The Early Heidegger’s Aristotle: the Logic of Possibility

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Declaration

This is to certify that:

• the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD,
• due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,
• the thesis is fewer than 100 000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

Signed,

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Abstract

The argument of this thesis is that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s is best understood after we have come to terms with the critique that Heidegger develops against theoretical attitude. By understanding how Heidegger determines the limitations of the theoretical attitude we can grasp the scope of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology that takes up the task of overcoming of those limitations. In particular this thesis follows the development of an underlying opposition in Heidegger’s work from 1919 to 1924. This opposition is staged around competing interpretations of the structural elements at work in the actualisation of research. Specifically these structural-logical elements are the understanding of unity and simplicity within the contexts of vision, speech and action that underlie the way that research takes up an object and understands its own possibilities and ends. When read in this way Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is a demonstration of possibilities of research that are invisible to theoretical attitude. As we have followed Heidegger’s reconstructions of Aristotle what emerges is a representation of Aristotle’s work where Heidegger attempts to alter our presuppositions about the possibility of research and thereby alter our understanding of Aristotle’s texts. The fundamental strategy of this alteration of presuppositions is to draw out the incompatibility of the structural-logical elements as employed by the modern philosophical positions criticised by Heidegger and the research carried out by Aristotle; this thesis makes this strategy explicit.

To carry out the argument we move from establishing an understanding of Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical attitude in chapter one, to examining the ways that alternative research projects may be carried out in chapter two, and then finally to closely examining Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle in 1923 and 1924 in chapters three and four. The four chapters together show how Heidegger’s arguments about the role of formalisation in research lead directly into the fundamental element in Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle, which is the conception the human being as being primarily in logos. With this new understanding of the nature of the human being insofar as it can do research and be the object of research comes an accompanying theory of both the nature of language and a rejection of the division of mind and world.
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**Introduction**

This thesis contributes to the growing literature on the early Heidegger and the early Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in particular. The publication and translation of the relevant lecture course notes and transcripts and other assorted texts from 1919 to 1926 has revealed that many of the examples, critiques, terms and conceptual strategies of *Being and Time* had been reworked in several versions in the years leading up to 1926. Heidegger’s close readings of Aristotle, carried out especially between the years of 1921 and 1925, make up a significant portion of this material. From 1922 to 1924 Heidegger attempted to write a book titled *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* that was to be his first major publication. The contents of the work as we have them from the texts during this period clearly show that the Aristotle book was not intended as a side project but rather as a presentation of Heidegger’s new approach to phenomenology. This thesis sets out to understand the nature of the early Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, or put another way, how did Aristotle become the vehicle, for a few years at least, for the development of Heidegger’s own philosophy.

The argument of this thesis can be summarised in three points. First, Heidegger’s representation of Aristotle in the surviving lecture course manuscripts and transcripts is best couched within Heidegger’s own project of developing a hermeneutic phenomenology. We shall examine below Heidegger’s analysis of what he calls the ‘hermeneutic situation’ to show that for Heidegger the task of interpreting philosophy, and thus the work of Aristotle, is closely aligned with a
phenomenological understanding of the conditions of possibility for research. Second, Heidegger’s criticisms of his own philosophical contemporaries should also be understood on the basis of Heidegger’s own project. It is important to recognise that Heidegger seeks to explain the conditions of possibility of what his philosophical contemporaries and Aristotle say rather than arguing with them directly. In order to grasp this step we shall briefly examine how Heidegger uses the structure of intentionality to define how these modern prejudices function within the ‘theoretical attitude’. Third, the thesis argues that throughout his readings of Aristotle Heidegger is focused on articulating an opposition between Aristotle and certain modern ontological prejudices. Thus this thesis examines Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle within the scope of the hermeneutic situation and in opposition to the possibilities of philosophical thought within the theoretical attitude. The thesis as a whole demonstrates that Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle in the early 1920s is best understood in opposition to the kind of research, which, according to Heidegger’s diagnosis, remains limited and determined by the theoretical attitude. By understanding the stakes of the opposition, fought especially over the nature of language, we can elucidate the reasons behind the manner in which Heidegger reconstructs the nature of Aristotle’s philosophy.

The structure of the thesis is made up of four chapters that are roughly chronological with respect to Heidegger’s lectures from 1919 to 1924. In the first half of the thesis, chapters one and two, we trace Heidegger’s critiques of the theoretical attitude back to their context in Heidegger’s underlying hermeneutical
approach and thereby elucidate the context into which Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s begins. Here we should not think of Aristotle in terms of simply an influence upon or an ally of Heidegger, but rather we should pay attention to the fact that Heidegger thinks that his own project can be expressed by articulating the difference between how Aristotle confronts the possibility of research and the way in which the possibility of research is confronted within the theoretical attitude. On the one hand we shall see that it is only on the basis of Heidegger’s own understanding of the problems of research in relationship with assumptions about the being of beings that Heidegger’s representations of Aristotle and the theoretical attitude become clear. On the other hand we shall see that Heidegger’s articulation of the difference between the two perspectives provides the way that Heidegger presented his own understanding of research during the pre-
Being and Time period.

‘Research’ here means an attempt to reveal beings in themselves. The opposition of research perspectives that Heidegger stages in the early 1920s plays out in relation to errors that have inhibited reflection upon what research really is. In particular, Heidegger attempts to reorient the possibility of understanding the object of human facticity and the method suitable for its analysis. In principle everything understood or experienced in any way belongs to human facticity. However, the possibility of turning back upon facticity itself and interpreting it in a way appropriate to the kind of being it is must be clarified in its scope; the historical question of the human being as a being among other beings is different from the
question of the human being to which all beings appear. It is the latter possibility that makes the possibility of investigating the human being ontological in scope. It is against this possibility, which provides a way in which beings can be gathered into a whole, that Heidegger measures Aristotle, the theoretical attitude and phenomenology.

What this thesis uncovers is that Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle in 1922-24 provides an intervention into the way in which the theoretical attitude understands the basic structures of the linguistic articulation of knowledge. While phenomenology may begin with the recognition of other intentional stances alongside the theoretical stance of just looking, the theoretical attitude is of special interest to Heidegger because it is entwined with the decision to do research, i.e. to switch from dealing with beings to trying to clarify and understand those beings. We shall see again and again Heidegger articulating the opposition between the Aristotelian option where a being that has become thematic can either be considered as embedded within the scope of its relations and ultimately as dependent upon the fact that understanding is always of being as a whole and the option of the theoretical attitude where the manner in which a being can be encapsulated within present intuition and have its relations determined within the regional structure of already established scientific possibilities. Underlying this opposition is a persistent argument by Heidegger that the manner in which the object of research is taken up is determined by the prejudices about the basic accessibility and form of beings.
There is a danger of accepting Heidegger’s understanding of the limitations of the viewpoint of the positive sciences too readily; the critique of the theoretical attitude is after all one of the most familiar parts of the early Heidegger’s project. But if the viewpoint of scientific reductionism is simply put to one side before beginning with being-in-the-world¹ and a new starting point, then the importance of Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical attitude as a consistent feature of Heidegger’s work is lost. We contend in this thesis that the development of Heidegger’s own position cannot be properly separated from what it resists, and that the reading of Aristotle too must be thought of within the development of the opposition. Let us quote a suitable passage from *Being and Time* which points to the presence of the theoretical attitude in Heidegger’s work.

The only peculiarity of seeing which we claim for the existential meaning of sight is the fact that it lets beings accessible to it be encountered in themselves without being concealed. Of course, every “sense” does this within the genuine realm of its discovery. But the tradition of philosophy has been primarily oriented from the very beginning towards “seeing” as the mode of access of beings and to being. To preserve this connection, one can formalize sight and seeing to the point of establishing a universal term which characterizes every access whatsoever to beings and to being.
By showing how all sight is primarily based on understanding ... we have taken away from mere intuition its priority which noetically corresponds to the traditional ontological priority of objective presence. ... We can decide about this kind of seeing only when we have obtained the explicit concepts of being and the structure of being, which only phenomena in the phenomenological sense can become.²

The quote above offers us a way to understand Heidegger’s hermeneutic position vis-à-vis the theoretical attitude. The theoretical attitude does not mean to be orientated only to visual presence, rather the theoretical attitude is the possibility of preserving the objective relation to presence through the formalisation of the relation of visual intuition. The theoretical attitude is thus a manner in which nature of beings and their accessibility can be understood. Thus Heidegger’s own hermeneutic phenomenology begins by undermining the theoretical attitude when it isolates and makes explicit the historical privilege of the formalised visual relation. The theoretical attitude provides a conception of a totalising and objective possibility of research. Rather than arguing against the theoretical attitude directly, Heidegger provides an explanation of how the perspective is possible on the basis of assumptions he deems false, that is, on the basis of being oriented towards the access to beings as seeing, this access can be encapsulated formally in the structure of a general concept of beings. We should add that the content of this objectivity is
variable as it can be directed at either exterior matter or interior propositional validity, but in any case presence shows up as the key criterion of the being of beings. What we can also note is that Aristotle’s work also takes place within an orientation to seeing as the access to beings and being, and that in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, presence is still the primary characteristic of beings. But, the possibility of formalising access into a single form of objectivity, which can found a proper reductionism as the theoretical attitude allows, is not carried out by Aristotle. Rather in the early 1920s Heidegger articulates the work of Aristotle in the separation of the theoretical attitude from Aristotle’s method.

The theoretical attitude is as much the formalisation of vision as it is the formalisation of meaning. In both cases an understanding of the most basic way that human beings have access to beings is at work; it is only on the basis of this understanding of access (which involves an implicit understanding of both the human being and beings in general) that what is simply given can be formalised and appropriated into a system. Heidegger, we argue, challenges the theoretical attitude when he grapples with the relation of ‘simple’ givenness to the task of thematically taking up what is given. The development of this possibility, in ways counter to the theoretical attitude, is the underlying task that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle undertakes. When we use terms like ‘simple’, ‘straightforward’, or ‘immediate’ (as we do frequently in this thesis), what is meant is nothing but the privilege given by Heidegger, and all phenomenologists, to the phenomena as given. For Heidegger, starting with the phenomena of environmental experience of the everyday activities
with which we are concerned and the language with which we already speak, these are ‘simple’ insofar as they offer themselves up as genuinely there, accepted, familiar and understood; that a simple encounter may have a complex set of conditions of possibility does not detract from the simplicity, on the contrary, the situation where the complex conditions of possibility fade entirely into the background and become obscure defines the ‘simple’. The objective sciences too work to attain a simple encounter with their object of study (the conditions of possibility for the simple object will be examined at length in thesis in terms of ‘regionality’). The simple givenness of beings, which shows and obscures beings at the same time, is there in the work and results of research as much as in pre-theoretical activity. The problems and positions that come to us as the history of philosophy are all examples of where something was taken up in a manner which was determined by understandings that remain inexplicit. Given that both everyday experience and philosophical theories are subject to an investigation of the understandings that support them, for the early Heidegger it is vital to connect the ambitions of phenomenology with a hermeneutical destruction/appropriation of the history of philosophy, i.e. the history of the understanding of being in research.

Understanding Heidegger’s hermeneutic approach is also pertinent here because Heidegger explicitly frames his reading of Aristotle with respect to the three-fold structure of the ‘hermeneutic situation’ at the beginning of the Introduction to the projected book on Aristotle written in October 1922, as well as in the concluding section of the 1924 Summer Semester, published as The Basic Concepts of
Aristotelian Philosophy. The three elements of the situation, the fore-having, fore-seeing, and fore-conception are not so important in their details as in the approach to philosophy they engender. Heidegger’s hermeneutic approach begins with an understanding that every interpretation can be assessed with respect to its conditions of possibility which themselves are not necessarily thematised within the interpretation itself. Furthermore philosophy is taken to be a possibility within life, where life has always already made an interpretation of itself. Hence in the 1922 Introduction Heidegger clarifies his attitude towards the history of philosophy by saying, “The past opens itself only in accord with the measure of resoluteness and the capacity of disclosure that a present has available to it.” In other words, the extent to which the philosophy of the past can be brought into the present is limited by whether we have come to the genuine problem that underlies philosophy or have become lost within the repetition of a hollow tradition.

While above we suggested that we must recognise two levels of discourse in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, that is, the underlying hermeneutic structure and the work of contrasting Aristotle and the theoretical attitude, these levels cannot ultimately be distinguished as two sets of claims. Heidegger is quite persistent in emphasising his own distance from the desire to finalise a philosophical position. Thus in the 1922 Introduction he also directs us to acknowledge that the possibility on which philosophy is grounded must be animated in the present. Heidegger puts this strongly in the following way, “… philosophical research … will never want to claim to be allowed to, and be able to, take away from future times the burden and
trouble of radical questioning.” For this reason we must acknowledge that Heidegger can fluctuate between representing phenomenology and Aristotle with respect to how each points towards the challenge of philosophy in its actualisation and representing phenomenology and Aristotle as concrete examples of research that can be analysed in terms of their underlying assumptions. In the early 1920s Heidegger presents both phenomenology and Aristotle most favourably when he refers to the need to take up the task of discovering the appropriate way to disclose beings. For this reason we can see how Heidegger can alternately praise and criticise phenomenology according to the demands of the material he is analysing at a given moment. The later Heidegger, looking back on the period, suggests that his reading of Aristotle is carried out alongside his own developments of phenomenology. From the lecture courses of the early 1920s, we can clearly see that Heidegger teaches phenomenology and “a transformed understanding of Aristotle” in parallel. And by the WS1923-24, published as Introduction to Phenomenological Research, Aristotle’s texts are not only deployed as paradigmatic of phenomenological work, but also as the basis for a critique of Husserl. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle takes place as a progressive stripping back of phenomenology to its bare insights into the starting point and possibility for research into the being of beings. Heidegger in Time and Being expresses this transition thus:

That which phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of
Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such. The more decisively this insight became clear to me, the more pressing the question became: Whence and how is it determined what must be experienced as ‘the things themselves’ in accord with the principle of phenomenology? Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and concealment?

While the quote above speaks to the place of Aristotle in Heidegger’s long term development, it also speaks to the first complicated feature of Heidegger’s work with which we must come to terms. Heidegger attempts to understand particular instances of philosophical research, such as the texts of Aristotle, and, at the same time, the possibility of philosophical research in general. Heidegger is even happy at times to define philosophy as the research that operated under this condition of constantly dealing with the problem of self-grounding. Thus not only are Heidegger’s close readings of Aristotle’s texts accompanied by the consideration of the possibility of philosophical research itself, but the possibility of philosophy is closely related by Heidegger to the consideration of just such a possibility.

Failing to acknowledge Heidegger’s multi-layered approach would lead to serious misreadings, but we can move now towards setting out the concrete themes that Heidegger tackles with respect to preparing for and undertaking his close readings of Aristotle. In summary the whole project takes place within a study of the conditions of possibility of research in general, and the problem of making human facticity into
a theme in particular. Heidegger does this by bringing into view the living conditions of possibility of linguistic formalisation and the historical actualisations of such formalisation in the terminology of Aristotle and the modern structures of propositional validity, scientific regions and the theoretical attitude.

Briefly looking at the relation between Aristotle’s conception of *theōria* and the theoretical attitude provides us here with an opportunity to compare the different possibilities for research in Aristotle’s work and in modern philosophy and science. Both *theōria* and the theoretical attitude are privileged attitudes of cognition in the mode of holding back from practical involvements. Each is an attitude that underlies a way of understanding the possibility for research. Those commentators who emphasise the critical elements in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle also emphasise the continuity of *theōria* and the theoretical attitude. However, the fact that Heidegger challenges *theōria* is not a reason to identify *theōria* and the theoretical attitude. *Theōria* is for Aristotle the highest possibility of human being wherein the being of beings is grasped outside of all involvements. But while *theōria* may bear some similarity to the theoretical attitude, the two are fundamentally different in the manner in which they sit alongside other human possibilities and the accompanying presumptions about the accessibility of beings. In the theoretical attitude beings are presumed to be simple such that they must be aligned with simple modes of access and representation, and thus perception and the proposition are likewise taken as simple. For Heidegger this apparent simplicity is also the conditions of possibility for a formalisation of access to beings that can sit within the totalising view of the
theoretical attitude. The collection of and relation between the objects and true sentences are what we refer to as regions. We shall see how regionality is especially important for Heidegger because it is paradigmatic of the way that the totality of beings is understood along with the possibilities of method within the theoretical attitude.

For Heidegger’s Aristotle the manner in which beings are accessed in the mode of being-in-the-world is guided by the understanding of the immersion of the human being in logos. The manner in which beings appear in all human activities cannot be ignored in order to access beings with plain unbiased perception. Theōria cannot be simply opposed to praxis because praxis shows ways of encountering beings that only theōria can fully grasp. Theōria discovers the unchanging conditions of possibility for praxis but simply excludes the particularity and changing context of praxis. For this reason theōria can be thought of as the complete actualisation of the human being. It is this completeness that gives theōria the position of grounding the disclosure of other human possibilities. In this thesis, the completeness of theōria is shown to work as a counter-concept of totality with which Heidegger confronts the theoretical attitude. While in the WS1924-25, published as Plato’s Sophist, Heidegger challenges the completeness of theōria given the particularities of praxis that it excludes, herein it is the opposition to the theoretical attitude that provides the underlying structure of Heidegger’s approach to Aristotle.

William McNeill’s collection of studies regarding the Augenblick, Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle and the Ends of Theory, has gone furthest in examining the
importance of *theōria* for Heidegger.\textsuperscript{10} On the one hand an opposition to *theōria* is clearly developed by Heidegger in the WS1924-25.\textsuperscript{11} But on the other hand McNeill notes that Heidegger’s critique of *theōria* is directed at the way that *theōria* develops in the history of metaphysics. McNeill thus discerns two different readings of Aristotle, one that culminates in modern science which separates *theōria* and *praxis*, and a more originary reading of Aristotle that confronts the problems of thinking of *theōria* as the most fundamental *praxis*. This latter possibility is what McNeill takes up as a problem in *The Glance of the Eye*. The theoretical attitude can be read as a form of *theōria* that is taken up by modern science and philosophy.

That Heidegger is critical of the contemporary philosophies of science and logic is obvious. But only if the theoretical attitude is unfolded in its deep implications can the starting point of Heidegger’s counter position show itself properly. Heidegger’s account of the theoretical attitude develops out of Heidegger’s own examination of the relationship between the implicit assumptions that underwrite the various regional sciences and the attempt to provide an underlying ontological framework for scientific knowledge through philosophical logic. Thus in order to account for the theoretical attitude generally, the specific critiques against the philosophies of logic and science with which Heidegger begins should first be explicated.

The notion of regions, as specific regions of objects and/or propositions, can be traced back at least to Aristotle’s distinction of primary and secondary philosophy.\textsuperscript{12} Aristotle suggests that primary philosophy includes a concern with truth in general, while the secondary kinds of inquiry demarcate a specific region of beings and
investigate these. Each region is a totality that belongs to a respective science, eg. arithmetic investigates numbers, while botany investigates plants. Phenomenology and neo-Kantian philosophy both renew the concern with the hierarchical relations that could be established between regions including the possibility of logic providing the region on which all other regions depend. Phenomenology and neo-Kantianism split apart regarding the manner in which experience is treated vis-à-vis the ambition of logic to become an ontology in the form of a super region. Even though Heidegger is critical of this logical ontology, in particular because it measures everything against the truth of the propositions that are founded in their respective regions, this does not mean that he turns completely away from thinking about regions. On the contrary, Heidegger seems happy to demarcate the various fields of science as regions although he also suggests that scientific researchers should be more aware of the way in which regions are delimited prior to and as a condition for the operations of a regional science. With the aid of Husserl’s distinction of formal and general ontology however, Heidegger reconceives of the relation of logic and the basic concepts that demarcate regions.

Regionality is fundamental to Heidegger’s understanding of how the sciences can lose touch with their original conditions of possibility and how they can provide a misleading path for philosophy to conceive of a super region based on formal logic. There is some difficulty however in discerning where Heidegger allows experience and regionality to overlap. In particular it is difficult to discern to what extent it is meaningful to talk of a region of pre-theoretical and non-objectifiable content that
some kind of phenomenological reduction is to uncover. Scholars differ regarding whether the early Heidegger’s attempt to discover the pre-scientific experience can be thought of as Husserlian and/or regional. Theodore Kisiel sees Heidegger’s account of non-objectified experience as a break from Husserl while Steven Crowell sees merely a modification. Michael Bowler suggests that both of them miss the mark insofar as they attempt to grasp what Heidegger uncovers as the subject matter of phenomenology or of primordial science. Bowler instead suggests that primordial science “brings the derivative theoretical sciences into existence by giving them their tasks and thus, setting them in motion.” Thus, instead of objectifying experience or discovering a region of experience that was non-objectifying, Bowler suggests that Heidegger showed the context of active life for the appearance of beings in a theoretical attitude. Bowler is right to emphasise the manner in which objects of science are constituted, but is somewhat unfair to oppose this insight to Crowell. Crowell himself suggests that phenomenology must be thought of as inseparable from life when he writes that “Phenomenology is ... not brought to experience from the outside but is the very ‘method’ of experience...” The difficulty of grasping what it is that philosophy looks at cannot be dismissed as a misunderstanding but must be examined as part of what life is. As Bowler suggests, the notion of an object of study must be subordinated to the manner in which the questioning of the object emerges. If this point is accepted then one can still go on talking about objects, but one must admit that the concept of ‘object’ has been considerably revised.
One of the challenges this thesis faces is to understand how Heidegger revises the basic relation of an object of research to life which includes research as a possibility. This is where Heidegger’s appropriation of the term ‘logic’ becomes crucial. Just as Husserl already considered the conditions of possibility of propositional truth founded in regions, so Heidegger too examines the pre-propositional structures of truth. Just as a logical ontology attempts to gather together the nature of truth from regions in general into a formal ontology, so Heidegger develops a different way of thinking about the totality of experience that is prior to regions. Heidegger’s new kind of totality is not another region, nor a more basic kind of object, but requires a recovery of the original problems of logic that have been lost in the tradition. This thesis emphasises how Heidegger distinguishes beings insofar as they may be originally encountered and beings insofar as they show themselves in a regional setting, that is, show themselves in relation to regional beings that have already been secured. Thus the very notion of ‘objects’ is not rejected by Heidegger so much as it is broken down into its constituitive conditions. Heidegger draws attention to the fact that the simple givenness of beings is in no way intrinsically or primarily founded on regionality or the modes of objectivity that are founded in regional sciences. Hence we shall draw attention to the way in which Heidegger appropriates the structural elements of singularity and formal identity so that we may clarify how Heidegger’s notion of logic intervenes in the more familiar meaning of logic as formal language.
Daniel Dahlstrom notes at the beginning of *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* that for the early Heidegger the term ‘logic’ encompasses the philosophy of logic of Heidegger’s contemporaries and his own philosophy of logic. ‘Logic’ also means an original sense given to the word ‘logos’ and its contemporary equivalents.¹⁶ In both of these oppositions logic refers to what it means to express the being of beings, including how beings can be taken up in propositions. Logic for Heidegger is thus also the way in which the emergence and possibility of the theoretical attitude can be explicated.

By examining the ways in which the early Heidegger takes apart the underlying prejudices at work in the contemporary philosophies of logic and science we can see that a confusion of formal and general ontology is at work in narrowing the region of objects towards which research is directed. In the details of this argument Heidegger opens a space for a new reading of Aristotle. Aristotle not only begins his research on foundations quite different from the modern theoretical attitude, but does so because he has a specific understanding of the difficulty and possibilities of philosophy. While the theoretical attitude attempts to adopt a position outside of subjectively coloured concerns, for Heidegger Aristotle begins his work through a radicalisation of the self-understanding of the Greeks, that is, of the way in which the human being is in *logos* and directed towards beings through *logos*. Hence Aristotle opens up the problem of research when he attempts to understand how beings are unconcealed and concealed in *logos*. 
For Heidegger the basic question of how research is possible is not simply a
question that itself might be researched like any other. Instead, Heidegger thinks
that this question is necessarily directed not only to beings but the being of beings.
Hence, Heidegger’s critique of the contemporary philosophies of logic and science
does not challenge the unfolding of formal logic nor the work of the regional
sciences in their internal rigour but rather challenges the understanding of beings at
work in the foundational demarcation of these research projects. Heidegger is not
attacking the results of sciences but rather the implied and assumed ontology of the
regional sciences. Because Heidegger is focused on ontology as a fundamental
human possibility he can claim that insofar as research is carried out an implicit
answer to the question of the being of beings has been provided. A scientist or
philosopher of logic or science need not employ such terms nor make any such
explicit arguments. Nonetheless, an understanding of the being of beings is
necessarily at work wherever the attempt is taken up to uncover and order
knowledge. In providing a critique of the theoretical attitude Heidegger attempts to
uncover this understanding of the being of beings at work in the securing of a
research object.

Logic and research are here thought together as containing the basic structural
assumptions that are brought to beings insofar as beings appear as such and
furthermore can be considered with respect to their being. Logic in this sense does
not mean a formal science, but rather the possibilities of research that are present in
language. Rather than thinking of logic as beginning with the validity of an
independent proposition, Heidegger asks: ‘what are the conditions of possibility for a proposition to appear independent?’ i.e. true and simple with its conditions of possibility hidden.

Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is not simply about giving due attention to the question of the being of beings as a possibility of human existence, it is also a way into a complicated logical problematic which is opened up by Heidegger as soon as he challenges the form of beings insofar as they are taken up in language and in the lived attitude of research. Heidegger’s revision of the dimension of formality in research is complementary with his critique of theories of language that regard the true, assertoric proposition in the indicative mood to be the paradigm of the relationship between being, language and truth. In Aristotle, Heidegger finds an originary attempt to deal with the intersection of these concerns, that is, the investigation of how language both succeeds and fails in its attempt to grasp the being of beings.

The first chapter of the thesis unfolds Heidegger’s critique of the attempt to unify formal logic with the knowledge sought in the regional sciences. The remainder of the thesis, with this critique in mind, examines Heidegger’s developing reading of Aristotle from 1922-1924. The primary materials on which the thesis is focused are the preserved lecture courses from 1919-1924. Through an exegesis and analysis of these lectures, the thesis offers a new way to read this material by establishing the underlying and driving problematic that Heidegger initially developed in the context of his critique of the philosophies of logic and science.
As the argument proceeds, the aforementioned lectures, as well as other texts from 1919-1924 are examined, first, insofar as they present an understanding of the meaning of being that is at work in the history of modern philosophy (an understanding that actively hinders the question of the meaning of being) and second, from the perspective of an attempted recovery of the underlying structure of Aristotle’s understanding of the relation between human existence and the research into the being of beings. The attention given to human existence is not intended simply as a way to unnecessarily multiply the objects of research, but rather is a result of the consideration that any research whatsoever must begin with the fact that beings already show themselves. Once the structure of beings and their apprehension is put into doubt, research must return to the fact that beings are encountered. It is in real experience, not a concept of experience, where the being of beings must be sought.

Heidegger’s lectures on Aristotle treat both Aristotle and the audience not simply as philosophers or scientists, but first as human beings in the world. If philosophy and science exist as modes of research then they must exist first of all as possibilities of the human being. When Heidegger addresses his students it is with regard to the way that the human being interprets itself. Thus, it is only by drawing out the students’ commitment to the prejudices of the theoretical attitude that Heidegger can prepare for a genuine confrontation between the principles being espoused by Aristotle, and those by which his audience orient themselves without recognising that these principles are themselves the vestiges of conflicts within the history of
metaphysics. Heidegger reads Aristotle with a specific understanding of the relation between human existence and research. Aristotle’s texts are set into a context where the original questioning possibility is there in the way that beings are encountered. This fundamental possibility of research that makes the implicit structures of experience thematic is precisely the initial connection between phenomenology and Aristotle’s method that Heidegger first pursues. On the one hand, Aristotle’s philosophy must be understood in relation to human existence insofar as the latter intrinsically interprets itself. If philosophy is to be genuine, and not simply the mechanical deployment of concepts that have been uncritically inherited, it must not be considered a demarcated scientific or cultural practice. Thus the way that beings are encountered and the research into the being of beings both belong to the same encompassing unity of life’s actualisation in the work of interpretation. This is what makes it a hermeneutic phenomenology. As Heidegger put it in the 1922 draft Introduction,

...the specific character of the object, factic life, must be brought out into the open. This is necessary not only because it is the object of philosophical research, but also because philosophical research itself constitutes a particular how of factic life itself.18
On the other hand, human existence is not a natural state behind the historical conditioning, it is intrinsically historical. This means that Heidegger is not in a position to clear away alternative philosophical positions in order to build a new philosophy on clean ground. Rather philosophy must take place as a transformation of the understanding of the being of beings that is already at work.

Heidegger suggests that by narrowing the object of research to beings of theoretical access research loses the proper connection to the phenomena and prepares a limited set of problems on which to work. Heidegger’s accusation of the narrow focus of the theoretical attitude is accompanied by explanations of how this lack of attention to the starting point of research is possible. On the one hand, there is the tendency of research to lose touch with its original problem altogether and become a technical activity. This possibility is outlined by Heidegger as part of the tendency to identify one’s own possibilities with the pre-given ways of the world, that is, the condition of ‘fallenness’. This ‘fallen’ research activity manifests in the unquestioning inheritance of terminology and the habituation of research methods. On the other hand, Heidegger develops a detailed historical account where a certain understanding of the meaning of being supports a traditional account of the possibility of grasping beings as beings. Thus, the primary question of research, ‘what is the being of beings?’ has been long provided with an initial answer. By assuming that the being of beings is presence, that is, that beings are complete-unto-themselves and independent in their being, means that the role of the observer can be to simply represent the being as fully as possible. Traditional philosophical
problems and positions can thus be considered to emerge after this answer. For Heidegger, questions like, ‘are beings accessible through innate ideas or approached empirically?’ are secondary to the need to question the assumptions about what beings are. Heidegger’s critiques of modern philosophy, especially with so broad an application, can certainly seem unjustified insofar as they assign a very naive set of beliefs to philosophers. But it must be remembered that Heidegger is not suggesting that philosophers openly present this underlying prejudice (which could be rendered as something like, ‘a being and its presence is the same, so a single all-encompassing perspective of access is basically a universal understanding of what beings are in their being’) as their philosophical position. It is necessary to balance Heidegger’s stringent criticisms of various philosophers against the fact that, for Heidegger, any attempt to extricate oneself from the theoretical attitude is fraught with difficulty.

Heidegger explicates the limitations of the theoretical attitude by expressing it in terms of the phenomenological structure of intentionality. Intentionality is the basic fact that consciousness is always directed towards something. The structure of intentionality means that the nature of what appears and the nature of how one is directed toward what appears must be examined in conjunction. The object of experience is the product of a correlation between the object’s way of self-presentation and the way in which Dasein is turned towards the object. The theoretical attitude presupposes that pure looking, that is, a directedness that does not involve itself in the object, is a privileged standpoint that does nothing but reveal
beings as they are. Thus the theoretical attitude presupposes that objectivity can be attained by adopting the attitude that is entirely empty, as if the theoretical attitude simple receives the object as it is. This possibility only makes sense if the ‘content’, the object part of the intentional relation, is already understood as self-supporting, prior to and independent of the observer. But we should also emphasise that Heidegger is not talking merely criticising naive realism or the procedures of the natural sciences. Thus, Heidegger extends the charge of ‘being embroiled in the theoretical attitude’ to the neo-Kantians in spite of the latter’s idealism. Whether or not the object is constituted by an ideal subject is not as important as the opposition drawn between a purely theoretical attitude and all other human attitudes to things. The completeness at which the theoretical attitude and regional sciences aim, it must be pointed out, is only a regulative ideal. While it may seem that Heidegger’s conception of science is contradicted by the principle that science never reaches certainty and that scientific methods and results are related in a circular fashion, the theoretical attitude underlies both this concept of methods and this concept of results.

‘The theoretical attitude’ is used herein as a convenient term for the prejudice that the subject can assume an ‘empty’ or ‘neutral’ intentional stance towards an already complete object and, further, that this provides the conditions for a privileged receptivity analogous to everyday observation, viz. the scientist is simply the neutral observer of phenomena in the way that, in everyday language, I might assume that I simply ‘look at’ an orange. The prejudices of the theoretical attitude
provide the basis not only for the ordering and systemisation of the modern sciences, but also provide assumptions about the being of beings that are at work in the procedures of research. Only when the fundamental logical assumptions of the theoretical attitude are examined, can the task of doing research in a way that is not beholden to the theoretical attitude begin: a task which will require the assumptions of the theoretical attitude regarding the form of beings and the possibility of objectivity be made explicit and kept in focus.

At its heart the theoretical attitude is a simple ontology that for Heidegger culminates a particular line in the history of philosophy. As Heidegger puts it is the WS1920-21, “A glance at the history of philosophy shows that the formal determination of the objective entirely dominates philosophy.” Thus the theoretical attitude gives precedence to the universal that can be employed to unify the various particular instances that can be experienced. The formal unity of beings is also the way in which the multiplicity of experience is subordinated to whatever is predetermined to be underlying. In such an approach the being is the universal, which, when apprehended by the mind, provides the foundation for all possible objective knowledge. Heidegger spends a good deal of time tracing the history of this approach to beings (from Aristotle to the scholastic world order to the material regions of modern science) and the latent problems that it ignores (e.g. the starting point in everydayness, temporality, and splitting the mode of access that belongs to beings into a mental and a sensory-physical). What is important here, however, is the way that Heidegger stages the confrontation with the theoretical attitude, not
only by criticising its positions and revealing its history, but through the
appropriation of the potential for formalisation and in particular the grasp of that
which is there such that it can be taken up in the mode of research We shall see how
Heidegger draws a close relationship between such initial cognitive grasping of
beings with the possibility of linguistic address towards beings.

The notion of formal identity is employed by Heidegger as turning point that
underlies both the possibility of the theoretical attitude and phenomenological
research. Formal identity is thought by Heidegger in terms of a constantly available
possibility of abstraction that can be applied to any experience. For Heidegger this
superficial free formalisation can be aligned first of all with the basic human capacity
to indicate that underlies language. One must stop and point out something that is
insofar as one attempts to grasp the being of beings. The assumptions about the
being of beings are present in the manner in which one takes up this intrinsically
singular formal identity of ‘that-being’. It is with regard to this initial possibility of
research, the starting point for the questioning of a being in its being, that Heidegger
describes both the theoretical attitude and the work of Aristotle. The appropriation
of linguistic formalisation in the work of the early Heidegger also underlies the
importance of language in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle.

Every philosophical approach to language involves an understanding of formal
identity on the basis of some prejudices about the being of beings, just as
understanding of the being of beings underlies every actualisation of research. The
way that language is taken up in research is what Heidegger calls ‘logic’. For
Heidegger the logic of the theoretical attitude is grounded in the relation of the singular present thing with the totality of things. Heidegger first argues in phenomenological terms that it is a fixation on and formalisation of the content element of the intentional structure that allows for the alignment of empirical objective research and formal logic, because the pre-established form of the content is on the one hand the self-same identity that can be encountered fully in its presence, both temporal and visual. On the other hand the totality of the region pre-establishes both the unity of the vision that is brought to the object, insofar as every region looks to a regional object with the basic concept of the region taken as given. Every regional ontology operates through a reduction of what is given in experience, for instance, a botanist sees only what is relevant for classifying plants, a physicist only what effects motion, a geometer only sees shapes, lines and points. But the totality of the region also determines the manner in which all the identities that belong to the region, all the differences that are relevant to the basic concept, will be gathered together in their full presence. Heidegger holds regional science up to the standards of phenomenological explication. By doing so Heidegger can juxtapose the structure of scientific objectification with the structure of the phenomenon, that is, the being insofar as it shows its way of being.

What is phenomenology? What is phenomenon? Here this can be indicated only formally. Each experience – as experiencing, and what
is experienced – can ‘be taken in the phenomenon,’ that is to say, one can ask:

1. After the original ‘what,’ that is experienced therein (content)

2. After the original ‘how,’ in which it is experienced (relation)

3. After the original ‘how,’ in which the relational meaning is enacted (enactment).

The theoretical attitude is fixated on content insofar as it looks towards the object but, at the same time, can be indifferent to content insofar as the content can be formalised as simply an object in general. The content is formalised insofar as it is presupposed to be formally one and self-identical and thus for the theoretical attitude the empirical being (which can be known and appropriated into a region) and formal logical identity are intrinsically compatible.

As a counter to content-fixation, Heidegger suggests both that the other elements of the intentional structure must become part of the analysis of the being of beings, and that ancient thought, such as that of Aristotle and Paul, can provide examples of such analysis. The element of enactment (or actualisation) in the intentional structure is aligned by Heidegger with the Greek notion of actualisation, *energeia*. Thus the Greeks already understood the structure of a being that has its mode of being in actualisation, that is the *psuchē*, the soul. For Heidegger, the *psuchē* is not a being like an object at all, nor a form in any sense, rather it is the
actualisation of life’s directedness to the world. The various modes in which this actualisation may occur must be combined with the underlying possibilities in which beings in the world may show themselves.

Prior to turning to Aristotle Heidegger has already developed a counter to the theoretical attitude called formal indication (formale Anzeige). We have already introduced the theoretical attitude with regard to the condensation of ontological prejudices within the formalised object in general and the fixing of the relation (the theoretical attitude itself) to this object as a mode of research. Heidegger’s method of formal indication, first visible in 1919, is directed towards the initiation of research and also regards the formalisation of an object to which research is aimed. However, when something is merely indicated formally, for Heidegger, this does not mean that it is thereby known. Heidegger deliberately defines formal indication as an inversion of the theoretical attitude – technically as the freezing of the content part of the intentional structure in order to free up the investigation of both relation and actualisation. What this practically means is that Heidegger attempts to carry out a line of research into that which is not like an object. Thus he takes up ‘I am’, ‘life’ and the existentials in Being and Time. Such ‘objects’ are formalised in the suspension of any assumption about the structure of beings.

It will be useful for the reader if we here set out in brief how the threads of argument run through the four chapters of this thesis. The four chapters build on one another not merely insofar as they examine Heidegger’s early works in a loose sequence, but also insofar as they follow Heidegger’s argument from its original
expression as a critique of the theoretical attitude to a partial culmination in the reading of Aristotle provided in the SS1924. The thesis reveals the prominence of formalisation as an ever present possibility of addressing beings that underlies both the fallenness of language and the latent potentiality that is to be taken up by phenomenology. By making explicit what Heidegger does with formalisation, the nature of the task that Heidegger undertakes with Aristotle can be made clear. Thus, firstly the role of formalisation as the shared element in the opposition between the theoretical attitude and formal indication is examined and the resulting unified realm of conflict is drawn out in Chapter one. Secondly, in chapter section 1.4, we argue that Heidegger’s Aristotle presents an inverted logic, opposed to the way that the theoretical attitude understands the being of beings. This manifests as an alignment of Aristotle and phenomenology against the theoretical attitude, but the nature of this alignment requires us to understand how life is secured as an object of research in a way that is fundamentally incompatible with the theoretical attitude. Hence Heidegger’s criticisms of the theoretical attitude are not left behind after Chapter One, but rather the opposition of formal indication and the theoretical attitude provides the underlying framework for understanding Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle.

Section 1.1 sets out the nature of the criticisms that Heidegger levels at the theoretical attitude as the underlying ontology of modern scientific and philosophical research. Heidegger’s treatment of Aristotle as the optimal target of a destructive retrieval is established in light of these criticisms. Aristotle plays both a
fundamental role in originating the structures at work in the theoretical attitude, but also harbours the potential to provide a counter example to the theoretical attitude insofar as Aristotle shows what is specifically missing in the theoretical attitude, that is, an approach to beings through the way that the beings show themselves in life experience.

Section 1.2 introduces the early argument about the relationship of generalisation and formalisation that Heidegger first levelled at the neo-Kantians. It was this argument that developed into the critique against the theoretical attitude and eventually the critique of metaphysics as a whole. Heidegger’s early arguments show how he initially set out, in terms of the framework of intentionality, the contrast between Aristotle’s conception of the possibility of research and research as conceived in the theoretical attitude.

Section 1.3 gives a comprehensive treatment of the method of formal indication as it functions as an intervention in the theoretical attitude. Formalisation is shown here to be at the heart of Heidegger’s understanding of how the theoretical attitude secures a narrow approach to the being of beings.

Section 1.4 develops the argument that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle needs to be understood as a conflict of logics. The criticisms that Heidegger levels at the theoretical attitude are at the same time a jettisoning of conventional foundations of research, and thus provoke the need to uncover a new foundation. This can be understood as two competing concepts of the whole of beings, on the one hand the
totality of a material region and on the other hand the totality of the human being’s interpretation of itself.

In Chapter two, Heidegger’s notion of formal indication is incorporated into a hermeneutic framework. Therein the unifying feature is that the manner of Dasein’s being is actualised in its own self-interpretation. Interpretation is the manner in which possibility is grasped explicitly in factical life, thus providing a new key concept of actuality that allows Heidegger to conjoin intentionality with the Greek approach to the being of comportment.

Section 2.1 reviews Heidegger’s notion of a hermeneutic unity as the encapsulating framework whereby beings are taken up in research. Research for Heidegger is understood as a possibility of Dasein’s awakening to itself. Formal indication in this context can now be reviewed insofar as it works destructively against the theoretical attitude, but also helps to clarify the possibility of Dasein making its own existence the subject of a thematic and explicit interpretation. Formal indication must go to work on language which harbours the way that the human being has taken hold of its possibilities. Understanding the averageness of language means also to grasp a possibility of historiological research, that is, the possibility of understanding the becoming of the human being’s existence in language. The connection of Heidegger’s concept of averageness with Aristotle’s concept of doxa provides the way to understand the importance of language in philosophical research for both Heidegger and Aristotle.
Section 2.2 continues to clarify the basic structure that underlies Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. On the one hand formal indication can be understood as a revision of the concept of the simple givenness of beings. On the other hand, the process of research must take into account a revised conception of the whole provided by the understanding of Dasein as a work of self-interpretation. The second fundamental link between Heidegger and Aristotle is this understanding of existence as actualisation. Actualisation is a way of being that is primarily itself, rather than directed at something outside of itself.

Section 2.3 introduces Heidegger’s WS1921-22, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, which brings together formal indication with the hermeneutic totality of existence.

Section 2.4 brings together several key passages from the WS1921-22 that establish the fundamental structure of Dasein’s self-interpretation as distinct from the structure that underlies regional sciences and the theoretical attitude generally. Heidegger’s discussion in the WS1921-22 regarding the nature of definition and its relationship to a philosophical approach to language is examined in detail. This section shows how Heidegger’s method of formal indication is used to provide an alternative to the traditional understanding of universality, conceptuality and definition. Formal indication is specifically used by Heidegger to intervene in the linguistic structures that philosophy has turned into technical apparatuses. By showing the lack of groundedness in such traditional structures, Heidegger points towards the need to first ground the possibility of research with the structure of
formal indication. Formal indication provides a new encapsulating structure to replace the role of the universal. But the structure of formal indication provides no information about the structure of the content that is to be sought out, only the need to seek it out. Thus Heidegger puts a philosophical emphasis on the possibility of the question, rather than any predetermination of the answer, and thus moves the ground from the totality of beings considered as things, to the totality of self-interpretation of Dasein, which is the discovery of its own possibility. Formal indication is merely the preparation for Dasein’s self-interpretation. The fact that research in this existential sense is thought through from its ground, brings the possibility of research to a state of completeness. Even while the results remain outstanding, the possibility of research itself is seized. Thus Heidegger brings the totalising function of formal indication and the existence of Dasein into alignment with Aristotle’s conception of theōria and the meaning of being as completeness, expressed in both the terms ‘telos’, end, and ‘peras’, limit. Philosophy, for Heidegger, must be understood in the sense of actualisation that takes precedent over content and relation.

Section 2.5 offers an explication of Heidegger’s claim that existential research ought to begin by analysing the basic categorial structures of Dasein’s relation to the world. This section provides merely a sketch of the more detailed category research presented by Heidegger in the second half of the WS1921-22. Nonetheless, the sketch is sufficient to show how Heidegger takes apart the categorial nexuses of
language, that is, the relations that have built up in the history of speech around the key terms of life and world.

Section 3.1 provides a close reading of the introduction of Heidegger’s WS1923-24. This chapter section shows how prominently the structure of formal simplicity functions in Heidegger’s explanation of both the possibility of deception and the disclosure of the being of beings. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the WS1923-24 is designed to show how Aristotle provides a direct phenomenological analysis of seeing and speaking. This moment in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle shows a crucial simplification of the possibilities for inquiry. By inquiring after seeing and speaking in the context of human being in the world, or simply the *psychē*, Heidegger can draw out the contrast with an inquiry that begins with seeing and speaking with regard to independent units, sounds, words, pictures, representation, etc. For Heidegger, Aristotle’s approach is grounded in his understanding of the human being as directed towards beings, and furthermore wanting to see and thus understand beings. While weaving together various passages from Aristotle, Heidegger sets out the various relations between the simple givenness of beings and the ways that their being can be articulated in order to clarify the possibilities of beings showing themselves deceptively and truthfully. Heidegger’s reconstruction of Aristotle’s understanding of deception includes the possibility of deceptively simple conceptions that are possible on the basis of taking things in a habitual manner. This deception is exacerbated by a tendency to speak about things superficially. In either
kind of deception the formal being is present but the articulation in the *logos* fails to take hold of the being of the being.

For Heidegger, the analysis of seeing and speaking is a fundamental example of Aristotle as a proto-phenomenologist because seeing and speaking show the human being insofar as it is directed towards beings, and thus seeing and speaking must be analysed as possibilities of the human *psychē*. Seeing and speaking, to the extent that they can show themselves as modes of access to beings, provide examples of the basic mode in which the human being can show itself to itself, that is, in the structure of potentiality, *dunamis*. Potentiality is not only what the human being has grasped as possible in the world, but also is the structure that the *logos* can take up and thus be directed towards the being of the human being explicitly.

Section 4.1 introduces the selective and interpretative reading carried out through the rest of chapter four of the first part of Heidegger’s SS1924. Having set out the details of Heidegger’s appropriation of formalisation in relation to the structures of *logos, dunamis*, and Dasein, and the critique of the theoretical attitude, the SS1924 can now be shown to possess a clear structure that pieces together all of the early Heidegger’s work with Aristotle at its centre. Thus throughout the close readings of Heidegger’s SS1924, the thesis keeps focused on the basic elements of the underlying structure: that is, 1. the element of formal simplicity that distinguishes the possibility of reflecting language back on to itself, 2. the element of totality that comes from understanding the nature of human existence as a whole, that is, as a complete entity only in the ultimate possibility of self-awakening, and 3.
the concrete interpretation that has been carried out which allows the structure of
the being of the being to show itself, as being in the world, orientated towards the
world as both shared and conducive, speaking with others in the mode of
deliberation, and so on. The three elements align with the first three chapters of
Heidegger’s SS1924.

Section 4.2 examines Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s most basic concept, that
is, *ousia*. It is not simply the underlying understanding of being as presence that
explains why *ousia* is so important for Aristotle. Rather, Heidegger, using *ousia* as an
example, shows how concepts work within language, and also how the accessibility
of beings that the concept of *ousia* isolates becomes a starting point for research.
Heidegger shows that the concept of *ousia* cannot be properly understood outside of
Aristotle’s understanding of the human being’s immersion in *logos*. The meaning of
*ousia* as literally ‘presencing’ and colloquially as ‘household goods’ is aligned, by
Heidegger, with Aristotle’s philosophical usage of *ousia* as presence in the sense of
accessibility. *Ousia* in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle is thus intrinsically
linked to the concept of the phenomenon, that is, the being the shows itself in its
being, which also entails that *ousia* must be sought out in *logos*.

Heidegger rejects any approach that begins with objects or sense-data. Beings in
general must be interpreted in terms of the way that the human being is, and can be,
directed towards beings. But as a whole, the being in the world of the human being
cannot be separated from speaking, including speaking with others. The present
character of beings to which *ousia* points is not an objective presence. Heidegger
brings out the role of ousia in Aristotle’s understanding of research by drawing attention to the structure of ambiguity. Heidegger asks ‘what in language can be addressed?’ or, in other words, ‘how can the way that the human being addresses the world be itself addressed?’ The identification of certain kinds of ambiguity, where one word is used to point to several beings, provides an opportunity to address language insofar as language is built up from the ways that the human being is in the world. Thus the context of the human being in logos draws attention to the conjunction of the encountered simplicity of an always already understood world with the latent complexity of the interpretation that discovers the constitution of present beings.

Section 4.3 follows the second chapter of the SS1924 where Heidegger reconstructs Aristotle’s approach to the totality of human being there. For Heidegger’s Aristotle the way that the human being can be grasped as a whole and as potentially complete is to be discovered by analysing the basic structure in which the human being is there in the world, in the here and now, in general. The ultimate end of the human being where eudaimonia and theōria are conjoined requires a complicated set of investigations into the nature of logos as the paradigmatic way that the human psuchē manifests. On the one hand logos is in continuity with the sounds that express the being in the world of animals. Humans too, as zōon, are directed towards a shared world of concern and communicate within the scope of this concern. On the other hand, logos has the basic possibility of bringing something to show itself, that is, logos brings beings to account for themselves, e.g.
with respect to their limit or end, with respect to being conducive, etc. Not only does the *logos* open the structural possibilities that culminate in the possibility of grasping things as a whole, but furthermore the *logos* is in each case the basic manner in which the human being actualises its concern and interprets its concern. *Theōria* thus can be understood as the actualisation that comes closest to paradigmatically representing the basic possibility of the human being; the basic human possibility is on the one hand the underlying condition of possibility for *praxis* and on the other hand the highest achievement of the human being.

Section 4.4 does not examine the third chapter of the SS1924 as a whole, but rather acts as a kind of appendix insofar as it shows how Heidegger recreates the status of the simple concrete encounter within being-in-the-world. This section focuses on how *doxa* is developed by Heidegger as structural element that shows how Aristotle grasped the possibility of the most immediate and pre-philosophical orientation within the world. *Doxa* is a crucial structural element for Heidegger because it encapsulates the manner in which the human being does not bring words to singular and clear representations but instead is immersed in *logos* from the beginning. In each case *doxa* provides a self-supported structure for various basic judgments about the world; *doxa* provides the possibility of encountering the world in a simple manner which forms a substrate for the possibilities of the human world that moves beyond the world of the animal.

In Heidegger’s reading the possibility of rhetoric means grasping *doxa* insofar as *doxa* is something that speaks for itself. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* can thus be read by
Heidegger as both an explanation of how one finds oneself in the world in *logos* and as an expression of Greek self-understanding.

Together the chapters of the thesis uncover a persistent strategy in the early Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. Once Heidegger has shown that the theoretical attitude has no foundation for beginning with a pre-formalised understanding of what beings are, the possibility of methodologically applying and appropriating the structural consistencies of experience shows itself as a dormant possibility of research once actualised by Aristotle. The totalisation of such research is completely different from the totality of regional sciences, and ultimately can only be thought of as the circular nature of human existence-as-self-interpretation. The early Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle can be greatly clarified in this context, where each part becomes a demonstration of the original structural self-showing where formalisation is an active modification of the human being or the subject of historiological research.

The originality of this thesis stems from not turning away from the theoretical attitude, but rather entering into Heidegger’s critique of it in order to explore the fundamental stakes. It is too easy to accept Heidegger's criticisms of the theoretical attitude, especially when the theoretical attitude often appears like a straw man, and to instead follow Heidegger into the recovery of Aristotelian concepts likes *phronēsis* and *praxis*. But Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is anything but discontinuous with his concerns regarding the possibility of linguistic formalisation. Put simply the early Heidegger’s project boils down to two things, first that the
meaning of research (and therefore of its possibilities) must be reconsidered in order
to discover a concept of research that does not simply assume the truth of the
distinction between the theoretical attitude and other forms of intentionality and
second that language is the key to this reconsideration. By first dealing with the
underlying issues of Heidegger’s project as expressed in his critique of the theoretical
attitude we can then pursue these into the readings of Aristotle and elucidate them
therein.

**Review of Literature**

There have been half a dozen books published on the relation of Heidegger to
and Aristotle in the last 15 years. There are enough books now such that the
literature can reflect on its own orthodoxies and disagreements. Mark Sinclair’s
2006 book attempts to make sense of some of the different readings of Heidegger’s
Aristotle by finding the fundamental divisions in Heidegger’s attitude towards
Aristotle.\(^{25}\) Sinclair finds three periods: the sympathetic period from 1921 to 1925,
the critical period from 1925 to 1931 and the turning period of 1935 to 1939.
Sinclair notes that most of the extant secondary literature is directed towards the
middle, critical period. While Heidegger is, at this time, explicitly critical of
Aristotle’s emphasis on the present (in the latter’s accounts of time and *sophia*) the
majority of commentators have paid most attention to the appropriation of
Aristotle’s concepts of *praxis* and *poiēsis*, *phronēsis* and *tecnē*. The discovery of the
influence of Aristotle on *Being and Time* was only made possible by the publication
of the WS1924-25 Plato’s Sophist lecture course. An orthodox position regarding Heidegger’s critical period is thus that Heidegger read Aristotle against himself. In short, Sinclair’s argument is that Aristotle’s accounts of praxis and phronēsis can reveal the temporal ecstatic dimension of experience in spite of the emphasis Aristotle puts on an isomorphism between the present now and the atemporal eidos. The exception to the rule is Ted Sadler’s 1996 Heidegger and Aristotle, which argues that Heidegger and Aristotle must be more straightforwardly opposed. Sadler pays more attention to the critique of Aristotle’s concept of time in the SS1927 lectures, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Everyone who mentions Sadler’s book rejects his argument as the direct result of taking too little of the source material of Heidegger’s Aristotle into account.

For Sinclair, the attention paid to the middle period is altogether too narrow and not only in Sadler’s work. This is because, for Sinclair, the arguments about the relation of praxis to Being and Time are limited only to suggesting that the latter inherits the concept from the former. The attention paid to praxis and poiēsis and phronēsis is easy to understand. On the one hand the concepts resonate with the concern with the political shown by some of Heidegger’s most famous students, Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss especially. And on the other hand these specific concepts shed light on areas of established Heidegger scholarship, for example, Being and Time and the concept of technology.

With the publication of more texts, not only does the breadth of Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle emerge in finer detail, but Heidegger scholarship has made
considerable recent progress in looking at parts of the Heideggerian corpus on their own terms. *Being and Time* in particular can hardly still be called the *magnum opus* of Heidegger. Nor can Heidegger’s work be divided into texts that provide a definitive statement of his position and works that deal with secondary issues. Such a conception would misunderstand the principle unity of Heidegger’s work, which I argue can only be understood insofar as the grand opposition staged in every one of Heidegger’s texts is encapsulated.

The thesis largely ignores Werner Marx’s *Heidegger and the Tradition*, published in the 1950s and translated in 1971, and Franco Volpi’s *Heidegger e Aristotele* (1984), as both precede most of the relevant Aristotle-related publishing. The more recent books, each of which are relevant to the project, are as follows. The first recent book is Ted Sadler’s *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being* (1996). Sadler argues against the orthodox view that Heidegger attempts to incorporate Aristotle’s practical philosophy, and instead suggests that the key to Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is the opposition of the concepts of time as they occur in the letters of Paul which Heidegger examined in his WS1920-21 ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’, and the concept of time in the fourth book of Aristotle’s *Physics* which Heidegger examines in *Being and Time* and *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, SS1927. While Sadler explores how Aristotle’s notion of time underlies the studies on *ousia* in the *Metaphysics*, most of the texts that are of interest in this thesis are not mentioned. I think his argument is coherent, and that Aristotle’s notion of time is the presupposition that Heidegger thinks needs to be understood in order to
understand Aristotle, but I think that Sadler overestimates both the extent to which Heidegger’s remarks about Aristotle can be taken as critique and the remarks made about Paul can be taken as the solution.

Sadler deliberately focuses on the presentation of Aristotle from the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, where Heidegger seems to set himself at a critical distance from Aristotle. The extent to which this critique can be taken as a guide for Heidegger’s other readings of Aristotle has been challenged by other commentators where his book has not been completely ignored. Sadler’s text was published prior to most of the lecture courses being published. At the time, the WS1924-25, *Plato’s Sophist* (published 1992 and translated 1997), stood alone as confirmation of the long heard rumours of the proximity of *Being and Time* to Heidegger’s earlier lectures. Sadler’s book not only suggests a grand opposition between Heidegger and Aristotle, but argues counter to the initial literature on the *Plato’s Sophist* course, that this opposition was in no way weakened on account of Heidegger’s sympathy with Aristotle’s practical philosophy. Sadler may well have been encouraged by the way that Gadamer remarked that the “dominating presence” of Aristotle in Heidegger’s early courses was perhaps due to Heidegger’s commitment to “strengthening the opponent.”

Sadler’s perception of the relation of Heidegger and Aristotle and his rejection of the orthodox belief in Heidegger’s sympathy with Aristotle’s practical philosophy both stem from peculiar readings of Aristotle’s position and a rather narrow regard for the meaning of *praxis*. For Sadler, even when Aristotle is interpreted outside of
the Scholastic distortion of his philosophy, Aristotle is still the paradigmatic
metaphysician. Sadler is content to oppose Heidegger’s *Seinsfrage* to Aristotle’s
being-qua-being because the latter is interpreted as meaning straightforwardly the
things that are and reducible as a whole only to one being in particular, that is, to
god. Heidegger on the other hand questions the assumption that beings can be
simply understood as presence, which for Aristotle is supposed by Sadler to be
“unproblematic”.29 Such a reading of Aristotle seems highly problematic and does
not accord with Heidegger’s comments on Aristotle either in the recently available
interpretations of *ousia* as there-being from the 1924 summer semester or in the
treatment of Aristotle’s approach to the question of being as analogy from the 1931
summer semester which was available to Sadler at the time.30

The second recent book is William McNeill’s *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger,
Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (1999). McNeill’s texts follows up references made
to the unexamined concept of the *Augenblick*, the momentary glance. While the fact
that Heidegger in the WS1924-25 lecture course, *Plato’s Sophist*, challenges the
motivations for Aristotle’s privilege of *sophia* over *phronēsis* has received a good
deal of commentary, McNeill investigates this tension in Heidegger’s Aristotle with a
much wider ranging analysis of Heidegger’s development. The *augenblick* is
investigated as the practical *aisthēsis* that belongs to *phronēsis*.

The third recent book is Walter A. Brogan’s *Heidegger and Aristotle: The
Twofoldness of Being* (2005).31 Brogan’s text is certainly the most detailed study of
the Heidegger-Aristotle relation to-date. While Brogan focuses on Heidegger’s
interpretation of the concept of *phusis* in the 1930s, which separates his work from this thesis, there is significant progress here in getting to the essence of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. Brogan takes his starting point from the 1939 essay on *phusis* because it is there, Brogan argues, that Heidegger identifies most clearly his guiding insight into Aristotle, that is, a two-fold conception of being. For Brogan, Heidegger’s early readings of Aristotle culminate in the discovery that it is the human being that is capable of disclosing this two-fold being in the way that beings can be understood in explicit relationship to their *archē*. The *archē* of beings can only be elaborated through various kinds of articulation, but most especially for Heidegger in the withdrawal of being. Against Sadler, Brogan runs perhaps the strongest version of the ‘inheritance-thesis’ insofar as he makes Heidegger’s development very much indebted to the discovery of Aristotle’s concepts of privation and potentiality.

The fourth book, already mentioned, is Mark Sinclair’s *Heidegger, Aristotle and the Work of Art: Poiesis in Being* (2006). As the title suggests, Sinclair examines how Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle can shed light on the enigmatic elements of his essay on art from the mid-30s. It is by focusing on the notion of destruction (*destruction*) over and above any considerations of the influence of one thinker on another, that leads Sinclair to suggest that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle must be taken as a repetition of Aristotle’s conception of being. Heidegger explication of the being of equipment in *Being and Time* is the first repetition. Heidegger’s concept of art is taken as a ‘second repetition’ of Aristotle’s hylo-morphic concept of being. Sinclair’s reading of the difference between the first and second repetitions is quite
conventional. According to Sinclair, in Heidegger’s later phase, Dasein is given less emphasis and instead the notions of openness and concealment are given a new privilege on the basis of a turn in Heidegger’s approach to presence. Instead of thinking of presence as determined by the concern of Dasein, presence is more properly determined by presencing. Sinclair’s thesis works perfectly well up to a point, but it has its drawbacks when it comes to understanding the details of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle outside of the revision of the distinction of matter-form.

The fifth book is Michael Bowler’s *Heidegger and Aristotle: Philosophy as Praxis* (2008), which examines Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle in the context of certain contemporary philosophical problems. Bowler’s thesis thus bears some resemblance to our own insofar as he reads Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle as part of an overcoming of contemporary metaphysical limitations due to ontological prejudices. Bowler’s approach consists of a series of examinations of Heidegger’s relation to Rickert, Husserl, Natorp and Dilthey, before turning to Aristotle, and in particular to his concept of *praxis*. Bowler’s thesis is that Heidegger finds that his contemporaries all fail to grasp that the concept of life cannot be added onto philosophy in order to find some motivating factor, but rather philosophy itself must be understood as life. Bowler argues that “… Heidegger appropriates from Aristotle the notion of philosophy as the fulfilment of life …” 32 Only Dilthey among Heidegger’s contemporaries sees the need to alter the way that life is understood in relation to research, but he fails to sufficiently break through the conventions of science. It is
Aristotle who provides the way to understand the origin of concepts in conceiving life in terms of *praxis*.

The recent literature treated above accepts that the exegesis of the relation of Heidegger to Aristotle demands to be questioned in itself. In this thesis, in opposition to much of the scholarship, we maintain that it is impossible to account for the Heidegger-Aristotle relationship either in terms of influence (of the latter on the former) or opposition. For the Heidegger scholars first able to access the early courses the extent to which *Being and Time* rested on the earlier readings of Aristotle had to stand out as the most extraordinary discovery. But now the shock of *Being and Time*’s Aristotelian content has worn away, scholars have sought to understand the real stakes of providing such an elaborate and original re-reading of Aristotle. Gadamer reports that while listening to the lectures no distinction was made clear between what was Heidegger and what was Aristotle.33 Scholars interested in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle have taken on the question of distinguishing them.

*Chapter 1: The Unity of the Opposition*

**1.1: The Unity of Conflict**

This section attempts to set out the basic structure and content of Heidegger’s critique of modern philosophy that is at its heart an identification of the ubiquity of the theoretical attitude. This underlying unity of Heidegger’s criticisms can then
provide the context in which to examine the general reasons for Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle and in particular how Aristotle is used as a pedagogical counter-example to the theoretical attitude. In order to reveal the underlying nature of Heidegger’s key problems the manner in which Heidegger criticises other philosophical positions must be clearly understood. While Heidegger criticises the historical analyses of Simmel, Dilthey, Spengler or the systematic integration of values and the sciences in consciousness by Natorp and Rickert, he always does so with regard to the underlying prejudices that drive the ontological claims that these thinkers make explicitly or implicitly. What we uncover is that Heidegger’s criticisms of the theoretical attitude boil down to the identification of a model of beings that stems from the calcification of the originary metaphysical understanding of being as presence. Because Heidegger’s criticisms identify an identical problem in otherwise disparate philosophies, the target of Heidegger’s criticisms is referred to for the most part throughout this thesis as ‘modern’ or ‘contemporary’ philosophy.

Heidegger’s critical assessments of other philosophical positions emerge out of a concern with the predetermination of the form of beings in research. In any investigation of beings the manner in which such an investigation can be carried out is potentially subject to its own investigation. Rather than examining the results of research, Heidegger investigates the way that research has been secured in its possibility, i.e. the way that the ‘objects’ of research have been already delimited by the foundational principles (what Aristotle would call the archai) of the particular form of research. The way a given set of beings appear in a given region, is
contingent upon the prior decision that, in delimiting that region, renders the appearance of beings within that region possible. In the SS1923, Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity, Heidegger suggests that “It is not a matter of entering into a debate with this philosophy or indeed refuting it” but instead the sole question to put to the contemporary development of philosophy is “into which guiding point of view has philosophy’s domain of objects been placed?”35 Thus, philosophy is examined by Heidegger with respect to the presuppositions about the being of beings that guide research to be carried out in a certain way. Heidegger characterises the basic way that the theoretical attitude grasps the possibility of research as follows:

Insofar as a multiplicity of regions, levels, and gradations of being comes to be encountered, there arises vis-à-vis it the task of a system which can encompass it and which as such includes two tasks: first, sketching out the conceptual framework, the basic guidelines, of the context of classification, and then allocating the respective places for concrete beings in the various domains of the system.36

In such an approach, the method follows what has already been decided, that is, that the form of beings is secured in the structures of regionality. Thus the form of
beings has been secured that allows the clarification of a systematic approach to the classification of objects.

Heidegger’s own project can be read as being in an active conflict with the theoretical attitude. The conflict is ‘active’ because the theoretical attitude cannot simply be avoided, but must be continuously resisted. The nature of this conflict is established here with respect to two key terms: research and logic. Both ‘research’ and ‘logic’ are given special interpretations by Heidegger within the context of human existence. The theoretical attitude, as has already been touched on, is a way in which research secures its object and method. But the theoretical attitude becomes more than a mere thought-technique when considered in the context of human existence as a whole. Interpreting the being of beings is not exclusively the province of the regional sciences. Instead, as human beings, we intrinsically possess the possibility of questioning the being of beings. An inability to recognise the way that the theoretical attitude has secured a limited way of approaching beings in research actively blocks the radical confrontation of the question of the being of beings. Thus Heidegger must reveal the theoretical attitude as the trap into which the human being’s proper possibility of questioning has fallen.

The predetermination of the being of beings at work in the research of contemporary philosophy and science is criticised in the context of Heidegger’s understanding of human existence. Research in this sense cannot be defined through the comparative method, that is, research cannot be understood by looking for a common characteristic in the examples of research that come down to us
through history. Research must be understood as one relation to beings that the
human being can decide to pursue. In this way Heidegger puts an attitude directed
towards attaining knowledge in the context of life. Thus, on the one hand research is
one kind of relation among many other possible relations to beings and on the other
hand, research must turn to beings that are already accessible prior to the research.
The human being has the possibility of deciding to alter its relation to beings, to
make a decision to *discover* the being of beings. Heidegger criticises philosophy and
science insofar as they inhibit the full realisation of this project. Thus, the
battleground that the theoretical attitude and Heidegger’s alternative research
possibilities share is each individual human being.

Phenomenology in Heidegger’s usage must also be understood from the context
of the possibility of research. Phenomenology for Heidegger is not a set of
techniques that can be adopted, but rather involves a critical challenge to the
ontological assumptions to which everyone is always, already committed insofar as
they exist, i.e. insofar as they have a relationship to their ‘ownmost’ possibilities.
The intention to do research into the being of beings is already there in some sense
for everyone, but for the most part the radicality of the question is inaccessible.
Research is in danger of losing the potential that belongs to it. For this reason,
Heidegger emphasises that the desire to question must be privileged over any
particular techniques or concepts that have been inherited. Thus Heidegger
attempts to reserve the term ‘phenomenology’ to mean a principled stance against
the conventional philosophical procedure of establishing a position. On this basis,
Heidegger can be critical of Husserl with respect to Husserl’s attempts to secure the object of research for phenomenology as consciousness. For Heidegger, phenomenology is intrinsically attached to the preparatory project of understanding the relationship of the sciences, philosophy, the theoretical attitude and the more basic possibility of research.

The conflict with the theoretical attitude is also present in the meaning of ‘philosophy’. The meaning of ‘philosophy’ for Heidegger also contains an inner tension. Philosophy can refer to the original questioning horizon of philosophy or the historical sedimentation of its subdivisions, questions, methods and results. When referring to philosophy as a cultural intellectual practice with its set questions and habits, Heidegger usually means ‘philosophy’ in a derogatory sense. Such a philosophical practice, which has its questions given with its divisions into logic, ethics, epistemology and so on, exists for Heidegger as the remains of the primary way that philosophy exists. The primary way cannot be essentially identified by distinguishing it from other cultural practices, but rather must be referred back to the potential for human existence to become aware of itself as a radical problem. This is not to say that the questions that philosophy in an academic sense are to be ignored, but rather that philosophy is worthwhile and genuine to the extent in which human existence is genuinely challenged.

‘Science’ too is said by Heidegger in different ways. Throughout much of his early period, Heidegger attempts to distinguish ‘science’ which is marked out by the decision to discover the being of beings, from science as it is more narrowly
developed in the theoretical attitude, that is, as a formal totality of propositions established within the confines of founded regions. Just as philosophy in the bad sense stems from philosophy in the good sense, so all scientific work stems from a genuine decision to discover the being of beings, and yet, the self-understanding of scientific practice has become severely degenerated.

‘Good science’, for Heidegger, like ‘good philosophy’ already, to some extent includes phenomenology. Phenomenology from the beginning cannot be distinguished from philosophy or science, but rather attempts to overcome the specific degenerative tendencies to which both are subject. One aspect of phenomenology seeks to reveal how science and philosophy can be genuine through the analysis of the constitution of objects to which philosophy and science are directed. Thus Heidegger can suggest that phenomenology allows for the final clarification of an ontology that grasps only objects. Phenomenology allows for an understanding of the tasks of such object-focused ontology. But phenomenology also allows for the discovery of the fundamental limitations and blockages of the tradition of ontology. For Heidegger, phenomenology shows ontology to have reached an impasse due to the prejudice that determines beings as objects, nature as the totality of objects and the subject as in relation to objects.

Heidegger’s attempts to reveal where philosophy and science fail to be research centre upon the way in which the simple being in intuition is approached. That we do encounter beings is a precondition for research. The disputes begin when determining how to investigate beings, that is, when answering how beings are
encountered in the first place and how they are to be fully revealed. For Heidegger, the decision to discover the being of beings only makes sense on the basis of several presuppositions. For the decision to do science to make sense there must be some presupposition of how beings are encountered prior to the decision such that they might need scientific treatment to discover them, as well as an apprehension of what a scientific apprehension will mean. Thus Heidegger begins by grasping the basic nature of the challenge of research simply at the level of beings insofar as they are covered but somehow given, and are able to be revealed in some way. Heidegger is then in a position to reflect on the nature of the theoretical attitude as one way in which these presuppositions have been made.

Heidegger does not connect the presuppositions that constitute the theoretical attitude to anything set down explicitly by any researcher but rather thinks that the presuppositions are revealed, again and again when the theoretical attitude is actualised in concrete research. The theoretical approach presupposes that an object in the world can be encountered in its full presence, and hence that research is fulfilled by pure empty looking. Thus the theoretical attitude includes a supposition that research requires the researcher to adopt a stance that receives the object just as it is, and must not add any subjective complexity to the simple object. This simple subject-object relation is accompanied by two further simple relations that help support the methodological gathering of the results into a system. The first is the relation of the particular object to a specific object type that exists alongside other object types within a region. The second is the general relation of all objects
to the basic concept which establishes what the region contains. The singularity of the object is predetermined as part of a set of objects each in a determinate relation to other objects contained exclusively within a region. Thus, the singularity of the object is fully determined by the differences from the other objects that belong to the same genus in the region. All objects for the theoretical attitude are fully determined, and fully known, through the identification of a species or object-type. The species, considered as part of the system, is at once simply ‘what the object is’ and is at the same time considered to be ‘the look’ of the thing. This ‘look’ which the theoretical attitude apprehends is only possible because it is precisely the role of the regional totality to determine the significance of the differences, thus some differences are differences of genus and others of species and others of particulars and all other differences are excluded from the region as so called noise.

Research in the theoretical attitude exercises the possibility of an object being encountered as merely the sum of its formalisable elements. Such an object is as such fully known, that is, fully appropriated into a region. But the formal relations that belong to the object are made possible by the basic relation between the individual object and the totality of the region. The experience of the object is as such structured from the beginning by the presupposition that the object is a part of a regional totality. For Heidegger, it is important to recognise that in the classificatory work of the regional scientist environmental experience is ‘destroyed’ insofar as it is seen only through a predetermined conceptual framework. Regionality and its importance in the early Heidegger’s conception of the
philosophies of science and logic of his time is discussed more extensively above and below. Here it is important to point out a few key points where Heidegger and the theoretical attitude come into conflict. Regionality itself is by no means rejected by Heidegger, at least not the early Heidegger. Regionality is simply a way in which predetermined beings are encountered in research, that is, encountered within a mode of research that has secured the objective realm to which it attends. This securing of the region is equivalent to the stabilisation of the identity and differences that allow for any species to be classified. Just as a botanist is concerned with plants, and thus aims to see with a conceptual framework built upon the basic concept of plant life, so all regions begin with a basic concept which guides the appropriation of all identities and differences that classify the full presence of the relevant object.

Research in or out of the theoretical attitude aims to discover the being of beings in some way. But different ways of actualising research are founded on different preconceptions about the being of beings. In the theoretical attitude, transfixed only by beings as they are predetermined as objects of a region, beings are appropriated into a system of true propositions. The truth of the propositions is supported by the stabilisation of identity and difference that is predetermined by the totalisation of the region as founded on its basic concept. Thus research in the theoretical attitude aims to discover the being of beings in the form of a system. The system is perhaps the best distillation of what Heidegger is working against, because the system specifically is accompanied by the presupposition that the system is the full appropriation of anything significant in the actualisation of intuition itself – the
system is the fulfilment of research in the theoretical attitude. A complete system is made up of nothing but the sum of true propositions without remainder. The attempt to find a pre-scientific world by Heidegger is a specific challenge to the claim to exclusive knowledge that the theoretical attitude maintains in its aim to create and finalise systems.

This preliminary sketch of the theoretical attitude is enough to see where Heidegger challenges his students to take up a phenomenological approach to their own scientific work. Heidegger attempts to change the students’ way of thinking about the constitution of a specifically scientific mode of intuition by drawing attention to Aristotle. At the beginning of the SS1924, Heidegger attempts to pinpoint where he shall intervene in the theoretical attitude, that is, at the level of the concept. To quote at length:

You have a genuine task to carry out: not of philosophizing but rather of becoming attentive, from where you are situated, to the conceptuality of a science, to really come to grips with it, and to pursue it in such a way that the research fulfilment of conceptuality becomes vital. It is not a matter of studying all of the scientific theories that periodically appear! By paying attention to the proper fulfilment of a specific science, you attain a legitimate, proper, and serious relation to the matter of your science. Not in such a way that you can apply Aristotelian concepts, but rather in doing for your
science what Aristotle did in his place and in the context of his research, namely, to see and determine the matters with the same originality and legitimacy: I simply have the task of providing the opportunity for Aristotle to put the matter before you.39

What is established in this paragraph? First, Heidegger opposes two ways in which science might be discovered as science. Heidegger rejects a comparative method where one might discover what science is by examining many sciences and then determining what is common among them. Instead of looking at many sciences Heidegger suggests that a single experience of one science is an opportunity to become attentive to the conceptuality that underlies that to which the scientist is aiming. The concept is already there in the intuition of the scientist insofar as it is the grasp of the possibility of grasping the object – but the object takes up all the attention of the scientist and the conceptuality of the research remains unthematised. For Heidegger, Plato and Aristotle are specifically attentive to uncovering concepts, that is to securing the original possibility of getting to the being of beings. What is vital here is the mutual bond between the experience of the scientist and the possibility of discovering the concept. The concept is to be discovered insofar as the actuality of research itself is made explicit. On the one hand, the scientist wants something and insofar as the scientist genuinely goes about the task of science the scientist is there in the proper mode of discovering a certain matter. On the other hand, the explication of the concept that supports the
object can come into conflict with the presupposition that the object is simply what is there in the world once all presuppositions have been removed.

Research can be concretely carried out in a way such that the conceptual nature of the scientific attitude does not become thematic; the scientist is rather attentive for the most part only to the object. What does conceptuality mean here? It means the conditions of possibility for a scientific mode of intuition, that is, the conditions of possibility for a simple appearance, including the apprehension of an object in the theoretical attitude. The conceptuality itself need not be made thematic in order for the object to give itself, and yet in the simple look of the object the opportunity is there to become aware of the conceptuality of the concept which supports the object in its singularity. By avoiding the concept the theoretical attitude avoids bringing into view the conditions of possibility for ‘objective’ experience. For Heidegger conceptuality becomes thematic when the conjunction of objects and the prejudices that are actualised in the attitude that looks to the object come to the fore. Thus the theoretical attitude in countered by Heidegger by replacing the stable object-region relation with an unstable relation of the concept with itself.

Once the structural conflict with the theoretical attitude is brought into view we can better understand how this conflict plays out with regard to what Heidegger calls ‘logic’. Preliminarily Heidegger uses two meanings of the word logic in parallel: one of these is modern formal logic and the other is Aristotle’s original logic. The modern understanding of (formal) logic is constituted by a number of presuppositions about the treatment of identities. The ancient understanding of
logic emerges from the specific understanding of being-there in *logos*. At first these two logics may seem to have little to do with one another besides the name. Yet the critiques that Heidegger levels at formal logic can only come to fulfilment on the basis of the alternative path offered by Aristotle’s understanding of logic.

Heidegger’s critiques of formal logic are not attacks on formal logic per se, but on the presuppositions about the nature of identities, presuppositions that allow for a simple semantic relation to beings. Put simply, the formal object that belongs within a system of relations that can purely be constructed mathematically or symbolically is not isomorphic with beings as they are encountered in lived experience. The relation to beings that humans possess is not to a region of individual and separable objects with definable qualities and relations. Nor can the work of classification that treats objects in this predetermined manner pass for a proper analysis of the being of beings. For Heidegger, the development of metaphysics into an epistemology of formalisation is founded on a number of incorrect assumptions about the nature of the relation of the subject and the object.

The nature of Heidegger’s critique can be summarised with reference to ‘the critique of the metaphysics of presence’. The critique of the metaphysics of presence has two basic steps. Firstly, Heidegger identifies an assumption in philosophy that ‘what is x’ must finally resolve into a full mental or sensible intuition of x in the here and now. This assumption regarding the ultimate correlation between being and intuition is attributed to the entire history of metaphysics. Second, the assumption is challenged on the basis that the form of fully present identities, in the unified form
of real objects or ideal propositional representations, or both together in the
correspondence theory of truth, all misrepresent the meaning of pre-theoretical
objects. The examination of the conditions of possibility for encountering something
cannot rest on the assumption that objects simply exist, nor on the assumption that
knowledge most properly relates to objects and their characteristics and relations.
The character of assignment that belongs to equipment, for instance, in the famous
third chapter of *Being and Time* on the worldhood of the world, is left behind if a
piece of equipment is taken to be a self-contained object present to hand.40 What
such examples are supposed to reveal is that the mode in which beings are accessed
in everyday life is involved in a fundamentally temporal mode of human
understanding. Heidegger again and again points out that the potential to formalise
the individual elements and the structures in which they show themselves is a
temptation. With various kinds of assignments Heidegger points out that,

These phenomena can easily be formalized on the basis of their
formal relation character. We are especially inclined today to subject
all beings to an ‘interpretation’ following the guidelines of such a
‘relation’, an interpretation which is always ‘correct’ because it
basically says nothing, no more than the facile schema of form and
content.41
In short, Heidegger sees how formalisation can be a way of treating one way of looking at something as the finished way of looking at something; formalisation thereby becomes a way of turning away from the possibility of questioning a being in its conditions of possibility.

Examples such as signs and tools that have significance in an existence defined by concern rather than in pure contemplation strike a chord with many readers. One, unfortunate consequence of this is that the critique of the metaphysics of presence is often accepted as a kind of natural correlate of this distinction in the absence of further analysis or investigation. But such simplicity can be misleading. Simply pointing out the lack of isomorphism between beings and presence is only a pointer to Heidegger’s problems. A much better way of getting to the core of Heidegger’s arguments is the specific attacks he makes on the theoretical attitude as it relates to language. If language is analysed in the same mode that one might analyse a present object then one begins by trying to approach the presence of the word. Since words intrinsically point elsewhere, and thus have absence in their essence, the project of looking at word-things begins on shaky foundations. The project must introduce additional concepts in order to locate the word either in intention or extension and must use such concepts in order to explain the co-constituting nature of the general-particular relation. Heidegger suggests that this kind of logical analysis is entirely justified in the project of ordering logical relations that have already been founded and explored. But such work has no chance of considering the genesis of such
relations and meanings, no chance of examining the motivated procedures of original questioning from which philosophy has emerged.

Language, or rather the relation of language to perception, lies at the crux of Heidegger’s polemic. The ordering tendencies of the theoretical attitude, prevalent in the contemporary pursuit of knowledge, are suitable only for predetermined fields of knowledge. Heidegger however wants to clarify how regions of knowledge are initially determined, and that includes the foundations that allow any general-particular relation to become ordered in a logical scheme. The theoretical attitude is linked to the conceptual hierarchical ordering of universal-particular and genus-species. The “highest level of theorization...resides in the unities of meaning and signifying connections of language.” A set of basic problems and the historical origins of the conditions of possibility for logical order are forgotten when the procedures of knowledge lead one to think that the only task is the classification of a natural order that is clear insofar as the researcher may look at the things themselves close enough to see all distinctions.

The unfolding of this critique is both a formal argument and also a theory of historical degeneration. Heidegger maintains a historical argument that the presuppositions about the nature of identity in the theoretical attitude can be understood as part of a natural degenerative tendency of philosophy. Aristotle has a prominent place in this historical critique insofar as he is responsible for most of the concepts that have become sedimented through their scholastic inheritance. Thus Aristotle is an important battleground where the recovery of original logic is at the
same time the destruction of the conceptual array available to the modern attempts to think the foundations.

Heidegger’s critical approach can be called destruction, or better the destructive retrieval. Destruction is aimed at the hermeneutic conjunction of past and present. Destruction is also the destruction of the regionalisation of history, which is as much to say the separation of the history of ontology from the ground of ontology in one’s own being. If philosophical concepts occur in a system that must simply be learnt as words and linked to experience through examples based on the worldview that the system of relations holds open, then philosophy has degenerated. Philosophy must go to experience itself, not to experience through the system of concepts with everything important already decided.

The concepts to be destroyed herein are especially those that support the confusion of formal and general ontology, that is the approach to beings that understands a being in general to be accessible in a region of formal objects. In such a confusion the logical form of objects is taken to be the basic example of what a being is, thus the general regions that scientifically classify the objective contents of experience are taken to be subordinate to the formal region of pure logic. These concepts support a concept of identity, and hence being, that is especially superficial. Heidegger spends a good deal of time analysing the privilege given to the presumption of full accessibility that the merely formal being possesses. Along with this critique, Heidegger appropriates and radicalises the position of formal identity with his method of formal indication.
Heidegger’s basic critique of the trespass of formal language into the realm of a
general ontology was secured right at the beginning of his career along with the task
of understanding how the theoretical attitude could emerge from pre-theoretical
experience. The attempt to understand how research could lose sight of its original
possibility guides Heidegger’s work. These tasks are both applied to Aristotle very
early on. What remains consistent in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is that
Aristotle is presented in two distinct forms aligned with each side of the polemic.

On the one hand, Heidegger raises a set of criticisms against the history of
philosophy and the work of his contemporaries and these criticisms are closely
aligned with the accusation of a widespread misappropriation of Aristotle. Heidegger is not only critical of this orthodox Aristotle who is invoked as the noble
father of the correspondence theory of truth, the substance theory of reality and the
logical theory of the natural order in genera and species, but Heidegger also suggests
that, “Aristotle has had an underlying influence on our ways of seeing and, above all,
speaking, ‘articulations’: logic.”43 Thus Aristotle has both an explicit and implicit
connection with the degeneration of philosophy throughout its history.

On the other hand, Aristotle is distinguished as the origin of so many familiar
concepts and operations of philosophy. The origin of these concepts however is
separated by a fissure from their inheritance. Thus Aristotle must be reintroduced to
the present age through a destructive retrieval. This requires the subordination of
all the familiar concepts of philosophy to the original horizon of questions in which
Aristotle worked. To this end, Heidegger’s own readings of Aristotle often take the
form of radical translations and explications designed to shock his students out of
the slumber of terminological familiarity. This work of destructive retrieval of
Aristotle’s original questioning horizon can be tentatively called the sympathetic
aspect of Heidegger’s Aristotle. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle follows Heidegger’s
belief that the tradition of philosophy and the possibility of genuinely questioning
the nature of the human being have become separated. For Heidegger, to re-read
Aristotle requires a twofold effort: on the one hand to question radically and
originally enough, and on the other hand to think with Aristotle insofar as the
original possibility of questioning has been taken up.

1.2: Heidegger’s Critical Beginning

Both neo-Kantianism and phenomenology emerge out of the attempts to
understand the relationship between and the foundation of different kinds of
objects and knowledge. Both philosophies attempt to disclose the basic kind of
knowledge that reveals the workings of knowledge in itself. For both, this task is
encapsulated by the term ‘logic’, but for Husserl the foundations of logic were to be
discovered in the region of consciousness. The trend of neo-Kantian epistemology
and philosophy of science as represented by Hermann Cohen, Heinrich Rickert and
Paul Natorp sought to revive Kant in order to explain how knowledge of the
objective world emerged in the experience of the scientist. The neo-Kantians
accepted that the substance of knowledge was bound up in the form of propositions,
the sum of which may be assessed through logical rigour. For Heidegger, on the

other hand, this perspective started from an enormous error, that of the confusion of general and formal ontology. Attacking the neo-Kantians provided Heidegger an opportunity to clarify his own understanding of phenomenology. Heidegger’s critiques of the neo-Kantians vis-à-vis phenomenology contain the germ of Heidegger’s logical thinking.

The confusion of general and formal ontology must be considered in some detail in order to grasp how it manifests a broader underlying crisis. For Heidegger this confusion is rooted in the history of philosophy from scholasticism to contemporary scientific thinking that culminated in the neo-Kantians. But why do general and formal ontologies need to be kept separate? What does this confusion have to do with the history of philosophy? What have they got to do with presence?

Firstly, general and formal ontology must be distinguished. On the one hand, general ontology is the study of the relations between identities that encapsulate and distinguish those same identities, that is, the relations of substance and species and genus. Such relations belong together with the stabilised objects as they are uncovered in the regional sciences. For example, an individual colour has a certain relation to the concept of colour in general. When we encounter the colour brown in the world, it is indeed a colour, and if we see the species brown as a colour we might also understand that insofar as this particular brown is to be a colour then it is not simply a particular experience of a colour, but it is furthermore not red, purple or any other colour. The being that supports this specific difference, where brown is not red rather than this brown is not a banana, is the species of brown, and this
species belongs to the genus colour. The articulation of such relations, and the separation of such relations from particular instances, belong to general ontology. On the other hand, formal ontology is the logical study of formal relations, relations of whole and part and the one and the many for example. Formal relations, which can be represented symbolically, are the province of mathematics. The relations of general ontology, while they are indeed separated from individual examples, belong to experience in the world, while formal ontology needs no such ground in experience. If one was to suggest that all the relations of general ontology could be subsumed within the formal structures of formal ontology, and thus all knowledge could be represented within a logical mathematical superstructure, then all facts could be known at least in their formal limits.

In 1919 Heidegger provides a critique of this move to subsume all knowledge into formal ontology. Certainly Heidegger has already developed a sympathy with life-philosophy (Lebensphilosophie) which runs counter to the logicist epistemology of the neo-Kantian orthodoxy. But Heidegger has no sympathy with the lack of logical and scientific rigour that often accompanies life philosophy. Instead he sets out a methodology of phenomenology that provides for a different relation between formal and general ontology. This method he calls formal indication. For Heidegger, formalisation represents the preliminary and utterly superficial level of knowledge. The capacity to formally represent knowledge as it appears in the logical apprehension of the form of the proposition, and thus the propositional form of truth, is the kind of knowledge that one has when all identities are flattened to a
single region of beings. This flattened experience which can be represented formally because one object is like any other object, joins together the pinnacle of metaphysical thought with the most basic tendency of average everyday understanding. On the one hand, formal ontology can appear like the highest level of general ontology as soon as the object-in-general is conceived. On the other hand, in average everydayness all beings are grasped through their species without any regard for the relationship of particular and universal, and more importantly without any regard for the complexity in the constitution of the species. Instead in averageness species are simply there already understood and commonly exchanged in communication. The simple presence of beings in averageness prepares the way to see beings as formally one. But averageness prepares for the more extreme expansion of formal ontology into language. The proposition-in-general can only be conceived when propositions appear to have a basic meaning in themselves. This basic meaning is the average meaning. The possibility of treating the proposition as an independent and formal unity in itself depends entirely on the deceptive character of average understanding to appear simple and completely comprehensible – this is the character of ‘idle talk’. Just as the over-extension of formal ontology is constructed on the predetermination of the object in general, propositions in general, and systems in general, so the everyday pre-theoretical tendency is to take beings as just beings in general inasmuch as they are all simply present beings. An alliance thus is maintained between pure intellectual activity and common understanding.
For Heidegger this flattened reality is the starting point of an inquiry into the manner in which we have understood our possibilities.

Because of [facticity’s] tendency to lapse, factic life lives for the most part in what is inauthentic ... in what it appropriates in averageness. ... Philosophy, in the way it asks questions and finds answers, also stands within this movement of facticity, since philosophy itself is simply the explicit exposition and interpretation of factic life.45

The way that we see things as obviously there is the result of the way we have secured ourselves in the world, viz. have understood our own being. It is the motive of wanting to understand our own being in the world which provides the means for the research into the being of beings after the securing tendency has been released from everydayness. Thus, only by first coming to doubt the completeness of beings as they commonly appear can philosophy begin.

How should we, according to Heidegger, begin to doubt the completeness of beings and thus begin to search after them? Not as Descartes and Plato do, by turning away from beings in order to take security in an idea of certainty. But rather in examining beings as phenomena, that is, as they are in their being. This examination of phenomena, that is, how beings show themselves in their being, is not to turn from a theoretical apprehension back to a naive one, because such
perspectives offer the same flattened identities. Nor is the phenomenon to be discovered by leaping onto a new concept to which all things can be reduced. The key method first of all is formal indication.

Formal indication involves patience insofar as it does not provide a method that can be blindly followed. Formal indication requires patience insofar as it stays with beings over time, without a predetermined understanding of the structure of the being in question; the investigation thus begun allows the very nature of beings to be at stake. Formal indication is also literally a formal indication, it points to beings insofar as beings present themselves, but what is isolated is simply that something presents itself, the what of beings is suspended. Formal indication thus involves a holding back from any confidence that beings are understood in their being. The capacity to point, the index, is held to be a fundamental possibility of human beings—the ‘that’ precedes the ‘what’. Heidegger expands a little regarding new possibilities of understanding the modes of access that co-constitute beings by employing the framework of phenomenological intentionality.

One form of intentionality splits the structure of the self-showing of beings into a three-fold structure: enactment, relation and content. Heidegger suggests that for the most part we are content focused, that is, transfixed by objects, we interpret our own being in the world with respect to things simply being there. Modern science and the logicist epistemology of the neo-Kantians develop this content focus into what Heidegger calls ‘the theoretical attitude’. Objectivity, which is nothing but the presupposition of the completeness of things insofar as they can be seen fully, is an
attitude towards beings where enactment and relation are both frozen in order to stabilise the fixation on the position of content. The theoretical attitude thus does not merely focus on content, as naive world fixation does, but the freezing of the other parts of the intentional structure means that content can be formalised and thus produce the possibility of treating objects and propositions as fundamentally compatible. When such an order of objects is founded on a basic concept, this is a regional science. The predetermination of being that founds the region means that beings can either be given fully as they are appropriated into the region or else appear as noise. The difference between the intentional relation of the theoretical attitude and the relation towards the pre-theoretical world in which we live for the most part is excluded from the totality to which the regional scientist is directed.

With this cursory look at the theoretical attitude with the intentional structure, formal indication can be clarified a little. Formal indication freezes the content element of the structure in order to draw out the relation and enactment elements. Thus we begin with the fact that something is there, and then ask how the being is accessed, how the being became accessible and how it became limited in its content. And in this context of developing a counter kind of research, we can consider the fact that turning to the phenomena does not simply mean to turn away from traditional ontology, but rather is inseparable from the destruction of the history of ontology. The patience of formal indication is required because all new method must at every stage counter the tendency of the theoretical attitude to lose sight of the phenomena in its attempt to secure a content focused order of knowledge.
1.3: Formal Indication versus the Theoretical Attitude

In the KNS1919, ‘Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’, Heidegger’s critique of the assumed compatibility of basic objects with a capacity to order them by virtue of the identity that is there simply in their presence is directed almost entirely at the regions of science. Not only does Heidegger therein define the ‘theoretical attitude’ within the structure of intentionality, but he also identifies in the foundations of regionalisation a twofold relation. Heidegger must prise apart this structural element from the theoretical attitude. On the one hand, the relations internal to an already established region are the relations of genus and species as they have been dealt with since the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. All such basic determinations are to be uprooted. But the crucial element of regionalisation is that all of its relations can only be clarified after the theoretical attitude has already been taken up. The event that has always already occurred is the opening up of sight on the basis of an original determination.

The original determination of regions is the determination of the totality of the field. This original determination provides the basic way that all elements in the system of relations can exist and can relate to one another. Regionalisation as an ordering of content is fleshed out below, but in short Heidegger develops a counter logic that replaces the way that relations and content have been understood to relate to one another and thus can be spoken of. In this divide, the beginnings of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle can be located. By reconnecting the propositional truth contained in the material regions of science back to environmental experience,
Heidegger can then ask how the conditions of possibility of research were originally understood. This is where Aristotle’s understanding of research as a possibility of life prepares the way for an explanation of the theoretical attitude.

We thus turn to formal indication and the formalisation that accompanies regionalisation and the theoretical attitude. With the publication and translation of Heidegger’s early Freiburg lecture courses accompanied with the large works of Kisiel and van Buren, ‘formal indication’ has become part of the Heideggerian lexicon. Three articles in particular, ‘Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications’ by Daniel Dahlstrom, ‘Heidegger’s formal indication: a question of method in Being and Time’ by Ryan Streeter, and ‘The Genetic Difference in Reading Being and Time’ by Theodore Kisiel, have contributed to the uptake of the phrase. The phrase ‘formal indication’ is immediately attractive by offering to encapsulate the method, or even the “secret weapon,” of Heidegger’s ‘phenomenological decade’. Both Kisiel and Streeter emphasise how the clarification of formal indication considerably contributes to the reading of Being and Time. Both emphasise how Heidegger is influenced by Husserl’s employment of indexicality in returning questions of truth back to their place in experience. With the indication of temporal existence in mind, Kisiel suggests that “it is because of the dominance of the formal indication in Being and Time albeit largely unstated there, that Heidegger’s overriding concern in his magnum opus is in fact the language of logos.” By ‘logos’ Kisiel means Heidegger’s attempt to ‘renew’ logic. It was this project that lead Heidegger to develop new categories to speak of the temporal
existence where substance and the handy had previously dominated. Such excitement in the literature resembles the response to the publication of the *Plato’s* Sophist lectures. Just as Heidegger’s reading of *Nicomachian Ethics* VI revealed how the *poiēsis-praxis* divide aligned with the first and second parts of the first division of *Being and Time*, formal indication prefigures the true significance of the existential concepts developed there as well. Some scholars, including Dahlstrom and Hent de Vries, have followed the less obvious road in order to analyse the historical and religious elements of formal indication. However, formal indication is not simply a useful name for something already known to Heidegger scholarship prior to recent attentions.

Set in its original context, formal indication is the keystone of the early Heidegger’s phenomenological stance against neo-Kantian philosophy of science (Rickert) and neo-Kantian critiques of the principle of description in phenomenology (Natorp). This stance evolves into the much more familiar and influential critique of metaphysics. Dahlstrom has noted how formal indication fits into Heidegger’s historical and logical critiques of scientific and metaphysical traditions.

Formal indication has been explicated by others by revealing how it underlies *Being and Time*. The primary reference is the WS1921-22, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, where formal indication is explained explicitly in formulations that already point to the later work. Dahlstrom points to familiar ‘formally indicative’ philosophical concepts such as death, and the familiar criticism of metaphysics. Soren Overgaard’s more recent explication, which owes a good deal
to Dahlstrom, settles on the securing of thinking ontologically instead of ontically as the best way to understand formal indication.\textsuperscript{53} While connecting formal indication with \textit{Being and Time} is initially helpful in understanding this difficult concept, there is also the danger of obfuscation through familiarity.

The following section examines the original argument for formal indication that Heidegger developed from 1919 to 1923. Therein formal indication emerges as a clarification of the possibility of phenomenology for Heidegger. The method is initially proposed as an alternative mode of research outside of the ‘theoretical attitude’ attributed to all contemporary scientific research. Heidegger thus counters the excessive claims made by the proponents of the theoretical attitude, especially by pointing to the theoretical attitude’s inability to distinguish its own founding ontological prejudices from method, reason and knowledge in themselves. Only in the context of this critical opposition can the stakes of formal indication be understood. Heidegger is proposing nothing less than the discovery of a different starting point for genuine research. This involves rejecting the primacy of the object in both the scientifically concrete and formal-logical abstract forms. Formal indication is an alternative way of taking up ‘that-being’ that does not hold any truth in itself but actualises a slumbering potential for Dasein’s self-awareness.

The examination of formal indication proceeds in two parts. The first part establishes the outline of the critical opposition of formal indication and the theoretical attitude that Heidegger consistently presents throughout the courses from 1919 to 1923. Both positions are articulated by Heidegger in the threefold
intentional schema of content-relation-enactment. The second part re-examines the critical opposition of formal indication and the theoretical attitude in the context of Heidegger’s appropriation of Husserl’s distinction between formalisation and generalisation. This requires returning to the second half of the KNS1919, ‘Phenomenology and the Problem of Worldview.’ Much of the argument that is presented there is reformulated in the introduction to the WS1920-21, ‘Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion’. 54

Formal indication can initially be defined in familiar terms. Formal indication is an empty pointing that resists determining its indicated content with inherited categories of subject and object. Instead formal indication attempts to save the phenomena by examining the sense of the indication from where original philosophical concepts can be drawn. Already it can be divided into a positive and critical aspect. On the one hand, *something* can be encountered prior to being encompassed within a demarcated theoretical order. For example, a tool encountered in practical concern is prior to a theoretically encountered object. On the other hand, it requires some effort to resist the tendency to take objects as they are ordered in scientific progress as indicative of the ultimate nature of things. This is as much to say that philosophy involves reversing the tendency to ‘take up residence’ in the world with settled concepts and objects. Thus formal indication can be understood as Heidegger’s determination of the possibility of philosophical concepts as distinguished from the settled, regional scientific concepts.
The ubiquity and breadth of what Heidegger gathers under ‘the theoretical attitude’ should not be underestimated. Heidegger attributes it to otherwise ‘contrary’ positions, such as realism and idealism, as well as to any and all arguments regarding either the subject or the object as a part or whole of fundamental knowledge. This pre-structuring of whole and part, beginning with the demarcation of respective material domains, is the mark of the theoretical attitude. When scientific practice takes place entirely within the scope of the theoretical attitude, it is most appropriate in the ordering of hierarchical connections within a given material domain, that is, in developing interlocking concepts appropriate to the observed objects. Problems arise when the ideal fully present nature of such appropriated objects is taken to be the model of identity, reality, objectivity and intelligible thinking tout court. The distinctive lack of questioning of the methodological demarcation in the face of paradoxes and intractable position taking fails to generate a proper motive to escape. The theoretical attitude goes unchallenged, outside of the revolutionary possibilities unleashed by phenomenology, because the theoretical attitude follows the normal tendency in factual life of maintaining attention exclusively on content. It must be emphasised that paradox and pseudo-questions are the result of the theoretical attitude’s correct application. Any alternative research platform remains hidden from the theoretical attitude.

Heidegger explicates both formal indication and the theoretical attitude initially in terms of intentionality. Heidegger’s approach is to encapsulate the theoretical
attitude, the limitations of its proper application, and the reasons for its entrenchment beyond those limitations. In the threefold enactment-relation-content structure, the theoretical attitude stabilises both enactment and relation and turns all attention to content, the ‘object’ part of the intentional structure. The theoretical ‘relation’ is one of fixation upon a material domain. The scientific activity proceeds to order and clarify the unities which are in each case types in the material domain in generalising hierarchising schemata. While all types in a region are essentially in a place with respect to the other types, this kind of relation allows each type to be both independent (and thus encounterable as one and the same) and dependent insofar as it belongs to the region. This mode of fixation and the treatment of objects in connection with other objects in vertical and horizontal relations of genera, species, identity and differentia is ‘objective’ insofar as the conditions of possibility for each unity is identified as the region. The theoretical relation introduces such norms of determination that allow the objects discovered to play off one another so as to allow for the stabilisation of the identities and their connections, but only within the limitations of the totality of the particular material domain. The critique of the theoretical attitude amounts to pointing to an ontological prejudice that guarantees that a simple mode of induction, deriving discrete universals, will be successful in any research project.

With formal indication, “There is no insertion in a material domain, but rather the opposite: the formal indication is a defense [Abwehr], a preliminary securing, so that the enactment-character still remains free.”55 Just as indication involves a
pointing ‘sense’ and a fulfilment in the corresponding object, formal indication purposely leaves the object in a state of unfulfilment (empty and thus ‘formal’) in order to draw attention to the other elements of the intentional structure. Steven Galt Crowell suggests “Formality here is not the emptiness of logical formality, but rather like Husserl’s ‘empty’ intentions that contain directions for their own fulfilment.”56 In this way, life experience can become questioned regarding the motives through which the world becomes articulated. The theoretical attitude, on the other hand, destroys experience to produce an object-type encapsulated within a material domain. Formal indication is an attempt to establish a method for research into questions that do not have a material domain to appropriate.

The questions that do not have such a material domain and thus are not suited to the theoretical attitude are not marginal questions; rather they are of two sorts in particular and we must not miss the opportunity to point to the significance of them belonging together. On the one hand, the theoretical attitude cannot deal with the question of foundation, that is, of a general ontology prior to the demarcation of material domains. On the other hand, the theoretical attitude cannot deal with reflexive questions of the subject (especially psychology) or the human sciences (especially history). Regarding the second issue, Heidegger accuses the attempts to found sciences of psychology and history of using a number of strategies in order to gain a material region, which narrow the relation so much as to fail to begin to deal with the phenomena (such as the treatment of the phenomena of the historical in terms of linear time, which is entirely under the theoretical attitude). The critiques
of psychology (founded on epistemological theories of the relation of the mind to the world) and historical sciences (founded on history as a series of facts) point to the radical limitations of the theoretical attitude: the theoretical attitude must secure its object at the initiation of research such that the whole of the object and the parts of the object are predetermined to be compatible.

In the early Marburg course, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, SS1923, formal indication is employed specifically regarding the connection of Dasein with the world. Recognition of the primacy of this relation is the securing of the phenomena with respect to a different kind of totality. Here especially, Heidegger makes explicit how formal indication intervenes at the moment when the phenomena can be won or lost. The “thematic category [‘phenomenon’] has the function of a critical cautionary guidance of seeing in a regress along a path of dismantling critically detected instances of covering up.”57 This ‘critical reminder’ is misunderstood if taken to be a ‘demarcation’. Heidegger even flags that this is not a method, but rather the empty preparatory stage of research. What must be demonstrated is the forehaving. “The forehaving in which Dasein... stands for this investigation can be expressed in a formal indication: *the being-there of Dasein (factual life) is being in a world.*”58 This formal indication must be taken up by the individual researcher, and it is worthwhile to emphasise how this emptying preparation is more important to Heidegger than any hermeneutical or phenomenological *method* in the conventional sense. To quote at length:
The forehaving needs to be more closely examined and appropriated so that the empty intelligibility of the above formal indication can be filled out by looking in the direction of its concrete source in intuition. A formal indication is always misunderstood when it is treated as a fixed universal proposition and used to make deductions from and fantasized with in a constructivistic dialectical fashion. Everything depends upon our understanding being guided from out of the indefinite and vague but still intelligible content of the indication onto the right path of looking. Successfully getting onto this path can and must be aided by a precautionary measure which takes the form of rejecting certain positions of looking which are dominant in the situation of research at the particular time, which seem relevant, and which thus of themselves crowd in upon us.  

What can be emphasised from this passage is that Heidegger is wresting 'looking' and 'intuition' away from the theoretical attitude. This is tantamount to juxtaposing two modes of looking, one that takes the present object into a schema that delimits the range of observation and the object in a single move, the other that remains with an interested looking and takes its sense of clarification from within the looking itself. The first reduces the look to the access to the present object. The second tarries with the simplicity of the look in order to draw out the complexity of the encounter. To point to the deeper distinction, the theoretical attitude considers
difference within the presupposition of an already established genus, an object of one type is not an object of another type, while the formal indication, on the other hand, has no such predetermined domain, but rather stops before the world in order to ask after the phenomena.

We can clarify the difference of formal indication and the theoretical attitude finally in their different concepts of language. Dahlstrom’s work has done more than anyone to demonstrate the coordination of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics with a critique of the logicist conception of language.\(^6^0\) Formal indication (if we can treat it as a method) refuses to separate language from life experience on the grounds that such a separation is equally impossible as separating indexicals from the context to which they are bound. The simple and formal oneness with which formal indication begins corresponds to the simple indication of something that is there. The theoretical attitude is linked to the conceptual hierarchical ordering of universal-particular and genus-species. The “highest level of theorization...resides in the unities of meaning and signifying connections of language.”\(^6^1\) The conflict between the two modes of language is motivated by an attempt to establish a foundation of logic in hermeneutics rather than in pure mathematics and thus a return to the ‘genuine’ ‘problems of logic’. With formal indication Heidegger has put forward a new basic relation of the phenomena to the preliminary totality which frames the question. What we normally call formal logic has its place along with mathematics: both emerge out of formalisation, but the categories at the disposal of theoretical work have their original motives founded in world-laden experience. The categories
of logic have become separated from their origins through the habituating
inheritance of philosophical systems and the possibility of accepting what is
understood as intrinsically simple.

Formal indication and the arguments in which it is embedded function as the
pivot with which Heidegger attempts to realign research practice with certain
intrinsic conditions of possibility for research in itself. These conditions are a set of
pre-theoretical intentional structures that the theoretical attitude has long since
broken apart as part of its objectifying abstraction. Only when the subject-object
schema is dissolved by a middle ground life experience, both active and passive
together, can the original derivation of concepts begin again. The world in this sense
is a necessary background of the concepts and motivations that can be properly
returned from the history of philosophy to the present. The extra-worldly concept of
the totality of ideal concepts conceived on the foundation of how objects are
encountered in the theoretical attitude allows a perspective wherein:

...all content is extinguished, its sense lacks all relation to a world-
content be it ever so radically theorized. It is the absolutely
worldless, world-foreign; it is the sphere which takes one’s breath
away and where no one can live.62
The theoretical attitude depends on the possibility of turning away from the fore-
having of beings and treating them only insofar as they appear for the regional order. The lived setting of beings is thereby eliminated. The outline of the opposition is now clear. Formal indication does not proceed in the way of fallenness (the normal tendency to remain fixated on the world and where the theoretical attitude finds the successes of scientific work) but rather draws attention to the emptiness of formalised content, and thereby prepares the way for questioning the how alongside the what. The crucial difference is that the ‘how’ in the theoretical viewpoint is hidden as part of the successful practice of the scientist. The theoretical attitude finds for itself a narrow totality: it comes to know everything only by limiting the totality to the ordering of object-types.

The second half of the KNS1919, ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’, is devoted to introducing Heidegger’s phenomenology in opposition to the theoretical attitude. In what Kisiel refers to as ‘the climactic last hour’ of the KNS 1919, Heidegger articulates his fundamental argument in relation to Husserl’s distinction of formalisation-generalisation. This argument provides the keystone of Heidegger notion of formal indication though the term is not used there. In the introduction to the WS1920-21 the formalisation argument is repeated as an explicit explanation of formal indication. Kisiel has been one of the few to emphasise the importance of formalisation in the early Heidegger’s conceptual genealogy.

The elements of the formalisation argument are presented slowly throughout the second half of the KNS. This process begins with an analysis of experience. The
experience that Heidegger puts forward as an initial example is of course weighted towards a phenomenological victory: the question, ‘is there something?’ With attention focused on the lived experience of this question, the various false candidates for what is primarily given are brought forward and dismissed. The experience of the question, without drawing upon anything in particular, does not require an objective realm let alone a psychic supplementary realm.

We wish to respond to the simple sense of the question, to understand what it implies. It is a matter of hearing out the motives from which it lives.... To hear out motives does not mean to search out causes of emergence or reifying conditions, it does not mean to search out things which explain the experience in a thingly way and within a thingly context. We must understand the pure motives of the sense of the pure experience. 65

The simple question that Heidegger has hit upon cannot be closed off by securing an object. The motive of the question multiplies into the motivations regarding the myriad problems that must be tackled in order to bring the question to make sense. The question turns back on itself, rather than fixating on content, which is usually taken up by the theoretical attitude as a secured object, and Heidegger himself asks us to pay attention to the form of the question. We must consider the question of
something in general which requires us to examine concrete things as universally as we can, but, “In the final analysis it belongs to the meaning of ‘something in general’ to relate to something concrete, whereby the meaningful character of this ‘relating’ still remains problematic.” If we ask the question ‘is there something’ we are required to consider the formal ‘something in general’ vis-à-vis the world. It would be an intolerable imposition of pre-conceptions at this point to turn from the problem of the motivation in this question ‘is there...?’ to a reified vision of the psychic. What must be grappled with here is the lack of any content with which we could subordinate the ‘relation-to’ part of the question. Once the inseparability of the relation and the empty content of the question is experienced “…the non-thingly character of all experiences whatsoever can be brought to full intuitive understanding.”

Heidegger has thus staked a claim on immediacy in phenomenological research, and can consider the counter developments in contemporary philosophy with respect to how they deal with this basic situation of questioning. Heidegger criticises both ‘critical realism’ and ‘critical-transcendental idealism’ for the use of sense-data as a kind of immediacy that can be complemented with intellectual mediation. Both are called ‘critical’ because they leave behind the ‘naïve’ apprehension of the world, and examine instead what is ‘truly’ immediately given and find the same starting point, i.e. sense-data. Critical realism asks, “how do I get out of the ‘subjective sphere’ of sense data to knowledge of the external world?” Critical-transcendental idealism asks “how, remaining within the ‘subjective sphere,’ do I arrive at objective
knowledge? The supplementation of physical knowledge removes any latent subjectivity in the sense data, e.g. brown is really only a wave length of light. The last remaining problem is the relation of the brain and the soul. Critical realism solves this by finding a parallel between the synthesis of sense-data of other people with one’s own sense-data and one’s own subject. Critical idealism locates the epistemological subject in the fact that the sense-data is eliminated as data when it is transformed into objective knowledge through the logical forms, i.e. the categories. And what constitutes objective reality is “the total system of categories and principles as discovered and validated by epistemology.” Experience has thus been examined only to conclude that all content must ultimately be reduced to the categorical forms that science ideally aims towards. The critical idealism of the Marburg school or ‘objective idealism’ has a fatal flaw: “the one-sided absolutizing restriction of knowledge and its object, therefore the concept of reality, to mathematical natural science.” Critical realism is also flawed insofar as it attempts to solve the problem of the external reality on the basis of a scientific account of that reality.

After the preliminary sketch, Heidegger asks what the shared starting point of sense-data is supposed to achieve. This starting point achieves nothing but the isolation of the point of conjunction of the real world, presupposed through science, with the immediately given supposedly achieved by removing the subject’s contribution to objectivity. “This primary character is only what it is when I practice theory, when the theoretical attitude is in effect, which itself is possible only as a
destruction of the environmental experience.”\textsuperscript{71} The immediacy of sense-data can only be thought as such within the theoretical attitude.

Heidegger, first of all, challenges the immediacy of sense-data by referring to immediate experience – the lectern in front of him is given immediately, to take the lectern as sense-data requires the theoretical attitude. The experience of the lectern is not the sense-data or the wave-lengths of light, but rather the lived encounter which is different for each respective person in the room. From the more common perspective of the theoretical attitude, such ‘immediate’ experience involves a myriad of presuppositions. Heidegger’s rejection of the theoretical attitude’s claim on immediacy shows where his guiding concrete intuition is directed.

“\textit{Environmental experience itself neither makes presuppositions, nor does it let itself be labelled as a presupposition.”}\textsuperscript{72} Environmental experience, by seeing rather than \textit{positing or presupposing} an outside world of objects, already avoids the founding problems of epistemology as well as the essential problem of the theoretical, that is, an insurmountable circularity in its attempt to establish its own first principles.

Heidegger suggests that Husserl’s principle of principles, “\textit{Everything that presents itself... originally in ‘intuition’ is to be taken simply... as it gives itself,}”\textsuperscript{73} is already an attempt to bracket out the theoretical attitude. ‘Phenomenological life’ is thus a bearing to the primordial intention of genuine life.\textsuperscript{74} With this in mind, Heidegger returns to a basic form of Natorp’s critique of phenomenology. Natorp argues that description of experience must appropriate experience under universals and thus has no recourse to call itself unmediated. The basic form of this critique
stems from the view of language as consisting of universals, and thus “there is only the theoretical universality of a genus and that all verbal meaning consists in nothing but this.” Heidegger then points to a deeper prejudice underlying this concept of language, that is, the appropriation of the object (description) has already been separated from the object (experience) which is already the theoretical relation. Phenomenology cannot begin from such a position.

In both the question “there is something?” dealt with earlier and the environmental experience of the lectern, Heidegger makes a claim for the dependence of the theoretical on the pre-theoretical. The pre-worldly experience of the question that has no concrete referent and the worldly experience of the lectern and its relative significance articulate two possibilities of a simple encounter from which research could begin. Both can be approached insofar as they are, prior to being determined as an instance of an object. With these two experiences Heidegger can establish two elements that correspondingly appear in the theoretical attitude. On the one hand, the culmination of the formal identity conceived within the theoretical attitude, the object in general abstracted from any particular ordered material domain, is traced back to the something in general seen in the experience of the question. On the other hand, the hierarchical connections established in the theoretical attitude such as the sequence brown (species)-colour (genus) are traced back to the environmental experience in the world.

The pre-worldly something and world-laden something are interpreted in light of Husserl’s distinction between formalisation and generalisation. ‘Formalisation’ is
‘free’ insofar as one may say of anything that ‘it is.’ Generalised connections are constrained insofar as they are motivated from within a specific domain. Generalised connections are thereby those that we encounter insofar as we encounter something as something, while formalisation is only the capacity to point to the singularity of something. When generalisation in the theoretical attitude fails to recognise its limitations, it may seem as though formalisation is a natural extension of the hierarchy that scientific generalisation uncovers in its practice. Formalisation, it must be noted, produces from its principle both mathematics and formal logic. Heidegger points to the danger of mistaking formal logic for formal ontology. The intentional structure of the theoretical relation can indeed produce an empty object, while still focusing on the content as such; this is mathematics and formal logic. But the formal something-in-general looks considerably different if the theoretical norms of determination are assumed or held in abeyance, because the free potential of formalisation is not restricted to the theoretical attitude’s focus on content.

The range of possible formally objective characterizations is obviously greater... *Anything that can be experienced at all is a possible something*... The indifference of the ‘anything whatsoever’... does not mean an absolute interruption of the life relation, no easing of devivification, no theoretical fixing and freezing of what can be
experienced. It is much more the index for the highest potentiality of life.\textsuperscript{77}

While formal indication is not mentioned here, the disconnection of indexicality and theorisation is the way that it is justified. The essential move is to reject the claim to universality of the object-in-general and the proposition-in-general. Heidegger’s argument not only pinpoints a hidden error in philosophy, but pinpoints how the theoretical attitude is founded in experience, and how inquiry founded in such experience need not accord with the theoretical attitude. Just as Heidegger continually points to the false epistemological problems of material givenness, the argument over the nature of language runs alongside the argument and helps to clarify it. “Signification... linguistic expression... is primordially living and experiential whether \textit{pre-worldly or worldly}.\textsuperscript{78}

Formal indication is possible because of the distinction between worldly experience and pre-worldly experience. Through this distinction fallenness itself becomes accessible. “The something as the experienceable as such is not anything radically theoretical and de-vivified, but is to be regarded rather as a moment of essence of life in and for itself, which itself stands in close relation with the character of the appropriating event of experiences as such.”\textsuperscript{79} Formal indication thus does not make sense if the standard of beginning taken up by the theoretical attitude is accepted, rather it brings to life the phenomenological mode of reflection prior to the concept being accepted as the ultimate presupposition of research. The
phenomenological beginning is a reflective intervention into life’s normal worldly occupation. Heidegger’s formal indication pinpoints the moment where phenomenological reflection is needed, not in order to turn against the natural attitude but a historically and factically located theoretical attitude.

1.4: The Conflict in Reading Aristotle

This section proposes a way of understanding the logic of the theoretical attitude and the logic of Heidegger’s phenomenological research. So far the thesis has focused on setting out Heidegger’s critical attacks on the theoretical attitude that provide the fundamental context for the development of formal indication. On the one hand, Heidegger has rejected an approach to objects and concepts that presumes that they can be exhausted by their interrogation by the regional sciences, as if it were the nature of phenomena to be completely apprehended by regional inquiry. On the other hand, this leaves Heidegger with the task of developing different concepts that allow for individual beings to show themselves. The research possibilities of the theoretical attitude are not jettisoned, but rather understood from within a new framework of life that provides a new logical structure that underlies the expression of the being of beings in research. This framework is how research is grasped in itself, which includes an understanding of the problems of approaching phenomena. The critique of the theoretical attitude is supposed to hold at bay a temptation to draw upon the self-identity of the object-in-general in grasping the problems that belong to research. The predetermination of this form of
identity, which functions in regional science narrowly and the theoretical attitude more broadly, has provided a fixed point from which concrete research can be understood. Heidegger now seeks to do without this fixed point and thus seeks to return to the radical problem of research as Aristotle saw it.

Aristotle is interpreted by Heidegger as being specifically attentive to two basic features of a framework for understanding research. On the one hand, the need to reconceive the conditions of possibility for the experience of beings, and, on the other hand, the need to establish a new conception of totality that explains the manner in which interpretation can be a part of the basic way that the human being has beings there in the first place.

The basic problems at work in Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle regard how intentional relations correspond to the expression of research. The topic of research is not one matter for phenomenology among others, it is the reflexive topic that requires Heidegger to challenge how intentionality comes to expression at all. Research, science, and the structure of questions, all contain an internal demand for ontology and are thus central to the early Heidegger’s project. The structure of intentionality provides Heidegger with a way of comprehending the ontological commitments at work in his neo-Kantian contemporaries. The criticisms that Heidegger develops in defending the intentional structure against the neo-Kantians develop into an analysis of the history of ontology. The keystone of Heidegger’s critique is the representation of the perspective on ontology and logic employed by the neo-Kantians as a narrow intentional relation. This limited perspective is part of
the theoretical attitude. By understanding how the conventional approach to ontology and logic both stem from the privilege of a particular intentional relation Heidegger can frame the possibility of correlating intentional relations of different kinds with the expressions that result from a genuine research intent. This task is the context in which Heidegger turns to Aristotle.

The underlying structure of the opposition between Aristotle’s research and the prejudices of modern philosophy is more important than the question of whether Heidegger is for or against Aristotle. Heidegger is neither interested in defending some position, nor asking whether Aristotle is correct or not in his results. The task is rather to understand how research can take place, and this involves an investigation into the development and application of prejudices in securing the object and methods of research. The problem of understanding the possibilities of research is at the heart of both a positive work directed at the being of the human being, but it is just as much at the heart of a critical work that examines the various ways in which the possibility of research has been actualised. Heidegger’s work on Aristotle unfolds in accounting for these various intentional relations both genetically and with a special regard for the circularity of any attempt to account for the understanding of beings and the being of this understanding. The account of the nature of the relations at work in the human possibility for self-understanding must also account genetically for the lack of understanding of the nature of the relations in everyday life.
Heidegger’s problems relating to the special relationship between an understanding of being and the possibility of a genuine research that is worked out in the Aristotelian corpus must be examined together. For Heidegger the radical change in the question of being that Aristotle institutes requires that the analysis of the understanding of being in everyday life is drawn out as the proper analysis of the concrete being-there of the human being. Aristotle’s radicalisation of the Greek understanding of being is set into context here on the basis of Heidegger’s critical opposition between his own directions in phenomenology and the guiding assumptions of the history of metaphysics.

Heidegger’s phenomenology is stripped back to what is fundamental and also focused on establishing a proper account for the fundamental possibility of research. That research has occurred is not disputed, hence the project of establishing a ground for ontology is tied up with a critical examination of the history of philosophy. In this history the possibility of research has been secured in various ways, though never with a complete self-understanding. Clarifying the inner articulations of these securing moves does not resemble a criticism that simply posits something incompatible. This ‘destructive’ work of clarification must go along with the research procedures while trying to account for the genesis of the assumptions that secure the research.

The early Heidegger uses the threefold intentional structure to elucidate how a research possibility is embedding in its assumption, and this strategy is extended to the analysis of Aristotle’s research. Thus Heidegger’s first step is the straightforward
decision to read Aristotle under the assumption that he can be interpreted within the scope of the intentional relation rather than with a starting point that stems from either the subject or the object. This initial move is the appropriation of Aristotle into the polemic that Heidegger himself stages between phenomenology and the neo-Kantians. This critical opposition between Heidegger’s phenomenology and the basic concepts of Cartesian or neo-Kantian metaphysics leads Heidegger to separate two distinct Aristotles, one that the tradition has adopted as its own founder, and one that harbours a deeper connection to the original possibilities of research that have been lost and rediscovered with phenomenology. Heidegger’s texts on Aristotle polemicise one Aristotle against another.

Heidegger’s critical opposition between phenomenology and neo-Kantianism is most basically characterised by the way that each deals with the relationship between thinking and the object. On the one hand, phenomenology attempts to take possession of the intentional relation, on the other hand, the tradition inherited by the neo-Kantians must deal with the division between the realm of inner experience and an outside object. Thus Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle begins with the experiment of interpreting Aristotle as fundamentally discordant with the modern assumptions of philosophy. This project leads Heidegger to close readings, re-translations, sometimes violent interpolations designed to break the hold of modern assumptions, and focus on passages like *Metaphysics Ï10* that previously did not sit well with how Aristotle had been systematised.
Due to the initial shift to an intention-focused Aristotle, Heidegger is faced with the task of substantially re-reading the entirety of the Aristotelian corpus. At an obvious level, Heidegger is forced to reconsider Aristotle’s remarks on knowledge, representation, perception, propositional truth, etc. These individual elements are not gathered together arbitrarily by Heidegger; rather each instance of a separable identity must be appropriated from the tendencies to formalise and universalise. Every separable identity must be refounded in Heidegger’s alternative conception of the whole, that is, the actualisation of interpretation.

While various ways that beings present themselves are potential thematisable, albeit overlooked due to the normal focus that is given to actually dealing with beings, the attempt to theorise these ways of being usually succumbs to the habits of the theoretical attitude. As the originary experiences from which all knowledge is derived are forgotten (being replaced only by habits of thought which operate without any sense of their origin) the tendency of theorisation to bypass the phenomena is increased. Knowledge always stems from some understanding of being, and yet, knowledge tends to lose connection with being when the structural elements of linguistic expression are taken to hold the key to a universal manner in which knowledge must be abstracted. Within such a perspective, individual things exist, but only the conjunction and separation of things and predicates can be true.

The critiques that Heidegger makes against representation, propositional truth, and inner experience, allow for a different basic conception of the form of both individual identities and relations. Thus even though Heidegger explicitly
subordinates the formal expression of relations to the phenomena in the multiple ways in which they are encountered, this still results in a counter logic.

This counter-logic means that the form of the language in which Heidegger expresses himself contains within it implicitly different kinds of identities and relations. On the one hand, Heidegger suggests that the underlying possibility of the relations that he expresses is provided by the nature of language itself, or rather the modes of human being that are in language. On the other hand, the counter-logic that results is still a matter of relation with individual parts, but in each case the relation is supposed to depend upon the latent structures which can be confirmed in experience. This means that Heidegger does not simply reject traditional logical structures, but rather attempts to show them in their original accessibility.

The elements that Heidegger can draw upon in order to provide a basic structure are limited to what can be pointed out. For Heidegger, the *logos* is precisely this possibility of pointing something out, that is of bringing something to show itself according to a specific determination, or in other words, *logos* means to point something out as something.\(^8^0\) *Anything* that can be pointed out can no more be encountered adequately through the expression of truths about it than can colour. The most basic knowledge of red must always be the experience of it, and *logos* is grounded in the same way. But Heidegger must not be thought to make language entirely superfluous in the face of experience, but rather that language must be understood as grounded in the way that a human being can be directed towards a being. Experience and language thus are in no way opposed, rather Heidegger’s
phenomenological point is that the articulations of the determination in the *logos* must be directed towards something and find some kind of fulfilment therein.

Heidegger must replace ‘logic’ as it is narrowly conceived with his own comprehension of the proper foundations of logic, which means he must define the place of identity within the context of where research is directed. Hence the new/original logic is built upon the possibility of experiences becoming explicit in their underlying structural conditions of possibility. *Doing logic* thus in each case requires, on the one hand, a resistance to the presumptions of the theoretical attitude and, on the other hand, transforming experience by making the inexplicit explicit. The experiential matters that Heidegger draws upon have, of course themselves been understood through the constraint of the theoretical attitude. Hence, the meaning of the various possibilities of experience must be reconsidered from the foundation. It is not simply a matter of reconsidering what the abstraction of universals involves, but furthermore a shift in thinking about what the senses are and what the possibilities of acting and cognition are. Most importantly the notion of experience at the heart of the theoretical attitude is completely rejected. For Heidegger experience is always already in the mode of understanding. Thus Heidegger can follow Aristotle’s research in two interrelated ways: Heidegger suggests that Aristotle has an amazing capacity for approaching phenomena directly, and also that Aristotle is guided by his understanding of what the human being is, that is, directed towards the world as a speaking being. Aristotle can thus speak as a researcher about the human as speaking-being (*zōon logon echon*). What Heidegger
discerns in Aristotle’s approach is the openness to the way in which the human being is oriented in the world, by ends, through others, and by prejudices and ways of accessing beings that have a history to them. In this way all of language becomes a field of study, not as a set of objects or discrete meanings, but as the living work of interpretation that makes up the human being’s existence.

Heidegger’s phenomenology seeks to do without the anchor point of presence. Modern thinking for the most part does its ontology at arms-length, on the one hand positing a present thing that is self-showing in accordance with its own self-identity and independence, and on the other hand, subordinating all thought to the potential for pure receptivity of this objective truth. Heidegger first of all rejects this structure, and in doing so, proposes to revise the assumed basic relations between individual identities and relations, that is, the rejection of presence is also the rejection of the form that underlies modern logic. In principle, the hierarchical order of regional ontology, which provides a basis for relations, definitions and so on, is re-examined with new demands, that is, that beings show themselves in the way that they are. Logical relations cannot be avoided however and thus the demotion of regional order by Heidegger creates a vacuum of logic, and thus also the need to re-establish the basic nature of individuals and relations as they occur in language, in being spoken of, in being directed-towards.

The regional ontology that provides the basic logic of the modern sciences has been constructed from the remains of the scholastic theological order of the world, mediated by the history of philosophy of course, but still with the basic feature that
all particulars must ultimately resolve into universals that exist in an order that allows all relations between particulars to be known at the level of the universal order. For Heidegger, the dispute about whether universals or particulars are more real is secondary. The scholastic system works perfectly for the empirical sciences because it too subordinates the intellect to an order of universals. The pure looking of science looks with a structure that has already been determined, that is with the principle determinations of the particular region, which goes with the respective science given by the basic concepts of the region. Once this delimitation of the theoretical attitude is clarified, Heidegger can go about establishing the problems of understanding research that does not have this support. Without the fore-conception of self-givenness of the identities resting on objective independence, research must return to the fore-having and fore-seeing in order to articulate the assumptions about the original accessibility of beings. Heidegger sees that beings must be accessible in a pre-thematic mode.

The revision of the assumptions that go into the expression of whole and part and the one and the many is perhaps Heidegger’s biggest shift in reading Aristotle. By grasping the logic of the theoretical attitude Heidegger can set out a different logic for reading Aristotle. It is the inexplicit ontological assumptions that determine the manner in which propositions mean. For Aristotle research begins with the logos and the assumptions that it harbours. Thus a renewed questioning logic is required to read along with Aristotle. The manner in which the particular and general never rest back on the assumption of universal order but instead rest upon the temporality
inherent in concrete actualisation of possibility replaces the need for a universal order, and allows Heidegger to follow Aristotle in building up a new analysis of the being of the human being there. The analysis of human being there becomes a task only once the support of the theoretical attitude has been dismantled.

Heidegger accounts for the relations between beings in completely different ways. On the one hand, the capacity to address a being comes within certain relations. On the other hand, these living relations always have their own emergence within themselves. These two facts, once they are complicated through historical inheritance, dictate the procedures of research to find order in a different way. Heidegger changes the way that basic formal relations of whole and part, and the ancient one and many, play a role in research. Research, and this includes all science and philosophy, cannot begin with the form of the one as given and then properly interpret experience afterwards. In order for the structures of the phenomenon to become thematic science first must deprivilege the unity and self-sameness of the object. Thus for Heidegger the activity of research specifically must not presume that beings are simply the conjunction of the independence of the object and the dependence of the identity on the system in which it belongs.

As Heidegger develops this contrast between the basic ways that beings can be grasped as such, one way that the opposition unfolds is discovered in temporality. The logic of natural order presupposes that the being of beings belongs to an atemporal order that is then encountered in temporal existence. Research in the theoretical attitude is thus a path of moving from the latter to the former. This
privilege afforded to an atemporal order denies access to the being of beings that is
to be found in the essentially temporal structures of decision, action and resolution,
which, for Heidegger, are fundamental ways that humans are *there* in the world. In
order to grasp Heidegger’s concept of truth, the way that the simplicity of *being
there* accords with the temporal structure of *praxis* must become visible.

When we look at the various ways that the human being takes hold of the basic
possibilities of being there, it is perfectly right that we should feel that something
has gone astray. The task of uncovering the ways of having possibility before one is
distinct from the way that possibility is thought in ‘scientific’ philosophy. The
distinction between what Heidegger is doing with Aristotle and how a modern
theoretical inquiry would go about understanding the question of possibility can be
marked out preliminarily as a distinction in ways of understanding being. The most
established and common mode of research is dependent upon the basic framework
of regionalisation, where a certain way of fixing the meaning of being is the founding
of the possibility of the inquiry. Regionalisation has become so habitual that the
meaning of being is not asked as a question. For Heidegger, Aristotle’s investigations
have a clear understanding of what regionality is, and what is not subject to regional
study. The human being can fall on both sides of this divide, e.g. regional as a
biological entity and non-regional as being-in-the-world. The investigation into the
being of human beings that underlies the possibilities of *logos, praxis* and *theōria*,
cannot be secured through a basic concept, and thus has rightly never come to
fruition amid the great successes of modern science.
In Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle it is the basic understanding of human being as having *logos* and the meaning of being as completion and presence that provides the basis for Aristotle’s inquiries. Both of these understandings already guide the everyday living of the Greeks. Such an understanding of being cannot be invented by an individual thinker, nor is it the exclusive concern of philosophers. Instead, the understanding of being is at work in the way that the human being has taken hold of what is possible, including the possibility of research.

The paradigm example of being directed towards the emergence of a being is *technē*. Heidegger’s exposition of the structure of *technē* has been rehearsed in the literature more than any other concept.82 *Technē* shows the way that a form of knowledge can be directed not so much to a thing which one then sets about making, but rather to the emergence of the thing. *Technē* is only a limited knowledge of the being to which it is directed because it does not contain the being that is made. First, *technē* is subordinate to nature, *phusis*, since the craftsperson does not make the causes that underlie the possibility of the product; thus *technē* uses potentiality from nature but the product remains supported by nature not the craftsperson. More importantly *technē* is intrinsically limited insofar as the end of *poiēsis* is released into ends that are separate from the production. The fact that shoes stand on their own outside of the craftsman can be juxtaposed with the internally complete structure of *phronēsis*, prudence. *Phronēsis*, like *technē*, is knowledge in the form of potentiality, but *phronēsis* is actualised in the grasping of the whole of the situation and taking hold of the situation to bring about the best
outcome. Phronēsis can be complete because any action carried out is not separate from the situation as a whole. Phronēsis rather opens the apprehension of one’s own existence as being in the world – this is the ‘object’ that is taken hold of and, for a moment at least, fully grasped. This possibility of genuine apprehension of the world runs counter to the specific tendency to understand all forms of knowledge with respect to some object, either real or ideal. Phronēsis thus provides a paradigm counter example to the object-focused tendency.

While the intellectual virtues, treated with substantial detail in the Plato’s Sophist lecture course of 1924-25, have received a great deal of attention, they are only examples of the ways of being that Aristotle presents in his analysis of the human being. In every case Heidegger must direct the students’ attention to an experience of apprehending something, preferably without any undue focus on objectivity, and then the possibility of such apprehending must be given its due. Modes of apprehension are of various kinds and this plurality manifests not only in different regions of objects, but also in the potential for the structures of apprehension to be modified by being analysed. The apprehension of the way of being of some being is also a being. In other words the research intent of phenomenology must understand itself as the attempt to order, purify and exacerbate the potential to address the being of beings that is there with every being. Every being has already been understood in its being in some manner or other.
Heidegger contests the acceptance of the presence of being as a starting point in modern philosophy by replacing it with the character of the ‘there’ and setting this into the background of the world. Formal indication brings phenomenology to recognise the starting point of the ‘there’. What we are here calling the starting point is what phenomenology secures as the phenomenon itself. The basic structure uncovered in the mere phenomenon is intentionality. Heidegger early on focuses especially on intentionality as a starting point and especially on the division of fulfilment and unfulfilment and lack of theoretical content. The thinking of the starting point, in relation to which the research into the being of beings must be understood, is required to encapsulate a kind of overall comportment to beings in which the pure research intent must emerge. For Heidegger, the possibility of the question of the being of beings must be worked out as a way of being in the world. This possibility Heidegger finds worked out in Aristotle in the manner in which logos is understood. *Logos* is grasped as the manner in which human being addresses the beings in such a way as to bring the being of beings to show itself. This potential, however, has already been appropriated by the fallen state in which the human being lives. The starting point, and thus also the particular possibility and challenges for research, must be secured at the beginning of any inquiry.

From Heidegger’s perspective, Aristotle never moves beyond the investigation of the starting point, which must be attempted at the beginning of each different investigation. The genuine content of the investigation is inseparable from the possibility of investigating. For Heidegger, to understand Aristotle’s inquiry into the
starting point requires that the structure of the logos is understood both in its potentiality with respect to the discovery of the being of beings as well as how it has been concretely actualised in everything that is peculiarly human. Thus much of the analysis examined is about uncovering the worldly nature of experience, the genesis of the fallen way of being that only recognises beings, and Aristotle’s way of securing the ways of being in the world by radicalising the way that being has traditionally been thought. Aristotle’s approach is thus tantamount to an investigation into the comportments of the human being, with an eye not merely towards the context in which objects are discovered, but rather with an eye to the various ways in which alethēia is there in the possibilities of being in the world.

Chapter 2: The Unity of Interpretation

2.1: The Turn to Aristotle

This chapter examines how Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical attitude and his counter-method of formal indication develop into the propaedeutic for the recovery of Aristotle. In this chapter, formal indication, understood as a logical intervention into the understanding of research, provides the foundations for Heidegger’s unfolding of the hermeneutic situation. The hermeneutical situation sets the problems of historical inheritance of language into relation with the possibility of doing research into the being of beings. This context allows Heidegger to bring the specific challenges of reading the history of philosophy to the
foreground. For Heidegger reading Aristotle is the most important example in the
history of philosophy not only with respect to the possibility of researching life as a
special kind of being, but also the possibility of philosophy as a special kind of life.
Heidegger’s rereading of Aristotle is a reanimation of Aristotle’s work in the context
of the questions that we ourselves can ask.

The method of formal indication and the critique of the theoretical attitude both
go to the heart of Heidegger’s original approach to Aristotle. Just as formal
indication involves blocking the ontological assumptions at work in the theoretical
attitude, Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle begins by dismissing the goal of cementing
an Aristotelian hierarchy of beings. With formal indication the formal identity
ascribed to beings is purely a preliminary formal element that is devoid of any
intrinsic relation to the totality of a system of such elements. The interpretation of
Aristotle’s terminology therefore can neither presuppose that each term has a
discrete definition, nor that the sum of the terms can be pieced together into a
whole. For Heidegger, Aristotle’s terms must be contextualised in the accompanying
understanding of the possibility of research.

The change in presuppositions about beings and what it means to disclose beings
in their being happens first of all at the level of logical structure, but this change is
also a change in what logic means. As the previous chapter emphasised, Heidegger’s
revision of logic involves rejecting any use of formal self-identity and the formal
structures of whole and part as basic underlying forms for beings in general. Logic, in
Heidegger’s revised understanding, is not about propositions interacting with other
propositions, nor individual beings relating to their attributes and genera in part-whole relations. Logic is the problem of language disclosing the being of beings.

Heidegger’s method of formal indication draws attention to the formal pointing that accords with the simple that-being of beings. This possibility has been taken up by the theoretical attitude, but exists prior to theoretical attitude. The theoretical attitude takes advantage of the fact that beings that have already been given in some way can be pointed out formally without reference to the original possibility of their appearance. Importantly formal indication reinterprets the self-identity of beings that is presupposed from the perspective of the theoretical attitude. The formal being in the understanding of the theoretical attitude is the self-identity that supports key determinate relations with limited other beings, that is, to the whole of the region, to the attributes of the individual especially in the form of differentiae, and in relation to other beings in the same region. Facts within the scope of the theoretical attitude are built upon the presumption of the self-identity of the object-type within the totality of the region. With formal indication, the formal being is a completely empty self-identity that is given not by the being that is pointed out, but entirely by the possibility of formally indicating something. The formal is ‘free’ to apply to anything and everything without being at all informative. The givenness of beings is thereby split into a superficial understanding and a questioning understanding by formal indication. Insofar as beings are formally, that is, are beings in general, they are not understood and merely prepare the way for the attempt to return to their original givenness.
Formal indication allows Heidegger to recontextualise the task of research within a unity of a hermeneutics as opposed to an objective order. This means that the nature of relations that beings enter into no longer resembles a work of classification, but belongs to a unified work of interpretation. Both formal indication and the theoretical attitude begin research with a presumption about how the formal self-identity of beings is to be approached. The opposition between the two starting presuppositions regards the logical relationship of formality and the being of beings, but this opposition plays out especially in the new basic relationship that Heidegger develops between philosophy and the historiological. For Heidegger there is both an alliance and a structural parallel between the object of regional science and the way that meaning can be approached when it is familiar. The historiological is the possibility of questioning the familiar inheritance of the language into which we have each grown. The familiarity with terms is part of a ‘flattening’ of the world, that is, the reduction of all beings to a single form of beings each knowable insofar as in its full presence it can simply be looked upon, differentiated and classified. The notion that beings are essentially comprehensible by being present aligns with the tendency of language to be understood in averageness. While the human being in the world confronts beings in their contexts in the world, these dealings become familiar and repetitive. The world of common averageness is a world of shared concerns that are generally already understood and can be thus referred to in a kind of short hand. This means that the average use of language is already an abstraction of dealings in the world and thus words have become a dictionary like set of beings, in each case intelligible by virtue of a basically
context free meaning. The historiological sense must break through averageness in order to question how concepts originally develop within the context of questioning after the being of beings.

Here we shall show that underlying logical opposition is between two different ways in which a being that is given relates to the explication of that being – only the being that has already been secured can be taken up in the work of classification, while the unsecured being taken up in formal indication must be examined with regards to its origins, that is, its original access and coming to expression. This underlying opposition unfolds into a complicated set of relations between language, history, research, averageness and fallenness. This chapter seeks to work through these interconnections and emphasises how Heidegger’s historiological challenge aligns with the original conception that Plato and Aristotle had of philosophy insofar as it counters the averageness of doxa. The peculiarities of Heidegger’s propaedeutic to Aristotle can be set into context by examining the relationship between Heidegger’s understanding of the hermeneutical situation and the understanding of philosophy with which Aristotle operated in his myriad inquiries.

The second half of this chapter (sections 2.4-2.5) turns to Heidegger’s WS1921-22 lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*. The first half of this chapter (sections 2.1-2.3) attempts to work through the complexities of the shift that Heidegger is undertaking in the lecture course. Throughout the chapter, the structure of the hermeneutic unity that is unfolded in the WS1921-22 is clarified by drawing on some of Heidegger’s lecture courses from 1923 and 1924. It will become
clear that the structure of hermeneutic unity, as opposed to the regional totalities of formal and general ontology, provides the foundation for Heidegger’s research project at least up to *Being and Time*.

Heidegger never ceases in his lecture courses during this period to express his own research project as countering the more conventional theoretical attitude. The opposition between Heidegger’s hermeneutics and the theoretical attitude is staged by Heidegger within the context of actually doing research. The WS1921-22 is an attempt to prepare students for the readings of Aristotle that were to come in later courses and in the Aristotle book that never came to fruition. Rather than attempting any normal introduction to Aristotle, Heidegger instead attempts to bring the students to confront the question of the possibility of philosophy. Philosophy is chosen as Heidegger’s premier example of a possibility of life. Philosophy cannot properly show itself through examples of philosophy, rather philosophy shows itself only insofar as the human being comes to itself. Thus we can see how the unity of human existence as a work of interpretation provides the perspective from which to examine the extent to which ‘logic’ has fallen into averageness. Heidegger’s recovery/destruction of philosophy requires a change in attitude towards language and its tendency towards averageness. The recovery of the concepts of philosophy that emerged with Plato and Aristotle must be brought back to life by re-establishing the questioning horizon. But this questioning horizon can only be recovered by breaking through our own prejudices, thus to come to understand what Aristotle
grasped as beings. Heidegger suggests that we should understand how we can be in the mode of research.

Only insofar as we are taken up by the same task of disclosing the being of beings can we break open the flattened concepts of philosophy and recover the original context in which they were determined. In attempting to grasp what it is that we grasp as beings we must ask the question, what is the possibility of being directed towards beings such as to disclose them? The grasp of this possibility is itself the disclosure of a certain kind of being, that is, ourselves. Heidegger is essentially making the implicit complexity of the simple explicit, in other words, every philosophical question brings with it a set of assumptions about how we can question, what can be questioned, and so forth, and Heidegger is simply reincorporating this relationality back into the question. The possibility of philosophy shows itself not through the inherited determinations of philosophy’s history, but rather through the experience of being directed towards the truth and at the same time having an understanding of how this being-directed-towards can fail. When the problem of disclosing beings in the world is taken up a genuine challenge then the history of philosophy can become philosophical again. Only by grasping how the human being is there in the world with respect to the disclosure of possibility can philosophy be understood as an intellectual comportment, that is, a way of being in the world that is directed towards the truth. For Heidegger philosophical concepts emerge from out of this context. Concepts address the basic
relationship of beings as they are encountered in the world and the disclosure of the possible ways of being in the world with respect to the truth.

One concept that Heidegger recovers from Aristotle is the concept of archē. In the WS1921-22, archē is isolated by Heidegger as a fundamental concept of Aristotle’s philosophy, along with logos and on, being. In all knowledge conceived broadly, the archē is that which must be disclosed in order to grasp the full structure of any potentiality, dunamis. The archē originates and guides movement, kinēsis. This structure is of course most familiar from Heidegger’s readings of the Nicomachean Ethics, book 6, presented in the Plato’s Sophist course of WS1924-25. Therein Heidegger examines how the division of phronēsis, technē, sophia and epistēmē is along two axes. On the one hand, the intellectual virtues differ regarding whether they look to the things that change or the things that are at rest, and on the other hand they differ regarding whether they look to disclose the archē itself or simply what shows itself in the light of the archē. The archē is thus explicitly that which allows beings to be disclosed in the forms of technē and epistēmē, that is, the two forms that do not attempt to disclose the archē. In technē the archē is the eidos that the craftsperson attempts to bring into being, but the craftsperson takes possession of the archē insofar as they look to that which is conducive to bring the eidos into its matter. Thus the eidos allows for the potential to bring the object into being and thus to show itself in the material, for example the right sort of wood shows itself as potentially a table. With epistēmē, the beings that show themselves are also disclosed on the basis of the archē, for instance in the way that a
mathematician can unfold the possibilities of numbers without investigating the nature of number itself. The investigation of the manner in which beings show themselves through archē is left to sophia. Sophia, not phronēsis, is thus the knowledge that encapsulates technē, even though phronēsis is the highest form of disclosing the things that change.⁸³

_Phronēsis_, conventionally means to bring about the best in a situation. _Phronēsis_ differs from _technē_ regarding the good – while _technē_ has already established its one specific goal, that is, the unchanging _eidos_ with respect to the potentiality in the material, _phronēsis_ aims towards the best result and thus the best action. _Phronēsis_ does not grasp what is possible by holding back from this possibility; rather _phronēsis_ only exists through (and, as it were, in the midst of) correct action. The archē of _phronēsis_ discloses one’s own being in the world as a whole, and thus the archē of _phronēsis_ is nothing less than Dasein.⁸⁴ _Phronēsis_ is a privileged concept for Heidegger insofar as it shows how human being in the world shows itself in the form of _praxis_. The kind of _poiēsis_ that shows itself in the examples of _technē_, where the ends and the means are distinct, is only a lesser form of _praxis_. _Praxis_ is not simply action, though _praxis_ underlies all kinds of action. _Praxis_ is rather how the world shows itself as conducive – _praxis_ is the mode of being in which our being in the world is disclosed in the form of a world encountered as conducive. Beings are already disclosed as conducive, even without any specific goal in mind. The disclosure of the being of beings must take up beings that are disclosed in this way
and question how possibility is taken up by grasping beings with respect to the various kinds of archai.

For Aristotle, philosophy, at least as an original possibility, is a matter of grasping the archai. In Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle the human being must look to its own ways of being in order to approach the archai of all beings. The archai are the fundamental source of beings as they are, as they appear and as they can be known. By starting with how beings already are known and apprehended, such as in the scope of the intellectual virtues, beings can be traced back to their ultimate intelligibility, that is, in the light of the archai. Philosophy is not a set of concepts that are given by common sense nor by its history, rather concepts emerge only by confronting the task of disclosing the being of beings. The praxis of philosophy only genuinely emerges from the commitment to this task, and any destruction of philosophical concepts is compelled by the attempt to disclose the genuine possibility of philosophy, that is, being directed towards the world intellectually. It is with this connection of archē and philosophy that Heidegger attempts to introduce phenomenology to his students.

Phenomenology too for Heidegger is principally the subordination of research to the self-showing of the things themselves. To the extent that the history of philosophy, and indeed common understanding also, has brought this self-showing to expression, a certain inexplicit phenomenology has been enacted. Philosophy expresses the self-showing of beings, but it also falls prey to the tendency to take up expressions and formulations without sufficient attention paid to the original
questioning context from which the original expressions arose. This condition of philosophising is due to the relation of language and disclosure. Language discloses beings but it also allows for words to become attached to average meanings that are disconnected from the conditions of intelligibility that were alive in the original disclosure. Thus the task of discovering the emergence of concepts requires returning to where the concepts were not inherited at all, but emerged from the task of making the phenomena explicit. At the same time any attempt to return to such an origin requires that one hold the tendencies of the theoretical attitude at bay. For Heidegger, Aristotle’s capacity to stay with the phenomena is not a return to common sense nor a return to what is given by the immediacy of sense-data. Aristotle and Plato were able to philosophise because of the attention they paid to the possibilities of being directed towards beings. While the Greeks in general grasped that different beings existed in accord with different ways of approaching them, Aristotle and Plato went to great lengths to develop a critical understanding of how the expression of the understanding of beings tended to slip into an obscuring obviousness and averageness viz. idle talk.86

Plato and Aristotle made language into the matter of philosophy; philosophy must transform the understandings that are already in play. This means that the task of re-reading the history of philosophy is, at the same time, the task of analysing one’s own language. To examine the history of philosophy is to examine language as it has already been understood; to interpret philosophy is to bring this understanding back into its own original conditions.87 Philosophy must turn to
language in such a way as to counter averageness. Averageness and the theoretical attitude both rely upon an interpretation of being as the presence of the self-identical. Averageness is a way of understanding language such that words contain an average meaning that is then applied to some particular meaning context. But averageness is not primarily a theory of language, but rather characterises the way that meaning tends to lapse into an obviousness which relies on the superficiality of formalisation and familiarity. The philosophical standard of Plato and Aristotle begins with a recognition of averageness and the difficulty of grasping the being of beings that is obfuscated by averageness.

Heidegger first major work on Aristotle, the WS1921-22, *The Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* is a propaedeutic that doesn’t present any close readings of Aristotle, but instead presents an attempt to recover genuine philosophical research. Such an extensive preparation for the return to Aristotle is required specifically because of the flattening of Aristotle’s conceptual language through the history of philosophy. Thus while the content of the WS1921-22 may be an early draft of the Dasein Analytic of *Being and Time*, it is also the recovery of the original tasks of philosophy that provides the context in which Aristotle can be reread. The second half of the lecture course examines the way that the human being develops its understanding of the world and the misunderstanding and tendencies that guide its understanding. These structures provide the encompassing relations in which all concepts have emerged. Language reveals this structure indirectly by expressing concern with the world. Philosophical research must follow up this indirect
connection, that is, philosophy must understand how the world has already been understood. Hence, as we have already argued, in Heidegger’s turn to Aristotle, it is not some free-standing structure that is encountered, but rather an example of the possibility of the hermeneutics of the human being.

2.2: Towards a New Logic

Heidegger’s WS1921-22 course begins by overturning the conceptual tools of the theoretical attitude and then leads into a basic analysis of the way that life activity works to find its own possibilities in the world. As an attempt to reawaken the scope of philosophical questioning the lecture course persistently expresses the opposition on which this thesis is focused. Thus we shall see that by opposing two different encompassing structures, regionality and self-interpretation, Heidegger revises how language works for philosophy. The understanding that the human being has established is marked by the tendency to understand itself in terms of what it finds in the world. Thus, the human being usually has a misapprehension of the relation of its own being to the world. The research path that Heidegger opens up is focused on the manner in which factical life is concerned with its world. But facticity can only be approached through concrete actualisations of its living concern. Every such concrete actualisation is also a grasping of one’s own possibility. This means that beings, including facticity, can be analysed insofar as they show themselves, that is, grasped in experience and considered in their modes of access and clarification.
Thus the formal element of formal indication attaches itself to the concrete aspect of what is experienced, while leaving the being of beings as a question.

While Heidegger’s new conception of the formal element replaces the position of a determined object in any inquiry, the lack of independence of the object means that attention must be given to the comportments that let beings show themselves and disguise themselves. Thus the pure looking comportment of the theoretical attitude can be considered to reveal certain differences but also to hide beings. Different comportments such as questioning and interpreting address in different ways the task of coming to know beings in their being. Bringing these comportments to light requires that one examines how one thinks in the present, or, better put, thought and knowledge cannot be assumed as innate human capacities but rather must be examined insofar as they show beings and reveal their own possibilities. One thus must bring together a reflexive attitude towards the present and a critical attitude towards the historical development of one’s own frameworks of thinking. This task does not aim at some free floating idea of thought, but must aim at what is there, the concrete factical being there in the world.

In providing a preliminary account of facticity in 1923 Heidegger talks of the factical as the encompassing matter that one accepts as there. Dasein is not only in the world, but it is in the world insofar as it discovers itself there as such. “Dasein is there for itself in the “how” of its ownmost being.” Self-discovery and interpretation define the encompassing basic manner of being of Dasein. This self-discovery is for the most part a looking away, such that one’s possibilities are
discovered as dispersed in the world, rather than fundamentally unified as one’s own existence. But Heidegger emphasises, “Our own’ is rather a how of being, an indication which points to a possible path of being-wakeful. Not a regional demarcation in the sense of an isolating contrast.” Dasein is discovered as a formal indication and this means that it is discovered as a possible field of inquiry. As a field of inquiry Dasein is not like a material science where the facts are discovered by looking at a specific domain of objects – rather the research into Dasein is defined as a possibility of wakefulness because it is the possibility of making thematic what and how we already are. The object of the hermeneutics of facticity is not an object to be represented, but rather the overcoming of Dasein’s alienation from itself.

The reflexive element of Dasein’s self-discovery provides a new ground upon which logical expression can stand and be put into relationships. Language becomes the real matter of philosophy insofar as it hinges together the way that the human being orients itself in everydayness and also provides the possibility for research. Any instance of research is actual only insofar as language that is experienced as simple and obvious is drawn into the possibility of questioning the conditions of possibility. Every use of language harbours this potential to be drawn back into an explicit analysis of Dasein. The concrete instance cannot be accounted for as an individual contained meaning, and yet can be experienced and pointed to as simple, i.e. as immediately there. It is the dependency of research upon the givenness that is taken up by language that means that the investigation cannot begin with predetermined modes of simple existence, such as is provided by natural science,
because the simple formal grasp of the being provides no clue as to the path that research must take. Instead, Dasein’s relation to the world is in each case relevant insofar as we must investigate in each case the manner in which a being becomes accessible and how it could show itself. This relevance is because the investigation of the relation of the human being to the world is the investigation of the way beings appear in general. Thus the existence of the human being as self-interpreting provides the new background into which each instance of givenness can be set. The ‘lived’ relation of the human being to its world is ubiquitous because we are always inside this relation.

The structures of Heidegger’s revision of logic cannot be treated as a consequence of the nature of objects in themselves, nor of the mechanics of rational thought. The structure of logic is a consequence of the double nature of facticity, on the one hand concerned with the world, and on the other hand alive in an activity of self-interpretation. The linguistic structure is not trapped by its own nature in the world, nor does interpretation require turning away from the world. On the contrary, the double-sided nature of falling and interpretation is always present in language.

Heidegger argues that both Plato and Aristotle conceive of the challenge of philosophy within the framework of an understanding of logos. In short, the common usage of language inculcates a low standard of knowledge that the philosopher must show as faulty and pursue to higher levels of understanding. Furthermore the manner in which Heidegger contrasts the ways of gathering beings
together that underlie the structures of logic can be shown in the contrast between
different approaches to problems of logic with respect to the study of the structures
of genus and archē. Where the formal order of genus, species and substance has
provided a basic structure for understanding the natural order, Heidegger argues
that the way that Aristotle understands the role of the archē in his various
investigations shows Aristotle originally bringing to expression the conditions of
possibility of experience. In particular the archē is a conjunction of the way that a
being appears/becomes and the target to which knowledge aims.

The goal of every investigation, whether this is explicit or not, is to bring an archē
or principle to show itself. To come to know something fully is the same as to
discover its archē. Thus the meaning of archē harbours the conflict between the
hierarchical order of beings and Heidegger’s own attempt to understand beings with
regard to how they first become accessible. These two alternative ways of
understanding what is sought in an investigation align with the difference of the
ontic and ontological, respectively. Heidegger is attempting to restore the
ontological mode of questioning in which Aristotle was working.

Heidegger’s reading of Plato and Aristotle begins by placing the question of being
into an understanding of the problems of logos as both revealing and concealing the
truth. For Plato and Aristotle, this reflection on the role of logos occurs most often
through their opposition between doxa and epistēmē. Doxa shows the danger of
language to appear complete. The Socratic elenchus of the Platonic dialogues
reveals the distinction between true knowledge and what passes for knowledge
through the unreflective use of words that appear as ‘ready-to-hand’. By itself, this reading of Plato and Aristotle is not especially Heideggerian at all. But Heidegger extends this reading in a number of interesting ways. The first thing that Heidegger adds is that a second danger of *logos* is more insidious than the first. The second danger of *logos* is that the terminology that emerges from new and original research has a tendency to succumb to the same failings as *doxa*. Philosophical language begins to lose its strangeness as soon as it is spoken, and with some wear a proposition that emerged from the most difficult of questions can acquire the ring of the most obvious truth. It is this second danger of *logos* that Heidegger extends in his thesis of philosophical degeneration in history. The work of Aristotle in particular is easy to understand if the task of understanding words is limited to the capacity to put them in the right order, to define them in simple sentences, and to use them within the scope of simple examples. The destructive retrieval that Heidegger applies to the work of Aristotle can thus be directly aligned with the manner in which Plato and Aristotle comprehend the challenge of dealing philosophically with common speech.

We should not at this point be lead astray by the process of connecting Heidegger’s concepts to Aristotle’s. Such work by itself is pointless unless such concepts themselves are brought by us back into a context of the foundations of philosophy. The sedimentation of philosophical terminology in the history of Aristotle’s inheritance does not simply mean that we will get a better understanding of these concepts simply by returning to Aristotle. Rather all philosophical concepts
are misleading unless thought within the original questioning horizon of philosophy. Heidegger’s recovery of the significance of *doxa* must be placed in the wider scheme of both the theoretical and pre-theoretical tendencies to lose connection with the original questioning possibility. For Heidegger, this kind of questioning attitude is precisely what is lacking in the normal tendencies of life. The living being attempts to secure itself in the world and resists any attempt to unsettle it.

In this context Aristotle has two distinct roles: on the one hand he produced many of the concepts that allow philosophy to become a barrier to real questions, and allow philosophical problems to become a game of words; on the other hand, Aristotle can be read in an entirely different way, that is, with regard to the real challenges of explicating the conditions of possibility for experience. What Aristotle understood about this task involved a basic critique of the deceptive character of language. Our understanding of language shows to what degree we maintain our confrontation with the original questioning horizon of philosophy. Common language and obvious truth always seem intelligible and yet, *as such* harbour the most anti-philosophical tendencies. The search for truth, for both Plato and Aristotle, is inseparable from the destruction of familiar words, i.e. words must have their potential recovered.

To do philosophy means to change language. For Heidegger language must change from simply living in the world with a myriad of concerns to an attempt to clarify the nature of Dasein. Interpretation begins by considering how language is working in the normal unreflexive mode. In this way, one is attempting to grasp the
possibilities within which language is working. How to gather up the manner in which life has dispersed itself means to go back to the origin, to consider the conditions of possibility. The fact that this problem exists allows Heidegger to suggest a radical change in the traditional way that Aristotle has been thought. For Heidegger, Aristotle introduces a structure that allows the multiplicity that unfolds in worldly phenomena to be brought back into a unity. This original unity that gives sense to a multiplicity is the concept of archē or principle. The concept of archē provides a kind of whole, different in structure from a genus, with which to encompass multiplicity. Heidegger suggests that archē has been misunderstood because of the primacy given to the concept of the genus in the history of philosophy. While the notion of the genus and the categorical articulations of substance are often taken as the most basic features of the Aristotelian worldview, for Heidegger it is the archē that is most important.

The distinction of archē and genus as two different ways that beings can be gathered into a whole shows the decisive opposition between Aristotle’s questioning horizon and the systematic ordering of regional science. A genus is what many things are in their essential form and is the sameness upon which differences in species can exist. The archē also gathers beings together so as to provide a ground for the disclosure of those beings, not insofar as they are separable or self-identical beings, but rather insofar as they only fully reveal themselves as they are with respect to the archē. Importantly, the archē does not only generate the beings that are encountered, but supports them in the way that they show themselves. The
emergence of the *archē* in an investigation is also a clarification of the being of beings.

The theoretical attitude in its attempt to classify assumes that the particular actualisation of a matter of fact is subordinate to the classification that it is seeking. If such a privilege is given to the order that the object is absorbed into then *how* one looks at the object is at best an arbitrary adjunct to the determinate self-sameness that the object possesses as a position within the order. This basic error precludes the return to the beginning, and thus precludes examination of the principle in anything more than an honorary role. In other words in the theoretical attitude “The character of a principle and the function of a principle, the ‘wherefore,’ become subsidiary within the ordering, totalizing, typifying tendency to classify.”90 The proper counter to this inability to step outside of this fixation on objects is provided by the Greeks. The “determinate object logic of the Greeks” directed a matter of fact to be seen “in the way it is present in correspondence to the peculiar way of approaching it.”91 For the Greeks, thus, the question of knowledge leads first of all to comportment. The being of the object is thus in each case already there insofar as the object is understood from within a certain way of being.

### 2.3: Formal Indication and Hermeneutics

As an intended introductory propaedeutic to a book, the WS1921-22 lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, on the one hand confronts the prejudices that stand in
the way of Heidegger’s interpretation, and on the other hand attempts to bring the
student to a basic understanding of the genuine questioning and method of
philosophy. Given the ambitious intention behind the text, it is a shame that the
lecture course remains today in the shadow of the famous draft introduction
produced in October 1922 that secured Heidegger’s Marburg appointment.92

The lecture course has received little attention from the perspective of
Heidegger-Aristotle scholarship because explicit treatment of Aristotle in it is sparse.
It has received little more attention in the wider Heidegger scholarship presumably
because of the difficulty of its expression and thematic structure. Even Kisiel’s
comprehensive The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time gives little attention to
this “verbose, baroque, and turgid course,”93 preferring to deal instead with the
draft introduction which is a “vast improvement over”94 the WS1921-22. But while
the lecture course and the draft introduction have a number of similarities, to qualify
all the differences between the two as advances and clarifications would mean that
the course could be discarded altogether. It is true that the draft introduction is
more elegant in style, is written in more familiar terminology and seems to be built
on classic Heideggerian premises. These factors make reading much easier, but the
draft introduction is still a much shorter treatment of some of the same themes with
which the lecture course deals in detail. The difficulty of expression in the course
stems from a combination of the latent prejudices in modern philosophical language,
which the course specifically attempts to overturn, and the ambitious task that the
lecture course sets for itself, which is nothing less than a revolutionary interpretation of what philosophy is.

John van Buren gives more attention to the text than most. In *The Young Heidegger* he notes how the concept of principle is important for drawing out the content-relation-enactment structure from worldly phenomena. van Buren does not, however, extend his investigation of principle into the significance it has for Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. But what is important is the way the text focuses on the possibility of philosophy. The principle of philosophy requires the turn to the being-sense of a particular being, and this is discovered in the relation and enactment elements of the intentional structure. It is this principle that allows philosophy to be defined with regard to its relation, that is the cognitive comportment towards beings, and also with regard to its actuality, that is the life lived in search of the truth.

The lecture course can be read as a continuation of the attempt to explain the nature of philosophy that Heidegger began in the previous courses with the method of formal indication. While formal indication promised to open new possibilities of research outside the scope of the contemporary scientific methods, there is little demonstration of its application until the winter semester of 1921-22. Not only is formal indication fleshed out in parts one and two of the lecture course within the terms of a hermeneutic situation, but part three presents an extensive and extremely dense preliminary account of factual life worked out entirely on the basis of phenomenological category research. Category research, recast here by
Heidegger, is formal indication applied linguistically (to the interrelation between terms that centre around particular experiences—these are called ‘categorial nexuses’) and historically (insofar as the destructive task of understanding one’s own history requires returning what has been preserved, i.e. language in a special sense, back to the original motives that founded the language—this dimension is called the ‘historiological’). Rather than introducing a form of being from outside the hermeneutic situation, category research opens up the relations between terms that have become familiar. The relation of life and world for instance is there in common language but it requires work in order to explore the significance and implicit complexities that are there in the manner in which each word means in relation to the other. Ultimately Heidegger’s category research can be read as the work of shifting ontological emphasis away from objects and towards the ways of being in the world that are expressed in language. The advances made by Heidegger in the territory of language provide formal indication with much greater clarity regarding that with which it is dealing. While earlier courses secured the possibility that there was philosophy that was not like science, in the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* the genuine task of category research is approached.

Articles by Daniel Dahlstrom and Ryan Streeter that have examined formal indication within this lecture course have read it in order to glean explicit remarks about formal indication without taking an interest in the status of the text itself in relation to the development of formal indication. Both articles examine how existential concepts are formally indicative, but they do so in order to establish that
the existential concepts in *Being and Time* are formally indicative, and hence are a special type of *philosophical* concepts. Formal indication is fundamental to understanding *Being and Time*, but the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* stands alone as a challenging and unique attempt by the early Heidegger to explain his own new philosophy.

The opposition of formal indication and the theoretical attitude provides Heidegger with a perspective from which to define philosophy. It thus provides a position from which to judge other means of defining philosophy, the path that the history of philosophy has taken, and how the Greeks originally developed the object and method of their philosophy. But formal indication is not simply a position that can be differentiated from other positions. Rather formal indication takes into account the nature of common presuppositions about philosophy, and research generally. Other positions contrary to Heidegger’s are not merely criticised but absorbed into a holistic conception of how philosophy is constantly faced with myriad possibilities of going astray.

Research that begins with formal indication pays most attention to how an intended being is to be fulfilled and the different ways that this may occur. What the theoretical attitude keeps fixed in order to stabilise its objective region a formal indication examines in order to ask how the being is to be approached in the first place. Formal indication does this by asking *how* something is encountered. Not only must one first attain the proper questioning experience in order to even grasp formal indication, but the prejudices of the theoretical attitude which dominate
modern possibilities of research block this experience from taking place. In the
lecture course of WS1921-22, Heidegger attempts not only to clarify this ‘how’ of the
encounter as the key to asking after the being of that which is encountered, but
furthermore how this ‘how’ is to be inquired after.

Because formal indication seeks out the origins of how beings can be accessed
and clarified in terms of their being it can be compared to the task of originally
founding a region of objects. The concrete research of the scientist remains fixated
upon such a region, and thus the research carries with it the how of the objects in its
fundamental presuppositions. Such a means of access, however, is not intrinsically
explicit. The scientist, rather, working within a tradition, encounters the objects in
the region as simply existing, and thus has no purchase on the possibility of
questioning this original foundation itself.

Heidegger is not interested in founding new regions which could themselves be
used as the basis of new classificatory research. Rather, the essential work of
philosophy is the maturation of the questioning of such initial access. Without the
assumption that objects simply are just as the scientist encounters them, the status
of objects vis-à-vis the origin of their accessibility is highly problematic. Thus the first
step in recovering philosophy is breaking through the assumption of the theoretical
attitude that objects and categories simply fit together. The second step is dealing
with the resultant situation, that is, that the previously accepted ground for the self-
identity of objects, categories, and true propositions has become untenable and yet
the objects are still discovered in the world, the categories are still spoken with understanding, the true propositions are still evidently valid.

The opposition of formal indication and the theoretical attitude is at work in the WS1921-22 lecture course, as with previous texts, not in relation to particular philosophical problems but rather by attempting to confront the problems which ground philosophy and research generally. The superficiality of the contemporary philosophical scene is measured against the struggle to establish the proper principles of philosophy. This struggle returns again and again to the basic twofold consideration: what is the object and method of philosophy? Questioning after the object and method of philosophy is not beyond the scope of the theoretical attitude, rather Heidegger wants to draw attention to the motives that are at work in all research in order to expose the superficial ways that these essential questions have been answered.

For Heidegger language harbours both possibilities of revealing and concealing. It is no surprise then that Heidegger takes the question of the proper method of philosophy to be closely related to the varying degrees with which language may be authentically understood. Thus while philosophy must ask conscientiously after its own proper object and method, for Heidegger these questions are never far away from the question of language, viz. “what is discourse about when it is discourse in the most proper sense?”97 Discourse, as a way of speaking that is directed at disclosing the being of some kind of being, is not ‘proper’ when categories are employed as though they are eternal determinations. Philosophy must struggle to
both question inherited terminology as well as focus discourse on the genuine tasks at hand.

The sedimentation of philosophical terminology is aided by the predeterminations of the theoretical attitude. Words in the theoretical attitude can be treated as objects or ‘concepts’ of an equal (or ‘flattened’) ontological status. Formal indication runs counter to the tendency to treat words as independent objects of thought or meaning, and instead asks how philosophical terminology emerges out of actual concern with life and the concrete work of research. Of course, one cannot simply ask about life without asking about the living of life in the world, but this activity of concern is a dynamic and all encapsulating relationship within which language has its proper place.

To read Aristotle not as a system of terms, but as actively questioning with motives guided by presuppositions, which in turn must be questioned, means also to break apart the traditional systematic and historical articulations of philosophy. The destruction of such articulations has no greater battleground than Aristotle. “Aristotle has had an underlying influence on our ways of seeing and, above all, speaking, ‘articulations’: logic.” And Heidegger adds in parentheses that here is a “predelineation of the radical and central problematic.” The turn to Aristotle thus provides a twofold contribution to the attempt to breakthrough the tendency to philosophise in words. On the one hand, the history of the interpretation of Aristotle is a constituent part of the development of the predeterminations that Heidegger wants to avoid. This issue is tackled in part one of the WS1921-22 lecture course.
On the other hand, Aristotle’s own research provides an example of this avoidance in two ways. First, Aristotle is concerned with the problem of principle, that is, what comes first in philosophy which guides the genuine task. This question occupies part two of Heidegger’s lecture course and the following chapter section below. Second, the situation of interpretation, factical life, is where the new research must begin after the presuppositions of the theoretical attitude have been rejected. The category research into factical life is the matter of part three of the lecture course.

The reasons for Aristotle’s significance for Heidegger’s attempt to renew ‘logic,’ are also the reasons why the lecture course must take the form of an extensive propadeutic. The modern reading of Aristotle that Heidegger wishes to overturn is symptomatic of the prevalence of the theoretical attitude. The conventional reading of Aristotle has no proper recourse to self-critique through historical sense because, Heidegger suggests, history within the theoretical attitude understands its task as the categorisation of event-types applied to a linear conception of time. If every epoch reads its predecessors according to its own style of interpretation, then the typifying approach of modern historiology provides no insight into the significance of reading Aristotle.

For Heidegger the possibility of research into factical life requires the development of new conceptions of history and language. The history of philosophy is philosophy only insofar as it is interpreted philosophically in the present. But philosophy is also inseparable from the interpretation of its history. The theoretical attitude divides the matters of reason from the concrete actualisation of facticity’s
self-interpretation and therefore the history of philosophy as well. Factual life is not
a constantly new stream of experience, nor the workings of a set of faculties.
Factual life is history that lives only insofar as it is interpreted. Whether life is lived
in the task of clarifying how philosophy actualises and how this relates to history is
entirely a matter decided in the interpretation of which factual life consists.
Philosophy is this reflexive possibility of factual life.

Factual life is not trapped in historical repetition, rather history may be
understood to the extent to which factual life is understood. The theoretical
attitude grasps factual life in the ordering of object types, and makes history alive
for itself in this limited way. To grasp history in relation to the origin of categorical
articulation of factual life is a much more radical affair because it specifically
challenges the ground upon which it is standing. Hence, the question of method, of
how research can make progress in such a hermeneutical situation, is forced upon
philosophy by its nature.

2.4: The Definition of Philosophy

Kinēsis, movement, and archē are thought by Heidegger as a way of grasping the
possibility of research. In short kinesis is how an archē reveals itself, most commonly
to the senses. Kinēsis, which is closely related to energeia, actualisation, is
supported in its possibility by archē. For example when fruit ripens the change is not
simply thought on the basis of a change in colour or taste but rather on the basis of
the nature of, and hence being of, fruit. The archē guides and unifies the change, it
allows change not in a way that is primarily to be measured, but rather is primarily the self-showing of a being.

Heidegger’s section on the definition of philosophy in the WS1921-22 uses the philosophical history of the concept of definition to stage a confrontation of logics. Definition is attached here to the notion of principle (das Prinzip) which here also points clearly to Aristotle concept of archē. A definition attempts to capture the essence of a being and Heidegger understands such essence here as closely aligned with the concept of archē. With this interpretation Heidegger can bring his own revised understanding of how an investigation can be secured to bear on the question of the definition of philosophy. Thus Heidegger can oppose the tendency of scholasticism and scientific regionality to try to capture beings, in this case philosophy, under a universal with the way that formal indication can provide a beginning without encapsulating the projected possibility of investigation. This provides Heidegger with a point of conjunction between formal indication and Aristotle’s use of archē.

For Heidegger a knowledge of principles can only be developed by understanding factical life. Because factical life must understand itself as actualised history, “Philosophizing, as knowledge of principles, is nothing other than the radical actualization of the historiology of the facticity of life...” 99 These two meanings of principle (archē) both belong to philosophy. The one that the theoretical attitude is familiar with belongs to the task of ordering categories that have already been established. Genera and species are principles insofar as they are ‘what’ things that
belong to them are. The primary meaning of principle means to understand how something appears in terms of how it matters for factual life. Thus, two basic objects of ‘logic’ emerge, “original-experiential explication and categorical-theoretical explication,” which both have their roots in Greek philosophy. “It is simply that one of these was lost in the process of levelling down what is original.”

The history of philosophy that Heidegger presents in the first chapter carries this loss of one of the meanings of principle as its underlying feature. Here the Greeks form a counter example to the modern prejudices underlying epistemology and historicism. The theoretical attitude in its attempt to classify assumes that the particular actualisation of a matter of fact is subordinate. If such a privilege is given to the order into which the object is absorbed then how one looks at the object is at best an arbitrary adjunct to the determinate self-sameness that the object possesses as a position within the order. This limited approach to the phenomenon precludes the return to the beginning, and thus precludes examination of the principle in anything more than an honorary role. Instead, “The character of a principle and the function of a principle, the ‘wherefore,’ become subsidiary within the ordering, totalizing, typifying tendency to classify.” The proper counter to this inability to step outside of this fixation on objects is for Heidegger provided by the Greeks. The “determinate object logic of the Greeks” directed a matter of fact to be seen “in the way it is present in correspondence to the peculiar way of approaching it.” The present, understood as the concrete actualisation that can be pointed to, is thus joined with the basic way that it is articulated in a clarification of the being of the
present being. The breakthrough to principle is thus not achieved by stepping outside of the everyday, but through the everyday coming to show itself in its conditions of possibility. The concrete experience in this structure replaces the notion of the object as the proper starting point, and the possibility of explication must be found entirely in the way that the present being is actually there, that is, already with its own articulations of presence and absence that cannot be reduced to ‘physical presence’. The analysis of the phenomenon just as it presents itself requires that the archē becomes thematic and also provides at the same time an opportunity for the concepts of philosophy to become genuine. Formal indication in this context is the setting for concepts themselves.

The early Heidegger occasionally uses the concept of ‘definition’ to stage the opposition of the theoretical attitude and formal indication in much the same way as he uses ‘research’, that is, as a task that the opposing positions both attempt to carry out. Definition is basically the being of a being pointed out in language, thus the possibility of definition rests on the assumptions about what beings are as well as what language can contain and/or to what it can point. By articulating formal indication as a definition of principle Heidegger can draw out the presumptions of the theoretical attitude from other common conceptions of definition. Several presumptions are exposed in this manner, namely that the definition is a matter of fact, and that the definition should grasp the totality of its object. Heidegger rejects both of these presumptions.
The definition is supposed commonly to be a ‘matter of fact’ that happens to distinguish an object from other objects. A matter of fact only exists on the basis of having the matter set out in advance, such as already having the object in its region. Such a definition accords with the comparative method of definition, that is, combining the closest genus and specific difference. The comparative method however only applies to distinctions among beings that have already been discovered in their way of being. Heidegger thus proposes to consider definitions that do not point out any kind of ‘object’ in the conventional sense, and definitions that have no presumption to contain the content to which they point.

The ‘object’ that Heidegger turns to is philosophy. The comparative method is first of all rejected. Such a method would have to presume to know what philosophy was basically in order to determine its differences. A ‘cultural form’ for instance, with examples from history, could provide the genus for philosophy that was then separated from other cultural forms such as literature or the natural sciences through some distinguishing features. For the comparative method the unity of philosophy would have to be already given by the concept of cultural form even while the attempt to define philosophy need not make this presumption explicit let alone questionable. Instead Heidegger sets out the issue of unity as a radical problem which he calls the problem of principle.

Principle here means what comes first which determines what follows. The forgetting of the problem of principle in the history of philosophy not only means that the question of original access is not treated as the fundamental first question
of research as it should be, but also fails to deal with the ontological complexity that this question requires. Since research in the sciences tends to happen well after the matter has been secured in basic outlines, a superficial grasp of the form of the being can pass as genuine. Such a situation allows for the confusion of the formal and general and thus gives rise to the formal concept of a ‘being in general’. When Heidegger turns to the ‘object’ of philosophy, and asks after a definition of principle of philosophy, the problem of principle can re-emerge. The problem of principle can then provide a context in which a notion of a being in general that has any content at all becomes impossible, and the question of the meaning of being can be asked again.

Philosophy is not an ‘object’ in the material sense, but contemporary historiography finds nothing questionable in finding it as an object in history, that is, as a cultural form and a historical matter of fact. Heidegger agrees that philosophy is an object only insofar as it is something. But the definition of principle that belongs to philosophy is not to distinguish a cultural form, but rather is to determine the very being of philosophy that determines its original possibility.

Heidegger clarifies the significance of providing philosophy with a definition of principle by considering four ways in which the relationship of philosophy and its definition are considered in the contemporary scene. Two ways of overestimating the role of definition and two ways of underestimating the definition are examined in order to reveal the underlying prejudices about the nature of concrete research and the form of the universal. The estimation of the importance of a definition of
philosophy divides according to whether or not the concrete work of philosophy is considered to be dependent upon such a definition. An underestimation of definition is ascribed to both those with a specifically scientific attitude and those of a mystical or romantic persuasion who suggest that philosophy can only be lived. These two positions would otherwise be seemingly opposed, but both agree that it is the activity of philosophy that is important and that this work can continue without the ascription of a definition. The belief in the irrelevance of the definition of philosophy can draw inspiration from the fact that the sciences and the arts can progress without concern over ultimate principles. By contrast, Heidegger describes the overestimation of providing a definition of philosophy as generally consisting in two stages, first in the demand that the definition should be the most general designation of philosophy possible (common to all species of philosophy) and, second, that the definition be rigorous to the standards of modern science. The positive virtues of each are that the overestimation sees that philosophy must “take its orientation from a principle”, the underestimation sees “the necessity of actually concrete philosophizing.”104 Heidegger does not merely suggest combining these two virtues, but rather the prejudices that suggest the four errors themselves must be drawn out. These errors relate to a misunderstanding of definition and principle.

The reason why modern definitions of philosophy are bound to fail is because the relation of the definition to the concrete work of philosophy is not understood to reflexively contain the problem of principle. The underestimation fails to reflect on the challenge that the origin of method presents. The overestimation of the
definition of philosophy takes as its guide the notion of the universal as it appears in
the genera treated within the theoretical attitude. For the overestimations, once the
most general definition is given, one that fits with an all-encompassing review of
philosophical disciplines, then philosophy may be clarified through its differentiae
into an appropriate number of classes and subclasses. In such a definition,
philosophy in each case is taken to be an object within a definite regional context.
Heidegger denies that philosophy can be properly grasped in a prepared formal
structure such as ‘a rose is a botanical organism’. For Heidegger such definitions
presuppose the region came before the original accessibility of the object.

In spite of the distinction between region-based and formally indicative
definitions, in either case, “this task, that of claiming the object in speech in such a
way and of bringing it into a possession determined by discourse, is the task of
definition...”\(^{105}\) The distinction splits apart on the basis of the understanding of
language. Definitions given within regions are simply expressions of the hierarchical
and differentiating relations. Such a rigid concept of definition grasps the
generalising function of names as the paradigm of language. However, principle
definitions cannot be located within the classificatory activity of theoretical attitude,
but only within the actualised task of concrete interpretation.

The principle definition and the concrete work itself are quite different kinds of
object that nonetheless exist in a fundamental correlation. Formal indication comes
into its own possibility by dealing with this correlation. The formally indicative
definition of principle of philosophy makes no claim to contain the totality of

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philosophy in its results nor procedures. Rather formal indication clears away any notion that what philosophy is may be simply taken from objective history, and in this clearing away of ready answers the question can first be asked. A formally indicative definition is rather to set factual life towards the task of coming to know what philosophy is. This beginning is nothing less than the proper disclosure of the unity of philosophy. Philosophy cannot be gathered up in a definition in any better way than a formal indication that makes explicit the need to begin the path towards philosophy. The pure formality of the formally indicative definition of principle contains no concrete work itself – but rather provides the fundamental possibility of genuine concrete philosophy. The formal indication opens the way to the concrete inhabiting and actualisation of the philosophy. Formally indicative definitions “present the object indeterminately, though in such a way that the actualization of the understanding of the particular definition leads to concrete possibilities of more precise determination.” The formally indicative definition of principle and the concrete actualisation of research are thus impossible without each other.

Heidegger’s understanding of categories is built upon the indexical relation as the generalising activity of language; a category points at something as a way in which something is, and thus grasps at the way that beings are. The distinction between the formal and the general allows formal indication to employ the formal something to form the basis for questioning how this something is, thus requiring the investigation of the general categories that surround the something in addressing the thing in language. The object is first fixed in terms of its formal content, rather
than within a generalising schema, in order to leave it free. At this level there is merely the simplest of cognitive circles. Formal indication can grasp that there is grasping. But this simplicity stays outside of any further determination. Heidegger wants to thereby show that the formal exists as a possibility alongside the general. The latter cannot provide a simple object, and only the theoretical attitude seems to by not observing the predeterminations with which it operates in the actualisations of its cognitive grasping. Any determination beyond the simple object must be within the intrinsically articulated schemes of the general. The general, which includes all categorical relation, is intrinsically articulated, but not intrinsically regional. Thus Heidegger frees the formal from the general and the general from the regional. The liberation of formalisation and generalisation from the theoretical attitude is, however, only one function of formal indication, the other is to be able to actually exercise the potential connections of free objects and new modes of determination that formal indication shows to be possible.

The first step from the formal indication of modes of possession of objects to the further determination promised involves observing that “there are immanently co-functioning, according to the “what” and the “how” of the objects (its “Being”), definite forms of cognitive grasping and determining, specific forms of the clarification of each experience.” Heidegger maintains this insight in relation to how the articulation of language is supposed to relate to simple, and thereby formalisable, intuition. The determination of the object cannot be split into a simple object that has attributes attached to it in a secondary way. Any articulation of the
object, if it is to be one of principle definition, must determine the object in relation
to how the object is originally possessed, viz. from the experience of the object, “the
actualization of the understanding ... is traversed ‘backward’.”¹⁰⁸ This backtracking
accords with the demand that the determination of an object must emerge from the
experience of the object and not be predetermined. This situation that the attempt
to gain a knowledge of principle is in, once realised, presents the task of category
research for the first time. Heidegger suggests that the theoretical attitude has gone
astray because it lacks this “basic experience in which philosophizing comes to
language.”¹⁰⁹

Philosophising comes to language when the basic activity of interpretation is
taken hold of at the level of principle. In every case, the notion of principle is
employed both to reject the basic logic of the theoretical attitude and employ a logic
wherein the structure of language has an intrinsic relation to the structure of
interpretation. Rather than logical structure being built up out of objects, Heidegger
must examine how the actualisation of intellectual comportment requires a
distinctive logic that deals with the differences of actualisation, relation and content.

The underlying structural connection of the relation of life and world with the
categorial articulation of the being of beings may not be apparent at first. The
positive developments of the new logic are deferred until the connection of
regionalisation and formal logic is exposed as unnecessary. What must be
established is a basic approach to the being of comportment where possibility has its
proper place.
The being of comportment is the basic way that the Greeks expressed the being of the actualisation of Dasein’s possibilities. This certainly includes acting, which in each case is a perfect example of Dasein’s existence in its own self-interpretation. The existence of the act requires that one both acts in the world and understands oneself acting at the same time. But the actualisation of possibility is much broader than action or decision, it rather concerns the whole of one’s own being.

The interpretation of life’s existence as actualisation must be sought in the concrete actualisation of such interpretation. Heidegger employs a basic technique for bringing the students to such interpretation as it is already familiar to them in common language. Heidegger draws attention to the importance of comportment by asking why one would say that *philosophising* can be learnt rather than *philosophy*. On the one hand, the term philosophy suggests a cultural object that one might study. On the other hand, philosophising means that philosophy is actualised insofar as comporting oneself philosophically is taken up as a possibility. Thus the use of the term ‘philosophising’ helps the possibility of philosophy emerge by pointing to a comportment rather than an object.

The connection of philosophising and philosophy can be re-expressed as an example where an object, philosophy, cannot be separated from a comportment, philosophising. The object must give way to the independence of the comportment. With the being of comportment raised to the primary ontological concern, Heidegger can now connect comportment with the Greeks.

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The comportment to ... is authentic precisely if it is originally and only a comportment, and that means, in today’s way of speaking, if it is an indication that the genuinely appropriate comportment to ... arises out of an independent comportment as pure actualization and that this actualization in turn has weight precisely for the explication of the content of that to which philosophizing comports itself as its object. (To the Greeks, to their way of thinking, this was self-evident. Their ontological sense of comportment is not ours; nevertheless, a genuine understanding of the Greeks will see in them this main point!)¹¹⁰

Authentic comportment is not secondary to the object, as in the case of such comportments as glancing disinterestedly at a desk before sitting down to work at it, or looking at the same desk out of appreciation for its aesthetic qualities. While these two types of comportment (disinterested glancing at the ready-to-hand object vs. aesthetic contemplation) are obviously different, they are both forms of comportment that take their bearings from the object. By contrast, authentic comportment is a comportment that (according to the procedure of formal indication) reflects on comportment itself. Again, Heidegger has the three-part formulation of intentionality to help him distinguish the possible ways of understanding here; insofar as comportment means to live within an understanding of a possibility of life obviously the sense of content is subordinate to the senses of
relation and enactment. Comportment can be interpreted according to the sense of
relation, where one looks at how what one is directed towards is brought out by the
comportment in a specific way. An example of this would be to think of philosophy
in terms of the kinds of objects that it clarifies such as the archē which remain
confused and inexplicit in non-philosophical life. But the self-contained
comportment itself, considered purely as a determinate actualisation, can be
considered according to its sense of actualisation. In this way Heidegger emphasises
that the notion of an independent object in general must ultimately be removed
from a proper understanding of comportment and thus philosophy. Relation
ultimately must be determined in its possibility by actualisation.

The privilege of actualisation over relation and content is effectively a change in
the basic logic of ontology. This change must not be separated from the conditions
that Heidegger brings with it, that is, the change in the function of logical expression
to formal indication. The expression of the structures exposed in interpretation by
itself is nothing without its role in the actual interpretation carried out by Dasein.
Actualisation must be interpreted and this interpretation is itself a mode of actuality
that Dasein may take hold of. To grasp the actuality of Dasein is the interpreting
possibility that Dasein for the most part has lost. The possibility of Dasein that
belongs to Dasein encompasses all other possibilities in the world that involve
various relations, and infinitely variable objects. In any case, the being of the sense
of relations and object must ultimately rest on the sense of the actualisation.
2.5: Category Research

Category research is only possible once *logos* has been wrested away from the theoretical attitude and the alternative original possibility for research with language has been experienced. Phenomena must be approached through a transformation of already understood language because it is in categorical articulation that factual life shows itself decisively. But language in this special sense is more than mere words. Language is the way that life articulates its own concern and all of its possibilities, but this articulation itself is not a matter of searching out the problems of principles. Philosophy must repeat the manner in which life has been articulated in categories in order to question how objects have been encountered. This is the actualisation of historiological sense. We all inherit and grow into a language as we understand and take hold of our possibilities. Philosophy must approach history in the way that it is there in factual life. The basic way to achieve this is in the suspension of the sense, or directedness, at work in the language we can speak or hear ‘clearly.’ This philosophical task must reject the tendency to let questioning be done within the theoretical attitude which cuts off the questioning of principles. Factual life shall not be grasped by looking at objects, but by carefully allowing the phenomenon of factual life to show how individual objects become encounterable in active relations. It is in following the interrelations of categorical nexuses, that is, how life has articulated itself, that philosophy can begin to understand itself.

The basic categories of factual life that part three of the WS1921-22 lecture course lays out are ‘basic’ insofar as they are the categories of the relationality of
life. It is through these categories that further categories can be seen to emerge and be understood in relation back to life. The category research provides nothing like an analysis of everyday life concerns, but rather the most basic framework of how factical life lives in an activity of interpretation. Philosophy must deal with this situation that it finds itself within. Thus it is especially appropriate that the basic categories of how life relates to what it is concerned about are experienced properly, not as words, but taken up into philosophy’s specific concerns. “The fundamental stage of philosophy involves understanding (and doing so precisely in the context of the following explication of the sense of relation) that these categorial nexuses are \textit{alive in genuinely concrete life}...”\footnote{111} The categorial nexuses provide the possibilities that philosophy must harness by precisely clarifying factical life and the task of research that lies in this direction.

Heidegger’s explication of factical life proceeds in four stages: 1. life-world-care, 2. categories of relationality, 3. categories of movement, and 4. ruination. Only the basic structures are summarised here so that the functioning of self-interpretation as the encapsulating whole of life’s relationality can be seen. Life relates to world through care. This is the fundamental relation to which all categories relate back. Life finds the world to be meaningful and as such it actively seeks to suit itself to this meaning and also finds the world to have a number of basic directions because of the presence of quite different realms of meaning, namely itself, other people and things. This activity of engaging with meaning also has a range of possible ways of relating life and world, which are articulated in the categories of relationality.
(inclination, sequestration and loss of distance). These three categories show how life responds to meaning in the world and takes up residence there with respect to its attempt to secure its own meaning. The maturation of these active relations is shown especially in the reflective categories of movement (relucence and prestruction). These show how care is modified by the way that life’s activity is visible to itself and is part of its own world. Life sees itself caring and must do so in order to experience meaningfulness properly. Relucence (literally ‘back-shining’) takes up the care that it sees and prestruction organises care. Ruination is more familiar in Heidegger scholarship – it is called elsewhere ‘fallenness’. If the categories of movement open the possibility of care itself becoming apparent to life, then ruination is the collapse of the potential separation of life from its concrete manners of caring in the world. Ruinance is the tendency of the categories of relation to become complete in themselves and for all meaning to become lost in mere habits of meaning. But, understanding ruinance, and specifically the formal indication of the characters of ruinance, turns out to be fundamental for philosophy to understand itself in terms of the self-interpreting character of movement.

The outline above can only be understood here in an inadequate way while the categorial nexuses have not been entered into. But the challenges these nexuses present can be seen with the help of a paper by Dan Zahavi that briefly draws upon the text. In his paper he rejects Manfred Frank’s critique of Heidegger’s notion of reflection. Zahavi is sensitive to the way that Heidegger presents a two-sided manner in which life understands itself, that is, on the one hand, life understands
itself when it is engaged in the world, and, on the other hand, life can reflect on the manner in which this is so. Where Frank sees reflection as a break with an otherwise world immersed subject, Zahavi grasps that reflection and immersion are both co-present in experience. But when Zahavi locates this division in the text as the opposition of relucence and ruination, he short cuts the complexity of Heidegger’s position. Relucence is a category of movement used to understand the categories of care. Relucence itself names the fact that care recognises its actualisations in the world as care, but this is not necessarily a philosophical direction. It cannot be defined as “life’s tendency towards self-illumination and self-interpretation.” Ruination, on the other hand, is counter to philosophy, but countering ruination is the movement of the interpretation as a whole. If there is a candidate for the opposite of ruination, it is the interpretation of the categorial nexuses that reveal movement to be the basic form of life. This interpretation is precisely the movement of the historiological taking up of facticity back into itself thematically and explicitly. It is ruination that prepares the various modes of actualisation of care in the world that the historiological actualisation counters. For Heidegger, ruination “seeks to abolish the historiological from facticity.” The specific challenge that Heidegger is attempting to overcome with the categorial structure of being in the world is the relation between philosophical reflection and normal life. Clearly for Heidegger, philosophy must be understood as a possibility of living, and yet as an example of life it obviously cannot be determined by separating it from other modes of life. Philosophy is nothing except the expression of life on the basis of bringing life to speech thematically.
Phenomenologically, a ‘category’ points out the phenomenon in a determinate way such that it “brings the phenomenon to intelligibility as the interpretatum.” This structures the research in a formal indication, whereby a phenomenon is taken up in a particular way, but this merely frames the task of pursuing the category in relationship with other categories. Categories in their nexus relate to one another in the same way that life and world are intrinsically related. The pursuit of these relationships is also an exploration of language while the sense of content is held at bay. In everyday language, the successful fulfilment of the indexical would be deemed a successful use of language, whereas in category research it is merely a fixed point that is of no interest. Category research only brings the phenomenon to interpretation through a transformation of meaningful language into a language that makes explicit facticity's own self-interpretation; thus the relation of life and world is the background in which the relationality of categories is set. The categories are “the preeminent way in which life comes to itself.” The categories show facticity at work and category research is only this possibility of self-interpretation that already belongs to the facticity. The “category is interpretive and is interpretive (specifically of factical life) only if appropriated in existentiell concern.” This appropriation means both that the category must be taken from the actualised history of factical life and appear in formal indication as questionable.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Heidegger begins his investigation of the concept of life, by examining the various ways in which the word ‘life’ is used. The word ‘life’ is said in different ways. In the face of this multiplicity Heidegger takes the
opportunity to clarify how language is to be treated here. As with the issue of the
definition of philosophy above, it is possible both to overestimate and underestimate
the philosophical value of the concept of life. Thus, on the one hand, it could be
suggested that the term’s multiple possible meanings is due to the ineffable nature
of what is named under the concept. In this case any attempts to clarify the notion
of life could only culminate in misunderstanding. On the other hand, one could take
the position that the vagueness of the word means that the concept is useless on the
grounds that one should try to operate only with adequately defined terms. Both of
these possible estimations of life as a concept result in the thought that one should
leave the word alone. Heidegger, however puts a great deal of weight on the
importance of following the sense of the word, i.e. of “pursu[ing] the tendencies in
the expression” and “ask[ing] of the relevant nexuses of expression how it happens
that the same word breaks out in them and whether this word and its use might not
give voice to certain basic tendencies of existence.”119 Heidegger thus treats
language as a guide to connections that present the opportunities for interpretation
of the phenomena at hand. This treatment of language thus need neither close off
ambiguity of meaning nor accept it without further attention.

Insofar as life is ‘living in’, ‘out of’, or ‘for something’, life is co-present with the
world. “The ‘something’ whose manifold relations to ‘living’ are indicated in these
prepositional expressions ... is what we call a ‘world.’”120 Heidegger does not
hesitate from pointing to the possibility of formalising this relation. Life and world
are not related as two separable things, but rather their relation is fundamental to
both of them. The relation is ‘referential,’ that is, life is directed towards the world which is there for it. Insofar as one can speak of living on the basis of something, the relational sense of life is caring. In the world this manifests as meaningfulness, a categorical determination of the world. The category ‘meaning’ is only possible because the world shows itself as meaningful. “The objects of a world... are lived inasmuch as they embody the character of meaningfulness.”\textsuperscript{121} This categorical determination of objects must be distinguished from a theoretical and constructivist approach to objects. Meaningfulness is not some character that objects can acquire, rather objects are always “met with, on the path of care.”\textsuperscript{122} Meaningfulness is thus the most basic determination of what is usually taken to be the most basic meaning of reality, that is, objects just as they are encountered. But just as ‘plain objects’ are shown here, albeit indeterminately, to emerge through the sense of the relation of life, that is, through care, meaningfulness applies to the basic character of everything which is encountered in the world including all that is ‘not meaningful’. Care is not directed towards meaning, however, but to the objects themselves, and usually meaningfulness remains inexplicit. But to formally indicate the meaningful in order to grasp meaning itself brings meaning itself to be considered, that is, meaningfulness \textit{can become explicit}. In formally indicating the whole of ‘what’ is experienced, the interpretation of the world is anticipated. As a category, meaningfulness has a broader sense than any particular kind of concern. Meaningfulness belongs to the whole of the world. Care “is both the relational and intrinsic basic mode and sense of the Being of life.”\textsuperscript{123} These categorical determinations are formal indications – care and meaningfulness are not defined in
order to bring one to encounter them as objects, but insofar as they articulate the activity and encountering of life as a whole. Together they establish the directedness of life.

The categorial analysis of life brings to light what, at the beginning of the lecture course, could only be expressed in the opposition of formal indication with the theoretical attitude. The analysis also reveals how philosophy, in resisting the tendencies of the theoretical attitude to analyse objects in terms of relations within regions of objects, must instead analyse how meaningfulness develops in factical life. It is thus category analysis that provides the experience of genuine philosophical research. On the one hand, philosophy is a knowledge of principles insofar as a principle prepares for the way something may be investigated further. On the other hand, philosophy is the actualisation of the historiology of factical life, insofar as it reveals how factical life actualises and makes this explicit. However, any ‘positive’ achievements of the lecture course pale in comparison with its propaedeutic intentions. The real intention of the course is not to transmit a series of doctrines, but to allow the reader (listener) to grasp how his/her own methods of interpretation are shaped by the way in which the principle questions of philosophy (method and object) have been answered, no matter how vague these answers may have been. If the lecture course is to have any effect at all it must encapsulate the two-sided function of formal indication. On the one hand, the procedures of the theoretical attitude must be seen for what they are. Only when the assumptions of regionality are clarified can the assumptions that underwrite these procedures be
suspended or rendered inoperable. On the other hand, the experience of the path of questioning that lies open in category research must transform one’s own relation to factual life at the level of method and at the level of questioning the self-identity of the meaningful.

**Chapter 3: The Unity of the Psuchē**

**3.1: Seeing and Speaking**

This chapter argues that a bridge can be found in Heidegger’s early interpretation of Aristotle’s texts on perception and language between the earlier methodological insight behind formal indication and the introduction of *alētheia* as a goal towards which phenomenology should be aimed. The relevant text is the first chapter from the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, WS1923-24, which bears some resemblance with *Being and Time* §7. Both present an etymological definition of phenomenology through an analysis of *phainomenon* and *logos*. Significantly the earlier text is explicitly a treatment of *De Anima* which is not mentioned in §7. Not only that, but the breakthrough definition of phenomenon offered vis-à-vis illusion/semblance (*Schein*), famous in *Being and Time*, is given a much more extensive presentation in the earlier text in relation to an analysis of *pseudos*, falsity. What is at stake in Heidegger’s close reading of Aristotle’s analyses is the structure of presentation, which can be drawn out explicitly by considering the conditions of possibility of falsity. The first chapter of *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*
sets up a basic dynamic between the simplicity of intuitive perception and the articulation of potentially false logos. This reconstructive work by Heidegger can be read as an attempt to set out the basic structures of human being there that underlie the basic way that research must approach both perception and the sedimentation of language.

The *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, published and translated quite late, has received little attention so far. Glancing at the contents this would seem justified since the opening section on *phenomena-logos* and the closing sections on Descartes are repeated in a revised form in *Being and Time* and the central section on Husserl is partially repeated in *Prolegomena: History of the Concept of Time*, which has also long been available. Heidegger’s introductory chapter on Aristotle in the WS1923-24 is important because it presents phenomenology by exposing the manner in which Aristotle investigates perception and speaking. Aristotle is used by Heidegger as a way of introducing phenomenology, and for Heidegger, as the first two chapters of this thesis have argued, this requires making the workings of the theoretical attitude explicit. Phenomenology must be presented in this way because the theoretical attitude blocks access to the different starting points of research that phenomenology attempts to pursue. But what does Aristotle offer Heidegger that makes him useful in this regard? We have already established how Heidegger attempts to thematise and intervene in the basic understanding of research that functions in the theoretical attitude. In short Heidegger’s strategy is to combat the presumption of an objective form and the maintenance of a content-focused
attitude towards such a form by drawing attention to the other parts of the intentional structure, that is, relationality and enactment. In the first chapter of the WS1923-24, Heidegger brings together passages from Aristotle’s analysis of perception, aisthēsis, in the second book of De Anima, and also several passages regarding logos from De Anima and elsewhere, in a deliberate effort to begin research into these matters within the context of the psuchē. The psuchē for Heidegger must be understood as being in the world, that is, primarily as a being that can only be understood in terms of its actualisation. The investigations of seeing and speaking do not so much attend to objects separated from what is seen and what is spoken of or communicated, rather seeing and speaking belong to the way that the human being is in the world.

Aristotle’s investigations of seeing and speaking provide Heidegger with two crucial examples of Aristotle’s method. A researcher might be tempted to begin by taking either seeing or speaking to consist of units that could be classified and totalised. But rather than looking to the physiology of the senses or theories of language Aristotle investigates seeing and speaking with respect to the way that the human being is open to and directed towards beings. The investigation thus becomes the question ‘what are the possible ways of being open to the world in seeing and speaking?’ This open nature according to Heidegger’s interpretation is simply the psuchē. The fundamental possible ways of the psuchē being directed towards beings are truth and falsity.

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The results of Aristotle’s investigation into seeing and speaking are not as important to Heidegger as the way in which Aristotle’s direct approach to phenomena is possible. Chapter Two of this thesis showed how Heidegger’s recovery of philosophical concepts required first of all the recovery of the unified context of Dasein’s interpretation. On the one hand this involves the thinking about Dasein’s dealings in the world as based upon Dasein’s interpretation of its own existence – in this way Dasein’s self-interpretation as an explicit theme is shown to be the underlying possibility already at work in its everyday understanding of the world. On the other hand, the way of encompassing the work of interpretation provides a counter concept of the whole which can be juxtaposed with the structure of regions. Heidegger’s strategy in the WS1921-22, explored in sections 2.4 and 2.5 above, is to expose the structure of Dasein’s encounters in the world with regard to their relationality and actualisation. To formally indicate is to point to an example that shows the content structure by itself to be inadequate in the task of bringing what is indicated into explicit thematisation. By using the relationality of life, directed at the world which is found meaningful, Heidegger could begin the work of setting intellectual work into a context that moved away from the frameworks underpinned by the ‘content-focused’ theoretical attitude. This task now goes through an extraordinary consolidation in the reading of alētheia. The essential relationality of living in the world becomes the basis for Heidegger’s reading of De Anima; Aristotle’s concept of the psuchē is read as being-in-the-world. In this Chapter seeing and speaking are drawn into their interconnection with truth and falsity in the unity of psuchē. Establishing this unified approach, beginning with the
basic openness to the world of the human being, clears the way for Aristotle’s analyses of *logos* and *aisthēsis* as possibilities of being directed towards beings. By bringing attention to the relationality of being in the world, and by looking at seeing and speaking together, Heidegger can present an understanding of truth and falsity that is distinct from the notion of a quality belonging to a proposition. In short, propositional bivalence belongs to content while *alētheia* and *pseudos* belong to relationality and enactment.

In effect Heidegger has swopped the problem of epistemology with one of ontology and is deliberately allowing the different problems that arise with two respective understandings of truth to show themselves in juxtaposition. The problem of accessing the world is rejected as a problem insofar as beings are taken to be already accessible. But the new problem that replaces it is how to overcome the ways in which beings can be covered over in the manner in which they are. To put this in another way, ‘does living/experience harbour possibilities of theorisation that the theoretical attitude covers over?’ The conjoining of living and experience, active and passive, points to Heidegger’s strategy. While the theoretical attitude isolates a way of knowing that approaches the world passively in the mode of objectification, Heidegger seeks out the possibilities that the theoretical attitude suppresses as part of its own constitution in the activity of coming to know, of attempting to bring a being to theorisation, in the attempt to overcome the deceptive and inappropriate possibilities of theorisation that cover over the phenomena. Just as Heidegger in the WS1921-22 pursued the relationality of life
explicitly as an alternative to a being thought as objective, so here the \( \text{psuchē} \) provides the perfect example of a being for which the accessibility of beings is at stake. The \( \text{psuchē} \) exists just in the way that it makes beings accessible – a revised meaning of truth and falsity can now be thought within this accessibility.

The shift in the meaning of truth from the correctness of assertions to the showing of beings is quite striking. On the one hand, seeing and indeed \( \text{aisthēsis} \) in general is now thought of as the basic way that beings are accessible, and thus seeing is most straightforwardly true. On the other hand, only when we consider what accessibility is within \( \text{logos} \) and the possibilities of deception that are opened up therein do we rediscover the problematic relationship of language, truth and the self-showing of beings. This shift underlies a whole set of juxtapositions focused on the new way that language must be dealt with. In short, the foundation of Heidegger’s interpretation is the opposition of two ways of understanding language and the relationship of language to generality and research. Rather than treating words as general concepts that are already possessed, Heidegger reads Aristotle as treating words, and, even more specifically, the activity of forming a general determination of a being, as the site of a problem. The problem is that the primary deceptiveness that must be overcome in research is not the inaccessibility of things (on the contrary things are intrinsically accessible) but rather the difficulty of adequately allowing things to show themselves in the manner of their original accessibility, that is, in the manner in which they are. Two structural elements of the theoretical attitude are overturned in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle, the being of
the being as a generalizable primary concept that leans on a isomorphism between presence and formal singularity, and the application of concepts to things in the relation of general-particular that leans on the status of words as general representations. These structures are deployed in arguments over realism and idealism – for instance in the determination of mere appearances, which are as superficially formalised as beings in general. Both of these structural elements are allowed by a basic possibility of deception which blocks access to a new possibility for research. Heidegger’s counter examples, presented in the form of readings of Aristotle, attempt to direct the *logos* at the ‘being characters’ of beings; in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle the *accessibility* of beings is the primary being character of beings that guides research into beings. For Heidegger’s Aristotle it is these being characters which can be overlooked and provide the condition of possibility for appearing in the first place. We can note too that this focus on accessibility forms the backbone of Heidegger’s understanding of conceptuality and *ousia* that he develops in the SS1924 (see chapter 4 of this thesis). In the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* Heidegger articulates this new reading of Aristotle through a new exposition of deception, *pseudos*, but the importance of deception is only meaningful insofar as the challenge of research is understood.

The two counter examples that Heidegger focuses on are seeing and speaking. Let us consider the two ways that research could miss these phenomena; this is as much to say that the questions of what speaking and what seeing are could begin with an understanding of the question which failed to begin to look for the
phenomena appropriately. Firstly the question could go astray by virtue of understanding seeing and speaking too quickly, i.e. the words in their familiar meaning have become average. Secondly, the possibilities of seeing and speaking could be taken up in the theoretical attitude by destroying experience, that is, the experience of seeing and speaking could too quickly be formalised and then located with a model based on pre-given region-based facts – for example, both could be considered as questions taken up in biology, physiology, neuroscience, psychology etc. Heidegger allows both of these errors to come to the fore in his lectures, such that the alternative approach can stand out in contrast.

For Heidegger, Aristotle begins with the understanding that seeing and speaking are the basic ways that the human being is there in the world, understood here as psuchē. Aristotle’s analysis of the being of logos and aisthēsis primarily with respect to the unity of the psuchē does not prevent Aristotle from breaking logos and aisthēsis into their parts such as sound and colour. On the contrary, by starting with the human being in the world, the parts of logos and aisthēsis can be approached as not being directed towards beings in the world. Thus the content of the senses in themselves is made subordinate to the psuchē. Colour and sound can be seen and heard by virtue of the nature of the senses to give these directly. Similarly a logos can be divided into names, but while names have a kind of meaning they are not themselves the logos. It is neither the phusis of colour and sound, nor the convention of names, that allows truth to exist. The truth of seeing and speaking is determined by the manner in which beings show themselves and how this is taken
up and preserved by the psuchē. The analysis of logos and aisthēsis is thus grounded in looking at how beings show themselves and how beings are pointed to as showing themselves in a certain way.

Aristotle’s investigation can be contrasted with an analysis orientated by the theoretical attitude in several ways. On the one hand, each analysis differs from the other in relation to what is questioned. Aristotle’s investigation does not look to seeing and speaking insofar as they can be seen to show themselves as self-identical present, object-like beings, but rather the analysis of seeing and speaking is grounded on a reflection of the ways in which the self-showing of beings can fail as well as be complete, i.e. in the notion of a fundamental possibility of error in all self-showing. This explanation requires that the logos show itself in its structural articulations with aisthēsis, with nous, and importantly also with the possibility of presentation/imagination, phantasia. Furthermore, the way the two approaches anticipate their respective results is different. For the theoretical attitude, to question seeing and speaking means to contribute to the completion of a region, that is, to classify the identity and differences that are relevant to the other beings in the region, which are all gathered together within the scope projected by the basic concept of the region. But for Aristotle’s investigation, it is rather a matter of how we are already directed towards beings that must be revealed to ourselves. We are directed towards the truth of beings and yet the way that this possibility unfolds leads us astray insofar as we do not recognise how it is that we go astray. The
analysis of logos shows how the human being is in the world for the most part. The investigation is thus directed at our own being and becoming in logos.

By bringing together the various passages from Aristotle, Heidegger can examine how such an analysis can take place. The fact that the analysis is taken as a premier example of how phenomenology can examine the things themselves does not mean that no concepts are at work in grounding the investigation, but rather the concepts of truth and falsity emerge only within the scope of the investigation itself. Concepts work to secure the possibility of beings showing themselves. Heidegger is specifically interested in the way that Aristotle’s analysis aims to provide the conceptual framework that allows speech and perception to show themselves in their most basic and highest possibilities. For Aristotle, the highest possibility of something, for instance the capacity of logos to pursue *alētheia*, can provide the fundamental clue to establishing the underlying and most basic possibilities of that same thing. Given that language and perception are the pre-eminent ways that beings are accessed, Aristotle’s attempt to explain precisely what and how things may be spoken of truly and perceived appropriately provide the particular examples that will allow a general grasp of language and sensation.

Truth, *alētheia*, emerges properly as a concept not only when it is grasped as the possibility by which any investigation is orientated, but also when the *psuchē* is understood as grasping and preserving the truth insofar as it grasps potentiality in *logos*. The investigations of Aristotle that Heidegger pulls together in the WS1923-24 allow the concept of *alētheia* to show itself not as a static property of
propositions, but rather as an underlying possibility of the psuchē. *Alētheia* is present in everything the psuchē has taken hold of, but also *alētheia* is here in the form of its own privation, i.e. as falsity. Heidegger’s uncovering of Aristotle’s conception of *alētheia*, a conception that differs considerably from the more familiar notion of truth as the *adequatio rei et intellectus*, is a crucial moment in his own development and in particular for his attempts to explicate Aristotle’s understanding of beings with respect to their self-showing. Commentators have noted the radical significance of this discovery since it appeared in ‘My Way to Phenomenology,’ published in *On Time and Being*. In this text, Heidegger notes that, after returning to Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* after they were reissued in 1922, a breakthrough turn to Aristotle occurred to him. “There I learned one thing—at first rather led by surmise than guided by founded insight: What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as *alētheia*, as the unconcealedness of what-is present, its being revealed, its showing itself.”¹²⁵ In the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* Aristotle is presented not only as a prelude to Husserl’s phenomenology, but in conflict with the author of the *Logical Investigations* over the true object of phenomenology. After the Aristotle section in the WS1923-24 has finished and the Husserl section is yet to begin, Heidegger makes the striking claim that the Greeks had no notion of consciousness. Phenomenology in Husserl’s analysis is precisely a science of consciousness. This distinctive opposition is enough to suggest that Heidegger’s comments made in 1963 refer to
the matter of the lectures delivered forty years before. Heidegger’s comments on Aristotle also refer to his increasing distance from Husserl.

Heidegger is specifically resistant to those elements in Husserl’s phenomenology that he believes show Husserl to be still caught in modern prejudices. In particular, Heidegger thinks that Husserl does not radically overcome the notion of certainty that has become fundamental to the modern philosophical ‘horizon of matters’. Heidegger detects in Husserl’s work an inherited and problematic division between certainty, which is alleged to belong to the internal relationship of consciousness to itself and deception which is held to belong, by contrast, to the external relationship to the world. For Heidegger the philosophical confrontation with deception in the modern era has become dominated by the conception of a world presumed to be separate from consciousness, and thus problematic in its accessibility. Furthermore, the certainty of rational inner experience, such as mathematics, is commonly employed as a standpoint from which to judge deceptive outer experience. Heidegger suggests that now a “specific idea of evidence [and certainty] predominates over every genuine effort to free up the possibility of encountering the genuine matters of philosophy.”

The interpretation of deception is of course fundamental to any consideration of method, given that every method is to confront deception. The modern scientific outlook, however, has narrowed the concept of truth to such a degree that the majority of experience is simply discarded from the beginning. Certainty as a guiding ideal is limited to what can be given with evidence within a predetermined sphere of
investigation, the determination of which, in fact, is the condition for the possibility of such evidence existing (or appearing) in the first place. Limited to the context of regionality, truth and falsity are reduced to a property of propositions. It is common to suggest that Aristotle is the originator of the propositional theory of truth. It is no surprise then that Heidegger would examine Aristotle’s theory of truth discussed in Metaphysics Θ10 where the ‘logical’ interpretation breaks down, that is, in the interpretation of the truth that cannot be opposed to falsity.

In Heidegger’s major interpretations of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ10 in WS1925-26 and SS1930, the ‘highest point’ of Aristotle’s philosophy is said to be the division between two forms of truth. One of these forms opposes truth to falsity in the variations of synthesis (combination) and diaresis (separation). This form seems to be the kind of propositional truth commonly recognised. The other form of truth has no opposition to deception, and can only be opposed to ignorance. Heidegger isolates 1051b9 to 1052a4 as the crucial passage; the passages just prior and posterior are considered to be an introduction and drawn out implications, respectively. In the crucial lines, referring to beings with regard to truth, Aristotle separates composite beings, which admit of truth and falsity through synthesis and division, from simple beings that have no falsity. The truth of simple beings is only thigein (contact, touch) andphanai (assertion, address) and ignorance is simply not touching. Aristotle qualifies this, “it is impossible to be deceived with respect to what a thing is, except accidentally...” The simple is identified with essence (to ti èn einai – literally ‘the what it was to be’), that is, what something is in itself, while
the accident (sumbebēkos) is what something may or may not be while remaining itself.  

It is by no means clear what Aristotle means by a simple truth of contact and some scholars have attempted to marginalise the text by suggesting that it is the result of a displacement.  

For Heidegger, however, what this fundamental kind of truth shows is that the world is not a separate entity from the human being that the human being must somehow escape its own mind to attain. Rather truth and deception belong to the way that the human being is there in the world. Dahlstrom interprets this connection in his work *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*. There, Dahlstrom argues that the kind of truth that Heidegger reads in Aristotle allows for no possibility of deception, correspondence or separation, and yet the human being is still at work in the world in a particular mode of life. Dahlstrom surmises that “Heidegger is attempting to link Aristotle’s determination of this sense of being to his own explanation of the primary, hermeneutic understanding: the ‘disclosure of the world’ that grows out of prethematic, concerned behavior.”  

It is not in a statement about the world that primary truth is attained, but in experiences like *phronēsis* that the world is disclosed simply as it is. This simple truth only makes sense once the assumption that the mind and the world are distinct entities is rejected. The *psuchē* is living in the world. In *Plato’s Sophist*, WS1924-25, Heidegger makes the relation between truth and the soul explicit: “Uncoveredness is a specific accomplishment of Dasein, which has its being in the soul,” and “the most immediate kind of uncovering is speaking about things.”  

In *Being and Time §44*
Heidegger maintains this Aristotelian understanding of the manner in which speaking about things may be said to be true.\textsuperscript{134} Effectively Heidegger replaces the notion of a truth that is contained in propositions with the character of uncoveredness/discoveredness which statements can demonstrate when they are true. “What is to be demonstrated [insofar as a proposition is true] is solely the being-discovered of the being itself—\textit{that being} in the ‘How’ of its discoveredness.”\textsuperscript{135} In other words, Heidegger accuses the correspondence theory of truth of flattening the mode of discoveredness, both of the proposition and the entity, into a simple consistent theoretical attitude. The correspondence theory of truth can then treat the mapping relation of entity to proposition on the basis of the structure of regions; thus truth and falsity point out differences that rest in the structures of regional relations. But for Heidegger the uncoveredness of entities is only possible because of being in the world. Being-in-the-world provides “the foundation of the primordial phenomenon of truth.”\textsuperscript{136} When Heidegger thus turns to truth in the mode of propositional truth this is not a matter of choosing bivalent truth instead of primordial truth, rather primordial truth underlies all possibilities of speech. Aristotle’s approach to deception too, for Heidegger, requires starting from being in the world.

In the \textit{Introduction to Phenomenological Research}, in order to present a preliminary account of ‘phenomenology,’ Heidegger turns to Aristotle to clarify ‘\textit{phainomenon}’ and ‘\textit{logos}’. The various passages from Aristotle that Heidegger gathers together in order to understand these two terms provides an opportunity for
a wide ranging interpretation of many of the most elemental features of Aristotle’s methodology. The texts that Heidegger analyses do not present definitions, but rather approach the terms through numerous connections with their parts and relations. Each of these relations is treated with careful attention regarding their ultimate potential of providing access to beings as well as blocking access to them, that is, their potential to deceive. The rest of this chapter closely follows Heidegger’s own close reading of some of these passages. But here it is not merely the details that are of interest but rather the inexplicit implications insofar as they can be unfolded into a basic picture of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. For this reason, Heidegger’s close readings of Aristotle are examined in the context of the dispute over the one and the many.

Heidegger’s explication of ‘phenomenon’ begins by attempting to grasp the fact of seeing. Such an interpretation cannot turn to locate seeing within a biological organism or psychology of experiences. The fundamental being of sight (as opposed to the contingent ways in which different living beings see) is a question about how what is seen is accessed and, therefore, what it means that something is perceivable. Thus the investigation of phenomenon begins for Heidegger in the reading of De Anima B7, on seeing.

Aristotle’s preliminary answer to what is visible, that is, what is in itself visible, is colour. Colour appears in daylight (phōti). Aristotle rejects claims that daylight should be understood in elemental terms and suggests rather that it is “presence of fire or some such thing in the transparent.”
In Heidegger’s reading, *De Anima* “deals with the being of a human being... in the world,” and *aisthēsis* is one manner of being in the world. Hence, the being of the sensible in this analysis brings together what is perceived with perception as a mode of access. The perceived is divided accordingly into a threefold: *idia* (what is peculiar to each sense), *koina* (what is perceived by the senses in common), *sumbebēkota* (what is perceived but without special reference to sensation at all). *Idia* are always especially present to the respective senses, as colour to sight and sound to hearing. Heidegger points at this stage to a passage from Γ3 (427b12) that proposes that the *idia*, are *aei alēthes*, always uncovered. This reference is extremely significant because it provides an important parallel to the concept of truth in *Metaphysics* Θ10. Both suggest that there are cases where presence is self-contained. The eye always sees colour; even in total darkness, colour is present, albeit in a state of privation. This potentiality for seeing colour allows one to see darkness. As *idia* are distinct among the senses, the *koina* (the common) are ways of being that more than one sense can perceive. The *sumbebēkota* (the accidental or accompanying) are all the things that are regularly perceived that do not involve the particular senses in a special sense. It is important to grasp the difference between the common and accidental. While one may see or hear a person, the person does not belong to the senses, rather such things simply accompany the senses. But *kinēsis* (motion) is perceived in special ways through the various senses. *Kinēsis* is a characteristic way of being. The senses in common are directed towards *kinēsis*. On the one hand, only through the *idia* and *koina* can the *sumbebēkota* be seen. On the other hand, the
Aristotle’s analysis of the senses shifts between the different levels of access to beings. As senses are actualised as access to beings, they can only be analysed as such and not separated from the actualisation of the living openness of beings in order to investigate how they represent beings. The threefold division of what is perceived is only a basic division of what shows itself to be distinct in terms of the different manners of perceiving. The way that things are perceived belongs to how they appear in the world. For colour, the idion of sight, things appear in daylight/transparency (diaphanes). Hence, light, present in the world, is a condition of possibility for sight. “The character of being for [light’s] manner of being-present is to let things be seen through it.”141 Heidegger draws attention to the directness of Aristotle’s mode of research that is a matter of looking at what shows itself and not constructing something behind what appears. The phainomenon is this “distinctive manner of an entity’s presence.”142 The phenomenon is a way in which a being is encountered. Aristotle does not ask whether colour belongs in the world or in the subject. Rather the being of colour depends on the presence of fire, usually the sun. Colour does not reveal only itself, rather it covers all entities that are seen. The sun, then, allows entities to show themselves as they are. Sight and the lack of seeing in darkness are matters of fact in the world.

Heidegger’s investigation of terms must re-establish the conditions where a matter of fact was first accessible. The meaning of the word ‘phenomenon’, which
this analysis into seeing is to establish, can only be determined on the basis of the facts being able to present themselves most clearly. Heidegger suggests that the separation of the words and the facts is the nemesis of philosophy. Philosophy has too much terminology that is supposed to be mastered, while what is most important is the capacity to question the matters of fact as they present themselves. An example of Aristotle’s determination to establish words only on the basis of the matters of fact and not vice-versa can be read in his reflection on darkness as a manner of letting some special things be seen. These things, fire-like things, such as fire-flies, are made especially visible in the dark and yet there is no collective name for them. Heidegger points out that this is because of the origin of Greek categories and the development of Greek philosophy from the starting point of light, which continues into our non-philosophical vocabulary. Our language is a “language of the day.” Only by returning to the motives in our directedness towards things can the development of such language be considered. Similarly, the way phenomena came to mean mere appearance and thus illusion can be analysed on this basis.

The things, “on the basis of their factual content, lay claim to being taken as existing.” In so doing they provide a starting point for research. Research must not by-pass the phenomena (para ta phainomena), but focus on the manner of presence in which things are. In this sense the phenomenon is “what shows itself in itself, with the explicit claim of serving as the basis for all further questioning and explicating.” In the well known beginning of The Parts of Animals, Aristotle defends his empirical work against those who would claim that the world of
appearance is not worthy of study. Heidegger turns to this defence in order to show how Aristotle presents the basis for a scientific approach to research. Therein, the two conditions for approaching phenomena are *epistēmē tou pragmatos* (a knowledge of the things) and *paideia* (education). Rephrased, these two are grasping the particular things and grasping the intelligibility of the field of knowledge, respectively. Between the two is the need to assess how to establish the basis of the investigation, that is, to secure the object of research by approaching it in the right way. This suitability belongs completely to the entity as *phainomenon*. The *phainomenon* is thus “a manner of being, how something is encountered and, indeed, encountered in the first and, as such, first legitimate way.”

In order to approach *logos*, Heidegger specifically wants to avoid beginning with the truth of the proposition as the key issue. Two of Aristotle’s analyses into the *logos* are brought together by Heidegger — on the one hand *De Anima* B8 investigates the *logos* from the perspective of the *phusis* of the *psuchē* and on the other hand *Of Interpretation* investigates how nouns and verbs make up the *logos* and how truth and falsity exists. Both of the analyses approach *logos* by considering the facticity of speaking with respect to the parts of *logos*. Speaking is not made up of these parts through combination, as though the parts contained the nature of the *logos*. Rather the parts only show themselves in relation to a variety of basic concepts. The sound and the letters, the names and the conventions of meaning are all present in speech. But all the parts can only be understood together if the *logos* is grasped with regard to the being of human being. In *De Anima* B8 Aristotle
approaches the *logos* through a variety of stages, beginning with sound, he then considers the voice. The voice is a sound produced by something living and contains some *phantasia* (image/presentation). ‘Image’ is inadequate as a term here unless understood as ‘something shown’. Heidegger says that the voice “is a distinctive type of being, namely, being in the sense of living.”\(^{147}\) Only in the scope of life can the *phantasia* be in the sound. The *phantasia* means that something shows itself through the sound, and in this way the sound is *sēmantikē* (sign/symbol).

*Of Interpretation* 4 also analyses how the *logos* rests on parts that have meaning but that themselves are not the *logos*. The name is part of the *logos*, but the parts of the name, unlike the *logos*, are not separately meaningful except accidentally in the case of compound names. Insofar as each name is a sound that has become a symbol the name is *semantikē* by convention. The sound of the voice is not enough to mean in the way of a symbol, that is, a marker that connects to something. Every word must have its genesis, its development. Just as the word ‘phenomenon’ had to be found in the facts of the matter, so every word is born in lived experience. Words do not *represent* so much as live. The sign does not stay in a fixed semantic relation, but rather, in the scope of a question, allows the relationship of man and world to be itself addressed.

He speaks insofar as something like a world is *uncovered* for him as a matter of concern and *he* is uncovered to himself in this “for him.”...

Language is the being and becoming of the human being himself.\(^{148}\)
For Heidegger, this understanding of language as the being of the human being, is something of which the Greeks were conscious, and not just in a philosophical context.

Heidegger thinks that Aristotle, especially in contrast to Plato, grasped that language was born out of a “free assessment of things.” This does not only mean that logos can combine names that themselves are fixed. While names are commonly understood as the elements from which a logos is built, this cannot provide a complete understanding of logos. Names are only intelligible as specific modifications of logos. A simple name is a unified act of meaning which has parts that do not relate to that unity, while a compound name, such as ‘pirate-ship’ is made up of simple names. But logos in not simply this unity of several names. Logos stems from the original ‘how’ of affirmation. Logos must be understood vis-à-vis truth and this means for Heidegger that we must deal with the relationality of simple truth and the bivalent proposition.

For Heidegger, truth and falsity are first defined in the context of ostentation, with specific regard for the fact that such an ostension occurs where logos is originally formed in the development of some subject matter. This pointing out is not simply possible on the basis of a previous acknowledgement, but is more properly the act of bringing something to recognition. “Alētheuein and pseudesthai are the basic ways in which a logos as apophantikos points something out and, indeed, shows an entity as an entity.” According to contemporary logic, an entity cannot be true, only propositions are true. While this rule is true within the bounds of propositional
calculus, it has been used to historically grasp what Aristotle must mean when he divides the combined and separated. *Prosthesis* (combination) and *aphairesis* (separation), Heidegger argues, do not refer to the proposition as a combination of words that result in true or false statements. Instead Heidegger suggests that they must be understood as part of the living engagement with the world, they must be understood as the basic ways that the human being can grasp the being of beings. Heidegger understands *prosthesis* and *aphairesis* to mean concretion and abstraction, respectively. The combination of *prosthesis*, Heidegger suggests, means to indicate something such that it shows itself, and in this way that which shows itself can show itself as it is or feign what it is not. This is the manner in which truth and falsity appear in the sentence. But the indication is situated in concretely dealing with the world. “Speaking is being with the world, it is something primordial, and is in place prior to judgments. It is from here that the judgement has to become intelligible.” *Kataphasis*, affirmation, only occurs if one stays with the world and speaks of a concrete being insofar as it shows itself. *Prosthesis* means to indicate something, and through doing so to show what it is. *Aphairesis* takes a being out of one concrete situation insofar as something can show itself by itself, for example, in geometry insofar as mathematics can show the being of shapes without needing a physical instance. With this distinction Heidegger means to show that the *logos* belongs to the concrete engagement with the world, not a system of words that maps onto reality.
Heidegger’s understanding of the living engagement with the world provides a context for the *logos* wherein the interplay of the indicating and self-showing of beings is primordial. The conceptual oppositions of combination and separation, unity and multiplicity as employed by Aristotle can be reread in the light of Heidegger’s understanding of language. The context provides an understanding of how the human being relates to *alētheia*. The human being has a fundamental range of possibilities structured by the manner in which *logos* can bring to light the self-showing of beings. The deceptive simple givenness of beings provides the framework with which to understand the formality of mere being, of the mere name, or simple presence. The manner in which the unity and multiplicity of beings is approached is caught up in the basic way of being towards beings insofar as they show themselves or remain hidden.

By understanding how Heidegger outlines the concrete context for *logos* as being in the world, truth and falsity can be interpreted as possibilities therein. Again, Heidegger puts formalisation, as an ever present possibility, into the concrete structure in order to distinguish it from the unity and multiplicity that emerges with the self-showing of phenomena. The unity and multiplicity of beings basically breaks into two modes, the possibility of free indication and lived actualisation including the possibility of proper research. In the superficial mode common speech can take up any being as formally one without difficulty, and speak of beings by combining them together. This happens when one talks about beings from a perspective that is foreign to the being of beings. For example talking about something that one knows
nothing about, or talking about an object based in one region with a discourse based in another region. In such cases, knowledge practices are not grounded in the self-revealing of the beings at all, only the superficial formal being is required. In the mode of proper research the formal oneness must be overcome and the multiplicity that emerges merely by taking several abstractly-conceived beings together must also be resisted. The proper mode of research attempts to make the oneness of a being evident and to allow the oneness of a being to show itself in multiplicity. The *logos* can make a claim on the being of beings by articulating the nature of the unity and multiplicity. In this way, the *logos* can be true or false. This truth and falsity is not simply the accordance of a proposition with a state of affairs that can be seen, but rather is the manner in which the self-showing of a being is indicated.

The *logos* and truth cannot be approached on the basis of isolated propositions. Rather the concepts of life, language, research and truth, must be approached together and only understood on the basis of the facts of the matter. The *logos* thus requires an understanding of how that which is encountered can come to be analysed. This problem of the origin of theoretical work, so prominent in epistemology, is something which Heidegger thinks is profoundly reflected upon in Aristotle’s articulation of the *logos* in its unity and multiplicity. This division shows how Heidegger brings Aristotle and Parmenides together as each providing fundamental theses of Greek philosophy. “For [Aristotle] and for the Greeks generally, the determination of the unity, of the *hen*, alternates with the determination of an entity’s specific being.”¹⁵⁴ On the one hand, the Greeks have a
thesis about being, i.e. that individual identities discerned through abstraction must be viewed in relation to a whole. This is the discovery of the dependence relation such as is found in identities \textit{pros ta alla} (in relation to another). On the other hand, the individual being that is encountered is encountered as such because it makes a claim to be and must be confronted directly insofar as it thus makes a claim on the living being who encounters. It is on the basis of this twofold approach to beings that Heidegger explains the way that Aristotle distinguishes the name from the \textit{logos}. “Meaning something in the case of a name is merely entertaining it in a formal sense, whereas in the \textit{logos} it is the \textit{ostension, the pointing out of the existing entity as existing.”}^{155} The name is possible because of formalisation, while the \textit{logos} is possible because things claim to be and are addressed as such. The \textit{logos} belongs to the encounter where the possibility of determination can be exercised.

The \textit{logos} does not belong merely to whatever is perceived at any time, but rather the \textit{logos} takes up the being of the entity \textit{as something}. “In the \textit{logos} what is spoken about is held onto as existing.”^{156} A proper example of this is the \textit{logos} \textit{horismos} (definition) which speaks not of particulars but about ‘what’ is spoken of itself. A definition takes \textit{logos} away from the encounter, but the ‘what’ still exists as a claim to be. Again, the twofold directions in which being is approached, from the dependence of things on the whole, and from the individual claim to be, are the key to approaching the phenomenon of \textit{logos}. When the \textit{logos} is taken away from a concrete situation the \textit{logos} is still ostension of something that claims to be. The phenomenon of the \textit{logos} shows itself not as self-contained, but rather as subject to
deception. Insofar as the *logos* still brings something into view even if that something is not perceptively accessible, the *logos* is considered to contain a *phantasia*. The *phantasia* is the presenting of something, while a mental image is a *phantasma*. The truth and falsity of *phantasia* is not insofar as the *phantasia* presents merely something, but rather insofar as it shows something as accessible in a certain way. *Phantasia* brings a being to sit within a context that determines the being of the being.

Just as ‘definition’ was defined in the last chapter in relation to showing that a path of research was open, a *logos* makes a claim on the way a being is. The self-showing of beings thus is crucially linked to the way a being may show itself further. The self-showing can be merely the potentiality for disclosure and this is where the formal indication and definition, the *logos horismos*, coincide. To miss this starting point for disclosure is for Heidegger the phenomena of primordial falsity in Aristotle. Heidegger brings *phantasia*, the possibility for presenting something, together with the possibility to distinguish something, *krinein*. *Krinein* is the possibility that makes the division of the one and many the primordial basis for the *logos*. Both *phantasia* and *krinein* are fundamental to the way that the human being lives in *logos*. *Phantasia* must be put alongside *aisthēsis* and *nous*, where *krinein* also is possible, as a way in which the world is accessible for the human being.\(^\text{157}\) *Krinein* means that one being can be encountered as not something else. *Krinein* thus makes individual beings determinate in some way by explaining them with regard to other beings, in other words, setting the one into a context of many. The *logos* points to this simple
being that is addressed with regard to some context of other beings. For Heidegger, this underlying potentiality of “setting off from one another” is part of Aristotle’s great leap forward beyond Plato. Human being can be characterised as “the sort of entity who is able to move about (kinēsis kata topon) in this manner of setting things off from one another and articulating them.”

To explain sight through the distinctions that it makes is not rare in Aristotle. Not only is sight determined as such at the very beginning of the Metaphysics A, but Aristotle often makes such remarks about seeing and distinguishing belonging together with an obvious echo of Plato’s similar discussion in the Theaetetus, a dialogue to which Heidegger and Aristotle both pay a good deal of attention. The question emerges both in the Theaetetus and De Anima Γ: if sight distinguishes colours, and taste flavours, then what distinguishes colour and flavour? For Socrates and Theaetetus in their dialogue it is the soul, and likewise for Aristotle. Thus insofar as nous and aisthēsis are analogous Plato and Aristotle agree. Heidegger’s understanding of logos, however, extends the range of how aisthēsis is to be understood in its unity. Heidegger proposes that Aristotle is clearly aware that logos belongs to being-with-others. In this way, the substrate, hupokeimenon, that is, what is there already, underlies what is spoken of as common. What one person sees can conflict with another because of this basic communality of the substrate.

Aisthēsis and logos both indicate something. This indicating brings the comportment of the individual alongside the shared experience of the world with others into a basic compatibility. Indicating, Heidegger explains, means to take “a
stance toward [the] world in a definite manner.” The significance of the definiteness in this stance underlies Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s understanding of truth and falsity. Truth in the primordial sense belongs to the way that a being is grasped in its being. Thus the truth that simply joins an object to an attribute that belongs to it, such as the board is black, is an inadequate example of truth. The board may indeed be black, and thus the statement may be true and not false, but truth can only be primordial insofar as it concerns the way that beings show themselves in their own being.

Primordial truth is not simply opposed to false statements, but rather is opposed to the possibility of missing the phenomena. The phenomenon is a being addressed in its being, that is, addressed such as to hit upon the way the being first shows itself and grounds all possible research into that being. The *logos horismos* is to be understood as this address that attempts to return to the original emergence. To speak of a being in such a way as to not grasp the being in its being is not a rare kind of speech, but rather is how one speaks for the most part. Common talk is deceptive insofar as it does speak of beings, but without grasping beings as they show themselves. This common talking around things, which produces a broad deceptive accessibility to the world, is more primordial than the falsity that is there in obviously false statements. The possibilities of truth and falsity are how the human being lives in *logos*. Primordial falsity is a way of being in the world rather than a property of statements.
Heidegger emphasises the concept of primordial falsity especially because it has been absent from the designation of truth and falsity understood as simply the combination of terms that happen to be correct about a state of affairs or not. Truth and falsity that simply combines subject and predicate is taken by Heidegger to be a derivative form of truth. The derivative form of truth and falsity that portrays truth as a property of the proposition is by no means an incorrect kind of truth and falsity, but rather it can only exist insofar as the parts of the proposition are already accessible independently of their combination or separation. The correctness of the proposition must be established by looking to the beings that are named in the proposition, for example, in the proposition, ‘the board is black’, the board is there, its blackness is there, ‘the board is black’ is hence true. This simple givenness is the same simple givenness that is there in common talk – access to beings is not possibly a question, because all things are already understood. This givenness is not the givenness of phenomena, but rather depends on the freedom of formalisation to point to anything. This abstract givenness is a kind of mere being that for the most part hides the primordial truth. Thus the derivative form of truth does not give proper due to the simple unity of the *logos*.

The derivative form of truth does not show the nature of primordial falsity. The example ‘the board is black’ is only adequate to show how truth can be wrongly considered to consist of the combination of terms in order to point out correctly a combination of present beings. The reach of common talk is far more encompassing because the human being is not simply confronted with present objects, but is
absorbed in a world that is primarily spoken. The fact that the *logos* is heard and taken up as pointing towards something provides the conditions for the *logos* to take a dominating role in the disclosure of beings. Rather than focusing on a matter itself, language can lose touch with phenomena and remain within the determinations that it has already taken up.

While Heidegger’s Aristotelian introduction to the WS1923-24 maintains a distance from earlier remarks about formal indication, clear links can yet be established. The importance of Heidegger’s incorporation of formalisation becomes clear with the recovery of Aristotle’s understanding of truth and falsity. Heidegger understands falsity, everydayness and the limitations of the theoretical attitude together. For Heidegger, the ubiquitous possibility of formalisation underlies both the false givenness of empty talk and also the potentiality for intervening in common talk with formal indication. The self-showing of beings is thus split into two forms, on the one hand the mere being that is possible because of formalisation, and on the other hand, the emergence of the being that is to be discovered in the *logos horismos*. For Heidegger, the formal form of beings must be treated as an empty starting point for the discovery of beings. Thus the ubiquitous possibility of formality which bestows a flattened oneness to all beings is not simply at work in common talk, but also provides the foundation for the *logos* that addresses the being in its being. Formal indication is the appropriation of the formal oneness of beings as a starting point.
The conflict over whether the *logos* is itself one or is made up of a minimum of two parts that happen to accord only emerges into full significance when returned to the Greek context of the one and the many. The *logos horismos* is not supposed to ascribe one being to another being, but rather to ascribe to a being what it is. The *logos horismos* is not about a truth that can be checked like ‘the board is black’, but rather is supposed to point to the self-showing of the being in its being. The *logos* in this case is not two beings, but rather is supposed to show the true oneness of the being. The simplicity of beings is thus split into a oneness which is the being itself, and a oneness which is merely a formal being in general.

The *logos* is thus not two words joined together, but rather is primarily pointing towards something and disclosing what it is in a certain way. The way of disclosing is variable, either properly disclosing of the being in its being, or disclosing in a deceptive manner. This character of deception is equivalent to the possibility of being secured in averageness where beings are not discovered in themselves but rather *talked around*. Average speech is thus a speech of multiplicity insofar as it speaks of one thing as something else. Language thus has a double manner. On the one hand, the *logos* is primordial and conjoined with perception, and on the other hand, the common language passes around, still ostensive, but determined within the scope of ways of conceiving that have become shared.

Just as Aristotle thought his predecessors did not take falsity seriously enough, so Heidegger thinks that this is still the case, and that even Aristotle did not fully grasp the fundamental relation of the facticity of language with various forms of falsity.
Falsity must be grasped in terms of how *krinein* (to distinguish) relates to the tradition of language, both how it is guided by previous speech, as well as contributes to the tradition. Heidegger emphasises this point especially: “Insofar as language is taken up in a traditional and not in a primordial sense, it is precisely what *conceals* things...”\(^{160}\) A false *logos* ostends, points out something as something, but ostends that which is not. This does not mean that a false *logos* points at nothing, rather it is the manner in which *krinein* distinguishes according to tradition that prepares the way for genuine comprehensive deception. This complete deception is not just a false statement but leads one to approach things in set ways that disguise the possibility of a more primordial analysis. *Krinein* works to determine how something is determined when it distinguishes on the basis of a previous ‘what’ that has already passed into common usage. For example, white is not black, thus they are both regarded as colours. In such cases an already determined ‘what’ sets off one from the other, and thus both are already taken as-something.

The traditional problem regarding not-being can be understood in terms of the context where the as-something occurs. To consider a thing ‘which is not’ directly, makes no sense and does not explain falsity. But *logos* does not just cite the ‘what’ of entities, rather *krinein* opens up the possibility to talk about things in relation to other things. For Aristotle, this means that falsity is possible on the basis of speaking about something. For Heidegger, the tradition of language means that relations can skip over the truth of the entity entirely and remain instead in the realm of the *elusive*. Thus the difficulty of understanding beings can be easily avoided because of
the possibility to speak around the things themselves can become the norm in public everyday speech. The tradition can become more acceptable than the original challenge to grasp things as they are.

Heidegger takes his cue from Aristotle in suggesting that falsity is much more common than usually realised. He then extends the scope of falsity well beyond ‘obviously’ false statements to make falsity into a concomitant of being in the world. The multifaceted meanings of falsity are thus encapsulated in what Heidegger regards as the foundation of all deception namely, the glib acceptance of a tradition which has been obscured as a tradition. The understanding of the world in terms of deception leads Heidegger to grasp the relation of language and perception in a new way. Language and perception are, on the one hand, defined as the same insofar as they belong to ostension within the being of the psuchē, which is dunamis through and through. On the other hand, language and perception are set in tension because of the way tradition guides expectation and the actualisation of ostension.

Ostention, the index, means not only to point to something as something, but also to take up a stance towards something in the world. The theoretical attitude becomes a certain possibility that is structured by the prejudice that makes it seem that only one empty stance, the theoretical one, lets the object plainly show itself. Describing the theoretical attitude in this way allows Heidegger to present the underlying prejudice of the theoretical attitude vis-à-vis the ambition of phenomenology and Aristotle. In phenomenology of course, as for Aristotle, the possibility of a true theoretical stance is no empty matter.
Heidegger’s interpretation of deception in 1923 is already on the way to the understanding of fallenness in relation to falsity in *Being and Time* written three years later. But what is most significant is the way the Greek notion of the human being as *logon echein* is completely embraced in this text. Heidegger’s later focus on the notion of truth can be confusing if not understood in this context. The explanation of the derivative nature of the correspondence theory of truth, too, which after the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* becomes a set piece in Heidegger’s texts, can only be properly appreciated when it is understood that Heidegger excludes even the possibility that Aristotle is a correspondence theorist. The multiplicity found in *logos* does not connect a perception with a concept, nor the subject to the object. The *logos* addresses beings first of all, and only insofar as this address is also an uncovering, can the *logos* be true. The real insight of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the WS1923-24 is the understanding of the task of philosophy that deception presents. The real struggle of philosophy is to address the things just as they are, and not simply accept that traditional determinations can provide appropriate ‘concepts’ for this. Aristotle’s analyses, in the most straightforward manner, must breakthrough the tradition in order to articulate the nature of the access to beings in the simplest way that *logos* can. The task then, is not to explain things so much as address what is there.
Chapter 4: The Unity of Aristotelian Research

4.1: The Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy

This chapter demonstrates that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, which has been reconstructed from the student transcripts and Heidegger’s lecture notes from the Summer Semester of 1924, presents a new ‘logic’, i.e. a new/old understanding of language in relation to research, in conflict with the degraded logic of the theoretical attitude. The three sections that follow (4.2-4.4) each performs a close reading of Heidegger developing aspects of this ‘logic’ in the first three chapters of the SS1924, respectively. In each case we show that Heidegger’s strategy is to first criticise the assumptions of modern philosophy (the understanding of logic, definition, substance, general and particular, genus and species, essence, syllogism, opinion, etc.) as essentially unfounded and harbouring obscurity and then, by returning the origin of these modern concepts in Aristotle, Heidegger presents a hermeneutical reading of their original meanings within the context of Aristotle’s method. In this way we demonstrate how the theoretical attitude not only provides a starting point for Heidegger’s own work, but that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is entirely couched within a destruction of modern philosophy which is essentially guided by the theoretical attitude.

The course was heralded by Kisiel as harbouring “an embarrassment of riches.” In The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time, Kisiel can only skim over the text because of the sheer weight of its content. The course was Heidegger’s last attempt to bring his projected book on Aristotle to fruition, and the scale of the work
bears out this ambition. The course attempts nothing short of a full scale rereading of the philosophical foundation of Aristotle’s understanding of the human being there. Kisiel directed Christopher Smith to the student manuscripts that would lead to an early paper on Heidegger’s treatment of the *Rhetoric*, ‘The Uses and Abuses of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology: The Lecture Course, Summer 1924’.\(^{162}\) Once Heidegger’s text was published in 2001 there quickly followed a short collection of papers, *Heidegger and Rhetoric*, edited by Daniel M. Gross and Ansgar Kemmann.\(^{163}\) But the attention given to the *Rhetoric* might mislead one into thinking that rhetoric was Heidegger’s primary concern in the lecture course. The course specifically brings together the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with myriad passages from many other texts, the *Rhetoric* being only one, in order to establish a rereading of Aristotle that begins with a recovery of Aristotle’s basic concepts. The traditional boundaries that might separate Aristotle’s different subjects are not merely challenged but entirely reworked. Heidegger’s course, and no doubt the book that was to follow, is supposed to be a new initial guide to reading Aristotle.

The first part of the SS1924 lecture course is made up of three chapters collectively titled, ‘Preliminary Understanding as to the Indigenous Character of Conceptuality by Way of an Explication of Being-There as Being-in-the-World: An Orientation towards Aristotelian Basic Concepts’. The first three chapters of the course each have a special task in laying the foundations for a complete recovery of Aristotle’s corpus. To this grand structure there is further added the beginning of a
second part that reviews some of the previous content and looks at some of the basic work in the *Physics*. *Prima facie*, the course as a whole proceeds in a manner that seems to contradict its explicitly stated ambitions. As regards the latter, Heidegger explicitly announces, early in the course, that his intention is to break open a path to understand the basic possibility of theoretical-conceptual thinking. The majority of the text however seems directed towards clarifying the nature of non-theoretical understanding. The fact that the clarification of *praxis* and the function of *logos* in everydayness is a necessary propaedeutic to grasping the original possibility of theory will be no surprise to those familiar with Heidegger’s following WS1924-25, *Plato’s Sophist*. But the extent to which *Being and Time* is a reworking of material originally presented as a reading of Aristotle is only revealed by the earlier (i.e. SS1924) course.

Heidegger’s three chapters can be summarised as follows. The first chapter attempts to recover the original context for Aristotle’s understanding of *logos*. For Heidegger, the essential feature of this context is the way Aristotle understands concepts and conceptuality. For Aristotle concepts develop out of a radicalisation of the disclosure of the world that is already pointed out in language rather than in the appropriation of ‘visual’ experience by the ‘logical’ mind. The second chapter opens up the basic structure of human being there with respect to the way that its concern doubles back on the disclosedness of possibility itself. In particular it is the accessibility of the *telos* of the human being that provides the way that the human being can examine itself as a whole. The second chapter thus can be considered to
be the pure structure of the human being there, which is discovered to be inseparable from the nature of logos. The third chapter examines the way that this structure has been actually taken up concretely in everydayness and the phenomenon of doxa (in Aristotle’s use of it) provides a crucial foundation for the analysis of being-in-the-world. The third chapter thus rounds out the inquiry by bringing to light the way that the Greeks actualised the possibility of self-interpretation.

The three chapters cover a wide range of subject matter because the underlying ambition of the text is to establish a total basic account of how all problems are to sit alongside one another. The nature of Heidegger’s text can be considered with regard to the concept of paideia. For Aristotle, paideia plays a special role in philosophy, that is, it is crucial to the development of philosophy’s capacity to discern the appropriate method, i.e. to see, at any given moment, how the philosopher should proceed. Paideia for Aristotle is crucial for discerning the different kinds of research that are possible, as well as the different ways that questions and answers can fit together. Rephrased, paideia is a familiarity with the intellectual comportments, not simply the methodological deployment of a single comportment (as in a regional science), but a familiarity with the relation of different kinds of objects and comportments, i.e. with what is proper to different kinds of objects.

In working his way through the host of Aristotelian themes, Heidegger’s course aims for breadth as well as depth. This is because the course, perhaps more than
any other given in the 1920s, attempts to elucidate Heidegger’s fundamental project of distinguishing the different ways that single identities can emerge in thought and be sedimented in the average use of language. Heidegger must re-establish some primordial ways in which the human being is in the world in order to show how philosophy can begin to reverse this sedimentation. The ways of being there with others is shown by Heidegger to be the basic matter of Aristotle’s ethics, politics and rhetoric. Heidegger thus is not focused on the conclusions of Aristotle, but on bringing the students to understand Aristotle’s research as a theoretical possibility that, far from being consigned to the dustbin of history, can and should be taken up in the present.

Throughout the text, Heidegger repeats Aristotle’s investigations; on the one hand weaving together close readings of selected passages and on the other hand intervening in the analysis in order to expose the underlying understanding of being at work. The result is a series of investigations that in each case are brought back to the unity of life as thought by the Greeks in surprising ways. The opposition of praxis and theōria, the most conspicuous opposition that Heidegger radicalises, becomes a completely new set of concepts when thought through the meaning of being as peras, limit, and the key form of peras for the being-there of living being, telos, completion. The modes in which praxis is deployed conceptually are not opposed to thinking, speaking, or looking. Rather all such ways of being are tied up in the articulations of logos.
In Heidegger’s interpretation *logos* is that by which human beings have the possibility of bringing something to manifest itself. Humans are distinguished from animals by having *logos* and in particular because *logos* introduces an articulation into the way humans understand and enact their own possibilities of being. Philosophy originates out of the attention paid to *logos*, the immersion in it and the manifold meaning of being that is expressed in it. In each case where Aristotle investigates the actualisation of the soul or being with others, it is in *logos* that the bearings of the investigation are to be found. Aristotle does not subordinate the *logos* to a concept of objects as discrete entities, but understands *logos* as the very keystone of human existence. *Logos* is both the human being’s directedness to beings and the possibility of determining this directedness. *Logos* means that beings can be brought to attention on the grounds of addressing them in a certain way. Everything is addressed according to an understanding of something. This understanding is inseparable from the human being’s capacity to be directed towards something.

Throughout the course Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle’s texts do not follow any traditional order, but rather Heidegger draws upon whatever is relevant at the time. Heidegger persistently attempts to make explicit the reflexivity of Aristotle’s method, specifically the importance in any philosophical investigation of asking what it is to make beings explicit in their way of being; particular philosophical topics are always set within the most general philosophical problem of self-grounding. Thus Heidegger tries to bring his students to grapple with the possibility of being directed
towards the world intellectually. As Heidegger unfolds his own representation of Aristotle it becomes clear that the conceptual and the theoretical possibilities are both caught up in the potential of *logos* to become explicit in definition. The *logos* always points. The *logos horismos*, definition, is supposed to point such that the being of the being shows itself clearly. *Theōria* is a kind of seeing, an extension of the way that seeing clearly and directly is experienced. But the *logos* as speaking does not stand opposed to sight, rather they must be thought together. There is no seeing that precedes interpretation. This interpretation for the most part lies hidden and all attention is directed towards the being. Insofar as the human being can address the being, the human being can also be directed towards the *logos* itself. Heidegger suggests that the fundamental possibility of *theōria* comes from hearing. Like seeing and speaking none of these human concepts are to be connected with an organ of the body, but rather with the possibility of beings being in some way. Hearing shows the capacity to be directed towards something with regard to the way that the *logos* makes something manifest. But hearing is not merely to be in the mode of shared concern with the statement, there is also the capacity to understand how something is understood. The way that concepts and the theoretical possibility emerge out of hearing can be best seen in the example of the conducive. To address a hammer as conducive means that the hammer is seen insofar as it appears in the light of the *telos*, which for *technē* and *poiēsis* appears as the *eidos*. Thus in addressing the hammer as conducive insofar as one is focused on the *eidos* in the mode of producing, there opens up the possibility of hearing the hammer as conducive as such, that is, in the how of its being.
For Heidegger it is imperative to bring the students before the experience of the conducive to show that the human being lives in relation to the *telos*, has the capacity to take up its ends and live towards such ends. But with regard to the underlying method, the way that *logos* takes up the structures in which beings have their being is the point of the example of the conducive. Possibilities of the human being to which Heidegger attempts to draw attention must be confirmed in experience. In examining the *psuchē* there is no task except to expose the determinate possibilities of beings – a possibility which the *logos* can ‘overhear.’

Insofar as we can grasp the way that *logos* can articulate all possibilities, so we must grasp the fundamental role of the being of beings as an all-encompassing goal for investigation. This is especially important when we look at the faculties of the human being. The various ways of accessing beings cannot be discovered through any examination of a material organ, but rather the investigation must attempt to follow the different relations that belong to different modes of being.

Heidegger’s revision of the *logos* requires challenging our understanding of both pre-theoretical and theoretical uses of language. Clearly this challenge is not so much a presentation of a theory of language, but rather an attempt to reorientate the possibilities of speaking from within speaking. Only by entering into the understanding of language already at work in the theoretical attitude is this challenge able to operate. This thesis has argued that the work of this opposition can be made explicit by drawing out the way that Heidegger understands the formalisability of language and intuition. It is especially in chapters one and two of
the SS1924 this this approach now comes to fruition. Heidegger encourages a decoupling of the intellectual from the formal by bringing such examples of understanding at work in practical activities to be themselves thematised. The theorisation of the practical depends upon the activity of the human and thus stands opposed to the understanding of the intellectual underlying the theoretical attitude. However, it is in *logos* especially that Heidegger will make this tension play the most important role.

It is clear that for Heidegger formalisation underlies a model of thinking about visual representation/intuition, linguistic representation and the isomorphism between them that plays out in the correspondence theory of truth. The kind of fallenness that plays out in the averageness of linguistic terms underlies the possibility of destroying environmental experience in the explanations of beings provided by particular scientific regions. Averageness is the condition of words that allows everyone to know what the words mean, and so the understanding of research must be to join such familiar experience to a realm where everything is certain but worked out in its own terms. Heidegger must intervene in this move in order to show that average familiarity harbours a deceptiveness that is not investigated from within the theoretical attitude. The way a being shows itself is available but is looked over in familiar seeing and spoken addressing. This looking over and missing the phenomena is the place where research must go.

To clarify, formalisation, the capacity to indicate in a superficial manner, provides the possibilities of seeming to know something that one doesn’t, of bringing
something to theorisation in an inappropriate manner, and also a fixing attention on something that one acknowledges one does not know. When looking at the actualisation of the psuchē Heidegger defines the first as the tendency of language to become entirely average, the second as the over-extension of the theoretical attitude and the third as formal indication. How does Heidegger’s turn to the conceptuality of concepts fit with this starting point? First of all, we must remember that formal indication is much more like an invitation to a pursue a question than a method of how to go about it. Hence when we turn to the conceptuality of concepts we are faced by the averageness of terminology that we can learn from the philosophical tradition. The terms and their definitions can be spoken entirely as a game of words with little understanding, and, furthermore, the terms can be used in their everyday use in their pre-theoretical state.

So how does Heidegger suggest breaking open the meaning of terms? By returning to the metaphorical, or better ‘polysemic’, deployment of familiar and average words. By turning to the plurality of meaning that a word provides in such deployment we can begin to counteract the singularity of the formalised, already known word. Heidegger’s turn to ambiguity as a fundamental feature of Aristotle’s basic concept ousia must be read as a shift in focus from the basic structure of a being as content, onto the structures of relationality and actualisation. We have already seen this move in Heidegger’s investigation of the word ‘life’ which we touched on in section 2.5 above. In both cases the plurality of meaning is used to draw attention to the modes of access to beings as a way of beginning the research
into such beings. The second chapter of Heidegger’s lecture course expands the basic understanding of the *logos* and basic example of how the conducive is in relation to a *telos*. Specifically the chapter develops two key concepts, there-being and the totality of ends. While it is the *logos* that allows human being to address the being of beings, it is the being-there of human being that allows the human being to be addressed in its being. The completeness of an *eidos* makes it stand out as a paradigm of being, but the completeness of being-there in *praxis* is just as fundamental as the *eidos*. While all modes of *praxis* include a *telos*, which Heidegger emphasises means completion rather than a purpose, *teloi* can be subordinate to one another. The question of the ultimate completeness of human being then can be asked. Aristotle’s answer is *eudaimonia* which is a perfectly conventional answer, but Heidegger suggests that Aristotle in fact is developing the meaning of *eudaimonia* further than its conventional usage. By focusing on *eudaimonia* as the completeness of the being-there of the human being, Heidegger argues that being towards *eudaimonia* means that the human being is the being that is concerned with its own being. This underlying possibility is the one that is both most prevalent for the human being and yet remains most inexplicit in everyday experience. In chapter two of the SS1924 Heidegger develops an encompassing interpretation of the human being with respect to its limits. Heidegger does not make any effort there to challenge Aristotle, but rather Heidegger focuses on making the Greek understanding of being as limit explicit.
On the one hand, Heidegger prepares a straight reading of Aristotle that is aimed at recovering the interconnections between Aristotle’s many and seemingly disparate investigations. But on the other hand, the investigation aims to clarify the function of the Greek understanding of being as presence and completion that provides the basis upon which Aristotle’s investigations operate. For the most part, the question is not whether or not Aristotle is correct or whether the Greeks in general were correct about being. Rather the idea that being in general has a clear meaning must be discarded, and the determinate understanding of being that the Greeks had must be recovered not only in order to properly read Aristotle, but in order to see how the meaning of being has changed. Heidegger interprets Aristotle as developing, radicalising and clarifying the basic experience of the being of beings that determined the meaning of being for the Greeks. The way that the Greeks understood being must be thought in the context of the way the Greeks experienced the completeness and incompleteness of beings. The capacity to address things in their completeness is the basic possibility that the commitment to grasp the being of beings must develop. This possibility of addressing beings with explicit regard for the way that they are (complete) is the possibility of definition, the determinate logos, the horismos logos.

Heidegger requires of us that we approach language from within. It is not a matter of juxtaposing a conceptual grasp of language as word or proposition with something outside of it, but rather a matter of drawing attention to what we pass over when we speak. Thus we are transforming our own language. All of the various
ways in which beings can be discovered and clarified belong to lived structures which must reveal their articulated character in order to release the latent expressibility from their being-there. The understanding of possibility has always already unfolded and become obvious. Thus the philosopher must look beyond this obviousness to recover the original grasping of possibility from which the structure emerged. The basic structure to be investigated is the address by which a being is pointed out in its being. This is the basic way that humans are there in having logos.

Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle provides an explanation for the form of Aristotle’s texts that we possess, viz. the monotonous and thorough extrapolation of common words in relation with one another, the raising and dismissing of previous opinions and the occasional diamonds of compressed formulation. For Heidegger, the way Aristotle writes is a direct result of his method. Aristotle summarises his method a number of times in the formula: we must start with what is known to us but obscure by nature to what is knowable by nature but at the beginning obscure to us.\(^{164}\) The first chapter of Heidegger’s summer semester of 1924 can be read as providing an interpretation of this one line. Certainly this involves an explanation of what average intelligibility is, what ousia means, and the fact that the Greeks in general understood both logos and peras, language and limit, as the specific being-characters through which the human being could be understood in its being. In addition, however, Aristotle’s concepts in their plurality can and, for Heidegger, must be gathered together through an insight into what this fundamental methodological statement means. The passage from familiar knowledge to knowledge in itself is the
vital structure of Aristotle’s work, because it shows the underlying model of transformation or *paideia* within which Aristotle’s works are produced. This transformation is built on an understanding of what the human being is before it is educated as well as what it can become.

Hence when we read Aristotle following Heidegger, we must be aware the texts are structured as a conduit, that is, they lead from one place to another, they lead from what is already intelligible to addressing beings in their beings. In order to understand this natural intelligibility we have to come to an understanding of language, the structure of averageness and being-with-others, and the latent potential for transformation accessible in the ambiguity in key words. On the other hand, to address beings in their being means to address beings with regard to their limit, their *peras*. For Heidegger, what Aristotle uniquely understands is that the limit cannot be approached except through what is already there in everydayness. Aristotle’s emphasis on deciphering natural understanding is in contradiction to the academic conception of the role of the ideas. The ideas project an ideal conception of knowledge that one must accept and then pursue. For Aristotle, everyday experience cannot be left behind. This should not be misunderstood; just because natural beings are thought to be genuinely accessible in perception does not mean that Aristotle suggests that all understanding can be reduced to that level. Aristotle and the friends of the ideas share an understanding of philosophy as a transformation of the nature of how one is there in *logos* but they differ regarding the way that the work of transformation is to occur.
For Aristotle, the *peras* cannot be found except through what is already accessible. This notion of accessibility however is where our interpretation of Aristotle is likely to go wrong. What precisely must be avoided is the introduction of any basic conceptual presuppositions from the outside. The assumptions that are to be made explicit are already at work in the appearance of the being which is to be interpreted. What is most plainly present for the most part, natural entities, are always Aristotle’s basic example of what is first of all present to us because natural entities present themselves as themselves insofar as they are natural. We must not introduce a concept of nature, but rather understand how nature already allows us to be confronted by natural entities, i.e. nature is already understood (vaguely or clearly) insofar as natural entities appear as such. *Phusis* simply refers to what is self-moved, albeit within a very broad definition of ‘movement.’ It is because that which is by nature moves itself in accord with its own principle that it presents itself as individual, as a self-contained and complete being. Thus Aristotle’s basic examples of what is familiar to us do not direct us to look at material entities, but rather direct us to question what it is that makes natural entities the most obvious beings that we can address in the world. The limit of a natural entity is given first in an ambiguous and inexplicit manner simply in the look of the entity. But the genuine limit of the natural entity is the directedness of its motion, growth, etc., towards its completion. This motion is not only the growth of the child to the adult, but is towards the end that belongs to the entity actualising what it truly is.
In Heidegger’s reading Aristotle’s investigations are directed at understanding how beings have been grasped and addressed. This means to grasp both the abstract quality of averageness in language as well as the underlying possibility of *alētheia*. The articulation between the elements in the structure of address is subject to misinterpretation if any element is not understood with respect to possibility. Possibility in this sense is not limited to any narrow concept of *praxis*, but underlies the manner in which the human being can be in the world in the mode of self-understanding. Nor can the structure of the address be understood with any division of the subject and object; the subject-object relation presumes that either the subject or the object is complete in itself, whereas the experience-address relation approaches the phenomena with an eye to discovering how a basic possibility has come to fruition. This is the task that Heidegger summarises as one of overhearing, that is, of examining the way that *logos* brings something to manifest itself. What is addressed cannot be thought of as a thing complete in itself that the subject must either see correctly or incorrectly. Rather, every address brings a determination to the matter. Every *logos* addresses something as something.

### 4.2: Ousia and Logos

In the first chapter of the *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* Heidegger focuses on recovering Aristotle’s method of transforming of everyday discourse into the proper search for the genuine being-character in the form of the limit. The limit or *peras* is the being in its completeness, and thus in its full presence, and is the way that something may be addressed not insofar as it is passed over in everyday
dealings but comes to the fore and is addressed properly as it is in itself. But this limit character does not give prominence to objects that for us seem the most independent and plainly present of beings. The addressing of beings in their limit belongs within the scope of logos and aisthēsis. It belongs to the nature of the human being in its genuine being-there.

Heidegger’s SS1924 as a whole seeks to put the being-there of human being into its proper relation with theōria. ‘Theory’ as theōria means the possibility of addressing beings as they are and thus is opposed to the normal presence of beings where beings seem to be simply present but actually are for the most part hidden. The theoretical possibility conjoins the simple presence that is there in seeing directly with the proper understanding of the being of beings. Theory is thus the fulfilment of the possibility of seeing the things themselves. For Heidegger, of course, the focus must not be on objects that have their way of being predetermined, but on the being of beings. This focus on the conditions for genuine seeing, on the work of understanding rather than the particular object, leads from the fallen and flattened state of being in the world back to an apprehension of the unity of actualisation, specifically the actualisation of the human being’s proper possibility, which Aristotle understands as theōria. It is at the level of the actualisation of the understanding of possibility that the revealing of the being as a being shows itself, where presence becomes present.

In the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy Heidegger shows Aristotle opening up a path from out of the fallenness in the world to an apprehension of our
ways of being. For the Greeks, unlike us, a thing’s way of being and its presence are already conjoined. This conjunction is already operative in the Greek conceptions of aisthēsis and logos. But it is the specific possibilities offered by the conception of logos that allows Aristotle to radically change the way that the being of beings is thought to come to presence. ‘Completion’ especially, thought with the concept of the limit, peras, is the basis upon which Aristotle determines his various oppositions in ways of being. The concept of limit, in the context of logos, provides the structure with which Aristotle understands the transformation of everyday experience.

The opposition between seeing poorly and seeing truly does not simply invite one to quickly abandon the world of opinion (doxa) for some true knowledge that solves the problem. To seek out the truth one must begin with the latent potential in poor perception. What most defines this state of poor seeing is the lack of understanding of the conditions of possibility for seeing the world at all. This challenge for Heidegger is directed most of all at the concepts that modern philosophy works with but fails to understand with regard to conceptuality. Heidegger must focus on the elements of contemporary philosophical thinking that are dependent upon the possibility of theory. These elements, such as concepts and universality, must be brought forward and considered. Only by releasing the latent potential in the presence and power of concepts that are already visible can the hermeneutic structure be genuinely lived rather than simply providing more theoretical concepts.
The opening chapter of the *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* begins by confronting the conceptuality of Aristotle’s concepts. Heidegger rejects any approach to concepts as self-contained and intrinsically intelligible. Instead, concepts are to be set into a context that explains both the genesis of concepts and their possibility of being mistaken as intrinsically intelligible. What makes the analysis of conceptuality especially important here is the linking of Aristotle’s method with Heidegger’s. On the one hand, Aristotle develops concepts through a specific treatment of language that transforms being-in-the-world in the state of average everydayness. On the other hand, Heidegger’s analysis recovers the indigenous context of concepts through a transformation of the modern inheritance of concepts. Just as Aristotle had to pay strict attention to the way that people already understood beings, so Heidegger must take up the philosophical spirit of the times in order to make it transform itself with its own motives.

First, Heidegger sets out the hermeneutic structure that attempts to break open the concept while giving due attention to its unity. The concept must be given a context that allows its unity to be seen within the lived experience of conceptualisation. Second, with regard to the concrete context in which the possibility of concepts can be thought, the context is discovered in the latent potential for transformation in average everydayness. The character of language that has been absorbed into averageness is the starting place for the discovery of concepts.
But what does ‘concept’ mean in this project? Concepts are, at one level, already familiar insofar as they play the role of basic principles in the grounding of regions. In the narrow case of regionality as well as more broadly, concepts let beings show themselves in a certain way, in a certain light as it were. The way that concepts encapsulate beings means that concepts can be considered a kind of whole. In Heidegger’s analysis however, the concept comes into conflict with the tendency to identify concepts with the character of universality. Any formal order that can be produced with the relations of concepts and objects can only be derived from the primary relation alive in the concept at work in making things visible.

One of the underlying targets of this analysis is the Platonic ideas. The Platonic ideas provide the example of concepts that have been separated from their context, distinguished prematurely from the discovery of possibility that are to be found in the state of being-in-*logos*. Aristotle’s interpretation of *logos*, for Heidegger, provides a much more nuanced framework for understanding the possibility of concepts. Aristotle’s understanding of *logos* is a conceptual apprehension of how *logos* provides access to beings, both in an average way, wherein conceptual articulation is flattened, and with regard for the true nature of *logos* which is fully uncovered in the theoretical possibility, that is, the access to the being of possibility itself. This means that Aristotle’s concept of *logos* is directed first of all at understanding the nature of language as it is concretely operating. The first and most basic unfolding of language is in being-with-others, which is examined in detail in the second and third chapters of Heidegger’s course. Here, however, Heidegger is
pursuing Aristotle’s concepts from the other direction, that is, through our own modern understanding of concepts.

The key elements of the text are introduced slowly by Heidegger as part of a delicate preparation for the task at hand. On the one hand the familiar Aristotle must be uprooted and on the other hand Heidegger must bring the students to the fundamental issues in the students’ own view of the matter. In order to avoid the superficialities of word play Heidegger carefully structures the introduction of the text so as to lead the students to a genuine historical confrontation. The past is set against the present explicitly, and different notions of self-evidence and historical origins are structured in such a way as to force the students to face the main questions not as mere exercises, but rather for real, in the scope of their genuine significance, with regard to how they presume to know what beings are. Herein, the key points of Heidegger’s presentation are represented in detail so that his arguments can be reconstructed and assessed.

An understanding of being is at work implicitly in every definition, and by ‘definition’ we mean a statement that allows a being to stand forth as what it is. A definition thus is not a particular species of propositional structure but rather is there in the clarity and simplicity of the pointing out. Heidegger begins by making this capacity for language to be clear, questionable. By fixing on the possibility of a definition Heidegger attempts to ground an investigation into the basic meanings and relationships of ‘logic’, ‘definition’ and ‘concept’. Logic is defined as a matter of concepts. A definition is supposed to determine a concept, to separate it and get to
the heart of what the concept is. A concept is supposed to be ‘what’ an object is, the
definition precisely isolates this ‘what’. But all of these basic definitions and
terminological relationships remain a mixture of clarity and obscurity; behind the
relationship between these terms is the understanding of the being of beings that
we have inherited from the history of philosophy. Heidegger thus turns to the
history of the concept and definition in order to explore their obscurity. In Kant’s
review of the definition Kant sees a split where the medieval philosophers saw
none. For Kant, the definition can either point to a concept or it can be the
‘genuine’ definition and point to what the thing itself is in its original possibility. For
Kant the concept is distinct from the intuition. For Kant the comparative method of
definition (which sorts beings into genera and species) only belongs to the former
and does not come into the genuine definition. What lies behind this division and
the disagreement of Kant and medieval logic is the presumption about what the
‘what’ means. Heidegger begins with the concept and the definition of the concept
as it has been thought from the medieval period to the logic of Kant. Heidegger
points to Kant’s treatment of the definition in which the relation of the definition
and the concept in general seems problematic. The definition is supposed to get at
the heart of the matter, that is, the concept itself is to be shown by the definition.
But the role of the genus and species in the scholastic definition of definition does
not seem to draw out what is essential in the concept, but rather seems to simply
distinguish what must have already been understood. What is left out of the
scholastic definition of definition is precisely what is most important. “The
conceptuality and the sense of the concept depend on how one understands, in
general, the question concerning what something is...

Logical expression is the perfect cover for prejudices regarding the ‘what’, the relation of individuation and being. Kant has an inkling of this and sees that the concept of the res is precisely what a definition requires but cannot attain by the ‘comparative method’ of closest genus and specific difference.

For the scholastics, the formal structure of genera and species give logical perfection to the concept of definition, but for Kant such an approach is not able to properly designate what a thing is from the ground up. It is in this context that Heidegger introduces Aristotle as the necessary step which philosophy must take to overcome the aporiai at the heart of modern understandings of “definition” – understandings that have been inherited from Scholastic logic without being properly reflected upon. “We go back to Aristotle in order to show that what, in traditional logic, is treated as definitio has a fully determinate origin, that definition is a symptom of decline, a mere thought technique that was once the basic possibility of human speech.”

All the traditional formal relations used in definition, such as genera and species, are to be returned into an original question of what beings are.

Heidegger’s understanding of the formalisation of relations in the logical notions of definition and concept can be contextualised within the broader tendency of language towards averageness. Averageness provides the conditions of possibility for the misunderstanding of the logos. The basic possibility of the logos is to show something, but this power of individuation should not be attributed to any order of
formalisation such as is given by regions. The *logos* allows for formalisation by bringing *something* into the light, that is, as a *being*, but each case of showing has the possibility of becoming average. With averageness, the conditions for the showing of a being in language are forgotten; familiarity and presumptions obscure what is shown. Forgetting the complexity of the conditions of possibility for the basic functions of the *logos* provides the possibility for misunderstanding the formalisation of language.

For Heidegger, any analyses of conceptuality and definition are dependent upon how language is understood. For this reason Heidegger attempts to establish a basic meaning of *logos* prior to the *logos* horismos. Firstly the recovery of the meaning of *logos* requires a rejection of the possibility of finding the essence of the *logos* in the possibility of the formalisation of logical relations. For Heidegger, if an understanding of *logos* is to provide the context for the analyses of the basic possibilities of the human being, then *logos* must be understood as the way that the human being most basically is. Thus Heidegger suggests that Aristotle’s understanding of *logos* should be unfolded from the phrase *zōon logon echon*, the living being that has language. Not surprisingly Heidegger understands life, *zōē*, as “a mode of being in the world.”168 *Logos* must be understood as the way that the human animal has its world differently from the other living beings. For Heidegger, the nature of *logos* is not simply to refer to beings in the world, but rather to speak being-in-the-world such that the human being has its world in a special way. Heidegger phrases this idea several different ways.
Speaking with others about something is, in each case, a speaking out of oneself. In speaking about something with others, I express myself (spreche ich mich aus), whether explicitly or not.\(^{169}\)

Logos has the basic function of bringing something to light, to let something be seen, apophainesthai. But we must also actively hold the presumptions of what a being is in general at bay and question the clarity itself. We quote a key passage at length:

A living thing is not simply at hand (vorhanden), but is in a world in that it has its world. An animal is not simply moving down the road, pushed along by some mechanism. It is in the world in the sense of having it. The being-in-the-world of the human being is determined in its ground though speaking. The fundamental mode of being in which the human being is in its world is in speaking with it, about it, of it. Thus is the human being determined precisely though the logos, and in this way you can see where, if definition is a logos, the matter of definition has its ground insofar as logos is the basic determination of the being of the human being.\(^{170}\)
Here Heidegger appropriates the possibility of speaking about the world back from the conception of a subject-object relation. Speaking about the world is given a new foundation by Heidegger such that any reference to the world is at the same time a reference to the human being. Being-in-the-world is the condition for any individuation of beings in the world. To inquire after the possibilities of speaking is to inquire into the way that the human being is in the world. Definition and conceptuality must be understood as such possibilities of speaking in this fundamental sense.

Heidegger describes conceptuality as “a concretely giving basic experience, not a theoretical grasping of the matter.”\textsuperscript{171} The definition, the \textit{horismos}, only exists insofar as a concept can be made explicit in speech, and thus the basic possibility of the \textit{logos} as showing is fulfilled. This possibility must now be contextualised in the scope of the broader investigation, i.e. to show the conceptuality of Aristotle’s concept. This task is set forth by Heidegger by encasing a philosophical problem within a philological problem. Philology is given precedence because it simply aims to understand the text; it is philosophy, by contrast, that presumes to know what it is to understand something. Heidegger presents this challenge with three questions which are familiar from other presentations of the hermeneutic situation though the terms fore-having, fore-seeing, fore-concept are not used here.\textsuperscript{172}

...the basic concepts will be considered in their specific conceptuality so that we may ask how the matters themselves meant by these
basic concepts are viewed, in what context they are addressed, in
which particular mode they are determined.\textsuperscript{173}

The three questions that Heidegger sets forth as his guide to the nature of
Aristotle’s concepts all look towards the primal scene of Aristotle looking and
articulating something that he can see. In summary they are: what was already
experienced? How was it addressed so as to accord with the original possibility of
grasping it? What claim of intelligibility is made regarding that which has been seen
and addressed? The questions each point towards the latent confusions in the
situation of intuition and expression. The scholastic appropriation of genus and
species already shows how Aristotle’s concepts are in danger of being simplified and
made average at the cost of taking them away from their original questioning
context.

The three questions are designed to return the concept to where it is part of a
question, part of a struggle to disclose the way beings are. The three questions that
Heidegger puts to Aristotle are designed to break open the unity of the concept in
order to analyse the accompanying assumptions that provided the basis for
articulating the original phenomenon. This means that the concept in its formal and
technical being is to be traced back to the living context wherein it can become
properly questionable. This move also attempts to intervene in a present situation
where such formalised concepts have been accepted within the technical jargon of
philosophy. The underlying structure of this confrontation is proposed in the

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philological introduction as “a methodological presupposition: faith in history in the sense that we presuppose that history and the historical past have the possibility, insofar as the way is made clear for it, of giving a jolt to the present or, better put, to the future.” This presupposition speaks directly of the hermeneutic approach that Heidegger is taking here. Only on the basis of the unity of past and present, and that means especially the possibility of one challenging the other, can the fundamental problems of reading Aristotle be encountered. The students must be prepared by awakening their desire to understand. The reliance on the concepts that are here broken apart must transition into the desire to understand how these contextualised concepts can work. This reworking of the meaning of concepts provides the drive to destroy the modern understanding of the concept and the accompanying presuppositions about the nature of experience, language, the intelligible and the sensible. Throughout the semester Heidegger replaces common assumptions about immediacy with a new understanding of immediacy within the scope of being-in-the-world. The basic tendency of Dasein to understand itself by securing itself in the world, thereby grasping its own possibilities within a set of comforting constraints, has long been familiar from Being and Time. But here, the past and present of philosophy are brought into the work of this revision. On the one hand, Heidegger wants to make his students look to their own experience and destroy the assumptions of modern philosophy which have come to shape that experience, on the other hand, he wants to reveal to his students the peculiar Greek way of understanding being and the way that Aristotle brought this understanding to the
level of the concept. Only when these tasks are understood as a unity, can the proper tasks be genuinely confronted.

On the basis of the unity of past, present and future, we can attempt to unfold the three questions. In so doing the manner in which Heidegger understands his hermeneutic principles and the concrete task of reading Aristotle can be brought into the open. The first question, regarding experience, is the ground for the second, of the guiding claim, and third, of the claim of intelligibility, because it regards the conjunction of what Aristotle saw and what Aristotle meant in his original concepts. It is in tracing out how each question leads to further questions that we can follow Heidegger in understanding the fundamental foundations of philosophy and science within the concrete and historical context of Aristotle’s inquiries with just a few basic concepts.

Heidegger selects the concept of movement, *kinēsis*, as a paradigm concept of Aristotle. Within the history of Greek philosophy there is no shortage of dispute about movement, but in order to understand these disputes one cannot simply assume that all the remarks about movement are about one concept, nor about many different concepts. Rather, the way that Aristotle understands movement is inseparable from the way that he and the Greeks in general saw and grasped what they saw. Movement is not simply something that one can see, rather it brings into question what seeing is. Aristotle himself qualifies movement with regard to perception as the key example of what the senses together reveal. Movement does not belong to one sense, like colour belongs to sight and pitch to hearing, but neither
is movement a mere unrelated accompaniment to perception. Movement and perception cannot be separated from one another at the level of phenomena because movement encapsulates everything that can be discerned in perception, that is, all differences that can be gathered together in understanding. This directness in describing the phenomena is held up by Heidegger as the standard from which Aristotle’s own statements may be judged. Hence, the initial question regarding the concrete experience of movement requires the next two questions. The second sub-question asks how does Aristotle come to the phenomenon at all, how does he manage to approach it and address it in its there-being? To ask after movement explicitly as something in itself can never be fulfilled by an example. Only in grasping the being of the human being there can movement show itself as the basic concept of nature. It is only insofar as the human being is directed towards nature rather than merely towards natural things that movement itself can appear. For Heidegger this question is the question of the *logos* which in itself will bring with it nothing short of the entire being of the human itself. The qualification of the human being as ‘having language’ is not merely a matter of a distinguishing feature of humans that separates us from animals. Only by understanding how the Greeks understood speaking shall we be able to understand how the Greeks understood the being-there of humans.

The concept of movement is taken as an example in order to draw out the significance of the approach. Heidegger distinguishes the question of how Aristotle addresses movement from the normal approaches that one might take to the
question. Heidegger thus asks rhetorically, “Does he clarify movement by way of concepts or theories that are already available, and that, perhaps Platonistically, lead him to say that movement is a transition from a non-being to a being? Or is it that those determinations that arise for him lie in the phenomenon itself?” In these two options Heidegger contrasts the degraded search for origins found in the methods of philology with his own approach. This is not to say that philology should not be taken into account, but rather that the former has no ground but in the latter possibility. Only by grasping how it is that experience has been grasped thematically can questions of influences and theories be dealt with. The primary address is nothing less than the logos coming to a stand with something, and in this situation the third question is demanded.

The third question (into what framework and standard of intelligibility is the address to be embedded) regards how the primary address in the second question is further articulated in research. While the first two questions go back to the experience that allows the concept to meet the phenomenon, the third question enquires into the context in which the concept can come to completion as part of successful research, and thus it is also the point where the concept can settle into a fallen state in a linguistic framework. The question of the specific intelligibility of the concept opens up the question about how the self-showing of the phenomenon is appropriated in research. Regarding this development the question can be asked, “Is the explication proposed to the phenomenon, or is it measured by the phenomenon?”
For Heidegger, the three questions are supposed to challenge our understanding of concepts; the questions are to test how much we understand concepts that have become too familiar. It is crucial to note how the basic character of the concept, as that which is supposed to contain within itself what is fundamentally there in any being, is inverted by Heidegger’s three questions. The singularity of the concept is divided into a singularity that depends on fallenness and averageness, and a singularity that reveals itself in the conceptuality of the concept. The conceptuality of the concept is situated in three ways, in experience, in logos and in knowledge. Only insofar as the reader of Aristotle is prepared to revive these elements can the essential unity of the concept be returned to its proper place. The concept is in no way dissolved in these hermeneutical tasks but rather recovered from the modern approaches that would claim that its unity was sacrosanct. The concept operates within the motives and actualisations of human being-there and thus the concept cannot be turned into the object that has its place in the mind as if it needed no work to acquire it. Instead, as in the method of formal indication, the concept must be treated as a potentiality for the being of beings to come to greater clarity.

These three aspects point to conceptuality without exhausting it, (1) therefore the basic experience in which I make the concrete character accessible to myself. This basic experience is primarily not theoretical, but instead lies in the commerce of life with its world, (2)
the guiding claim, and (3) the specific character of intelligibility, the specific tendency towards intelligibility.¹⁷⁷

With this declaration of methodological rigour Heidegger is now prepared to confront the history of philosophy in the broadest possible brushstrokes. The method of the three questions directs Heidegger to investigate a set of concepts that have been the subject of the most foundational disputes of western metaphysics on the basis of their indigenous origin in Aristotle’s work. Not only in Aristotle but in Aristotle insofar as he transformed the potential latent in the Greek understanding of beings, logos and intelligibility. Thus, Heidegger suggests, the opposition of realism and nominalism, with regards to the nature of genera and species, shall now rest in the “determinate concrete contexts of Greek philosophy, or better in scholastic misunderstandings thereof.”¹⁷⁸ Scholastic philosophy stands at the cusp of ancient and modern philosophy, or better put, at the moment where Aristotle’s concepts were understood with more attention paid to their organisation than to their place inside a questioning project. Given that Heidegger is especially concerned with the power of Aristotle to bring modern thought to its own genuine concern with its foundations, the scholastic organisation of the concept is a preliminary way into this transformational potential.

When the scholastic definition of the concept is read in the context of the first hermeneutic venture into Aristotle Heidegger identifies the key direction in which the stability of the scholastic system is to be punctured. Language as the place of the
concept is not given its proper due by the scholastics. For the scholastics the
definition remains a technical instrument that qualifies the intuition of the universal,
and the accompanying disputes simply regard the nature of that universal. For the
Greeks, on the other hand, the notion of the definition develops from the basic
meaning implied by man’s existence insofar as he has language. Language first and
foremost means to be directed towards something, to show it, and to bring it out of
obscurity. The Greek concept of definition, *horismos*, extends this basic meaning of
language and clarifies what is latent in human understanding.

Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greeks is fundamentally founded on the notion
that the Greeks had an understanding of *logos*, that is, they understood their own
possibility for being in the way humans were in language. Any treatment of language
as a single ontic phenomena among others means that the important role of *logos* is
missed. *Logos*, like *zóē*, belongs to the fundamental determination of man’s being.

“The being-in-the-world of the human being is determined in its ground through
speaking.” ¹⁷⁹ Only once the notion of *logos* has been seen in the way that it grounds
the Greeks’ understanding of human being as speaking, as being with one another,
and as ultimately capable of being directed towards something in itself, can the
original notion of definition be approached.

The articulated nature of being-in-the-world, which, for the Greeks, is already
interpreted as the human being in speaking, provides the indigenous context where
the concepts of Aristotle must be sought. For the scholastics too, their own
organisation of the concept can be judged against this original standard in order to
see simultaneously where the modern notion of the concept is grounded and what there is assumed and what is left behind. Heidegger briefly accounts for the traditional scholastic concept, broken into four features that turn back within themselves. The notio (acquaintance with ...), intentio (aiming at ...), conceptus (grasping of ...) and species (the look of ...) all fail to account for the original context and finitude of the concept. Instead, the universal concept is reduced to a state of pure looking; the structure of the understanding has no structure at all except for the implicit unity attributed to the universal. Whether this unity belongs to the nature of reality or to the nature of man’s capacity to generalise, that is, realism or nominalism respectively, in no way touches on the articulated nature of logos, that is, the human being-in-the-world. The human being is not primarily attached to the theoretical capacity, rather the human being speaks its being-in-the-world and shares this world with others. For Heidegger, “These are inseparable structural aspects of the logos.”¹⁸⁰ But this structure only opens up the way towards the actual examination of being-in-the-world.

The relationship of speaking-with-others to being-in-the-world is the key element that the history of philosophy left behind and could never recover on the basis of the philosophical mistake of qualifying the nature of intuition separately from the nature of logos. Logos is suspended between oneself and others. In hammering home this point, Heidegger projects the framework for the extensive recovery of speaking-with-others that occurs throughout the text. We quote the key passage at some length:
The expressed “lies fixed,” is a *keimenon*. The *keimena onomata*, precisely as *keimena*, as “fixed,” are available to others; they are *koina*, they belong to each. When a word is expressed, it no longer belongs to me, and thus language is something that belongs to everyone; specifically, in such a way that a fundamental possibility of life itself is vitally given in precisely this common possession. Often the expressed is still only spoken—consumed in mere words without an explicit relationship to the matters spoken about. Therein lies an intelligibility that is common to all. In growing into a language, I grow into an intelligibility of the world, of language, that I have from out of myself insofar as I live in language. A *common intelligibility* is given, which has a peculiar character of *averageness*. It no longer has the character of belonging to an individual. It is worn out, used, used up. Everything expressed harbors the possibility of being used up, of being shoved into common intelligibility.\(^{181}\)

Regarding the first two sentences in this passage, Heidegger assigns a footnote to a single turn of phrase in the middle of *Metaphysics* Z:15.\(^{182}\) The phrase refers to the nature of words to belong to more than one thing at a time. But in context this point is made against the theory of ideas insofar as the ideas are supposed to be absolutely individual but such individual things cannot be defined with other words.
Not only are individual things for the most part perishable, but even eternal individual things run into trouble because of this incompatibility with language. For Aristotle, all words used to refer to anything must always be able to be used to refer to other things. The ideas thus could not be given individual names since the names then would be incomprehensible. Heidegger thus chooses to point to a moment where not only definition rests on the shared character of words, but also where Aristotle expressed his own distance from Plato. While Plato bundles cause, definition and language all together as subordinate to the ideas, for Aristotle they must each be approached as they show themselves. For Aristotle, the theory of ideas cannot be abided because of the simplification of language that it would require. Heidegger follows Aristotle in this regard; for both Heidegger and Aristotle, averageness in language cannot be avoided or excluded in order to attain the pure givenness of theōria.

The expressed that “lies fixed” shows the structure of the constitution of things that are found in the world in common. The averageness of terms that devolve into the obvious is based on the shared nature of experience that is part of how expressions pass from their enactment into their simply being there. Communication becomes the standard by which intelligibility is measured. In bringing to light such a treatment of language as the index of what is there in common Heidegger prepares the way for the investigation of language. The basic questions this time are not simply aimed at concepts which have sedimented within
average language, but regard how concepts relate to intelligibility for Aristotle. Language itself must become thematic in its possibilities.

It is clear that for Aristotle *ousia*, originally a participle of ‘being’\(^{183}\) but colloquially ‘goods’ or ‘condition’, replaces the Platonic Idea as the key to approaching the question of being. But for Heidegger, an understanding of this (Aristotelian) turn away from Plato, must also take into account the change in the approach to language that the later thinker brings to the conceptions of his former teacher. *Ousia* might indeed (as Aristotle scholarship has agreed for millennia) be the central term of the Aristotelian corpus. However, it is likely to be misunderstood unless the nature of *logos* has already been established. In the name of clarifying what *ousia* and *logos* mean for Aristotle, Heidegger draws out what he takes to be the principle character of *ousia*, namely, *ambiguity*. This character, Heidegger argues, has been neglected by the history of philosophy. But for Heidegger, Aristotle’s constant refrain ‘x is said in many ways’ is not about the need to deal with the irrelevant vagaries of language before doing philosophy, instead it is a pillar of Aristotle’s understanding of research.

In a strikingly original set of reflections, Heidegger brings together the crucial juncture of ambiguity and *ousia* that provides the ground upon which all of Aristotle’s other concepts are built. The kind of ambiguity to which Heidegger refers cannot be understood as the product of mere confusion. Heidegger admits that ambiguity provides the conditions for straightforward falsity when the straightforwardly true is also present, but clarification of propositional bivalence is
not truth in the primary sense. Rather, the challenge here is to push beyond the normal kind of fulfilment that the average intelligibility of language usually aims and to recover the framework of intentionality out of which everyday discourse (everyday ways of speaking and seeing) first emerged.

The being of beings that remains for the most part hidden is the how of original determination. The ‘how’ remains obscure behind the obviousness of the ‘what’ that is satisfied in the common shared ‘what’ with which speakers are always already concerned. Already in the shared nature of language, the ‘what’ is presupposed to be present for all parties, public, accessible as such. How things are determined originally must not arise as a question for average intelligibility, but rather can only emerge once the average intelligibility has been grasped as such, which is not to say that words suddenly become meaningless, but instead that the nature of the common exchange of meanings is inadequate to explain original determination. Common language works within ways of seeing that have opened up before the arrival of any particular speaker.

Ousia is thus a conduit of intelligibility from doxa, views or opinions, to the how of original determination. Each inquiry must begin in the common usage of language insofar as this language is understood. This beginning is not a moment of rejecting common understanding and instead turning to empirically grounded arguments. The principal way of moving through common understanding towards proper knowledge is through the exploration of ambiguity, i.e. through the investigation of how terms can become dispersed in the world. The investigation of ambiguity transforms
common intelligibility, redirecting the address of language to conceptuality in the midst of multiple meanings. This transformation of the ‘what’ to which language is directed allows conceptuality to show itself:

Ambiguity can be the index for the fact that the scope of a word in its ambiguity arises from a legitimate relation to, a legitimate familiarity with, the matter; that the multifariousness of meaning is demanded by the matter, an articulated manifoldness of distinct meanings; that the matter is such that it demands, from out of itself, the same expression but with various meanings.¹⁸⁴

Ambiguity, if taken seriously, brings the simplicity of addressing and encountering beings into conflict with the complexity of their conditions of possibility for being as such. Put in another way, ambiguity disrupts the relation between intention and extension, so as to require a reflection back on the functioning of words. The multiplicity of applications of a single word provides the structure for a reflection into the possibility of language. If a parallel with Being and Time is desired: *ousia* takes the role of the ready-to-hand, and conceptuality is the multiplicity of assignment that shows itself when the simplicity of the ready-to-hand, in this case words, is disturbed by ambiguity. The breaking open of simple meaning allows the conceptual realm to be glimpsed and philosophy to begin.
Everything said so far can be considered to be nothing but a clarification of how Aristotle begins. For Heidegger, if Aristotle’s beginning is not understood then the entire corpus falls flat. The character of ambiguity specifically functions as a way of understanding how philosophising turns against the security of average intelligibility and releases this intelligibility as the potentiality for the inquiry into the being of beings. This provides the key for reading Aristotle’s repeated methodological refrain: we must proceed from what is intelligible to us but not by nature, to what is intelligible by nature but at first obscure to ourselves. While Aristotle says this many times, it is never exactly clear what he means. Through Heidegger’s reading the phrase marks out the point at which philosophy must begin. The intelligibility of everyday speech is not just obfuscation, it also harbours the claims to intelligibility that once broken motivate the need to re-attain the fulfilment in a proper inquiry, in other words, average everydayness is not discarded but rather becomes questionable.

This philosophical turn has two manifestations and Heidegger holds off at first from articulating them. On the one hand there are the actual transformations inside language as the conditions of concept formation are made explicit, but on the other hand there are the guiding principles of this transformation as a whole. The process as a whole is a matter of judging whether or not the grasp of the articulation is in fact keeping to the phenomena. This is the power of judging whether someone speaking knowingly is actually talking about something, that is, whether the knowledge holds as such or is just empty terms and systems. This capacity to pass
judgment on learning is called by Plato and Aristotle *paideia*. The link between Plato and Aristotle can be made most explicitly here if one turns to the allegory of the cave.\(^{186}\) The transformation that Plato describes, from the imprisonment where knowledge is judged only within average intelligibility, to the exterior sunlit world where things can be seen for themselves is named in the text as *paideia*. In Heidegger’s reading of the allegory he summarises Plato’s intent, by stating “real educating lays hold of the soul itself and transforms it in its entirety by first leading us to the place of our essential being and accustoming us to it.”\(^{187}\)

The most basic concept of Aristotelian philosophy, *ousia*, must be first understood within the framework of the turn in everyday intelligibility. This most basic of all concepts takes hold of the acquaintance with the things that are most plainly there. The concept of *ousia* begins in the articulation of its ambiguity insofar as it harbours the claim to know. Once the ambiguity is released, then the unity of presence must be re-fulfilled in the knowledge of the how of determination.

Heidegger’s recognition of the inner kernel of Aristotle’s ‘theory of language’ is at the same time a theory of the human being and a theory of the soul, *psuchē*. It is only in the analysis of the soul, that is, the inquiry into the basis for the relation of the human being’s address to things, that language can be considered. What opens up in the analysis of words is a repetition of their origin, or rather, an understanding of the origin that is latent in words as they are and what they can be. This concept of the conditions of possibility for original naming underlies the manner in which
Aristotle grasps the different ways that the ambiguity of words must be grasped in the transformation of the soul.

Heidegger identifies two distinct ways that Aristotle understands the origin of words, which must be understood as a transformation of the soul. On the one hand, where the meaning of an articulation has already been understood, then nameless determinations can make themselves present in their obvious absence. There is no word for all things that have a rudder for instance, or all things that can especially be seen in the dark, and yet names could be formulated for these things at will because they are already concretely determined. But this kind of naming is not the only way that words are made, nor is it the most interesting genesis of words. For the most part this quotidian way of providing new names for things that are already comprehensible at the time of their naming, hides the genuine transformation of the soul which must have already occurred for these things to have become apparent in a determinate form.

The second form of new words is much more important, and specifically requires the latent ambiguity of language to be grasped. Heidegger puts it in the following way, “...education can proceed in such a way that the term is fixed to a word that is already at hand, and such that an aspect of meaning that was co-intended with the ordinary meaning, though not explicitly, now becomes thematic in the terminological meaning.”188 This provides the basic structure for how all the basic concepts of Aristotle must be examined. Each reaches into the claim in common words in order
to draw out the nature of the soul at work in the structure of the word. This work of
transformation is given the general title education or *paideia*.

The genesis of the concept *ousia*, customarily signifying common goods or
property, is not a displacement of everyday meaning into a scientific theory of the
world. Nor is it possible to call it a metaphor. Rather, Heidegger suggests the
customary meaning and the terminological meaning of *ousia* exist together. If one is
separated from the other then the terminological meaning loses its own proper
address to the place where the human being takes hold of beings as ‘there’, ‘around
about’, ‘available’. This availability of the things that one has possession of sits
perfectly alongside the customary availability of the common word. Heidegger
isolates the key feature of this average intelligibility by qualifying it as “understood
‘without qualification’.”189

The address to things in the world has already been made by every human being.
Words address the self-showing of things, which can always be taken up in average
intelligibility. The transformation of this claim into the task of discovering the being
of beings is entirely dependent on the fact that for the Greeks this is being. The
availability of beings is the basic ‘how’ of their being. Beings are there for myself in
the most basic manner of being. The ‘how’ of the being of *ousia* is its emphatic
being there. The question of the being of beings is thus already bundled into this
compressed self-obviousness of *ousia*. The questions of access, of availability, of
there-being are all condensed in what is already taken to be. It is in the examination
of the availability of beings that the question of being is to be expanded, and in each
case it is the fact that beings are already understood that paves the way for questioning, that is, \textit{for the obvious to become questionable}. It is precisely the point where \textit{ousia} is clarified as there-being, that the term is transformed. “The being of being will become visible through the clarification of the \textit{there-character} of beings.”\textsuperscript{190} What is there is turned into the question of what is ‘there-being?’ and ‘how is it?’ \textit{Ousia} stands for what all beings are insofar as they are beings and may be questioned in their being on the basis of their being there. “For, in the end, it is only from beings themselves that the character of their being can be gleaned.”\textsuperscript{191} This is the ground of Aristotle’s inquiry, and Heidegger adds that this is something that Plato missed.\textsuperscript{192}

Once Heidegger has reinterpreted \textit{ousia}, Aristotle’s hylomorphism can be re-examined in a new light. In \textit{Metaphysics} Δ8, Aristotle’s definition of \textit{ousia} is presented on the basis of an examination of body, \textit{soma}. The chapter is only 12 lines long, but Heidegger gives the passage a great deal of emphasis. Certainly the passage is closely aligned with the opening passage of \textit{Metaphysics} Z4, but here no complicated theory is put forward, rather the most basic encounter with common bodies is the starting point. The four basic ways in which \textit{ousia} is employed are as a) simple bodies and their parts, b) the causes that make the bodies what they are, e.g. the soul in the animal, c) all essential parts, and d) the essence, which is to be identified with the definition. On the basis of these four usages, Aristotle claims that \textit{ousia} has a twofold meaning. On the one hand, \textit{ousia} is a matter of being the ultimate substrate (\textit{hupokeimenon eskhaton}) and, on the other hand, what is
separately (*khōriston*), that is, the particular shape (*morphē*) and form (*eidos*). Heidegger wishes to draw out the determinate manner in which the Greeks understood being from Aristotle’s definition of *ousia*. The way that being is understood inexplicitly and explicitly is contained within the understanding that the human being speaks insofar as it is. Hence in the four ways that *ousia* is spoken the potential is constantly in view for common intelligibility to be transformed into the address of a being as it is; in each case this potential also leads to the danger of lapsing back into average meaning. With this task in mind Heidegger’s careful analysis of *Metaphysics* Δ8 can be grasped with respect to its underlying stakes, i.e. Aristotle’s chapter articulates both the basic character of the Greek determination of being and the way that Aristotle conceives of the fundamental principles of research into beings.

Each of the basic ways in which *ousia* is spoken address beings that have the character of being available, but this availability is articulated between being available in a common and indeterminate way and being available in such a way wherein the being is addressed specifically in its being. The first way that *ousia* is said, *hupokeimenon*, is not taken by Heidegger to mean that which underlies qualities that are simply the appearance of a thing in itself. Rather, *hupo* is translated as “in advance”. The substrate is thus the character of things to be there prior to being taken in their being-there explicitly. The substrate addresses the world as available just because one can turn at any time to what is there without further determination. This character is simply called *being-at-hand*. All of the other
meanings depend upon this first meaning, but not as species of it or as lesser forms. Rather each of the other three articulate the substrate insofar as they require the substrate to have its character of being-at-hand and furthermore they show the substrate as not everything, they address what can remain to come out of the substrate as what it is.

The second meaning of ousia, the cause of the being, Heidegger first refers to as “that which is also at hand therein.” The key example that Aristotle gives, that the soul is not predicated of the animal, but rather constitutes the animal as such, i.e. as a living being, is taken by Heidegger as more than an example at random. The being that the living has that separates it from the object in general is the standard way that presence is first articulated. The modes of being of the living and the simple presence that is common to all things are articulated in a number of ways. Specifically, the being-there of the living is articulated into the special modes of being that make up its being-in-the-world, to discern (krinein) and to move (kinein). It is in these modes that the animal is present. The discerning and the moving do not show themselves primarily as some independent process or something merely visible. They are only seen insofar as a soul shows itself as also there, as the origin and unity of the ways of being that the animal has as an animal. Hence, to investigate these modes of being means to investigate the soul.

The third and fourth meanings both rest on more archaic histories, and together they articulate the way that the history of philosophy prior to Aristotle has understood the question of being. For the ancients, those who Aristotle designates
as his predecessors, the question of being still comes, by necessity, out of the direct confrontation with beings. No other way of questioning being would be about being. The matter at issue, and Heidegger is constantly mindful of this, is how to question beings in their being. The third meaning of ousia answers this question by looking at the character of the limit. The limit marks a confluence of appearance and determination. On the one hand the limit is classically ascribed to the boundary of things, such that the outer limits of an object, i.e. those parts which present themselves as the form of the object, are given as the boundary within which the being is and outside it is not. On the other hand, the limit is also appropriated mathematically, at least geometrically. Mathematics thus provides a way of grasping what is general in forms. Limit in this sense provides a basic way in which what is grasped in a being is not something utterly unique, but rather what is grasped, the form, is a conduit to mathematical knowledge as the proper meaning of forms. The character of limit thus provided a starting point for other philosophical positions, including those that raised number to the status of the most proper ousia.

The fourth meaning, also inextricably tied to the pre-Aristotelian philosophical tradition, is a specific interpretation of what most properly constitutes a being as itself. In scholastic and modern terms to ti ἐν einai is translated as the essence, which only gives some indication of its meaning. But Heidegger is especially hesitant about dealing with it until the end of the lecture where he will gather the basic meanings of ousia together. Einai (the infinitive ‘to be’) is specifically connected with the criterion for a successful definition, but this is precisely what is in question
here. The possibility of definition is not based on the assumption that there are essences, but rather essence and definition both belong to the potential for addressing a being with regard to it being itself, present and individual. Hence, Heidegger points out that *to ti ἐν einai* must not be thought as general meaning in distinction from a particular, but rather the very division of general and particular must be put aside. The meaning of *einai* as the *ousia* that is most properly addressed in a definition is the being of the particular in its being there. What is articulated in this meaning is not ‘particularity’ in the modern sense, but rather setting a being at a certain proper distance. What is articulated is thus the turning away from the context of dealings, and the turning to the being in its there, in its coming to be there itself.

For Heidegger, each of the different ways that *ousia* can be said address the transition that research undertakes, i.e. from the obvious to the inexplicit nature of the things themselves. Research must set the encountered being within a background of conditioning assumptions that were once obscure. These underlying conditions must allow the being to become intelligible in the manner of its appearance, its original accessibility, how it has been addressed and hidden in obscurity in average language. Contrasted with such a methodology, one can grasp instead how a notion of individuality can be introduced such as is provided by a principle of regional sciences. Formalisation is only a preparation and insofar as it prepares for a question a formalisation shows itself as lacking understanding. Heidegger thus reads Aristotle’s explication of the ambiguity of *ousia* through the
opposition of the theoretical attitude and phenomenology, resulting in a radical rewriting of the traditional understanding of *ousia*. The originality of Heidegger’s analysis here is first of all due to his understanding of naming as the release of ambiguity within the conduit that passes from common intelligibility to the address of the being of beings. Through these reflections on the meaning of *ousia* for Aristotle, Heidegger achieves a new way of looking at the groundedness of conceptuality, that is also accompanied (and made possible) by clearing away the residue of the Scholastic understanding of *ousia* as substance. Thus, Aristotle’s summary of the meaning of *ousia* as *eidōs* (its fifth meaning in Heidegger’s list) simultaneously captures the sense of presence and of separability. Heidegger will then go on to use this fifth articulation of *ousia* as the basis for an attack on the opposition of general and particular as they belong within the conventional natural order articulated by genera and species.

For Heidegger, *eidōs*, species, does not belong to a *genos*, genus, on the basis of a world thought to be intrinsically in an order of wholes and parts. The *eidōs* is what is kept in view, the appearance that is fixed on, but this appearance is not necessarily dependent upon the sense of sight, nor should it be understood in terms of representation. Instead, Heidegger grasps *eidōs* paradigmatically as the constancy of the view which guides *poiēsis*. In addition, he also sees it as the *genos*, the condition of possibility for the *eidōs* coming to its own completeness. The *eidōs* has a *genos* because it comes into its being from out of something, it has a history. The *eidōs* is seen as complete and a completion of becoming that is grounded in its
genos. “If the human being is determined as zōon logon ekhon, the speaking comes in this way from its zōon, being a ‘living thing’; this is its genos.” The formal structures of ‘Aristotelianism,’ in particular those relating to species and genus, are swept away as misinterpretations of the original apprehension of beings in their being. Being-there is articulated in itself in being present and in being complete.

Aristotle’s principal statement of method replaces any need, still felt by Plato, to introduce a counter concept of being that must be opposed to the way that knowledge is regulated in common speech. Aristotle instead understands common speech with respect to the way completeness and the limit are addressed rather than as merely derivative of an original address to the limit. Aristotle understands the nature of the obscurity of common speech and uses this obscurity as the pivot on which common understanding may be turned in its basic tendency. Heidegger isolates the specific potential for transformation thus:

It is so self-evidently there that I see beyond it; I do not notice it. Precisely this not-being-noticed, the self-evidence of the being-there of the world shows itself. But I must proceed precisely from what is ungenuinely there to what is genuinely passed over in acquaintance.
The specific articulations that can be addressed are thereby disclosed. What is addressed indeterminately harbours the potential for determination when coupled with the commitment to address beings insofar as they are present in their limitedness. The attempt to recover the potential in common intelligibility is a change in the mode of addressing the world, that is, a change in being-there. This change is not a replacement of common thinking with a different form of thinking, rather it takes a basic experience of beings seriously and seeks to see things properly by being led by the clue which everyday discourse and everyday modes of apprehension provide. At this stage in the text, Heidegger has on the one hand given an exposition of Aristotle’s understanding of the genesis of the transformation of vision and speaking in theōria, but as yet we are given little indication of what the fundamental significance of this return to the origin is to have. In short, Heidegger brings us to Aristotle in order to show that the passage from common talk to theoretical work does not function by adopting the systematic results of the history of science and philosophy as the basis for a theoretical worldview that is separated from normal life by a fissure.

The opening chapter of the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy does nothing except prepare the native ground on which to examine Aristotle’s concepts. The significance of this grounding is entirely in the maintenance of the connection between common intelligibility and the capacity to address beings with respect to their limits. All intelligibility rests on the fundamental possibility of addressing what is there. The character of the there can either be grasped inauthentically in the
obvious world in which one is immersed, or it can be grasped explicitly in the there understood in its limit. The world shows itself as such in the grasping of the ambiguity of this address, that is, the way that the logos can bypass beings in their being there. The bypassing must be understood as a fundamental way that the limits of things may be present in advance. Things are there in advance, harbouring the possibility of investigation, insofar as they can be addressed generally and vaguely with average understanding. Heidegger draws attention to this by explaining the passing remark Aristotle makes at the beginning of the Physics regarding the way children begin by referring to all men and women as mother and father. “This indeterminacy of the usual gives the child, precisely, the possibility of being orientated to humans among the things that are there.” In other words the average understanding stands out insofar as it grasps what is in the foreground on the basis of retreat of the background that allows the foreground to appear. The individual thing that appears in this way is thus simply there and always already understood. By confronting a being that has its presence conjoined entirely to understanding, the child does not have to deal with the danger of the unintelligibility of the singular.

By starting with the way that things are addressed, Aristotle expands upon the basic way that the Greeks understood the meaning of what is present in terms of completeness. But obviously this Greek understanding of being is not the only way in which being can be understood. With a different understanding of being, the path of research would be orientated differently. For the Greeks, the understanding of
how language can address the limit of beings provides the anticipation of what investigation can achieve. If, on the contrary, the investigation that moved towards the limit was a matter of discarding everyday life and instead turning to extended objects, then the research method could be examined with regard to whether it was appropriately directed to understand extension.

Aristotle’s method can be distinguished from a Cartesian worldview in two ways, both of which Heidegger brings into focus because both resonate with the way we understand research in the modern era. Firstly, the focus on the telos as the limit for both praxis and kinēsis is incompatible with the mathematical levelling of all points in time and space. And secondly, what is there is taken to start with the pragmata, things and dealings, that is, what is there in praxis, while Descartes sees correct (effective) praxis as deriving from theory. This distinction between what is there for Aristotle from what is objectivity for Descartes must be grasped in order to understand Aristotle’s entire project. Equally fundamental is an understanding of how an inherently metaphysical assumption about the completion of the object orients as well as inaugurates the pursuit of objective scientific inquiry in such a way that it blocks the basic understanding of what Aristotle is investigating. In order to question the being of beings, one cannot go towards the object in itself, but rather must investigate the limit character of being there which shapes our understanding of the question. At the same time, however, the fact that the question requires the investigation of the being there of the human being in no way suggests that the investigation somehow restricts its view to psychology or the subject.
In contrast to the Greek determination of the ‘there’ as ‘limit’, later metaphysics presupposes a different determination of the ‘there’, a determination which culminates in such notions as objectivity vs. subjectivity, extended substance vs. mental substance, and in general the creation of a gap between the psuchē and the world which, for Heidegger, simultaneously breaks with (and falls away from) the phenomenological and Aristotelian understandings of ‘world’. For Heidegger, the understanding of research, based as it is upon one’s understanding of being, must be made explicit in relation to the way the human being is in the world. “One can designate this logos [the horismos] as the genuine mode of entry into beings insofar as peras is the basic character of the there.” For Aristotle’s investigation, the basic possibilities of speaking are not replaced with the concept of peras, but rather the peras, in the forms of eidos and telos, becomes the guide for understanding how the human being speaks with regard to its possibilities.

4.3: The Being of Being-There

The first chapter of the SS1924 brought to attention the significance of that which is most properly addressed in language, the being-there and being-available of things. Ousia becomes an encompassing term for beings insofar as they have become questionable. The second chapter turns to the unification of the work of interpretation in the actuality of the being there of the human being. The possibilities that are found in being in the world must be gathered together with respect to the ultimate possibility of being there in the world. While the first chapter
brought Heidegger and Aristotle into a close alignment regarding the importance of language, the second chapter brings to the fore a shared methodological insight, namely, that the human being is most clearly itself (and as complete and self-contained the human being can be thought of as being entirely ‘self-actualised’) when its possibility of self-interpretation, which is there obscurely insofar as the human being finds itself in the world, is fulfilled in an apprehension of its own being – in this way, the highest possibility of the human being shows also the most basic and ubiquitous possibility. Heidegger reserves the term ‘existence’ as this possibility where human possibility reaches fulfilment, but for Aristotle ‘theōría’ is this ultimate fulfilment. While Heidegger’s preference for phronēsis over theōría and sophia articulated in the WS1924-25 is already well known, n the SS1924 Heidegger is more concerned to show how Aristotle follows the telos of the human being from the way that the ends of the human being show themselves in everyday discourse to the way that telos can stand on its own such that telos (and telos here is a kind of peras) can be understood as Being.

This theoretical possibility of whiling alongside the world, theōría, is related to the theoretical attitude but we must be careful to differentiate them. The meaning of theōría cannot be grasped within the theoretical attitude, but rather can be best understood as an extension of the concept of praxis. Praxis can be contrasted with poiēsis insofar as praxis is complete in itself, while poiēsis depends on something outside of its action, such as a finished product and the purpose of that product. Theōria possesses the completeness of praxis to the highest degree; the
completeness of theōria does not even require the movement of other kinds of praxis, but instead theōria contains its actualisation in a state of rest. Theōria maintains this constancy of praxis in a single moment by seeing the whole, by understanding completely. Only insofar as theōria is complete in seeing the whole can theōria be understood as just pure looking. But just as theōria encompasses and completes the kind of looking that is there in praxis, it is also the culmination of the understanding that is there in logos. Hence the ambiguities and relations at work in everyday language must be untangled as part of the self-interpretation of human being-there.

On the one hand, Aristotle’s conceptualisation of ousia transforms being-in-the-world into an explicitly self-questioning project, on the other hand, the independence of actualisation, which underlies the project of self-interpretation, is set out as the ultimate goal. The work to be undertaken from the former to the latter is the work of concepts. Concepts seek to characterise beings in their being. Aristotle begins with the understanding of beings that is already at work, because concepts must be grounded in and not lose their connections to such (everyday) understandings. Thus the way the human being has already understood its own being in the world provides the context for seeking out the nature of this ground. As Heidegger suggests, “We are seeking the realm of conceptuality, and are thus led back to the determination of the being of human beings, which is characterized as the sort of life that speaks.”199 Thus the question that must be asked in order to
investigate the theoretical possibility is ‘what is the possibility of speech as a possibility of being-in-the-world?’

The second chapter approaches the being there of human being from two directions. First, Heidegger shows how Aristotle examines the human way of being from the direction of the psuchē. From this direction humans are distinguished from animals insofar as they speak, and on the basis of this speaking, humans are said to be by nature in the polis and household. This distinction, however, can only prepare for a basic understanding of the fact that living things have their way of being insofar as they are directed towards the world and also in the fact that living entities have this world together. Second, Heidegger examines how Aristotle begins with the end (telos) of human being and works backward. Humans can be distinguished from animals insofar as the logos allows what one is directed towards to itself be grasped as such. What one is directed towards, which is addressed in speaking, can be addressed superficially or more explicitly with regard to the meaning that guides the address. The most obvious way in which the human being is directed to the world meaningfully is with respect to some end or other. And insofar as ends are either relative (an end for some other end) or absolute (an end in itself, or at least an end that belongs to the human being as a human being), the question of being directed towards, which the logos can pursue inasmuch as what one is directed towards can be questioned, can be pushed towards the question of what the end of the human being is. For Aristotle such a familiar question ‘what is it that I am aiming for?’ is also asking, albeit implicitly, after a basic understanding of what the human being is and

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how its end shows itself. Every attempt to delimit the end of the human being in
desire, at least in desire as normally conceived, fails to fulfil the full range of
possibility that is there in the ‘having the towards which before one’. In Heidegger’s
reading of Aristotle, the concern of human beings is not simply an extension of the
concern of animals, but rather a radicalisation of it due to the nature of logos that is
responsible for unleashing the world forming potential of human Dasein, a potential
which the animal does not have. While both humans and animals constantly
confront a world as always, already constituted, only possession of the logos can
allow for the possibility of a radical reconstitution of the world with all the
implications this has for both the possible revelation and possible obfuscation of
beings. Ultimately we will see this radicalisation resolve itself into the being that is
concerned with its own being.

A considerable amount of the content of the second chapter could be mapped
onto the third and fourth chapter of the first division of Being and Time. Citing the
characters of assignment and the ‘They’, which are both drawn out in some detail
here, provides some orientation. The fact that much of Being and Time was initially
presented as translations and interpretations of Aristotle has long been recognised.
Concern is closely aligned with praxis. The reference character of the ready-to-hand
is sumpheron, the conducive. The being-character that has a much greater presence
here however is telos, the end or completion, and specifically telos as the
determination or limit-character of being. Telos is a specific way of being to which
the Greeks were originally attuned. By clarifying the nature of telos Heidegger shows
the basic contours of Aristotle’s method. By grasping the telos of praxis as such, the being there of human being shall come into view.

The human being’s encounter with the world must be uncovered. In attempting to uncover the underlying structures of such encounters however, one should not think of the encounter on the model of a subject who then encounters the world as something which stands-against her. The structural interrelation that makes up the nature of any encounter begins with the being-character of peras, or limit, which encapsulates a range of meanings. Limit means in particular the circumference that is visible from the outside as something’s form, as well as what divides something being what it is as opposed to what it is not. Telos is the peras that belongs to movement (kinesis), including praxis, which is precisely the how-being of the human in its world. Thus the primary task of discovering the being there of human being is first the task of understanding the directedness towards the telos, and, as always with Aristotle, this task is in the context of the manner in which the human is in the world, that is, logos. We shall see, on the ultimate journey to seeing, how theoria is the fulfilment of human being, how logos finds its own fulfilment not in the completion of a task, but rather in the clarification of the conducive, sumpheron, in deliberation.

Humans are already immersed in logos, and thus it is appropriate for Aristotle to first of all get an overall understanding of logos in order to prepare for the analyses that shall take place as a transformation in logos. Logos is the basic way that the human being is, and hence Aristotle can best approach the peculiarity of humans,
their *idion*, by understanding *logos* from the perspective of the *psuchē*. The *psuchē* is a manner of being that encapsulates the directedness of being in the world. For human being the *psuchē* means to be in the world through *logos*, which means that *logos* must first of all be thought in terms of being directed towards that which is of concern. Understanding what is of concern to the human being is also a matter of concern because of the way that the *logos* hears itself. The human *psuchē* is both liberated and put in danger by this reflexivity. Thus when Aristotle begins with the way that animals are there in the world in the way that they indicate their situation with one another through noises, the peculiar way that the human being is there in the world can be examined in its original point of departure.

*Logos* can be first be distinguished from what it is also, *phōnē*. *Phōnē* here is primarily the noises of animals insofar as they indicate to one another. *Logos* is *phōnē* but is more than that. *Phōnē* made by animals is to indicate what is pleasing and distressing and in indicating they are indeed there with one another. This perception, indicating and being orientated towards the pleasing and away from the distressing is the mode of being of animals. What distinguishes speaking is that it has “the function of making manifest... such that what it refers to is made to speak... making manifest the beneficial and the harmful, and thereby the proper and improper too.”200 This distinction and result of *logos* is how Aristotle explains how the human being has the possibility of living in the house and the *polis*. This living-together of human being is on the basis of the common good that guides the
speaking with one another. Humans are more than animals because they bring before themselves and each other that with which they are concerned.

Humans and animals are both in the world and on a certain level they are both there in the way of animals, that is, the world is of concern. Thus being-in-the-world is first of all encountering what is uplifting and upsetting for being there. What is there is not distinguished from these characters of uplifting and upsetting, nor are these characters distinguished from the world. To begin with there are neither objects nor values. But human nature does not leave nature at this point in some reflexive rational capacity, rather, we must come to an understanding of how logos provides the possibility for agathon, the good, and the particular koinônia, commonality, that makes the household and city possible. This shall emerge once we have understood how logos does not belong to some individual faculty of reason, but rather belongs to speaking with one another.

In order to clarify being-in-the-world as it is determined by logos, and this determination is precisely the key to the determination of the possibility of the being-there of human being, Heidegger needs to prepare the way by clarifying the meaning of being-in-the-world, that is, the way of being of living beings. The world “befalls the being-in-the-world of living things.”\textsuperscript{201} The world is always there in such a way that it matters even in not mattering. In not mattering the world announces its being there. The world shows itself insofar as the human being has always understood its basic possibilities and has decided its own being on the basis of this understanding. The ends toward which human being is directed have been made
manifest in the way that the human being is there. The determination of this how, the possibility of living, depends on “the extent to which this living is closed up in itself or is awake, the extent to which being-in the-world is uncovered or has the character of the uncovered there, and thus the extent to which the world itself and being-in-the-world are discovered.”

A fundamental link is made here between the capacity to see the world as it is with the otherwise reflexive question of what this seeing itself is.

Aristotle grasps in the potential of human being that aisthēsis and logos develop in the way that possibilities of living are grasped. In each development understandings are at play; nothing in being-in-the-world is actual without understanding being there also. Thus the task is to discern in life what the basic possibilities are, and this has been uncovered in the fact that the human being there makes the determination of the uplifting and depressing manifest to itself, that is, the human can see the limit of good and bad. The human can attend not only that which is good and bad as such, but also what the good and the bad are in themselves.

Aisthēsis is not primarily any kind of sense data, but rather means everything that is taken to be there. Hence the perception of determination should not be thought as something like mental perception as opposed to what is seen with the sense organs, even though Plato and Aristotle will often use such a division to clarify what they are talking about. The sense organs can only be thought of as such on the basis of aisthēsis and not the other way around. The tendency to locate perception
somewhere in the relation of the subject and the object destroys the proper understanding of \textit{aisthēsis} and \textit{logos}. The basic approach to observing human being-in-the-world in terms of the structures of possibility is left behind if we try to place concepts either in relation to an objective understanding of the world or originating instead out of a subjective contribution. For Heidegger, \textit{aisthēsis} and \textit{logos} as Aristotle takes them up philosophically, have been approached too abstractly in modern philosophy. Language and perception as they are lived within provide the lifeblood for all philosophical research; philosophically they must be approached with regard to the way that beings have already been accessed as well as the continuing possibility to reappropriate what has been familiar and make all beings questionable. For example, the encounter-characters of being-in-the-world that articulate the way that the good and the bad are encountered cannot properly be pursued as isolated phenomena, or a line of special research; the good and the bad must be pursued insofar as they are encountered in the way that the human being is in the world, i.e. the good and the bad inflect the human being as it understands itself in the world.

Heidegger puts a great deal of weight on the way that Aristotle connects disposition, \textit{diathesis}, with the supporting or uplifting, \textit{hēdu}. Just because animals encounter and address the world primarily as uplifting or depressing does not mean that they are somehow primarily theoretical, only in a narrow way. It would be a mistake to think of the capacity to distinguish food sources and threats as a part of a mechanical reflex. The discovery of the world is not a passive situation, rather the
world is encountered always within the basic way that animals are seeking to find the world, to discover the situation. What is discovered is discovered in the context of the animal being there in a disposition that is cultivated by what it finds. The disposition and the support, ḥēdu, are both there together determining one another, cementing one another. The world is discovered in such a way that the being finds itself in the world in its proper possibility.

Being-with-one-another appears in phōnē as it does in logos but differently due to the different ultimate possibilities in each case. Nevertheless, the way that being-with-one-another appears in the double significance of phōnē, insofar as the animal both finds itself in the world and indicates the world, is the ground for the possibility of logos. The coordination of disposition with that which is discovered in the world requires us to move past any simple conception of perception as recognition and reflex. Rather, an understanding must be developed of the possibility and actuality of the living being that is appropriate to the method of analysis that operates through the observation of being that is made in action, in possibility, in the being of human being. Just as the cultivation of disposition in the animal requires comprehension of the basic way that life always finds itself in the world, so the understanding of being-with-one-another that shows itself in logos pushes beyond any way of grasping the world in terms of subject and object.

The different possibilities that the human being has over the animal are intimated in the concept of the good, agathon. This human level of awareness of the world is not a matter of some innate general concept of goodness but rather a
capacity to direct attention to the determination or ‘limit’ of the good. On the one hand, there is the possibility of discovering the good in general, the perception of determination here means the possibility of being directed towards the good not simply in indicating it, but in deliberation. Deliberation shows how *logos* is exercised in being towards the good insofar as one can address the world in relation to a *telos*, i.e. the *telos* can become the shared background that allows the *logos* to present the world as expedient or oppressive. Just as the noise of the animal is also a welcoming or pushing away, a coming towards or a fleeing from, in *logos* the appearance of the expedient, *sumpheron*, invites movement. The possibility that lies in the disposition that discovers itself in the world is opened up in the practical possibilities of human being. The *logos*, addressing itself to the determination of the good, can look towards the possibility that is there in the disposition in the way it finds the world. The world becomes disclosed as conducive or not so, as well as proper or improper. These possibilities allow us to approach the key question, “how *logos* is the characteristic of being in the world wherein the world is there for human beings.”

Before proceeding to clarify the relation of *logos* and *sumpheron*, we can first examine the fundamental meaning of determination, limit and definition such that we can grasp what Aristotle understands as the fulfilment of his inquiry. To address the limit is to address what can be separated from out of the encounter. This separability provides the possibility of addressing something as something. The way that the human lives with others in shared talk, with the special capacity to bring something to attention, is always also complemented by the meaning that is passed
over. The reason a human being is still with-others even when alone is because of the nature of *logos* to always already being concerned with a world that can never fully belong to the individual.

The limit includes the *eidos*, which in one manifestation is inseparable from the *phantasma*, the imaginable imprint on the soul. The look of the thing is enough to have the thing there, addressed as such. What this discloses is not some primary part of the *eidos* as a representation. Apprehension/disclosure must be understood as a united whole, rather than divided analytically into its constituent parts. What is crucial is the mode of encounter that shows itself in human being. The relation to the limit that is identified in each of Aristotle’s analyses shows how the limit is essential to what is encountered. Thus the identification of the expedient or conducive means grasping how the limit is essential for our capacity to address something as expedient.

The conducive or expedient is a fundamental way that the world is encountered for humans. Aristotle thus grasps the various ways that the conducive in *logos* stands on its own and in relation to limit. He identifies three characters in the *Rhetoric* that Heidegger isolates as a decisive moment where the human being shows itself in *logos*. The three characters are,

1. *ta pros to telos*, ‘that which, in itself, is towards the end.’

2. *kata tas praxeis*, ‘within the purview proper to praxis.’
When one addresses the conducive, these three characters are all there, and thus can be potentially addressed along with the conducive. Thus the analysis is not a matter of bringing concepts together, but rather of bringing the conducive itself to language. The capacity to frame the consideration of how to bring something about, the logic of the conditional, can be shown in the articulation of the conducive. The syllogismos can present this if-then relation that brings together the end of the concern with the matter that can be deliberated about. The end that supports the syllogism in its simplicity is not in question because the praxis that is captured in the syllogism has its end fixed. But deliberation presents the world in the light of such a fixed end. The relations between the propositions are nothing without their relation to the end, but this dependence does not make the syllogismos unimportant. The syllogismos is rather the fulfilment of the logos insofar as the determination of the conducive is brought into language. In such speaking, in fixing the logos to its end in concern, the world is there explicitly as the conducive. The human being is given its there, its when, its how, in the world explicitly. “The being of human beings is in this logos, legein [to speak] as logisethai [to reckon or calculate] is a having-there of the world in such a way that I am in the world in a position determined by a here and now.” What is addressed as there in the world is addressed just as being there as much as it is addressed as conducive to something. In other words, the theoretical
emerges out of the addressing of things as simply there, even outside of all specific ends.

What remains outside of the account is the being-with-one-another and the function of *logos* as communication. These things are not added on to *praxis*, nor to what comes out of *praxis*, the theoretical. Rather the Greeks took the *logos* in an originary manner as always addressing the common world, the shared world, the shared and universal good. It is by grasping the conjunction of *logos* as always in *koinōnia* and always addressing what is intelligible in an average way that the basic understanding of *logos* is established. For Heidegger, the address to a common world through a mode of average intelligibility provides the context for Aristotle’s analyses. When Aristotle uncovers the structure of *agathon*, the good, it is by developing what is already there in the common address of the world as conducive.

It can remain obscure how the two main elements of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle at this point are to relate together. On the one hand, the world is there in *agathon* and *sumpheron*. On the other hand, the human being is there with one another in the mode of average everydayness. The appearance of the world through *sumpheron* is a perfect example of Heidegger’s focus upon the conditions of possibility of something that can be encountered in a straightforward manner, which the *logos* can address and draw out with regard to its limits. The *sumpheron* shows how *pragmata* can appear in the scope of a project, as simply there and also with the possibility of being addressed as such, as co-given with the *telos*.
But how does this simplicity (and latent complexity) of the sumpheron relate to the averageness of meanings which develop in the context of communication? It is important to reorientate our understanding to the type of structures that are being brought to light. The situation of understanding the sumpheron and agathon are themselves hermeneutic tasks, they too take place in logos. The unity of averageness and concrete being there only comes to light when they are both comprehended through logos. This unity is most clearly seen in the fulfilment of praxis, not in achieving an end but rather in the actualisation of deliberation. Deliberation is the fundamental form of communication, that is, the way that the logos is there for others as much as oneself. But this feature of speaking does not stand or fall with the presence of another person. Deliberation is actualised as much when one is alone as with other people. The real subject of language is the indeterminate subject in general, the ‘they/one’, Das Man. Averageness is in no way some kind of inessential holding back from the world which is genuinely made up of authentic concrete things. Averageness is the way that humans are for the most part in the world in concrete being-with-one-another. The making manifest of logos is the way that humans are being-in-the-polis.

The commonality and averageness of how human beings find themselves in the world leads to a nearly endless variety of worldly phenomena. Investigating agathon must be understood as directed in the opposite way to this plurality. The agathon, which is the peras of the being of human being, underlies and unifies the potentiality that all the variety of phenomena enact. This unification is not to
provide a genus of all phenomena, as if the good were the common quality of all beings. First, the good appears just as much or even more in things that are precisely not good, this includes not only things that appear as bad, but also as indifferent. Second, the good is the end that is there in the kind of movement that belongs to *logos*. Thus Aristotle is not trying to unify phenomena artificially but allow the self-showing of being towards the good. The structure shows itself and the primary place of the good as what supports the structure also shows itself as such. This privileged place of the end is what allows the *agathon* to stand for the whole. *Agathon* is the fulfilment of the way of being for the human being.

The *agathon* becomes explicit when its self-showing reveals itself as the fixed element of *praxis*. In *technē*, the *agathon* shows itself in this way. Heidegger interprets *technē* to mean knowing one’s way around in a fixed concern. Thus it makes sense that *technē* came to be associated with craft, because crafts have established what the good is, shoes for example, and the *technē* thus means to have what it is to be directed towards bringing shoes into being. But the broader meaning of *technē* refers to the determination of an end, the *agathon*, and the familiarity with what is conducive with respect to this end.

Heidegger now has in place the conceptual interpretations sufficient to address Aristotle’s insistence that politics is one way of aiming towards the highest good. This interpretation is not possible without the above clarification of *praxis* in the relation of *technē* and *agathon* and the clarification of *logos* in the relation of being-with-others and averageness. With these elements in place, Heidegger can now ask
what it means to know one’s way around being-in-the-\textit{polis}. The way that the human being is there with one another is in the manner of comportment, the \textit{\v{e}thos}.

As politics, the being-with-one-another, can been understood as a \textit{technē}, the question ‘what is its end?’ can be asked. An ‘ethics’ thus appears insofar as the human being develops an acquaintance with living with this end in mind. Aristotle thus draws attention to the various ways that people have sought to encapsulate the end of life as a whole, the ultimate \textit{agathon}. This division is the well-known division of the \textit{bios apolaustikos} (life of pleasure), \textit{bios politikos}, and the \textit{bios theōrētikos}. Each of these ways that people have grasped as the end of life can be approached from two basic ways in which the \textit{agathon} belongs to the structure of grasping possibility. On the one hand, the end of life is necessitated by the fact that different ends are often ‘second-order’ ends which are guided and limited by other, further ends. For example, the saddle-maker aims at making a saddle, but this end is guided by the nature of horse riding. If the end of life is to be genuinely there, then it must have a proper limit. On the other hand, the end of life must be suitable for such a limit, which allows Aristotle to challenge the aims of the \textit{bios apolaustikos} and the \textit{bios politikos}. The limit that brings together the variety of ends in life must belong intrinsically to the nature of concrete being there, thus even where it seems that someone has decided to seek pleasure or reputation this end may fail to be self-sufficient and self-encapsulating enough to be a proper end. The proper end, like \textit{praxis}, should be for itself.
The *bios apolaustikos* and the *bios politikos* both fail as ultimate ends of life, because neither belongs to being there itself; neither is the proper fulfilment of being there. In the former, the search for *hedonē*, pleasure, means that life is given over completely to the world, one succumbs to the world in this way, such that life is not taken hold of. In the latter, the search for reputation, *timē*, means that life is dictated by other people. Reputation can always be taken away from life. Neither possibility grasps the *agathon* in general. In part, this is because the attempt to grasp the *agathon* in general is misguided. The *agathon* must be understood with respect to *praxis*, thus, it must be investigated as an end itself. The question of the *agathon* requires a consideration of the completeness of the way that the human being is there. This investigation requires a shift in the way that the human being has considered its own being. *Eudaimonia* is thus transformed by Aristotle from the way that it occurs in common speech to a new terminological meaning that aims at the concept of completeness itself.\textsuperscript{206}

The transformation of *agathon* and *eudaimonia* into a new terminology begins with the identification of an intrinsic ambiguity in the concept of end. The *teleion*, which Aristotle develops into a concept, has the same doubling of meaning that *ousia* has. It refers to both a being and to this being as it can be thought with respect to how it is. The *teleion* is thus both “something that is completed [and] what constitutes being-completed”.\textsuperscript{207} These two sides of the concept of end come together in the way that Aristotle grasps how something can be good. Different kinds of good and different kinds of *aretē*, excellence, are determined by the coming
to a completion of the respective good. Thus a good doctor is determined by the fact that the doctor has come to an end in his or her grasp of the possibility of medicine. Having a full possibility at one’s disposal is the way that an aretē can be determined. In each case, being a good this or that is not primarily a goal to aim at, but rather constitutes the possibility as such. Thus telos is a way of being rather than a being that has a relation to something outside of it. For example, a doctor is constituted by having the concern of the end of medicine, that is, the presence of the doctor is tied the possibility of taking hold of how the being of medicine is. This way of having the telos before one, such that it can be brought to expression explicitly, is the way that actuality can appear as such. In this possibility the completion of being-there is discovered. It is through the apprehension of the limit as a way of understanding being-there that the genuine and primary nature of the agathon, eudaimonia and aretē can be understood.

The possibility of ‘merely’ being there in the sense of withdrawing from any particular praxis can now become explicit. The human being is not simply there first of all as a merely aware consciousness that then can have content and projects assigned to it. For Heidegger as for Aristotle awareness is never a neutral state. The possibility of just being there, of withdrawing from all concrete projects, is not the primary state that exists prior to concern, it is rather the possibility of the fulfilment of genuine concern in theōria. Just being there cannot exist as a turning away from one’s own being in the world, it is rather only possible as a commitment to alētheia.
Thus Aristotle’s investigation into *agathon* begins by observing how *agathon* is dispersed, but also that some ends are obviously guided by more genuine and encompassing ends. Not only is the search for the highest good opened up, but also the need to question the way that the end can be grasped in its being is revealed. This means that all particular goods must be set aside, but also that the attempt to generalise from these goods must also be set aside because a generalised good still fails to ask the proper question of what kind of being the good is. Aristotle determines the good as an end, as a completion, and as such, this kind of being must have itself fully in its concrete there-being. It cannot remain something to be attained, but must somehow genuinely be. Thus the question of the highest good is transformed into the question of the completeness, and thus being, of the human being. When the end that is sought out is interpreted in this way then other meanings of the end can become subsumed under this meaning. The various goods, pursuits and even the end that comes with death, are all ways in which the human being can be fulfilled. But the fundamental way in which that human being is there explicitly, has grasped hold of his or her possibility as such, is precisely in the possibility of grasping life as possibility.

With the *teleion* Aristotle radicalises the meaning of *peras* and *telos* as they occur in common discourse to refer to beings and to a way of being simultaneously. This new technical term is required in order to speak properly of the mode of being of the *psuchē*, the actuality of life. The investigation of *technē* provides a valuable step towards the examination of the *telos* in itself. The *telos* that appears alongside the
conducive in technē allows the telos, as the determining factor of certain beings to appear, as such. Furthermore, the telos in this role points to two further insights, a) that the telē are not all ends in the themselves means that some ultimate telos can be sought, and b) that the common attempts to name this ultimate telos fail to encapsulate the meaning of life because they look to the conjunction of life with the world or polis.

The result of Aristotle’s transformation of telos is that telos must be disconnected from any particular goal and must rather mean being itself. The way that life is there means the way that the concernful being maintains itself in its presence. “Telos thus means, originally: being-towards the end in such a way that this end constitutes the genuine there, determining, in a genuine way, a being in its presence.” 208 This meaning of telos encapsulates the way of being of that which is determined by a telos, that is, with respect to completeness. The resulting concept, the teleion, is explicit whenever a being is addressed such that its completeness is explicitly there as maintaining a being in its presence. The teleion is thus the clarification of what is sought in the question of the highest good.

Heidegger’s reformulation of eudaimonia that results from the teleion is a long way from where the investigation set out. For the human being, “The being on which it ultimately depends can, for being-there, only be its way of being, so that here a fundamental determination of being-there shows itself: such a being that, in its being, depends upon its being, explicitly or inexplicitly.” 209 Put in the more familiar refrain: the human being is a being that is concerned with its own being. In

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investigating the being of the being that is concerned, the nature of concern shows itself in its twofold structure. On the one hand, the concern belongs to the world, and this includes the coming into one’s own proper being insofar as one is there with one another, that is, one way of looking at the way of being of the human being is there explicitly as ἔθος. On the other hand, the being of the human being has a world because of the nature of concern that is only revealed in the explication of the teleion. The teleion shows how the human being is most properly there in its concern, and that this may be explicit or not.

In coming to one’s own being there, the teleion is there explicitly as the being of one’s own presence. One is there in the here and now insofar as the human being is actually in the mode of concern. But human beings are occupied with many concerns just as there are many ends, none of which are ontologically basic. Rather, the inquiry into the concrete human being must return to the basic factor of the psuchē of the human being, that is, logos. Logos allows the human being to be there in grasping its own possibility explicitly. The being-possibility that is grasped with the teleion is the determination of the being of the human being itself. The teleion is thus the basic ontological determination of the human being.

In the following section, being there in concern is shown in the way that it usually is, not in a mode of constant discovery, but rather transfixed by a world already discovered and lived within in the concerned manner of maintaining a view. The way that the human being has understood its possibility has for the most part developed into the average understandings of what is good and bad. The investigation of the
psuchē, that is, the concrete actualisation of concern, can manifest as rhetoric, which is directed towards grasping the way that average understanding situates itself in the world.

**4.4: The Interpretation of Concrete Being-There**

The framework that is opened up in the first two chapters of *The Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* is constructed with two key structures of research. On the one hand, *ousia* provides the turning point in research from the trust that one has in that which one encounters in the world to the multiplicity of ways of being in the world. This transition requires a change in one’s attitude to one’s own familiarity with language. On the other hand, the actuality of the *psuchē* provides a new totality, not of objects but of possibilities that can themselves become explicit insofar as the human being grasps itself in its being there. In this way, the conception of knowledge based upon the ordering of objects and propositional truth is confined to regional science and the proper form of knowledge that belongs to human existence, *the having of possibility*, is restored such that own’s own existence becomes the encompassing inquiry from which all regional sciences depart and without which no regional science would be possible. The individuality of what can be encountered as there is given a new role in the hermeneutic project, that is, as a starting point for questioning.

This hermeneutic framework can only be built up from within the appropriate experience of the world that shows itself. The concern for one’s own existence
shows itself as the most encompassing possibility only insofar as one can turn back onto possibility itself in logos. This framework also deals with the tendencies of the theoretical attitude. By going into experience and developing a new awareness of the variability of possibilities that have been discovered, and by grasping the nature of ambiguity that belongs to language, the tendencies to abstract any subjective contributions to experience and to divide up identities of sense-data and linguistic form are held at bay. What Heidegger is most critical of here is not a complicated argument for the theoretical attitude but its very first moves in securing a certain field of inquiry.

With this framework in place Heidegger’s basic interpretation of Aristotle is at a preliminary end. Many different inquiries could follow. The obvious inquiry that has already been established in coming to eudaimonia are the aretai, the various possibilities in which praxis can be actualised. The most thoroughly examined parts of Heidegger’s commentaries on Aristotle regard the intellectual aretai in the Plato’s Sophist lecture course, WS1924-25. But Heidegger does not continue to extrapolate the Nicomachean Ethics at this point in the SS1924, either with regard to the dianoetic or ethical virtues. Instead, Heidegger turns to the interpretation of being in the world with regard to the specific feature of speaking with one another. This is not because Heidegger thinks that being-with-one-other has been mistreated insofar as it has been demarcated into fields of inquiry like politics and ethics that have separated it from its proper phenomena, though this is certainly the case. Rather, it is because there is a text of Aristotle that is specifically dedicated to unfolding the
way that the Greeks interpreted their own being there in the world, that is, *The Art of Rhetoric*.

In Heidegger’s understanding of the Greeks, life was understood to be primarily lived in discourse with one another, and thus it is obvious to them but not to us that the hermeneutics of being there is primarily an account of how the human being is there in the world in speaking with one another. Heidegger suggests that a contemporary version of the Greek *zoön logon echon* would be “the human being is a living thing that reads the newspaper.” What Heidegger means is that the world is understood from within a predetermined set of possibilities that are already the matters of common talk. New events are presented as things that one is already concerned with, but not in a way that brings one to deal with something new, in spite of the content being news. Concerns have already become average in the manner in which everyone is aware of what ‘everyone’ thinks.

The *Rhetoric* provides an opportunity for Heidegger to examine not simply the necessary basic structures that underlie the various possibilities of human being, but specifically the manner in which the Greeks understood being in discourse. The fact that people are orientated towards the world in the mode of concern underlies the possibilities of speaking to people. The *Rhetoric* is not simply an analysis of being there, but rather also an investigation of the possibility of discoursing with one another on the basis of an understanding of how the human being is there in *doxa*, beliefs or views. *Doxa*, as Heidegger reveals, is the basic mode in which the human being grasps the world. For Heidegger, the phenomenon of *doxa* does not just show
how knowledge can go astray, rather doxa is much more interesting insofar as it shows how the human being is there with others.

Doxa is a much more encompassing possibility than any particular kind of knowledge. Aristotle’s account of the different kinds of knowledge founded in various possibilities of being directed towards alētheia is found in Nicomachean Ethics Z, which Heidegger examines in detail in the WS1924-25. In each case, each form of knowledge is revealed to be a different way that the being of beings can be seen. Technē (familiarity with how to bring something into being), phronēsis (the ability to bring about the best result in a new situation), epistēmē (knowledge of what is unchanging) and sophia (the wisdom that sees the true nature of the whole) are each ways in which nous (being directed towards or being open to beings) is actualised. Each one is a possibility of seeing insofar as what is seen is seen within the specific structure of the individual possibility, each of which Aristotle distinguishes from the others. This possibility of seeing, of grasping the obvious, is available in more possibilities than these intellectual virtues. Each of the senses, for instance, provides a distinct kind of seeing, though none of them has wisdom because none of them shows by itself any kind of cause. The manner in which the Greeks interpreted being in the world in the mode of discussing with one other shows a much more basic possibility that underlies the way that the human being is in the world, that is, doxa.

Doxa certainly does not refer primarily to opinions that lack proper reasons, though it has a broad enough meaning to be able to play the role of the opposite of
epistēmē as it does in the *Meno*. *Doxa* lies at the foundation of not only epistēmē, but also all dialectic and politics. *Doxa* is the bedrock of discussing with one another. Anything known in the manner of epistēmē is never up for discussion, because one does not discuss things that are certain. *Technē* can be up for discussion regarding its means, because it is a conjunction of a fixed end with the variability of means that are available. But *technē* is a limited structure with a determined end. *Doxa* is the way that the human being is basically orientated in the world.

*Doxa* in its most basic meaning can be expressed in Heidegger’s terms as the expression of concern in an average way. The *Rhetoric* provides Heidegger with the analysis of what makes up the way that concern has settled into averageness, the possibilities that speak in *doxa* are the way that the human being has situated itself with others in the world, as a being that maintains various positions, views, understandings, goals.

Being-in-the-world is the basic character of being-there with regard to its discoveredness: the world as that with which living deals within a certain familiarity in a concernful, speaking way. This familiarity regarding the world, and dealing and living in it, is borne by speaking as the peculiar exhibiting of that to which one is orientated. At the same time, this familiarity is the mode in which views and orientations are cultivated. Views are cultivated, renewed, established, hardened in speaking. Speaking-with-one-another is,
accordingly, the clue to the uncovering of the basic phenomena of
the discoveredness of being-there itself as being-in-a-world. We take
rhetoric as a concrete guide insofar as it is nothing other than the
interpretation of being-there with regard to the basic possibility of
speaking-with-one-another.\textsuperscript{211}

Thus Heidegger’s first insight about the Rhetoric is that it concerns the basic way
that the human being has settled into concerns. This background of concern is not
primarily any particular concern, but rather the broader background of concerns that
encapsulates how one feels about things, what kind of person one thinks one is,
what is good and bad in general. Doxa may have a broad meaning and may seem
like a less philosophical topic than the study of the proper intellectual possibilities,
but for Heidegger the breadth of its application is not due to a vagueness in its
conceptual boundaries, but rather because it defines the manner in which the
human being is there in the world. “One must take fully into account that the Greeks
lived in discourse, and one must note that if discourse is the genuine possibility of
being-there, in which it plays itself out, that is, concretely and for the most part, then
precisely this speaking is also the possibility in which being-there is ensnared.”\textsuperscript{212}
Doxa is not ensnared in certain opinions, on the contrary, individual views can
change. The way that doxa takes up the world however is not with an understanding
of the possibilities of truth, but rather looking to the kind of truth that speaks out of
the view itself. Doxa is an ensnarement insofar as it does not comprehend itself but
rather takes up one’s own existence directly. *Doxa* speaks for itself and *doxa* provides a foundation for more *doxa*. Rhetoric depends on both of these characters; on the one hand, rhetoric must come to see what speaks for itself and, on the other hand, rhetoric attempts to produce more *doxa*.

Heidegger is adamant that rhetoric is not a *technē* in spite of Aristotle sometimes saying so. Rhetoric is more properly a *dunamis*, specifically the potentiality for seeing what speaks for a matter. Rhetoric is not a *technē* that takes hold of persuasion, *pistis*, though it aims to persuade. The crucial point that Heidegger makes is that neither *doxa* nor persuasion can be demarcated as something in the world, they are rather being in the world. Persuasion is not something that can be fixed on by itself because it belongs to the manner in which all things speak for themselves. Thus rhetoric can never be a complete field of knowledge but must look to the general structures in which *doxa* is usually situated. Rhetoric must be recognised as a peculiar possible inquiry.

The manner in which the *Rhetoric* approaches its subject manner can be considered vis-à-vis *theōria* in order to clarify how rhetoric is possible. Heidegger emphasises the extent to which Aristotle pays attention to the basic way of approaching what it is that an inquiry is directed towards. In theoretical investigations the goal of the inquiry lies beyond the normal habits of life. Hence work must be done in order to clarify the goal, the method, and the particular problems that belong to a kind of inquiry. A theoretical inquiry is primarily clarified by confronting the *aporia*, which is the way that the problem blocks the way to
understanding how the problem is to be resolved. In studying the *aporia* the investigation becomes itself. The proper method and success of the investigation becomes clear to the inquirer by grasping the special difficulties that belong to the inquiry. In theoretical challenges the inquirer must submit to the inquiry. The inquiry has its proper nature that must be entered into as a world in itself. The knowledge that is aimed at is once and for all. With rhetoric this situation is completely the reverse.

Rhetoric deals with matters that everyone is already accustomed to discuss. There is no need to get one’s bearings with respect to the goal of the discussion, or how to take up a stance with respect to a unique method. Rhetoric addresses matters in the way that people are for the most part already situated, thus the potential for rhetoric depends upon being able to see along with others what makes a view of a matter speak for itself. The rhetor is also situated in the world and must not only see in this way but grasp how this seeing takes place and the possibility for change within this situation. While in theoretical investigations any particularity of person or mood or circumstance must be discarded, in rhetoric all such circumstances are not only important, all such circumstances are fundamental determining factors of rhetorical deliberations. The deliberating does not aim at acquiring some certain knowledge, but to come to a view of a matter which, while on the one hand is already established in deliberation as a basic view regarding a concrete situation, on the other hand never ceases to be possibly different. Nothing to be deliberated is ever completely settled.
For Heidegger, the *Rhetoric* provides a guide for understanding the basic way that the human being is *there in logos*. The way in which the human being is there in discussion of familiar concerns provides the paradigm of the default state of the human being. The scenario of rhetoric is a significant possibility for the way that human being is in *logos* because it takes place entirely in speech. In a discussion in the assembly the subject matter is usually absent from the discussion in two ways. Not only is the matter of discussion usually of something past or future, but furthermore the matter of discussion is never something that has a certain answer. The foundation of discussion is not in the matter that is discussed as an objective event, but rather the discussion is founded in the listener, the speaker and the *logos* itself. Thus the *Rhetoric* provides an analysis of how a view of the world is maintained and changed within the possibilities that human-being-in-*logos* allows.

The basic starting point is grasping that the human being can be completely immersed in *logos*. *Doxa* must be grasped as a way of being towards something that is had in advance. All kinds of having something in advance refer to basic ways in which *logos* grasps its possibility. It is within the scope of this structure that *doxa* can be analysed as more than simply a set of opinions, but also as ‘having a view of something’ itself. When read in this way, Aristotle’s analyses of *doxa* and associated attitudes regard the nature of being there with respect to the way that it is directed towards and can speak of its own possibility. All the ways that the human being manages to direct itself towards something, and thus to orientate itself in the world, reveal themselves especially when their relation to *logos* is made explicit. By
following Aristotle’s distinction of two different ways of being there, *doxa* and resolution, *proairesis*, Heidegger shows how each grasps a certain possibility that is opened by *logos*.

*Doxa* is not simply a view of something, but more actively *maintaining* a view of something. *Doxa* is directed towards *alētheia* in a particular way such that the view taken up speaks for itself, offers itself as its own correctness. “To opine that the matter is thus and so lies in the view itself.” While *epistēmē* can be distinguished from *doxa*, the distinction is not that *doxa* lacks the proof that it should properly have. Rather, the way that *doxa* is convincing is of a different order to *epistēmē*. *Epistēmē* is directed towards a being that is not present but can be known definitely in its absence. Thus *epistēmē* is knowledge of what cannot change. *Doxa* can be about the same thing as *epistēmē*, but not in the same way. *Doxa* is intrinsically a commitment to a view that nonetheless could change. *Epistēmē* can only be when the nature of what is known has completely revealed itself such that one need no longer check. *Doxa* has no such order that can be appropriated, but rather *doxa* remains at the level of orientating oneself in one’s world along with other people. *Doxa* can also be distinguished from the presentation of something, *phantasma*, which human beings and animals share. Because *doxa* is a commitment to something, has in itself a *logos*, a deciding of something over something else, *doxa* thus maintains the view of the world in *logos*. Through *doxa* the human being has become familiar with the world. *Doxa* thus are not opinions about things that one has no reason to contemplate but rather *doxa* carry the obviousness of all the things
in the world. “This familiarity regarding the world ... is borne by speaking as the peculiar exhibiting of that to which one is orientated.”

In order to clarify doxa insofar as it has its directed-towards within itself Heidegger turns to the contrast with resolution, proairesis. Both phenomena are cases of being directed at the world through logos, thus unlike wish or impulse which belong to animals as much as humans, doxa and proairesis belong specifically to the way that the human being finds itself in the world. The distinction between doxa and proairesis is due to what they are directed towards, that is, how they each shape a basic way of being in the world. Proairesis is directed towards the prakton, the act, but comes to completion insofar as the world is there in a simple way. Thus proairesis is the result of a deliberation such that the world is found in full determination where the situation that is uncovered completely depends upon what one can do. Proairesis is thus not fulfilled in an action but is “a genuine possibility of being in the moment.” Doxa, on the other hand, stands back from praxis, and instead answers itself. Both doxa and proairesis reveal the basic possibility of being directed towards something that can change. While proairesis is that mode of being in which the practon is there essentially, that is, where the practon is the determinate possibility that the proairesis has secured, with doxa the path to discovering the being of beings has been begun with the twofold understanding of commitment to a view, but also with the understanding of this commitment in the context of an ongoing conversation.
Both *doxa* and *proairesis* show the way that the world can be there in *logos* in a simple manner. This simple exhibition that takes place in *doxa*, which stays within the confines of concern as it has already been interpreted, is a possibility of truth. The only opening in the circle of question and answer is the speech of other people. Like the shadows for people in the cave, *doxa* is intrinsically a matter of discussion. In this simplicity, the being-in-the-world in average intelligibility is the fundamental starting point. The simplicity of *doxa* replaces the simplicity that the theoretical attitude proposes as primary. Instead, *doxa* is the simplicity that can be achieved by the actualisation of interpretation in the world. Thus the possibility of being there in *doxa* can only be fully accounted for within the framework that shows how concern underlies the conditions of possibility for the appearance of beings as such. It is through the examination of *doxa* that “there result definite conditions for how *logos* itself must be with respect to its *exhibiting character*, its *concreteness*. It must be able to show this everydayness, must be able to exhibit *simply*...” It is on this basis that the world appears as such, properly, with respect to the possibilities in the world that are available or not available as the case may be. The primacy of this way of being-in-the-world is the way that *logos* must be understood. In this understanding, the basic meanings of matters that are lived with in the world carry with them an orientation that includes being with others.

All of the basic possibilities must be understood with respect to how the *logos* grasps the possibilities of being in the world. Being good and being bad are thus more primarily there in the way of being of oneself and being with others than any
possibility of certain knowledge of beings. This being good and being bad applies to one’s being with others essentially in ethics, just as much as it applies to the deliberation of the proper course of action or justice in the context of rhetoric. Nor, at the basic level of everydayness, are ἔθος and the conducive broken apart such as to have nothing to do with one another. Having doxa means to be most basically with regard to this shared world. “Doxa is the genuine discoveredness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world.”217

The basic task here is to clarify how one is there in the world in average everydayness. What has been discovered is that one is not founded in certainties, but rather in the trust that one puts in the immediate and most obvious intelligibility. Certain knowledge is only one possibility that can be followed up. But to take epistēmē as the basic form of knowledge distorts our understanding of doxa as common knowledge. The pursuit of epistēmē requires the attitude of theōria, that is, of abandoning the way that one is with others for the most part, that is, with respect to ἔθος, the good and bad of being-with-others. Doxa must be thought of as both the trust in the immediate and as the ground for further deliberation on the basis of what has been grasped initially. Thus Heidegger emphasises how doxa provides the basis for epistēmē as well as the deliberation of the assembly. On the basis of Heidegger’s reconstruction of the meaning of doxa communal deliberation is not some arbitrary construction but is rather more basic to being in everydayness than any other kind of logos.
Conclusion

The argument of this thesis is that Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in the early 1920s is best understood after we have come to terms with the critique that Heidegger develops against theoretical attitude. By understanding how Heidegger determines the limitations of the theoretical attitude we can grasp the scope of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology that takes up the task of overcoming of those limitations. In particular this thesis follows the development of an underlying opposition in Heidegger’s work from 1919 to 1924. This opposition is staged around competing interpretations of the structural elements at work in the actualisation of research. Specifically these structural-logical elements are the understanding of unity and simplicity within the contexts of vision, speech and action that underlie the way that research takes up an object and understands its own possibilities and ends. When read in this way Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle is a demonstration of possibilities of research that are invisible to theoretical attitude. As we have followed Heidegger’s reconstructions of Aristotle what emerges is a representation of Aristotle’s work where Heidegger attempts to alter our presuppositions about the possibility of research and thereby alter our understanding of Aristotle’s texts. The fundamental strategy of this alteration of presuppositions is to draw out the incompatibility of the structural-logical elements as employed by the modern philosophical positions criticised by Heidegger and the research carried out by Aristotle; this thesis makes this strategy explicit.
To carry out the argument we move from establishing an understanding of Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical attitude in chapter one, to examining the ways that alternative research projects may be carried out in chapter two, and then finally to closely examining Heidegger’s readings of Aristotle in 1923 and 1924 in chapters three and four. The four chapters together show how Heidegger’s arguments about the role of formalisation in research lead directly into the fundamental element in Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle, which is the conception the human being as being primarily in *logos*. With this new understanding of the nature of the human being insofar as it can do research and be the object of research comes an accompanying theory of both the nature of language and a rejection of the division of mind and world.

In chapter one we began by emphasising the strategies that Heidegger develops in order to show the origins as well as the limitations of the theoretical attitude. It is here that we saw how Heidegger’s determination of the theoretical attitude depends upon the hermeneutic presupposition that the way someone undertakes research is guided by the presuppositions one has about the being of beings, both the basic accessibility of beings as objects of research but also the accessibility of already known knowledge. Thus Heidegger’s critique of the theoretical situation is also an attempt to expose the latent assumptions that allow modern philosophy to accept its understanding of language and the mind-world relationship. Heidegger’s basic strategy involves drawing attention to a number of structures that do not sit neatly within the objective orders of regionality, e.g. the indexical structure of reference,
impersonal grammatical constructions (‘it worlds’ and such – these are not analysed in this thesis but are part of the same family), the fact that the immediacy of environmental experience (such as the way that a lectern is encountered in everyday life) cannot be successfully explained through a framework that either implicitly or explicitly assumes the primacy of theoretical apprehension. In each of these examples Heidegger attempts to take away from the theoretical attitude its privileged self-understanding as objective and replace this with an understanding of the theoretical attitude as a limited perspective that Heidegger expresses using the structure of intentionality (which we examined as the tendency of being content focused). Throughout chapters one and two we showed how Heidegger argues that what is supposed to be an objective theoretical apprehension of beings is only a limited viewpoint that depends on a restriction of formalised relations to a unified and stable field of objects and results. This position, that we conveniently call the ‘theoretical attitude’ manifests as regionality, formal propositions in general, a linguistic atomism, the correspondence theory of truth and the generalisation of material and historical objects as apprehensible in a context free manner. Counter to this is Heidegger’s insistence on the freedom of formalisation and an accompanying devaluation of a specific kind of theoretical formalisation that limits the scope of research. By rejecting the possibility of presenting all beings in the context of a formalisation of intuition (including logical apprehension), Heidegger prepares a space in which to reconsider the possibility of research and thus also the original possibilities in which logical form has been exercised in the pursuit of theoretical apprehension.
By focusing on the different manners in which research understands the structures of language we showed the importance of starting from within the opposition that Heidegger develops between the theoretical attitude and its alternative. These issues we gathered together under the term ‘logic’. Heidegger clearly is not concerned with the rigour of formal logic within itself, rather it is the use of logic as an extension of encompassing objectivity that Heidegger thinks stems from a confusion. This is a crucial underlying aspect of Heidegger’s project which we examined in terms of Heidegger’s critique of the confusion of general and formal ontology. The consequences of that critique shape the alternative understanding of the possibility of research that Heidegger then continues to develop both as a hermeneutical phenomenology and through the readings of Aristotle.

While the modern tendency to conceive of knowledge in the form of a system leads to a form of research in which knowable elements are extracted from the world and subsequently interconnected within the limited whole of a particular region, Heidegger repositions the elements and structural relations of research within the whole that is the self-interpretation of the human being. It is this replacement, or put another way this incompatibility, that provides the foundation for Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle. Only when we understand Heidegger’s rejection of the manner in which regionality can encapsulate knowledge and the aims and results of research within a system can we understand why Heidegger replaces both the notions of the proposition in general and the mind-world divide with the notion being in the world that is immersed in logos.
If the theoretical attitude allows for the manner in which beings show themselves to be left behind, Heidegger’s Aristotle discovers repeatedly that the possibility of research is a transformation of the way that beings are already encountered. *Dunamis* provides an appropriate paradigm of this structure. *Dunamis* is always already discovered in some way insofar as it appears in actualisation, but it is when *dunamis* is discovered in itself, and thus not simply in its actualisation, that it stands on its own. *Dunamis* plays the role of rest that contains motion within itself; it is the mode in which the human takes up itself in *logos*.

In 1923, Heidegger has already established the structure of *dunamis* as a way into Aristotle’s *De Anima*. As chapter three of this thesis initially established, *dunamis*, thought within the general understanding of the human being as directed towards beings, provides a structure in which the human being shows itself to itself. What is possible for the human being is always already there for itself insofar as it is concerned with the world, but insofar as the human being grasps its own being, the world no longer dictates its activities to it. This framework for reflexivity in being in the world replaces the totalisation of objective regions. The hermeneutic structure provides a different ground on which conceptual formulation can rest. The nature of this mode of presentation is idiomatic of the human being; the self-showing of beings that can be taken up is the nature of *logos*. *Logos* for Heidegger is more the capacity to take up the self-showing of beings than it is explicit use of words and speech. The framework of *logos* encompasses the fallenness of *doxa* and the possibility of bringing the human being before itself as a totality. What Heidegger
identifies in Aristotle is that the understanding of being in *logos* is crucial for making the shift from being overcome by the world to the philosophical life which takes up *logos* in order to fulfil its possibilities. For the early Heidegger, the demonstration of this questioning research in the conceptual work of Aristotle is already a crucial step towards making a recovery of such original research possible in modern times.

*Logos* plays the role of the matter of philosophy in Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle; *logos* provides both the manner in which the human being has understood itself and the possibility for research. We examined how *logos* is the manner in which the human being is in the world in both chapter three, insofar as *logos* shows itself in the possibility of *pseudos*, and in chapter section 4.4 in the form of *doxa*. In both cases Heidegger’s concern with establishing the possibility of a formal indication shows itself insofar as the *logos* allows something to be grasped *simply*. The accessibility of the simple that Heidegger investigates provides a deliberate counterexample to the understanding of determination offered by the theoretical attitude. In the theoretical attitude a being can be determined in relation to the genera, species and differentiae that provide the underlying units that can be set into relation in logical expression. *Logos* in Heidegger’s reading provides a different way in which a being can be there as one and many. Thus the starting point of research is already there in that which language has already pointed out.

In section 4.2 we investigated the transformation that language undergoes in philosophy. The use of the polysemy of *ousia* takes up an understanding that has already taken place. On this basis we can show how research is a possibility that
belongs specifically to the human being insofar as the human being is primarily insofar as it speaks. Once we have made this shift, language is no longer something into which content can be put; the form of the proposition-in-general is simply no longer possible. Instead for Heidegger language cannot be separated from the being of the human being insofar as it finds itself in the world. In section 4.3 we showed how research into this human being could be understood as a kind of encompassing whole. The being of the human being finds self-expression and self-understanding in the concept of eudaimonia. The possibility of theōria which goes along with Aristotle’s use of eudaimonia thus makes sense when we grasp how the self-showing that belongs to the movement of praxis is precisely what theōria grasps in its stillness. Eudaimonia too, for Aristotle, provides a concept of the whole in the form of the telos of the human being insofar as it is the underlying basic possibility. Eudaimonia and theōria are both possibilities of being in the world that remain constant, and thus insofar as they are the highest possibilities of the human being they are simply the possibility of the human being completely being itself.

This encompassing structure makes it clear why Heidegger is so critical of an understanding of results which could be separated into a totality by themselves or stand up as an atomic unit of fact. The whole in which research can understand itself must be the attempt to make explicit the self-interpretation in which the human being finds itself. Philosophy can only take place as an exacerbation and purification of the most basic possibility that belongs to life. Thus at one end of the scale, logos in the form of doxa is already a situatedness, a way of finding oneself in the world.
At the other end of the scale, the highest possibility of the human being is also the most basic and ubiquitous, albeit intrinsically obscure. The most important results of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle are that the totalising structure of being in the world already holds the possibility of phenomenological research within the most basic tendency of *logos*. Thus any conception of phenomenological method is ultimately subordinate to intrinsic directedness of the human being towards the truth. The manner in which the Greeks pursued this possibility, most effectively in the work of Aristotle, by following the self-understanding of the human being is based precisely in the Greek understanding of *logos*. The former result is most closely aligned with Heidegger’s own project as will be expressed in *Being and Time*, while it is the latter element, and especially the Greek way of understanding the meaning of being as presence in conjunction with limit, that provides the reasons for why Heidegger ultimately keeps his distance from Aristotle.


\[1\] Note on use of terms. Throughout the thesis we do not maintain any strict division of hyphenated and non-hyphenated terms like ‘being-in-the-world’ vs ‘being in the world’ or ‘being-there’ vs ‘being there’, but the former is generally used when pointing to Heideggerian terminology. Citing German is kept to a minimum, while the Greek, especially in the second half of the thesis, is used frequently. All the Greek terms are used in their basic forms (i.e. nominative singular/plural and either first-person first principle part indicative active or infinitive) unless Heidegger’s usage
requires diverging from the rule; in this manner we treat all the Greek as a set of technical terms for which we (following Heidegger) are providing an exegesis.


⁴ Ibid, p. 156.


⁷ Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, p. 79.


⁹ For an example of where Heidegger explains why he thinks the Greeks privileged, completeness and eternity and thus also *theōria* and *sophia* above *praxis* see


18 Heidegger, *Becoming Heidegger*, p. 158.
Clearly the correspondence theory of truth, for instance, does not have the following it had in the 1920s. But even while the term ‘theoretical attitude’ is used to collect a number of positions together, Heidegger’s diagnosis of the theoretical attitude is directed at the guiding assumptions about the nature of beings and their accessibility.


The notion of content-fixation is discussed in more detail in chapter one. See chapter section 1.3 especially.


Formal indication does not occur as a term in the KNS1919 but is clearly articulated therein for the first time, see this thesis chapter 1.3. For some of Heidegger’s best explications of formal indication see, Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, pp. 38-45; to see Heidegger put formal indication into opposition with the theoretical attitude see, Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, pp. 61-65. A dense but also illuminating explication of formal indication is put within Heidegger’s consideration of the meaning of ‘definition’ in the first chapter of Heidegger, (trans. Richard Rojcewicz), *Phenomenological Interpretations*


34 For an example of Heidegger’s critique of historicism see Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, pp. 22-37. For an example of Heidegger’s critique of neo-Kantian epistemology and the theoretical attitude see Heidegger, *Towards a Definition of Philosophy*, pp. 80-99.


36 Ibid, p. 32.


Ibid, p. 77, H. 78.


Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p. 4.

See for example KNS1919, ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview’ in Heidegger, Towards a Definition of Philosophy, pp. 94-98.


54 KNS1919 is published in GA56/57 translated as Towards a Definition of Philosophy. WS1920-21 is published in GA60 translated as The Phenomenology of Religious Life.

55 Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, p. 44.


57 Heidegger, Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity, p. 60.


60 Dahlstrom, Daniel O., *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*. On formal indication specifically see pp. 242-252.

61 Heidegger, *Towards a Definition of Philosophy*, p. 94.

62 Ibid, p. 95.


66 Ibid, p. 57.


68 Ibid, p. 68.

69 Ibid, p. 70.

70 Ibid, p. 70.

71 Ibid, p. 72.

72 Ibid, p. 79.

73 Ibid, p. 92.
74 Ibid, pp. 92-3.

75 Ibid, p. 94.


77 Heidegger, *Towards a Definition of Philosophy*, p. 97.

78 Ibid, p. 98.

79 Ibid, pp. 97-98.


81 On the privilege of the atemporal see for example Heidegger, *Ontology: Hermeneutics of Facticity*, pp. 32-33.

82 For example, Brogan, Walter, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, pp. 39ff.

83 Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, pp. 40 & 47.

84 Ibid, pp. 93ff.

85 With regard to the study of *phasis* see *Physics* A1, 184a10-17. With regard to *sophia* see *Metaphysics* A1-2, 982a1-6.
86 Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, p. 11.


89 Ibid, p. 5.


Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle, p. 11.

Ibid, p. 4.

Ibid, p. 83.

Ibid, p. 69.


Ibid, p. 16.

Ibid, p. 15.

Ibid, p. 16.

Ibid, p. 17.

Ibid, p. 17.

111 Ibid, p. 74.


113 Ibid, p. 166.


115 Ibid, p. 65.

116 Ibid, p. 66.

117 Ibid, p. 66.

118 Ibid, pp. 64ff.


120 Ibid, p. 65.

121 Ibid, p. 68.

122 Ibid, p. 68.

123 Ibid, p. 68.


125 Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 79.


Heidegger points to the passage on the definition of essence, Ibid, 1029b13b.


Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, p. 17.


The principle texts analysed by Heidegger are *De Anima* B6-8 & Γ2-3, *Of Interpretation*, and *Metaphysics* Δ29.


\(^{140}\) Ibid, p. 6.

\(^{141}\) Ibid, p. 6.

\(^{142}\) Ibid, p. 6.

\(^{143}\) Ibid, p. 8.

\(^{144}\) Ibid, p. 8.

\(^{145}\) Ibid, pp. 8-9.

\(^{146}\) Ibid, p. 10.

\(^{147}\) Ibid, p. 10.

\(^{148}\) Ibid, p. 12.

\(^{149}\) Ibid, p. 13.

\(^{150}\) Cf. Plato, *Sophist* 262b-d.


\(^{154}\) Ibid, p. 16.

\(^{155}\) Ibid, p. 16.

\(^{156}\) Ibid, p. 17.
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159 Plato, *Theaetetus* 185a.


164 For example, Aristotle, *Physics* A1, 184a.


167 Ibid, p. 11.


171 Ibid, p. 15.


173 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, p. 4.

174 Ibid, p. 5.

175 Ibid, p. 12.


177 Ibid, p. 12.


180 Ibid, p. 16.

181 Ibid, p. 16.
As a participle and as a usage of the verb ‘to be’ which generally combines with other meanings, a literal translation of *ousia* is problematic and potentially misleading. Standing in a participle clause by itself *ousia* would simply be ‘being’, but in Aristotle’s usage which emphasises the noun function it could be translated as ‘being’ or ‘beingness’. But it would be wrong to ignore the more common meaning of *ousia* as ‘property’ and the fact that Aristotle spends a good deal of time providing the terminological meaning of *ousia* with explanation. The traditional translation of ‘substance’ stems from such explanations as those in *Categories* 5 wherein Aristotle stresses how *ousia* provides the foundation for all the other categories.


Ibid, p. 18.


Ibid, p. 20.


196 Ibid, p. 27.

197 Ibid, p. 28.

198 Ibid, p. 29.

199 Ibid, p. 35.


201 Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, p. 36.


204 Ibid, p. 41.

205 Ibid, p. 42.

206 Regarding *eudaimonia* as the independent foundation of *teloi*, cf. Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, pp. 118-119.

207 Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, p. 56.


210 Ibid, p. 74.

211 Ibid, p. 95.

212 Ibid, p. 74.

213 Ibid, p. 98.

214 Ibid, p. 95.

215 Ibid, p. 98.

216 Ibid, p. 90.

Bibliography

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**Other Texts**


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