatives, incentives and conditions of entry enacted by the state. It is important to examine the architecture of control and the extent to which this limits the freedom of movement and expressions of migrants. However, it is equally important to acknowledge that migrants exercise a degree of agency and influence in their new society. Rima Berns McGown suggests that the political culture in Western liberal states such as America, Canada

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508 A. Duval-Smith, ‘France divided’, p.3
509 A. Sage, ‘France: Headscarf ban is judged success as hostility fades,’ The Times Online, 5 September, 2005, www.timesonline.co.uk
510 A. Duval-Smith, ‘A France divided’, p.3
and Britain is continuously changing as a result of patterns of migration.\textsuperscript{512} For example, the dominant Canadian central power base in the mid-1990s was predominantly Judaeo-Christian and European. However with an expanding non-European, non-White, non-Judaeo-Christian population the ‘centre’ is now influenced by alternative traditions and value-systems is a way that has created a more vibrant range of cultural and normative themes.\textsuperscript{513} The integration of migrant communities has occurred to varying degrees depending on the country and the immigrant group. Therefore, it is necessary to examine integration on a case by case basis and to evaluate the specific practices that migrant groups engage in to establish a sense of security and home. As a result of movement, hybrid identities and overlapping communities emerge that challenges the dominant approach to security.

\textit{Islamophobia: Islam as the contemporary object of modern security}

\textit{As an American and as a Muslim, I was horrified to watch the television that morning. I felt as if pieces of myself were tumbling from those buildings. All the work we had been doing........to build up positive relations between Muslims and other faiths seemed to be falling and crumbling.}

Sharifa Alkhateeb of the North American Council for Muslim Women\textsuperscript{514}

In the last two decades there has been a steady increase in the number of Muslim migrants settling in Western countries.\textsuperscript{515} The extent to which migrant Muslims feel at home and secure in Western nations relates to their status as members of an ethnic community, a religious community and as members of a certain socio-economic class. In the ten years, in particular, questions surrounding the integration of Muslim migrants have become highly politicised in the West. Under the banner of the ‘War on Terror’, the Muslim faith has become the object of security, resulting in limitations on the religious rights of Muslims.\textsuperscript{516}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{512} R. Berns McGown, \textit{Muslims in Diaspora}, p.54
\bibitem{513} ibid., p.54
\end{thebibliography}
the aftermath of September 11, theories of assimilation have gained significant political clout in popular and academic debates about immigration and national security. These theories have underpinned political campaigns, legislative changes and policies that restrict the intake of migrants and attempt to disguise the religious differences between groups.

By November 2001, the term ‘9/11’ had become its own locution with a powerful plethora of meanings. There were official and unofficial acts of retaliation committed against Muslim and Arab populations. The official American backlash included: waging war on Afghanistan and Iraq, compelling other Western state to commit resources to the War on Terror, the introduction of the Patriot Act and a range of changes to migration and border control policies that targeted Muslims using racial profiling.\(^517\) The age-old strategy of retribution that was being enacted on a global scale was paralleled by an unofficial domestic backlash against Muslim neighbours. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many Muslims reported that their local mosques and schools had received threats, along with an exhausting volume of requests for information and interpretation for local authorities and community groups.\(^518\) Worse still, there were violent attacks against Muslims such as the case of Hazim Barakat, an Islamic bookstore owner in Virginia, whose store window was shattered by bricks and wrapped with messages of hate.\(^519\) Other communities such as Sikhs were also targeted for their turbans, revealing the ignorance and insecurity of Americans who were unfamiliar with their newest citizens. Muslims, Arab-American and South Asian minorities were under threat in their own neighbourhoods and lived in fear that they would be marked with suspicion by other Americans. At a domestic and international level, the representations of 9/11 and the policy response of states fostered insecurity among religious minority groups as well politically dominant groups.

Prior to the events of September 11, the idea that Islam was the new major threat to global security was already gaining momentum. The Al Qaeda network was recognised as a threat to the West with the first attack on the World Trade Centre in 1883. The level of threat was seen to intensify when US forces in Saudi Arabia were attacked at Khobar Towers in 1996 and the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were bombed in 1998.\(^520\) Political elites in the United

\(^{517}\) D. L. Eck, ‘Dialogue and the echo boom of terror’, p.22
\(^{518}\) ibid, p.23
\(^{519}\) ibid,p.24
States and other Western nations have used a broad range of descriptive terms to define the threat. Sometimes the Muslim threat is described as a clear ‘us against them’ battle, where it is very clear that ‘them’ refers to specific groups that have used political violence such as Al Qaeda. However, at other times, the enemy has been described in very broad terms to capture all people of Middle Eastern origin or all Muslims. Some of the enemy are seen as clear opponents, holding or wanting to acquire a specific territory or site within a nation. Others are represented as a ‘shadowy’ network that spreads its influence through cells and organisations in numerous different states. No matter how it is portrayed, Islam is presented as an enemy as vast and as threatening as the Communist bloc.521

Muslims are portrayed as ‘other’ in much of the literature that circulates through popular and some academic circles in the West. This literature both reflects and informs the cultural and religious prejudice that Muslims encounter in the West.522 The Islamic faith is often presented as a monolithic religion with adherents who are hostile to the West and its values. Muslims are often portrayed in mainstream Western media as fanatics and zealots; as suppressors of women’s rights and freedom of speech; as people with a narrow, inflexible worldview and violent tendencies.523 This image of Islam is juxtaposed against the West’s liberal democratic tradition and respect for freedom and individual rights. It is also contrasted against the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Importantly, however, Western political regimes are associated with secularism whilst Muslim states are typecast as theocratic and irrational. This view generalises the spectrum of political regimes in the non-Western world and ignores the extent to which religion is also a powerful political force in the West.

The changes in the perception of Islam over time can be linked to the ability of political elites to construct ‘others’ of the West that become the objects of security policy.524 Islamophobia is based on the misconception of Muslims as a ‘single, monolithic bloc’ who hold values that are ‘separate and other’ and have nothing in common with secular or Judeo-Christian communities.525 Fred Haliday argues that Islamaphobia is a complex phenomenon that manifests itself in different ways in different locations and at various points in history. For example, in the United States today, anti-Muslimism relates primarily to the fear of terrorism

521 J. Williams, ‘Endless enemies’, p.68
522 R. Berns McGown, Muslims in Diaspora, p.60
524 C. Rudolph, ‘Security and integration’, p.65
525 E. Burnley, Steps to Racial Equality: Positive Active in a Negative Climate, London: Runnymede Trust, 1988, p.4
and inter-state political confrontation between the West and Islamic states. In Europe, however, it relates predominantly to the fear of the erosion of European identity and the potential threat posed by the difference of Islamic culture and religious practices to established European cultural and religious traditions.\textsuperscript{526} Haliday asserts that it is not dislike for the religion itself or its practitioners which leads to discrimination against Muslims in various contexts. Islamaphobia is part of a broader political movement based on defining threats to the Western world and defending the ideological and cultural boundaries of Western nations. It is for this reason that Islam has a complex heritage of encounter with the West that has ranged from a relationship of tolerance and acceptance to one of hostility and resentment.

There is a long history of popular and political literature attacking Islam that has exacerbated xenophobia and racism throughout the Western world. However, it is also important to acknowledge that there is also a body of writing that advances the view that Islam is capable of and adapting to the challenges of contemporary society and that Muslims do not need to reject their understanding of Islam in order to integrate into a Western secular nation.\textsuperscript{527} This alternative view suggests the history of Islam and ‘the West’ is not a clash of civilisations but rather a complex history involving the pursuit of political and social power and the intersection between religion, politics and society.\textsuperscript{528}

Islam acts as a barrier to entry, acceptance and movement in a host society when the religion itself is regarded with prejudice by the majority national group. It can be difficult to measure the extent to which Muslims are discriminated against in Western societies, as there are no objective tools to measure cultural and religious racism and evidence is often anecdotal and inconsistent because victims are reluctant to make formal complaints. This goes to the heart of the reason why Muslim migrants struggle to establish a sense of security in their host society. One of the most obvious examples of discrimination is the reactions of non-Muslims to the wearing of the hijab. Most of the women interviewed by Rima Berns McGown in her study of Somali Muslim migrants describe the experience of being rejected by prospective

\textsuperscript{527} R. Berns Mc Gown, \textit{Muslims in Diaspora}, p.68
\textsuperscript{528} F. Halliday, \textit{Islam and Myth of Confrontation}, p.45
employers on sight when they wear the *hijab*, yet they have experienced no trouble finding work when their heads are uncovered.\(^\text{529}\)

The lived experiences of Muslim migrants in the West indicate that Muslims are adapting their lives in various ways to adjust to living in a multi-faith society. This contradicts the underpinning assumption that Islam is incompatible with a modern political regime. Many Muslims who have migrated to the West have successfully ‘re-homed’ and established a sense of identity and security in their host countries. The increase in the movement of Muslim migrants has enhanced the security of some groups of migrants. However, for others the ability to dwell in multiple nation states to resist legal, economic and cultural forms of marginalisation is crucial. Mulki Al-Sharmni interviews a specific group of Somali migrants who live between two or more different countries to maintain their economic livelihood as well as their sense of identity and security.\(^\text{530}\) For this group of migrants, Western liberal states have been able to provide some degree of protection and economic opportunity. However, Western liberal states have not provided these migrants with the tools they need to integrate into society or to establish an overall sense of security. Somali migrants, even those who have acquired citizenship in the West, are kept on the margins of their host societies through an “uneven field of structural inequality”.\(^\text{531}\) Some Somalis in Western nations have chosen to move from their host Western country to a Middle Eastern country in order to secure social and economic capital. The two different localities offer different opportunities and levels of protection for Somalis. Émigrés who migrate from the West to the Middle East are in pursuit of economic opportunities as well as social capital. Many migrants establish small to medium sized businesses in which they often employ other Somalis. Establishing a base in the Cairo increases the everyday security of this group of Somali migrants, however, it also increases their social status within the diaspora because of their economic success. This example highlights that individual and collective security can be pursued through exploiting transnational links and networks as well as taking advantage of the specific opportunities and protections that different societies and states can provide for migrant groups.

\(^\text{529}\) R. Berns McGown, *Muslims in Diaspora*, p.205
\(^\text{530}\) M. Al-Sharmani, ‘Living transnationally: Somali diasporic women in Cairo’, *International Migration*, vol.44, 1, March, 2006, p.72
\(^\text{531}\) S. Rosaldo, ‘Cultural citizenship in San Jose’, *Polar*, 17, 1994, pp.57–63
In the current climate, the movement of people is securitised to the extent that some groups are unable to preserve their sense of identity and community in their host country. The securitisation of migration has resulted in the introduction of policies that are intended to protect the national majority; however, they often target minorities in a way that jeopardises their security. Securitisation also creates conditions of insecurity for the entire population. Resentment between minority and dominant groups is enhanced, as is the likelihood of conflict between groups. In an immigrant-receiving nation, policies that restrict the right of migrants construct differences between ‘locals’ and ‘foreigners’ fail to address the source of people’s insecurity. In the context of an increasingly diverse and changing demography in the West, it is more and more common for individuals to reach beyond the state to a form of community such as the diaspora that provides security and a sense of home. This chapter has critiqued the methods and the policy rationale used by the state to control mobility and cultural difference. In the next chapter I will explore some possible roles that the state could play in allowing for a wider range of groups to pursue their own security.
Five  Re-thinking security at home and abroad: A revised role for the state

The modern state can play a role in facilitating security for a wider range of individuals and groups. Earlier chapters have highlighted the importance of transnational expressions of identity that are linked to the pursuit of security for an increasing number of people. I have also argued that the state is not the sole provider or protector of people’s security. However, it is unrealistic to assume that the diaspora and other forms of political community, below and beyond the nation, will replace the nation state in the current climate. The nation state is the only form of political community that is mandated in the current international system. Historically, the modern state has created conditions of insecurity for certain groups of citizens by using physical and discursive violence in the name of sovereignty and national security. This chapter considers the question: Can the role of the state be reconfigured to allow a wider range of individuals and groups to pursue security and self-reliance?

The state must take steps at a domestic and an international level to re-think its approach to security. At home, it is important to recognise that national homelands are comprised of culturally and morally diverse citizens. On that basis, the state should allow ethnic and cultural communities a degree of autonomy and differentiation from each other in order for individual members of those communities to establish a sense of security and self-reliance. This chapter will advance the argument that cohesive and peaceful societies are more likely to emerge when an ideology of tolerance of cultural diversity is embraced at an official and a grassroots level. At the international level, I argue that states need to rethink their defensive approach to interstate relations based on the modern dualisms of friend/enemy, inside/outside and security/insecurity. Mutual estrangement is a feature of the international system given that all states are internally fragmented and vulnerable. If states recognise their own particularities and their own foreignness there is greater scope for states to engage on terms that do not entrench traditional inequalities and power dynamics. In this chapter, dialogue and conversation will be examined as tools that can be used to decrease the likelihood of conflict between states. Conversation and dialogue are tools that are rarely used by statesmen to engage with others. However, these are useful tools that aid in the establishment of mutual agreements, consensus and understanding between states.
The homeland as a site of cultural and religious diversity: Identity politics in perspective

As a first steps towards re-thinking the dominant approach to security, we need to re-conceptualise the homeland as a plural space in which cultural and religious identities shape the political character of the nation. It is impossible to discuss political identity without addressing cultural difference. According to William Connolly, identity and difference are interwoven: identity defines itself through difference and through the conversion of difference to otherness. If it is the case that individuals define their own identity in relation to others then it is unrealistic to assume that cultural homogeneity will be a defining feature of any national homeland. Cultural and moral diversity exists within as well as across cultures. The pursuit of security through a modernist framework discourages individuals from expressing their cultural and religious differences in an attempt to increase national unity and social cohesion of the nation. However, individuals who are a part of a national community have not simply replaced their cultural, religious, sexual identities with a singular national identity based on secular and civic values.

The regime of modern citizenship compels citizens to commit to visions and values of liberalism and secularism. However, examining the historical development and consolidation of nations both in the West and in former colonised countries suggests that the most nationalist movements have appealed to cultural and ethnic characteristics to form bonds between groups of differently situated individuals.

Scholars of political liberalism predicted that culture and religion would not be significant as the project of modernity was consolidated across the West and former colonised countries. Francis Fukuyama predicted in the early 1990s that the global spread of liberalism and capitalism would eliminate ideological and cultural differences between nation states. Other liberal scholars argue that ethnic and cultural differences disappear in a modern society, or are at least confined to the private sphere, because citizens unite under the universal values and practices of democracy and capitalism. In contrast to Fukuyama’s prediction, in the period of late modernity there has been a resurgent affirmation of identities of an ethnic,

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532 D. Campbell, and M. Schoolman, ‘Introduction’, p.10
religious or cultural kind. The resilience of identity politics as a form of political and socio-cultural expression suggests that the projections made by some liberal theorists were misguided.

National communities have always been multiethnic and fractured; however, the scholarly traditions of liberalism and humanism attempt to downplay these differences. Jacques Derrida claims that the impact of Western thought has put us into national and cultural ‘iron cages’ in an attempt to disguise the fact that cultural diversity is all around us and that the confrontation with difference is unavoidable. As a result of the dominance of liberal political thought, this view impacts upon the way we think about security. Other scholars agree with Derrida that polyethncity is a natural condition that has existed for centuries. For example, William McNeill, a renowned historian from the Chicago school, argues that before 1750 conquest, disease and trade all contributed to the reinforcement of polyethnicity of territories from Asia to Europe to the Middle East. From the eighteenth century onwards, he argues that the theory of modern nationalism based on ethnic and cultural homogeneity within a geographic or sovereign boundary has not been realised.

Culture and religion, in liberal political theory, are often associated with negative traits such as parochialism, tradition, and narrow mindedness. However, identifying with one’s culture or religion can also be associated with positive attributes such as common ancestry, shared characteristics and shared socio-cultural experiences. Culture and religion play an ongoing role in struggles for rights, recognition and resources. Historically, identification with cultural and religious communities has helped migrant groups to access economic opportunities and political and social power in a host nation. Culture and religion are vehicles through which communities mobilise and articulate their socio-cultural particularities and their needs, which may be distinct from other groups in the nation. Culture and religion are primary categories through which individuals and groups enter into the political sphere and articulate their rights and aspirations.

536 R. Cox, ‘The point is not just to explain the world but to change it’, p.90
539 ibid., p.12–13
It is important to note that the concept of identity has been used in the past to draw a line between those who govern and who are enslaved; between those who live within the cultural borders of the nation and those who are excluded and between those who have civil and political rights and those that do not.\(^{541}\) Identity can be used as a category to justify forms of political oppression, social exclusion and hierarchy within a nation. Worse still, some political regimes have legitimised various forms of physical and discursive violence against minorities using categories of identity. Postmodern and post-structuralist theorists have rejected identity politics and political movements based on categories such as race, class and gender on the grounds that they lead to the entrenchment of hierarchies. Judith Butler and Joan Scott, for example, argue that the use of categories such as race, gender or class implies an acceptance of the practice of discrimination and exclusion that accompany such classifications.\(^{542}\) They assert that identity is not the ground of interest, perspective or agency but rather it is a deceptive and dangerous effect of discursive processes and modern power relations.\(^{543}\)

This insight is useful for analysing the operation of power and the use of techniques of governance in modern societies. However, the post-structuralist approach has its own limitations; namely, it reduces identity to a construct of discourse and language. It is important to acknowledge that identities are both constructed and ‘real’ in the sense that they are constituted in part through theory-mediated interpretations and in part through lived experience.\(^{544}\) Identities highlight the ways in which our everyday lives are affected by various social, political and cultural axes of difference. The ‘real’ aspects of identity are those that relate to the body, to our relationships with other humans and to our locations in institutionally maintained social hierarchies.\(^{545}\) In short, we cannot simply dismiss identities and social classifications as artificial and meaningless; rather we must confront their reality and investigate their sources.

\(^{543}\) ibid, p.42
\(^{545}\) ibid, p.12
When it comes to official policies of the state as well as unofficial forms of discrimination at the level of the everyday, a number of minority groups have become objects of security policy because their identity is constructed as threatening and dangerous. The post-structuralist focus on discourse and language also ignores the positive role that identity politics can play in the practical rebuilding of communities and the articulation of an alternative security politics. It is important to acknowledge that identities are constructed through language and discourse, in a context shaped by power relations. However, they are meaningful to individuals and groups at a practical level. Political identities based on ethnicity, culture, religion or any other signifier of difference can be affirmed in ways that are not ideological, divisive or discriminatory. When employed in this way, they have the potential to enrich our understanding of ourselves and our connection to a broader historical community. The assertion of alternative communal identities is an integral part of the pursuit of security for marginalised groups that have previously been objects of state security policies or societal discrimination. For example, the strategic use of identity as a political platform can help minority groups living in a nation to assert an identity that is different from the mainstream and to articulate an alternative politics.

Identity is a form of individual and communal expression that provides individuals with a historical understanding of their place in the world as well as a publicly accountable form of political representation and knowledge. Cultural identities are a source of historical record and continuous knowledge that assists individuals and groups to establish a sense of home and security. Identity also reflects the way that others perceive us and our place in the social world. Identities have particular ethical importance in the social world, because it is through our identities that we learn to “define and reshape our values and commitments, we give texture and form to our collective futures.” While the ‘real’ and ‘constructed’ aspects of identity are analytically distinct, they are historically related in the sense that interpretations of identity inform how people treat each other and how social institutions are organised.

It is important to acknowledge that identity politics and cultural differences are not simply going to fade away as global elites continue to promote liberalism and capitalism through

547 P. M. Moya, ‘Introduction’, p.11
548 ibid., p.12
549 S. Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, New York: Routledge, 1992, p.81
international institutions, trade, humanitarian intervention and the development industry. Cultural difference is a defining feature of the majority of national homelands. National elites and practitioners of the modern state have attempted to disguise this diversity, as Sankaran Krishna has observed: “The making of the nation serves as universal alibi for the violent unmaking of all alternative forms of community.” Acknowledging cultural difference within the national homeland forms a key part of the critique of the dominant approach based on the pursuit of cultural homogeneity and fixity.

A revised role for the state in facilitating security at home and abroad

Throughout this thesis I have argued that the policies of states enacted in the name of security are, by and large, counterproductive. Given the resilience of the modern state as the predominant form of political community, it is necessary to revise the role that the state can play in fostering a secure environment for the widest possible range of individuals and groups. Changes must be made to the way that states approach the question of security within their own borders and at the international level.

At Home

When cultural difference is conceived of as a threat to the stability and security of a political community it is impossible to create the conditions in which multiple cultural groups can feel secure. In a multicultural society, conflicts over values, practices and forms of knowledge are inevitable. Critics of multiculturalism often argue that it is for this reason that diverse societies cannot be cohesive or secure. However, the existence of semi-autonomous cultural communities within a nation state does not preclude consensus being established or resources being distributed relatively evenly throughout the nation. It is vital to acknowledge that any form of consensus reached in a multicultural society will only ever be temporary, as the needs and aspirations of each cultural group are never identical, even if they sometimes overlap. The needs of cultural communities also change over time as new groups arrive in a political community, each with their own unique set of political needs and aspirations that challenge the existing political culture.

550 S. Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, p.20
One possible way to re-think the state’s role in the security debate is to theorise the state as a facilitator rather than a provider or protector of citizens’ security. The state can play a role in facilitating a politics of negotiation between different cultural communities. Moving away from the premise that the state is the ultimate provider and trustee of security, theorists of the human security movement argue that the state’s primary role should be to enable individuals and groups within the nation to ‘self-secure’. The concept of self-securing challenges the assumption that security is best handled from ‘above’, traditionally by the state, but now also by international institutions and large non-governmental organisations. According to Robert Cox, political movements and the social sciences need to be less deterministic and more ‘sensitive to emerging and declining historical structures and movements of self-organisation in social and political relations’.

The state also has a role to play in fostering an environment in which dialogue and debate can take place between differently situated cultural groups. Urban theorist Leonie Sandercock labels this specific form of political negotiation an ‘antagonistic political regime’. An antagonistic political regime is a regime in which multiple ethnic groups have a substantial influence over the political culture and in which the definition of national identity is continuous contested. In such political communities, consensus over the allocation of resources and the very definition of national identity is the result of continuous debate and negotiation between different cultural communities in which the state plays a role as a mediator. Whilst there is not pre-existing and permanent ‘common good’ within a political community, there is continuous debate over what is, or what may become, common ground and consensus.

Throughout the thesis I have highlighted the important link between security and the ability to express an identity and to feel a part of one or more cultural communities. An antagonistic political regime provides scope for a wider range of individuals to articulate their differences from other individuals and groups. Within an antagonistic regime it is acknowledged that different groups have specific needs and that they have a right to articulate their difference

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553 R. Cox, ‘Point is not just to explain the world’, p.87
555 L. Sandercock, ‘Cosmopolitan urbanism’, p.48
from the mainstream political culture. It is still important to establish a more general sense of belonging in an intercultural society in order for democratic structures to be meaningful.\textsuperscript{557} This overarching conception of community should not be based on race, religion or ethnicity; rather it needs to be formulated from shared experiences of living-in-common. It is a form of political community that must be continuously re-defined through negotiation.

The state also has a role to play in promoting democratic principles that value dialogue and deliberation over uniformity and consensus. According to William Connolly a democratic ethos should not be based on a set of abstract principles or cultural attributes, but rather on the need to disturb these principles. Democracy is about the ability to disrupt and challenge assumptions that are presumed to be universal. The state has a role in promoting democracy only to the extent that it promotes respect for “multiple constituencies honouring different moral sources”.\textsuperscript{558} Connolly argues for a form of democracy that revolves around multiple minorities coexisting and co-governing in a safe and mutually respectful environment.\textsuperscript{559} It is important to remember that democratic negotiations do not take place outside of relations of power and domination. However, this does not mean that we should shy away from the attempt to implement pluralism and participatory democracy. Both Connolly and Sandercock recognise that there must be some common basis upon which individuals can unite and engage in debate and decision-making processes.\textsuperscript{560} A broad pluralist notion of democratic decision-making can produce a form of common ground upon which differently situated individuals can debate substantive issues.\textsuperscript{561}

Connolly argues that democracy is not merely a set of institutional arrangements, but that also, even primarily; it is an attitude, a cultural disposition.\textsuperscript{562} Acknowledging the cultural dimension of democracy requires the state to focus less on formal institutions and more on facilitating a democratic culture of negotiation and tolerance. Currently, the states direct most of their resources towards state-based institutional politics and fail to acknowledge the positive role of the politics of disturbance.\textsuperscript{563} Both order and disorder are necessary and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{557} L. Sandercock, ‘Cosmopolitan urbanism’, p.40
  \item \textsuperscript{558} W. Connolly, \textit{Why I Am Not a Secularist}. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p.51
  \item \textsuperscript{560} W. Connolly, \textit{Pluralism}, Durham: Duke University Press,2005, p.43
  \item \textsuperscript{561} R. Bleiker, ‘Visualising Post-National Democracy’, p.134
  \item \textsuperscript{562} W. Connolly, \textit{The Ethos of Pluralisation}, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995, p.154
  \item \textsuperscript{563} \textit{ibid.},p.142
\end{itemize}
complementary features of a democratic regime. Disorder can sometimes be required to promote regimes that are more just and accountable. Furthermore, in some political communities, disorder is often the only reality possible as it is the only way in which minorities can pursue security and articulate their political needs and aspirations.

A key feature of an antagonistic political regime is that all cultural groups have a right to disagree with the practices and principles of other communities and to prioritise different factors in their pursuit of security. The various cultural groups that make up a multi-ethnic society must negotiate for their rights to inhabit particular public spaces and to meaningfully participate in public life and political affairs. In order for this to occur it is important that the state creates spaces and sites for intercultural interaction and negotiation. The relationship between public space and security will be explored in Chapter Seven. The point to emphasise here is that the state has a role to play in supporting individual citizens to develop tolerance and sensitivity to cultural difference and to encourage practices that enhance the democratic ethos. Citizens of a nation state are most likely to develop a sense of belonging and to feel secure if the political community as a whole values diversity and if this is reflected in its structure, policies, conduct of public affairs and self-understanding.

If the state is to become a facilitator in an antagonistic political regime it is necessary to examine the discourse and language used by the state that prevents minorities from participating in political life and pursuing their own sense of security. In particular, the construction of national history is a discourse through which the state attempts to enforce oneness and cultural uniformity. History is also the discourse through which particular security narratives are normalised and presented as factual realities. Modern nation states are defined by historical accounts of war and conflict. The history of war and conflict is used to justify current military expenditure and defensive security policy. Re-thinking the role of the state in the provision of security must include a radical overhaul of the way that we think about national history. For cultural communities, documenting and remembering the past is an important part of identity formation. It is also linked to the ability of communities to feel self-assured and to be able to participate in a broader community. To allow individuals and groups to ‘self-secure’, states need to ensure that multiple histories can be preserved and

565 L. Sandercock, ‘Cosmopolitan Urbanism’, p.48
566 ibid., p.50
passed on through communities. National history, as it is documented in text books, museums, monuments and official state records, privileges a singular account of historical events. Official historical accounts represented as true and accurate representations of events. A number of postmodern historians suggest that the search for empiricism in history should be abandoned in favour of privileging multiple historical narratives and politicising the discipline of History.\(^{567}\)

Ashis Nandy makes a compelling argument for why states and citizens should ‘forget history’. Nandy argues that millions of people around the world live “outside of history”. People who exist outside of the official accounts of history have their own experiences and memories of the past and their own way of coming to terms with the past.\(^{568}\) The Western mode of constructing the past based on rationalism, secularism and empiricism has become the dominant mode of imagining the past in the North and the South. According to Nandy, historical conciseness tends to “absolutise the past in cultures that have lived with open-ended concepts of the past or depended on myths, legends, and epics to define their cultural selves.”\(^{569}\) The dominance of modern history has also helped rigidify civilizational and national boundaries and consolidate the modern state. This process has marginalised alternative versions of the past. Nandy suggests that plural imaginings of the past are important because they allow for multiple cultural communities to draw from the past to define their contemporary identities. Nandy also argues that forgetfulness is an important trait that is used to move on from conflict and events that have divided communities in the past.\(^{570}\) The use of ‘principled forgetfulness’ is particularly important for communities that need to re-establish a sense of security after experiences of violence and trauma.

There a very few examples of states that privilege myth and legend over history at an official level. However, there are some examples of societies in which communities have their own methods of remembering and forgetting the past that are resilient in the face of ‘national history’. Nandy argues that the myths and memories that define the ancient Indian city of Cochin have contributed significantly to the peaceful coexistence between communities and the hospitality of the city. These memories have been passed from one generation to the next through myths and legends as well as through religious texts, art, cultural practices. These

\(^{569}\) *ibid.*, p.44
\(^{570}\) *ibid.*, p.52
collective memories are stronger than any overarching meta-narrative of the city. A number of historians have noted that there are large gaps in the official knowledge of the history of Cochin. The majority of references to the past exist in the form of traveller’s tales, folk songs, indigenous histories which offer a sketchy picture of the history. Some of the most important insights into how Cochinis understand themselves and their city can be found in the legendary accounts of Kerela of the Christians, Muslims, and Hindus. Many of these narratives are subject to revision by the communities that value them and there are numerous histories of the city which contradict and undermine each other. For example, there are various explanations of how the city got its name. Some say the city was named after a river close by, (‘Kochi’), while others claim the city was named by Chinese settlers. It is possible that the name has meant different things at different points of time and that it has a unique significance for each community. It is this ambiguity surrounding the development of the city that allows for multiple narratives and myths to survive which are not replaced by a singular ‘official’ history.

The introduction of nationalistic text books, politically correct stereotypes and historical accounts inspired by European history has influenced the way that most Indians view themselves and their history. In his interviews, Nandy found that many of the interviewees initially attributed Cochin’s cosmopolitanism to the triumph of rationalism, secularism, Indian nationalism and high education standards. However, when questioned further, the interviewees revealed that their sense of identity and community was based on a more emotive, privatised account of the city rather than as a result of the introduction of modern nationalism. In these narratives other communities are described as villains, conquerors, victims, friends, enemies or protectors. There are emotional stories of how one’s own community survived through ingenuity, courage, cunning and sometimes, with the help of other communities. These historical accounts stand in stark contrast to official Indian policy documents or history text books.

The triumph of myth and legend over modern historical categories has minimised the level of tension between Hindu and Muslim communities and contributed to the peaceful co-existence.

571 E. S. Goldberg, and N. Katz, The Last Jews of Cochin: Jewish Identity in Hindu India (Studies in Comparative Religion), South Carolina: University of Carolina Press, 1993, p.8
572 A. Nandy, ‘History’s forgotten doubles’ p. 164
573 ibid., p.176
574 ibid., p.178
of these groups. Despite the entry of modern categories that attempt to sharpen differences between Hindus and Muslims, most Cochinis see generic terms such as Hindu, Muslim, Christian and Jew as representing confederations of living communities who all have a place in the social structure. This brief discussion of constructions of the past in Cochin provides an interesting starting point for re-thinking the role that the state plays in allowing communities to construct their own versions of the past. The state could allow a great number of people and groups to pursue their own security by ‘forgetting history’, or at least allowing free and open debate about the nation’s past that exposes the plurality of experiences within the nation.

**Abroad**

The commitment to establish global security from the ‘top down’ and the primary use of military solutions to achieve this aim must be challenged. Re-thinking security at home poses important questions about how nation states approach the question of security abroad and our relationship with others. The current approach to international peace and security aims to protect the sovereignty of states using a defensive approach to conflict resolution and other threats of global significance such as terrorism, nuclear weapons, drugs and natural disasters. There are numerous international institutions, agreements and non government organisations that are set up specifically to address the question of global peace and security. However, it would appear that these arrangements have not been able to prevent or manage numerous conflicts that have erupted since the Cold War, nor have they been able to curb the instances of international terrorism or prevent non-state actors such as people smugglers, drug dealers or pirates from infiltrating the borders of nation states. The majority of military and humanitarian interventions carried out in the name of global security have occurred in the Third World. However, by and large, these missions have produced conditions of greater insecurity for Third World populations. Furthermore, despite treaties and agreements on non-proliferation, states that currently possess nuclear weapons have shown no sign of reducing their stocks while new nuclear threats continue to emerge.

The global security discourse is structured around a division between zones of peace and zones of conflict. These zones loosely correspond to the division between former colonial powers and former colonised nations. Under the current international order, some states are

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considered to be rational actors with sound moral principles and international credibility. Other states are characterised as irrational actors who cannot be trusted and whose actions must be closely monitored by other states. States of the global North create security alliances based on ideological and economic similarities, while the rest of the world is constructed as dangerous and unpredictable.

It is widely acknowledged, particularly among postcolonial scholars, that nationalism is a derivative discourse of colonialism. Similarly, security doctrines have travelled easily from the First to the Third World. Throughout the period of formal colonisation, non-European societies were subjected to Western modes of governance, which involved the calculation and management of the population. In the period of decolonisation, the principle of ‘divide and rule’ was further entrenched through the creation of internally mandated nation states. Today, states and other political elites continue to rely on these techniques to enforce artificially created boundaries. Modern security doctrines have become further entrenched through international institutions such as the United Nations, peace-keeping, military training, knowledge transfer from North to South and the development profession.  

One of the consequences of the internationalisation of the Western approach is that experiences and knowledge formations in non-European societies have been marginalised. The conservative approach to national security remains the dominant approach in many former colonised nations, resulting in anachronistic security policy. Forms of alternative knowledge appear to have no traction at an official level in many former colonial countries. Humanitarian intervention and peace-keeping missions carried out under the auspices of the United Nations also operate to consolidate the Western approach to security and conflict resolution. As Phillip Darby and other postcolonial scholars have argued, humanitarian intervention is accompanied by a project of social engineering to build democracy, civil society and a free market economy. Peacekeeping missions and intervention can also prolong conflict and create on-going physical and psychological insecurity for people on the ground. In the past, Western intervention in former colonial countries has resulted in political elites in Third World countries gaining control over fragile political regimes with the support of foreign powers. For example, Ken Booth notes that during the Cold War, Third World societies were subjected to forms of intervention that created “a society of states run by

577 P Darby, ‘Rolling back the frontiers of empire’, p.707
Western governments and a variety of local strongmen.” In the contemporary climate, the control exercised by Western powers may be more indirect, however, the role of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq clearly demonstrates that patterns of intervention are producing similar results.

The approach to global peace and security has not changed substantially since the Cold War. Given that this approach has exacerbated conditions of insecurity for most people it is necessary to ask the question: how do we go about building better relationships with others at the international level? For states to engage with each other on different terms, an important first step is to listen to the claims of the other. Engaging with others and acknowledging their claims, requires state actors and political elites to employ the human qualities of listening, caring and relating to the situation of others. These qualities must be employed by citizens at the level of the everyday as well as political elites. In his inquiry into nationalism in Australia, Ghassan Hage argues that Australia has become a “worrying” society in which fear has become the dominant motivation for action or inaction. According to Hage, “worrying exerts a form of symbolic violence over the field of national belonging and eradicates the very possibility of an alternative mode of belonging”. National worrying prevents states and their citizenries considering the plight of people in other states and from caring for minorities within their own state. When caring rather than worrying is the dominant emotion in confrontations with the other, it is more likely that the experiences of suffering and insecurity of others may be acknowledged. Hage suggests that caring can be recovered as a dominant feature of national culture; however, it is unlikely that this could happen within the current security paradigm.

In the current climate, states continuously work towards creating maximum conditions of security. However, no state or citizenry will ever feel completely secure. A major shift in thinking that needs to occur at an international level involves the recognition that security and insecurity are inextricably linked. Under the current framework, the world’s most powerful nations attempt to demonstrate that they are secure through the exercise of military might. These states are also considered to be responsible for the security of weaker states and for the overall stability of the international order. The defensive and militaristic actions of

579 G. Hage, Against Paranoid Nationalism, p.23
580 ibid., p.23
hegemonic states are represented as acts of confidence and leadership. However, in reality, these actions are often motivated by a deep sense of insecurity and fragility. As Senator William Fulbright commented in 1960 on the state of the United States: “...the lack of self-assurance seems to be based on an exaggerated sense of power and mission.” The aggressive actions of the United States, along with other major powers, can be explained based on the desire to eliminate insecurity within the nation and beyond through the use of heavy-handed military policy. However, what may be required to shift the parameters of the security debate is for states to recognise that insecurity is a natural and unavoidable condition. There is even a potential for security to be enabling under certain conditions.

Insecurity can provide the basis for establishing affinities with others as well as coming to terms with difference and movement within and across borders.

A useful starting point for re-thinking the way that states relate to each other is to conceive of all states as foreign and strange. The concept of mutual estrangement fits within the conceptual framework of insecurity. Julia Kristeva argues that we are all strangers to ourselves and that we need to engage with the foreignness within us. Kristeva argues that the idea of the stranger is imminent to our being and to all definitions of human identity, she states: “the foreigner is within me, hence we are all foreigners. If I am a foreigner, there are no foreigners”. When estrangement is acknowledged as a universal and natural attribute, the experience of political life can be viewed primarily as an experience of hybridity in which no one entity is an authentic or original member of the community. The figure of the stranger is associated with threat and danger in conventional security discourse— it is an object not a subject of security. However, taking an alternative approach to security requires us to view states as strangers who can contribute positively to the moral and social fabric of international society precisely because of their difference. It is common for states to be identified as similar and familiar in some circumstances and strange and foreign in other circumstances. Consequently, all states, rich and poor, share a condition of hybridity and indeterminacy that produces common experiences of estrangement.

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581 P. Darby, ‘Security spatiality and social suffering’, p.463
582 W. Fulbright, quoted in P. Darby, ‘Security spatiality and social suffering’, p.463
583 P. Darby, ‘Security spatiality and social suffering’, p.462
584 J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.190
585 ibid., p.192
587 J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.116
There are two distinct understandings of the stranger and his/her relationship to the community that have emerged in the literature on estrangement. The first approach considers the stranger as a particular kind of body from elsewhere that is different from the majority of inhabitants of a particular place. This body is often viewed as abnormal and threatening. It is this particular conception of the stranger that underpins the dominant security discourse critiqued in Chapter One that constructs the stranger as an object of security policy. This view of the stranger also underpins the rationale for defensive security policies underpinned by the discourse on ‘rogue’ and ‘failed states’. By contrast, the second understanding of the stranger treats ‘estrangement’ as a natural condition that is experienced by everyone in a political community. From this perspective, strangeness is viewed as a positive attribute that enhances the ability of individuals to learn from each other and to respect each other’s differences. This conception has influenced the contemporary view of scholars, such as Kristeva, who argue that strangeness is a universal condition that should be embraced rather than feared in a communal context. Policy-makers and political elites need to acknowledge that foreignness can never be entirely removed and that it can serve as a basis for sharing experiences of insecurity and suffering with others and for devising alternative ways of states living in common.

A number of scholars, particularly in the field of postcolonial and cultural studies have conceptualised frameworks for re-thinking our relationship with the other. Morgan Brigg, in his critique of conflict resolution and peacekeeping, argues that at the heart of the global security discourse, there is an inability to respond to cultural difference. This failure to acknowledge and engage with cultural difference has resulted in forms of intervention carried out in the name of security that create further conditions of insecurity on the ground, prolong conflict and marginalise alternative forms of conflict resolution. Employing a Foucauldian approach, Brigg highlights the neo-colonial politics of conflict resolution. He argues that intervention is used to enforce the liberal agenda based on Western conventions about the sovereign self and the sovereign state. At a practical level, Brigg demonstrates this point with reference to the training and accreditation of conflict resolution practitioners. Military

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590 J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.192
training and knowledge transfer, according to Brigg, in many ways naturalises the liberal understanding of the political and reinforces the preoccupation with order and the rational subject. Brigg theorises a new political framework for improving relationships with others based on the concept of ‘relatedness’. Drawing from his experiences working in conflict situations with Australian Aboriginal people, Briggs argues the relatedness is about establishing a sense of co-being with the other and becoming close to the other.\(^59^2\) In order to relate to others, both Kristeva and Briggs suggest that we need to look within ourselves and to our experiences to connect with others across difference. The next section explore some of the ways in which states and their citizenries can relate to the other in order to establish ways of living and being in-common in a diverse international world.

*Hospitality and engagement: from conflict to transnational conversation.*

As a part of the dominant approach to modern security, it is assumed that a clear distinction can be drawn between the local and the foreigner and that sharp boundaries around a political community be it local, national, or transnational can be established.\(^59^3\) The current approach to migration and border protection confirms this. When a new member is accepted into a national community it is assumed to be an act of generosity and benevolence on behalf of the host nation. Existing members of a nation are encouraged to extend a *limited* welcome to certain strangers who are in need of protection or who are considered to be of value to the existing community members.\(^59^4\) Existing members of the community are conceptualised as ‘hosts’ who ‘welcome’ new members under certain conditions that are acceptable to the majority group. The danger of this approach is that there is a substantial power asymmetry between hosts and foreigners. This often results in hosts attempting to assimilate and/or domesticate new-comers under the banner of national security.

There is an inherent tension between the two ideas of universal estrangement and universal hospitality.\(^59^5\) If hospitality is to be extended to new strangers seeking refuge, a pre-existing conception of local and foreigner must be enforced. When a group of people claim to be

\(^{59^2}\) M. Brigg, *New Politics of Conflict Resolution*, p.23


\(^{59^4}\) S. Benhabib, ‘Hospitality, sovereignty, and democratic iterations’ in S. Benhabib; with commentaries by J. Waldron, B. Honig, W. Kymlicka; R. Post (ed.), *Another Cosmopolitanism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.149

\(^{59^5}\) K. Iveson, ‘Strangers in the Cosmopolis’, p.74
‘locals’ and extend their hospitality to strangers, they are distinguishing themselves from the strangers on the grounds that they are the original and or the more authentic inhabitants of the community. Thus, the idea of hospitality assumes that there is a place with sharp boundaries into which the stranger will be welcomed, by a group of locals. As Jacque Derrida aptly states:

It does not seem to me that I am able to open up or offer hospitality, however generous, even in order to be generous, without reaffirming: this is mine, I am at home, you are welcome in my home.

When the categories of ‘host’ and ‘stranger’ are employed in this way, hospitality can be used to reinforce political inequalities by preserving the categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The group that constitutes the political majority in the nation seeks the power to determine which new members should be accepted and on what grounds. The limited extension of hospitality from a dominant group to a marginal group allows the national majority to determine who can enter the national home and to what extent their difference will be tolerated. This process can also occur at a sub-national level in an urban context. In a city in which some groups have a long historical connection to a particular space and/or have a large degree of political and economic power, there are some groups that may assume the position of hosts who attempt to police the borders of urban community.

The category of the stranger is often invoked by those who have assumed the status of ‘host’ or ‘local’ as a result of the position of power and privilege they hold in society and not because they have a natural claim or entitlement to a city or a nation. The difference of the stranger is often exaggerated or misrepresented by the hosts in an attempt to sharpen the borders of their own community. In any analysis of national security, it is vital to bring into question the very subjecthood of the host community and its inhabitants and to contest the rights of those who assume the power to welcome or reject strangers. In contemporary multi-ethnic societies, there are multiple narratives of history of origin, entitlement and

596 K. Iveson, ‘Strangers in the Cosmopolis’, p.74
598 A Alund, ‘The stranger: ethnicity, identity and belonging’, p.41
territorialis. Different communities within the broader society have their own constructed view of the history of a particular place and the arrival of different groups. In order for communities to value diversity it is necessary to challenge the binary between host and local. The central question of providing hospitality to strangers therefore shifts from the issue of how ‘locals’ should respond to the stranger to the question of how members of a community should respond to their individual and collective estrangement.

Looking back through the history of both Western and non-Western societies, there are numerous historical examples of communities exercising unconditional hospitality. This is particularly true of the relationship between different religious communities: Christians have hosted Jews, Muslims have hosted Hindus. In some cases, such as the rule of the Moguls in India, social structures were adapted so that religious groups could co-exist. Martin Marty argues that most of the world’s religions value hospitality as a part of their worldview and moral order.601 In the contemporary period, religious conflict and the ‘clash of civilisations’ often overshadows the fact that religious groups regularly host people of other faiths without attempting to convert them and without fear that their own religious identity is under threat. At the level of the everyday, people of different religious and cultural backgrounds invite each other into their homes on the basis that the other will not attempt to change them or threaten their identity. When this exchange takes place, the two parties tend to listen more carefully to the other, to speak differently and learn more carefully in the presence of the other.602 There is a degree of curiosity between differently situated individuals and groups that can be used in a positive way to learn about the other and establish forms of commonality and difference.

Marty argues that providing hospitality starts at the domestic and local level, but this can provide both practical and metaphorical examples for the larger international scale.603 Of course, achieving this at an international level is much more difficult because the risk in offering hospitality is that it will not be responded to with the same sentiment. However, there are significant historical examples of peace movements, led by figures such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela, that have rejected the violence initiated by the Other and offered hospitality as an alternative. These are examples of situations that have

602 ibid, p.186
603 ibid, p.188
involved the use of significant physical and discursive violence carried out by a state. In each of these situations the leaders of peace movements rejected the security methods used by the state and offered to engage in conversation with the oppressor.

States often engage in negotiations, arguments or forums that are conducted to achieve a specific outcome, however, they rarely engage in conversation. States need to engage regularly in conversation to find the things they have in common as well as to affirm and understand each other’s differences. According to Marty ‘conversation’ is not as same as ‘argument’. Argument is guided by the answers not the questions.\textsuperscript{604} When two parties, whether they be nations, cultural groups, religious leaders or differentially situated neighbours, engage in conversation they are free to search for what they have in common. These types of fruitful conversations between differentially situated individuals and groups have taken place for centuries and they continue to prosper. However, they are often overlooked because they are perceived as localised, domestic and apolitical. It is important to bring these conversations into the international limelight and recognise their role in preventing and managing conflict.

Conversations across cultures have produced far-reaching forms of consensus. Some of the issues that cultural and religious groups have reached consensus on include: the movement to ban landmines, to curb global warming, the creation of the International Criminal Court and the movement to curb the use of child soldiers.\textsuperscript{605} The global movement to ban anti-personnel landmines is particularly significant for our purposes because for the first time in history, states agreed to eliminate a conventional weapon that had been used by nearly all fighting forces for about 100 years.\textsuperscript{606} From these conversations has emerged a nucleus of a movement that seeks to enhance global security not by increasing the number of weapons being developed, traded and deployed but rather by focusing on ‘human security’ needs as the primary linchpin upon which all security rests.

The human security movement has largely been squandered through the invasion of Iraq and subsequent acts carried out in the name of the ‘War on Terror’. While people across the globe were united in their sorrow and disapproval of the terror of September 11, many people at the

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\bibitem{604} M. Marty, ‘Risking Hospitality’ p.190
\end{thebibliography}
time hoped that this global unity would result in a different type of leadership to respond to the attacks. Many people hoped that governments would attempt to diffuse tensions between the West and the Islamic world by beginning to address the root causes of the problems that made recruiting for terrorist networks possible. However, by and large, in the aftermath of 9/11 governments attempted to convince their populations that war and preparations for war, including military expenditure and tax payer subsidies for the arms industry are the only answer to the threat of terrorism.

The popularity of a militarised response to September 11 and the inability of most people in the West to question the ‘War on Terror’ without sanction meant that there was limited debate on the issue in the parliament, the media and even at universities. However, it is important to recognise that there are important dialogues taking place at a global level between multiple state and non-state actors concerning the question of the use of force by states to intervene in the affairs of other states to resolve conflict. While the decision to use force is generally couched in terms of the ‘national interest’ and rights of states to use force as a last resort, it is important to recognise the continuous moral dialogues take places below and beyond the state on the appropriateness of this particular approach to security. Through dialogue we need to challenge accepted thinking about how to address violence and the myriad of threats to human security. Shifting the terms of reference of the security debate beyond the ‘clash of civilisations’ and the use of violence to punish violence will not be easy. However, with sufficient will and commitment from people across a range of states, dialogue can be used to constructively address common security problems.

Conversations reveal that different cultures and religions have their particularities, however, they are not all in conflict with the stories others tell. There are congruencies, points of overlap and often surprising agreements that come out of cross cultural dialogues. Conversations require differently situated people to listen to the claims of the other in exchange for the opportunity to tell one’s own story. People who have reached such a level of empathy are less likely to be instigators or supporters of war or conflict as a means to mediate disputes. Veena Das has argued in various essays that in the aftermath of violence and trauma it is vital to acknowledge the pain of others. Das insists on hearing the voice of the victim, accepting that suffering is collective as well as individual, and recognising the need for a

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607 J. Williams, ‘Endless enemies or human security’, p.69
608 A. Etzioni, ‘Transnational moral dialogue’ p.83
public acknowledgement of pain. In this context, talking about pain and suffering can be a way of connecting with the other. The exchange of experiences of pain and suffering take place primarily at the level of the everyday. Through this exchange meaningful relationships can be formed between differently situated individuals at a local level. However, sharing experiences of pain and suffering has important international implications. Das argues convincingly that the inability of the United States to recognise the pain of others after 9 11 was a major motivating factor behind the decision to respond with greater violence.

In order for states to engage in conversation a fundamental shift in political ethics is essential. States need to be willing to participate, honour their obligations to respect and listen to each other and show humility. This chapter has argued that there are initiatives that can be undertaken at home to improve the conditions for everyday people to pursue their own security. These changes are based on the recognition that cultural identity cannot be separated from political identity. Consequently, the state has a role to play in ensuring that different cultural communities can preserve their particularities and at the same time connect with a broader political community. By encouraging multiple historical narratives to be preserved within the national homeland and downplaying the search for an ‘accurate’ and singular national history, states can expand the opportunities for self-securing. At an international level, a radical shift away from defensive and territorial approaches to conflict resolution is needed. We need to re-think the distinction that currently exists between friendly, rational states and rogue, failed states. States need to recognise that mutual estrangement is a feature of international order an on that basis no one state asserts moral superiority over the other. States, as well as people on the ground, need to engage in frank and free conversation to expand the range of possibilities of to address violence and conflict on a global scale.

Throughout this thesis I have argued that the state is not always the best placed agent to deliver security to its citizens. In fact in many cases the state is understood to be a primary cause of violence and social suffering. However, it is important to recognise that the state can also play a constructive role in re-building communities that have experienced violence and trauma. Thus, while we do need to loosen the links between security and the state, we also need to re-think the role of the state as a facilitator of human security. The state can play an

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610 *ibid.*, p.209
important role in encouraging differently situated individuals to acknowledge their mutual estrangement and to share historical narratives and experiences of pain and suffering. In this chapter I have argued that it is only in coming to terms with our differences and re-thinking security at home that individuals can pursue their own security and allow others the right to do the same.
Six Security and the everyday: Living with difference

A 2005 feature article series in ‘The Guardian’ newspaper described London as a cosmopolitan city in which “every race, colour, nation and religion” can be experienced.\(^{611}\) The series argued that it is the cultural diversity created by migrant groups that makes London a vibrant and specifically ‘cosmopolitan’ city. The articles also linked cosmopolitanism to progress, contemporality and increased social and economic opportunities for a greater diversity of people. To supplement the articles, the Guardian provided its readers with a map of London illustrating the concentration of different ethnicities and religious groups throughout the city. The author suggested that there was a high degree of intermixing and interdependence between differently situated groups; as well as an overarching sense of loyalty to the city itself. The map indicated that migrant communities often live in areas inhabited predominantly by members of their own ethnic/cultural group. However, the author argued that there was a high degree of tolerance of cultural difference because cultural communities have preserved their differences whilst living in a broader political community. Cosmopolitanism, in this argumentative series, is used to describe the increased cultural diversity in London that, according to the author, enhanced the social cohesion of the society and ensured that individuals from a range of cultural groups could pursue social and economic opportunities.

In the same year an article published in ‘The Independent’ newspaper, by the paper’s crime correspondent, reported on the growth of criminal gangs within migrant communities in certain parts of London. The article was based on an interview with Sir John Stevens, the former Commissioner of the London Metropolitan police.\(^{612}\) This piece was also supplemented with maps illustrating the neighbourhoods that contained enclaves of migrant communities. The article linked areas of ethnic ‘ghettoisation’ with criminal behaviour and an increase in conditions of insecurity for Londoners. The author linked particular migrant communities with specific crimes, for example: the Albanian community was identified as perpetrators of vice in Soho; and the Jamaican community was allegedly involved in the drug trade in Brixton and Hackney.\(^{613}\) The author encapsulated the sentiment of the Commission in the statement: “we are a tolerant country, but we will not allow any form of criminality……I

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\(^{612}\) J. Bennetto, ‘London’s cosmopolitan criminals targeted’, *The Independent*, 5 February, 2005, p.15
\(^{613}\) *ibid.*, p.15
think these people [migrants] come from countries that think we are a soft touch—we prove otherwise”. This article presented the difference of migrants and their tendency to live in ethnic enclaves as a security threat to the Londoners from politically dominant groups. Here multiculturalism is presented as a dangerous feature of city life that makes London a less desirable place to live and work.

These two articles present contrasting accounts of British attitudes towards ethnic and religious difference and its link to security and social cohesion. The first celebrates the opportunities and benefits of living with cultural difference; while the second casts difference as something to be feared, resented and policed. As part of the contemporary debate on multiculturalism a wide range of perspectives on how to manage cultural difference within and across political communities are expressed. Some states and their institutions promote multiculturalism whilst others discourage it at an official level in favour of cultural assimilation. However, in order to establish when a society is culturally plural it is vital to look at the culture of the everyday to determine how people really feel about living with difference and how it relates to their individual and collective security. Chapter Six privileges ‘the everyday’ and as a frame for ascertaining how people on the ground pursue and sustain security in the face of change or conflict. In this chapter, I argue that robust security arrangements and methods for conflict resolution can emerge at the level of the everyday, often without the involvement of the state or formal institutions.

The Guardian series highlights that a high degree of intermixing and interdependence can develop between different cultural communities who share resources and public space. On the other hand the article in the Independent suggests that the presence of distinct cultural groups in a city can increase the security of people at the level of the everyday. In this chapter, I use these contrasting perspectives—one of social integration and multiculturalism and one of cultural assimilation and homogeneity—to build the argument that security is linked to the ability of communities to preserve their difference whilst at the same time develop a degree of interdependence. I examine the trend that has emerged in some modern cities towards cultural and class segregation, based on the fear of cultural difference—the sentiment expressed in the second article. I contrast this against some examples of social integration where cultural communities share resources and live and work together. Social

614 J. Bennetto, ‘London’s cosmopolitan criminals’, p.15
integration works best when communities are mutually dependent on each other but within an environment in which they are able to preserve their difference.

The second key line of argument developed in this chapter is that local knowledge about security and conflict resolution and prevention should be privileged over the objective knowledge of security ‘experts’. The field of security and strategic studies is currently dominated by experts, mostly from the Western academy, who write prolifically on the key threats of our time and how to solve them. These threats are presented as tangible realities that can be addressed through strategic policy-making and threat analysis. However, given that there is no one definitive answer to the world’s security problems and that there is no consensus over what makes people physically and psychologically secure, it makes little sense to rely on an objective approach to knowledge when it comes to security. Chapter Six develops the argument that local knowledge and practices of resilience related to security should be privileged as a part of reconceptualising what it means for people to be physically and psychologically secure.

An ancient pluralism: Pre-colonial traditions of tolerance and accommodation

Cultural pluralism and tolerance of cultural difference are often assumed to be modern phenomena that can be historically linked to the consolidation of capitalism and modernity. In some circumstances processes of modernisation have increased the degree of interaction between differentially situated individuals and communities at a local and national level. However, cultural pluralism is not a product of modernity even though it is a feature of most contemporary societies. Engaging with cultural difference is a way of thinking and acting that predates the modern sovereign state. Pluralism can be linked to economic and social relationships that have emerged in a number of different primordial, modern and postmodern contexts.615

To demonstrate that cultural pluralism is not a product of modernity or liberal democracy it is useful to look back to pre-colonial traditions of tolerance and accommodation. In Chapter Four I examined the ancient trading route between Australia, Indonesia and China and argued that the Mascassans and Indigenous Australians developed strong ties based on travel between the three countries and socio-cultural and economic engagement. In this chapter I will use a second example from the pre-colonial world to demonstrate that cultural

communities can live together in a manner that allows for the preservation of difference. The Indian city of Cochin in Kerala provides a telling example of a culturally diverse society with a history of tolerance and peaceful co-existence. Cochin is an urban hub with a historical and contemporary culture of pluralism. It is one of the largest natural harbours in India and is a site of cross-cultural exchange for economic and socio-cultural benefit. The city has a unique reputation as a historical trading port where people from China, Africa, South East Asia, and Europe came together. Today, Cochin remains, a symbol of cultural diversity and religious and ethnic tolerance and an illustration that social cohesion can be achieved in a community of communities. At least fourteen distinct communities inhabit the city. They include: Jews, Eurasian Parangis, Tamilians and Saraswats. Historically, Cochin has served as a place of refuge for communities fleeing oppression and discrimination in other parts of the world as well as a place of economic opportunity and international exchange for a number of different cultural communities.

Cochin has seen occasional disputes between communities, however for centuries it has not seen a bloodbath or riot of the kind documented as communal violence in many other parts of India. This is not to say that communities in Cochin have no hostility toward one another or that there are no historical or contemporary disputes between communities. Every community has its experiences of struggle and encounters with other communities, according to a remembered mythic past. Each community views some communities as good and others bad. The Jews and the Christians, for example, talk disdainfully about the Portuguese and their fanatic Catholicism. Syrian Christians have a collective memory of the destruction of sacred books and documents by Catholics, whilst Jews remember the harassment by the Portuguese. However, none of these historical experiences has lead to an imprisoned hatred of one particular community or to an outbreak of ethnic or religiously motivated violence. According to Ashish Nandy the cultural plurality of Cochin is, in part, sustained by the right to stereotype and dislike other communities whilst at the same time acknowledging their place in the city and respecting their rights to live by a similar communal mentality.

The communities of Cochin are not separated by sharp or permanent borders. Consequently, within communities in Cochin, there is little search for ethnic purity or cultural homogeneity.

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616 A. Nandy, *Time Warps*, p.158
617 *ibid.*, p.159
618 *ibid.*, p.159
Nandy suggests this is largely due to the fact that residents have not experienced a sense of threat to their established way of life and they are culturally self-confident. When individuals feel secure with regard to their own identity they are less likely to fixate on sharp delineations between one community and the next. Historically, the communities of Cochin have borrowed resources and adopted certain cultural practices without inhibition. They also have shared sites for religious worship. For example, the Fort of Cochin contains mosques that are hundreds of years old that share the region’s style of Hindu temple architecture and sacred decoration. There are also similarities in cultural practices between different religious communities. The Knani Christians share many customs with the Jews, including a hereditary priesthood, which also reflects Hindu Brahmin pedigree, and similar marriage and food rituals. The sharing of cultural and religious traditions as well as geographical sites enhances the degree of interdependence between communities and softens the boundaries between one community and the next. In this environment, the pursuit of security is not based on ‘us’ and ‘them’ rather it is based on individual communities finding ways to ‘self-secure’ in a manner that allows other communities to do the same.

Cochin is an ancient trading port with a long history of trade, especially in fishing, shipbuilding, and spice. Over time, communities have become interdependent and encouraged cooperation between communities for economic purposes. The trading relationship between Hindu kings and foreign traders contributed significantly to the acceptance of foreigners in Cochin. The kings of Cochin were especially hospitable to foreigners because of its geographical location which opened it up to the Arabian Sea and because the Jewish, Christian and Muslim traders filled a void in Cochin’s economic life because there were no trading castes in Kerala. Nandy argues that in addition to the fact that Cochin is was an international trading hub, the myths and memories that define the city have contributed significantly to the degree of tolerance between communities and the city’s peaceful history. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the rejection of an official ‘national history’ in favour of multiple historical narratives provides scope for a wider range of communities to preserve their identity.

619 A. Nandy, *Time Warps* p.160
620 *ibid.* p.160
621 *ibid.,* p.161
622 E. S. Goldberg, N. and Katz, *The Last Jews of Cochin*, p.20
It is important not to idealise the city of Cochin as a place where communities live in complete harmony. The city’s communal amity includes distance and hostilities. However, such tensions operate within a broader psychological universe of tolerance, which acts as an inbuilt check against communal violence. Cochin is a city in which distances and hostilities have their place along with closeness and friendship as a part of the social fabric of the community. The communities of Cochin do not live together in the kind of cultural melting pot envisaged by some liberal theorists of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism. Rather, their lifestyles are partly autonomous and involve a degree of separateness from other communities. These areas of autonomy reflect legitimate differences in religion, caste, cultural and sect. These differences have not eroded over time or lost their significance; despite the fact communities have undergone some changes. According to Nandy, the pre-modern culture of pluralism in Cochin is continuously under threat from nationalist ideologies and the steam-roll development approach and spread of neo-liberalism that has affected so many countries since the formal end of colonialism. However, in the face of such pressures and external influences, Cochinis appear to be loyal to their unique practices of neighbourliness and the city’s community-based normative structure.

The example of Cochin demonstrates that plural societies can also be cohesive and secure societies. As Nandy states, multiculturalism may sometimes imply a “culturally embedded identity in which others are telescoped into the self as inalienable parts of the self”. The spread of modern nationalism in Europe and throughout the colonies has impacted significantly on primordial cultures of pluralism and multiculturalism. However, there are some political communities in which nationalist ideology has not become the dominant mode of imagining political community. Former colonial countries are often characterised as backward or dysfunctional precisely because they have not been able to successfully implement the abstract requirements of a modern political community. The roster of armed violence that occurs in many former colonised states suggests that the constitutional guarantees of equality and secularism provided through citizenship are not sufficient to maintain peace between individuals and groups. While these conflicts are generally played out in the global South, it is important to remember that Western societies are also segmented along lines of class, religion, language, political ideology and that this influences the political

623 A. Nandy, *Time Warps*, p.207
624 *ibid.*, p.207
625 *ibid.*, p.209
culture of each nation to a high degree. By and large, the nationalist attempts to homogenise the nation and treat everybody the same as a means to ensure stability and security have not been successful. As a result, states have had to derive a number of arrangements that acknowledge the need for distinctions within the rubric of equality and democracy. In addition, people on the ground have derived a number of local solutions to accommodate cultural difference.

The impact of modernity: Bourgeois practices of exclusion

The term ‘cosmopolitan’ is used with increasing fever in the fields of social and cultural studies, geography and political science. However, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily equate to tolerance of cultural difference at the level of the everyday. The idea that certain spaces, practices and people are ‘cosmopolitan’ is a concept used increasingly in the everyday vernacular of contemporary societies. In the Guardian articles referenced in the introduction, increased diversity in an urban setting is generally considered to be a measure of progress and sophistication. Cosmopolitanism has become a popular term that policymakers and urban planners have co-opted to create an association between multiculturalism, modernity and their particular place or space. Cosmopolitan spaces are used to brand a particular city or nation as global and to make it more desirable for investment, tourism, and consumption. Such quarters are marketed as spaces that offer the visitor a ‘genuine’ encounter with difference in a safe and comfortable environment. However, the labelling of a city as cosmopolitan does not necessarily mean that there is a tolerance of cultural difference with a particular urban community. In fact, in many modern cities that are branded cosmopolitan there remains hostility to certain kinds of difference. The term cosmopolitanism refers to forms of social organisation and practices, in particular, those linked to the activities of the middle class, which are based on the mixing of different cultures. Cosmopolitanism is often linked to mobility, change and the breakdown of

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627 Ibid., p.12
628 S. Benhabib, ‘The philosophical foundations of cosmopolitan norms’, in S. Benhabib; with commentaries by J. Waldron, B. Honig, W. Kymlicka; edited and introduced by R. Post, Another Cosmopolitanism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.15
parochial or traditional social forms. The term can also be associated with people; it is conceived of as a quality of mind which allows individuals to navigate successfully through a globalising world without fear of encountering cultural difference.

Cosmopolitanism is often assumed to be a modern phenomenon that can be historically linked to the consolidation of capitalism, industrialism and liberal democracy. In its current form, cosmopolitanism is an intrinsically classed phenomenon; it is bound up with economic and social cultural capital, education and the ability to move between a number of different sites and communities. The middle class is a socially constructed category with boundaries that are defined by practices of consumption associated with consumer goods. However, although class is constructed it has a very real and permanent impact on the way that individuals relate to each other and the ability individuals to establish economic and social security. An important feature that distinguishes the middle-class as a group is that they tend to adopt of certain dispositions and practices that are labelled ‘cultured’ or ‘worldly’. These practices range from travel and the consumption of cultural goods to the ability to speak other languages and the acquisition of knowledge about other cultures. Consequently, a link has been established between cosmopolitanism and the middle class. However, these practices do not necessarily result automatically in an appreciation and celebration of cultural difference or an ethic of open mindedness.

In many modern nation states, it is members of the middle class who are best placed to travel overseas and encounter other peoples, places and cultural practices. Middle classes are also more likely to live in large urban cities with a high degree of cultural intermixing.

Members of the middle class have encounters with difference on a daily basis; however, these encounters are often commoditised in the form of ethnic restaurants, import stores, international media, and architectural forms among other cultural commodities. The consumption of particular forms of ethnic commodities by the middle-class is often labelled

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632 B. S. Yeoh, ‘Cosmopolitanism and its exclusions’, p.142
634 ibid., p.124
These patterns of consumption do not enhance the degree of tolerance and accommodation between cultural groups. In some cases, individuals identify as global or cosmopolitan by distinguishing themselves from those for whom ‘the global’ is not a cultural or economic reality or an experience that they can relate to. This entrenches a false dichotomy between global and local and it is based on the assumption that boundaries of political communities are fixed. Cosmopolites distinguish themselves from forms of localised popular culture in ways that often leads to a new form of elitism and differentiation between groups. For example, in M. W. Rolfe’s study of the districts of Glebe in Inner Newcastle, (Australia), he argues that ‘cosmopolitan spaces’, which are gentrified and culturally diverse, are be contrasted against ‘the suburbs’, which are spaces of ‘myopic mainstream Australian culture’. Inhabitants of spaces labelled cosmopolitan are perceived as globally-oriented whilst the suburban residents are framed as working class and parochial.

David Ley argues that it is middle-class residents in cities that are the most likely to adopt cosmopolitan practices because they possess cultural and economic capital that enables them to consume cultural commodities and engage with other cultures. It is important not to assume that these cosmopolitan spaces are automatically more tolerant of cultural difference than suburbs that are less affluent and have more culturally homogenous populations. For example, in a number of gentrified parts of Australia, multicultural products are consumed but cultural difference is still viewed as a threat to the established political and social order.

As I discussed in Chapter Four, the movement of people can enhance the security of those who move and those who stay at home. A wide range of groups have the opportunity to move in a globalised economy. Cosmopolitanism is commonly associated with the movement of middle class elites rather than working class people. Mobility is a feature of the middle-class lifestyle that is contrasted against the immobility of rural and local groups that are considered to be more parochial and territorially bounded. Scholars such as Turner maintain that a dualism can be established between those who move and those who do not. He states:

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638 M. W. Rofe, ‘I want to be global’, p.2520
640 ibid., p.160
in a world of mounting unemployment and ethnic tensions, the working class and the inhabitants of areas of rural depopulation may well be recruited to nationalist and reactionary parties.\textsuperscript{641}

This proposition assumes that working class people are more likely to adhere to regressive nationalist movements, which promote intolerance of difference and are fearful of globalisation. Implicit in this statement is also a view that middle classes and elites are more cosmopolitan simply because they are mobile and economically empowered. Turner’s stance devalues the local skills and nationally bounded sentiments of the working class and contrasts them against the highly mobile skills and liberal attitudes of more privileged classes.\textsuperscript{642} In some cases, the middle classes become detached from specific locales and do not feel the need to identify with one particular cultural community. However, having the freedom to move does not necessarily mean that the middle classes are more willing to accept cultural difference or to adopt a more open-ended approach to living with others.

A degree of financial independence as well as particular skills are often prerequisites for individuals to navigate between and within different cultures.\textsuperscript{643} The accumulation of economic and social capital can also make it easier for the middle classes to consume cultural commodities. In global economic hubs such as Singapore and Hong Kong, middle class elites come and go relatively freely. Global cities are sites where multiple cultures intersect for social and economic purposes. However, middle class elites can travel through these cities with their own culture intact because of their position of social and economic privilege. In other words, travel provides them with the opportunity to engage with other cultures on their own terms.\textsuperscript{644} This type of travel and cultural consumption is not likely to open up avenues for engagement between dominant and marginalised groups.

The consolidation of bourgeois culture can operate to cement a line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of difference in an urban context. In his insightful analysis of multiculturalism in Australia, Ghassan Hage argues that there is a broad acceptance of some

\textsuperscript{642} ibid., p.142
\textsuperscript{644} B. S. Yeoh, ‘Cosmopolitanism and its exclusions’, p.144
forms of difference, namely culinary and fashion customs that migrants have introduced. However, this has led to the commodification of specific cultural differences and the intolerance of other kinds of difference. The consumption practices of the middleclass can be misleading: on the one hand they appear to be supportive of multiculturalism because they have the desire to consume different cultural commodities and have new cultural experiences. On the other hand however, they engage in political socio-cultural practices that exclude other groups from participating in public and civic life.

Bourgeois culture is linked to certain social and moral practices that place individuals in a restrictive social framework. In this environment people strive to conform to social and moral norms and come to resent certain kinds of difference. Taken to the extreme they come to view marginal communities and cultural practices as a threat to their own status and social and economic security. In reaction to the perceived ‘threat’ of other classes and cultures, the middle-classes adopt a range of strategies in an attempt to protect their own security at the expense of marginalised groups in the city. The pursuit of security among the bourgeois often involves an attempt to take security into their own hands. They tend to guard their own homes and the surrounding neighbourhood from encroachment from other cultural groups and classes and come to view security as a private rather than a public good. The privitisation of security occurs when there is a strong sentiment among the elite that national and local authorities can no longer be trusted as the primary providers of security. A number of scholars have examined the practice of urban segregation by the middle classes. For example, Tim Butler notes in his study of the multiethnic city of Barnsbury in North London:

*it is the middle classes…..who huddle together into essentially ‘white settlements’ in the inner city and who attempt to isolate themselves from the city’s diverse cultural groups.*

Cosmopolitanism is generally associated with the ability of individuals to move beyond parochial sentiments and forms of local community. However, becoming cosmopolitan does

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647 *ibid.*, p.78
648 A. Wolf, *One Nation, After All*, p.175
650 *ibid.*, p.2469
not do away with the need to feel a part of a community or to establish a sense of home and belonging. It is only when individuals are aware of, and attached to, a home with its own distinct cultural particularities, that they can contrast their home with places that are home to others.\textsuperscript{651} Contrary to the commonly held belief that multiculturalism and cultural pluralism are modern phenomena, the consolidation of modernity, more often than not, has sharpened the division between differently classed and cultured individuals. In the next section, the impact of cultural and class segregation and the privatisation of security is examined as it relates to people on the ground.

Security and the everyday

The pursuit of security at the level of the everyday should be grounded on a real rather than an abstract concept of community. Real communities are based on difference and disjuncture both within and between communities.\textsuperscript{652} In Chapter Two, I argued that the pursuit of modern security involves an attempt to assimilate and domesticate others to create a cohesive and stable community. National security is also based on the pursuit of an abstract community in which cultural homogeneity is a prerequisite. The point was made earlier in this chapter that cosmopolitanism is generally associated with the middle class. This link between cosmopolitanism and the bourgeois results in the privileging of certain groups, knowledge and practices over others. However, individuals from marginalised groups, as contrasted against mobile middle-class elites, engage with difference just as regularly as elites, albeit on a local, as opposed to a global scale.\textsuperscript{653}

The dominant approach to security revolves around the idea that ‘political identity’ and ‘community’ are pre-given concepts that must be defended as a part of the pursuit of security. However, an important part of building security from the ground up involves recognising that ‘community’ is a productive process of socio-cultural interaction, in this sense it is not reliant on a pre-given identity or history of solidarity.\textsuperscript{654} James Donald argues that fostering a sense of community and solidarity between disparate individuals is a continuous process that involves making and remaking the boundaries and values of a community from the bottom-

\textsuperscript{651} K. Appiach, ‘Cosmopolitan patriots’ in P. Cheah and B. Robins, (eds.), Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp.91–92
\textsuperscript{652} J. Donald, Imagining the Modern City, London: Athlone Press, 1999, p.151
\textsuperscript{654} J. Donald, Imagining the Modern City, p.146
up.\textsuperscript{655} This conception of community challenges the view that cultures can only live together if they share the same cultural traditions and values. In order for this productive approach to community building to work, neighbours from different cultural backgrounds need to acknowledge the things they have in common, while also accepting that they are strangers with very different moral values and cultural practices.\textsuperscript{656} I have argued throughout the thesis that cultural and moral uniformity are not a basis for peaceful coexistence between communities as individuals are more likely to feel secure when they are able to freely express themselves.\textsuperscript{657} However, consensus between differently situated individuals within a political community is possible and necessary in certain contexts.

Building community and security from the bottom-up involves the consolidation and repetition of cultural practices. National communities and national homelands are based on abstract concepts and connections. Linking the security of individuals to the security of an abstract community such as a nation state is not a meaningful way to engage people on the ground in a dialogue about what makes them secure. However, by focusing on real communities and real social practices the link between individual security and collective security can be explored. Sociologist Heni Lustiger-Thaler has explored in detail the dynamics of community formation at a grassroots level.\textsuperscript{658} Lustiger-Thaler argues that communities are not formed from inherent or natural connections between individuals; rather they are the product of human-made connections and commonness based on experience and place.

According to Lustiger-Thaler, “community” is a common identity constructed through the “artful practices” of everyday political and economic encounters. These practices include routines of cooperation, teamwork and problem solving.\textsuperscript{659} The artful practices that constitute communal identities have a spatial dimension and are related to particular locations; however, they are not bound to one singular place. Locations contribute to the creation of local solidarity and practices that differentiate a community from another.\textsuperscript{660} It is by sharing these spaces with other members of the community that differently situated individuals find ways

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\textsuperscript{655} J. Donald, \textit{Imagining the Modern City}, p.146  
\textsuperscript{656} \textit{ibid.}, p.151  
\textsuperscript{657} Z. Bauman, ‘Strangers: the social construction of universality’, p.39  
\textsuperscript{659} \textit{ibid.}, p.11  
\textsuperscript{660} G. Dipankar, \textit{Culture, Space and the Nation State}, p.240
\end{footnotesize}
of living and being-in-common. In essence, community is constituted from an ensemble of local practices and it is embedded in local understandings of local places. In order for people to feel and be secure they need to feel comfortable in their surrounding social environment — this can be achieved through the sharing of common space and the reproduction of “artful practices”. According to Lustiger-Thaler, communities have less to do with political institutions or government and more to do with the politics and culture of everyday life. However, theorising local politics and community formation at the level of grass-roots interaction must also take into account the impact of national and transnational forces.

In multiethnic societies, comprised of groups with different practices and values, conflicts and disputes between groups are inevitable. While disagreements and disputes cannot be avoided, the way that conflicts are mediated in a multiethnic society bears directly on the prospect of peaceful co-existence between groups in the future. In a society in which there are no methods for mediating disputes between groups it is likely that the difference of the other will continue to be a source of insecurity. A method for mediating disputes between groups is also necessary to enable the public display of different systems of values and meaning that influence the way that individuals express their political identity. In the absence of intercultural dialogue and a fair process for mediating disputes, conflicts are insolvable except by the imposition of one culture’s views on another through the use of physical or discursive violence. The processes of intercultural dialogue, mediation and dispute resolution can expand the intellectual and moral horizons of members of a community and can enhance their understanding of the position of others.

A diverse political community that is sustained through everyday practices has no requirement that its members are learned and skilled in liberal politics or that they have similar cultural attributes. In a multi-ethnic society, some communities may not want to share identities, establish common ground or acknowledge the cultural difference of the other. An important part of the pursuit of security by cultural communities involves defining the features that make them unique and distinct from the rest of society. Consequently, some

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661 H. Lustiger-Thaler, ‘Community and Social Practices’ p.16
662 ibid., p.12
communities will be less likely than others to participate in collective security building, shared tasks, and public deliberation to establish the common good.\footnote{I. O'Flynn, *Deliberative Democracy*, p.48} It some cases, it may be important for communities to maintain a degree of separation and distance from other communities. The importance of creating space between communities is particularly pronounced in a post-conflict situation when groups who have demonised each other during a conflict attempt to live together in close proximity.\footnote{S. Gates and H. Strand, ‘Military intervention, democratization, and post-conflict political stability’ in M. Oberg and K. Strom, (eds.), *Resources, Governance and Civil Conflict*, London; New York: Routledge, 2008, p.165}

The case study of the repatriated refugees in the Bosnian town of Banja-Luka examined Chapters Two and Three highlights the difficulties ethnic minorities face when attempting to re-establish their sense of home and security in a post-conflict environment. Although it is important for some communities to maintain a degree of separateness from other communities, in an urban context, it is difficult for any one community to be socially or economically self-sufficient. When different cultural communities have to share the same resources and public spaces they must confront shared problems such as resource scarcity, environmental damage, spatial planning and demographic change.\footnote{K. Iveson, ‘Strangers in the Cosmopolis’, p.79} The concept of social integration and mutual dependence as a form of security-building will be further examined in the final chapter.

**Local conflicts, local knowledge**

In order to re-think security to place people at the front and centre, local knowledge must be privileged over the knowledge of security experts. A lucrative industry comprised of policy makers, academics, consultants and other professionals generate ‘knowledge’ about security threats and how to combat them. The security industry has extended its reach even further since the attacks of September 11 as everyday citizens are consuming books on global terrorism and other security threats with increasing fervour. As books on the dominant security threats of our time, including the clash of civilisations, rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, environmental disaster, appear on the shelves of mainstream bookstores an increasing number of people are being exposed to security issues that dominate the global media. However, this type of engagement generally does not prompt discussion about the
root causes of these security threats or how people on the ground can pursue security to create more robust political communities.

The dominant approach to security is legitimised by a large body of literature and academic debate on a set of issues that are considered to be the security dilemmas of our time. However, the scope of these debates and the range of permissible thought and action on security are limited by Western-centric and anachronistic scholarly disciplines. In many societies, insight into conflict resolution and security are not documented and disseminated through academic or expert channels. Under the dominant approach only certain kinds of knowledge about security are recognised as credible and useful. From the period of colonial expansion into the non-Western world to the present day, Western experts have attempted to implement a singular view of how societies should organise themselves politically, socially and economically. The pursuit of peace and security is linked to a broader aim to spread liberal democracy across the globe through the consolidation of the nation state. The dominant view within the discipline of International Relations is that the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty can be reworked and applied to the states of the developing world. It is assumed that by replicating the nation state a degree of cultural and political uniformity is created that enhances global security.

The dominant view underpinning contemporary security debates is that the state is the only legitimate form of political community and that order is predicated on the universal unit of the state. Within this system, the shared goal of the majority of states is the defence of individual state sovereignty as well as the safeguarding the of system as a whole. In pursuit of this aim, military interventions into ‘failed states’ or ‘rogue states’ that overtly aim to impose liberal democracy from the top down and the outside in, are becoming increasingly common. However, to date these interventions have been uniformly unsuccessful and have severe economic, social and political costs. Humanitarian interventions and peacekeeping missions into former colonial countries are justified in the name of human rights, global security and the social and economic development of the third world. However, a large number of scholars and activists from different fields have questioned the motivations of Western nations and argued that imposing democracy from the outside exacerbates existing and creates new conditions of insecurity and oppression for people on the ground.

The most pertinent contemporary example of the West’s attempt to impose a security regime on the non-Western world is the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq. The United States and the coalition of the willing are attempting to rebuild the Iraqi state and its institutions using a range of techniques of intervention from military invasion to the use of private consultants and NGOs. The intervention in Iraq is part of a broader attempt to impose order on a region they perceive to be both fractured and dangerous. In his analysis of the reconstruction of Iraq, Toby Dodge argues that strong parallels can be drawn between the British occupation of Iraq in the 1920s and the role of the United States Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2003. Both external powers have attempted to understand and ‘know’ the population through the production of expert knowledge about different ethnic groups, census data and surveys of the natural and built environment. In both situations the political authority has not attempted to engage with the local population or establish meaningful communication with Iraqi society. The British administration understood the Iraqi society through the distorted stereotypes of the day that were generally based on knowledge generated in Europe and the limited experiences of colonial explorers. In the current climate, the Western coalition relies on the Iraqi political parties formed in exile to act as intermediaries despite the fact that these parties often have limited connections to people inside the country. A significant amount of resources, funding and intellectual attention has been dedicated to ‘knowledge’ about Iraq and the development of strategies to restore peace and security in the country and the surrounding region. However, this knowledge is generated by external experts with little or consultation with local people inside Iraq.

State sovereignty is conceptualised as an unalienable right in International Relations theory and it is viewed as the key determinant of a state’s security. However, in reality the application of this principle is inconsistent. In the name of international peace and security, the sovereignty of many former colonial states is overridden. States that are perceived as weak or corrupt do not have the same right to sovereignty and are often not trusted to make decisions about their own security. Ultimately this view has been used to legitimise the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive war against unstable postcolonial states that is justified under the guise of international security, human rights and liberal democracy. The undermining of postcolonial sovereignty intensified in the 1980s when the Washington Consensus provided a

670 T. Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, x
671 *ibid.*, xi
672 *ibid.*, xiv
mandate for international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to intervene in the economies of postcolonial states by providing loans in exchange for free trade and the liberalisation of capital and financial markets. These loans were tied to a range of policy reforms including privatisation of state industries, cutting tariffs and the devaluation of currencies.  

External intervention into former colonial countries now extends far beyond the economic sphere to include a wide range of social, cultural and governance reforms that are implemented through multilateral institutions; non-governmental organisations and even private companies. In addition to the pervasive reach of development professionals into postcolonial countries, military interventions and economic sanctions are used to promote a liberal global order in the name of protecting human rights and furthering democracy. The combination of military, financial and diplomatic methods to spread liberal democracy is underpinned by the belief that global security is enhanced through the creation of homogenous political communities and that postcolonial states only have a right to sovereignty is they have met their ‘responsibilities’ to the international community. The contemporary politics of humanitarian intervention and development enforces the view that there is only one way to pursue security and that the knowledge about security developed in the West should guide domestic and foreign security policy.

In the field of security studies there is a general neglect of the importance of local knowledge, including non-written forms of communication. Currently, the majority of ‘security experts’ are trained in the West and write primarily for a global (Western) audience. They may have some practical experience of mediating conflicts however; even the most experienced and well-travelled scholars cannot possibly know the wide variety of traditions of conflict resolution and security that exist in local cultures around the world. This is, in part, because oral traditions and local practices are not recognised as “knowledge” in the current security environment. In a complication of cases studies and theoretical contributions from postcolonial scholars, Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker focus on insights into conflict resolution and security building practices emanating from indigenous peoples in Asia, Austral and Oceania.  

Brigg and Bleiker argue that indigenous approaches to conflict resolution

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and security are often articulated using methods that are not recognised as knowledge formation in the Western world. Insights developed and refined by centuries of experience with conflict are handed down from generation to generation through a range of informal methods including stories, performances, rituals and customs.

Clashes among different religious, ethnic and cultural norms are inevitable, however, communities can respond to clashes across difference in a wide variety of ways. Some responses to conflicts across difference are forward-looking with a view to establishing collective security over time. Others are more punitive and focus on the allocation of guilt and blame to particular individuals and communities. Brigg and Bleiker argue that the prevailing responses to these dilemmas are framed almost exclusively through Western approaches to conflict resolution. The dominant view is that politics and religion must be kept separate and that one should not inform or shape the direction of the other. There is also a view that emotional and private responses should not inform political deliberations. There are many non-Western traditions of conflict resolution and local knowledge about security that have been used over time to build robust communities. There are also many values other than rationally that shape local approaches to conflict resolution. It is important that communities are able to preserve traditional methods and local knowledge as a means of self-securing. In re-thinking our approach to security and conflict resolution we need to enrich prevailing Western theories and practices of conflict resolution as well as their local counterparts through mutually beneficial encounters and exchange. This is not to say that all Western knowledge should be discarded. Rather it is about pluralising the field of knowledge about security and recognising what we can learn from the everyday.

The people who have the most sophisticated insight into local practices of conflict resolution and methods of self-securing are local practitioners that operate at the level of the everyday. Local practitioners gain their knowledge through their experiences and involvement in resolving conflicts within and between communities. They have an understanding of what makes a particular community secure and the factors that contribute to insecurity. Unlike conventional academics and scholars who aim to be objective and impartial, local practitioners have a vested interest in finding a practical way to address and prevent conflict and they are valued for the subjective knowledge about particular communities. We should

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not assume that local knowledge is pure or unaffected by external knowledge and practices, nor is it always productive or accurate. It is also not useful to draw a sharp distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ knowledge, as many local traditions in former colonial countries are shaped by contact with the West. Processes of globalisation have rendered cultural boundaries porous, which has led to a fusion of different forms of knowledge. Local practitioners do not all possess the skills and authority to communicate their knowledge to the outside world. Consequently, it is vital to connect neglected local knowledge to the mainstream discourse on security and the wide range of ‘security experts’ who influence decision-making in this field.

Opening up a constructive dialogue between differently situated groups on ways of articulating and communicating knowledge about security is not a straight forward task. Linguistic differences, geographic limitations and economic constraints hinder the ease with which different groups can communicate. Differently situated groups have different views on what it means to be and feel secure as well as the methods that are acceptable to achieve security. For example, there are substantial differences in the way that local practitioners acquire and share their knowledge—through oral dialogue, custom and preformative acts—and the way that security experts share their knowledge through—elaborate conferences, diplomatic negotiations and institutional forums. However, we should not let these barriers preclude us from thinking about a common discourse through which people can share their diverse views and experiences on how conflicts are avoided and overcome in different political communities.

Western methods of resolving conflict and building peace tend to be limited to methods of formal political engagement and recognised forms of communication. In the case studies from Asia, Australia and the Pacific explored by Brigg and Bleiker, it is made clear that non-verbal forms of communication, including silence, are important methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Western methods privilege verbal and formal communication between conflicting groups, often at the expense of recognising the cultural value and meaning of silence, gestures and communal commitments. Silence is often misinterpreted and misunderstood by the Western audiences as hesitation, apathy or stubbornness. However, silence can also symbolise acceptance, subtlety, respect and thoughtfulness. This is demonstrated through the non-verbal tradition of the Australian Aboriginal Dreaming and the

676 M. Brigg and R. Bleiker, ‘Introduction’, pp.2–3
balance that must be maintained between conflicting parties. Re-establishing peace and balance between communities in the Australian Aboriginal tradition begins with the recognition and sharing of emotion between differently situated individuals and groups.  

This can include the use of silence as a form of recognition in cases when feelings and sentiments cannot be verbalised.

The case studies highlighted in Mediating Across Difference on conflict and peace-keeping in Melanesia demonstrate the importance of privileging everyday practices and local knowledge over expert knowledge about security. The area of the Western Pacific, known as Melanesia, has been labelled part of a ‘geographical area of instability’ by Australian foreign policy-makers, security experts, and the West more broadly.  

This group of islands is one of the most culturally and linguistically diverse region in the world. National boundaries, which were established as a part of the transition from colonial rule to independence, cut across older cultural affinities and pre-colonial trade networks. Consequently, official political institutions in the region are weak and the political culture is fluid. Western media attention on the Solomons and the surrounding islands has focused on political turmoil, ethnic divisions and the resilience of aggressive tribal cultures over democratic institutions. However, the chaotic nature of politics in the Pacific Islands is often exaggerated in the media, while the strength of non-state social institutions and indigenous ways of managing cultural difference are rarely picked up on.

Solomon Islands is one of the most troubled nations in the region, having endured civil conflict from 1998 to 2003, which destabilised the state and created economic hardship for the population. However, throughout this period of political turmoil and economic hardship, most Solomon Islanders lived in situations of relative peace and security because of the strength of traditional social institutions and local practices of conflict prevention and reconciliation.  

The conflict in the Solomon Islands was, in part, motivated by ethnic tensions; however, ethnic and cultural difference has not historically been a problem in the region. Solomon Islanders are accustomed to interacting with people from other islands, including people who speak different languages and understand social relationships in

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677 M. Brigg, and R. Bleiker, ‘Introduction’, p.8
679 ibid., p.146
680 ibid., p.147
different ways.\textsuperscript{681} Prior to colonisation, the communities that comprised the Solomon Islands were not isolated from one another. There were dense networks of trade and interaction and cultural exchange. These patterns of exchange and interaction between differentially situated communities continued after the arrival of Europeans. Many Soloman Islanders viewed Europeans as new community of ‘different people’ and they worked to engage them in trade and establish social ties.\textsuperscript{682} The history of accommodation of cultural difference demonstrates that hospitality and pluralism are characteristic of Soloman Islander communities. This legacy has contributed to the relative peace in the region.

The civil war in the Solomon Islands was primarily a conflict between Guadalcanal and Malaita ethnic groups. Despite the hostilities between these two groups, in the past they have lived in relatively peace.\textsuperscript{683} In an analysis provided in \textit{Mediating Across Difference} the authors point out that Guadalcanal and Malaita are not distinct ethnic groups; each is comprised of different language and cultural groups that were not united prior to colonisation. The two groups also share the same Christian faith and there is a long history of interaction and intermarriage between the two groups and the islands they originate from. Many of the combatants who were involved in the conflict had grown up together and were “enemy friends”.\textsuperscript{684} The civil war was not just one conflict, but multiple conflicts involving violence between strangers but also between friends and neighbours. This scenario is not unique to the Solomons. In a number of conflicts in former colonised countries that are characterised as ethnic in nature, tensions and hostilities have emerged over a period of colonial rule when certain ethnic groups were privileged over others.\textsuperscript{685} The fact that ethnic divisions are often created from the top down in the post-colonial world, reinforces the need for a local approach to security and conflict resolution that draws upon primordial traditions of tolerance and pluralism.

Across the Solomon Islands, local approaches to conflict resolution are characterised by pragmatism. When the conflict in the Solomons officially ended in 2003, the process of reconciliation began at the level of the everyday and involved community leaders rather than political elites. Community leaders, with the encouragement of government agencies, have

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{681} D. McDougall and J. Kere, ‘Christianity, custom and law’, p.154
  \item \textsuperscript{682} ibid., p.154
  \item \textsuperscript{683} ibid., p.160
  \item \textsuperscript{684} ibid., p.156
\end{itemize}
been engaged in the process of crafting reconciliation ceremonies since the conflict ended. These ceremonies involved both customary peacemaking exchanges of food and valuables between conflicting groups and Christian rituals that foster forgiveness between victims and perpetrators through prayer. The Christian Church also plays a significant role in conflict resolution in the Solomons. Christianity has shaped how Solomon Islanders tolerate cultural difference and welcome new members into the existing social structure. The influence of the Church can be traced to colonial missionaries. However, imported religious practices in the Solomons have merged with local traditions to form a unique response to conflict prevention and management based on inclusion of all kinds of conflict and problems and all kinds of people. The Christian approach has provided a framework for any person involved in a conflict to be involved in its resolution in an environment in which open dialogue is promoted and different cultures are welcomed.

In addition to peacemaking through prayer, customary dispute settlement is also used as part of the process of reconciliation in the Solomon Islands. Customary methods often involve some kind of material exchange and a re-instantiation of productive relations between distinct groups. Customary dispute resolution is particularly important when social groups have been torn apart, as a result of conflict or through other means, for example, in some communities incest is viewed as symbolically tearing apart kin groups. Communities and kin groups can be reunited through ceremonies that involve the exchange of valuables. Compensation serves as a material sign of the reconciliation and symbolises a ‘covering’ of an offence or an incident; after an offence or incident is ‘covered’ it is not appropriate to speak of it again. This approach to conflict resolution is forward-looking and based on the assumption that social groups need to live and work together.

Methods of security building and conflict resolution in the Solomons provide a good example of the intersection between local and foreign practices and knowledge of conflict resolution as well as the merging of Western and pre-colonial traditions. Both indigenous and exogenous techniques, structures and institutions are used to resolve conflict. Local people are accustomed to adapting existing models to fit intercultural circumstances. This

686 D. McDougall and J. Kere, ‘Christianity, custom and law’, p.160
687 ibid., p.160
688 ibid., p.108
689 ibid., p.115
690 ibid., p.109
mentality applies to encounters between Solomon Islanders as well as new-comers and foreigners. Solomon Islanders are willing to utilise different principles as a part of a flexible approach to conflict resolution and security. This pragmatic approach combined with an openness to foreigners and the accommodation of difference produces a robust security framework.

This chapter has explored the link between security and the everyday. The active promotion of diversity at the level of the everyday enhances the security of individuals and the community as a whole by allowing for plural and hybrid identities to exist. In an urban context, some urban practices and particular uses of public space downplay the value of cultural diversity and actively discourage moral pluralism. The practices of consumption associated with modernity promote the commodification of culture and the intolerance of cultural difference. Recent trends towards the privitisation of security, in particular the emergence of the gated community exacerbate this trend. However, alternative trends involving participation in shared tasks and community safety projects allow individuals and cultural communities to preserve their differences and also participate in collective security building.

There are in-built features of everyday life that make it possible for different groups to co-exist and to be secure in their differences. In an urban setting there is a strong incentive for groups to avoid conflict and isolation because they have to live together in close proximity. It is impossible for residents to know all inhabitants of a city or to feel at home in all of its parts— in this sense everyone is a potential stranger. However, this does not mean that all urban environments are inherently insecure. In the majority of political communities, it cannot be assumed that there are common values, standards or practices that are fixed or beyond contestation. However, when estrangement is recognised as a positive feature of a political society, individuals are encouraged to express their uniqueness from other individuals and resist attempts by a dominant group to assimilate and domesticate the minority.

The process of gating in some modern cities is evidence of social segregation in the city and represents a move towards the privatization of security. Social segregation is a process that results in the detachment of certain individuals and groups from each other and from the broader urban community. It is in this context that fear and suspicion between groups become the dominant way in which individuals relate to each other. Social segregation can be challenged through restoring public space and promoting co-dependence. Furthermore, I have argued in this chapter that local knowledge about security and local methods of conflict resolution are most effective in resolving disputes and restoring confidence and respect between different communities. At the level of the everyday, the sharing and preservation of local knowledge is a vital part of conflict prevention and resolution. However, it is also important for communities to be open to external influences and new ideas in order to establish a robust security framework. A multicultural secure community is more likely to emerge when there is regular and sustained engagement between different communities and when those communities regularly participate in shared tasks. Ethnically mixed communities, in which there is a high degree of interaction between differently situated individuals involves everyday encounters with cultural difference. This is a key part of the process of self-securing.

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**Seven  Spaces of Radical Openness: Security and Spatiality**

The underlying argument of this thesis is that the link between security and identity should be the starting point for reconceptualising an alternative approach to security. This involves privileging the psychological and metaphysical aspects of security over the physical and tangible aspects. However, in the final chapter, I argue that reconceptualising security also needs to acknowledge the role of place and space in the formulation of people’s sense of security and home. In shifting the focus away from the dominant territorial approach, which focuses exclusively on the physical determinants of security, it is vital not to neglect the spatial element. The design and use of space impacts on the pursuit of security and the extent to which individuals feel at home in their socio-cultural environment. Spaces are embedded with meaning and particular moral codes that determine who can access them and how people should behave. In the final chapter I postulate that one possible way in which the ambit of security can be expanded is by privileging the important link between space and identity.

This chapter will explore the lines of connection between the home, the community and public space. I argue that the pathways between the home and the broader community should be recognised as ‘meeting places’—important sites of social interaction and exchange in which individuals can find things in common as well as celebrate their differences. Meeting places provide an opportunity for people to connect and to start to feel comfortable with the differences of the other as well as their own differences.

In the liberal tradition, which underpins the dominant approach to security, it is assumed that a sharp distinction can be drawn between the public and private sphere. Security issues clearly sit within the realm of the public sphere. With this paradigm, the pursuit of security is focused primarily on public institutions and spaces such as the government, the military and the spaces of civil society. Related to this, is the preoccupation with boundary—setting and the attempt to isolate groups of people from one another in order to keep them secure. Security boundaries are set at the national level and they filter right down to the local level. At the level of the neighbourhood, town or village the drawing of boundaries can result in social segregation and an exaggeration of the division between the public and private sphere. In this chapter I argue that social segregation and the retreat away from the public sphere fosters xenophobia and insecurity among both minority and majority groups. As an alternative I argue that we need to open up public spaces, encourage social and cultural integration and recognise the links between the home and the community.
The connection between space and identity has been well-known to urban planners, architects and policy-makers from the time of classical antiquity. Spatiality is an expansive and complex thematic area and it is beyond the scope of the thesis to cover the large body of literature on public space. What is important for this thesis is to recognise that the organisation and of use of space has a direct impact on people’s security. In the process of rethinking security we need to consider how spaces can be reconfigured as inclusive sites that promote diversity. Throughout the thesis I have argued that in order to feel secure people need to be able to express an identity and identify with at least one cultural community. Participation in the public sphere of social and political action is an important part of this. People also need to feel at home in their socio-cultural environment and to be able to impact upon the political culture and character of the society in which they live. In order for this to occur, there needs to be a continuum between the home, the community and the public spaces in which people live, work, consume and socialise.

The public sphere was originally conceived of by liberal theorists as a space in which individuals could put aside their cultural differences and establish the common good through rational argument and deliberation. However, the suppression of cultural difference in the public sphere has hindered the ability of minorities to feel a part of a cultural community and to express themselves in public. We tend to think of culture as something that lifts the individual from mundane everyday practices into spaces of ritualised pleasure and belonging. However, cultural spaces are also sites of control and exclusion that contain images and memories symbolising who belongs in specific spaces and what behavioural codes are expected at the level of the everyday. This has a direct impact on the ability of culture groups to feel secure and at home in their socio-cultural environment.

Public culture is constructed at the level of the everyday— in the streets, shops, parks and workplaces. It evolves and it changes over time as a result of negotiations over who has the right to be in certain spaces and to use them in particular ways. In theory, public spaces are supposed to be open to everybody. They are spaces where all citizens should have a right to discuss issues that affect them and formulate public consensus as a result of discussion and deliberation. However, a critical examination of the history of public space in the modern

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696 S. Zukin, *The Culture of Cities*, p.3
period reveals that only certain groups have had meaningful participation in the liberal public sphere and contributed to political decision-making and the formation of the ‘common good’. When participation in the public sphere hinges on assumptions such as: common values and attributes; and knowledge of liberal politics and democratic practices, certain individuals and groups are marginalised or left out entirely of public discourse. It is also assumed that rationality is exercised in the same way by all humans and can also be used to separate ‘political’ concerns from ‘private’ pursuits, including cultural and religious practices. This raises a fundamental question regarding the relationship between security and public space: Is there a way to broaden the cultural attributes and prerequisites that determine access and participation to the public sphere to enable a wider range of individuals and groups to participate?

Public spaces have been used in the past as a tool to exclude some individuals and groups from the civil and political sphere and to entrench the power of political elites. They have exacerbated the marginality of certain cultural groups and in some cases have made it impossible for marginalised groups to establish a sense of security and home within a political community. It is for this reason that some postmodern and postcolonial scholars have been reluctant to devote a great deal of intellectual energy to the idea of public space as site for progressive politics and new articulations of identity. Postmodern and postcolonial theorists argue that the public sphere is an ideologically charged construct that cannot be separated from the cultural and historical specificity of the European enlightenment. In recent academic debates on globalisation and identity politics, place-based communities have not been given adequate attention because of the current preoccupation with virtual rather than face-to-face relationships. Place-based or localised social movements and forms of community are often assumed to be parochial, defensive and ineffectual in confronting increasingly globalised forms of power and communication. However, it is important to recognise that people’s relationship with place and space shapes their identity.

Throughout the thesis I have argued that we need to promote movement within and between territorial boundaries. Transnational and hybrid identities and global networks, which are a

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700 P. Chatterjee, ‘Response to Taylor’s Modes of Civil Society’, p119
701 D. Harvey, Social Justice and the City, Port Melbourne, Victoria: Edward Arnold, 1975, p.1
product of this movement, challenge the dominant approach to security and our understanding of politics more broadly. However, unlike some theories on globalisation and network society, this thesis does not go as far as to say that transnationalism and network society are the answer to all our security and political dilemmas. It is also unrealistic to assume that the state can simply be replaced with a new form of borderless world society. I am especially conscious of the hyperbole used in relation to the liberatory potential of globalisation in light of R.B.J. Walker’s argument that borders are here to stay. Economic and socio-cultural integration and challenges to state sovereignty have not done away with the need for people to establish boundaries between places and people. Consequently, in this chapter, it will be suggested that re-thinking security is not about eliminating borders altogether or moving beyond place-based identities; rather it is about recognising that the politics and productive encounters that can occur at the border. It is in these sites of encounter and the pathways between public spaces and the private home that new approaches to security are beginning to take hold.

**Home as a site for building individual and collective security**

Within the discourse on security, states and public institutions are the primary sites where security regimes are built and defended, while private sites such as the home are considered apolitical. However, the home is the key site in which individuals develop and maintain their security and sense of identity. In Chapter Two the concept of the modern home was examined as a metaphor and a set of practices that are linked to the pursuit of national security. While the home is a powerful metaphor, it also has an important spatial dimension. Home is generally associated with one or more geographical sites that hold a particular significance in relation to the formation of individual and group identity and the pursuit of security. Under the dominant approach it is associated with the identity of the nation and to a lesser extent to the national majority group living with the national homeland. However, home places can also be used as a part of the pursuit of an alternative approach to security that starts at the level of the individual and the everyday.

The home is a site that links the inside to the outside, the individual to the collective community and individual. In the same way that social identities are shifting, multiple and contradictory, the identity and the character of the home is similarly unstable, changeable and

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subject to interpretation. The particularity of a home is established, in part, by placing boundaries around it and defining it through particular characteristics. However, home places are also defined and identified in relation to other places. As Doreen Massey highlights, places are formed through the connections and processes that link them to the outside world. It is this idea of connection and process that I wish to explore in relation to space and security. People and places connect in a range of diverse ways and the maintenance of connections between places and between people can enhance individual experiences of security.

It is well documented that minority groups have been excluded from the public sphere and conventional political channels and that they have their own historical narratives and that not represented in conventional historical accounts. Consequently, the home is a particularly significant site for marginalised groups. Revisionist historians are beginning to uncover the politics of the home and illustrate that intellectually and intuitively the home is a public and political site as well as a private site of recovery and solace. Through the thesis I have argued that the inability of certain groups to establish a sense of home directly contributes to their marginality and insecurity.

Historically, the economic and social structures that are linked to modern regimes have deprived certain groups of people of their ability to establish a home. For these groups the home has never been a private or secure space. The extent to which political elites have managed to intervene in private spaces and control the home-making practices of minority groups varies from state to state. Modern institutions have also operated to subjugate minorities to service the needs of the dominant national group to varying degrees in different nation states. The South African apartheid regime is one of the most extreme examples of state intervention in the private sphere. The regime systemically attacked and destroyed black African efforts to construct home places and sites where security for community members could be guaranteed. Apartheid was an attack on both the public and private spaces inhabited by black Africans. The regime systemically worked to eliminate the private reality

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703 F. Tonkiss, *Space, the City and Social Theory: Social Relations and Urban Forms*, Cambridge; Malden: Polity, 2005, p.3
705 N. Papastergiadis, ‘Introduction’, p.6
706 b hooks, *Yearning: Race and Gender*, p.4
where African women and men could affirm their identity and feel safe. The invasion of African homes hindered their ability to build relationships in the wider community and to articulate their political needs and aspirations.\textsuperscript{708} There are many other examples of where the home has been the subject of government intervention as a part of the attempt to repress and domesticate minorities. However, in many of the countries where political elites have attempted to control the movements of minorities and intervene in their public and private spaces, the home has served as a crucial site for organising and forming political solidarity and challenging existing power structures.

Home places are sites of resistance and political activism. However, they are also private spaces of refuge and regeneration in which minorities can recover from experiences of oppression and start to rebuild a sense of security by connecting with others and sharing experiences. For groups who have been marginalised and oppressed in their national homeland or their local community, the restoration of homely spaces is an important part of building a sense of individual and collective security. African-American sociologist, bell hooks, argues that the home plays a vital role in resisting racism and colonialism and in rebuilding a sense of identity for marginalized groups.\textsuperscript{709} In the official historical accounts of major conflicts including wars, anti-colonial struggles, and civil disputes, the significance of the home has been downplayed or ignored entirely. Historians are now beginning to uncover the importance of the home as an individual and communal site of resistance. In a contemporary context, the home continues to serve as a space in which minorities can restore their dignity and develop a sense of solidarity with others.\textsuperscript{710}

The second chapter of the thesis explored the disparity between the theoretical conception of the modern home— as a stable, safe and nurturing space— and the reality of home as a space of hierarchy and subjugation in a modern society. This disparity between the metaphor and the reality of the modern home is particularly pronounced in a colonial setting. The experience of home for victims of colonisation has never been defined by a sense of safety, enclosure and protection from the other. According to hooks, the meaning and experience of ‘home’ is very different for those who have been colonised in contrast to members of a dominant group that carried out imperial activities.\textsuperscript{711} During the period of formal

\textsuperscript{708} A. J. King, \textit{Domestic Service}, p.23
\textsuperscript{709} b. hooks, \textit{Yearning, Race, Gender}, p.43
\textsuperscript{710} \textit{ibid.}, p.41
\textsuperscript{711} \textit{ibid.}, p.3
colonisation, local culture was threatened by imperial powers and invaded to varying degrees, for colonised peoples, the boundaries of home have been ambiguous and changeable since the time of colonisation.\textsuperscript{712} For those groups living in the colonies, there was no time or physical barrier between the coloniser and the colonised.

For many Europeans, the experience of colonialism involved a distant and indirect encounter with difference and the other. It was an encounter that, for the most part, provided no threat to the established order or the European home and the sense of safety and enclosure associated with the home. From the point of view of colonised populations, however, home has never been associated with enclosure, privacy and isolation from the other. Rather, the encounter with the other was, and still is, ‘immediate and intense’ and the boundaries between public and private are fluid. Colonial fiction writer Dorris Lessing argues that the experience of colonisation also impacted upon settler communities and the construction of their sense of home and identity. White settler communities were anxious about the ambiguities and changeability of their concept of home and security. Furthermore, they were constantly defending their sense of home and entitlement and were trying to establish clearly defined borders around the colonised population. The experience of colonisation suggests that home has always been an open and public and inherently political site that must be continuously defended and redefined in response to external influences.\textsuperscript{713} Home places are not sites that can be sheltered or protected from the other or the encounter with difference.\textsuperscript{714} This does not mean that it is inherently insecure; rather it suggests that we should invite the other into the home and recognise that home is a process that involves creating a pathway between the public and private.

The conception of home as an open-ended process has relevance beyond the formal period of colonisation. For many people the experience of modern life, in the West in the former colonised countries has made it difficult to identify where home is and what its exact significance is. In the late modern period, some people have experienced an extreme sense of alienation and estrangement from living in places with overlapping and flexible borders in which the encounter with difference is more regular and immediate.\textsuperscript{715} While the steady

\textsuperscript{713} D. Massey, ‘Place called Home’, p.10
\textsuperscript{714} \textit{ibid.}, p.9
\textsuperscript{715} \textit{ibid.}, p.12
increase in migration, travel and economic and social integration in the last decade has made some people less attached to home as a singular site it has not done away with the concept entirely. The majority of people still have a need to establish some sense of permanence and feeling of being at home in order to feel secure. Even for those who have not moved or been directly affected, globalisation has prompted the re-assessment of what it means to be at home in the contemporary age. Indeed, for some groups who are largely immobile, their reaction to globalisation has been to re-enforce and defend their traditional sense of home and reinstate borders. Consequently, I have argued throughout the thesis that we cannot do away with the metaphor of home entirely; rather we should focus on moving beyond the modern conception of home and recognise that home-making practices are diverse and ongoing.

While home serves as a site of solace and refuge it must be connected to the broader social environment. I argued in the previous chapter that local approaches to conflict resolution and security should be privileged over expert external knowledge. An important part of building security from the bottom up involves building and maintaining communities through shared experiences and interdependence.

**Getting to know the neighbours: social integration and collective security building**

The pursuit of modern nationalism is based on the attempt to create cohesive and homogenous communities. However, as I have established in previous chapters communities are inherently diverse and fractured. The differences between individuals living in a community are particularly pronounced in an urban setting. Within an urban community it is likely that there will always be signs of the unfamiliar, the strange, and the incomprehensible. In large cities it can be difficult to distinguish ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ inhabitants from others who have moved to the city. There are often groups in the city with a long historical connection to particular sites and to sources of socio-economic and political power. However, these groups must also compete with new groups that impact upon the public and political culture of the city.  

Resilient and secure communities are more likely to emerge when there is a degree of mutual dependence between members. For example, in multi-ethnic cities such as Berlin, the ability to engage in business requires cosmopolitan competencies in order to establish a sense of financial and socio-economic security. Adopting an ethic of openness towards difference is

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not always a choice made voluntarily by individuals; rather it is socially produced and enacted by individuals as a means to capitalize on economic and social opportunities. Even when individuals are forced to encounter difference, mutual respect between differentially situated individuals is more likely to emerge. Being attune to cultural difference is an important skill in business. Indeed, according to Antoine Pecoud, the practices performed in local, ordinary times and spaces are often the primary sites where everyday cosmopolitanism takes its form in many contemporary cities. Pecoud draws from the cosmopolitan practices of German-Turkish entrepreneurs in Berlin to demonstrate that developing a set of skills for intercultural dialogue is an important part of the pursuit of economic and social security at the level of the everyday. Cosmopolitanism in business is a two-way process; global capital seeks out new markets and new opportunities and at the same time, ethnic minority entrepreneurs display cosmopolitan tendencies and skills in order to widen their range of clients and expand into new markets. Although these exchanges are of an economic nature they help to foster a degree of interdependence and mutual understanding between groups differentially situated groups. In this sense they can be viewed as a part of the process of self-securing.

Processes of urbanisation place individuals from different cultural backgrounds in a setting in which they must live and work closely together. However, urban communities are not naturally harmonious or unified even if there is a degree of interdependence between different communities. James Donald, in his book, *Imagining the Modern City*, argues that the city should be imagined as a space of community in which encounters between differently situated groups take place. However, he cautions that the city is also a potential site of aggression and conflict between communities. As a result of the fear of the difference of the other, members of urban communities often experience feelings of insecurity, alienation and estrangement because they are forced to live in such close proximity to others. Contemporary urban societies are comprised of individuals and groups who share little in common other than the urban spaces they inhabit and the opportunities and resources they are competing for. However, strong bonds of community that cut across cultural differences can

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718 ibid., p.16
719 ibid., p.17
720 J. Donald, *Imagining the Modern City*, p.135
721 ibid., p.136
emerge in an urban context.\textsuperscript{722} This is, in part, because in the city individuals are often liberated from parochial forms of community that restrict their ability to identify with multiple communities and to be socially mobile.\textsuperscript{723} Thus, urbanisation can encourage individuals to establish links to other communities and to feel a part of a broader community whilst also maintaining links to their original communities.

Leoni Sandercock argues that intercultural exchange and social integration occurs first and foremost, in the spaces of the ‘micro-public’. The micro-public is the area or a series of spaces of public urban life in which different groups are forced to negotiate and engage in dialogue for the purpose of resource sharing, business and solving common problems.\textsuperscript{724} When strangers from different cultural groups encounter each other on a regular basis in the public sphere they are more likely to view security as a collective problem that must be managed by the whole society. Micro-publics are shared spaces in which strangers encounter each other on a regular basis in social, economic and cultural encounters.\textsuperscript{725} In political communities that are conflict ridden, public spaces tend to be territorialised by particular groups and differentiated along the lines of class, ethnicity or age. They can also become spaces that people only frequent in transit to avoid contact with one another.\textsuperscript{726} In political communities with a high degree of interaction between different cultural groups, individuals are thrown together in the spaces of the micro-public spaces in situations where they complete shared tasks, solve problems on a collective level and work towards common goals.\textsuperscript{727} As a part of this process, urban inhabitants come to realise their common fate as well as their mutual estrangement. In the spaces of the micro-public, communities are also exposed to alternative visions and practical ways of living and being in common. This is a form of collective security building from the bottom up that enables cultural groups to preserve their differences and recognise the right of others to do the same.

In an environment in which ethnic groups communicate on a regular basis there is a greater incentive for conflicts to be mediated in a peaceful way because groups have an interest in future cooperation. This is not to suggest that conflict never emerges in ethnically mixed

\textsuperscript{722} N. Ellin, \textit{Integral Urbanism}, New York: Routledge, 2006, p.4
\textsuperscript{723} ibid. p.4
\textsuperscript{724} L. Sandercock, \textit{Cosmopolis 2}, p.94
\textsuperscript{725} L. Sandercock, ‘Cosmopolitan Urbanism’, p.44
\textsuperscript{727} L. Sandercock, \textit{Cosmopolis 2}, p.95
neighbourhoods. However, when individuals are placed in situations in which they need to cooperate with differently situated individuals, methods of self-securing are likely to emerge. Sandercock develops the argument that cooperation and co-dependence are forms of self-securing with reference to a Community Fire Station in Handsworth, (Birmingham, U.K). At this fire station, Britons work alongside Asian and Afro-Caribbean Britons on a range of projects designed to enhance public safety. The regular interaction between the different communities helps individuals overcome their xenophobia and move beyond negative stereotypes about the other. By completing shared tasks and solving shared problems, differently situated individuals learn to respect and cooperate with one another.

Community projects, such as the building of a fire station can result in changes in attitude and behaviour towards the other. This example demonstrates that cooperation and the completion of shared tasks of mutual benefit are forms of community security-building. Community security-building projects emphasise that security should be pursued in cooperation with others rather than in isolation from others. Community security-building involves designing public places, facilities and local institutions in which daily interactions between differently situated individuals can occur. When individuals have a reason to engage and cooperate, cultural differences can be mediated through lived experiences and mutual interdependence. The types of spaces in which this meaningful engagement can occur are often not recognised under the dominant approach to security as ‘political’ or ‘public’ spaces. Urbanisation creates an environment in which individuals are more likely to encounter difference on a daily basis. However, this does not mean that cities are automatically more tolerant or cosmopolitan places. In some cases modern cities have sharpened differences between cultures and classes because of the way they are planned and used. In extreme cases this has resulted in urban segregation and increased conditions of insecurity for both minority and majority groups. In the next section I explore the consequences of social segregation and the attempt by individuals to create a safe home by cutting themselves off from others and avoiding confrontation with cultural difference.

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729 L. Sandercock, Cosmopolis 2, p.95
730 ibid., p.95
731 ibid., p.94
Urban spaces of exclusion: Gated communities and the retreat from public space

The modern city is a site that is constituted through the interplay between spaces and imaginations. As urban residents confront the experiences of the everyday, through the construction and consumption of public culture, they remake the city and their own identities in various ways.\(^7\) Thus, it is both the real and the imagined social environment in which the political is expressed through a series of practices and everyday encounters.\(^8\) Within a city specific sites and spaces will be identified as ‘safe’ by some people and ‘unsafe’ by other people. These labels develop as a result of the lived experiences of different groups; however, they are also a product of perception and imagination. The meaning attached to particular places and spaces in the city shapes individual experience and impacts upon their ability to feel safe and at home in the urban environment.

The design of modern cities can create new forms of marginality and exacerbate some existing social divisions. Marginalised groups in an urban setting including: homeless people, migrants, homosexuals, the mentally ill have been confined to periphrastic spaces in the city. These groups are viewed as a threat to the security and comfort of the middle classes. In the city, periphrastic spaces are generally areas of social and economic disadvantage with an inferior standard of public amenity and infrastructure. In earlier chapters of the thesis it was highlighted that increases in migration, in particular from former colonised countries to highly developed countries, has changed the demographic composition of industrialised societies. ‘Others’ are venturing outside of their designated periphrastic space into dominant public spaces and sites of political and social action. Consequently, ‘political life’ often fails to take place where it is supposed to and ‘political subjects’ often fail to act in the way they are supposed to. In response to being excluded from the public spaces in the city some minority groups have established their own spaces in which their identities and cultural idiosyncrasies can be expressed. As a result, cultural difference has become a more visible feature of many modern cities.


\(^8\) H. Lefebvre, *Product of Space*, p.86
It is important to note that not all minority groups have responded to cultural discrimination by resisting and creating alternative public spaces.\textsuperscript{734} In some cases, the hegemony of the dominant political group has made it impossible for minority groups to express themselves in public and this has impacted directly on their sense of security. When cultural or religious discrimination threatens the security of minority groups some individuals within that group attempt to conceal their cultural and religious differences in public or reject their affiliation with the marginalised community to resist discrimination. Returning to the example of the ban of the \textit{hijab} in France in public spaces, it is telling that many Muslim women and girls opted not to wear the \textit{hijab} even before the introduction of the official ban for fear of religious discrimination and harassment because of the anti-Muslim sentiment in France.\textsuperscript{735} The decline in the number of women wearing the \textit{hijab} was cited by the French government as evidence that the nation was more cohesive and secure and that the assimilation policy was a success. However, the decrease can also be linked to the fear felt by Muslim women of a backlash and discrimination in public settings such as the workforce, the school and the street. When members of a minority group attempt to downplay their association with the group often the overall social perception of the group deteriorates and the insecurity of the group as a whole is exacerbated.

In liberal democratic theory security is conceived of as a public good that should be pursued collectively for the benefit of the political community as a whole. However, in reality security is increasingly linked to the ability of individuals to be able to pay for personal protection or to be associated with a private space or network that provides protection. As a result of change demographics and the perception that cities are becoming increasingly unsafe large numbers of people are retreating from public space. The privatisation of security places individuals in a competitive social and economic environment in which security is perceived of as a personal rather than a collective pursuit and spaces are designed for private rather than communal use. Throughout this thesis I have argued that individuals are the most important referent of security; however, this does not mean security should be pursued privately in isolation from others and the broader socio-cultural environment. The privatisation of


\textsuperscript{735} J. R. Bowen, \textit{Why the French don't like headscarves}, p.11
security and the retreat from public spaces has implications for the security of marginalised and dominant groups.

Throughout Western liberal states, and in some parts of the ex-colonial world, individuals are retreating further and further into the private and enclosed spaces in response to the perceived threat of others—be it neighbours, a particular sub-section of a local or nation community or other nationalities, culture and religious groups.\(^{736}\) This is a part of the attempt to secure the home and shelter oneself from the encounter with difference at the local, national and global level. In order to protect the privacy and perceived security of the home, individuals are using a wider range of personal security methods and are relying less and less on the state and local authorities. Consequently, we have witnessed a decline in the use of public spaces, the privatisation of certain public spaces and the increase in the use of private security methods. When certain classes and groups of people retreat into the private sphere, a generalised “fear of the city” is propagated that increases xenophobia and tensions between different groups. This fear, coupled with a growing scepticism of the ability of state and local authorities to protect the citizenry and maintain social order, results in the privatisation of security.\(^{737}\)

The most extreme example of the privatisation of security and the retreat from public space is the emergence of gated communities.\(^{738}\) The ‘gated community’, or what Zygmunt Bauman refers to as a ‘voluntary ghetto’ is a manifestation of urban xenophobia and an attempt by the middle class to take security into their own hands.\(^{739}\) Gated communities are privately policed residential developments that restrict public access through the use of gates, fences, booms, walls, private security guards and CCTV surveillance systems. They are generally luxury housing estates built on the urban fringe away from parts of a city that are highly developed and densely populated. Houses in these developments are enclosed by a wall with guarded entry points.\(^{740}\) Gated communities often contain facilities such as shopping malls, schools, hospitals and even universities. These amenities are provided to make the gated community self-contained as possible and to reduce the need for residents to leave the community.\(^{741}\)

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\(^{739}\) Z. Bauman, *Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*, p.116
\(^{741}\) *ibid.*, vi
boundaries of the gated community are also enforced through a set of legal agreements that include a code of conduct, building regulations and restrictions on entry and exit of the development. The design of the estates as well as the rules and regulations that govern their use, forms a part of the residential arrangement to control the mobility of visitors and provide reassurance to inhabitants that their neighbourhood is safe.

The emergence of gated communities is part of a broader trend of private decision-making and private expenditure on security that has wide public ramifications. Mike Davis, in his analysis of gated communities in Los Angeles, argues that gated communities can, in part, be attributed to the belief that ‘security [is] a positional good … [and] has less to do with personal safety than with the degree of personal insulation … from “unsavoury” groups’. The process of gating can be linked to a trend occurring in some cities where the urban elite are turning away from wider urban problems and responsibilities to focus exclusively on the protection of their own homes and way of life. By living in a gated community, urban elites attempt to create a ‘weightless’ experience of the urban environment in which they are not plagued or threatened by the problems of other groups. The gated community, in theory, allows for a seamless transition between their ‘secure’ private homes to their ‘secure’ workplaces, schools and leisure destinations. This is based on the presumption that security is a privilege rather than a public good that can be purchased by the rich and denied to those with fewer resources.

The extensive effort made by elites to isolate themselves from other classes and cultures in the city does not enhance the security of those individuals or the urban community as a whole. Longitudinal studies of gated communities in the United States and the United Kingdom indicate there is no difference in crime rates between gated and non-gated communities. However, of greater importance than actual statistics on crime and safety for our purposes, is the evidence suggesting that personal perceptions of safety and security generally decreases once a person moves into an gated estate. Residents who live inside a gated community often see themselves as potential targets of crime because they are living in

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743 M. Davis, City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, London: Verso, 1990, p.244
an area with a high concentration of personal wealth. Furthermore, living inside an estate fosters xenophobia and mistrust because individuals are less likely to move around and parts of the city and the surrounding social environment become unknown quantities.\textsuperscript{747} This paranoia prevents residents from moving outside of their gated community; as such they are left to imagine what dangers and threats might lurk beyond the estate in the form of people, places and practices. Gated communities are designed to enhance personal security, however, in reality; living in a gated community increases the sense of insecurity experienced by the urban elite and does nothing to protect them against threats to their physical safety and well-being. Furthermore, it increases the marginalisation of the lower classes and other cultural minorities that struggle to access political power and generate social capital.

The spatial withdrawal of the elite from the broader urban society has a detrimental impact on low-income and marginalised groups who have limited or no choice over where they live and work. These groups are also more reliant on the city’s public infrastructure such as housing, transport and community facilities. The social and residential segregation of elites has a range of negative effects on marginalised groups including; the reduction of opportunities for work, increased concentrations of deprivation and homelessness, greater vulnerability to economic downturns and isolation from jobs, public services and schools.\textsuperscript{748} The segregation of urban elite accelerates the spread of poverty in cities and can lead to the clustering of individuals along ethnic lines in ways that exclude certain groups from education and employment.\textsuperscript{749} This fosters resentment among the lower classes and increases the likelihood that particular places will become targets for crime.\textsuperscript{750}

The idea that there is a mutual obligation between local governments and individual inhabitants to maintain the city’s infrastructure and work collectively to create a secure environment is challenged by the emergence of gated communities and social segregation. In liberal democratic theory security is conceived of as a collective good that local authorities and citizens have a responsibility to uphold. Gated communities have their own private arrangements for fiscal organisation and revenue; as such they are not reliant on local government or national resources and infrastructure. This arrangement means that urban

\textsuperscript{747} G. Wilson-Doenges, ‘Explanation of sense of community’, p.600
\textsuperscript{748} E. J. Balkey and M. G. Snyder, \textit{Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States}, Washington DC and Cambridge: Brooklings Institution Press, 1997, ii
\textsuperscript{749} \textit{ibid.}, ix
elites can ‘opt out’ of municipal provisions and their responsibility for wider urban problems while those who cannot afford a user-pays system are left with the remnants of declining public spaces.\footnote{J. E. Balkey and M. G. Snyder, \textit{Fortress America}, xv}

When the middle and upper classes move into gated communities the quality of life for people living outside the gates often deteriorates because there are fewer resources available and the city’s public spaces and infrastructure is left to deteriorate. Guy Thuillier’s study of gated communities on the fringes of Buenos Aires illustrates this point.\footnote{G. Thuillier, ‘Gated communities in Buenos Aires’, p.67} Up until the late 1980s in Buenos Aires, the majority of middle class people lived in apartment blocks located in the hub of city. City life was characterised by public activity, busy streets, cultural events, shops and cafes.\footnote{Ibid., p.67} In the late 1980s, the upper and middle classes began to move out of the inner city and into gated estates located on the urban fringes. The popularity of the inner city lifestyle steadily decreased among the elite, consequently, the vibrant city culture of Buenos Aires deteriorated during this time. The inner city housing blocks and public spaces (parks, gardens and public facilities) became run-down and in some cases deserted or used for alternative illicit purposes.\footnote{Ibid., p.68} Inhabitants of the gated community were provided with an alternative public life and community facilities within the gated community, hence had no vested interest in maintaining the city’s public spaces. As segregation increased, so did the perception that the city’s public spaces were unsafe and dangerous because they were inhabited by people from working class backgrounds and there was an increased risk of cultural and class intermixing.

The number and size of gated communities in Buenos Aires has steadily increased since the early 1990s to the extent that there are an estimated 500 developments surrounding the city.\footnote{S. Roitman, ‘Who segregates whom?’, p.117} Sonia Roitman analyses a particular gated community called Palmares, located in the Argentinean metropolitan area of Mendoza, to demonstrate the impact of social segregation on the residents of the gated community as well as the residents of the surrounding areas.\footnote{S. Roitman, ‘Who segregates whom?’, p.121} She interviews residents and workers of Palmares as well as a diverse range of residents from outside the estates. In the interviews conducted by Roitman, seventy per cent of interviewees stated that their primary reason for moving to a gated community was the increase in crime in
the city. The interviewees commented that Buenos Aires had developed into an unsafe city plagued by violence, social unrest and street crime.

Interestingly, the residents of the surrounding poorer neighbourhoods also expressed a desire to ‘close’ their suburbs even though they could not afford to live in a gated community. This suggests that the lack of faith in public authorities to keep the city safe was a view commonly held by all classes. It also demonstrates that urban segregation can have a ripple effect and create a situation where people from different backgrounds who used to live together suddenly feel the need to live separately. Living in a gated community, is partly about the perceived increase in physical protection, however, it is also an attempt by urban elites to preserve the cultural identity and class status. In this sense it is a part of their pursuit of cultural security. One of the residents interviewed by Roitman states: “if I say I live in Palmares, I am rich and happy, without problems and this brings a bit of envy”. Roitman’s interviews revealed that the residents of the Palmares typecast people living in the surrounding neighbourhood as poor, uncivilised and more likely to commit crime. Conversely, from the outside the gates of Palmares, residents of the surrounding neighbourhood view the elite as exclusive, indulgent and exploitative of other classes. The creation of boundaries in the city between classes and cultures increase xenophobia and feelings of insecurity among dominant and marginalised groups.

In re-thinking our approach to security at the level of the everyday political elites, urban planners and city dwellers must work together to rediscover the value of ‘the social’. This process could start by linking security building to community building. There is a substantial amount of work to be done in this area to promote social integration and the regeneration of public space as a part of the pursuit of security. However, some of the literature emerging on resilient communities and alternative approaches to community development suggest that scholars are beginning to link individual security and wellbeing to the strength of the community and the quality of shared resources and public spaces. There is also evidence that some communities are taking steps to integrate with other communities and develop and maintain public spaces. Collective action to mitigate the effects of climate change and shift

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757 S. Roitman, ‘Who segregates whom?, p.121
758 ibid., p.122
759 ibid., p.123
towards sustainable resources has been particularly effective in some cities as a method of collective security building. The way that people live together—the way they are housed and the way they socialise and consume—is a key determinant of the security of the community and the individuals within that community.

Gated communities are becoming more prevalent in some cities; however there are also examples of mixed residential communities that can be linked to the collective pursuit of security. Studies of mixed class and cultural communities in the United Kingdom suggest that housing developments inhabited by residents with varied incomes and cultural backgrounds are sustainable and can reduce socio-economic disadvantage. Mixed residential communities have been established in various parts of the United Kingdom in areas that were previously all public or social housing and typically disadvantaged. A study conducted by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation of three mixed communities in the United Kingdom concluded that people living in mixed tenure and income housing developments see their neighbours as “ordinary people” who they can identify with even though they occupy different social worlds.\footnote{Mixed Communities: Success and Sustainability', Joseph Rowntree Foundation, March, 2006, p.2} The study revealed that tenure mix, including owner occupiers, private renters and public housing tenants, can improve the desirability of living in an area that was previously viewed as dangerous because it was exclusively public or social housing.\footnote{ibid., p.4} An important part of creating successful mixed communities is the provision of a high quality physical environment and the provision of a range of local services. This links back to my point earlier in the thesis that private homes need to be connected to the broader socio-cultural environment in order for individuals to feel secure.

Mixed residential communities are also evolving in the Australian city of Melbourne where there a number of innovative residential housing projects combine owner-occupied housing with private rental and public housing. These apartment blocks and townhouses bring different classes and cultures together in an environment in which feeling at home and secure is linked to engagement in the broader community. In these mixed-use residential developments individuals are encouraged to use shared public spaces such as community gardens and sport facilities. This contributes to the development of a sense of community and interdependence between residents, as owners and renters share common resources and work towards shared goals such as sustainability, public safety and the maintenance of public

\footnote{Mixed Communities: Success and Sustainability', Joseph Rowntree Foundation, March, 2006, p.2} \footnote{ibid., p.4}
amenities. The popularity of gated communities coincided with many people leaving the city to buy larger houses to increase their private space. However, mixed residential communities have attracted some residents back to the cities by creating high-quality housing and sustainable neighbourhoods in the inner city with access to public spaces. The rejuvenation of the city and its public spaces in an important part of re-thinking security as a process of ‘place-making’ rather than just building houses and protecting individuals.

In an urban context social segregation has consequences for the pursuit of individual and collective security and we must work towards social integration as a part of re-thinking modern security. However, the consequences of social segregation and the privatisation of security are even more pronounced in a rural setting when resources are generally scarce and changes to the composition of a community or culture is likely to have a greater impact on the individuals living in that community. With the predominant focus on globalisation and people who move in pursuit of economic, social and cultural opportunities, those who stay behind are often neglected in contemporary political analysis. The next section raises some important questions about the plight of rural people and suggests that they should be included in the process of re-thinking security.

Urban/Rural Divide: considering the plight of those who don’t move

Throughout the thesis I have focused on people who move and how this is linked to their pursuit of security and home. Increasing numbers of people are moving from the country to the city, particularly in developing countries. There are a variety of reasons for this, however, overwhelmingly people move in pursuit of economic opportunities from areas where farming and agrarian practices are unsustainable. Farming populations in developing nations, and in some developed nations such as Australia, have been forced to move into the city as a result of the push to industrialise and grow cities as part of the global development agenda. The growing flow of people between rural and urban areas is accompanied by the flow of goods, money, waste and information—resulting in uneven development and increased conditions of insecurity and uncertainty for rural populations.

A significant amount of research has been conducted on uneven development and it is clear that the benefits of industrialisation have not spread to rural areas where the large majority of

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764 C. Tacoli, ‘Beyond the rural-urban divide’, *Environment and Urbanisation*, vol.10, no.1, April, 1998, p.3
people in developing countries still live. Conditions of insecurity are particularly pronounced in countries such as China and India where there are pockets of economic growth centred around cities and urban hubs. The issues associated with the rural/urban divide are increasingly recognised as central in processes of social, economic and cultural development. However, despite this focus, the significance of rural-urban interactions is often downplayed or ignored entirely in the development of social and economic policy. Furthermore, the economic hardship and the associated problems in rural areas are generally perceived of as development or environmental problems rather than security issues.

In a number of developing countries economic policy has an urban bias because of the strong internal and external push to industrialise. This results in differential wages, taxes and uneven terms of trade for rural and urban sectors. National governments generally favour the urban sector over the rural sector owing to the political power of urban-dwellers. Urban-dwellers constitute a minority in most developing countries; however, they exercise a degree of influence over government policy which is disproportionate to their numbers. The disparity between urban and rural populations is exacerbated in some countries because governments deliberately redirect resources away from rural areas and agrarian populations to accelerate industrialisation. The sharp division between the urban and rural is another example of boundary setting whereby a false dichotomy is created that exacerbates the insecurity of marginalised peoples and simplifies the complexity of rural-urban interactions. Political authorities in developing nations use a range of institutional, social and economic policy tools to compartmentalise countries into rural and urban sectors. This leads to a sharp division socially and economically between the city and country and the creation of a dual economy.

When large numbers of people flock to the cities to pursue economic opportunities, the security of both those who move and those who stay at home is affected. Those who move to the city often struggle to find housing, access services and establish socio-cultural networks in cities that are often receiving labour at a rate they cannot absorb. In some cases national governments control migration to the cities by restricting the settlement of rural people to ensure their migration is of a temporary nature. Those who stay at home generally have fewer resources and struggle to generate income from traditional sources. Most commonly it is

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766 ibid., p.339
767 C. Tacoli, C., ‘Beyond the rural-urban divide’, p.3
women and children who remain in the village and their capacity to sustain an economic livelihood is reliant on remittances. While the economic livelihood of some people in rural areas has increased because of the use of remittances, overall security has decreased as a result of economic liberalisation and the government bias towards urban-dwellers. For example, in large parts of the countryside in China where migration is extensive, social and economic life has been significantly disrupted. In China and other developing countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe some rural areas have changed to the point of being unrecognisable as a result of the movement of workers into the cities. As I have argued throughout the thesis, the ability to feel at home and secure is linked to the broader socio-cultural environment—when that environment undergoes radical change individuals must re-establish their sense of home and security even if they have not moved.

Large-scale industrialisation and development projects such as mining, dam projects and forestry, have adverse impacts on rural populations in the developing world. It is well documented that the activities of multinational corporations and some development institutions across the developing world— from the clearing of the Amazon to dam projects in Southeast Asia— have caused widespread dislocation and dispossession of tribal, nomadic and Indigenous peoples. These are often the most marginal people within the rural population whose survival is linked to access to natural resources and geographical sites. The consequences of these large scale projects have been analysed as part of environmental impact assessments or economic evaluations. However, they have rarely been analysed from a human security perspective. As a result of dispossession and resource scarcity, violence and human rights abuses have increased in certain rural areas. Violence in cities is widely reported because of the impact that is has on large numbers of people and infrastructure. However, violence in the country often goes unreported or is considered to be necessary ‘collateral damage’ as a part of industrialisation. In some cases, violence is carried out by the state against rural populations who attempt to resist mining explorations and other foreign impositions that destroy or radically disrupt their local environment. Recent reports of police brutality and human rights abuses against protestors in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea

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769 *ibid.*, p.377
highlight the need to analyse the activities of multinational corporations and development institutions from a human security perspective.  

As a part of a broader development agenda, initiatives in some developing countries have placed a high priority on agriculture and rural development, based on the assumption that this will help address rural poverty. However, in many cases the main beneficiaries have been successful farmers and wealthy or well-connected businesses. Other development initiatives target assistance in rural areas by identifying ‘poor households’ and providing cash handouts to selected households. The direct transfer of cash to identified households can inadvertently create new social divisions between the aid recipients and the rest of the community. While the identified households may be ‘richer’ in monetary terms they are often more marginalised because they become disconnected from their social networks and are reliant on a private source of funds rather than shared resources. Furthermore, despite the efforts by aid practitioners to explain why certain households are deemed eligible to receive transfers while others are not, a sense of puzzlement and unfairness about the selection process can often persist in rural communities, creating further divisions and resentment within the community. The success of large-scale as well as so called ‘grass roots’ development projects in rural areas has been hindered by the failure to recognise the complexity of rural interactions which involve spatial as well as cultural and sectoral dimensions.

Attempts to develop and stimulate growth in the urban sector have generally failed to acknowledge the complexity of rural/urban interactions and have entrenched a sharp division between the city and the country. As a part of re-thinking the plight of rural people who are often marginalised under the current approach we need to recognise the patterns of interaction and exchange between the city and the country. ‘Urban’ and ‘rural’ are not clear-cut spaces or sectors. For example the ‘urbanisation’ of certain rural economies and employment structures demonstrates that the economic practices associated with cities can also be successful in cities. The temporary migration of workers from the country to the city

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771 J. Knight and L. Song, Rural/Urban Divide, p.3
772 F. Ellis, ‘We are all poor here: economic difference, social divisiveness and targeting cash transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Paper prepared for the Conference: Social Protection for the Poorest in Africa: Learning from Experience, Uganda 8-10 September 2008
also blurs the division between rural and urban space as households may be multi-spatial, with some family members residing in rural areas and others in towns. Households may also engage in agriculture within urban areas or in non-farming activities in rural areas.\(^{773}\)

Re-thinking security needs to consider the situation of rural people who choose not to or cannot move to pursue economic and social security. Some of the alternative approaches to rural development which are focused on building sustainable farming communities by combining market practices with local knowledge about community and the environment are a step in the right direction. As a part of broadening the scope of the security discourse to include marginalised groups we need to devise specific policies and initiatives to build rural communities. In essence, we need to consider the situation of those who stay behind as well those who move and recognise that both groups of people are affected by policies and initiatives designed to sharpen the boundary between urban and rural.

**Politics at the border: From sites of separation to ‘meeting spaces’**

It is important to examine how and why particular spaces create opportunities for a wide range of individuals and groups to articulate their cultural identity while other spaces are exclusive and create conditions of insecurity for marginalised groups. All cultural communities and social movements are embedded in historically and geographically specific contexts. Consequently it is vital to analyse the way that public spaces are used on a case by case basis and to recognise that they are constantly produced and reproduced through social relations and practices.\(^{774}\) As I established earlier in the chapter places are constructed from the exercise of power and resistance and through continuous social contestation; as such they are dynamic and characterised by disorder rather than order.\(^{775}\) While places are often characterised by disorder and instability they also provide an arena for different groups to express an identity and identify as a part of a community.

A number of scholars have highlighted the radical potential of spaces that are created and inhabited by marginal groups. I would like to take this argument further to suggest that marginal spaces are productive sites for the articulation of an alternative security politics because they allow for alternative articulations of identity. Marginal spaces function as a

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\(^{773}\)C. Tacoli, ‘Beyond the rural-urban divide’ p.3  
\(^{775}\)ibid, p.61
meeting ground for a diverse range of local, national, and transnational actors who share the condition of marginality but often share little else in common. Homi Bhabha, refers to these radical spaces as ‘third spaces’. Third spaces are ‘in-between’ transnational spaces in which the articulation of culture goes beyond national boundaries. Jiemin Bao builds upon this definition by suggesting that the ‘third space’ is not just theoretical; it is created in, and by, social practices. Third spaces exist at a crossroads of ideology, discipline and action. In these spaces, marginalised groups are encouraged to reflect upon the multiple influences and locations that contribute to their construction of identity and community. The identities that are formed in these third spaces reject modern dichotomies such as: foreign/local, inside/outside, public/private and strange/familiar. Members of a community formed in a marginal space often develop hybrid identities and engage in everyday practices that reflect the shifting political and economic structures and as well as shifting identities.

A significant portion of this thesis is dedicated to examining patterns of movement across borders. I have argued that we need to acknowledge the importance of transnational movements in providing security and a source of identity and sense of home for an increasing number of people across the globe. However, it is also vital to acknowledge that interactions across borders and deterritorialised forms of identity and community have not replaced the need for borders and place-based identities entirely. R. B. J. Walker argues that modern political life has thrived on the creation of very sharp borders between places and people. The territorial and ideological borders of the modern state and the system of states have enormous influence on the way that political communities are established and maintained and the way that individuals see their place in the world. According to Walker:

*Differences and antagonisms have thrived in many settings but the highly structured patterns of differential and always potential antagonisms expressed at the constitutive and*

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779 ibid., p.19
780 R. B. J. Walker, *After the globe*, p.32


regulative limits of modern politics are quite striking, both for the aspirations they express and for the dangers they invite.\(^{781}\)

In this statement Walker acknowledges that modernity is sustained through the construction of borders and limits between people and places. While this system is artificially constructed it is also based on a very common human tendency to define ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘here and there’ and ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’.

In the literatures on globalisation, cosmopolitanism and human rights a number of scholars have called for a move from ‘international relations’ to ‘world politics’—a political field situated outside the existing system of states that is devoid of borders between people and places. However, the most important lines of demarcation in contemporary political life are those inscribed spatially between the territorial jurisdictions of sovereign states. As much as we may aspire to move beyond the boundaries of the territorial state, these borders are ‘real’ in the minds of political elites and everyday citizens; as such they cannot simply be ignored or labelled anachronistic. In the current climate, territorial and ideological borders frame the discussion around the legitimacy of the use of force and military intervention; claims to rights and citizenship; and about the role and limits of the law.\(^{782}\) Consequently, it is impossible to imagine a form of world politics that is dismissive of the current inter-state system.

Borders are a necessary starting point for re-thinking security, and for reconceptualising ‘the political more broadly’ because they affirm the conditions under which we understand change and transformation in general.\(^{783}\) While we cannot do away with territorial, political, and cultural borders entirely, we can develop a more sophisticated appreciation of the various ways in which contemporary borders can be productive sites for political exchange rather than lines of separation. Borders need to be understood as complex sites at which practices of political engagement take place. Borders are commonly represented in modern political theory and history as permanent and they are defined as legal and spatial realities rather than sites of complication and ambivalence. We are encouraged to think about boundaries as sites where very little happens except the separation of one political community from another. This conception of border can be traced back to the consolidation of the nation state and European colonial expansion into territories that were previously not defined by sharp borders.

\(^{781}\) R. B. J. Walker \textit{After the Globe}, p.34

\(^{782}\) \textit{ibid.}, p.27

\(^{783}\) \textit{ibid.}, p.27
Australian writer and philosopher Paul Carter examines the political history of a particular type of border—the coastline—as a part of his inquiry into the colonial mechanisms of mapping, naming and place-making. Coastlines have come to be imagined as ahistorical and a part of the natural landscape in the Australian imaginary. The word *coast* is linked to the *side* or *edge* of a place that separates land from sea. However, Carter suggests that a *coastline* is different in the sense that it is a human invention and interpretation of the world that is used to trace geographical particulars. Coastlines provide a way of applying the science of reason to the unknown natural world. Coastlines were invented and documented by early explorers to Australia such as Mathew Flinders who aimed to follow the land so closely that “the washing of the surf upon it should be visible, and no opening, nor anything of interest escape notice.” As a part of the creation of colonial knowledge through mapping, coastlines of Australia were created in ways that reflected the experience and prior knowledge of British explorers rather than the realities of the Australian landscape or the history of indigenous peoples who lived there.

The coastline was represented on the colonial map as a line that transformed the ambiguous zone between the land and the water into a decisive, calculable barrier. In reality, however, the coastline was a zone of unprecedented human encounter in which navigators and marine surveyors confronted unknown people, places and processes. Carter argues that coastlines were important places for drawing a line between native people and European colonials. The two groups were divided through a kind of “mutually immobilising symmetry” that operated to entrench the differences of the two groups and to prevent “other ways of meeting.” As the natural coasts of Australia were transformed into colonial coastlines physical barriers in the form of pillars or posts were set up to enforce the line of separation between local and foreigner. Foreign merchants would stop behind one of these barriers where they could do their bargaining with the merchants of the island who stood on the other side of the barrier. This mechanisation of movement was designed to create “a place of meeting where no one met.”

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784 P. Carter, *Dark Writing*, 2009, p.51
785 *ibid.*, p.51
786 *ibid.*, p.56
787 *ibid.*, p.63
788 *ibid.*, p.67
The distance created between the two trading groups in a colonial setting can be starkly contrasted against the ancient trading routes between Indigenous peoples and the Macassans examined in Chapter Four. While the former discourages interaction the latter is based on forming connections and being open to the difference of the other. Carter argues that this method of trading or completing a transaction without meeting has continued until the present day. It is reflected in the design and use of check-in counters, trading ports and barrier systems that are used all around the world today. This historical example of the border as a site of regulation rather than meeting remains relevant today in a world where borders are used to discourage cultural encounter with the other and restrict movement.

Under the dominant approach to security, borders are viewed as unsafe sites that individuals should pass through rather than dwell in. We often see opportunities and actions and stability existing either side of the border rather than at the border and we have been encouraged to think about borders as if they were just simple lines distinguishing here from there, now from then, safe from unsafe or normal from exceptional. Many scholars such as Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze have highlighted the fact we live on boundary lines rather than either side of them. This encourages us to shift our thinking away from seeing borders merely as lines of separation. We need to be more aware of the opportunities that exist at the border and to view them as meeting places. The border can be a site of productive political exchange and social interaction. When viewed in this way, it is a site that can strengthen security between differently situated groups. Walker argues that our political futures and the most interesting forms of political analysis will involve borders, boundaries and limits. However, he postulates that borders will not be in the form we currently recognise them—as a line that can be reduced to descriptive geography. They will not be exclusively associated with the modern state and the inter-state system.

The increasing frequency with which people are on the move, crossing borders, and dwelling in borders means that the traditional lines of separation between people and places are up for negotiation on a number of fronts in many different ways. The experience of living with difference in a place with permeable borders means that individuals experience home and express their differences in ways that are distinctly different from modernist/national

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789 R. B. J. Walker, *After the Globe*, p.6
imaginings. An increasing number of individuals live at the boundary or on the margins of a
political community. In this context, hybrid or ‘in between’ identities develop that add a layer
of complexity to traditional identities.792 Borders are not merely places that people pass
through, they can also be conceptualised as inclusive ‘meeting spaces’ where marginalised
and dominant communities come to meet. When differently situated individuals and groups
meet they do not disguise signs of their class and cultural difference or forget histories of
domination and oppression. A meeting space should be an environment in which both new
and old values and forms of identity can co-exist.793 A key feature of meeting spaces is that
they are heterogeneous; they are spaces where cultural groups can concomitantly converge
and maintain their distinctiveness from one another in a public setting.

hooks describes meetings spaces as marginal because they are ‘unsafe’, risky sites in which
identities are contestable and unstable. In the preface to Feminist Theory: From Margin to
Centre hooks writes:

Living on the edge—we developed a particular way of seeing
reality. We looked both from the outside in and the inside out.
We focused our attention on the centre as well as on the
margin.794

The margin is a site of radical possibility and a central location for the production of a
counterhegemonic discourse founded in the habits of being and the culture of the everyday.795
By inhabiting marginal spaces individuals are more likely to broaden their perspective and
recognise the fragility of their own identity. The condition of marginality is commonly
associated with negative experiences of deprivation and exclusion. However, this position of
marginality can be reconceptualised as a site of strategic resistance and liberatory potential.
Marginal identities are based on ambivalent and overlapping conceptions of self and other.
Marginalised groups are often better placed to acknowledge their own difference and to
embrace the differences of others because of their lived experiences.796

792 D. Massey, ‘Place called home’ p.17
793 b hooks, Yearning, Race and Gender, p.149
794 b hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre, Boston, MA : South End Press, 1984, p.i
795 S. Gunew, Framing Marginality: Multicultural Literary Studies, Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994,
p.3
796 J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves, p.192
The pursuit of modern security is premised on a clear and coherent division between self/other, friend/foe and inside/outside. It is based on the idea that people need to live on either side of a border to be included in the body politic. People at the border are generally marginalised form the centre of power. These groups are commonly constructed as victims with no agency that exist in an oppositional relationship to a dominant group. A number of scholars have critiqued the binary construction of the centre and the margin and argued that modern distinctions such as security enforce these artificial borders and limitations. Jonathan Boyarin, for example, critiques the binary construction between the margin and the centre in his study of Jewish and Palestinian relations in Israel. He highlights that the ‘margin’ and the ‘centre’ are constructed categories that serve a particular political purpose. The two positions are not as clear cut as they seem in the sense that people, processes and places can be part of the centre and may also be marginal at the same time. Furthermore, their status as marginal people may change according to the specific context and the other groups that are receiving them. For example, Israeli (and other) Jews and Palestinians are both marginal people in different ways. Since the creation of the Jewish state, Israelis have felt insecure in various ways even if they live within the territorial borders of the Jewish homeland.

The attempt by the Israeli government to create a cultural and religious homeland with clear cut borders has not solved the problem of the insecurity and marginality of Jewish people. The Israeli government has tried to create a sharp division between Jews at the centre and Palestinian groups at the borders. However, more often than not this has exacerbated the insecurity of both groups. This approach has not increased the security and stability of the dominant political group, rather; it has created several marginal groups including: Russian and Asian Jewish immigrants, of Arabs living in Israel proper and both Arabs and Israelis in the occupied territories. Boyarin argues that the way in which the categories of ‘margin’ and ‘centre’ are conceived of in modern political thought legitimises claims about conditions of security and wellbeing of people that are false or misleading. He argues that it is important to breakdown the binary between the margin and the centre and consider on a case by case

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798 ibid., p.132
799 ibid, p.135
800 ibid,p.135
basis, the conditions that allow cultural groups to participate in political society and pursue their own security.

If borders are to become meeting spaces in which differently situated individuals can come together, it is necessary for people to do more than talk ‘about’ the other and make abstract commitments to learning more about them. Meaningful engagement is about being with the other and living with their differences over time. Engagement between differently situated individuals can be challenging and confronting especially in circumstances when a marginalised group invites members of a politically dominant group into the space that they identify as home. When members of politically dominant groups are invited to enter into the marginal space of the other they are likely to be exposed to new perspectives and identities. In this marginal space, which is neither the centre nor the periphery, oppressors and the oppressed can speak with the other and not about the other. The margin is an inclusive and open-ended space in which the binaries between the coloniser and the colonised and the subject and the object are confronted. It is unrealistic to assume that distinctions between dominant and oppressed groups can be overcome merely through the process of confrontation at the border that previously separated these groups. However, engagement between differently situated groups can enhance understanding, broaden perspectives and provide scope for a future of compromise and co-existence. The margin has historically been a site that minority groups have had allocated to them within a hierarchical structure and field of discrimination. However, the margin can also become a site that is chosen specifically as a site for building security; within which individuals can recognise the value of mobility, contingency and risk and engagement with differently situated individuals.

This chapter has examined the relationship between spatiality and security. A liberal public sphere—which is still prevalent in most nation states—is created and sustained through the hierarchical organisation of groups and the exclusion of certain forms of cultural difference from public and political activities. The design and use of public space is a tool used to consolidate the power of political elites and the modern state. Subsequently, minority groups

801 b hooks, Yearning: Race and Gender, p.150
have not been able to express their sense of community and cultural identity in a public setting. It is vital for individuals to have both private and public spaces in which they feel at home in order to feel secure in their socio-cultural environment. One possible way to envisage such an environment is through the promotion of marginal spaces as meeting spaces that can be inhabited by a wide range of individuals and groups. The use of the border as a site of exchange and encounter provides an exciting new location in which subjectivity is sustained and new worldviews can be articulated. Throughout this thesis I have argued that the pursuit of security is linked to the ability to move within and between nation states and to connect with differently situated individuals. In the final chapter I have argued that pathways of connection between the home and the neighbourhood; one city and the next; and one country and another provide scope for new security politics to emerge.

I have established in this chapter that it is often in the gaps and leakages between the public and private spaces that individuals come to feel safe and at home in their social world. The concept of public space can be used productively to conceive of new forms of social and political action. In this chapter I argue that public spaces can bring differentially situated people together in an environment that nurtures fractured and hybrid identities and ultimately leads to new articulations of security. Public spaces are sites that can promote alternative ideas and practices of security and in some cases they challenge our understanding of ‘the political’ more broadly.
Conclusion

The thesis has argued that the mainstream approach to security creates new insecurities and exacerbates existing conditions of insecurity for large numbers of people. Based as it is on the pursuit of cultural homogeneity within fixed territorial boundaries, we know that these are ideal rather than real characteristics of political communities. However, it is very difficult to challenge the dominant approach because of the hegemony of the modern state and the supporting architecture of control. The association between security and the modern state can be traced back to the European Enlightenment and the triumph of the nation state as the only legitimate form of political community. The nation state and the underlying principles of modern security have been exported to the non-Western world and have often been implemented even more vehemently than in Europe. Consequently, today we are faced with a situation in which one particular security narrative has narrowed the range of permissible thought and action on security in the overwhelming majority of nation states. I have argued that security needs to be reconceptualised to place people at the front and centre of the security debate. In the current climate, the state remains the primary subject of security. From domestic policy to international agreements and interventions, security policies and frameworks are designed to protect the interests of the state and its territorial integrity. While the state is the primary subject of security it is also viewed as the entity that provides and protects people’s security.

The conclusion reached is that despite continuous changes in the geo-political and economic and natural environment, thinking on security has not changed substantially since the Cold War. Political elites, policy-makers and many academics remain confined within the disciplines of realism and neo-liberalism when devising solutions to security dilemmas. This results in a continued reliance on state-centric and militaristic solutions to security problems that often arise because of marginalisation and socio-economic hardship. The conventional solutions that have been tried in the past have frequently resulted in cycles of conflict, social suffering and ongoing marginalisation of certain groups of people. Authoritarian regimes and even democratic nation states are routinely in the habit of using the promise and rhetoric of security to sustain their power.

The thesis has challenged the association between the pursuit of security and the use of military force and other political technologies at the disposal of the modern state. I have argued that security should be expanded into other domains of social and political life. In
particular this thesis focused on the link between security and identity. The review of the existing literature in the fields of security studies and international relations established that the work is focused on the physical protection of the state and to a lesser extent to individuals and communities. Some studies were identified including those that emphasise the link between security and identity. This inquiry has privileged the psychological aspects of feeling secure over the physical condition of being secure. While it is important to be physically secure as well as to feel secure, the dominant approach focuses almost exclusively on tangible threats. There is no shortage of experts working in the field of security studies to analyse military, economic political and environmental threats to the state, and to a lesser extent the citizenry. However, what is generally missing from the analysis is a focus on what makes people feel secure. The focus on people’s security in this thesis is based on the premise that in order to feel secure people need to be able to express an identity and feel a part of a community. Throughout the thesis I have analysed what makes people feel perpetually insecure in the current environment and I have suggested possible ways to create a society in which people are not paralysed by the politics of fear.

States have a tendency to undermine the individual liberties and freedoms they are constituted to protect. This thesis highlighted the divergence between the liberal-democratic rhetoric on individual rights and freedoms espoused by states and the reality of modern governance which involves physical and discursive violence. While the state is generally perceived of as a guarantor of people’s security, in many cases it is the primary cause of people’s insecurity. A number of postmodern scholars have highlighted that security is a form of political technology. It operates within a powerful architecture of control that serves to maintain the authority of the state. The current discourse on security also serves to create unwavering loyalty from citizens and to increase the gap between political decision-making and people on the ground. I argued that the dominant approach to security is based on the manipulation of human fears about ‘the unknown’. Whether it is unknown people, places or practices, people have a natural tendency to fear what they don’t know or understand. In the current climate, the general public is instructed to stay out of the business of security and to trust that security experts have the situation under control. This increases the sense of powerlessness and uncertainty experienced by everyday people and perpetuates the belief that security policy should be filtered from the top town. I have argued that relying on the politics of fear as the basis for security policy encourages people to be suspicious towards the other and to view difference as a threat. Fearful citizens privilege the known over the unknown and
they are more likely to retreat from public life in an attempt to take shelter from the encounter with the world ‘out there’. The thesis has identified the consequences of a state-centric approach to security and established that people must be the primary subject of security.

To demonstrate the need for a new approach to security and to map out how this could occur, I pursued two key lines of argument. First, that mobility needs to be re-cast as an enabling security process rather than a threat to the security of the state and the citizenry. Second, the case was developed for linking security to cultural diversity and privileging mutual estrangement over cultural homogeneity. The dominant approach to security suggests that fixity is the primary determinant of the security of states and people. A political community is considered to be secure if it has territorial and ideological boundaries that are fixed and permanent. The nation state, as the dominant form of political community, is often presented as a natural entity that has always had clear and permanent territorial boundaries. However, I argued it is important to historicise the modern state and to recognise the significant degree of physical and discursive violence that was used to create it. The permanence of the nation state is enforced through the use of the modern home metaphor, which is based on the idea that home is a fixed place with boundaries that carve out a place of safety and refuge from the threatening external environment. The home metaphor links the fate of the nation to the safety and well-being of people on the ground. It is also used to justify restrictions on the movement of people within and between nation states. This thesis provided a critique of current use of the home metaphor by political elites to pursue security policies that restrict individual freedoms and movements. The idea that the homeland is under threat from the movement of certain kinds of people is a popular trope used in the pursuit of national security.

In the context of globalisation an increasing number of people rely on the ability to move between nation states to secure their sense of economic and social well-being and to establish a sense of home. These patterns of human movement challenge the authority and territoriality of the nation state. Consequently, under the current approach human movement has been securitised and linked to instability, economic decline, crime, and terrorism. Political elites attempt to enforce the idea that states have fixed boundaries by emphasising the similarities of those within the territorial homeland and downplaying the solidarities that citizens may have with people beyond the homeland. The thesis examined the range of coercive policies and practices to control the movement of marginalised groups who are considered threatening to the state from asylum seeker policy to the counter-terrorism campaign. Some of these
policies are designed to keep the other out while others are designed to domesticate the other within. Foreign security policy impacts most on groups such as refugees, asylum seekers and guest workers who are already marginalised in the countries they come from and become further marginalised as a result of attempting to relocate to another country. These are people predominantly from former colonised countries who leave their homelands in pursuit of economic, social and cultural security. To date, it has been relatively easy for Western liberal states to characterise people on the move as threatening to the economic, social and political stability of the state because of the link between insecurity and migration, underpinned by the politics of xenophobia. However, the recent economic crisis in Europe and the associated political turmoil may have implications for migration and asylum policy, as the people now seeking economic opportunity and security are ‘people like us’ who share cultural, ideological and historical connections.

Looking back on primordial patterns of movement and traditions of exchange and hospitality suggests that mobility is a securitising force rather than a threat. Historically people have moved around and engaged in cross-cultural dialogue, trade and exchange as a part of the pursuit of economic and social security and as a part of the home-making process. While some primordial traditions have proven to be resilient, many were affected by the consolidation of the territorial state, both in Europe and in the colonies. The example provided in this thesis was the trade and cultural exchange between Indigenous Australians and the Massacans that occurred prior to White settlement. Traditional nomadic practices and patterns of trade, cultural exchange and hospitality demonstrate that the ability to move can be vital for the economic and social survival of certain communities. While the modern state has attempted to control the movement of people, new patterns of movement have emerged as a result of decolonisation, globalisation and political and economic integration. Political elites have responded by attempting to keep ‘the other’ out and controlling the movement of people within. While the ease and frequency with which certain groups of people are on the move has increased, the borders of nation states have never been sharp or permanent. Reconceptualising security should begin with an acknowledgment of the fragility of national borders. We also need to question the link between territorial borders and cultural and political allegiances of people living within the borders.

Parallels can be made between primordial traditions of cross-cultural economic and social exchange and contemporary transnational networks that operate beyond the reach of the state. This thesis focused on one particular form of transitional community—the diaspora—to
demonstrate that an increasing number of people are forced or choose to pursue security by finding solidarity with people across borders. Through participation in transnational and sub-national networks individuals can reduce their reliance on the state as the sole provider of security and engage in self-securing practices. In the dominant security paradigm movement is viewed as a threat to the territoriality of the state as well as the fixity of the individual home. However, through an examination of historical and contemporary patterns of movement, I argued that movement should be recast as a positive feature of current the epoch that enhances individual and collective security.

The two lines of argument are closely linked because the ability to move can only be enabling in an environment in which cultural diversity is tolerated and promoted. Cultural, religious, class, sexual and other differences are often viewed as the primary cause of conflict, discrimination and exclusion. However, difference can also be used to create cohesive and resilient political communities. The dominant security narrative based on an ideal of a culturally pure homeland perpetuates feelings of insecurity. Through an analysis of the link between nationalism and the dominant security paradigm it was argued that the pursuit of cultural homogeneity perpetuates feelings of insecurity. When sameness is the basis for security and solidarity, every member of the political community—regardless of whether they are in the majority or minority group is placed in a vulnerable position. The aim of the modern nationalist project is to create a homogenous society based on a shared culture and unwavering loyalty to a territorial homeland. Drawing from the work of Ghassan Hage and Zygmunt Bauman, I argued that this ideal national homeland is based on a fiction of sameness that fosters xenophobia within the nation and ensures that even members of the dominant national group live in fear that they may one day not ‘fit in’.

The thesis examined some of physical and discursive methods that are employed by nation states to create cultural conformity within the nation. It was argued that the metaphor of the modern home—based on fixity, enclosure and familiarity— is used to justify politics and practices that aim to homogenise the population and force minorities to downplay their differences. The home metaphor is used to naturalise hierarchies and subjugation within the individual home and the nation through the process of domestification. The ideological link between the home, security and domesticity enables the politically dominant group to have their needs serviced by minority groups within the nation. I argued that it is not a blanket fear of the other and their cultural differences that leads to the securitisation of migration. Rather it is the fear of uncontrolled cultural difference that is viewed as a threat to the national
homeland. Domesticated groups are usually unable to express their differences within the nation or to challenge the established authority of the politically dominant group. They are often inhibited from expressing a sense of identity or identifying as part of a cultural community. Consequently, others of the nation struggle to feel at home and secure within their political community.

The critique of nationalism and the modern metaphor of home raised an important question regarding the construction of identity and community. If certain forms of political identities and communities are exclusive and lead to the preservation of hierarchies, what kinds of identities and communities should a new approach to security promote? To begin to address this question the thesis suggested that we need to broaden our understanding of what it means to have solidarity with others as well as our understanding of what it means to feel at home. People connect and relate to each other in a variety of ways that cut across national borders and the political communities. Connections are formed on the basis of common beliefs, experiences, cultural background or agenda. However, communities are always made up of individuals who share some things in common but who also share differences. In the current climate, at a domestic and international level, people are encouraged to form solidarity with others on the basis of sameness. But what if people we encouraged to relate to each other on the basis of difference? Drawing from the work of Julia Kristeva, I argued that all individuals are in some way estranged from others. Recognising our mutual estrangement is a fundamental shift in the way that individuals relate to each other. This does not mean that individuals cannot share things in common or have overlapping views and experiences. Rather, it means that solidarity with others must be established and continuously reaffirmed rather than assumed.

If security is linked to the ability to express an identity and to feel a part of at least one community, a secure political community must have an in-built culture of tolerance. It is often assumed that multiculturalism and pluralism are modern phenomena that accompanied the consolidation of the nation state and individuals rights and freedoms. However, in the thesis I questioned the extent to which modern regimes are tolerant of cultural difference. Indeed, it is difficult to find a nation state in today’s political climate in which multiculturalism extends to the tolerance of all kinds of difference. By looking back to primordial and non-Western traditions of pluralism and tolerance, the link between security and diversity is highlighted. This thesis referred to Ashis Nandy’s work on the Indian city of Cochin to illustrate that cosmopolitan political communities pre-date the modern state. For
centuries the cultural communities of Cochin have shared resources and cultural and religious practices without inhibition. As a result of the interdependence between differently situated communities; the sharing of cultural and religious practices; and the preservation of some separateness between communities, the people of Cochin have come to rely on difference to secure their economic, social and cultural security.

This thesis argued that political communities in which there is no requirement for individuals to be culturally and morally similar are more likely to be secure because people are more likely to express their differences and recognise others right to do the same. Privileging cultural diversity within a political community does not mean that communities should live completely autonomously or separately from one another. This thesis compared two competing trends emerging in some modern cities— social segregation and social integration— and concluded that social integration enhances individual and collective security. In order to establish secure political communities it is vital for differently situated people to work together on shared tasks, to share resources and to establish overlapping views and aspirations. The theoretical concept of ‘communities within a community’ is not new, as many theorists of multiculturalism and identity have argued that it is possible, and indeed natural, for individuals to identify with numerous kinds of communities. However, cultural pluralism is rarely presented as a feature of a political community that is indicative of individual and collective security. The thesis has argued that cultural diversity is a prerequisite for a society in which a wider range of people can build their own security.

In developing the scope of the thesis I have been cautious not to present an alternative to the dominant security narrative that may be equally as restrictive and exclusive as the current approach. There is no consensus over what security is or how to achieve it. A new approach to thinking and practicing security needs to be nuanced and open-ended rather than prescriptive. This project has also attempted to propose a way forward that is grounded in real-world situations rather than high theory. A part of developing a practical approach to re-thinking security involves creating a revised role for the state. In the current approach, the nation state is often a primary cause of people’s insecurity. Whilst it is important to critique the current role of the state, it is unrealistic to assume that the state can be taken out of the equation all together. Consequently, it was suggested that the state should focus on providing ways and means for people to self-secure, rather than relying on top-heavy methods of the past.
Some scholars have proposed that the state needs to increase its role in creating the preconditions for a secure political society. Ian Loader and Neil Walker assert that the state is a “civilising force” and that it should play the primary role in providing the regulatory and cultural infrastructure to create a single security space.\(^{804}\) By contrast, this thesis has developed the case for reducing the role of the state as the primary security actor and allowing for multiple security narratives and security spaces to emerge, each with their own cultural, moral and regulatory framework. When conceived of as a facilitator rather than a provider or protector of people’s security a wider range of people can pursue individual and collective security and they are more likely to respect the right of others to do the same.

A central argument advanced in the thesis is that people need to be actively involved in the conception and implementation of ideas and practices that are designed to enhance security. In academic circles the view that writing about contemporary security requires more than writing about the nation state and its military, police and security operations is becoming more broadly accepted. Scholars in the critical security and human security movements have put forward persuasive arguments for making the individual the basic moral unit and referent of security. Building upon these foundations, this thesis has argued that there is a greater need to focus on the psychological aspects of security within the broader human security movement. This is not to deny that the human condition of feeling secure is not linked to the absence of physical threat. However, there are numerous circumstances in which people feel insecure even when there are no identifiable objective threats to their physical security. Consequently, the focus of this project has been to look at the socio-cultural and political circumstances in which people are most likely to feel at home and secure. Examining these real-world social and political conditions suggests a move away from high theory and expert knowledge to a more grounded approach that requires privileging local knowledge and case-by-case analysis of security conditions.

If the state is to act as a facilitator rather than a guardian or provider of people’s security we need to privilege the relationship between security and the everyday. This thesis highlighted that security arrangements that are established between people at the level of the everyday often emerge without the involvement of the state or political elites. In many cases these arrangements are more resilient because they are based on real rather than abstract or assumed solidarities between differently situated individuals. The dominant approach to

security privileges the knowledge of ‘experts’ over the knowledge of local people. However, if we recognise that what it means to be and feel secure varies across time and place then it is vital to privilege local methods of conflict resolution and collective security building. Resilient communities are more likely to emerge when people from a diverse range of backgrounds are involved in creating policies and practices to enhance security. As a result of the top-down approach that is characteristic of the dominant approach, most people feel excluded from the pursuit of security and feel powerless to change their situation to make their lives more secure.

As a part of the exploration of security and the everyday, the thesis argued that the design and use of space and the meaning attached to spatial practices impacts significantly on the construction of individual and group identity. The critique of the liberal public sphere suggested that modern public spaces exclude certain types of people and practices, namely those that may threaten the hegemony of political elites. Modern public spaces, such as city squares, parks and gardens have traditionally been designed for the elite and middle classes and they come with inbuilt codes of exclusion. However, the thesis has proposed that public spaces can also be productive sites for intercultural exchange in which dominant and marginalised groups can come together and new hybrid identities are produced. When re-thinking the use of public space it is important to look at spaces that have not previously been recognised as ‘public’ or ‘political’. For example, I argued, drawing from the work of bell hooks that ‘marginal spaces’, space at the border, can be sites of resistance and activism. Marginal spaces can serve as ‘meeting places’ for individuals and groups from dominant and marginal groups to talk openly about issues that impact upon their identity and their community. The use of the border as a site of resistance and as a meeting space provides an exciting new location in which subjectively is sustained, new worldviews are articulated and new ways of establishing security are explored.

Developing a more inclusive and open-ended approach to security must start by acknowledging that most people are left out of the dominant security frame. As Rajni Kothari aptly states “the homogenising thrust of building national and international security leaves out a large number of minorities and ethnic communities”. However, an important aim of this project was also to demonstrate that the situation is not hopeless. There are alternative

voices and movements in various locations that are becoming more and more aware of how to combat the conservative routines and dogmas of modern security. Throughout the thesis I referred to specific groups and movements to demonstrate that new solidarities can be formed within and across marginalised groups. My purpose in providing these illustrative examples was not to demonstrate that alternative approaches to security have replaced the dominant discourse. Rather it was to suggest that there are pockets of resistance to the dominant security narrative which provide fruitful ground for re-thinking security.

New social movements, including communities of resistance, diaspora networks and issue-based communities, continue to spring up across the globe. They challenge our understanding of what it means to have solidarity with others and what constitutes ‘the political’. Growing numbers of people who have previously been left out of the dominant security paradigm are discovering ways to communicate across borders to challenge existing power structures and to collaborate in a mutually beneficial way to pursue their own security and establish a sense of home. Although these movements are all different and are formed around a diverse range of causes, many of them have common goals and can benefit from working creatively together. Many of these movements use space in innovative new ways that challenge the conventional understanding of the liberal public sphere and create opportunities for collective security building at the level of the everyday. I have argued we need to place greater emphasis on ‘the social’ as a method of building security frameworks that a people-centered but not individualistic.

Solidarities are the basis of community and are fundamental to the pursuit of individual and collective security. This is in part because solidarities are formed through concrete human practices not through abstract conceptions of community (such as the nation state). Exploring new ways of forming solidarities within and across cultural communities is a part of building security regimes from the bottom up. New social movements act in specific situations of suffering and injustice to alleviate conditions of insecurity for individuals. However, they also engage in broader struggles that address security dilemmas with global dimensions. While these important political movements are also featured in the studies of cultural theorists or sociologists, they are rarely recognised by theorists of International Relations or

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security studies. The intention of the thesis is to prove that there is a necessary link between grass-roots movements and the conception and implementation of security arrangements.

A society in which all individuals and groups can confidently assert their differences from one another is more likely to be secure because groups are less likely to feel threatened by other groups. It is also more likely to be a society in which differently situated groups rely on each other and use each other’s’ differences as a resource rather than a threat. There are exciting patterns of movement and action occurring in different parts of the world which suggest that people are pursuing their own security. As academics, policy-makers and activists it is our job to recognise the liberatory potential of these new social movements and to link them to the pursuit of individual and collective security.

The proposed way forward involves privileging movement and diversity as a means to individual and collective security. The conclusion of the thesis is that in communities that have no requirement for individuals to be culturally and morally similar, individuals are more likely to share partial perspectives, trust others and commit to actions to enhance security. Re-thinking security must start with a move away from the nationalist preoccupation with fixity and cultural homogeneity as markers of a secure society. Instead, we need to start an open and plural dialogue about security that reflects fundamentally on the idea of security, on what is means for individuals to feel and be secure and on the complex contradictory practices that exist between security and the practices of people. Reconceptualising security means engaging more imaginative forms of political analysis and intervention and taking fuller account of the fate of individuals and human collectivities in the pursuit of security.
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