The Career of Licinius Mucianus

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Abstract

This thesis constitutes a close examination of the political career of an ancient Roman historical figure from the first century AD – the general, statesman and writer Gaius Licinius Mucianus. The study utilizes a chronological structure to elucidate the origins and *cursus honorum* of Mucianus before 69 AD, his role in the planning and execution of the Flavian uprising in 69 AD as well as his subsequent political career in the Roman Senate – as both *de facto* temporary head of state in early 70 AD and as suffect consul in 70 and 72 AD. In addition to establishing a chronology of Mucianus’ life and career, this thesis also examines several specific facets of Mucianus’ career, including his relationship with Titus and Vespasian, both prior to, during and following the ‘Year of the Four Emperors’, the nature of Mucianus’ own political ambitions and the extent to which Mucianus’ ambitions were ultimately fulfilled by the Emperor Vespasian.

The primary methodology which will be used in the course of this thesis will be a close examination of primary source material. The sources which will be utilised in this thesis can broadly be divided into two categories – literary and archaeological. Belonging to the former category are five central historical works from antiquity – the *Historia Romana* of Cassius Dio, the *Historiae* and *Annales* of the senator and historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus, the *Bellum Judaicum*, composed by the 1st-century Romano-Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, and Pliny the Elder’s *Naturalis Historia*. These works will, in turn, be supplemented by further accounts derived from later commentators as well as other contemporaries – including Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus’ *De Vita Caesarum*, the *Epitome Historiarum* of Ioannes Zonaras, the *Epistulae* of the Younger Pliny and the *Stratagemata* of Sextus Julius Frontinus. The latter category – archaeological sources, includes a substantial corpus of material evidence derived from military and civil
structures as well as Roman coinage, papyri and inscriptions – preserved in expansive collections such as the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* and *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae*, compilations such as Mattingly and Sydenham’s ‘Roman Imperial Coinage’ as well as more explicitly pertinent works such as Homer Newton’s 1901 dissertation ‘The Epigraphical Evidence for the Reigns of Vespasian and Titus’ and McCrum and Woodhead’s ‘Select Documents of the Principates of the Flavian emperors including the year of revolution AD 68-69’.
Declaration

This is to certify that:

i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the masters

ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used,

iii. the thesis is 53,721 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps, footnotes, bibliographies and appendices as approved by the Research Higher Degrees Committee
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Abbreviations


ANRW  Haase, Wolfgang, Temporini, Hildegard (eds.), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1972-).


CIL  Mommsen, T. et al. (eds.), *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (Berlin: Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1863-).
CIS  

CPJ  

Eckhel  

HAE  
Caro, R. et al. (ed.), *Hispania Antiqua Epigraphica*, (Madrid: Instituto de Arqueologfa y Prehistoria, 1950-).

IG  
Kirchhoff, A. et al. (eds.), *Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1873-).


P. Fouad  

P. Hibeh  

PIR1  
Klebs, H. et al. (eds.), Prosopographia Imperii Romani, 3 vols. (Berlin: Reimerum, 1897-8).

PIR2  
Groag, E. et al. (eds.), Prosopographia Imperii Romani, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1933-).

RE  

REA  
**RPC**

**SEG**
Hondius, J. et al. (eds.) *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (Amsterdam, Leiden: Gieben, Brill, 1923-).
Introduction

On July 1 of the year 69 AD, Vespasian was proclaimed Emperor at Alexandria. Several days afterwards, the legions of Syria under the command of Gaius Licinius Mucianus (cos suff. 64, II 70, III 72) followed suit.¹ The outcome of the civil war of 69 was that Vespasian was accepted as princeps across the Roman Empire and established a dynasty that would last until the end of the first-century AD. Mucianus’ precise role in the Flavian uprising is at times difficult to discern. It is evident that he was one of Vespasian’s key supporters during the year 69, having conspired with Vespasian and his son, Titus, to overthrow the usurper Aulus Vitellius. Mucianus personally led the vanguard of the Flavian force through Asia Minor and Thrace to confront Vitellius. In addition, it is clear that he played a significant role in the political administration of the Roman Empire during the early months of 70 when he appointed commanders and eliminated any possible pretenders to the throne such as Calpurnius Piso Galerianus, Lucius Calpurnius Piso (cos ord. 57)

and Vitellius’ young son.² Although Domitian signed the decrees, Mucianus wielded the power.³ During this time, he was also able to prevent the prosecution of Titus Clodius Eprius Marcellus (cos suff. 62, II 74) and Lucius Junius Quintus Vibius Crispus (cos suff. 62/63, II 74, III 83), who were being assailed by Helvidius Priscus in the Senate, thereby incurring the wrath of the senators.⁴ Despite the seemingly momentous role that Mucianus played both in the lead-up to the Flavian ‘putsch’, the uprising itself and the administration of the Empire during Vespasian’s absence from Rome in 70, however, few modern authors have sought to examine the specifics of Mucianus’ career and his military and political role in the Flavian seizure of power.

This thesis, through the use of both primary literary sources, such as Tacitus, Cassius Dio, Suetonius and Flavius Josephus, as well as epigraphic sources contained in the *Inscriptiones graecae ad res romanae pertinentes, Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, and *Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae* will attempt to construct both a chronology of Licinius Mucianus’ political career as well as rationalize Licinius Mucianus’ actions throughout the period 22-77 AD in terms of his own political ambitions. This thesis will initially detail Mucianus’ political career – including his cursus honorum until the year 69. Subsequently, it will focus on the deliberations which preceded the Flavian campaign of 69 – with an implicit focus on the relationship between Mucianus and Vespasian as well as the rationale behind the strategic aims presented by Mucianus in light of the realities of the subsequent campaign. In addition, this thesis will also focus on the relationship between Mucianus and his Flavian colleagues after 70, attempting to discover, among other things,

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³ Ibid, 4.39.
whether Mucianus sought to establish an independent power base in the Roman Senate and the extent of his influence within Vespasian’s regime.

The Modern Historiographical Tradition

Licinius Mucianus has typically received merely a cursory mention within more expansive treatments of the rise and reign of the Emperors Vespasian, Titus and Domitian. In particular, treatments of the year 69 are not in short supply. Barbara Levick’s 1999 work, ‘Vespasian’, for instance, depicts Mucianus as an ambitious, if largely politically unsuccessful individual. According to Levick, Mucianus’ decision to renounce any claim to the purple in favour of supporting Vespasian was not indicative of his lack of ambition. Instead, it was a realistic decision based on the fact that, in comparison with Vespasian’s, Mucianus’ own career had been less than stellar. As Levick points out, according to Tacitus, Mucianus was a ‘notorious homosexual with a theatrical manner’ and he had no sons of his own to serve as heirs. As such, he ‘made the realistic choice between backing the marginally preferable Vespasian, with the chance of substantial gains, and of being swept away.’

Levick does concede that Mucianus enjoyed considerable political influence during the years 70-71 – as is evidenced by his banishment of a large number of Cynic and Stoic philosophers from Italy, including Demetrius and the Stoic C. Tutilius Julius Hostilianus of Cortonia. Nevertheless, Levick regards Mucianus’ political position as having degenerated before his death, in spite of his third consulship in 72. She emphasizes that, following 72, Mucianus is not found in further office and apparently came to speak of Vespasian himself with scant respect – disparaging Vespasian’s claim to power and instead asserting his own achievements in 69 in the

6 Ibid, 90.
field and as an orator. A similar line is followed by Kenneth Wellesley in his work, ‘The Year of the Four Emperors’. Wellesley regards Mucianus as an unobtrusive figure in Vespasian's administration: ‘his talent for diplomacy, intrigue and organization was employed to make an Emperor of another, not of himself.’ He emphasizes the fact that Mucianus' second and third consulships in 70 and 72 were, like the first, suffect and not ordinary consulships.

Some authors, on the other hand, have taken a literary approach to the discussion of Mucianus’ role in the planning and execution of the Flavian uprising. M. Gwyn Morgan, for instance, in his 2006 book, ’69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors’, emphasizes that the introduction of Mucianus’ rousing speech into the Tacitean account of the meeting at Mount Carmel does not merely serve as a rhetorical aside but as a deliberate solution to a number of historical problems which Tacitus had himself perceived within the events of early 69. In Morgan’s reckoning, Mucianus’ speech and subsequent role in the strategic discussions in early 69, while not an implausible reconstruction on the part of Tacitus, nonetheless function as literary tools – as a means of assuaging Vespasian’s fears of failure, as evidenced by his hesitation to initiate his campaign at the outset of 69 AD, and as a means of explaining Vespasian’s peculiar decision to leave the most important military task to Mucianus. According to Morgan, Mucianus’ eagerness to gratify his own ambitions offered Tacitus a unique opportunity. In the face of Vespasian’s reticence to initiate his campaign, the Tacitean Mucianus implores Vespasian to adopt the purple – citing the fact that Vespasian had already won too much renown to avoid the risk of being removed as a potential leader by a worthless rival. Subsequently, Mucianus volunteers to lead an immediate expeditionary force towards Italy – an offer which cannot be rejected for fear of damaging the

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7 Ibid, 90.
9 Ibid, 183-4. See here also Tacitus, Hist., 2.77.
friendship. The end result, according to Morgan, while largely unflattering towards Mucianus’ character, nonetheless serves as a convenient solution to the problems which Tacitus had encountered. Not only did Mucianus establish that it was both possible and necessary for Vespasian to contest Vitellius’ imperial authority, he also ensured that, by taking upon himself the most perilous task of leading the expeditionary force through Italy, he reduced the risk to Vespasian himself.¹⁰

More focused treatments of Mucianus’ career have certainly emerged in the latter half of the 20th century. A short-lived debate between J.A. Crook and Perry M. Rogers, exhibited in two separate articles – J.A. Crook’s 1951 article ‘Titus and Berenice’ and P.M. Rogers’ follow-up 1980 article, ‘Titus, Berenice and Mucianus’, reveals a number of points of contention surrounding the position and political influence of Mucianus during the years 69-77. Crook, in particular, emphasizes that, while Mucianus’ political ambitions following 70 AD did not extend to the acquisition of the Emperorship itself, he nonetheless sought to establish a power base in the Roman political sphere to hedge against the rival political influence of the future-Emperor Titus. Crook narrates a series of political skirmishes between Titus and Mucianus as well as the latter’s alleged supporters: Aulus Caecina Alienus (cos suff. 69) and Eprius Marcellus. According to Crook, the ultimate indicator for the success of Titus’ struggle was the appearance of Julia Berenice, sister of Marcus Julius Agrippa II and Titus’ mistress, in Rome in 75. In the author’s reckoning, her arrival in Rome was indicative of the fact that Titus at last felt strong enough to further his own plans – the opposition to which was weakened by the death of Mucianus ca. 77.¹¹

Crook’s reconstruction of the events up until 77, however, is largely rejected by Rogers in his 1980 article. In contrast with Crook, Rogers minimises Mucianus’ role in Flavian politics after 70. He instead emphasises that, while it is clear that Mucianus was in control during the early months of 70, his assertions of power likely ceased upon the return of Vespasian to Rome in autumn of the same year.12 According to Rogers, as the motivating force behind the Flavian elevation in 69, Mucianus could have expected to retain a position of influence in the Flavian regime, albeit primarily of an advisory nature. This did not imply, however, that Mucianus would be able to exercise his authority independent of the princeps – nor did it necessarily imply that Mucianus would seek to establish a base of supporters in the Senate to satisfy his own political ambitions and maintain a ‘defence’ against Titus.13

Two additional recent treatments of Mucianus: ‘C. Licinius Mucianus, Leader in a Time of Crisis’ – authored by Gerda de Kleijn in 2009 and a subsequent 2012 study by the same author: ‘C. Licinius Mucianus: Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome’ offer a more comprehensive treatment of Mucianus’ role, not only during the Flavian uprising but also in his capacity as de facto head of state during 70 AD. In the former article, de Kleijn argues that, during 69, Mucianus functioned as the ‘transforming leader’ of the uprising and, through a series of meetings and deliberations with his allies, established himself as the strategic mind behind the Flavian revolt. De Kleijn largely dismisses any notion of a rivalry between Mucianus and Vespasian – instead asserting that Mucianus’ speech at the plenary session in mid-69 indicates that Mucianus was willing to take an equal share in the risks and dangers associated with Vespasian’s bid for the purple, but in the end

13 Ibid., 87-88.
would not make any claim of his own for the Emperorship. De Kleijn also highlights the fact that Mucianus’ own talents as a diplomat as well as his previous experience as governor of Syria allowed him the unique ability to form networks with other influential figures – most notably Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo’s (cos suff. 39) associates. It is worth noting, however, that, even as one of the most focused attempts to analyse Mucianus’ career to date, de Kleijn’s article is decidedly limited in scope. For one, the article follows the account given by Tacitus almost exclusively, and de Kleijn accepts, almost without question, the espoused motive of the Tacitean Mucianus for supporting Vespasian in 69 AD – the ‘recovery of the res publica’. In addition, the article focuses almost entirely on the deliberations preceding the Flavian campaign – eschewing any discussion of the details of the campaign itself, or the eventualities associated with Mucianus’ march through Asia Minor.

The second article, ‘C. Licinius Mucianus: Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome’, deals primarily with Mucianus’ administration of the Empire after Vitellius’ defeat in late 69 and preceding Vespasian’s return to Rome in October 70. According to de Kleijn, upon his arrival in Rome at the end of year 69, Mucianus presented himself as the ‘person in charge’ and he enacted a series of measures intended to ‘appease Rome’ and pacify the northern part of the Empire, with the ultimate aim of paving the way for Vespasian, the new Emperor. To this end, the author highlights several aspects of Mucianus’ de facto leadership of the Roman state. Upon arriving in Rome, Mucianus’ first port-of-call was dealing with the surplus of soldiers still housed in the city – including both the victorious troops of the Flavian generals and the defeated Vitellians, as well as the composition

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15 Ibid., 315-321. Although she does not elaborate upon what this precisely entailed.
16 Ibid., 322. and Tacitus, Hist., 2.76.
and size of the Praetorian Guard.\textsuperscript{18} According to de Kleijn, Mucianus took immediate action – sending the legions \textit{III Gallica} and \textit{VII Galbiana} away from Rome and systematically extracting the remnants of the Vitellian forces from the Praetorian Guard by handing out honourable discharges, and, later, the gradual dismissal of undesirable elements of the guard to prevent mass opposition.\textsuperscript{19} The second major aspect of Mucianus’ rule, according to de Kleijn, concerns Mucianus’ successful eradication of any political or military influence among his personal rivals or those of the Flavian party. These included other prominent members of the \textit{partes Flavianae}, including Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus, the remnants of the Vitellian party, and the ‘Piso family’, including the African governor, L. Calpurnius Piso and his close relatives, Calpurnius Galerianus and Crassus Scribonianus.\textsuperscript{20} De Kleijn describes Mucianus’ systematic dismantling of both Vitellian and Flavian power-bases as a pragmatic attempt to ensure the stability of the Flavian regime – as she states: ‘After the Flavian victory in Rome, Antonius Primus was in charge for only a couple of days, until Mucianus entered the city and took over. There is no record of Primus’ direct reaction, but most likely Mucianus will have considered him a nuisance and a threat to the stability he aimed at from the outset.’\textsuperscript{21} The final aspect of Mucianus’ rule which de Kleijn details concerns Mucianus’ interactions with the Senate. As the author highlights, upon Mucianus’ arrival in Rome, the Senate was in disarray as a result of an ongoing debate on the subject of Neronian \textit{delatores}. According to de Kleijn, Mucianus again took decisive action to ensure stability in the

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 11. Several groups of soldiers claimed to be members of the Flavian guard. In the autumn of 69 AD, a number of Vitellian legionaries in Italy had been enrolled in the guard. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.93.) There were also members of the Othonian cohorts who had been dismissed by Vitellius and had joined the Flavian cause. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.67., 3.55.) Finally, there were also Flavian soldiers, to whom a position in the guard had been promised. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.46.) See here ‘4.4 Mucianus and the Praetorians’.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 446-448.

\textsuperscript{21} De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome.”: 446.
capital – silencing those members of the Senate, including Helvidius Priscus and Curtius Montanus, who had levelled accusations against other senators of crimes committed under Nero.22

Yet again, however, de Kleijn’s article is limited in scope. While she devotes a considerable amount of space to what she perceives as the immediate threat of usurpation of the Flavian regime at the hands of the residual Vitellian forces and members of the partes Flavianae in late 70 AD, little is said about Mucianus’ relationship with either Vespasian and Titus and, indeed, the implications of the extension of an unprecedented series of powers to Titus after 70 for Mucianus’ own position in the Flavian regime.23 Despite claiming, at the outset of the article that she will seek to discover whether Mucianus ruled as Vespasian’s ‘straw man’ and whether he was mainly led by instructions given by Vespasian in Alexandria, the author gives little impression of the level of interaction between the two men during Mucianus’ administration. Furthermore, despite purporting to hold a contrary view to the arguments put forth by Crook in his aforementioned article, de Kleijn says little about the extent to which Mucianus may or may not have sought to establish an independent power base in Rome nor the reasoning for his acceptance of the arduous task of restoring order in the capital in the first place. She states only that ‘Mucianus stuck to the goal of the Flavian uprising, living up to his promises to Vespasian’.24

While the events of the ‘Long Year’ 69 as well as those of Vespasian’s career in general are well documented within secondary sources, it is evident that there is a considerable gap within modern historical research concerning the ancillary historical figures within the Flavian uprising and subsequent reign. Licinius Mucianus, like others of the great imperial amici, has certainly been

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22 Ibid., 451-454.
23 See here ‘4.10 Mucianus’ Career After 70 AD’.
24 Ibid., 433, 457.
noted in modern sources however investigations into his career have largely remained limited to secondary discussions in the course of historical analyses of the deliberations preceding the Flavian rebellion, discussions of the rebellion itself or, alternatively, studies of contemporary ancient sources such as Dio, Tacitus and Pliny. The reasoning for this seeming scholarly neglect of Mucianus is twofold. Initially, for Mucianus’ career until the beginning of 69, there is little direct evidence among the primary literary sources. It is unsurprising, therefore, that, in modern sources, the few analyses of Mucianus’ early career, in particular, largely take the form of side-notes in larger historiographical works or biographical works on either Titus or Vespasian. To date, for instance, the only modern discussion of Mucianus’ geographical and familial origins comes in the form of an appendix in Syme’s monumental work, ‘Tacitus’, and, even then, the focus of the discussion is placed upon the origins of Lucius Licinius Sura (cos ?, 97, ord. II 102, III 107) rather than those of Mucianus. The second major reason for the scholarly neglect of Mucianus likely derives from the manner in which Mucianus is portrayed in the ancient literary sources. In contrast with the portrayal of Titus and Vespasian, in the majority of the literary sources, Mucianus is reduced to a position of comparative insignificance. As is revealed in chapter one of this thesis, Flavius Josephus, in his account of the Jewish War, only mentions Mucianus in passing and furnishes no judgment, positive or negative, about his character or deeds. Similarly, Suetonius,

25 Neither Dio nor Josephus mention Mucianus’ early career. Tacitus does, however, furnish some clues in book one where he states that when Mucianus, during his younger days, had ‘cultivated friendships with the nobility for his own ends; later, when his wealth was exhausted, his position insecure, and he also suspected that Claudius was angry with him, he withdrew to retirement in Asia and was as near to exile then as afterwards he was to the throne.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.) The majority of the evidence for Mucianus’ early career, as is detailed in chapter one, can be derived from a memoir composed by Mucianus himself, the fragments of which are contained within the Naturalis Historia of Pliny the Elder (see ‘1.2 The Fragments of Mucianus in Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia’).


27 See ‘1.5 Flavius Josephus’.
in his outline of Vespasian’s life, mentions Mucianus only twice. Dio, in the part of his history dedicated to the final stages of the year 69, focuses almost entirely on Vespasian and he accords only a single chapter to Mucianus’ administration in Rome.\textsuperscript{28} Tacitus’ \textit{Historiae} is more promising, although it is also notable that Mucianus only remains a prominent character in the text for a remarkably short time. Prior to the year 69, we only hear of Mucianus twice in the \textit{Historiae}, both times with reference to his position of governor of Syria.\textsuperscript{29} Following the conclusion of Mucianus’ administration with the return of Vespasian to Rome in 70, Mucianus largely fades into oblivion.\textsuperscript{30}

Despite the seeming scholarly neglect of Mucianus, however, his career is nonetheless important for several reasons. Initially, as this study will seek to elucidate, although Mucianus is accorded a relatively minor place in both ancient sources and modern sources alike, his political career was nonetheless exceptional and, through the use of both literary and epigraphic evidence, can be detailed almost in its entirety: suffect consul in 64, 70 and 72 respectively, Mucianus was legionary legate under Domitius Corbulo ca. 57-8, governor of Lycia-Pamphilia around 58-60 and of Syria in 67. In addition, Mucianus held literary interests, both antiquarian and auto-biographical, the latter of which is preserved, at least in part, in the \textit{Naturalis Historia} of Pliny the Elder. As will be highlighted in chapter one and two of this thesis, Mucianus’ literary interests are significant because of the close connections between his political postings and the subject of his writings – offering us, in turn, an example of how a Roman governor such as Mucianus might have spent his time in the provinces in addition to providing insight into the political allegiances which formed

\textsuperscript{28} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 65.2.
\textsuperscript{29} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.10., 1.76.
\textsuperscript{30} The final mention of Mucianus in the \textit{Historiae}, apart from Tacitus’ conclusion, deals with Mucianus’ efforts to put down the Batavian rebellion in Gaul with Domitian close at hand. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.85.)
the basis for the divergent factions of 69 AD.\textsuperscript{31} Even more important, however, is the fact that, despite his exceptional career, Mucianus took the unprecedented step of choosing to support another candidate for the Principate. Tacitus emphasises that Mucianus willingly served as right-hand man of Vespasian rather than as an aspiring monarch – and he records a number of episodes from 69 AD to illustrate this.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, even upon his acquisition of the position of \textit{de facto} leader of Rome in late 69, there is little evidence to suggest that Mucianus sought to make his position permanent and he appears to have ceded his authority to Vespasian immediately upon the \textit{princeps’} return to Rome in the autumn of 70. Mucianus’ motivations for eschewing any aspirations towards the Principate are unclear and require investigation – primarily through an examination of Mucianus’ personal and political relationships with Vespasian and Titus. Ultimately, therefore, this study will attempt to rectify the void in modern scholarship – not merely endeavouring to reconstruct Mucianus’ own career but also to offer speculation as to the personal and political motivations of the \textit{amicus}, as well as to elucidate conclusions concerning the relationship between Mucianus and the Emperor Vespasian himself.

\textbf{Chapter Structure}

This thesis will utilise a predominantly chronological structure to examine and interpret the political and military career of Gaius Licinius Mucianus. It is important to note that this thesis will not attempt to merely reconstruct the career of Mucianus through the years ca. 20-22 until ca. 77,

\textsuperscript{31} More specifically, it will enable us to identify the extent to which the so-called ‘Corbulonians’, those of the general Domitius Corbulo’s subordinates before his death in 67 AD – of which Mucianus was seemingly a leading member, formed the basis of the \textit{partes Flavianae} following the meeting at Mount Carmel in 69 AD. His writings will also offer some indication of the manner in which Mucianus’ relationship with Vespasian transformed after 70 AD.

\textsuperscript{32} The initial and most famous of these episodes concerns a meeting in May or June of 69 AD, possibly held at Mount Carmel, in which Mucianus cedes imperial authority to Vespasian and asserts that he will take responsibility for an equal share in the risks and dangers associated with the Flavian campaign. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.77.)
it will also seek to answer a number of specific questions concerning Mucianus’ origins, his political career until 69, his role in the Flavian uprising, his relationship with the Emperor Vespasian, his influence within Vespasian’s regime as well as a number of historiographical issues surrounding the depiction of Mucianus in the literary sources. Consequently, this study will be divided into four chapters. The initial chapter, ‘Mucianus in the Ancient Sources’, will examine each of the four central literary sources for Mucianus’ career – Tacitus, Cassius Dio, Pliny the Elder and Flavius Josephus. This chapter will deal primarily with the historiographical issues surrounding each of these literary sources in an attempt to determine the reliability of each text. Subsequently, the second chapter of this thesis will primarily deal with Mucianus’ geographical and social origins and his early career – including his *cursus honorum* under Claudius and Nero until the inception of his Syrian command in 67. It will establish a chronology of events – beginning with Mucianus’ birth ca. 22, his geographical and social origins, continuing with his early senatorial career and exile under Claudius, his role as legionary legate under Domitian Corbulo, governorship of Lycia-Pamphilia ca. 60 and consulship of 64, and concluding with Mucianus’ Syrian command ca. 67.

The third chapter of this thesis, ‘Titus and Mucianus: The Instigator and the Mediator’ will deal with the Flavian rebellion of 69. It will focus on the relationship between Mucianus, Titus and Vespasian at the beginning of 69, how Mucianus and Vespasian resolved to make a bid for imperial power and, finally, Mucianus’ role as both a military leader and diplomat prior to and during the Flavian rebellion. Several questions will be examined: initially, what were the origins of the Flavian imperial ambitions and who was the primary instigator of the Flavian bid for power in 69? Second, how did Mucianus assist in the instigation and organisation of the Flavian rebellion during
the first half of 69? Finally, what role did Mucianus take in the immediate execution of the rebellion in the second half of the year?

The fourth chapter of this thesis, ‘Mucianus in Rome’, will deal primarily with the administrative exploits of Mucianus following 70 – ending with his presumed death between 75 and 77. The larger part of this final chapter will focus on Mucianus’ arrival in Rome after the conclusion of the civil war in December 69, the nature of the power he assumed in the capital and the challenges he faced while serving as de facto head of state. It will also deal with Vespasian’s arrival in Rome in October 70 and the extent to which Mucianus retained his influence under Vespasian’s regime in the capital. Ultimately, this chapter will also rationalise Mucianus’ support for the Flavian cause and determine the veracity of Tacitus’ assertion that the amicus was ‘more content to transfer imperial power to another, than to hold it himself’.33

33 Ibid., 1.10.
Chapter One: Licinius Mucianus in the Ancient Sources

1.1 Introduction

The sources for the period of Mucianus’ career can broadly be divided into two central categories – primary and supplementary. Belonging to the former category are four central historical works from antiquity – the Historia Romana of Cassius Dio, the Historiae of the senator and historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus, the Bellum Judaicum, composed by the first-century Romano-Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, and an unknown work authored by Mucianus himself, fragments of which are contained within Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia. These four works are, in turn, supplemented by further accounts derived from later scholars as well as other contemporaries – notably, Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus’ De Vita Caesarum, the Epitome Historiarum of Ioannes Zonaras as well as the Strategemata of Sextus Julius Frontinus. For Mucianus’ life and career, these latter sources are less informative, either due to their brevity or the fact that they merely furnish ancillary references to the Flavian amicus or his colleagues. Hence, this chapter will examine the former four central primary sources for Mucianus’ political career. It will investigate several aspects of these ancient sources, including the primary sources utilized by each of these historians, the biases inherent in each work as well as the manner of composition of each source.

1.2 The Fragments of Mucianus in Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia

The most important contemporary source for Mucianus’ early political career, including his geographical and familial origins, as well as his cursus honorum until 69 is the Naturalis Historia of Pliny the Elder. The importance of Pliny as a primary source for the career of Mucianus derives largely from the fact that much of the material within the Naturalis Historia originates from an earlier text composed by Mucianus himself. The latter text has been lost, yet no fewer than thirty-
two *fragmenta* within the *Naturalis Historia* are directly attributed to Mucianus and, given the apparent interests of Mucianus or the context within which Pliny inserts these fragments, more can be perceived where he is not cited by name.  

**Figure 1: List of Geographical References by Fragment:**

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<tr>
<th>Geographical Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>Achaea</td>
<td>10 (<em>NH.</em>, 7.36.)</td>
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<td>Armenia</td>
<td>7 (<em>NH.</em>, 5.83.)</td>
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<td>Cycladic Islands</td>
<td>1 (<em>NH.</em>, 2.231.), 3 (<em>NH.</em>, 4.66.), 4 (<em>NH.</em>, 4.67.), 27 (<em>NH.</em>, 31.16.)</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6 (<em>NH.</em>, 5.50.), 16 (<em>NH.</em>, 9.68.)</td>
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<td>Hispania</td>
<td>29 (<em>NH.</em>, 32.62.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2 (<em>NH.</em>, 3.59.), 12 (<em>NH.</em>, 8.6.)</td>
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34 The fragments explicitly attributed to Mucianus were collected by Peter, H.W.G., *Historicorum Romanorum reliquiae*, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1870), 101-107., reproduced in Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), *Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 247-252. and are detailed in Figure 1. Note that some modification has been made to the original source – namely fragment 30 has been more appropriately attached to Rhodes rather than Asia Provincia. The identification of further fragments, not cited by name, but possibly, albeit dubiously, derived from Mucianus are collected by Münzer, F., *Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1897), 392-5.
Lydia 11 (NH., 7.179.)
Rhodes 9 (NH., 5.132.), 30 (NH., 34.36.)
Syria 8 (NH., 5.128.)
Thrace 23 (NH., 14.54.)
Unknown Location 13 (NH., 8.201.), 14 (NH., 8.215.)

Numerous interpretations of the nature of Mucianus’ original text have been espoused by modern commentators. The most common of these interpretations asserts that Mucianus’ work constituted a compilation of natural marvels or prodigies and, furthermore, that his text belonged to a genre known as ‘paradoxography’ – pseudo-scientific collections of prodigies and natural phenomena. The reasoning for this initial interpretation is that much of the fragmentary material attributed to Mucianus in the *Naturalis Historia* includes numerous observations about *curiosa* or *mirabilia*.

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witnessed across the Empire. Thus, for instance, Pliny reports that Mucianus had personally witnessed instances of females turning into males at both Argos and Smyrna.\textsuperscript{36} Elsewhere, in four separate instances, Pliny records Mucianus’ testimony concerning the existence of intelligent thought and humanlike behaviour among elephants, goats, apes and dolphins.\textsuperscript{37} Syme, in particular, was seduced by the notion of a ‘Mucianic’ volume of \textit{mirabilia} – citing Mucianus’ eagerness for ‘curiosa and for \textit{mirabilia} about men and animals, fishes and fountains, buildings and works of art’.\textsuperscript{38} Kappelmacher, as early as 1926, considered alternative designations for Mucianus’ text, including a ‘Chorographie’ or a ‘Perieges’, but concluded that the work was better characterised as a collection of ‘Admiranda’.\textsuperscript{39} More recently, T. Murphy’s analysis of Pliny’s \textit{Naturalis Historia} characterises Mucianus as an archetype of a group of aristocratic Romans who ‘toured the East to see the quaint collections of ancient kings or garner anecdotes for gentlemanly works on the world’s marvels’.\textsuperscript{40} Following on from Murphy, Rutledge offers the somewhat unsubstantiated assumption that the fragments must have originated in two separate texts – the first a history of Vespasian’s eastern campaign during the Jewish War, which included a ‘digression on exotica’ and the second a book ‘devoted entirely to \textit{mirabilia}’.\textsuperscript{41} Authors concerned primarily with the Greek tradition of ‘paradoxography’ have also frequently taken to

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 8.6.
\textsuperscript{38} Syme, R., “Pliny the Procurator.”: 203-4.
\textsuperscript{40} In Murphy’s reckoning, Mucianus ‘spent time in Asia and compiled a collection of \textit{mirabilia} from which come thirty-two anecdotes quoted in the \textit{Natural History}’. (Murphy, T., \textit{Pliny the Elder’s Natural History} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 57, 60-61.)
\textsuperscript{41} Rutledge, S., \textit{Ancient Rome as a Museum: Power, Identity and the Culture of Collecting}, Oxford Studies in Ancient Culture and Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 193. It is unclear how Rutledge determines the existence of two separate texts, suffice to say that Rutledge’s own citations appear to indicate that the author believes the existence of fragments dealing with phenomena in the Eastern half the Empire (namely, \textit{NH.}, 19.12. and 16.214-215 [16.213], the latter of which is either mistakenly attributed to Mucianus by the author or otherwise mis-cited) to constitute evidence that Mucianus composed a history of Vespasian’s campaign.
including Mucianus among the ranks of Greek and Roman paradoxographers and ethnographers. Most notably, Schepen and Delcroix, in their seminal article on the origins and development of paradoxography, unequivocally characterise Mucianus’ text as a ‘real paradoxographical collection’.  

Recently, however, several further analyses of the fragments have disputed this conventional interpretation of the *amicus* text. Baldwin’s 1995 article, ‘Pliny the Elder and Mucianus’, raises the important observation that, although it is clear from the fragments that Mucianus had a predilection towards ‘bizarre items of the tabloid variety’, his interests extended far beyond recording unusual phenomena. In fact, the prevalence of the ‘prodigious’ citations in the *Naturalis Historia* may be instead indicative of Pliny’s own taste for the arcane and marvellous rather than characteristic of Mucianus’ original work. Certainly, it is evident that many of the fragments extant in Pliny’s text do not readily fit the definition of a marvel or prodigy. For instance, numerous fragments constitute simple observations about distances and geographical locations. These include fragments four and five wherein Mucianus details the circumference of the island of Syros and that of the Black Sea, as well as fragment six, wherein Mucianus specifies the location of a

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lake, measuring two hundred and fifty miles in circumference and located between the Arsinoite and Memphite nomes.\textsuperscript{44} In addition, Mucianus also appears to have included a number of decidedly innocuous observations concerning, for instance, the strength of Thracian wine and the manner in which saffron is transplanted in Lycia.\textsuperscript{45} Equally, we also have numerous references to Mucianus’ tourist activities in the eastern half of the Empire. These references frequently pertain to idiosyncratic religious practices and iconography in the Greek East, such as fragment seventeen, in which the \textit{amicus} records details about the \textit{murex} and a peculiar practice wherein the same shellfish is worshipped in the shrine of Venus at Cnidos.\textsuperscript{46}

Perhaps the most expansive analysis of the ‘Mucianic’ fragments recorded by Pliny is that of G. Williamson. Williamson reiterates Baldwin’s point that the traditional designation of Mucianus’ text as a paradoxographical work does not take sufficient account for all of the fragments contained within the \textit{Naturalis Historia}.\textsuperscript{47} He also argues, however, that the literary tropes prevalent in Mucianus’ fragments do not match those of extant Hellenistic and Latin ‘paradoxographical’ texts from the 4\textsuperscript{th} century BC onwards. To this end, Williamson highlights two main tropes prevalent in the aforementioned texts. Initially, paradoxography, as a genre, focuses on peculiar, bizarre or miraculous natural phenomena: mysterious creatures, odd behavior or strange events. In paradoxigraphical works, examples are appropriated from ‘all over the known world’, and are

\textsuperscript{44} Frag. 4, frag. 5, frag. 6. See also frag. 9 for the circumference of the isle of Rhodes. (see Figure 1) One admits, however, that Mucianus displays a tendency to record fantastical figures, sometimes as large as five times those recorded by other ancient commentators, as is noted by Pliny in frag. 4, 6 and 9.


\textsuperscript{46} Frag. 17.

\textsuperscript{47} In Williamson’s reckoning, as many as one third of the fragments cannot be classed as \textit{mirabilia}. (ibid., 227.)
typically compiled in the form of ‘short anecdotes that confound the reader’s expectations’. As Williamson observes, in contrast with earlier paradoxographical works, the extant fragments of Mucianus are almost entirely centralized in the core of the old Greek world – the cities of Asia Minor, the province of Lycia-Pamphilia and of Egypt as well as the surrounding islands. It is also notable that many of the ‘marvels’ presented by Mucianus are comparatively innocuous by Ancient standards and were popular tourist attractions.

The second trope which Williamson highlights relates to the purpose and composition of paradoxographical writing. According to the author, in contrast with Greek ethnographic or geographical writing, paradoxigraphical writing is characterized by a lack of autopsy as well as an emphasis on derivative accumulation of material. Greek paradoxigraphical works, in particular,

48 Ibid., 14. This trope is evident, for instance, in the pseudo-Aristotlian work, De mirabilibus auscultationibus, wherein we hear of the ‘lava-stream in Sicily’ which ‘blazes up amounts to forty stadia,’ the copper from India which is ‘so bright, pure, and free from rust that it cannot be distinguished in colour from gold,’ as well as of the Phoenicians who first sailed to Tartessus, who obtained such a large quantity of silver that they were forced ‘to make of silver not only all other articles which they used, but also all their anchors.’ (Aristotle, De mirabilibus auscultationibus, 40, 49, 135.)

49 See Figure 1.

50 The most explicit example is the temple of Artemis at Ephesos – one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, but other examples are also patent, including Mucianus’ citation of the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Cnidus, most famous for its nude cult sculpture of Aphrodite constructed by Praxiteles. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” 232., frag. 24, frag 17.)

51 Ibid., 226. This is not strictly true. Authorial autopsy is relatively rare in early paradoxographical treatises, but there are certainly examples of authors claiming to have personally witnessed prodigies. This is evident, for instance, in the case of an author such as Ctesias of Cnidus. Ctesias, while closer to an ethnographer than a paradoxographer, nonetheless made a habit of citing himself as a witness for certain paradoxa – such that he was criticized for transmitting falsehoods by Lucian centuries later. (Lucian, Vera Historia, 1.3. and see also the discussion of Ctesias by Nichols – Nichols, A., The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and Commentary with an Introduction (PhD diss., University of Florida, 1998), 43-45. And fragments at 111f.) Equally, Aulus Gellius’ portrayal of the marvels presented in Apion’s Aegyptiaca and Pliny’s Naturalis Historia, lays emphasis on the propensity of the latter authors to adduce themselves as eye-witnesses for mirabilia. (Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, 5.14.4, 9.4.13. and see Keulen, W., “Gellius, Apuleius, and Satire on the Intellectual.” In L. Holford-Strevens, A. Vardi (eds.), The Worlds of Aulus Gellius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 139f.) It is also evident that later paradoxographers combined regular citations of earlier sources with claims of personal autopsy. Phlegon of Tralles represents a salient example. While he includes numerous references to mirabilia derived from earlier sources (cf. Hansen, W.F. (ed.), Phlegon of Tralles’ Book of Marvels, 2.1, 3.1, 11.1, 13) on other occasions he claims to have witnessed certain
often consist of citations of marvellous events and phenomena gleaned from earlier authors.\textsuperscript{52} It is apparent, however, that Mucianus’ fragments display a degree of autopsy not evident in other works of paradoxography. As Williamson and Baldwin both highlight in their analyses, in their extant form, the fragments cannot be taken as a truthful reproduction of Mucianus’ original phrasing. At the very least, Pliny has placed the anecdotes in indirect speech and in many cases we might assume that Pliny has modified the language significantly.\textsuperscript{53} Despite his rhetorical manipulations, however, Pliny frequently emphasizes that Mucianus based his authority almost entirely on personal autopsy.\textsuperscript{54} In the first place, Mucianus does not explicitly cite any other authorities, and the only fragment where Mucianus is linked to another author at all is fragment thirty-two wherein Mucianus and Theophrastus alike give the opinion that ‘certain stones give birth to other stones’.\textsuperscript{55} Elsewhere, however, Pliny explicitly quotes Mucianus as the primary prodigies personally (9), and he even goes out of his way to encourage the reader to seek out the marvels themselves (15.1, 35).

\textsuperscript{52} Williamson cites, as an example, the \textit{Historiae Mirabales} of Antigonus of Carystus, a ‘serious work of compilation’ incorporating citations from no fewer than sixteen other named writers including Aristotle and Callimachus, as emblematic of the Greek tradition of paradoxography. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), \textit{Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods}, 227.)

\textsuperscript{53} Williamson notes the case of fragment twenty-two wherein Pliny, in the course of an attack against a spurious \textit{mirabile}, utilises Mucianus’ alleged claim that he had read a letter written by Sarpedon at Troy – an incident which, in William’s reckoning, was seemingly reported in the first place without any skepticism. (ibid., 229.) Baldwin notes that ‘it is never absolutely clear to what extent Pliny’s extracts comport his own paraphrases or the original phraseology of Mucianus.’ (Baldwin, B., “Pliny the Elder and Mucianus.”: 295.) Ash adds the observation that the only fragment where Pliny reproduces Mucianus verbatim is frag. 29 – and even then it is unclear where the quotation ends. (Ash, R., “The Wonderful World of Mucianus.” \textit{Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies}, suppl. 100, vol. 50 (2007): 6.)


\textsuperscript{55} Frag. 32.
authority. For instance, in fragment thirteen, Pliny cites Mucianus as an eyewitness to the strange behavior of two goats.\textsuperscript{56} Similarly, Pliny refers to Mucianus as ‘the authority’ for a Tempsis who lived for one hundred and fifty years at Mount Tmolus Heights.\textsuperscript{57}

The question of the literary designation of Mucianus’ work, then, becomes considerably more complicated. Williamson, for his part, dismisses the notion that Mucianus’ text was a geographical treatise along the lines of Strabo’s \textit{Geographica} – an interpretation previously favoured by the likes of Chilver, albeit eschewed by Baldwin.\textsuperscript{58} Further, he also rejects the notion that Mucianus’ work should be regarded as an ethnographic text, on the grounds that, contrary to Greek ethnographic works, the cultural scope of Mucianus’ fragments remains considerably limited.\textsuperscript{59}

Instead, the author offers a fourth possible literary designation for Mucianus’ text – that of a ‘memoir’ or ‘commentary’ dealing with Mucianus’ official life.\textsuperscript{60} The reasoning for this is threefold. First, the frequent references to Mucianus’ personal autopsy within the fragments

\textsuperscript{56} Frag. 13.
\textsuperscript{57} Frag. 11.
\textsuperscript{59} The development of this latter genre, much like paradoxography, was largely a Hellenistic phenomenon. Epitomised by the likes of Homer and Herodotus, Greek ethnography is conventionally defined as the ‘self-conscious prose study of non-Greek peoples’. (Skinner, J.E., \textit{The Invention of Greek Ethnography: From Homer to Herodotus} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3.) In Williamson’s reckoning, however, ‘[Mucianus’] mirabilia are set within the society to which [he] belongs rather than outside it. This is contrary to the usual pattern, found in Philostratos’ Life of Apollonios of Tyana, or Ktesias’ Indika, or indeed Lucian’s parodic True History, where places like India, Ethiopia, China, and Scythia become the setting for marvels because they stand outside the settled rule of Rome and the civilizing effects of its humanitas.’ The author does concede that several exceptions to this pattern exist among Mucianus’ fragments, particularly fragment fourteen, which suggests knowledge of a more exotic location. Nevertheless, Williamson dismisses this interpretation on the grounds that the fragment, if it was not lifted directly from a similar description of monkeys attributed to Cleitarchos by Aelian (\textit{VH.}, 17.25.), might easily be attributed to some location in Egypt or even Rome itself. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), \textit{Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods}, 242)

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 237.
indicate a high likelihood that the original text was composed in first-person. Second, although the geographical spread of the fragments does not cohere with the sprawling locations found in paradoxographical, ethnographic or geographical treatises, Mucianus’ inclusion of geographical data, including distances, nonetheless parallels the inclusion of similar data in other well-known commentaries, including Julius Caesar’s *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*. Finally, and most importantly, the geographical distribution of the fragments bears a great deal of resemblance to Mucianus’ own travels during his career prior to 69 – as documented by Tacitus and Pliny himself. A number of patent examples can be elucidated. For example, it is noteworthy that the large majority of the fragments derive from cities and islands within the Roman province of Asia – a region which, according to Tacitus, served as the location of Mucianus’ exile during the Principate of Claudius. Similarly, the second largest distribution of fragments derives from Lycia-Pamphylia. In this latter case, we are even informed by Pliny that these fragments relate to Mucianus’ tenure as governor of the region, likely in 60.

Williamson’s case is compelling, but his final conclusion might be overstated. The lines between ancient Greek and Roman literary traditions are rarely clearly defined. The introduction of *mirabilia* into Latin geographical treatises, for instance, is not an unknown phenomenon. Thus,
the first century Roman geographer Pomponius Mela could introduce ‘anthropological curiosities, natural phenomena [and] supernatural phenomena’ into his narrative as a means of unravelling the *perplexum ordinem* of the known world.\(^6^6\) By way of comparison, the third century author Gaius Iulius Solinus, who derives a large portion of his work, the *Collectanea rerum mirabilium* or *Polyhistor*, from both Mela and Pliny, blurs the lines between *paradoxographia*, *chorographia* and *geographia* by including elements from each tradition.\(^6^7\) Serious examples of biographies, commentaries and histories are also guilty of exceeding the boundaries of their ostensible literary designation. In the Greek tradition, the best known ethnographies are those incorporated into Herodotus’ histories, including descriptions of the Egyptians, Scythians and of the denizens of the Achaemenid Empire, and he displays a particular interest in the marvellous and uncanny.\(^6^8\) Equally, in the Latin tradition, Plutarch includes paradoxographical elements – most famously within his biography of Quintus Sertorius.\(^6^9\) Caesar and Sallust alike are known for incorporating

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\(^{67}\) On Solinus’ value as a geographer see Broderson, K., “[Mapping Pliny’s World: the Achievement of Solinus.” *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 54:1 (2011): 63-88. Broadly speaking, the text offers a tour of the world known to the late Roman Empire – beginning with Rome itself, expanding into Western Europe, the Mediterranean, Northern Africa and as far as India. As noted by numerous authors, however, Solinus displays a marked tendency to emphasise the ‘memorable’ aspects of the regions he deals with in the texts, including ‘the magical, the spectacular and the grotesque’ – a fact which probably accounts for the relative popularity of his text throughout the Medieval period. (Dover, P., “Reading ‘Pliny’s ape’ in the Renaissance: the Polyhistor of Caius Julius Solinus in the first century of print,” in J. König, G. Woolf (eds.), *Encyclopaedism from Antiquity to the Renaissance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 417-418.)


numerous ethnographic digressions into their respective commentaries and monographs.70 The lost historical work of Marcus Porcius Cato, the *Origines*, too incorporated tales of natural wonders – including descriptions of certain goats that jumped extraordinary distances, bizarre creatures that lived in the Alps and enormous mountains of salt.71 Even Tacitus has, at various times, been dubbed a paradoxographer on the basis of his vivid descriptions of Nero’s Rome.72

In fact, while it is entirely possible that the overall structure of Mucianus’ text resembled that of a memoir or commentary, there is nothing necessitating the conclusion that the entirety of the work followed the same structure. It stands to reason that Mucianus must have maintained a coherent central narrative, perhaps in the form of a commentary, with reference to his official activities as governor of Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 60 and perhaps also his tenure as *legatus legionis* under Corbulo ca. 58, yet other segments of his text defy classification.73 The key sections of Mucianus’ fragments that stand out are those dealing with the amicus’ experiences in *Asia Provincia* and the Cycladic

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71 Cornelius Nepos, in his short biography of Cato, gives an overview of the *Origines’* content. (Nepos, *Cato*, 3.4.) The fragments attributed to Cato were collected by Peter (Peter, H.W.G., *Historicorum Romanorum reliquiae*, vol. 1, 40-67.), and reproduced by numerous authors including Chassignet (Chassignet, M.(ed.) *Caton: Les Origines. Fragments* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1986).), and more recently by Cornell, T.J. et al. (Cornell, T.J., et al. (eds.), *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*, vol. 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014), 135f.) In fact, Cato’s *Origines* appears to have merged numerous genres. Apart from a history of the origin of Rome down until at least 149 BC, references in the extant fragments reveal geographical descriptions, regular ethnographic features such as descriptions of climates, flora and fauna, agricultural practices and social and legal customs of Italy and Spain, including lists of tribes and towns, as well as accounts of various mirabilia. Furthermore, in the cases where he did relate marvellous phenomena, Cato, like Mucianus, appears to have claimed personal autopsy rather than secondary reading. (See here the extensive analysis of the *Origines* in Cornell, T.J., et al. (eds.), *The Fragments of the Roman Historians*, 191f. and the relevant fragments at 208, 217.)


73 See here ‘2.4 Domitius Corbulo and Licinius Mucianus’ and ‘2.5 Mucianus’ Governorship of Lycia-Pamphylia’. The key fragment here is frag 19., wherein Pliny cites Mucianus for a case involving two litigating fishmongers. Autopsy is not attributed to Mucianus, however, as Baldwin notes, the wording *addit Mucianus aestimata lite* suggests that the case fell under Mucianus’ jurisdiction as governor of the province. (Baldwin, B., “Pliny the Elder and Mucianus.”: 298.)
Islands.\textsuperscript{74} In 1969, Syme briefly suggested, without justification, that these portions of the text constitute a digression.\textsuperscript{75} How should we characterise this \textit{excursus}, however? Although the fact that the overall spread of Mucianus’ extant fragments is concentrated in the Greek East renders unlikely the notion that his original text constituted an expansive geographical survey of the \textit{orbis terrarum}, it is notable that the group of fragments dealing with \textit{Asia Provincia} and the Cyclades derive from a remarkably large number of distinct locations. Mucianus had no official post in Asia, and yet he goes to considerable trouble to include details about religious practices, geographical data and natural wonders from virtually the entirety of the province. References in the fragments reveal locations along the Anatolian coast at least as far south as Cnidos and as far north as Cyzicus and the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{76} Equally, Mucianus also includes references to several of the major islands of the Aegean archipelago.\textsuperscript{77} On the basis of their geographical provenance, one might regard these fragments as a straightforward record of Mucianus’ tourist activities – as would fit closely with the model of a commentary. However, more than incidental observations, this section of the fragments bears witness to Mucianus’ capacity for considered, systematic research and cataloguing. Thus, for instance, Mucianus is not content simply to record a singular observation of the curious \textit{nauplius} fish but, instead, engages in a lengthy quasi-scientific investigation of the manner in which the fish conceals itself under different weather conditions.\textsuperscript{78} Similarly, although it does not strictly constitute an example of a \textit{mirabile}, his analysis of the types of wood used in the construction of the statue of Diana at the temple in Ephesus delves not only into the immediate character of the statue’s construction, but also the history of its alteration, the identity of the

\textsuperscript{74} See Figure 1.
\textsuperscript{75} Syme, R., “Pliny the Procurator.”: 231.
\textsuperscript{76} Frag. 10 (Smyrna), frag. 18 (Dardanelles), frag. 28 (Cyzicus).
\textsuperscript{77} Frag. 1 (Andros), frag. 3 (Delos), frag. 4 (Rhenea and Syros), frag. 27 (Andros).
\textsuperscript{78} Frag. 18.
original artist and the particulars of the method used to treat the wood.\textsuperscript{79} Further, Mucianus was clearly concerned with convincing the reader of the veracity of the phenomena he had observed. In many cases, he utilises the common paradoxographical strategy of objective listing of prodigies and natural phenomena, with little in the way of exegesis or embellishment.\textsuperscript{80} As previously noted, contrary to the paradoxographical tradition, Mucianus does not appear to have cited any sources for the tales that he transmits beyond assuring his readers of his personal autopsy, however there are hints in several of the fragments of references to earlier Hellenistic texts.\textsuperscript{81}

The structure of the segment of Mucianus’ text dealing with \textit{Asia Provincia} and the Cycladic Islands, then, reveals itself as an unusual concoction of a travel journal or \textit{periplus} and a paradoxographical treatise. Quasi-scientific first-hand investigation of natural phenomena, religious practices and \textit{mirabilia} is a common feature of second-century travel writing.\textsuperscript{82} In fact,

\textsuperscript{79} Frag. 24.

\textsuperscript{80} Schepen, G., Delcroix, K., “Ancient Paradoxography: Origins, Evolution, Production and Reception,” 391. The trope of ‘listing’ phenomena according to their geographical location is clearly evident in frag. 29. Mucianus may also have included extensive lists elsewhere – for instance, in the case of fragments 15, 16, 17 and 18. The original source for these fragments may well have taken the form of a ‘list’ of the different types of fishing and marine life that Mucianus encountered during the course of his exile. Equally, one also notes that Mucianus rarely includes elaborate descriptions of the phenomena he encountered. Instead, he appears to have largely resorted to plain language and objective listing of the ‘features’ of a particular phenomenon – as in the case of frag. 17, where he frankly describes the feature of the murex as ‘broader than the purple and has a mouth that is not rough, nor round, and a back that does not stick out into corners, but is stuck together like a bivalve shell’. This ‘unpretentious, unadorned matter-of-fact style’ too is a key feature of paradoxographical writing. (ibid., 399.)

\textsuperscript{81} Convincing the reader of the truth of \textit{thaumata} or \textit{mirabilia} is a common trope of paradoxography – although the common practice is to specify the literary provenance of \textit{mirabilia} rather than to utilise evidence gained through quasi-scientific observation or personal autopsy. (ibid., 383-386.) As Williamson observes, a distinct Herodotean influence can be perceived within several of Mucianus’ fragments, including fragments 14, 15, 17 and 25, and perhaps Mucianus even took some of his stories directly. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, 241-242.) Mucianus, then, either did not cite his source originally, or Pliny did not see fit to transmit the citations. Little can be known due to the fragmentary nature of Mucianus’ text.

\textsuperscript{82} Williamson admits that Mucianus’ travels, as documented in his fragments, might well be regarded as an ‘early precursor of the sorts of travel undertaken or described by later writers of the Second Sophistic such as Pausanias, Lucian, or Aelius Aristides’, but he does not consider the notion that, in addition to the content, the sort of writing and research methods that Mucianus undertook in the course of composing his work may also have functioned as a ‘precursor’ to these latter authors. The similarities between Mucianus’ work and the likes of Pausanias’ \textit{Peregriesis}
numerous parallels can be drawn with a famous *periplus* from the second century, Arrian’s *Periplus Ponti Euxini*. Arrian’s text, like Mucianus’, bears witness to the author’s wide-ranging travels, and much of the work is dominated by extensive, dispassionate lists of the ports, cities and rivers around the circumference of the Black Sea, as well as the distances between them.83 Interspersed among these lists are a number of anecdotes of varying lengths, describing aspects of the religious topography and mythological background of the Greek colonies along the coast of the Black Sea, and including numerous brief references to *thaumata* or *mirabilia*.84 The content and the research methodology underpinning both Arrian and Mucianus’ works contain a great deal of similarities, although the central focus of the two texts diverges.85 Mucianus, for his part, does not appear to have been overly concerned with transmitting accurate data about geographical distances.86 On the other hand, Arrian is meticulous, and the data he records is remarkably precise

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83 Arrian, *Periplus Ponti Euxini*, 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25. Cf.

84 See, for instance Arrian’s discussion of the construction of temple at Trapezus (ibid., 1, 2.), the alleged tomb of Apsyrtus (6.3-4.), the statue of the goddess Phasiane at Phasis (9.1.), the anchor from the mythical vessel of Jason and the Argonauts (9.2.), the island of Achilles (21-22) – especially his description of the birds who attend to the temple of Achilles (21.3-4., see also Pliny, *NH.*, 10.78.) and Achilles’ appearance in the dreams of those who visit the island. (23.1-2.)

85 Compare, for instance, Mucianus’ fragments on the miraculous qualities of the water drawn from various springs (frags. 1, 27, 28.) and Arrian’s discussion of the oil-like properties of the water from the Mogros river, the unusual freshness of the water from the Pontus, and the water from the Phasis which initially appears tainted but becomes fresher over time. (8) Compare also Mucianus’ discussion the construction of the temple of Diana at Ephesus (frag. 24) and Arrian’s discussion of the progress of the construction of a sanctuary dedicated to Hadrian at Trapezus. (1)

86 See no. 44. Ash suggests that the inclusion of geographical data in Mucianus’ text at all should be considered as indicative of a literary strategy intended to give a ‘plausible veneer’ to the less believable phenomena which Mucianus wrote about. (Ash, R., “The Wonderful World of Mucianus.”: 9.)
– even by modern standards.\textsuperscript{87} Equally, while references to \textit{thaumata} constitute a comparatively small portion of Arrian’s overall text, Mucianus displays a greater emphasis on observations about natural phenomena and local religious practices, and he frequently does not focus on singular locations, preferring instead to include comparisons of phenomena discovered at numerous locations.\textsuperscript{88} More importantly, however, both authors utilise the literary strategy of personal autopsy – although Arrian, unlike Mucianus, carries this strategy to its natural conclusion. Mucianus is content to simply record that he ‘had seen’ a particular phenomenon, but Arrian goes even further – espousing \textit{raison d’êtres} for believing or disbelieving a prodigy.\textsuperscript{89}

Ultimately, then, the literary designation of Mucianus’ original text may be insoluble. For the specific purpose of reconstructing the \textit{amicus’} career, however, two key features of the fragments are crucial. The first of these concerns the aforementioned emphasis on personal autopsy in the fragments. As both Dio and Tacitus are explicit concerning Mucianus’ geographical movements throughout 69, with the possible exception of from Mucianus’ references to his movements through Thrace, much of Mucianus’ travels detailed within the fragments can be reasonably

\textsuperscript{87} Falconer, W., Falconer, T. (trans.), \textit{Arrian’s Voyage Round the Euxine Sea Translated: and Accompanied with a Geographical Dissertation and Maps to Which are Added Three Discourses} (Oxford: J. Cooke, 1805), 27.

\textsuperscript{88} See here frags. 10, 31. Collating and comparing \textit{mirabilia} from numerous locations falls more readily under the banner of paradoxographical writing than travel writing – by virtue of the fact that authors such as Arrian or Pausanias were concerned primarily with detailing the features of a singular location or region rather than categorizing \textit{mirabilia} according to their theme or content.

\textsuperscript{89} See here, for instance, frags. 10, 12, 13, 18, 24. wherein Pliny describes Mucianus as simply having ‘seen’ females turning into males at Arescon and Smyrna (10), the strange behaviour of two goats (13), or the behaviour the \textit{nauplius} fish in the Dardanelles. (18) Compare with Arrian who, for instance, cites as proof for his claim that the Pontus has fresher water than the sea around it the fact that ‘those who live around the sea lead all their cattle down to the sea and water them from it…and the opinion is that this watering spot is more beneficial to them than fresh water is.’ (8.4.) When discussing the alleged anchor of the \textit{Argo} that is on display at the mouth of the Phasis river, Arrian is sceptical: ‘this object, made of iron does not look old to me – although it is not the size of modern anchors, and the shape has been altered in some way – but appears to be more recent.’ (9.2.) Similarly, when reporting the various wondrous happenings on the island of Achilles, Arrian concludes: ‘these things that I have recorded about Achilles’ Island are reports from those who have either landed there, or have learned it from others, and they do not seem incredible to me.’ (23.3-4.)
assumed to have occurred prior to the Flavian uprising. As a correlative, therefore, Mucianus’ fragments also allow us to formulate some semblance of a chronological ‘blueprint’ for his career until at least the beginning of 69 AD. For instance, as we shall see in chapter two of this thesis, Mucianus’ observations about the source of the Euphrates River can almost certainly be linked to his tenure as legatus legionis in Armenia under the command of Domitius Corbulo around 58.

Similarly, no less than five of the fragments offer us tangible evidence of Mucianus’ governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 60 AD. The fragments relating to Egypt, Rhodes and Thrace are more difficult to assess. Mucianus held no official position in Egypt and it is unlikely that he visited the province during his career. Yet, given Mucianus’ relative proximity to the province after his

90 It is difficult to determine whether Williamson’s suggestion that the original chronological scheme of Mucianus’ text is partially preserved in the Naturalis Historia should be upheld. If we can indeed regard Pliny’s ordering of the fragments as indicative of Mucianus’ own chronology then it should allow us to make some ancillary conclusions about when, for instance, he visited the islands of Andros, Delos, Rhenea and Syros relative to his exile in Asia. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, 233.) There are, perhaps, too many outliers. One notes, in the first place, that the fragments related explicitly to Asia Provincia are spread across almost the entirety of the Naturalis Historia. The important fragment 31, which adduces Mucianus as evidence for the wonders of the Sarcophagus stones in Lycia and Assos, appears as late as book thirty-six. Meanwhile, Pliny records Mucianus’ personal observation as evidence for the transformation of females into males in the nearby city of Smyrna as early as book seven. (Frag. 10) Compare also frags. 1 and 27 which deal with the same phenomenon but are situated at entirely different ends of the history.

91 Frag. 27. And See ‘2.4 Domitius Corbulo and Licinius Mucianus’.


93 Williamson observes that, since the time of Augustus, regulations had been in place preventing senators from visiting Egypt without special permission from the emperor. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, 235. Citing Tacitus, Ann., 2.59.) Even if Mucianus had sought out an imperial dispensation, however, one finds it difficult to determine a time when Mucianus could have possibly visited the region. Imperial dispensation would not have been an option under Claudius, owing to the less-than-affable relationship he had established with the emperor. Further, upon his return to Roman political life during the mid-late 50s, Mucianus’ time is well-accounted for. He was likely in Armenia serving under Corbulo ca. 58, governing Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 60 and back in Rome in 64. It is possible that he made the trip personally during his Syrian command in 67, but again, it seems unlikely that Nero would provide imperial dispensation to allow Mucianus, a former adherent of Domitius Corbulo, free reign to associate directly with Tiberius Alexander and the Egyptian legions III Cyrenaica
appointment to the Syrian governorship in 67, it is probable that he could avail of information provided by political acquaintances who had access to the most famous tourist destinations in Egypt.\textsuperscript{94} The fragments relating to the island of Rhodes could be derived from Mucianus’ personal investigations during his exile in \textit{Asia Provincia} – as might well be the case with fragment twenty-five.\textsuperscript{95} Equally, however, it is noticeable that fragments nine and thirty reference several locations that fall a large distance outside the boundaries of \textit{Asia Provincia}. Hence, it is also possible that Titus served as the source of information for the number of statues at Rhodes, Olympia and Athens, as well as the distance between Rhodes, Cyprus and Alexandria.\textsuperscript{96} The singular explicit reference to Thrace, wherein Mucianus, while \textit{praesens in eo tractu}, was able to ascertain the quality of the wine in the region, could be attached to his exile.\textsuperscript{97} On the other hand, an alternative context for the fragment is provided by Tacitus, who records evidence of Mucianus’ journey through Thrace with his Syrian legions during the year 69.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{94} Tiberius Alexander represents the most likely candidate. He was almost certainly an acquaintance of Mucianus by virtue of his earlier service under Domitius Corbulo and \textit{praefectus Aegypti} from 66. (See ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’).

\textsuperscript{95} This would seemingly be the implication of Pliny’s use of \textit{expertus} in frag. 25, but see also ‘2.3 Early Career and Exile Under the Emperor Claudius’.

\textsuperscript{96} Although Pliny cites Mucianus as the source for fragments 9 and 30, he does not record any indication that the observations about the distances between Rhodes, Alexandria and Cyprus or the number of statues at Rhodes derived from Mucianus’ personal autopsy. On the other hand, we know that Titus travelled by means of Rhodes and Cyprus in the course of his journey back from the \textit{Consilium Amicorum} in Corinth during February of 69 and, furthermore, that he crossed from Cyprus to Syria, presumably to call in on Mucianus, before returning to his father in Judaea. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.2. and see ‘3.4 The \textit{Consilium Amicorum} at Corinth and the Decision for War’) Titus’ journey would certainly be an occasion for Mucianus to record information about the distances involved in the journey, and perhaps, too extrapolate further conclusions about the distance between Rhodes and Alexandria.

\textsuperscript{97} ‘[Mucianus]…ascertained when actually visiting that region’. (Frag. 23.) This is the interpretation favoured by Syme (Syme, R., ‘Pliny the Procurator.’: 204.) One should note also the reference to the oysters derived from the city of Histria, near the mouth of the Danube, contained within frag. 29.

\textsuperscript{98} Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), Pilgrimage in Greco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, 232. See the discussion at ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’ and ‘3.10 Mucianus in Moesia’. This is pure speculation. Undoubtedly, the latter interpretation pre-supposes that Mucianus included, in his work, an account of
Second, as the fragments are explicitly linked to Mucianus’ personal autopsy, they offer an effective means through which a modern scholar might readily uncover the personality, psychology and partialities of the man himself. To this end, R. Ash’s recent valuable analysis of Mucianus’ work, ‘The Wonderful World of Mucianus’, reveals the amicus as ‘a selectively efficient, but hedonistic and humorous man’ whose work is replete with ‘ebullient enthusiasm’ and ‘elegant literary games’. Ash’s analysis underplays an important consideration, however. More significant than the ‘cumulative impression’ of Mucianus’ character than one might derive from the fragments of his text is the evidence that we might glean of Mucianus’ attitude – not only towards his colleagues, Vespasian and Titus, but also towards the evolution and regression of his own fortune throughout the period extending from the reign of Claudius to that of the Flavians. Crucial here is the dating of Mucianus’ composition. According to Ash, there are numerous possibilities – either the fragments might be read as a product of Mucianus’ forced retirement from political life after 72 AD, or they might be read as a product of Nero’s principate when ‘many writers, including Pliny himself, chose to investigate fairly recondite or escapist topics, as a strategy for keeping out of trouble’. She concludes that the most likely possibility is that Mucianus’ text instead constituted a slowly-evolving project that he began under Nero and continued to work on under Vespasian until its publication in the early-mid 70s AD. This is a reasonable assertion. However, it raises the issue however of how Mucianus intended his work through the Eastern Empire during the latter half of 69. The evidence available does not allow us to formulate a definitive conclusion either way.

100 Ibid., 6.
101 Ibid., 16.
102 In fact, modern scholars have proposed numerous dates for the completion of Mucianus’ text. In 1956, Bardon proposed a date just prior to 62, following Mucianus’ governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia – on the basis of the preponderance of Lycian material in the fragments. (Bardon, H., *La littérature latine inconnue*, vol. 2 (Paris: Klincksiek, 1956), 182.) More conventional wisdom has placed the final publication of the text considerably later – at least after 72. The reasoning for this is that Pliny uses the term nuperrime (‘most recently’) on two occasions when...
to be received by the Flavian regime and its adherents, among whom Pliny explicitly positioned himself.\textsuperscript{103} Ash thinks that Mucianus intended the work to reflect positively on the Flavian regime – either as a means of propagandising Vespasian’s triumphant arrival in Rome in late 70 or, otherwise, as a later, desperate attempt to re-ingratiate himself with Vespasian and Titus following his forced withdrawal from Roman political life after 72 AD.\textsuperscript{104} Neither of these interpretations cohere with Suetonius’ description of Mucianus’ interactions with Vespasian after 72.\textsuperscript{105} On the other hand, a hint may be found in a minor observation advanced by Baldwin. Baldwin notes a change in tone in the Plinian references to Mucianus around book nine – an observation which is dismissed out of hand by Ash.\textsuperscript{106} Perhaps not so coincidentally, hints of Plinian sarcasm and disbelief tend to appear in the fragments related directly to Mucianus’ official duties as governor of Lycia-Pamphylia.\textsuperscript{107} Baldwin suggests briefly that Pliny was reacting to Mucianus’

\textsuperscript{103} Pliny’s attachment to the Flavian regime is undoubtedly evidenced by the magnificent dedication at the outset of the \textit{Naturalis Historia} to the future-emperor Titus. (See here Isager’s analysis of the dedication in Isager, J., \textit{Pliny on Art and Society. The Elder Pliny’s Chapters on the History of Art}, 18f.)

\textsuperscript{104} Ash, R., “The Wonderful World of Mucianus.”: 16.

\textsuperscript{105} As Suetonius informs us, Mucianus had little issue with expressing his discontent over his political standing, or lack thereof, after 72 and, otherwise, boasting about his services to the emperor during the preceding years. (Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 13.) If Mucianus’ unknown text was, as Ash suggests, intended as a \textit{captatio benevolentiae} directed towards Vespasian and Titus, this would undoubtedly represent a significant departure from the impression transmitted by Suetonius and, indeed, Tacitus, who asserts that Mucianus \textit{socium magis imperii quam ministrum agens} (‘acted more as a colleague than as a servant of the Emperor’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.83.).


\textsuperscript{107} Baldwin, B., “Pliny the Elder and Mucianus.”: 297-301. The author does not, however, make the connection between the relevant fragments and Mucianus’ governorship. The relevant fragments include frags. 19, 21 and 22.
appropriation of material from prior commentators, but this does not necessarily fit with Pliny’s
grandiose tribute to Mucianus’ expertise in the matter of oysters at fragment twenty-nine, nor the
fact that he frequently adduces Mucianus’ claims as the sole named source for certain prodigies.108

One might equally suggest that Pliny’s disapproval stems from the tone and content of the original
text. Pliny was happy enough to transmit information from an excursive section of Mucianus’ work
that dealt exclusively with the amicus’ travels in Asia Provincia when he had withdrawn from
Roman public life in disgrace.109 Mucianus’ commentary on his governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia
was a different matter, however. If he were still in the process of completing his work ca. 72-75,
Mucianus cannot have let such an opportunity pass for scoring rhetorical points against Vespasian.
This is perhaps the context for fragment twenty-one, wherein Pliny, upon introducing Mucianus
as ter consul et nuper provinciae eius legatus, remarks sarcastically that the latter individual
thought it worth handing down to posterity an anecdote about a wondrous plane tree in Lycia.110
Mucianus, we are told, held a banquet with eighteen of his followers, and thought the splendour
of the tree superior to the pleasure afforded by man-made luxuries such as marble, paintings and
gold panelling – such that he fell asleep while trying in vain to hear the pattering of the rain on the
leaves. The anecdote reeks of nostalgia and hypocrisy; and a warped attempt to retroactively
emulate Vespasian’s famed austerity.111 The implication was certainly clear to Pliny, and he reacts

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108 Ibid., 301. As Baldwin notes, the tribute to his knowledge of oysters is the only place where we find a
complimentary adjective or adverb applied to Mucianus. (ibid, 300.) Whatever he personally thought of Mucianus’
character, Pliny clearly admired the amicus’ talents as a scholar and his expertise in esoteric subject matters. This is
confirmed by the fact that Pliny cites Mucianus as the sole authority for numerous phenomena, sometimes more than
once (see frags. 1 and 27 for Mucianus cited twice for the same phenomenon. For Mucianus as the sole witness for
phenomena see frags. 2, 8, 11, 12, 16, 26, 28, 31.).

109 It might also be suggested that it is no accident that Mucianus cast his travels in Asia in a paradoxographical frame
– if only to disassociate them from the ignominious events that had led him there.

110 [Licinius Mucianus], who was three times consul and recently governor of the province.’ (frag. 21)

111 Ash regards this fragment as indicative of an ‘unpretentious’ Mucianic appreciation for the comfort and pleasure
offered by natural wonders, but this interpretation again does not fit with Tacitus and Dio’s characterisation of the
irreverently – first by attaching a near-identical anecdote about the licentious Caligula and thereafter satirising the origins of Mucianus’ political career.\textsuperscript{112} It should come as no surprise, then, that there are few hints in the extant fragments to Mucianus’ military exploits in either ca. 58 under Corbulo, in 69 in the service of Vespasian, or his earlier Syrian command ca. 67.\textsuperscript{113} Mucianus’

\textit{amicus}. (Ash, R., “The Wonderful World of Mucianus.”: 10-11.) As Tacitus informs us, Mucianus’ penchant for man-made luxury bordered on legendary (Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.) and he contrasts Mucianus’ extraordinary self-indulgence directly with Vespasian’s asceticism. (ibid., 2.5.) Nor is this the only place in the \textit{Naturalis Historia} where we are treated to an ironic episode from Mucianus’ career. In book fifteen, Pliny records an invective against Vitellius, delivered by Mucianus during his second consulship, in which the \textit{amicus} exorciates the former emperor for demanding the preparation of absurdly expensive dishes ‘as broad as the Pomptine Marsh’. (Pliny, \textit{NH}., 15.163.) Apart from exhibiting Mucianus’ considerable talent for rhetoric, the accusation strikes one as especially bizarre given Mucianus’ own demonstrable license when it came to matters of money. (Tacitus, Hist., 1.10, 2.84., Dio, Hist., 66.2.)\textsuperscript{112} Pliny informs us that Gaius too was so struck with admiration upon seeing a plane tree in the territory of Veliternum that he saw fit to hold a banquet inside for fifteen guests and their attendants. He unflatteringly adds that Gaius’ stature added considerably to the shade offered by branches. (Pliny, NH., 12.10.) As Baldwin notes, this anecdote is followed by a ‘quintessential Plinian gibe at \textit{Graeciae fabulositas}'. (Baldwin, B., “Pliny the Elder and Mucianus.”: 299.) We are then treated to a tale of an un-named Thessalian eunuch who ‘from motives of ambition’ enrolled himself in the freedman of Claudius and gained considerable wealth, whereupon he took the ostentatious step of importing a legendary plane tree from Crete. The latter tale bears something of a resemblance to Mucianus’ own career under Claudius. As Tacitus informs us, Mucianus squandered his considerable wealth cultivating the friendships of prominent figures in Rome and engaged in numerous unreputable private activities – such that he attracted the ire of the emperor. (Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.)

\textsuperscript{113} Only two dubious references to Mucianus’ command under Corbulo and his governorship in Syria are attested. (frags. 7, 8.) Nothing is said of Mucianus’ march through Asia Minor in 69, unless we attach frag. 23 to Mucianus’ movements through Thrace during this period. (see no. 98) It is interesting to note that Mucianus is cited in the bibliographies for books 6 and 10 of the \textit{Naturalis Historia} but he is adduced nowhere else in each of these books. (Baldwin, B., “Pliny the Elder and Mucianus.”: 294) Perhaps Pliny smuggled in additional fragments without citing Mucianus directly. One passage that stands out is Pliny’s geographical description of Greater and Lesser Armenia at \textit{NH}., 6.9. No sources are cited for any of Pliny’s observations, and yet the passage reads as an extension to the discussion of the source of the Euphrates River attributed directly to Mucianus and Corbulo’s authority in the previous book of the history. (frag. 7.) These omissions are understandable in any case. In the first place, Pliny cannot have been keen to emphasise Mucianus’ connection to Corbulo. As will be highlighted later in this thesis, the former adherents of the general represented a powerful element of the Flavian support base from mid-69 onward. Mucianus was not only the most senior member of this group, but it is possible, if not likely, that he was directly responsible for garnering the support of several prominent members, including the likes of Titus Aurelius Fulvus (\textit{cos suff.} ca. 70/71, \textit{ord. II} 85), Marcus Vettius Bolanus (\textit{cos suff.} 66), Gaius Rutilius Gallicus (\textit{cos suff.} ca. 70, \textit{II} 85) and Sextus Julius Frontinus (\textit{cos suff.} ca. 73, \textit{II} 98, \textit{ord. III} 100). (see ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’) Secondly, while Mucianus’ political accomplishments by the time of his governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 60 were relatively unimpressive by Vespasian’s standards – the latter had already earned the \textit{ornamenta triumphalia} and a suffect consulship as a result of his distinguished military service in Britain, by 67 this situation had changed dramatically. Mucianus had acquired a suffect consulship of his own ca. 64 and, thanks to Nero’s intervention, could claim a provincial command equal to that of Vespasian. (see ‘2.7 Mucianus’ Syrian Command’) Further, it was from this position that Mucianus felt capable of publicly acting as the prospective emperor’s equal. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.77,
propensity to insist upon the vital role that he played in Vespasian’s accession to the emperorship, and his documented frustration at being denied substantial honours during the early years of the emperor’s reign can only have been magnified in his account of his political career ca. 58-70.\textsuperscript{114} Pliny may have simply found it difficult to abstract fragments from Mucianus’ moralisation, or otherwise judged that doing so would be less than congenial to Vespasian and Titus. Either way, Mucianus is conspicuously absent from the \textit{indices auctorum} in the preface to the \textit{Naturalis Historia} – a strange omission, in light of the fact that Pliny considered Mucianus’ contributions important enough to cite him in no less than seventeen of the thirty-seven books of the history.\textsuperscript{115}

1.3 Tacitus

The most important source for Mucianus’ later career, particularly during 69, is the major historian of the period and contemporary of Mucianus, Publius Cornelius Tacitus. As Syme highlights in his monumental work on Tacitus, in the \textit{Historiae} and the \textit{Annales}, Tacitus ‘speaks for the Emperor and the provincials’, yet he is reticent to reveal any information about his own life and career. Consequently, much of Tacitus’ early life passes in complete obscurity – neither his family nor birthplace are on record and even his \textit{praenomen} is of doubtful validity, although his birth can be readily assigned to either 56 or 57 AD on the basis of his \textit{cursus honorum}.\textsuperscript{116} Hints of the early

\textsuperscript{2.83.) Drawing from Mucianus’ account of his Syrian governorship from 67 would surely have amplified the impression that the \textit{amicus}, at least from the perspective of his political accomplishments, stood as an equally legitimate candidate for the purple. This impression would then have been borne out by Mucianus’ account of his march through Moesia – wherein the \textit{amicus} led the vanguard of the Flavian forces, successfully repelled a Dacian incursion and was thereafter too rewarded with the \textit{ornamenta triumphalia} for his trouble. (ibid., 2.83, 4.4.) More than merely giving the outward appearance of equal footing with Vespasian, these latter achievements risked eclipsing even those of the emperor himself.

\textsuperscript{116} Syme, R., \textit{Tacitus}, 59, 611-624. The date of Tacitus’ birth is derived from his appointment to the position of quaestor during Titus short rule – as can be gleaned from his debt to Titus, alluded to by Tacitus in \textit{Hist}, 1.1. Tacitus’ appointment to the position of quaestor must have eventuated during the three years of Titus rule – 79-81 AD. Given
stages of Tacitus’ own political career, however, are found in the historian’s own words at the outset of the Historiae: dignitatem nostram a Vespasiano inchoatam, a Tito auctam, a Domitiano longius provectam non abnuerim.\textsuperscript{117} On the basis of this statement, it may be assumed that Tacitus had been tribunus militum laticlavius, held some of the minor posts of the vigintivirate under Vespasian and advanced to a quaestorship under Titus around 81 or 82.\textsuperscript{118} Abroad, probably as proconsul of a senatorial province when his father-in-law Agricola died in 93 AD, Tacitus returned to Rome after an absence of three years or more to hold a suffect consulship in the second half of 97, whereupon he delivered the funerary oration for the commander, Lucius Verginius Rufus (\textit{cos ord. 63, suff. II 69, ord. III 97}).\textsuperscript{119} Thereafter, the information on Tacitus is limited. The letters of the younger Pliny provide some clues. We can deduce from Pliny’s comments about material that he had provided to Tacitus, including information about the eruption of Vesuvius and the prosecution of Baebius Massa in 93, that Tacitus was in the process of writing the Historiae ca. 106 AD. The date of the work’s completion is not known, although Birley places it ca. 109-110.\textsuperscript{120} Tacitus, therefore, was at least a partial eyewitness not only to the Flavian uprising but also the subsequent administration at the hands of Mucianus in Rome in 70 as well as the reigns of

\textsuperscript{117} 'I cannot deny that my political career owed its beginning to Vespasian; that Titus advanced it; and that Domitian carried it further.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.1.) Tacitus only mentions the beginning of his senatorial career because it is strictly relevant to his assertion that the historian will be honest despite the benefits offered to him by the ruling dynasty.


\textsuperscript{119} See Pliny, \textit{Ep.}, 2.1.6., 2.11. for the prosecution of Marius Priscus with Pliny in 100 AD

\textsuperscript{120} Birley, A.R., ‘The Life and Death of Cornelius Tacitus.’ \textit{Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte} 46:2 (2000): 240f. analyses the evidence for the date of Tacitus’ composition of the Historiae – namely the material contained within Pliny, \textit{Ep.}, 2.11-12, 6.16, 6.20, 7.33. Birley does, however, note the possibility that the completion of the Historiae may be placed somewhat later, on the basis of Pliny’s strange omission of any comment about the work’s completion – thus implying that Tacitus only finished the work after Pliny’s departure for Pontus-Bithynia ca. 110.
Vespasian, Titus and Domitian.\textsuperscript{121} How, then, would Tacitus have viewed the civil strife of 69? Moreover, how would he have viewed Vespasian and, indeed, Mucianus himself? As Syme highlights, for the Roman intellectuals, civil war was the ‘worst of all evils, worse even than submitting to tyranny’.\textsuperscript{122} Tacitus himself declares the subject matter of his work as ‘a period rich in disasters, terrible with battles, torn by civil struggles, horrible even in peace.’\textsuperscript{123} Nowhere is the historian’s acerbity more evident, however, than within his descriptions of each of the individuals who had perpetuated the civil war of 69 AD. In the preface of the \textit{Historiae}, Tacitus notionally disavows bias in his portrayals of the three initial rulers during the year 69 – Galba, Otho and Vitellius: \textit{mihi Galba Otho Vitellius nec beneficio nec iniuria cogniti}.\textsuperscript{124} Yet, only half a book later, Tacitus resorts to the denigration of Galba’s character. We are treated to a tale of an emperor who, while incapable of understanding the self-serving reality of the post Julio-Claudian era, ineffectually clings to the tenets of the old world.\textsuperscript{125} In Tacitus’ reckoning, Galba’s failings were

\textsuperscript{121} While he was not a senator during the year 69, we may assume, on the basis of his oratorical faculties, that Tacitus was likely in Rome during the uprising.
\textsuperscript{122} Syme, R., \textit{Tacitus}, 205, referring to Plutarch, \textit{Brutus}, 18. Tacitus’ personal feelings on the subject become overtly clear during his description of the burning of the Capitol. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.72.)
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 1.2.
\textsuperscript{124} ‘I myself knew nothing of Galba, of Otho, or of Vitellius, either from benefits or from injuries.’ (ibid., 1.1.) This declaration that he would be strictly impartial is a trope which appears in the works of a great number of Roman annalists – including Tacitus own ‘Annals’ in which he declares that he would write \textit{sine ira et studio} (‘without either bitterness or partiality’ – Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, 1.1.) as well as the works of Seneca and Sallust (see, for instance, Seneca, \textit{Apoc.}, 1.1: \textit{nihil nec offensae nec gratiae}. – ‘no concession will be made to malice or favour’).
\textsuperscript{125} In Tacitus’ account, Galba cannot fathom the soldiers’ discontent during his adoption of Lucius Calpurnius Piso Licinianus – an adoption which, in Galba’s mind, was already a pale substitute for the \textit{libertas} of the Republic. (ibid., 1.16., 1.18.) Nor does he display any comprehension of the self-interested motives of his advisors, of the senate, of the praetorians, or of the general populace. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.12-13. Cf. Keitel, E.E., “Sententia and Structure in Tacitus Histories 1.12-49.” \textit{Arethusa}, 39:2 (2006): 223f.) Equally, when Galba is granted the opportunity to uphold the patriotic ideals which he so vehemently clings to, he lacks the fortitude to follow through with concerted action. This is demonstrated first by his failure to impose his authority on the \textit{legati} who would be dispatched to quell the mutiny in Germany: \textit{legati quoque (nam senatus electionem Galbae permisserat) foeda inconstantia nominati, excusati, substituti, ambitu remanendi aut eundi, ut quemque metus vel spes impulerat}. (‘In nominating, excusing, and changing the deputies, the Senate having entrusted the selection to Galba, the Emperor showed a disgraceful want of firmness, yielding to individuals, who made interest to stay or to go, as their fears or their hopes prompted.’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.19.) Secondly, it is demonstrated by his feeble display when news arrives that Otho has entered the Praetorian camp.
only bested by Vitellius, whose indolence and ineptitude reached almost legendary status. His rise to power only comes about by virtue of the accomplishments of his distinguished father and, thereafter, he leaves the conduct of the civil war to his lieutenants and soldiers.\textsuperscript{126} Ultimately, upon realising the inevitability of his demise, Vitellius fails on all accounts. He cannot manage his forces, he is indecisive, paranoid, and spends his time languishing in a drunken stupor.\textsuperscript{127} Otho, on the other hand, presents a stranger case. He was a man of action. We hear from Tacitus of his avarice, corruption, and the fact that, in Rome itself, Otho had been feared and detested even more than Vitellius.\textsuperscript{128} Yet, a protracted streak of irony runs through the historian’s account of Otho’s reign. A man who advanced his personal cause by sowing discontent among the provincial troops and preying upon the licence of the officers, Otho ultimately falls victim to a rampant soldiery that refuses to recognise his authority.\textsuperscript{129} If Galba was an example of obsolescent severity, Otho was the epitome of a new-age temerity – an unfortunate truth that Tacitus has Otho himself enunciate: \textit{simul reputans non posse principatum scelere quaesitum subita modestia et prisca grauitate retineri.}\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{125} Tacitus, Hist., 1.9.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 3.56. According to Tacitus, even when offered the chance to abdicate under favourable conditions, Vitellius could not rouse himself to action: \textit{tanta torpedo invaserat animum ut, si principem eum fuisse certe non记住isset, ipse obliviscetur.} (‘Such a lethargy had come over his spirit, that, had not others remembered he had been an Emperor, he would have himself forgotten it.’ – ibid., 3.63.)
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 1.21-2, 1.50.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 1.23., 1.45-46., 1.80-85.
\textsuperscript{129} ‘At the same time he reflected that power acquired by crime could not be retained by a sudden assumption of the moderation and of the dignity of former times’. (ibid., 1.83.)
In contrast with Tacitus’ denigration of Vitellius, Otho and Galba, however, his attitude towards Vespasian and the *partes Flavianae* is decidedly ambiguous. When describing the reaction of the Roman populace to the death of Galba and the maltreatment of his body by his camp-followers and servants, as well as the despair which filtered through Rome at the thought of further violence at the hands of Otho and Vitellius’ adherents, Tacitus emphasizes the uncertainty with which the people regarded Vespasian and the armies of the East, for ‘although Vespasian was a better man than Otho or Vitellius, they shuddered at another war and another massacre. Indeed, Vespasian’s reputation was uncertain; he, unlike all his predecessors, was the only Emperor who was changed for the better by his office.’

This comment betrays much of Tacitus’ narrative concerning Vespasian as well as the *partes Flavianae* – including Mucianus. Much like Josephus, Tacitus had great reason, at least in retrospect, to present the career of Vespasian in a positive light. After all, he owed his status and advancement to the Flavian house. Nevertheless, when we first come across Vespasian in the *Historiae*, unlike in the *Bellum Judaicum*, he is treated not as the prophesied ruler of the known world, but as an uncertain and sometimes feared figure who is plagued by indecision and superstition. In fact, it is only after he is drawn into action by the words of Mucianus that we are treated to an overtly positive depiction of the *novus homo*. It is then that we hear from Tacitus of Vespasian’s humility and popularity among the troops, his soldierly discipline and industriousness, his *pietas* and generosity.

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131 Ibid., 1.50.
132 Ibid., 1.1.
133 Ibid., 2.74. See also 2.78.: ‘After Mucianus had spoken, the rest became bolder; they gathered about Vespasian, encouraged him, and recalled the prophecies of seers and the movements of the stars. Nor indeed was he wholly free from such superstitious belief, as was evident later when he had obtained supreme power, for he openly kept at court an astrologer named Seleucus, whom he regarded as his guide and oracle.’
134 See ibid., 2.80., 2.82. As Tacitus records of Vespasian’s efforts to gather funds and recall veterans to his cause: ‘Vespasian visited each place in person, encouraged the workmen, spurring on the industrious by praise and the slow by his example, concealing his friends' faults rather than their virtues. Many he rewarded with prefectures and
Tacitus’ attitude towards Mucianus is similarly ambiguous. In the first place, Tacitus appears to have held a great deal of respect for Mucianus’ talents as a scholar – and he even used Mucianus’ collations of Republican records as a primary source for his commentary on the late Republic.\textsuperscript{135} It is notable, however, that, despite extolling Mucianus’ scholarly talents, in the Tacitean account, Mucianus’ own attributes and achievements are frequently overshadowed by those ‘soldierly’ traits of Vespasian. We note, for instance, that Tacitus deliberately contrasts Mucianus, a complex character whose extraordinary talent as a public speaker was matched only by his tendency towards luxury and licentious behaviour in private – with Vespasian, the austere soldier and commander whose ‘food was whatever chance offered; in his dress and bearing he hardly differed from the common soldier’ and who, had he not been so ‘avaricious’, would have been ‘quite equal to the generals of old’.\textsuperscript{136} We even hear from Tacitus of Mucianus’ ‘excessive greed’ and that it was only because of Mucianus’ insistence, in the guise of a necessity for the Flavian war effort, that Vespasian approved the prosecution of wealthy provincial men in order to seize their fortunes.\textsuperscript{137}

There is, nonetheless, a disjunction between Tacitus’ explicit delineation of Mucianus’ character and his conduct during and preceding the Flavian campaign. According to Tacitus, Mucianus took the initiative, demonstrated his diplomatic skills, provided support by means of his network of amici and clientes and, most importantly, formulated the aim of the joint uprising: to bring civil war to an end and restore the Empire. At the Flavian meeting at Mount Carmel in early 69, Tacitus

\footnotesize{procuratorships; large numbers of excellent men who later attained the highest positions he raised to senatorial rank; in the case of some good fortune took the place of merit.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.82.)}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{135} Tacitus, \textit{Dial.}, 37.2.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{136} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.5.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 2.84. See also Tacitus’ comment in book two where he seemingly equates Mucianus with Otho and Vitellius: ‘At once great and wretched, the state was forced to endure within a single year an Otho and Vitellius, and to suffer all the vicissitudes of a shameful fate at the hands of a Vinius, a Fabius, an Icelus, and an Asiaticus, until at last they were succeeded by a Mucianus and a Marcellus — other men rather than other characters.’ (ibid., 2.95.) Tacitus’ intentions here are not clear.}
has Mucianus serve as the core proponent of the Flavian campaign and he places in the mouth of Mucianus a magnificent speech assuaging Vespasian’s fears about the coming campaign and assuring him of its success.\(^{138}\) Whatever his misgivings were about Mucianus’ personal failings, Tacitus nonetheless lauds Mucianus as a man who, like Vitellius and Galba, might have been an Emperor, but instead chose to support another.\(^{139}\)

Aside from Tacitus’ personal views of Mucianus and Vespasian, as well as the events of 69 AD, however, the question of the historian’s sources also remains problematic. While it is clear that Tacitus almost certainly had access to the *acta senatus*, as evidenced by his elaborate description of the discord in the Senate during the early years of the 70s AD, for the events and intrigues preceding the proclamation of Vespasian in the East, Tacitus must have appealed to alternative sources.\(^{140}\) Unfortunately, Tacitus only cites two sources explicitly. Pliny the Elder, along with Lucius Vipstanus Messalla, a friend of Tacitus, military tribune and temporary commander of a legion under Antonius Primus, are named as sources for the second battle of Cremona.\(^{141}\) As Syme highlights, however, for the events of 69, Tacitus likely did not have to make an ‘anxious search’ for information. Narratives of the year were not in short supply. Pompeius Planta, an equestrian who is known to have written about the Battle of Bedriacum, may have served as one of Tacitus’ sources. Additionally, several biographies of figures relevant to the events of 69 are attested by Tacitus.\(^{142}\) Parallels have long been noted between Plutarch’s ‘Life of Otho’, Suetonius’ *De Vita

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\(^{138}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.76-8. (See ‘3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel’ for further discussion)

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 2.77.


\(^{141}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.25, 3.28. Messalla’s status as temporary commander of *legio VII Claudius* is given at ibid., 3.9.

\(^{142}\) The evidence for these sources is given at Syme, R., *Tacitus*, 177, n. 7, 8. The relevant biographies include that of Helvidius Priscus by Herennius Senecio (Tacitus, *Agr.*, 2., Pliny, *Ep.*, 3.11.3., 7.19.6.), as well as a biography of Lucius Annius Bassus (*cos suff.* 70), legate of *XI Claudia* in 69 AD (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.50.), which appears to have been composed by one Tiberius Claudius Pollio. (ibid., 7.31., *ILS*, 1418.) The rationale for assuming that Tacitus took from
Caesarum and the early books of Tacitus’ Historiae – although the identity of the common source is a matter of considerable debate. For the proclamation of Vespasian and Mucianus’ march through Asia Minor, the sources are even less certain. Analogous passages in Josephus’ Bellum Judaicum and Tacitus’ Historiae suggest a common source. The personal commentarii of Vespasian and Titus have been suggested, although rejected by numerous modern authors. It is notable, in any case, that Tacitus does not transmit Josephus’ misleading impression that the Judaean legions spontaneously declared for Vespasian, and, unlike in Josephus’ account, the role of Mucianus as ‘kingmaker’ is heavily emphasised. Possibly, then, Tacitus had recourse to the temporising influence of Mucianus’ testimony. As was previously noted, it is possible that Mucianus included in his fragmentary text some account of his movements through Thrace and Asia Minor in mid-late 69, and we know that Tacitus was well aware of his scholarly exploits.

Panegyrical literature about Helvidius Priscus is the sheer amount of information that Tacitus reveals about the character of Priscus and Eprius Marcellus in book four of the Historiae – even overshadowing that provided about Mucianus and Domitian. (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V, 20.)

Contemporary observers such as Cluvius Rufus, Pliny the Elder and Gaius Suetonius Paullinus (cos ord. 66) each serve as viable candidates – although the case for Rufus has received little support since Mommsen. On Cluvius Rufus see Mommsen, T., “Cornelius Tacitus and Cluvius Rufus.” Hermes, 4 (1870): 295., with support from Townend, G.B., “Cluvius Rufus in the ‘Histories’ of Tacitus.”: 337. On the case for Pliny the Elder see the authors cited by Syme in App. 29. (Syme, R., Tacitus, 675, n. 3.) The case for Gaius Suetonius Paullinus as a major source is argued by Martin. (Martin, R.H., Tacitus, 192f.)


Josephus, BJ., 4.601. Tacitus’ emphasis on Mucianus’ role in the Flavian uprising is epitomised by Mucianus’ famous oration at Tacitus, Hist., 2.76-77. which is entirely absent in Josephus’ text.

This is suggested in Syme, Tacitus, 178. Cf. Tacitus, Dial., 37.2. Mucianus undoubtedly included a lengthy explanation of his role in inducing Vespasian to take the purple.
1.4 Cassius Dio

The third major primary source for the career of Mucianus, Lucius Cassius Dio Cocceianus, unlike Tacitus, was not a contemporary of either Vespasian or Licinius Mucianus. Born a century later, ca. 164 AD, Dio was a member of the Senate under no less than nine Emperors – from Commodus to Severus Alexander.\(^\text{147}\) Two central issues arise when utilizing Dio as a primary source for the careers of both Vespasian and Mucianus. Initially, it is important to note that Dio’s history has not survived in its original form for the period of either Vespasian or Mucianus’ life. What has been preserved are mere excerpts from the original text, or abridged versions of it, contained within the ‘Epitome’ of books 36-80, covering the period from Pompey to Severus Alexander, compiled by the eleventh-century Byzantine monk, Ioannes Xiphilinus. According to Millar, however, Xiphilinus’ work ‘is not so much a précis of Dio as a rather erratic selection from his material, substantially, but not invariably, in Dio’s order and often keeping very close to Dio’s wording’.\(^\text{148}\)

The second, and more important, issue concerns Dio’s sources. Given the fact that Dio was composing his history over a century after the death of Mucianus, we do not have the benefit of personal autopsy on the part of Dio.\(^\text{149}\) The question of where Dio derived his information from for the Principates of Claudius, Nero and Vespasian, therefore, remains problematic. It is certain that Dio was capable of drawing upon a vast array of material, including oral accounts; and he read


\(^{149}\) As noted by Millar, Dio does display a predilection towards utilizing his own personal experience or seeking out eyewitness reports for many of the events detailed in his History. For instance, he can testify to the nature of the Pannonians not from hearsay, but from his personal dealings with them. (Dio, Hist., 49.36.) However, the furthest into the past that he could delve in this manner was to 117 AD, and the death of Trajan. (Millar, F., A Study of Cassius Dio, 35-36. Cf. Dio, Hist., 39.1.)
widely during the supposed ten years he spent researching prior to writing his history, although perhaps not, as he claims, ‘virtually everything written by anyone about [the Romans].’\textsuperscript{150} Unfortunately, however, Dio’s own comments tell us relatively little about his sources. As Millar observes, Dio rarely cites a source directly, however ‘oblique, anonymous references are fairly common’.\textsuperscript{151} The historian occasionally notes the existence of more than one version of a particular source or otherwise indicates that the veracity of a particular event is uncertain.\textsuperscript{152} The only sources that he cites directly, however, are Augustus’ autobiography and Hadrian.\textsuperscript{153} As numerous modern commentators have observed, it is likely that Dio derived much of his information for the late Republic and Imperial period from earlier annalistic histories of Rome. These histories may have included those of Livy, Cremutius Cordus, Aufidius Bassus, Cluvius Rufus as well as several unknown sources.\textsuperscript{154}

More significant for the books dealing directly with Vespasian’s accession and Mucianus’ role in the Flavian uprising, however, is Dio’s possible dependence on Tacitus. The similarities between both Tacitus’ \textit{Annales} and Dio’s \textit{Historia Romana} for the period of Tiberius’ reign are certainly


\textsuperscript{151} A brief list of these references is given at Millar, F., \textit{A Study of Cassius Dio}, 35, n. 1.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 35. And Rich, J.W., \textit{Cassius Dio: The Augustan Settlement}, 7. Rich also includes a list of these references at n. 31 and 32.

\textsuperscript{153} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 44.35, 66.17, 69.11. (Cf. Millar, \textit{A Study of Cassius Dio}, 34, 61, 85.)

well-documented. For the closing years of Tiberius’ reign, parallels between the two texts abound – and the parallelism for the years 34-35 AD is particularly noticeable. Nevertheless, conventional rationalizations have largely eschewed any notion of a direct inter-dependence between Dio and Tacitus for this period. Instead, scholars such as Schwartz in the latter half of the nineteenth century and, more recently, Martin and Lintott have instead followed the view that both authors drew their information independently from common sources. Schwartz, for instance, posited the existence of an unknown first-century annalist who provided material for both Dio and Tacitus’ accounts of Tiberius’ reign. More recently, this view has also been echoed, at least in part, by Martin – both with reference to Tiberius’ reign and the Principates of Claudius and Nero. As Martin highlights, while there are patent similarities between both Dio and Tacitus’ accounts of Nero’s reign, there is nonetheless evidence to suggest that Dio drew upon common sources with Tacitus rather than on Tacitus’ text directly.

On the other hand, analyses of Tacitus’ potential influence on the parts of Dio’s history dealing with the Flavian Emperors are almost non-existent. Unlike the reign of Tiberius, where Tacitus, like Dio, was entirely dependent on earlier literary sources, and that of Nero, which Tacitus was only partially able to recount from personal experience, the rise of Vespasian and the reign of his sons eventuated entirely within Tacitus’ lifetime. One might assume, therefore, that if there was

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157 According to Schwartz, the largely hostile historical tradition towards Tiberius – demonstrated in Dio, Tacitus and Suetonius, and the comparably positive depiction of Germanicus are indicative of the existence of another historian, who wrote during the reign of Caligula, and served as the basis upon which the aforementioned historians constructed their image of Tiberius’ reign. (Schwartz, E., “Cassius Dio,” in *RE*, vol. 3, 1716.) It is notable that Syme rejects Schwartz’s theory as being overly-ambitious. (Syme, R., *Tacitus*, 272-3.).
ever an occasion for Dio to utilize Tacitus as a source, the latter’s account of the Flavian Emperors would have presented ample opportunity. Nevertheless, parallels between the two historians’ accounts of the rise and reign of the Flavians are scant beyond general narrative consistency. We hear from both Dio and Tacitus, for instance, that upon reaching Rome after the death of Vitellius, Mucianus set about administrating the Empire in conjunction with Domitian and that, as a means of assuaging the ire of the Praetorian cohorts, Domitian gave a speech in front of them and acceded to their demands for further service in the army and pay. Yet, the former historian’s account of Mucianus’ administration offers few specifics concerning the amicus’ behavior during his administration beyond innocuous details concerning his adoption of the imperial seal and his extraction of funds for the public treasury ‘from every possible quarter’. By contrast, Tacitus sets out on an elaborate description of Mucianus’ administration and the senatorial intrigue which surrounded it – including, among other things, an account of Mucianus’ efforts towards nullifying the influence of Antonius Primus and Arrius Varus. Furthermore, several instances in Tacitus’ text where he has furnished additional details concerning certain momentous events are entirely absent from Dio’s text. One finds it strange, for instance, that, if he was indeed privy to Tacitus’ Historiae, and given Dio’s general propensity to allocate speeches a disproportionate amount of space in his own work, he skips over Mucianus’ speech at Mount Carmel entirely, instead stating merely that ‘Mucianus was also urging [Vespasian] strongly to this course’. Similarly, Dio includes details which are absent from Tacitus’ Historiae. For instance, it is notable that the only full treatment of Vitellius’ character in Tacitus’ work is in his obituary while earlier references

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159 Ibid., 65.22., Tacitus, Hist., 4.46.
160 Dio, Hist., 66.2.
161 Tacitus, Hist., 4.11.
162 Dio, Hist., 65.9. See, for instance, the disproportionate amount of space allocated to the speeches voiced by Marcenas and Agrippa in ibid., 52.1-40.
state little except his apparent dependence upon his father’s distinction. According to Tacitus, Vitellius’ character was marked by ‘simplicity and liberality’ and he displayed a tendency towards buying ‘more friends than he kept’.\textsuperscript{163} Dio, on the other hand, adopts a comparably hostile view towards Vitellius and he includes multiple unequivocal accounts of the latter’s licentious behavior during his early life – including his activities among Tiberius’ spintriae on Capri and his zealous support of the Blue faction in the circus.\textsuperscript{164} An even more crucial episode which is included by Dio but is absent in Tacitus concerns Mucianus’ denouncement of the Stoics for their alleged eccentricity and arrogance and their subsequent expulsion from Rome at the hands of Vespasian.\textsuperscript{165} Seemingly, therefore, whether Dio was indeed privy to Tacitus’ History or not, the narrative divergences and omissions in both of the works indicate that, for the period of the Flavian ‘putsch’ and reign of Vespasian, at the very least, there is little reason to assume that Dio made extensive use of Tacitus.\textsuperscript{166}

\textbf{1.5 Flavius Josephus}

The final major literary source for the career of Mucianus is the Bellum Judaicum of Flavius Josephus. The author of this latter work was a Jewish defector who ingratiated himself with the

\textsuperscript{163} See Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.86 for primary description and ibid., 1.9., 1.52. for supplementary references.
\textsuperscript{164} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 64.4., 65.5. This latter description can likely be attributed to an alternative earlier literary source other than Tacitus – likely Marcus Cluvius Rufus (\textit{cos suff.} 45). The basis for this assumption is that an almost identical set of anecdotes appears in Suetonius (Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vit.}, 3.2., 4.1., 7.1., 14.3.).
\textsuperscript{165} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.13.
\textsuperscript{166} The extensive divergences between Dio and Tacitus’ accounts suggest, then, that the two historians must have used different sources. The specific nature of Dio’s sources for the years 69-75 is difficult to determine, however. Levick thinks that the historian must have used a source published prior to the end of the Flavian era on the basis of the largely favourable picture of Vespasian (and the comparatively unfavourable picture of the Flavian opponent Helvidius Priscus) which Dio presents. Levick briefly posits Pliny the Elder as a tempting possibility, but rightly dismisses the notion on the basis that Pliny’s historical work was published too early. (Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 204.) One observes that Dio devotes a considerable amount of time and detail in book 66 to Titus and Vespasian’s eastern campaigns, perhaps suggesting a connection to Josephus, either directly or through a secondary source. Like Suetonius, Dio includes a direct reference to Josephus (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.1. and Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 5.6.), although this still does not account for Dio’s unique version of Mucianus’ activities after 70.
Flavian dynasty and, while enjoying the munificence of the Caesars in Rome, wrote a history of
the Jewish Revolt of 66-73 AD with the alleged blessing of Titus.\textsuperscript{167} It should come as no surprise
that the major issue with Josephus’ text concerns the extent to which the author, either wittingly
or unwittingly, incorporated imperial propaganda into the \textit{Bellum Judaicum}. As Syme observes,
Tacitus and Dio both lament the tendency of the Principate to hamper historical inquiry, as well as
to ‘reward flattery and penalize scholarly freedom’\textsuperscript{168} Josephus has no such concerns, however.
He does indeed attempt to grapple with the question of bias in the preface to his Greek edition.
While emphasising Roman power, genius and glory and contrasting it with the ‘seditious temper’
and ‘tyranny’ of the Jewish people, he does not purport, as he says, ‘like other writers who claim
to be writing history’, to denigrate the actions of the Jews.\textsuperscript{169} Nevertheless, he goes on to include
a diatribe against the besieged population within the walls of Jerusalem – asserting that ‘I know
the Almighty has abandoned the holy places and stands now on the side of your enemies’.
Moreover, in a seeming attempt to engage in historical revisionism, Josephus also takes the same
view of Pompey’s destruction of the Temple in 63 BC – deeming those who had been subjected to
Roman violence as being ‘unworthy of the liberty they had enjoyed’. Josephus conceives of both
Vespasian’s campaign against the Jews, and that of Pompey a century earlier as preordained,
asserting that ‘without God’s aid it would not have been possible to consolidate so great an
Empire’.\textsuperscript{170}

\textsuperscript{167} Thus, Josephus’ comment: ‘the Emperor Titus…personally put his own stamp on my volumes and bade me publish
them’. (Josephus, \textit{Vita.}, 363.) The text itself was almost certainly composed between the years 74 and 79 on the basis
of the fact that Josephus includes a reference to Aulus Caecina Alienus as a traitor – a designation which must date
after Caecina’s arrest and execution at the hands of Titus in June of 79. (Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 4.634.)
\textsuperscript{169} Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 1.4-5.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 9.4. The ultimate outcome of Vespasian and Titus’ quashing of the Jewish rebellion was, according to
Josephus, not only Rome’s ‘victory in the campaign against enemies’ but also ‘the end of civil disasters – and thus the
beginning of hopes for prosperity’. (ibid., 7.158-162.)
It is likely for this reason that Josephus’ *Bellum Judaicum* has been described as an example of ‘pathetic’ historiography.\(^{171}\) Undoubtedly, the work is unashamedly favourable towards the Roman Empire as well as the, then newly-formed, Flavian dynasty. A prominent example of Josephus’ flattery towards Vespasian is his ostentatious prophetic declaration in book three of the *Bellum Judaicum* that Nero and his line of successors would soon be dead and that Vespasian would take their place – not only to become ‘Caesar and Emperor’ but also master ‘of sea and land, and of the whole human race’.\(^{172}\) Amusingly enough, according to Josephus, Vespasian remained suspicious that this flattering premonition comprised merely a temporizing measure – however Titus allegedly took a liking to Josephus and convinced his father to keep Josephus as part of their entourage.\(^{173}\) It is thus unsurprising that, for the imperial heir apparent, Josephus is even more complimentary.\(^{174}\)

An essential question therefore, given the overall ‘pro-Flavian’ tone of Josephus’ work, is that of the author’s precise relationship with the Flavian house – and by extension, his relationship with Mucianus.\(^{175}\) As Cotton and Eck observe, we know from literary evidence provided by both Josephus himself, and other authors such as Suetonius and Dio, that Josephus had personal contacts

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\(^{171}\) Parente, F., “The Impotence of Titus, or Flavius Josephus’s *Bellum Judaicum* as an Example of “Pathetic” Historiography,” in *Josephus and Jewish History in Flavian Rome and Beyond*, 45. Harsher judgements have been rendered by other modern historians. Cohen judges Josephus as a ‘Roman apologist and propagandist’ (Cohen, S.J.D., *Josephus in Galilee and Rome* (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 234.), while Levick dubs him a ‘disingenuous source close to the Emperor’. (Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 3.)


\(^{173}\) ibid., 3.9.


\(^{175}\) This question has been dealt with, with varying levels of detail, by authors such as Weber, Grant, Mason, Mader, Cotton and Eck.
with Vespasian, Titus and, later on, also with Domitian and his wife Domitia Augusta. A written recommendation from Titus attached to the Bellum Judaicum suggests, at the very least, an amicable relationship between the historian and the young Caesar. Even so, Josephus says relatively little about his relationship with the members of the imperial family. He recounts that he accompanied Vespasian to Alexandria in 69, and then joined Titus’ entourage for the remainder of the Judaean campaign, after which he returned to Rome with Titus in 71. Near the end of his auto-biographical work, the Vita, Josephus gives an extensive account of the variety of beneficia he received from Vespasian and his sons. These beneficia included two separate land grants, the first furnished by Titus and the latter by Vespasian. They also included a grant of Roman citizenship, together with the Flavian name, and an annual pension. Josephus then proceeds to assert that, even after Vespasian’s death, the Flavians continued to bestow honours upon him.

The beneficia cited by Josephus appear to be superficially impressive, however modern scholars are divided about the efficacy of Josephus’ testimony as evidence for his relationship with the Flavian house. Rajak, for example, regards the benefits conferred upon Josephus as ‘striking in their generosity’, and an apt payment for Josephus’ services as a cultural interpreter and diplomat.

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177 Josephus, Vita., 361-3. As Rajak notes, there is nothing to suggest that the Bellum Judaicum should be regarded as an officially approved history of the war. The preface to the Naturalis Historia indicates an established practice wherein a work would be offered to the Emperor as an application for an ‘expression of his interest and satisfaction’. (Pliny, NH., pref., 6, 8.) It is likely that Josephus followed the same pattern – when Titus affixed his seal to the Bellum Judaicum, he did so simply out of appreciation for the content and nothing more. (Rajak, T., Josephus: The Historian and His Society, 203.)

178 Josephus, Vita., 415-422.

179 ‘My treatment from the emperors remained unchanging. When Vespasian died, Titus succeeded to the throne, and accorded me honours similar to what his father had…Domitian, succeeding Titus, increased my honours’. (ibid., 428-429.)
to the besieged Jews in Jerusalem and to the upper stratum of the Jewish community in Alexandria. Other commentators are sceptical. Yavetz offers the harsh judgement that ‘it is doubtful whether a Roman emperor considered friendship with Josephus to be an asset’. He observes that Josephus was never awarded the title of amicus Caesaris, nor was he counted among Titus’ comites. Instead, it is more likely that he was a member of the Caesar’s lower entourage ‘in the same category as doctors and magicians, philosophers and buffoons.’ More recently, Cotton and Eck have extended this argument even further. In the reckoning of the latter authors, Josephus’ relationship with Vespasian and Titus, or even the members of the equestrian and senatorial orders in Rome after 71, was nominal. The honours bestowed upon Josephus were no more or less impressive than the numerous other clientes who bore the name T. Flavius after 70. This view is also echoed by authors such as Mason, who observes that neither Josephus nor his sons were granted equestrian status. Despite his protestation that he received extraordinary honours, Josephus ‘did not reach even the lowest rung of the cursus honorum in Rome; much less was he an amicus or trusted advisor of any Flavian Emperor.’

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In contrast with his palpable flattery of the Flavian Emperors, Josephus’ attitude to Mucianus is difficult to discern. One might assume Josephus’ attitude to Mucianus to have largely followed his positive depiction of Titus and Vespasian – given the former’s momentous role in the uprising of 69. Yet, despite admitting Mucianus’ political and military significance in the course of his account of the fall of Vitellius and his German legions, Josephus nonetheless declares his reticence to expatiate upon either Mucianus or Antonius Primus’ exploits during the events of 69 – instead asserting that ‘I have omitted to give an exact account of them, because they are well known by all, and they are described by a great number of Greek and Roman authors.’ Subsequently, having eschewed any notion of recording any lengthy account of Mucianus’ march through Asia Minor, Josephus goes on to record a number of innocuous details concerning the travels of Titus in Greece and Syria, as well as Vespasian’s deliberations over the turmoil in Rome following the fall of Galba.\textsuperscript{184} Elsewhere in Josephus’ text, we note few examples of Josephus passing either positive or negative judgment on Mucianus – merely fleeting references concerning his presence at the meeting at Mount Carmel, his march through Asia Minor or simply the use of Mucianus as a medium for evoking further flattery of Vespasian.\textsuperscript{185} Moreover, it is even more puzzling that, in contrast with Mucianus, Josephus extols the exploits of other members of the partes Flavianae. In book five of his Bellum Judaicum, Josephus even goes to the extent of replacing Mucianus as the main proponent of the Flavian uprising with another compatriot of Titus, Tiberius Julius Alexander:

\textsuperscript{184} Josephus, BJ., 4.490.  
\textsuperscript{185} See ibid., 4.620: ‘Vespasian then removed from Caesarea to Berytus, where many embassages came to him from Syria, and many from other provinces, bringing with them from every city crowns, and the congratulations of the people. Mucianus came also, who was the president of the province, and told him with what alacrity the people [received the news of his advancement], and how the people of every city had taken the oath of fidelity to him.’ Cf. ibid., 4.621, 5.43.
[Tiberius Alexander] had formerly been governor of Alexandria, but was now thought worthy to be general of the army [under Titus]. The reason of this was that he had been the first who encouraged Vespasian very lately to accept his new dominion, and joined himself to him with great fidelity, when things were uncertain, and fortune had not yet declared for him.\textsuperscript{186}

In fact, Josephus’ inattention to Mucianus and his compatriots likely speaks to Josephus’ personal relationships rather than a deliberate attempt to diminish the achievements of the Flavian amicus. While Josephus displays a tendency to accord those of his patroni – Vespasian and Titus, prominent positions in the \textit{Bellum Judaicum}, few other Roman dignitaries are accorded a comprehensive treatment.\textsuperscript{187} These omissions should not be considered surprising. It is true that Josephus emphasises, with extraordinary enthusiasm, the services which he rendered to Titus at the siege of Jerusalem and his own status as an ‘ideal general’.\textsuperscript{188} This does not imply, however, that Josephus enjoyed a position in the Roman camp that afforded him access to the upper echelons of Titus’ confidantes. Titus must have considered Josephus’ serviceability as a translator and propagandist useful, but Josephus was one of many minor personages on Titus’ staff who served

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid, 5.43.
\textsuperscript{187} As Cotton and Eck observe, there is a striking dearth of references to persons belonging to the senatorial and equestrian class in Josephus’ work. One should expect, if Josephus maintained as intimate a relationship with Titus as he implies in books five and six of the ‘Jewish War’, that Josephus should have been in close contact with the members of the senatorial and equestrian class, and foreign dignitaries that made up Titus’ entourage. However, of the prominent individuals whom we know to have been present at the war council convened by Titus to decide the fate of the Jewish Temple in 70 AD – including Tiberius Julius Alexander the \textit{praefectus Aegypti}, Sextus Vettulenus Cerealis (\textit{cos suff.} ca. 73), legate of \textit{Legio V Macedonica}, Aulus Larcius Lepidus Sulpicianus, legate of \textit{Legio X Fretensis}, Marcus Titius Frugi (\textit{cos suff.} 80), legate of \textit{Legio XV Apollinaris} and C. Aeternius Fronto, \textit{praefectus castrorum} of the two Egyptian legions, only a passing mention is given to Cerealis at Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 6.236-7. References to the others remain conspicuously absent. (Cotton, H.W., Eck, W., “Josephus’ Roman Audience: Josephus and the Roman Elites,” in Edmondson, J., et al. (eds.), \textit{Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome,} 41f.)

in a similar capacity.\textsuperscript{189} Certainly, he cannot have considered Josephus important enough to include him in the war council at Berytus, despite the author’s decidedly suspicious account of a meeting between Vespasian and his colleagues, including Mucianus, in which Vespasian begins by extolling the virtues of Josephus himself.\textsuperscript{190} Nor did Josephus gain any notable connections among the Roman elite upon his arrival in Rome in the spring of 71.\textsuperscript{191} His status as a former Jewish rebel and captive, and his propensity to attract detractors carrying accusations of subversion and treason cannot have endeared him towards the likes of Mucianus – even had the latter a passing interest in Josephus’ literary pursuits after 71.\textsuperscript{192} Consequently, given his ostensible lack of contact with Mucianus, it is probable that, even if he had the motivation to do so, there was little recourse for Josephus to form a cogent view of the amicus.

1.6 Conclusion

The sources for Mucianus’ career present numerous problems. Apart from the fact that, for Tacitus, Dio and Josephus alike, the primary sources utilized by each of these historians to

\textsuperscript{189} For instance, Nicanor and Aeneas. (Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 5.32f.) Schwartz notes that Josephus uses the term ‘friend’ quite liberally when referring to not only his own relationships but also those of his colleagues. The military tribune Nicanor, for instance, is overtly referred to as a ‘friend of Titus’ – although, as the author notes, one should doubt the extent to which Titus would have considered a lowly military tribune as one of his amici. (Schwartz, S., \textit{Josephus and Judaean Politics}, 7, n. 16.)

\textsuperscript{190} Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 4.624.

\textsuperscript{191} Josephus, \textit{Vita.}, 423. Josephus furnishes few hints of his personal relationships in Rome after 71. There is some suggestion that he courted the affections of the Herodian family. (Schwartz, S., \textit{Josephus and Judaean Politics}, 11., Mason, S., “Flavius Josephus in Flavian Rome” in A.J. Boyle, W.J. Dominik (eds.), \textit{Flavian Rome: Culture, Image, Text} (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 563-564.) A certain individual ‘Epaphroditus’, possibly the prominent freedman of Nero who had been awarded the \textit{dona militar} for his part in suppressing the Pisonian conspiracy of 64, is also mentioned in three of Josephus’ texts. (ibid., 564-565, Cotton, H.W., Eck, W., “Josephus’ Roman Audience: Josephus and the Roman Elites,” in Edmondson, J., et al. (eds.), \textit{Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome}, 50-51.). No other significant individuals are mentioned in direct contact with the author.

\textsuperscript{192} In 72, Josephus was accused of sedition by the \textit{sicarius} Jonathan, apparently at the behest of the proconsul of Cyrenaica, Lucius Valerius Catullus Messalinus. (Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 7.447-448., \textit{Vita.}, 424.) And see Cotton, H.W., Eck, W., “Josephus’ Roman Audience: Josephus and the Roman Elites,” in Edmondson, J., et al. (eds.), \textit{Flavius Josephus and Flavian Rome}, 46-47.
construct their accounts are difficult to discern, it is also evident that each of the ancient historians’ accounts, despite their protestations to the contrary, are subject to distortion contingent upon the biases of each author. Thus, as emphasized in part two of this chapter, Tacitus displays a tendency to accord largely pessimistic portrayals to those individuals who were guilty, either advertently or inadvertently, of propagating the civil discord of 69. Similarly, in the *Bellum Judaicum*, Josephus emphasizes the characters of Vespasian and Titus to the detriment of other members of the *partes Flavianae*, including Mucianus, whom he mentions only in passing. It is clear, in any case, that for both Mucianus’ political and military career as well as his character, both Tacitus and Pliny serve as the most expedient sources of information. Of the four main literary sources, only Tacitus sees fit to include a description of Mucianus’ character in book two of his histories. Moreover, unlike Dio, who relegates Mucianus’ tenure as temporary head of state to a single chapter in book sixty-six of his history, Tacitus dedicates almost the entirety of the second half of book four of the *Historiae* to Mucianus’ administration. It also appears that, in his capacity as a senator at Rome for the period during and following Vespasian’s rule, Tacitus had access to the greatest variety of sources – likely including several eyewitness accounts such as those of Pompeius Planta and Vipstanus Messalla and possibly even the testimony of Vespasian and Mucianus themselves. Pliny, on the other hand, presents a stranger case. The importance of the *Naturalis Historia* does not lie in Pliny’s own literary contributions, but in one of the sources which he drew upon – an unknown text authored by Mucianus himself. This latter text, while conventionally defined as a prodigious work, bears the hallmarks of numerous literary genres, including those of a memoir or commentary, a paradoxographical text and a travel journal. Regardless of the literary designation of Mucianus’ text, however, the fragments remain useful for two reasons. Initially, as a large portion of the
fragments contained within the *Naturalis Historia* can be directly linked to Mucianus’ personal experience, they can be used as a means of reconstructing the chronology of his early political career until at least 67. Second, thanks to the selections and omissions of Pliny himself, we can also make some tentative suggestions about the way in which Mucianus’ attitude towards Vespasian and Titus had transformed by time of the publication of his text ca. 72-74. More specifically, it appears that the tone of the original text may have indeed reflected, at least in part, the *amicus’* frustration over his exclusion from substantial political honours after Vespasian’s arrival in the Roman capital in late 70 AD.
Chapter Two: The Origins and Early Life of Licinius Mucianus

2.1 Introduction

The career of Gaius Licinius Mucianus during its earlier stages is rife with problems and speculation. The literary and epigraphic evidence, in particular, is largely fragmentary and disjointed. We have only a limited number of off-hand remarks from Tacitus and Suetonius, erratic testimony derived from Mucianus’ fragmentary text, as well as a small amount of epigraphic evidence derived from Mucianus’ tenure as governor in Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 60 AD and in Syria during the late 60s AD. Fragmentary and disjointed though it is, however, the evidence for Mucianus’ early career allows us to construct some semblance of an outline for his cursus honorum. This chapter, therefore, will analyse several aspects of Mucianus’ early career – beginning with the geographical and social origins of the amicus as well as his political career under the Emperor Claudius, including Mucianus’ alleged self-imposed exile in Asia Minor ca. 45-50 AD. Subsequently, this chapter will examine Mucianus’ career after his return to the cursus honorum ca. 54 AD under the Emperor Nero, including his apparent tenure as legatus legionis under Domitius Corbulo ca. 56-60 AD, his tenure as legatus Augusti pro praetore Lyciae et Pamphyliae ca. 60 AD and his acquisition of the consul suffectus ca. 64 AD. Finally, this chapter will also deal with Mucianus’ key appointment to Syria as legatus Augusti pro praetore ca. 67 AD – with an implicit emphasis on the reasoning for his appointment by Nero as well as his early relationship with the future Emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus.

2.2 The Geographical and Social Origins of Licinius Mucianus

The social and geographical origins of Licinius Mucianus remain considerably murky. To a great extent, this is reflected by the fact that, to date, the only attempts to elucidate the origins of the
great novus homo have taken the form of mere ephemeral digressions on the part of authors such as Ronald Syme and George Williamson. The most significant of these treatments is undoubtedly Syme’s discussion in his 1958 work, ‘Tacitus’, of the origins of both Licinius Mucianus as well as another individual who shared his namesake – one Lucius Licinius Sura, an influential senator from Tarraco and personal friend of the Emperor Trajan. As Syme observes, parallels can be drawn between both individuals not only in terms of their respective political significance – Licinius Sura, like Mucianus, would have a share in the proclamation of an Emperor, but also in terms of their origins. For Mucianus’ origins, we have only epigraphic sources – a series of inscriptions from Lycia recording Mucianus’ bestowal of citizenships upon a number of local families during his time as governor of the region under the Emperor Nero. A particularly lengthy genealogical inscription from Oenoanda records Mucianus’ conferral of citizenships upon two brothers – Mousaius and Thoas, who would subsequently assume the names ‘Gaius Licinius Musaeus’ and ‘Marcius Thoas’. This inscription is subsequently confirmed by two further

194 Ibid., 790-1. Like Mucianus, Sura was a talented scholar and rhetorician. See Martial, Ep., 6.64.10. wherein Sura is named as a patron of literature in the company of two famous consuls – Silius Italicus and Aquillus Regulus, as well as of the Emperor himself. He also shared Mucianus’ interest in curiosities. (Pliny, Ep., 7.27.1-15., 4.30.1-11.) See also Dio, Hist., 68.5. on the friendship between Trajan and Sura: ‘so great was the friendship and confidence which he showed toward Trajan and Trajan toward him, that, although he was often slandered, — as naturally happens in the case of all those who possess any influence with the Emperors, — Trajan never felt any suspicion or hatred toward him.’ Sura was apparently also responsible for composing Trajan’s orations on more than one occasion. (Julian, Caesares, 327.)
195 In fact, Sura’s role in the rise of Trajan remains enigmatic. The only clue we have that indicates that it was through Sura’s agency that Trajan was induced to seize power is a brief statement at Victor, Ep. Caes., 13.6.: ob honorem Surae, cuius studio imperium arripuerat, lavacra condidit. (’[Trajan] established baths in honour of Sura, with whose zeal he had secured imperium.’)
196 IGR, 3.500, 2.3-6. Mucianus is not mentioned by name, yet the former brother’s assumption of Mucianus’ own namesake as well as the fact that both brothers served as Lyciarchs at some point under Claudius and Nero would seemingly efface any doubt of Mucianus’ patronage. (see here IGR, 3.493, n. 4; 500, commentary on 2.4-7 for the approximate dating of the Lyciarchate of the brothers)
inscriptions from Oenoanda, which also reveal that, in addition to taking on the namesake of Mucianus, the brothers also assumed the tribe ‘Sergia’. Syme takes this to indicate that Mucianus may have been enrolled in the tribe ‘Sergia’ and that he had passed his own tribe to those individuals who owed their citizenship to his agency.

For Syme, the corresponding tribal origins of the two Licinii indicates a likelihood that the two men may have similarly shared their geographical origins in Tarraconensis. In Sura’s case, Tarraconensis remains a reasonable candidate for his origin on the basis of both the literary and epigraphic evidence. The evidence for Syme’s assumption of Mucianus’ Spanish origins, on the other hand, is decidedly flimsy. In the first place, the members of the ‘Sergia’ tribe were hardly exclusive to Tarraconensis. By the first century AD, the ‘Sergia’ tribe could be linked variously with both the Marsi and Paeligni peoples of central Italy, with the town of Asisium in Umbria and with the Sabine towns of Cures and Trebula Mutuesca. In Citerior itself, only Carthago Nova can be claimed with confidence to have been enrolled in the ‘Sergia’. Meanwhile, the tribal affiliations of other towns in and around the Ebro valley in northern Citerior are largely

197 *IGR*, 3.496, 3.633.
199 Ibid., 790-791.
200 As Groag and Syme note, both Tarraco and Barcino were enrolled in the ‘Galeria’ tribe, whereas Sura himself was enrolled in the ‘Sergia’. However, Syme contends that the inland *colonia* at Celsa, in the Ebro valley, represents the likely location of Sura’s *patria*. (Syme, R., *Tacitus*, 791 and Groag, E., *RE*, vol. 13, 472.)
201 The make-up of the ‘Sergia’ tribe is described by Cicero in his *De Petitione Consulatus* as he comments on the failure of a man to carry the tribe of which he was a member. The voters that Cicero mentions derive from Cures and Trebula Mutuesca, and from the Marsi and Paeligni. – Cicero, *De Pet. Cons.*, 30. For the extension of the ‘Sergia’ tribe from Cures to Trebula Mutuesca, see Taylor, L.R., Linderski, J., *The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic* (University of Michigan Press, 1960), 90. See also ibid., 275. for list of possible senatorial members of the tribe during the late Republic as well as the geographical distribution.
The situation in Hispania Ulterior, however, is comparatively promising. The Roman colony at Hispalis, ‘Julia Romulus’, attested by Strabo, was seemingly enrolled in both the ‘Sergia’ and ‘Galeria’ tribes simultaneously. Elsewhere in Ulterior, Carteia, Italica, Tucci, Ucubi, Urso and Hasta are all attested to have been enrolled in the ‘Sergia’. In addition, similar to Hispalis, Cordoban epigraphy attests both the ‘Sergia’ and ‘Galeria’ tribes.

It is important to note, in any case, that the cognomina ‘Licinius’ and ‘Mucianus’ indicate that Mucianus himself passed by adoption from the gens ‘Mucia’ to that of ‘Licinia’. One might lend credibility to Syme’s conclusion, therefore, if one could claim with certainty a direct intersection between the ‘Sergia’ tribe and both of Mucianus’ respective families – the ‘Licinii’ and ‘Mucii’ in Tarraconensia. However, while Syme is intent on drawing a parallel between Sura and Mucianus, the connection may be merely circumstantial. In fact, the existence of Licinii in Spain is barely worthy of mention given their frequent appearances not only in Spanish inscriptions but also in central Italy as well as Macedonia. The Licinii were a prominent family in Corinth around the end of the first century AD, with the name ‘Publius’ being the usual one in the family. Similarly,
members of the Licinii and their associated familial branches – the Licinii Crassi, Licinii Luculli, Licinii Nervae and Licinii Murenæ can be identified in locations across central Italy. In Spain itself, aside from Sura’s attestation in the aforementioned inscriptions, frequent references to Licinii can be found in Hispania Citerior. References to an M. Licinius, who seemingly served as proconsul either during or just preceding the Principate of Augustus, can be found in epigraphic material derived from Hispania Baetica. Another M. Licinius, carrying the additional cognomen ‘Maternus’ and named in position beta of a titulus from the Testaccio of ca. 150 AD, is also deemed by Haley as a likely candidate as a Spanish freeborn of Baetician origin. Other Spanish Licinii can also be singled out. One Licinius Lartius, praetor in Hispania and later legatus of an imperial province, is mentioned in multiple instances by the elder Pliny as one of his contemporaries. Quintus Licinius Silvanus Granianus, a praefectus in charge of the sea coast and a procurator Augusti, is also positively identifiable as being of Spanish origin on the basis of his tribe – the ‘Galeria’. Additionally, a well-known individual, Publius Licinius Caecina – quaestor in Baetica at the time of Nero’s death in 68 AD and one of the foremost allies of Galba, also found his origin bears the name P. Licinius Priscus (IG, 4.202., see here also Geagan, D.J., “The Isthmian Dossier of P. Licinius Priscus Juventius.” Hesperia 58 (1989): 349-360.) while another, styled ‘Anteros’ can be identified from an inscription of AD 43/44. (IG, 4.853) A further ‘Licinius’, named ‘Philostratus’ was seemingly a libertus during the reign of Tiberius. The sheer number of Licinii present during the last age of the Republic and first century of the Empire is illustrated by the lengthy list contained within the PIR2, L, 271-288., consisting of no fewer than seventy-eight citations. PIR2, L, 271. Haley, E.W., Baetica Felix: People and prosperity in Southern Spain from Caesar to Septimius Severus (United States: University of Texas Press, 2003), 158. Licinius Lartius died before Pliny (Pliny, NH., 19.2, 19.11, 31.2, 31.18.). He is likely the same individual as Largius Licinius, who is cited by the younger Pliny (Pliny, Ep., 2.14, 3.5.) as a person to whom the elder Pliny could have sold his Electorum Commentarii, during the latter’s residence in Spain, for 400,000 sesterces. See here CIL, 4264 = ILS, 2716; 4266 = ILS, 2717; 4224; 4217. See also PIR2, L, 284. for further details. The son of Q. Licinius Silvanus Granianus was Quintus Licinius Silvanus Granianus Quadronius Proculus – suffect consul of 106 AD, governor of Asia and correspondent of the Emperor Hadrian. (see Eusebius, Hist. Ecc., 4.9, Zonaras, Ep., 11.24. and PIR2, L, 284.)
in Hispania. By contrast, very little mention of Mucii in the Spanish provinces. As Syme notes, one dedication at Tarraco indicates that a P. Mucius Scaevola was, at the very least, active in Spain in the last age of the Republic – likely the pontifex attested in 64 BC by Macrobius, yet other references to Mucii are conspicuously absent.

There is another path of enquiry, however. One particular passage in the *Naturalis Historia*, attributed to Mucianus, deals with a comparison between the oysters in Spain, Asia Minor, Britain, Greece, as well as Latium itself. The passage itself, while seemingly insignificant, is nonetheless curious for two reasons. Initially, it is the only place in the fragments where Pliny quotes the words of Mucianus explicitly, which suggests, at the very least, that the *amicus* visited Spain at one point. It is also notable, however, that the reference to Illici itself is an anomaly within the extant fragments of Mucianus’ text. As Williamson notes, not only is the reference to Illici the only reference to the Spanish provinces in the Empire, it is the only instance within the fragments of the *Naturalis Historia* attributed to Mucianus where he references the western half of the Empire at all.

Furthermore, while Mucianus’ experiences in the Greek East may be linked to his own exile to Asia Minor under Claudius as well as his tenure as governor of Lycia-Pamphylia during

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214 He was rewarded by Galba with the command of a legion in upper Germany, but was shortly after convicted for embezzling public money. (See Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.53., Pliny, *NH.*, 20.199 and *PIR*2, L, 271.)
216 Frag. 29 (Pliny, *NH.*, 32.62.). In the passage, Mucianus extols the oysters that can be found in the city of Cyzicus as ‘larger than those of Lake Lucrinus, fresher than those of the British, sweeter than those of Medulae, sharper than the Ephesian, fuller than those of Illici (in Spain), less slimy than those of Coryphan, softer than those of Histria, whiter than those of Circeii’.
217 Aside from two fragments which refer to wonders in Italy – the urbanisation of the Pomptine Marsh (frag. 2 – Pliny, *NH.*, 3.59.) and the arrival of two elephants from Puteoli (frag. 12 – ibid., 8.6.), the other fragments within the *Naturalis Historia* relate almost entirely to the Greek East, as well as its neighbouring regions – Phoenicia and Egypt. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, 230.)
the reign of Nero, no other literary references to Mucianus’ Spanish travels are evident. It is possible, then, that the reference to the Illici in this passage may in turn be a reference to Mucianus’ own Spanish geographical origins. The specific location of his birth would therefore remain indeterminate, yet both Hispalis and Carthago Nova offer likely possibilities given their relative proximity to Illici itself and the fact that both were at least partially enrolled in the ‘Sergia’ tribe.

Regardless, while some inferences can be made about the geographical origins of Mucianus, the details of his familial life and childhood remain almost entirely a mystery. Tacitus offers us a single clue concerning Mucianus’ specific heritage – the speech given by Mucianus during the early months of 69 AD. Referring to Corbulo, Mucianus, when encouraging Vespasian to make a bid for the Principate, observes *splendidior origine quam nos sumus fateor*. As Ash observes, utilising the first person plural, Mucianus ‘suggests solidarity with Vespasian through their undistinguished backgrounds’. The validity of this suggestion is difficult to determine. It is notable, in the first place, that Vespasian’s own lineage was not, by any means, exalted. Suetonius furnishes several details concerning Vespasian’s parentage during his introduction to the princeps. Vespasian was descended from Titus Flavius Petro of Reate, a centurion or *evocatus* who, having fought for the Republicans at Pharsalus, fled the battlefield and returned home. Petro’s son and father of Vespasian, Titus Flavius Sabinus completed no military service and instead served the role of a tax collector of considerable repute – to the extent that statues were erected in tribute to his fairness in the province of Asia. Vespasian’s mother, Vespasia Polla, descended from comparatively loftier stock. According to Suetonius, her father, Vespasius Pollio, was thrice

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218 See here chapter one, Figure 1.
219 Ibid., 230.
220 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.76.
221 ‘His origin, I grant, was more illustrious than ours’. (ibid.)
appointed military tribune as well as prefect of the camp and her brother was a ‘senator of praetorian dignity’.\textsuperscript{223} If Mucianus’ aforementioned statement can indeed be taken as an indication of his own lack of senatorial parentage – concurrent with Vespasian’s origins and contrary to the illustrious origins of Corbulo, then it would be reasonable to assert that Mucianus too descended from equestrian stock.\textsuperscript{224}

2.3 Early Career and Exile Under the Emperor Claudius

Many of the details of Mucianus’ early political career are similarly difficult to determine. Tacitus only includes a single chapter describing the early years of Mucianus’ political career and few details can be gleaned from Mucianus’ fragments in the \textit{Naturalis Historia}. Several observations can nonetheless be made. In the first place, if, as will be argued below, Mucianus acquired a legionary command under Corbulo ca. 57-58, a propraetorian governorship in 60 and, subsequently, a suffect consulship in 64, then his birth should be dated at least as early as 16-18 AD.\textsuperscript{225} By extension, if Mucianus had entered the Senate at the regular age of twenty-five, then his senatorial career must have commenced ca. 41 – coinciding with the early years of Claudius’ reign.\textsuperscript{226} Second, in spite of his unremarkable origins, Mucianus appears to have amassed a

\textsuperscript{223} Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 1.1. 
\textsuperscript{224} Thus, De Kleijn’s assumption that Mucianus was descended from a senatorial family in Spain seems improbable. (De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Leader in a Time of Crisis.”: 315.)
\textsuperscript{225} And perhaps earlier. The normal age of acquiring the praetorship was thirty-nine and of the consulship, forty-two. The dating of Mucianus’ praetorship defies estimates in no small part due to the introduction of a lengthy period of exile into Mucianus’ career. Nonetheless, the regular progression of the \textit{cursus honorum} dictates that Mucianus should have held the praetorship prior to his legionary command under Corbulo. (Alföldy, G., \textit{Die Legionslegaten der Römischen Rheinarmeen}, Epigraphische Studien, vol. 3 (Cologne: Boehlau Verlag, 1967), 76-80.) An interval of at least five years before a praetorship and a provincial command was stipulated by the \textit{lex Pompeia de provinciis} of 52/51 BC. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 40.56.) Hence, if we assume, as we will below, that Mucianus’ propraetorian governorship fell ca. 60 then a dating of ca. 55 might be offered up for his praetorship. This is by no means certain, although it must be said that such a date coincides neatly with the accession of Nero and the demise of Claudius – the latter of whom may well have stood as a significant impediment to Mucianus’ advancement.
\textsuperscript{226} Augustus had set the minimum age of entry at twenty-five. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 52.20.)
considerable amount of wealth during his early years. The basis for this assumption is twofold. Initially, Tacitus, in his appraisal of the character of Mucianus in book two of the Historiae, describes the amicus as magnificentia et opes et cuncta privatum modum supergressa extollebant.\textsuperscript{227} Elsewhere, we hear from Tacitus that, during his youth, Mucianus was capable of squandering a considerable amount of resources in pursuit of leisure and power and that, decades later, Mucianus would make a monetary contribution to the Flavian war effort in mid-69 – which Tacitus insinuates was sizeable, even if Mucianus had assured himself of reparations.\textsuperscript{228} We also have some amount of epigraphic evidence. For instance, we know from a fistula aquaria found at Genzano in 1877, the information that Mucianus had an estate in Ariccia, one of the wealthiest urban areas.\textsuperscript{229} The source of this wealth remains unclear. Whether Mucianus’ fortune derived from his personal endeavours or was inherited from his family cannot be determined given the elusive nature of Mucianus’ heritage. Suffice to say that, during his early years, Mucianus lived the high life, squandering his wealth to curry favour with prominent individuals in Rome and engaging in activities which Tacitus found distasteful. In Tacitus’ words, he ‘cultivated with many intrigues the friendship of the great’ and ‘over subjects, friends, and colleagues, he exercised the influence of many fascinations’. Meanwhile, according to Tacitus, in his leisure time, Mucianus’ ‘self-indulgence was excessive’.\textsuperscript{230} While Tacitus does not specify the nature of Mucianus’ ‘self-indulgence’, it is probable that it is the historian’s elliptical way of referring to Mucianus’

\textsuperscript{227} The full passage reads: ‘Mucianus, on the contrary, was eminent for his magnificence, for his wealth, and for a greatness that transcended in all respects the condition of a subject; readier of speech than the other, he thoroughly understood the arrangement and direction of civil business.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 2.5.)

\textsuperscript{228} Tacitus, Hist., 1.10. for Mucianus squandering his resources and 2.84 for Mucianus’ later contribution to the Flavian war effort – to which Tacitus adds the observation: largus privatim, quod avidius de re publica sumeret. (‘[He was] liberal with private means, because he helped himself without scruple from the wealth of the State.’)

\textsuperscript{229} Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 115. The inscription simply reads C.LICINI.MVCIANI. (CIL, 14.2173.)

\textsuperscript{230} Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.
homosexuality. We certainly know, from several decidedly transparent insinuations on the part of Tacitus as well as some candid assertions by Suetonius that Mucianus had acquired a reputation as such. In his biography of Vespasian, Suetonius delights in repeating the gossip that Mucianus was guilty of *notae impudicitae* and that even Vespasian, when deliberating upon Mucianus’ conduct in private, would later comment that ‘he himself was at least a man’.\(^{231}\) Tacitus reiterates the rumours – informing us of Mucianus that ‘in his public capacity he might be praised; his private life was in bad repute.’\(^{232}\)

It is unsurprising, in any case, that Mucianus’ senatorial career under Claudius was short-lived. His exploits certainly did not go unnoticed, and we are informed by Tacitus that the *amicus* attracted the ire of the Emperor. Mucianus, suspecting that Claudius had taken some offence to his behaviour, withdrew from office into a retired part of Asia Minor and was ‘as like an exile, as he was afterwards like an Emperor’.\(^{233}\) The specific location of Mucianus’ exile is unknown. It has long been assumed that the most likely location is the island of Rhodes on the basis of Mucianus’ description of a temple there and his anecdote concerning the cuirass of the former king of Egypt, Amasis – an artefact which was allegedly housed on the island.\(^{234}\) More recently, this has been disputed by Williamson and Baldwin – although neither author offers a compelling alternative.\(^{235}\) Two main considerations should cause one to doubt Rhodes as a candidate. Initially, apart from the dubious origins of the aforementioned fragment, which Mucianus may have taken directly or

\(^{232}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.10. It is not mere coincidence that there are no references to Mucianus’ immediate family or children.
\(^{233}\) Ibid.
\(^{234}\) *PIR2*, 280., and see frag. 25 (Pliny, *NH.*, 19.12.)
indirectly from Herodotus, there may be little reason to associate the fragment with Mucianus’ exile at all. Williamson argues that, given the close proximity between Rhodes and Lycia, it is equally conceivable that the fragment could be linked with Mucianus’ later governorship of Lycia-Pamphylia.\footnote{Ibid.} This is possible, but it is also noticeable that, in contrast with the fragments derived from Asia Provincia, Lycia-Pamphylia and the Cyclades, Pliny supplies little indication of Mucianus’ personal autopsy at Rhodes, save for the author’s use of the more ambiguous past participle, *expertus*, in fragment twenty-five. Hence, we should not discount the possibility that Mucianus’ ‘investigations’ at Rhodes should be put down to second-hand experience – perhaps via Titus.\footnote{At first glance, Pliny’s use of the word *expertus* (‘having proved through investigation’) in frag. 25 (Pliny, *NH.*, 19.12.) seemingly indicates personal autopsy. It is curious, however, that Pliny does not supply a similar indicator of Mucianus’ autopsy in fragments 9 (ibid., 5.132.) and 30 (ibid., 34.36.) and, furthermore, the latter fragments reference locations that fall outside the boundaries of *Asia Provincia* (see ‘1.2 The Fragments of Mucianus in Pliny the Elder’s *Naturalis Historia*’). Additionally, this is a departure from Pliny’s more usual tendency to utilize the verb *vide*o (‘to see’) when referring to phenomena that Mucianus had personally witnessed – for instance, frags. 7 (ibid., 5.83), 10 (ibid., 7.36), 12 (ibid., 8.6), 13 (ibid., 8.201), 18 (ibid., 9.94), 20 (ibid., 11.167), 24 (ibid., 16.213). Several possibilities arise here. Williamson believes that the fragments related to Rhodes should be assigned to different stages of Mucianus’ career. He argues that fragment 25 should be attached to Mucianus’ tenure as governor of Lycia-Pamphylia and that fragment 9 could instead be indicative of a parallel account of Vespasian’s return from Alexandria to Rome in 70 – on account of the anomalous inclusion of the distance between Alexandria and Rhodes in the latter fragment. (Williamson, G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.), Pilgrimage in Graeco-Roman & Early Christian Antiquity: Seeing the Gods, 223, 235-236.) While it is true that Vespasian travelled via Rhodes in 70 (Josephus, *BJ.*, 7.21., Suetonius, *Div Vesp.*, 8.), one wonders why Mucianus would have been compelled to relate Vespasian’s triumphant journey back to the capital after relations between the two men cooled after 72 (see ‘4.2 Rationalising Mucianus’ Support for the Flavian Cause’). On the other hand, the addition of fragment 30 to the equation, which refers to number of statues at Athens, Olympia and Rhodes, causes the relevant fragments to bear a suspicious resemblance to Titus’ journey to Greece in early 69 (see no. 96.). The latter individual at least held a passing interest in *mirabilia* and is known to have visited temples on his return journey to Caesarea. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.4.) Surely, Titus would have related details from his expedition to Mucianus upon his arrival in Syria in February 69. (Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.501.)}
insinuates that Mucianus had investigated both curiosities in close proximity during the recent past.\textsuperscript{238}

On the other hand, alternative locations might be hypothesised. Syme, in a 1969 article on the subject of Pliny, suggests Cyzicus – a city on the Propontis in north-western Anatolia, as a possible location for Mucianus’ retreat. This would seem a far more reasonable suggestion than Rhodes on several counts. In the first place, as Syme highlights, given Mucianus’ palpable fascination with\textit{ miracibilia} and curiosa, his love for architecture and art, and his propensity to engage in scholarly pursuits, one might assume that the place of his retreat was ‘not back country, but some city of art and elegance’.\textsuperscript{239} We know from both epigraphic and literary evidence that Cyzicus fits the bill. The city had produced several historians, philosophers and other writers whose works are quoted by Athenaeus – such as Agathocles, Neanthes, Deilochus and Eudoxus.\textsuperscript{240} Cyzicus also had works of art which included, according to Cicero, paintings of Ajax and Medea which Julius Caesar had thereafter purchased.\textsuperscript{241} It also retained other artifacts which would have been of particular interest to someone such as Mucianus – for instance, a chryselephantine statue of the Meter Dindymene,

\textsuperscript{238} Compare here the wording of frag. 25 (Pliny, \textit{NH.}, 19.12.) – quod se expertum nuperrime prodidit mucianus ter cos (‘…a fact which Mucianus, who held the consulship three times, recently stated that he had proved to be true by investigation’), with frag. 22 (ibid., 13.88.) – praeterea Mucianus ter cos. prodidit nuper se legisse,cum praesideret Lyciae, Sarpedonis ab Troiascriptam in quodam templo epistulae chartam. (‘Mucianus who was three times consul has stated that recently, when governor of Lycia, he had read in a certain temple a letter of Sarpedon written on paper at Troy.’) Compare also frag. 21 (ibid., 12.9.) which similarly references the recent past: Licinius Mucianus ter consul et nuper provinciae eius legatus… (‘Licinius Mucianus, who was three times consul and recently governor of the province…’) Whether Pliny’s use of the term\textit{nuper} is a replication of Mucianus’ own words or Pliny’s own addition is difficult to ascertain, nor should it necessarily be taken as an explicit indication that Mucianus visited Rhodes during the same period as his governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia. It is true that Pliny utilises the superlative\textit{nuperrime} relatively loosely in the\textit{Naturalis Historia}, as noted by Ash (see no. 102). Nevertheless, the wording of frag. 25 implies that it should be placed much later than Mucianus’ exile – at least during, or following, Mucianus’ tenure in Lycia-Pamphylia, and perhaps as late as his Syrian governorship.

\textsuperscript{239} Syme, R., “Pliny the Procurator.”: 203-4. And see chapter one.


\textsuperscript{241} Cicero, \textit{In Verr.}, 2.4 and Pliny, \textit{NH.}, 8.38 for Caesar’s purchase of the paintings
recorded by Pausanias to have been a spoil of an earlier conflict between the Cyziceni and Proonnensus. Moreover, Cyzicus was a known producer of luxury goods – for instance, it is noted by both Pausanias and Pliny as famous for a particular type of perfume, which Pliny dubs *Cyzicena amaracus.* The city also harboured royalty – Antonia Tryphaena, daughter of King Polemo of Pontus and mother of the last king of Thrace, Rhoemetalces III, who served, along with several of her offspring, as benefactors of the city. Consequently, for someone like Mucianus, who, by Tacitus’ account, displayed a propensity towards *nimiae voluptate, cum vacaret,* the city would have represented an ideal residence.

There is certainly a great deal of circumstantial evidence to support Mucianus’ exile in Cyzicus. Apart from the numerous references in Mucianus’ fragments to Cyzicus itself – including a fragment wherein Mucianus hails Cyzicena as the first among eight varieties of oysters in repute, it is also noticeable that the geographical distribution of the other Asian fragments remain in remarkably close proximity to Cyzicus. Hence, if Mucianus’ place of residence during the reign of Claudius was not Cyzicus, it was almost certainly some location nearby. Possibly, Syme has neglected other candidates, however. The isles of the Aegean archipelago were favoured sites of

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242 Pausanias, *HP.*, 7.46.4.
243 Pliny, *NH.*, 13, Pausanias, *HP.*, 4.36.5. The city itself had retained a great deal of wealth – ostensibly due to the fact that, despite the revocation of Cyzicus’ status as *civitas libera* during the reign of Tiberius (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 4.36.), the city itself had continued to flourish throughout the early Empire – possessing almost total dominion of the lands to the south of the Propontis.
244 On Antonia Tryphaena see *PIR2,* A, 900. On her family see Sullivan, R., “Antonia Tryphaena,” in *ANRW,* vol. 7.2 (1979), 922-923.
245 ‘Excessive self-indulgence, when he had leisure.’ (Syme, R., “Pliny the Procurator.”: 204., Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.10.)
246 On Cyzicus directly, see fragments 28 (Pliny, *NH.*, 31.19.) and 29 (ibid., 32.62.). See Figure 1 in chapter one for the relevant fragments in Asia Minor – particularly frag. 20 (ibid., 11.167.) in Ephesus. Syme also notes that, on the basis of Mucianus’ apparent taste for oysters, Cyzicus should be a favoured candidate for his retreat. The Hellespont, according to Catullus, was noted precisely for its famously-attested oyster. (Syme, R., “Pliny the Procurator.”: 204. Citing Catullus, *Frag.*, 1.)
exile for disgraced Romans from at least the first century BC onwards. Delos served as the site of exile for at least one of the victims of the lex Varia, one Mummius Achaiacus. Following Augustus’ institution of greater penalties from those aquae et ignis interdiction in 12 AD, relegation of exiles to the Cyclades became commonplace – particularly the islands of Gyaros, Serifos, Andros and Amorgos. Certainly, the Cyclades feature numerous times in the fragments of Mucianus contained within the Naturalis Historia; and the amicus displays a particular interest in the religious topography of both Andros and Delos. Delos might be favoured as a location for Mucianus’ exile on the grounds that, during the previous century, the island had served as a free port and competitor to Rhodes. However, the island had long since declined as a cultural centre by the turn of the millennium – in no small part due to its sacking at the hands of Menophaneses in 88 BC.

Alternatively, we might also consider several cities along the Anatolian coast. Smyrna and Ephesus feature in the fragments and, like Cyzicus, afforded luxuries of the variety that fascinated Mucianus. Smyrna, furthermore, offered a bustling port and thus a central point from which the amicus could tour the Cyclades and the Propontis. Additionally, it had already acted as a refuge for one of the most notorious exiles from the late Republic, Publius Rutilius Rufus (cos. 105

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247 Hence, Juvenal’s Aegean islands ‘crowded with Great exiles.’ (Juvenal, Sat., 13.246-247.)
249 Numerous examples of individuals deported to the region are collected by Braginton. (Braginton, M.V., “Exile Under the Roman Emperors.” The Classical Journal 39:7 (1944): 394f.)
250 See frags. 1 (Pliny, NH., 2.231.), 3 (ibid., 4.66.), 4 (ibid., 4.67.), 27 (ibid., 31.16.).
251 Strabo, Geog., 14.5.2. It could therefore have offered easy access to locations along the Anatolian coast.
252 Pausanias describes the island as almost deserted by the second century AD. (Pausanias, HP., 3.23., 8.33., 9.34.)
254 Ibid., 1016.
255 One should note, in any case, that it is unlikely that Mucianus was relegated to a single location. Tacitus, after all, states that he merely gave the appearance of an exile. 256 It is therefore also possible that Mucianus simply followed a pattern that would later be replicated on a grander scale by the likes of Dio Chrysostom – namely, he eschewed a permanent residence entirely in favour of traversing the tourist trails of Asia Provincia. 257

2.4 Domitius Corbulo and Licinius Mucianus

It is not until the death of Claudius in 54 AD, and the reign of Nero, that we find any indication in the sources of Mucianus’ return to the *cursus honorum*. Remarkably enough, there is evidence to suggest that, upon returning to Roman political life, Mucianus achieved rapid ascendency – beginning, seemingly, with a command under the illustrious general, Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo. In 55 AD, Domitius Corbulo was appointed to a special command in the East as *legatus Augusti pro praetore retinendae Armeniae* with the task of ‘restor[ing] the heavily shattered Roman influence over Armenia’. 258 Corbulo’s successful campaign against the Armenian King Tiridates – waged from 55 until 60, encompassed numerous legions, auxiliary forces, and their *legati*, most of which had derived from the province of Syria. In early 55, Corbulo received two of the Syrian legions, *III Gallica* and *VI Ferrata*, as well as a sizeable chunk of the Syrian *auxilia* in addition to

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256 Even so, the historian’s wording does imply that Mucianus observed at least some of the same deprivations as those banished in an official capacity. From the time of Claudius, the minimum penalties applied to those exiled from a province involved removal from the province itself and debarment from Rome and Italy with no pre-specified place of residence. It also became conventional practice to ban the victim from their province of birth. (Braginton, M.V., “Exile Under the Roman Emperors.”: 392, n. 7, 9. citing Suetonius, *Div Claud.*, 23.2., Tacitus, *Ann.*, 14.41.) Hence, one wonders if Mucianus’ choice of an Eastern province as the location of his exile should constitute further circumstantial evidence of his birthplace in Spain.
257 Ibid., 392.
the *cohortes* and *alae* which already resided in Cappadocia. By the end of 58, Corbulo accumulated, in addition to his existing forces, *legio IV Scythica, alae* and *cohortes peditatae* from Moesia and a further detachment from the Syrian legion *X Fretensis*.\(^{259}\) It was, therefore, with the combined forces of *III Gallica, VI Ferrata* and *IV Scythica*, as well as elements of the legion *X Fretensis* that Corbulo launched his offensive against Tiridates in 58 – and in two successive campaigns succeeded in the capture of Artaxata and Tigranocerta and subduing the entirety of Armenia.\(^{260}\)

The most striking evidence for a relationship between Mucianus and Corbulo is contained within Pliny’s *Naturalis Historia*. As numerous observers, including Syme and Borghesi, have noted, in the fifth book of his history Pliny records in the same textual context that, along with Corbulo, Mucianus reached the source of the Euphrates.\(^{261}\) Fittingly, both Syme and, most recently, Vervaet accept this as evidence that Mucianus was *legatus legionis* under Corbulo around 58 AD.\(^{262}\) The precise reasoning behind this conclusion, however, requires further explanation. It should be noted, in the first place, that the fragment in question unequivocally references the personal autopsy of both Mucianus and Corbulo: *ut prodidere ex iis, qui proxime viderant*.\(^{263}\) The fragment, therefore, can almost certainly be linked to Mucianus’ personal experience, rather than a second hand

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\(^{261}\) Frag. 7 (Pliny, *NH.*, 5.83.). ‘Mount Aga’ here is almost certainly an error. It is likely that Corbulo was referring to ‘Mount Abus’ – which is cited by Strabo (Strabo, *Geog.*, 11.14.2.). Both the ‘Capotes’ and ‘Abus’ are situated in the same mountain range – stretching from the Araxes to the Euphrates. (Cf. Smith, W., *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1854), 1115.)


\(^{263}\) ‘…as has been stated by two of the persons who have seen it nearest to its source.’
account. In addition, the mere fact that Pliny records both Corbulo and Mucianus’ divergent opinions on the subject of the Euphrates simultaneously indicates a high likelihood that the original accounts were recorded in concert – that is, they indicate a personal disagreement on the part of Mucianus and Corbulo.264 There is also considerable circumstantial evidence. In the first place, it is likely no coincidence that Mucianus himself frequently invokes the name of Corbulo. Certainly, in the discussions among the Syrian, Judaean and Egyptian legati at Mount Carmel in June 69, Mucianus makes a point of reminding his colleagues of the fate of the general.265 More importantly, it is also evident that not one legatus legionis is on record for the Corbulonian legion VI Ferrata for the entire period between 19 AD until ca. 79 AD – leaving ample room for Mucianus’ tenure as legionary legate.266 There are, admittedly, alternative candidates who might also have served as legatus of VI Ferrata – namely Marcus Vettius Bolanus (cos suff. 66) and Lucius Verulanus Severus (cos suff. ca. 66). We know that both Bolanus and Severus, commanding the legions IV Scythica and XII Fulminata, were dispatched to Armenia together in 61 AD.267 Bolanus, if Statius is to be believed, was a close amicus of Corbulo and it is not difficult to believe that he may have served as such in his capacity as legate of one of the Armenian legions under

264 It would be a remarkable coincidence, in any case, if Corbulo and Mucianus had visited the Abus mountain range at different times. It would represent an aberration in Mucianus’ fragments – there are few other times during Mucianus’ career, outside of the period in which Corbulo was active in Armenia (58-63), within which Mucianus may have personally visited the region. He was almost certainly languishing on the Propontis, or nearby, prior to Nero’s accession in 54, in 60 he was likely pre-occupied with the governance of Lycia-Pamphylia, by 64 he was probably back in Rome and by 67 he was in Syria.

265 an excidit trucidatus Corbulo? (‘Have you forgotten how Corbulo was murdered?’ – Tacitus, Hist., 2.76.) See also the ostensible pronouncement of Mucianus below with regard to the tax laws in Palmyra in which Mucianus extols the ‘excellent Corbulo’.


Corbulo in 58-9. Severus, for his part, is recorded explicitly as legatus under Corbulo by Tacitus. Of which legions Severus and Bolanus were legati cannot be known – suffice to say that they certainly commanded III Gallica, VI Ferrata or the vexillatio of X Fretensis. It is noticeable, in any case, that Mucianus displays a particular affinity for legio VI Ferrata – particularly during the years 67-69. As shall be referenced below, there is evidence to suggest that Nero’s stationing of Mucianus as legatus Augusti pro praetore in Syria – in command of legio VI Ferrata, IV Scythica and XII Fulminata, may have been at least partially a result of his earlier experience as legate of the former legion. Moreover, in the year 69, it would be VI Ferrata that would serve as the vanguard of the Flavian forces’ march through Asia Minor, with Mucianus at the helm. There is, therefore, a high likelihood not only that Mucianus served under Corbulo but, moreover, that he served as legatus legionis of VI Ferrata.

2.5 Mucianus’ Governorship of Lycia-Pamphylia

Mucianus’ fortunes, following his appointment as a legionary legate under Corbulo in the East during the reign of Nero recovered even further with a subsequent appointment to a governorship

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270 The final legatus may have been Cornelius Flaccus (PIR2, C, 1392) who appears to have also served under Corbulo in 58. (Tacitus, Ann., 13.39.) It is also worth noting that Severus acquired a suffect consulship only two years after Mucianus. Perhaps this is indicative of a series of honours handed out to those responsible for the successful offensives of 58-60 – wherein Mucianus would be one of the initial recipients but Severus’ would have been delayed due to his continued activities in Adiabene in 61. (See Gallivan, P.A., “Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero.”: 303., Syme, R., Tacitus, 826. And “Missing Persons II.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 8 (1959): 207.)
271 See the discussion below on Mucianus’ Syrian governorship. The death of Corbulo in 67 AD was seemingly not taken lightly by the Syrian legions in 67 AD (including VI Ferrata) – as evidenced by the fact that Vespasian, the reigning governor of Syria ca. 66-67, was compelled to restore discipline among the legions in the province. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 4.6.) Mucianus’ prompt appearance in the region in August/September 67, at the behest of Nero, was likely no coincidence.
272 See ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’.
in the province of Lycia-Pamphylia ca. AD 58-60.\textsuperscript{273} There is, in fact, considerable scholarly
debate over whether Pamphylia and Lycia constituted separate provinces in the time of Nero.\textsuperscript{274}
Nevertheless, epigraphic as well as literary evidence for Mucianus’ governorship of the region is
abundant. Initially, we have two fragments, derived from Mucianus’ own testimony, which
explicitly identify him as a former governor of the province of Lycia.\textsuperscript{275} Second, we also have
fragments recorded by Pliny which can be circumstantially linked to the discharge of Mucianus’
oficial duties during his tenure as governor of the province. For instance, as Williamson notes,
Mucianus’ anecdote concerning the \textit{anthias} fish appears as ‘less a tourist tale than a legal case
relating to a dispute between two partners in a fishery business, which had presumably come to
Mucianus’ attention in his official capacity as governor’.\textsuperscript{276} Aside from literary evidence contained
within the \textit{Naturalis Historia}, we also have some inscriptions attestations. In addition to the
aforementioned dedications recording the conferral of citizenships upon two brothers – Mousaius
and Thoas, one further dedication, also discovered at Oenoander in northern Lycia, refers to
Mucianus explicitly as ‘propraetorian legate of Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus’\textsuperscript{277}
We also have a third inscription from Attaleia in Pamphylia which identifies Mucianus again as

\textsuperscript{273} Pliny, \textit{NH.}, 5.83.
\textsuperscript{274} Syme, R., “Pamphylia from Augustus to Vespasian,” in Syme, R., \textit{Roman Papers}, vol. 1., ed. E. Badian (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979), 42. And see ‘Appendix I: Lycia and Pamphylia Under Nero’.
\textsuperscript{275} Frag. 21 (ibid., 12.9) and 22 (ibid., 13.88). Both fragments identify Mucianus as having been recently governor of
Lycia – in Pliny’s words, \textit{Licinius Mucianus ter consul et nuper provinciae eius (Lyciae) legatus} (‘Licinius Mucianus,
who was three times consul and recently governor of the province (of Lycia)’ – ibid., 12.9).
\textsuperscript{276} Likewise, Mucianus’ tale of an unnaturally large plane tree is directly associated with his role as governor – as we
are informed, Mucianus used the location to ‘hold a banquet with eighteen members of his retinue inside the tree’. Williamson,
G., “Mucianus and a Touch of the Miraculous: Pilgrimage and Tourism in Roman Asia Minor,” in J. Elsner, I. Rutherford (eds.),
Baldwin, B., “Pliny the Elder and Mucianus.”: 298. And frag. 26 (ibid., 21.33.) which utilizes Mucianus as the authority for the assertion that ‘in Lycia after six or seven years [Saffron]
is transplanted to a well-dug bed; in this way it recovers from degeneration.’
\textsuperscript{277} \textit{OGIS.}, 558 = \textit{ILS.}, 8816.
‘propraetorian legate of Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus’. Finally, we have another inscription, discovered at the so-called ‘Sebasteion’ in the city of Bubon during the 1960s, recording a dedication in honour of Mucianus:

Βουβωνέων ἢ βουλῆ καὶ ὁ δῆ–
μος ἀφιέρωσεν διὰ Γάϊου Λι–
κινίου Μουκιανοῦ πρεσ–
βευτοῦ [Νέρωνος] Σεβαστοῦ
ἀντιστρατήγου.279

The question of when to place Mucianus’ governorship of the region is problematic, however. Several solutions have been offered by modern scholars. William Mitchell Ramsay concluded, in two separate studies during the 1930s, that the most likely date of Mucianus’ governorship was 53-54 AD – just prior to the alleged tenure of one Tiberius Plautius Silvanus Aelianus (cos. suff. 45, II 74) as legatus of Lycia.280 Even discounting the fact that Ramsay places Mucianus’ governorship prior to death of Claudius in 54 when, undoubtedly, Mucianus was still residing in Asia Minor, Ramsay’s conclusion is problematic. The author asserts, based on the dubious

278 AE, 1915, 48.
279 ‘The name of Nero has been seemingly effaced from the inscription. Nonetheless, reconstructed, the inscription reads: ‘[· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·] the council and the people of Boubon dedicated (the statue or the building) through Gaius Licinius Mucianus, provincial governor of the Emperor [Nero].’ As Jones highlights, the expression διὰ Γάϊου Λικίνιου Μουκιανοῦ does not indicate the specific contribution of Mucianus to the dedication. Mucianus may have been the initiator of the honourary act (presumably described in the lost section of the inscription) or he may have assisted in its realisation in one way or another. Either way, the mere fact that the inscription describes the dedication as having taken place ‘through’ Mucianus indicates the necessity of his consent as imperial representative in the province. (Jones, C.P., “Some new inscriptions from Bubon,” Istanbuler Mitteilungen 27/28 (1977/78 [1979]): 291.) The inscriptions from the Sebasteion of Bubon, with the statues were published jointly by J. Inan. (AE, 1981, 789 – 793. and Kokkinia, C. (ed.), “Boubon, The Inscriptions and Archaeological Remains.” Meletemata 60 (Athens, 2008): 34-52, n. 6, 8-10, 12-20.)

assumption that the Plautius Silvanus attested in SEG, 4.646 refers to a Plautius Silvanus legatus Lyciae instead of the Marcus Plautius Silvanus (cos ord. 2 BC) of Augustan fame to which the titulus is usually attributed, that Lycia must have constituted a separate entity ca. 54 AD.\textsuperscript{281} However, there is no reason to doubt Dio’s assertion that Lycia had been attached to Pamphylia by Claudius ca. 43, nor is there, for that matter, any reason to assume that Mucianus acquired the post of a propraetorian legate during the early 50s and then immediately regressed to the status of a legatus legionis ca. 56.\textsuperscript{282} A more reasonable solution is offered by Syme who, in two separate analyses, including his monumental work ‘Tacitus’, offers the year 58 – or slightly afterwards, subsequent to Mucianus’ service as legionario legate under Corbulo, as the most likely date of Mucianus governorship in Lycia-Pamphylia.\textsuperscript{283} Vervaet concurs partially with Syme’s conclusion with the added comment that it was likely immediately following the Armenian campaign of 58-9 AD and perhaps due to a recommendation from Corbulo himself that Mucianus’ acquired the governorship.\textsuperscript{284} This latter date would seem more probable. If we can indeed conclude that Mucianus served as legionario legate in the Corbulonian legions then this date would fall in adequately with the logical progression of Mucianus’ cursus honorum – namely that he progressed from the position of legatus legionis under Corbulo to a legate of praetorian rank in 60, following the conclusion of Corbulo’s Armenian campaign and the departure of the Corbulonian forces –

\textsuperscript{281} According to Ramsay, the titulus in question, which was found in Attaleia, may have instead been transferred from Aperlai or another location along the Lycian coast ca. 912-1916 AD and instead commemorates a legatus under Nero of Lycian origin rather than M. Plautius Silvanus (cos. 2 BC). (ibid.)

\textsuperscript{282} See ‘Appendix I: Lycia and Pamphylia Under Nero’.


including *VI Ferrata* to the province of Syria.\textsuperscript{285} In fact, the situation may be reconstructed as follows. We know, thanks to epigraphic evidence, that Eprius Marcellus was *legatus Augusti propraetore Lyciae* and, if Dio can be believed, *legatus* of both Lycia and Pamphylia ca. 54 AD.\textsuperscript{286} When Corbulo was appointed to resolve the Armenian crisis in 56, a large scale reorganisation of the Anatolian provinces took place. Thereafter, a temporary division occurred wherein the province of Pamphylia was attached to Corbulo’s command in Cappadocia-Galatia – under the authority of Gaius Rutilius Gallicus.\textsuperscript{287} Following the removal of the Pamphylia from his authority, Marcellus continued to serve as *legatus Augusti propraetore* of Lycia from 56 onwards – an assumption which is further supported by Tacitus’ remark that only the Lycians brought a lawsuit against the *legatus* ca. 57.\textsuperscript{288} With the conclusion of the initial Armenian campaign in 60, however, and Corbulo’s cumulation, in addition to Cappadocia-Galatia, of the Syrian province, the strategic link

\textsuperscript{285} Rather than the opposite – which would have Mucianus regressing from *legatus Augusti pro praetore*. See above for the Armenian campaign of Corbulo and also Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.”: 437-8.

\textsuperscript{286} *AE*, 1956, 186. See also Dio’s comment that Claudius ‘reduced to servitude the Lycians, who rising in revolt had slain some Romans, and merged them in the prefecture of Pamphylia.’ (Dio, *Hist.*, 50.17.) Curiously, the perception that Lycia remained a distinct province until the reign of Vespasian has persisted (cf. Zimmermann, M., “Lycia et Pamphylia.” *Der Neue Pauly* 7 (1999): 537., Sahin, S., Adak, M., *Stadiasmus Patarensis: Itinera Romana Provinciae Lyciae* (İstanbul: Yayınlari, 2007), 85f.). This cannot be the case, however – as evidenced by the inscription mentioning Mucianus’ tenure in Pamphylia. (*AE*, 1915, 48.)

\textsuperscript{287} See ‘Appendix I: Lycia and Pamphylia Under Nero’. One additional interesting, but seemingly unfounded, interpretation is that Lycia and Pamphylia persisted as a single province under Eprius Marcellus ca. 56-7 and Mucianus in the years thereafter. However, the province itself retained only the name ‘Lycia’ – hence, accounting for the difficulties involved in Marcellus’ designation only as *legatus Augusti propraetore Lyciae* without the addition of Pamphylia. (Hort, F.J.A., *The First Epistle of St Peter 1.1-11.17: The Greek Text with Introductory Lecture, Commentary and Additional Notes* (London, New York: Macmillan and Co., 1898), 162-163.)

\textsuperscript{288} Vervaet, F.J., “CIL ix 3426: A new light on Corbulo’s career, with special reference to his official mandate in the East from AD 55 to AD 63.”: 583-4. Citing Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.33. See again *AE*, 1956, 186. for further confirmation that Marcellus governed only Lycia ca. 57 AD. This, admittedly, presents a difficulty. Should we assume, as Borghesi did, that Marcellus was in Rome answering his accusers in 57 and had therefore concluded his tenure in the province, we are left with a considerable gap prior to Mucianus’ governorship in 60. (Borghesi, B., *Oeuvres completes de Bartolomeo Borghesi: oeuvres épigraphiques* 2, Vol. 3, 286.) One might be inclined to hypothesise that an unknown candidate filled this gap or, otherwise, that Marcellus governed *in absentia*. 92
between Galatia and Pamphylia was rendered obsolete.\textsuperscript{289} Pamphylia and Lycia were then once again united under Mucianus in 60.\textsuperscript{290}

Whether Mucianus’ promotion to the position of \textit{legatus Augusti pro praetore} was a direct result of Corbulo’s recommendation, on the other hand, cannot be known. There is a dearth of evidence to support such a conclusion. If we could follow with any degree of certainty Statius’ assertion that Pamphylia had been attached to Corbulo’s command of Cappadocia-Galatia during the mid-50s AD then, perhaps, we might be able to establish a clearer link between Mucianus’ subsequent governorship of the region and a Corbulonian recommendation.\textsuperscript{291} It is likely that Nero drew upon a contiguous pool of qualified individuals who already had experience in the region, namely Corbulo’s personal retinue of \textit{legati}, when searching for a viable candidate for the now-vacant position of \textit{legatus propraetore} of Lycia-Pamphylia.\textsuperscript{292} The mere fact that other viable candidates were not selected over Mucianus is perhaps indicative of the fact that the \textit{amicus} had acquired some degree of favour from Corbulo. Undoubtedly, Bolanus and Severus were both equally viable candidates for the propraetorian legateship yet, as we know from the literary sources, both individuals persisted in their role as legionary \textit{legati} throughout the year 61.\textsuperscript{293} 

\textsuperscript{289} On the strategic link, see Vervaet, F.J., “CIL ix 3426: A new light on Corbulo’s career, with special reference to his official mandate in the East from AD 55 to AD 63.”: 586.

\textsuperscript{290} Curiously, Brunn, apparently without the knowledge of the addition of Pamphylia to Mucianus’ command, placed Mucianus’ governorship in 61 – after Corbulo’s accumulation of the Syrian command in 60. (Brunn, L., \textit{De C. Licinio Muciano}, 11.)

\textsuperscript{291} Statius, \textit{Silvae}, 1.4.76. and ‘Appendix I: Lycia and Pamphylia Under Nero’.

\textsuperscript{292} See below on Mucianus and Vespasian’s Syrian governorships.

\textsuperscript{293} We know from Tacitus that, in 61 AD, both Bolanus and Severus were dispatched, along with \textit{IV Scythica} and \textit{XII Fulminata}, to assist Tigranes. (Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, 15.3.)
2.6 Mucianus’ Consulship of 64 AD

Following Mucianus’ tenure as legatus Augusti pro praetore in Lycia-Pamphylia, he acquired a further honour in the form of an appointment to a suffect consulship at some point during the mid-60s AD. No date for Mucianus’ consulship is attested in the literary sources and inscriptive evidence is sparse. Even so, excepting unusual circumstances, the regular practice adopted by the Caesars entailed promotion from a praetorian governorship to the consulate relatively quickly. Further, there is some degree of epigraphic evidence in the form of a set of Herculaneum tablets, published by Carratelli and Ruiz between 1946 and 1953, which record Mucianus, along with Quintus Fabius Barbarus Antonius Macer as having been in office as consul between the dates of 10 July and 1 October of an indeterminate year. Even though we know for certain the duration of Mucianus’ tenure as consul suffectus, however, the specific date of Mucianus’ time in office is once again problematic. As will be detailed below, we know from both literary evidence and epigraphic evidence that Mucianus acquired a governorship of Syria – almost certainly succeeding the tenure of Vespasian in the region in August-September of 67 AD. The post was reserved for a consularis. Hence, Mucianus’ consulship must fall somewhere before 67 AD. Various dates have been suggested, extending from 54 until as late as 67. However, a convincing clarification is


296 See here ‘2.7 Mucianus’ Syrian Command’, below.

provided by Gallivan. Notwithstanding the fact that a date of ca. 60 or earlier would be dangerously close to Mucianus’ governorship of Lycia-Pamphylia, July suffects are already known for the years 60-63 as well as 65.\textsuperscript{298} As Gallivan notes, the year 66 is also possible – but is too close to Mucianus’ Syrian governorship. Moreover, the year 66 AD is more readily filled by two other \textit{consules suffecti} – Appius Annius Gallus (\textit{cos suff. ca. 66}) and L. Verulanus Severus.\textsuperscript{299} Thus, we are left with one final possible date – July-October AD 64.\textsuperscript{300}

\textsuperscript{298} The epigraphic evidence is recorded by Gallivan, P.A., “Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero.”: 293-4 and he provides a revised list of Neronian \textit{fasti} on 309. As the author notes, the identities of the \textit{consules suffecti} for the year 60 AD, Gaius Velleius Paterculus and Marcus Manlius Vopiscus (\textit{AE}, 1929, 161, Carratelli, G.P., “\textit{Tabulae Herculanensees I.”}, 382.), are almost certain. The July \textit{consules suffecti} for the other relevant years are, respectively, Gnaeus Pedanius Salinator and Lucius Velleius Paterculus in AD 61 (\textit{CIL}, 16.4 = \textit{ILS}, 1987.). Lucius Afinius Gallus and an unknown colleague in 62 AD who seemingly remained in office as irregular \textit{consules ordinarii} throughout the latter half of the year, Quintus Manlius Tarquitius Saturninus and Titus Petronius Niger in AD 63 (Carratelli, G.P., “\textit{Tabulae Herculanensees I.”}: 381., “\textit{Tabulae Herculanensees III.”}: 458, 460.) and, finally, Gaius Pomponius Pius and Gaius Ancius Cerealis in 65 AD. (\textit{CIL}, 4.2551 = \textit{ILS}, 8584.)

\textsuperscript{299} Gallivan, P.A., “Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero.”: 305., cf. Eck, W., “\textit{Ergänzungen zu den Fasti Consulares des 1. Und 2. Jh.n.Chr.}” \textit{Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte} 24:2 (1975): 337. for the observation that Mucianus’ Syrian governorship in 67 demanded at least a year interval prior – thus discounting 66 as a possibility. The epigraphic evidence for Gallus and Severus’ suffect consulships is found in \textit{CIL}, 6.10055 = \textit{ILS}, 5268. The evidence cites the pair as suffect consuls on 23 August – indicating that they were regular July suffects. There is some confusion as to whether Gallus and Severus were in office in 66 or 67, yet, as both Gallivan and Syme conclude, 66 represents the more likely date on the basis that M. Annius Afrinus and C. Paccius Africanus are the more probable candidates for AD 67. (Gallivan, P.A., “Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero.”: 304 and Syme, R., \textit{Tacitus}, 826.)

2.7 Mucianus’ Syrian Command

Mucianus’ steady stream of honours, following his return from exile in 54 AD, reached its apex in the spring of 67 AD – with a final appointment to the position of legatus Augusti pro praetore of the province of Syria. Both the date and the evidence for the existence of this latter praetorian legateship are comparatively easier to determine. We have, in the first place, the explicit statements of both Tacitus and Josephus. Tacitus, at the outset of his account of the year 69, informs us that ‘Syria and its four legions were under the command of Licinius Mucianus, a man whose good and bad fortune were equally famous.’ Suetonius concurs, citing Mucianus as the commander of the Syrian army ca. 69 – as does Josephus, who informs us that, in late 68 or early 69, the future Emperor Vespasian had conducted diplomatic relations with the Syrian legate through his son Titus. Second, we also have a single fragment derived from Mucianus’ work which can likely be attributed to his Syrian legateship. As we hear from Pliny, it is on the authority of Mucianus that, between the Syrian city of Joppa and the island of Arados ‘fresh water is brought up from a spring at the bottom of the sea, which is 75 feet deep, by means of a leather pipe’. Finally, we have some amount of epigraphic evidence. Mucianus is attested directly in AE, 1947, 166 and we have several further inscriptions which can be attributed to the amicus – for instance, a pronouncement of the legatus Augusti pro praetore of Syria preserved in the Palmyrene tariff.

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301 Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.
302 Suetonius, Div. Vesp. 6., Josephus, BJ, 2.14-20. See also AJ, 12.3.1. for Mucianus seemingly preserving the privileges of the Jews during his Syrian command – particularly with regard to the profits acquired from oil.
303 Frag. 8 (Pliny, NH., 51.128.)
304 The tariff is preserved in CIS, vol. 2, 3.3193. and in a less complete form in IGR, 1056. A full translation can be found in Cooke, G.A., A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903), 313-40. The relevant section is found at 330. The pronouncement reads: ‘As for provisions, I decree that a tax of one denarius should be exacted according to the law for each load imported from outside the borders of Palmyra or exported there; but those who convey provisions to the villages or from them should be exempt, according to the concession made to them . . . As for camels, if they are brought in from outside the borders whether loaded or unloaded, one denarius is
For the date of Mucianus’ Syrian command, we have several indications in the sources. It is traditionally held that Mucianus’ Syrian legateship succeeded that of Gaius Cestius Gallus (cos suff. 42). In 63 AD, following the failure of Lucius Junius Caesennius Paetus (cos ord. 61) at Rhandeia, Nero granted Corbulo a second extraordinary command – spanning across both Cappadocia and Syria and including all seven legions of the Syrian army. Cestius Gallus, likely around the same time, was granted tenure as legatus Augusti propraetore of Syria to oversee the civil administration of the province. Following the recall of Corbulo in 66, his forces fell under the command of Gallus, who assembled an army with combined vexillationes from III Gallica, VI Ferrata and X Fretensis along with the the entirety of XII Fulminata before his march to Jerusalem. Subsequently, after his defeat at Beth Horon, Cestius continued to hold office for a short period during the following year before dying whereupon, it is assumed, by the likes of Morgan, Gallivan and Wiedemann, that Mucianus succeeded him as Syrian legate. There is a
due for each camel according to the law, as was confirmed also by the excellent Corbulo in his letter to Barbarus.’ As evidenced partially by the legatus’ extolling of Corbulo, the pronouncement can almost certainly be linked to Mucianus. This is also the opinion shared by Seyrig, H., “Le Statut de Palmyre.” Syria 22:2 (1941): 165-67. See also Matthews, J.F., “Tax Law of Palmyra: Evidence for Economic History in the City of the Roman East.” The Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984): 179, n. 28. See here also the coinage from Mucianus tenure as governor in Syria during the reign of Galba and Otho in Eckhel, vol. 3, 282., Mionnet, vol. 5, 169, suppl. Vol. 8. 131., BMC, Syria, 176. 305 See here, for instance, Morgan, M.G., 69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors, 174.


307 Gallus was, at least prior to 66, responsible only for the civil administration of the province and not any military functions: Syriaeque executio C. Cestio, copiae militares Corbuloni permisssae: et quinta decima legio ducente Mario Celso e Pannonia adiecta est. (‘The administration of Syria was entrusted to C. Cestius, and the military forces to Corbulo, to which was added the fifteenth legion, under the leadership of Marius Celsus, from Pannonia.’ – Tacitus, Ann., 15.25.) Cf. Josephus, Vita, 8., 308 Josephus, BJ, 2.499, 544. The presence of a vexillatio of VI Ferrata in Gallus’ force would seemingly indicate that the entirety of Corbulo’s army was under Gallus’ command. (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 114.) For the campaign see Josephus, Vita, 8, 43, 65, 67, 71.

problem, however. We do not know when Mucianus arrived in Syria, but it appears that it was not before the summer of 67 – several months after the death of Gallus. The earliest mention of Mucianus in the literary sources is not until October 67, during the siege of Gamala, when, according to Josephus, Titus was dispatched by Vespasian to meet with Mucianus who was now residing in Syria.\footnote{Josephus, BJ., 2.14-20.}

There is, nonetheless, a further consideration. We know that in 66 AD, T. Flavius Vespasianus was assigned a special command as legatus Augusti pro praetore exercitus Iudaici in the east with the task of settling the revolt in Judaea after Gallus’ failure.\footnote{Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.} The reasons for his appointment have served as a matter of considerable scholarly debate. Suetonius offers up the explanation that Vespasian was a commander of ‘tried energy’ and his family’s reputation, having derived from an equestrian lineage, need not be feared.\footnote{Ibid., 4.5.} There are other considerations, however. By mid-winter 66, the situation in Judaea had taken a dire turn. Some six thousand Roman soldiers had fallen outside the walls of Jerusalem and the violence had already begun to spread to neighbouring provinces.\footnote{On Cestius Gallus’ disastrous campaign, see Tacitus, Hist., 5.10. and Josephus, BJ., 2.540f. Josephus details the extent of the Roman casualties at 2.555. Syria was unaffected, but the conflict spread over into the large Jewish community in Alexandria and Tiberius Julius Alexander was forced to commit two legions to stem the violence. (Josephus, BJ., 2.494-497.)} Certainly, Nero needed to quickly find a new candidate to deal with the situation and, as a result, some emphasis has been placed on the fact that Vespasian was immediately available among the ranks of the emperor’s comites in Greece.\footnote{Nero’s tour of Greece is dealt with in acute detail by Dio (Hist., 63.8f.). The full list of Nero’s comites is not known. Most of the known personages are gleaned from Dio’s account (particularly ibid., 63.10-14.). The number of explicitly-named members of senatorial or equestrian status is strikingly small, although it is likely that other unnamed members were present – for instance, one Gaius Paccius Africanus. (Bradley, K.R., “Nero’s Retinue in Greece, Ch. 6.)} However, we should be wary of reckoning

Vespasian’s appointment as a matter of simple convenience.\textsuperscript{315} Nero’s Hellenic tour had a more ambitious goal than merely exhibiting the emperor’s talents as a public performer. Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio alike refer to Nero’s plans to launch an Eastern offensive through the Caucasas with the intention of subjugating the Sarmatian peoples north of the Darial Pass.\textsuperscript{316} Vespasian’s selection as the emperor’s comes in 66, then, was likely no accident. He was a decorated military commander and senior consular, and therefore Nero could well have intended that Vespasian would serve as one of the leading commanders in his expedition against the Sarmatians.\textsuperscript{317}

\textsuperscript{315} The argument that Vespasian’s appointment was a fortunate coincidence resulting from his presence in Nero’s retinue and the urgent nature of the mission is advanced by Nicol, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 25-26. and Jones, B., \textit{The Emperor Titus} (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 20.

\textsuperscript{316} The key ancient sources each mention Nero’s planned Eastern campaign (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 63.8., Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.6., Suetonius, \textit{Div Ner.}, 19.), although there is some confusion over the emperor’s intended destination. An additional advance through Egypt towards Ethiopia may also have been discussed (cf. Pliny, \textit{NH.}, 6.181.). The matter has been dealt with in extensive detail by modern scholars (Garzetti, A., \textit{From Tiberius to the Antonines: A History of the Roman Empire AD 14-192} (New York: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1974), 181f., Mommsen, T., Dickson, W.P. (trans.), \textit{The Provinces of the Roman Empire: From Caesar to Diocletian}, vol. 2 (Chicago: Ares, 1886), 62f., Griffin, M.T., \textit{Nero: The End of a Dynasty}, 228f.)

\textsuperscript{317} Vespasian achieved significant military distinction as legate of \textit{II Augusta} during Claudius’ invasion of Britain in 43, including the \textit{ornamenta triumphalia}, and acquired a suffect consulship in 51. (Suetonius, \textit{Div Vesp.}, 4., \textit{PIR}2, F, 398.) It is true that two decades had passed since Vespasian’s last military experience, but there is further evidence to suggest that Vespasian held a position in Nero’s inner circle in 66. Vespasian’s loyal service as governor of Africa earned him neither wealth nor popularity, but a timely intervention in a grain supply crisis in 63 must have endeared him towards the emperor. (Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, 15.18. Cf. Garnsey, P., \textit{Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis} (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 224-225. and Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 23. for the grain crisis as the context for Vespasian’s unpopularity in Africa) Undoubtedly, Vespasian was one of Nero’s close advisors in Greece. His skills as an arbitrator were seemingly well-known among the Roman aristocracy (ibid., 24.) and he could well have counselled the emperor on the early preparations for the Eastern expedition. Circumstantial evidence may be derived from the accumulation of troops in Alexandria from the summer of 66. Apart from his creation of \textit{I Italica} (Suetonius, \textit{Div Ner.}, 19.), it also appears that Nero transferred some two thousand soldiers from Africa, seemingly \textit{vexillationes} of \textit{III Augusta}, which would have fallen under the command of Vespasian three years earlier. (Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 2.494.) Possibly, the detachment relocated to Alexandria was a concession to Vespasian – if the latter was indeed intended to take command of the force. Curiously, no further mention is made of the African contingent after this point. Morgan thinks the detachment must have returned to Africa by 68 (Morgan, M.G., \textit{69 A.D.: The Year of Four Emperors}, 293.), which may well be indicative of Nero’s strategic division of the Eastern command between Mucianus and Vespasian in 67 – as detailed below.
situation in Judaea rendered the prospect of immediately realising Nero’s Eastern campaign moot, but this only ensured that Vespasian’s appointment to the Judaean command was inevitable.\textsuperscript{318} On the other hand, whether Vespasian’s appointment was a partial result of third-party influence – namely that of Tiberius Julius Alexander and Marcus Julius Agrippa II, is difficult to discern.\textsuperscript{319} It is true that Tiberius Alexander had become personally invested in the Judaean conflict in his own right, by virtue of the fact that he had already committed two legions to stem the rising discontent in the Jewish quarter of Alexandria.\textsuperscript{320} There is also evidence to suggest that both individuals had close connections with Vespasian since the reign of Claudius.\textsuperscript{321} It seems unlikely, however, that Nero required much convincing. Certainly, he must have recognised the benefit of Vespasian’s pre-existing relationships with the key players currently involved in the Judaean conflict.\textsuperscript{322}

\textsuperscript{318} Later rumours indicated that Vespasian had fallen afool of Nero at an early point during the latter’s tour of Greece (Rudich, V., \textit{Political Dissidence Under Nero: The Price of Dissimulation} (United Kingdom: Routledge, 1993), 194. dates the incident to the late summer or early autumn of 66.). Dio and Suetonius report the incident in an appropriately dramatic fashion, the latter recording that one of Nero’s freedman, Phoebus, rudely rebuked the future emperor for falling asleep during Nero’s public performances. (Suetonius, \textit{Div Vesp.}, 4., Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.11.) The offence cannot have been too great. Only two or three months would pass before Vespasian received his appointment to the Judaean command. Further, Vespasian’s remarkably lenient treatment of Phoebus years later would have exceeded even Vespasian’s reputation for clemency – had the freedman truly placed the future emperor at risk of lethal retribution from Nero. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.1., Suetonius, \textit{Div Vesp.}, 14.) The source of the rumours, in any case, must have been Cluvius Rufus. Even as one of the more moderate primary sources for Nero’s reign, Rufus is less than congenial towards the emperor on more than one occasion (for instance, the unflattering anecdote reproduced by Tacitus at \textit{Ann.}, 14.2.). A consular in his own right, Rufus must too have had a vested interest in making the entire affair in Greece look ridiculous – by virtue of the fact that the emperor compelled him to take up the humiliating role of imperial herald. (Suetonius, \textit{Div Ner.}, 21.2., Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 63.14.)

\textsuperscript{319} The evidence is cited at ibid., 25-26. The main connection here concerns Antonia Caenis, the freedwoman of Antonia Minor who became Vespasian’s mistress prior to and following Vespasian’s marriage to Flavia Domitilla Major between 38 and ca. 69. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.14., Suetonius, \textit{Div Vesp.}, 3, 21., \textit{Div Dom.}, 12.) Agrippa had been educated in Claudius’ court and thus could have known Vespasian from a relatively early date. (Josephus, \textit{AJ.}, 19.360.) Alexander’s family, on the other hand, had close connections with both the Herodes of Judaea and the household of Antonia Minor and Claudius. Josephus states that when Agrippa I was in financial strife, he obtained a sizeable loan from Alexander ‘the Alabarch’ – the father of Tiberius Alexander (ibid., 18.159.) and later married his daughter, Berenice, to Alexander’s son, M. Julius Alexander. Josephus also goes on to name the elder Alexander as a friend of Claudius and guardian of his mother Antonia’s property in Egypt. (ibid., 19.276.)

\textsuperscript{322} At the very least, Vespasian was capable of transitioning smoothly into the vacant command left by Gallus. Immediately upon arriving in Syria, apparently having sent word ahead, he rallied both his own and Agrippa II’s
However, for a command that demanded decisive military success, lest the conflict destabilise the Eastern provinces, the deciding factors were, first, Vespasian’s exemplary experience as legate of *II Augusta* in Britain some decades earlier, second, his apparent status as a loyal member of Nero’s immediate advisory circle.323

Determining how Nero divided up the civil and military responsibilities in Syria and Judaea is another matter altogether. According to Josephus, Vespasian was sent to ‘take command of the army in Syria’, presumably, as Nicols notes, as *legatus Augusti pro praetore communi ad exercitum qui est in Syria*, but this has also frequently been disputed.324 Modern scholars have frequently insisted that Josephus must have meant that Vespasian commanded only that part of the Syrian army that was destined for Judaea, including the legions V, X and XV, and cite Tacitus’ statements that ‘Licinius Mucianus governed Syria with four legions’ and that ‘the conduct of the Jewish War, with the command of three legions, lay in the hands of[…].’325 A summary

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323 Thus, Tacitus’ assessment of the outcome of the rebellion: *missu Neronis Vespasianus fortuna famaque et egregiis ministris intra duas aestates cuncta camporum omnisque praeter Hierosolyma urbis victore exercitu tenebat.* (‘Vespasian was sent by Nero, and by help of his good fortune, his high reputation, and his excellent subordinates, succeeded within the space of two summers in occupying with his victorious army the whole of the level country and all the cities, except Jerusalem.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 5.10.) On the more expansive threat of Parthian involvement and Eastern destabilization see Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 28. But contra. Morgan, who regards the Judaean revolt as an exaggerated affair, furnished by the ‘ax-grinding Josephus’. The latter author states that Vespasian’s appointment, again, was a matter of mere convenience: ‘if Nero decided that he needed a competent commander who could be sent to the area at once, and so had to pick somebody from his own entourage, Vespasian no doubt looked like the best choice.’ (Morgan, M.G., *69 A.D.: The Year of Four Emperors*, 174.)


refutation is furnished by Nicols, who observes initially that, contrary to the assumptions of the aforementioned scholars, the Tacitean passage in question describes the situation of early 69, not mid-winter 66/67. Secondly, he notes that Tacitus refers to Vespasian alone as the direct successor of Cestius Gallus. In Nicols’ reckoning, following Gallus’ defeat, Nero divided both the military and civil responsibilities – just as they had been between Corbulo and Gallus, and dispatched Vespasian to take command of the legions. When Vespasian arrived, however, he found Gallus either dead or near death and, consequently, even if he had not received an official appointment as commander of the armed forces in the region, nonetheless ‘effectively exercised that power throughout the spring and summer of 67’. It was Vespasian, then, rather than Cestius Gallus, who had effective control of the entire area, including Syria, until Mucianus arrived in August or September 67.

Nicols’ reconstruction of Vespasian’s command raises an important question, however. Why did Nero see fit to give Mucianus the position of propraetorian legate of Syria? Vervaet offers two probable raison d'être for Mucianus’ appointment to the important legateship of Syria. Initially, as a former legatus of the legion VI Ferrata, he may have been chosen to placate Corbulo’s clientes following the latter’s death earlier in the same year. Second, Nero must have also been made aware of Mucianus’ enmity towards Vespasian, who was now residing in neighbouring Judaea, and may therefore have appointed him to keep Vespasian himself in check. It is therefore likely, according to Vervaet, that Nero himself, by means of mandata, divided the Corbulonian legions between the two commanders in 67 AD. Undoubtedly, Nero displayed a great deal of common sense in his appointment of Vespasian to the Syrian governorship and the Judaean problem – yet it is clear

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327 Ibid., 113-114.
from the sources that this appointment was not without consequence. In the first place, if the aforementioned reconstruction of Vespasian’s command in Syria is accurate, then Vespasian must have inadvertently been placed in command of no less than seven legions ca. 66-67 AD – an extraordinary command which would have matched that of Corbulo’s ca. 63. More importantly, of these seven legions which were briefly under Vespasian’s command from mid-winter 66/67 to the summer of 67, all had served under Corbulo during the period 63-66 AD and three had served earlier, during the Armenian campaign of 58-60 AD (III Gallica, VI Ferrata and IV Scythica). Moreover, there is some suggestion in Suetonius that the Syrian legions were incensed over the fate of their former legate – as the historian records, when Vespasian arrived in Syria in 67, it was necessary for him to restore discipline among the legions: *correcta statim castrorum disciplina*. Nero would have been right to be nervous about such a large concentration of disgruntled legions. Thus, the *princeps* took two separate measures. Initially, Nero broke up the core of Corbulo’s former army – sending III Gallica to its former province of Moesia, removing V Macedonica, X Fretensis, XV Apollinaris to an officially-sanctioned Judaean command under Vespasian and leaving the three remaining legions – IV Scythica, VI Ferrata and XII Fulminata in Syria. Subsequently, Nero dispatched Mucianus, a man who not only had experience as *legatus legionis*

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330 Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 4.6. As shall be further elucidated in ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’, the forced suicide of Corbulo for what one might call treason in 67 AD had a disastrous effect on the Eastern legions – first and foremost because it had denied the senatorial and equestrian officers as well as the centurions a powerful patron.
331 On the removal of III Gallica to Moesia, see ibid., 6.3 and Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.74 – contra. *Hist.*, 2.4, 2.6. For the involvement of V Macedonica in Vespasian’s Jewish War see Josephus, BI, 3.65. and 5.41-2., for X Fretensis see involvement in siege of Jotapata (ibid., 3.222-240. and in the fighting around Joppa (Josephus, BJ., 3.290.) XV Apollinaris was commanded by Titus during the last phase of the Judaean rebellion (ibid., 4.237.). As early as autumn 66, V Macedonica, X Fretensis and XV Apollinaris arrived in Ptolemais, the city in which the legions formed to suppress the uprising were concentrated (ibid., 3.64.)
under Corbulo but, seemingly, had been a favoured *cliens* of the renowned general in his own right, to placate those of the remaining Corbulonian legions in Syria.332

There is no evidence, on the other hand, to support the assumption that Mucianus was poorly-disposed towards Vespasian prior to the former’s appointment to the Syrian legateship in 67. Both Tacitus and Suetonius certainly mention an unfriendly rivalry between the two men – Suetonius, in particular, attributing Mucianus’ ‘grudge’ to a ‘jealousy of which he had hitherto made no secret’.333 It is also true that, in book two of the *Historiae*, Tacitus goes to great lengths to draw a sharp contrast between the personalities of both Vespasian and Mucianus. In the Tacitean Mucianus we find a notorious exquisite whose capacity for diplomacy, intrigue and organization was un-matched – he was ‘eminent for his magnificence and wealth’ and ‘experienced in civil administration and in statesmanship’ but he lacked a military reputation.334 By contrast, Vespasian was the soldier *par excellence* – an expert in strategy and an energetic warrior whose bearing and dress, according to Tacitus, ‘hardly differed from the common soldier’.335 Despite Tacitus’ initial insinuations, however, the historian does little to enlighten us as to source of the feud or, indeed, the date of its instigation – all we hear from him is simply the comment: ‘governing as they did the neighbouring provinces of Judaea and Syria, jealousy at first led to quarrels.’336 Some clue as

332 See above discussion of Mucianus’ command in Lycia-Pamphylia for possible favour under Corbulo. The fact that *VI Ferrata* was left to Mucianus indicates some sort of logical distribution of the legions on the part of Nero. It is noticeable that no reprisals were made against the former officers of Corbulo under Nero. In fact, several, including Mucianus, Tiberius Alexander (prefect of Egypt from 66 onward – ibid., 2.309) and Titus Aurelius Fulvus, legate of *III Gallica* from 64 onward, continued to retain prestigious posts in the Empire. (see *ILS*, 232. for Fulvus’ command under Corbulo and Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.79. for his *ornamenta consularia*, awarded for his conduct against the Rhoxolani in the spring of 69) Perhaps this is indicative of a wider contingency plan on the part of Nero to ensure the continued loyalty of the Corbulonian legions.


334 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.5.

335 Ibid.

336 Ibid.
to the source of the feud may nonetheless be garnered from the political history of the Syrian province itself. Historically speaking, governors in Syria displayed a tendency to enter into altercations with generals on special missions who ‘abstracted troops, pulled rank and stole thunder’. It is possible that the relationship between Mucianus and Vespasian followed a similar pattern. Vespasian, we know, based his forces for some time in Syria. As Josephus informs us, upon his arrival in 66 AD, Vespasian did not enter the Judaean province immediately and instead gathered his forces in the Syrian city of Ptolemais. Further, he continued using the city as a base until July 67. Mucianus would not arrive in the region until at least a month later, however it is noticeable that Vespasian promptly transferred the location of his base-camp to Caesarea prior to Mucianus’ arrival. Thereafter, displaying pragmatism consistent with that demonstrated by Corbulo a decade earlier, Vespasian did not return across the border into Syria. Vespasian’s attempt to circumvent the inevitable problems arising from shared jurisdiction with Mucianus’ command was clearly not entirely successful, however. Syria, during this period, functioned as one of the most prestigious gubernatorial posts in the Empire insofar as it offered command over numerous legions, administrative and military jurisdiction over Syria proper, and also the

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337 Levick cites the clash between Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso’s (cos ord. 7 BC) and Germanicus Julius Caesar (cos ord. 12, II 18) in 19 AD as the most notorious example of such a dispute. However, she also observes that a similar dispute eventuated only thirty-six years later, in 55 AD, in which C. Ummidius Quadratus and Domitius Corbulo had also quarrelled – the former having protested that Corbulo had robbed him of the glory of the two men’s seemingly successful effort to bring the Parthian king Vologaeses to heel. (Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 45., citing Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.8-9. And Josephus, *BJ.*, 3.445., cf. Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 115, n. 11. for the same observation.)

338 Josephus, *BJ.*, 3.29, 3.64, 3.110. Jones sees this as the primary factor behind the hostility between Mucianus and Vespasian. (Jones, B., *The Emperor Titus*, 51.)

339 Ibid., 3.409.

340 Compare Vespasian’s behavior with Corbulo’s from 54 onwards. Upon receiving two legions and supporting auxilia from Quadratus in Cilicia, Corbulo immediately departed for the adjoining province of Galatia-Cappadocia. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.8.) When he finally did march to Armenia, however, he circumvented Syria entirely. Levies and supplies were drawn through Galatia-Cappadocia. (ibid., 13.35.)
responsibility for safeguarding the eastern provinces, including Judaea. Nero’s division of responsibilities effectively stunted Mucianus’ authority and prestige by reducing him to a purely administrative role without the mandate to intervene in Judaea. Understandably, then, Mucianus must have objected to Vespasian’s appropriation of Ptolemais in his absence and, further, that he would undoubtedly be required to provide continuing logistical support for the Judaean campaign – especially in light of the fact that he had no hope of achieving any distinctions in the event of a successful outcome. It appears likely, therefore, that the conflict Tacitus mentions between Mucianus and Vespasian developed as a result of immediate jurisdictional quarrels, rather than pre-existing animosity.

341 Judaea was annexed to Syria in 6 AD. (Josephus, A.J., 17.355.) Depending on how we interpret Tacitus and Josephus, it may have become an independent province in 44 AD or later – whereupon it fell under the authority of an equestrian procurator. (Cotton, H.M., “Some Aspects of the Roman Administration of Judaea/Syria-Palaestina,” in W. Eck (ed.), Lokale Autonomie und römische Ordnungsmacht in den kaiserzeitlichen Provinzen vom 1. bis 3. Jahrhundert (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 75-91. Cf. Mason, S. (ed.), Flavius Josephus: Translation and Commentary, vol. 1b (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 78f. who also deals with the confusion over the various designations of the equestrian governor as prefect and procurator). For the relationship between Judaea and Syria during the first century see Yoder, J., Representatives of Roman Rule (Germany: De Gruyter, 2014), 159, n. 119. When Judaea became an independent province, no legions were stationed in the region and the local garrison consisted entirely of a paltry auxiliary garrison – most of which was stationed with the equestrian governor in Caesarea. (Saddington places the garrison at no more than three thousand men – Saddington, D., “The administration and the army in Judaea in the early Roman period (From Pompey to Vespasian 63 BC – AD 79),” in M. Sharon (ed.), The Holy Land in History and Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 36.) Hence, the province was dependent on Syria for military aid in the event of a serious disturbance.

342 Levick observes that Cestius Gallus failure at Beth Horon likely stemmed from supply problems, especially for the cavalry. (Levick, B., Vespasian, 28.) This could be another reason for Mucianus’ appointment in Syria. His reputation as an efficient administrator must have been well known by this time.

343 This conflict would, therefore, largely mirror that which eventuated over a conflict of jurisdiction between Corbulo and the Syrian legate Ummidius Quadratus. Nero settled the latter conflict admirably – proclaiming that, for their joint successes, both should have their imperial fasces wreathed with laurel. (Tacitus, Ann., 13.8-9.) Nicols (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 115.) describes the conflict between Mucianus and Vespasian as one of ‘overlapping jurisdiction’, a conclusion also followed by Jones, B., The Emperor Titus, 51. and Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 90. This overlooks the fact that Vespasian departed Syria proper prior to Mucianus’ arrival – seemingly in an attempt to pre-empt any such issues arising from the overlapping commands. That the disagreement appears to have persisted until at least June 68 (Tacitus, Hist., 2.5.) suggests that more long-running issues were in play. Mucianus, at the very least, must have taken exception the fact that he was relegated to the position of providing passive logistical support while Vespasian, by all accounts, accumulated success after success.
2.8 Conclusion

Historical analyses of Mucianus’ early career have traditionally resorted to one of two approaches. The first, epitomised by the likes of Morgan, has tended to efface Mucianus’ career almost entirely – referring to the dearth of literary evidence as grounds for omitting any significant account of his *cursus honorum.*\(^{344}\) The second approach, exemplified by historians such as Levick and Wellesley, has tended to reduce Mucianus’ early career to a series of ‘unobtrusive’ distinctions, which, in the latter historian’s reckoning, were characteristic of the amicus’ alleged indifference to his own advancement.\(^{345}\) In fact, despite Mucianus’ sojourn in Asia Minor, which may have lasted almost a decade – from the mid-to-late 40s AD until at least 54 AD, it is evident that that Mucianus accelerated rapidly through the *cursus honorum.* His service during the Corbulo’s Armenian campaign in 56-60 AD functioned as the catalyst for a string of prestigious appointments, including two separate tenures as a governor of praetorian rank – the first, perhaps, at the behest of Corbulo himself, as well as a suffect consulship ca. 64 AD. The salient points of Mucianus’ early career, which can not only be elucidated from both epigraphic evidence and the literary evidence recorded

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\(^{344}\) As Morgan states: ‘[Mucianus’] career under [Nero] is another almost completely blank. All we know is that he held the consulship, probably in the mid-60s, and was appointed governor of Syria in 67.’ Morgan, M.G., *69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors,* 174.

\(^{345}\) See here Wellesley’s comment on Mucianus’ early career: ‘This indifference to his own advancement coupled with his experience of the East was the reason why Nero had put him in charge of Syria; and though his great services to the Flavian cause earned him two more consulships in 70 and 72, it is noticeable that they, like the first, were suffect and not ordinary: even these distinctions were unobtrusive.’ (Wellesley, K., *The Year of the Four Emperors,* 116.) Levick does not concur with Wellesley’s assertions concerning Mucianus’ lack of ambition but she does insinuate that Mucianus’ career was less than impressive: ‘his active military experience was as a subordinate – he had probably been in Armenia under Corbulo – while Vespasian, who may have begun in the East as commander of the entire Syrian force, went on to his own war. There were blots on Mucianus’ career (he had been suffect consul in the 60s, after years at praetorian rank) and, a notorious homosexual with a theatrical manner, he had no sons, a disadvantage as he is made by Tacitus to acknowledge.’ (Levick, B., *Vespasian,* 53.) The comment ‘years at praetorian rank’ is perhaps excessive. As we have established, Mucianus likely spent only three years as a governor of praetorian rank prior to his suffect consulship. He could hardly have accelerated anymore rapidly through the ranks after so many years spent in exile.
by Pliny and Tacitus, but also dated with a reasonable degree of certainty, indicate a great deal of ambition on the part of the *novus homo*. In the course of both his tenure as *legatus legionis* in Armenia, as well as his two praetorian governorships, Mucianus undoubtedly cultivated relationships with influential political figures – including, first and foremost, Domitius Corbulo himself as well as others of Corbulo’s retinue, such as M. Vettius Bolanus and L. Verulanus Severus.  

Finally, he also caught the eye of Nero and it was almost certainly through the *princeps*’ direct influence that Mucianus acquired the Syrian command over no less than three legions.

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346 See here ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’.
Chapter Three: Titus and Mucianus - the Instigator and the Mediator

3.1 Introduction

By 69 AD, the two most powerful commanders in the armies of the Eastern half of the Roman Empire were the governors of Judaea and Syria, T. Flavius Vespasianus and C. Licinius Mucianus. Both commanded three Roman legions, numerous auxiliary forces of horse and foot, their own fleets and the support of kings, and both were men of considerable reputation, albeit for different reasons. It was likely in February of 69 that Vespasian, along with Mucianus, began to organise their party with a view towards seizing the throne. Yet, it was not until four months later, at the beginning of July, that the legions of Egypt, Judaea and Syria respectively declared in favour of Vespasian’s Principate. Determining when and how the two amici resolved to contest the purple is a difficult issue, which is complicated by two main factors. First, the entire affair is blurred by Flavian propaganda which renders elusive definitive judgements about the underlying motivations of Vespasian and his confidantes, including Titus and Mucianus. Second, deliberate concealment and effacement of the Flavian deliberations by the ancient sources, most notoriously including Josephus, gives rise to significant problems of chronology. This chapter will seek to answer three key questions – initially, what were the origins of the Flavian imperial ambitions and who was the primary instigator of the Flavian bid for power in 69 AD? Second, how did Mucianus assist in the instigation and organisation of the Flavian rebellion during the first half of 69? Finally, what role did Mucianus take in the immediate execution of the rebellion in the second half of the year?

347 Tacitus, Hist., 2.81.
3.2 Vespasian’s ‘Secret Hopes’ and the Relationship between Mucianus and Titus

Despite the unfavourable relationship between Vespasian and Mucianus during the period 67-68 AD, the two governors nonetheless remained in close diplomatic contact. The reasons for this are patent – apart from the fact that Mucianus’ Syrian jurisdiction was immediately adjacent to Vespasian’s in Judaea, the former also controlled considerable military resources. Even following the transfer of \textit{III Gallica} to Moesia around the time of Nero’s death, Mucianus still controlled as many legions as Vespasian: \textit{IV Scythica, VI Ferrata} and \textit{XII Fulminata}, as well as the sizeable resources of Syria’s dependent principalities.\footnote{Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.},” 6.3., Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.74., contra. ibid., 2.4, 2.6.} It is thus unsurprising that, given the delicate nature of the negotiations, Vespasian saw fit to dispatch his son, Titus, as his emissary to the Syrian legate. Little can be said with certainty about the explicit nature of the communications between Titus and Mucianus prior to 69 AD – suffice to say that they seemingly became a regular occurrence from the autumn of 67 onwards, despite Tacitus’ assertion that it was only after the death of Nero that the two had begun negotiating, and that, in contrast with his attitude towards Vespasian, Mucianus reacted in a positive fashion to Titus’ diplomatic overtures.\footnote{Ibid., 2.5.} According to Josephus, during the siege of Gamala in August/September 67, Vespasian saw fit to dispatch Titus to Syria to welcome the newly-instated Mucianus.\footnote{Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 4.32.} Over the coming months, the discussions undertaken by the future Caesar and the Syrian legate likely encompassed the most pressing political issues of the time.\footnote{Titus is almost entirely absent from Josephus’ narrative dealing with the Judaean conflict in 68, which would seemingly indicate that Titus was compelled to maintain fairly frequent contact with Mucianus from August or September 67 until June 68. (Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 57., Jones, B., \textit{The Emperor Titus}, 43., Flaig, E., \textit{Den Kaiser herausfordern: die Usurpatation im Römischen Reich}, Historische Studien, vol. 7 (Frankfurt, New York: Campus, 1992), 364.)} First and foremost, it must have been Titus’ responsibility to
negotiate the delicate situation of Vespasian and Mucianus’ overlapping jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{352} Second, a key topic of discussion may also the political upheaval of the previous year – during which, Vespasian had been absent in the East.\textsuperscript{353} Finally, if we are to follow Nicols’ supposition that Vespasian knew of Gaius Julius Vindex’s revolt before it was officially proclaimed in Gaul in March 68, he must have also recognised the importance of ascertaining the attitude of his colleague in Syria towards the impending rebellion.\textsuperscript{354}

The personal relationship between Mucianus and Titus prior to 69 AD is significant for several reasons. Initially, it allows us to advance the conclusion that it was thanks to Titus’ intervention that Mucianus and Vespasian resolved their differences. In Tacitus’ reckoning, Titus struck a favourable chord on a personal level for Mucianus, and it was he who effected the reconciliation between Vespasian and the Syrian governor:

\textsuperscript{352} Jones, B., \textit{The Emperor Titus}, 43.
\textsuperscript{353} Mucianus’ location prior to his Syrian governorship is unknown. He was in Rome in 64 and possibly remained there during the following years until he was called into service in 67. He may therefore have been a firsthand witness to the persecutions that took place in the capital following Vespasian’s departure with Nero in early 66. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 63.12-18, Pliny, \textit{Epist.}, 1.5.3., Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.42.) The scale of the persecutions is not known, but it is clear that the political situation had degenerated to the point where the emperor was desperately required in the capital by the end of 67. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 63.19., Suetonius, \textit{Div. Ner.}, 23.) Mucianus’ connection with Corbulo, furthermore, must have been some cause for concern for Vespasian, especially in light of the latter’s fate earlier in the year. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 63.17.)
\textsuperscript{354} This conclusion follows on from the assumption that Josephus found the dates for military events in the \textit{commentarii} of Vespasian. (see Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 63.22. for Vindex’s character and revolt, see also Philostratus, \textit{Apol.}, 5.10.) Nicols suggests that Josephus transcribed these dates into the calendar of the administrative capital of Antioch. Consequently, Vespasian would have learned of Vindex’s revolt as early as 9 March 68 (9 \textit{Dystros}) – in turn indicating that Vespasian had received word of the revolt before it was officially proclaimed in Gaul during the same month, possibly from Flavius Sabinus. Nicols also believes that the revolt of Vindex and Galba served as the primary impetus for the ‘two eastern governors to unite.’ (Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 55, 93.) Jones adds the observation that Vindex had already sent letters to numerous provincial \textit{legati} and thus ‘prudence demanded that [Vespasian] should be aware of the attitude of his colleague in Syria’. (Jones, B., \textit{The Emperor Titus}, 43, citing Plutarch, \textit{Galba}, 4.2.)
Second, it also allows us to challenge the assertion, championed by several scholars, that the Flavian imperial ambitions can be dated prior to 69 and, in fact, as early as 67 AD – during the final months of the reign of Nero. The argument for this latter date stems initially from Josephus’ famous prediction of Vespasian’s elevation to the purple in late 67. Second, it is based on the assumption that Titus resolved the argument between Vespasian and Mucianus in October 67. The latter point is easily refutable. As Nicols notes, the time between Mucianus’ arrival in Syria in late summer 67 and Titus’ visit in October would be ‘too short to account for the quarrel between the two governors to break out and be resolved’. Indeed, both Tacitus and Dio stress that it was not until after the death of Nero in June 68 that the two governors resolved their differences and entered

355 …until Titus, who was the great bond of union between them, by representing their common interests had terminated their mischievous feud. He was indeed a man formed both by nature and by education to attract even such a character as that of Mucianus.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 2.5.) It is likely that a man of Mucianus’ persuasion was decidedly enamoured with Titus. The latter was, by all accounts, handsome, well-spoken and confident; and he also shared common interests with Mucianus in the field of mirabilia. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.4. and Pliny, NH., 2.89.)

356 Several varied interpretations of the origins of the Flavian ambitions have emerged in modern scholarship. Weber believes that the beginnings of Vespasian’s ambitions lay prior to Nero’s death and that preparations for the uprising were already well underway during Galba’s reign. (Weber, W., Josephus und Vespasian, 154.) Drexler cites Josephus’ prophecy at Josephus, BJ., 3.399-408. as a firm indication that ‘Vespasian schon damals die Hoffnung auf den Thron gehegt hat’. He adds the observation that the initial communications between Mucianus and Vespasian coincided with Vespasian’s pardon of Josephus after the siege of Gamala. (Drexler, H., “Review of Tacitus und das flavische Geschichtsbild.” Gnomon, 28:7 (1956): 523.) Chilver, on the other hand, offers a slightly different interpretation. Building upon Tacitus’ assertion that Vespasian and Mucianus resolved their differences exitu demum Neronis (‘finally upon the fall of Nero’) he asserts that both men were ‘calculating chances’ before Vitellius even reached Germany in late 68 (although not prior to Nero’s death, as Nicols asserts at Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 93.). The author adds that the possibility of Vespasianus rem publicam susciperet (‘Vespasian assum[ing] the direction of the State’) only entered the mind of Titus at Corinth (see Tacitus, Hist., 2.1. and below) as a result of prior deliberations between Mucianus and Vespasian. (Chilver, G.E.F., “The Army in Politics, AD 68-70.” The Journal of Roman Studies 47:1/2 (1957): 34, cf. Chilver, G.E.F., “Review of Tacitus und das flavische Geschichtsbild.” The Journal of Roman Studies 46:1/2 (1956): 204.) Morgan, finally, absolves himself of any firm judgement but states that it is ‘tempting’ to connect Vespasian’s ambitions with Josephus’ self-serving prediction in 67. (Morgan, M.G., 69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors, 178.)

357 Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 93.
into close consultation. The former point requires that we assign any level of credibility to Josephus’ alleged prophesising at all. *Ex post facto* omens of Vespasian’s rise to power are common in the sources. Even were we to lend credence to Josephus’ insistence that he made his prediction during Nero’s lifetime, it is difficult to conceive of the circumstances under which Josephus would have made such an ostentatious declaration. Vespasian already enjoyed a favoured position in 67 by virtue of his Judaean appointment and perhaps also anticipated further triumphal honours for his military successes. He must also have been keenly aware of the tenuous nature of his rapport with Nero – especially in the wake of the fallout from the conspiracy of Annius Vinicianus in the winter of 66/67. Undoubtedly, as Levick notes, Vespasian would not have taken too kindly to Josephus’ prophesising and the result would have been the latter’s immediate execution. The prophecy, judging by its appearance in the works of both Suetonius and Dio, must nonetheless have some basis in reality. Embellished versions of Josephus’ portent could well have surfaced as part of a comprehensive Flavian propaganda program enacted during the second half of 69. At the time of his capture, however, it is more likely that Josephus simply

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358 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.5., Dio, *Hist.*, 66.8. It is doubtful, then, that Vespasian had entertained imperial ambitions until this point if he could not even be assured of an amicable relationship with his neighbour.


362 Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 43.


regaled Vespasian with predictions of future military success and offered his assistance as a translator and propagandist.\textsuperscript{365}

### 3.3 Titus’ Trip to Rome in 68 AD

In fact, we do not find any definite evidence of Flavian imperial ambitions until the end of 68 AD – and at the hands of Titus rather than those of Vespasian. In the winter of 68/9, Vespasian dispatched Titus, Agrippa II and several \textit{amici} to Rome.\textsuperscript{366} Ostensibly, Titus’ expedition resulted from Vespasian’s apprehension concerning the intentions of the new \textit{princeps}, Galba, as well as a desire to obtain a mandate from the Emperor for future campaigning. Seemingly, Galba failed to issue further instructions to his commander in Judaea following his accession despite the fact that, according to Plutarch, the \textit{praefectus praetorio}, Gaius Nymphidius Sabinus, had allegedly written to the Emperor in an alarming fashion concerning the affairs in the East prior to the former’s death.\textsuperscript{367} As Nicols suggests, the fact that Vespasian his Judaean campaign for a year indicates that Galba was in no particular hurry to confirm Vespasian’s command.\textsuperscript{368} Josephus, too, informs us that Vespasian deferred his campaign in the hope of receiving further instructions from Galba.\textsuperscript{369}

\begin{footnotesize}
(Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 5.) The confusion could well have stemmed from a ‘pre-dated’ version of the prophecy that emerged around June (cf. Levick’s discussion of the Flavian exploitation of \textit{fortuna} as a means of presenting Vespasian as a ‘reluctant Emperor’ – Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 67.). At the very least, Josephus’ alleged prophecy would have functioned as a useful augment to other Flavian propaganda strategies that surfaced during the same period – such as the apparently counterfeit letter from Otho, advocating Vespasian as imperial successor, that circulated immediately prior to the latter’s accession in July 69. (Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 6.)

\textsuperscript{365} Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 43. And see ‘1.5 Flavius Josephus’.


\textsuperscript{367} Plutarch, \textit{Galba}, 13.

\textsuperscript{368} The campaign was planned for July 68 however would not resume until June of the following year. (Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 4.550.) As Nicols comments, such a ‘noncommittal attitude’ was typical of Galba towards men he suspected. The author cites the Emperor’s treatment of Verginius Rufus and Gellianus as evidence. (Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 61. Citing Plutarch, \textit{Galba}, 10, 13.) Contra. Morgan, M.G., \textit{69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors}, 176. who asserts that this view ‘goes beyond the evidence’.

\textsuperscript{369} Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 4.498.
\end{footnotesize}
Apart from the Emperor’s inaction regarding the Eastern commanders, news from Rome concerning the early months of the new Emperor’s reign was disturbing to say the least. Not only had he fallen under the influence of undesirable advisors such as Titus Vinius (cos ord. 69) and Cornelius Laco, ‘the former the worst of men, the latter the laziest’, he had already exercised violent retribution against a number of senior figures who were either associated with Nero’s regime or, otherwise, constituted potential threats to his position.370 Nor was his reach limited only to Rome. Galba had Lucius Clodius Macer, the legate of III Augusta assassinated by the local procurator Trebonius Garutianus and failed to investigate the execution of Gaius Fonteius Capito (cos ord. 59), the governor of Lower Germany.371 More important from Vespasian’s point of view was the fact that his brother, the popular praefectus urbi, Titus Flavius Sabinus II (cos suff. ca. 45), also lost his office, to be replaced by Ducennius Geminus in January of 69.372

All of this being said, Vespasian and Mucianus likely recognized Galba as soon as they learned that the Senate had done so and administered the oath to their troops.373 Vespasian’s recognition of the new princeps does not appear to have been merely a matter of courtesy either – as Tacitus states on two separate occasions that the Eastern governor’s adherence to Galba’s authority was

370 Tacitus, Hist., 1.6., Cf. Suetonius, Div. Galb., 14. for the addition of the freedman Icelus to Galba’s advisors. The men executed in Rome included Publius Petronius Turpilianus (cos ord. 61) and Cingonius Varro. The former had been selected as Nero’s general over Vindex and Galba himself. His career was distinguished – certainly more so than Galba’s in recent years. He was consul in 61, governor of Britain between 61 and 63 and curator aquarum in 63. He had also received the ornamenta triumphalia in 65. (Tacitus, Agr., 16., Ann. 14.29, 39, 15.72., Plutarch, Galba, 15., Frontinus, De Aqu., 102.) Cingonius Varro was consul designate and seemingly executed for his involvement with Nymphidius Sabinus. (Murison, C.L., Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies (Hildesheim: Olms, 1993), 51.) Information about his earlier career is sparse. (Tacitus, Ann., 14.29., Plutarch, Galba, 15.)
372 Ibid., 1.14., 1.46.
373 Neither Josephus nor Tacitus state specifically that Vespasian or Mucianus took the oath. However, given that we known Tiberius Alexander took the oath relatively early (see no. 375.), we might also assume that both of the aforementioned individuals promptly administered the oath to their own legions.
Further, in neighbouring Egypt, Tiberius Alexander’s enthusiasm for the new emperor was patent – as he declared for Galba before he was even requested to do so. Even so, it is not difficult to imagine Vespasian’s trepidation over the early events of Galba’s reign. Particularly concerning might have been Galba’s rumoured plan to limit the posts entrusted to senators and equestrians to two years’ duration which, if retroactively applied, could well have resulted in Vespasian’s removal from his Judaean command. On the other hand, whether Vespasian was aware of Sabinus’ dismissal prior to his decision to send Titus to Italy is unclear, yet Galba’s march towards Rome tardum...et cruentum and the executions of several provincial governors must have done little to assuage Vespasian’s misgivings. Neither Tacitus nor Suetonius devote a great deal of space to the raison d’être for Titus’ voyage to Italy – both instead choosing to record with some degree of scepticism the Roman public’s reaction to the journey and the budding rumour that Titus was en route as an aspirant to the position of Galba’s heir, by means of adoption. Suetonius reports the dubious claim that Vespasian feared assassination – which could well speak to his uncertainty concerning the emperor’s intentions. Tacitus, however, offers a secondary explanation for Titus’ journey – that ‘his age now qualified him to compete for

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375 *MW*, 328. for Tiberius Alexander’s edict declaring for Galba.
376 Suetonius, *Div Galb.*, 15. Suetonius does not indicate whether the rumour was to be taken seriously. It is not outside the realm of possibility if we consider the notion that a ‘shake-up’ of the legionary commanders could well have been a prudent approach to ensuring that none of the more energetic legions attempted a coup. If Galba seriously considered such a policy, however, the results could only have been devastating for Vespasian and Titus as both might have lost the opportunity to conclude the war in Judaea and thus the commendations that would follow. This could also have been another rationale for the timing of Titus’ journey to Rome. Vespasian assumed the Judaean command in the winter of 66/67. Titus’ trip coincided directly with the two-year anniversary of Vespasian’s appointment.
377 ‘Slow…and blood-stained’. (Jones, B., *The Emperor Titus*, 44.) On Galba’s march see Plutarch, *Galba*, 11.1. Neither Tacitus nor Plutarch specify when Galba left Spain or when he entered Rome, although the former comments that Galba’s arrival at Rome was tardum. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.6.) Similarly, according to Plutarch, several senators came to Galba in Spain to urge him to hurry to Rome.
office’. Determining the reliability of this claim is contingent upon the precise timing of Titus’ journey. Ash lends the observation that the rumour of Titus’ impending adoption could only have held water until Piso’s adoption on 10 January 69 and, thus, he must have set off prior to this date. There is no reason to believe that Titus delayed – the mere fact that he set sail in the middle of winter suggests a journey of unusual urgency. Further, by the beginning of 69, Titus was of the proper age to acquire the praetorship. The normal time of elections had long passed, but it appears that there were appointments to the praetorship during January. A praetorship could well have been a realistic prospect, but perhaps not an urgent concern. Tacitus, however, adds a qualifier to Titus’ espoused motivations – namely that they were only ferebat. The literary formulation implies dissimulation and, by extension, that more pressing political concerns must have occupied Titus’ mind. Undoubtedly, these ‘hidden’ motives included the aforementioned death of several prominent officials, the dismissal of Sabinus from office and, most importantly,

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381 The danger of winter voyages is well documented in the ancient sources. As Casson notes, ‘shipping during this period was reduced to the absolute minimum – the carrying of vital dispatches, the ferrying of urgently needed supplies, seaborne military movement that was impossible to delay.’ (Casson, L., Ships and Seaw生产设备ship in the Ancient World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 270f.)
382 Titus turned twenty-nine years old on 30 December 68.
383 Elections were normally held in July, but some circumstances occasioned their delay until August, or even January of the following year. (Cicero, ad Fam., 10.26.1, 3.) The tumultuous events of the previous year, including the death of Nero in June, could well have caused their delay. It is notable, at the very least, that two individuals, Sextus Julius Frontinus and Helvidius Priscus, appear as praetor elects for 70 – apparently at the behest of Galba, rather than Vitellius. (Tacitus, Hist., 4.39. for Frontinus as praetor urbanus in 70, ibid., 2.91, 4.4. for Priscus as praetor elect under Vitellius after his recall from exile in late 68)
384 Sage accepts Titus’ purported desire to begin his official career as the primary reason for the trip. (Sage, M.M., “Tacitus’ Historical Works,” in ANRW, vol. 33.2 (1990), 910. contra. Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 94.)
385 ‘Alleged’. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.1.)
Galba’s continued inaction concerning the confirmation of the Judaean command. Titus sought to establish a diplomatic accord with Galba in light of these issues.\textsuperscript{387}

3.4 The Consilium Amicorum at Corinth and the Decision for War

Titus had only reached Corinth in Greece when he received the news, early in February 69, of the death of Galba in the coup staged by Otho at Rome on 15 January and of the rising of Vitellius on the Rhine. According to Tacitus, he thus summoned several of his amici and debated the options open to him.\textsuperscript{388} ‘This consilium amicorum led to the conclusion that it was more prudent to turn back than to become a hostage of one or the other rival, and ‘that any offence given by his own non-appearance in Rome would be overlooked when Vespasian declared for the victor.’ Tacitus adds that, on the other hand, if Vespasian claimed the Principate, any insults would be forgotten altogether.\textsuperscript{389} This latter statement indicates that, at least in Tacitus’ opinion, Titus was the first of the Flavian group to consider seizing the Empire and that he did so in February 69, at the Corinth meeting. This conjecture is also supported by the subsequent narrative of Titus’ journey to rejoin his father in Caesarea. At the outset of his narrative, Tacitus dismisses all assertions that Titus halted his journey for personal reasons – that ‘his longing to get back to Queen Berenice fired him to return’. According to Tacitus, eschewing the attractions of the Queen and imbued with newly-acquired hope as a result of his deliberations, Titus embarked on a carefully considered and protracted voyage. He first called in at Rhodes, where it is possible that he met with the governor

\textsuperscript{387} On Sabinus’ dismissal as a rationale for Titus’ journey see Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 60. On Titus’ intention to establish a diplomatic accord between Galba and Vespasian see Levick, B., Vespasian, 44. Josephus reports that Vespasian sought a mandate from Galba concerning the Jewish War. (Josephus, BJ., 4.498.)

\textsuperscript{388} According to Tacitus, the information concerning Vitellius’ revolt did not become common knowledge until after the death of Galba. (ibid., 1.50.) Presumably, this report would have reached Titus soon after Otho’s accession.

\textsuperscript{389} Ibid., 2.1.
of Asia, Gaius Fonteius Agrippa (*cos suff.* 58), who would later be given command of Moesia.\(^{390}\) Subsequently, Titus visited the oracle at the temple of Paphian Venus on Cyprus where he allegedly encountered the priest Sostratus, who disclosed an encouraging future.\(^{391}\) Finally, Titus made, in Tacitus’ words, a ‘bold’ crossing to Syria, where he presumably consulted with Mucianus about his intentions before returning to his father by mid-February 69.\(^{392}\) Even if Tacitus is not explicit about the outcome of Titus’ deliberations at Corinth, the implications are clear. Titus was contemplating a course of action with greater ramifications than just the possible offence given to Otho – considerations which, according to Tacitus, ‘held him balanced between hope and fear’.\(^{393}\) If Titus had sought merely to encourage his father to declare in favour of either Otho or Vitellius, there would have been little reason for his sojourn in Cyprus nor, indeed, his consultation with Mucianus and, perhaps, Agrippa. Moreover, he would have had little reason for concern in the first place. Judging by Vespasian’s swift declaration in favour of Galba several months prior, a man who had clearly raised a great deal of suspicion in the Flavian camp, a subsequent declaration for Otho, who had already taken actions favourable towards the Flavians – including the restoration of Sabinus to his former office, was a foregone conclusion. Finally, it seems that Titus delayed his return sufficiently to allow Vespasian and Mucianus to make their decisions on their own anyway – as Tacitus informs us explicitly, ‘before the arrival of Titus both armies had sworn allegiance to Otho’.\(^{394}\)

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\(^{390}\) See below ‘3.10 Mucianus in Moesia’

\(^{391}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.4.

\(^{392}\) See also Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.501.

\(^{393}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.2.

\(^{394}\) Ibid., 2.6. De Kleijn observes that Tacitus’ assertion may be corroborated by the evidence of some *aes* coins issued at Antioch in the period under consideration. The coins in question depict Galba and Otho respectively on the obverse and, on the reverse, an inscription mentioning Mucianus and the people of Antioch, suggesting that the Syrian governor supported both Emperors in public shortly after their accession. (De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Leader in a Time of Crisis.”: 320. cf. *RPC*, vol. 1, 4313 for the coin depicting Galba, *RPC*, vol. 1, 4316, 4317, 4319
It is no coincidence, therefore, that, upon Titus’ return to Judaea, the foundations of the Flavian party that would later contest the purple began to materialise. As Tacitus asserts, it was precisely at this time that Vespasian and Mucianus, allegedly now aware that their soldiers were unsatisfied with their expected ‘compulsory submission’ to the victor in the West, determined that civil war was inevitable and had ‘beg[un] to arm for it’.

The historian adds that Mucianus and Vespasian were ‘recent converts to the project of war’ while the others of the Flavian camp – ostensibly referring to Titus and his amici, had ‘long fostered [civil conflict] from various motives’. The other sources concur. Suetonius states that it was following the deaths of Nero and Galba, while Otho and Vitellius were contending for the sovereignty, that Vespasian ‘entertained hopes of

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396 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.6-7.

397 Ibid., 2.8.
obtaining the Empire.\textsuperscript{398} Dio, equally, conflates Titus’ return with Vespasian’s deliberations over the state of the civil war.\textsuperscript{399}

\subsection*{3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions}

Nevertheless, while it is clear from Tacitus that the decision to revolt had been made in February of 69, neither Mucianus nor Vespasian appears to have been willing to enact their plan instantaneously. As Suetonius elaborates, while the struggle between Vitellius and Otho was still undecided, Vespasian made no move ‘though his friends were very ready to support him, and even pressed him to the enterprise’.\textsuperscript{400} Much has been made of this so-called \textit{cunctatio}. Morgan, for instance, argues that Vespasian’s hesitation represents a classic example of a \textit{tertius gaudens} – that is, the Flavians were the third party who intended to wait until the struggle between the other two parties had been fought, and the victor had been so weakened by his success that he could be defeated.\textsuperscript{401} In reality, however, Vespasian’s inaction was likely not an active strategic decision at all – but rather one borne out of necessity. Action prior to the realisation of the outcome of the Othonian-Vitellian conflict would have been tantamount to treason which, in and of itself, would not have been problematic except that Otho, despite being responsible for the violent end of his predecessor, had garnered a remarkable amount of support – both from the Senate and from the provincial legions.\textsuperscript{402} Of particular concern to Vespasian was the support of the powerful Danubian legions – including no less than six legions: \textit{XI Claudia} in Dalmatia, \textit{X} and \textit{XIII Gemina} in

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{398} Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 5.1.
\bibitem{399} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 65.8.
\bibitem{400} Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 6.1.
\bibitem{401} As Morgan highlights, this was the plan enacted by Vespasian in the winter of 67-8 when Vespasian rejected his officers’ advice to attack Jerusalem in favour of waiting for the rival factions within the city to kill one another off. (Morgan, M.G., \textit{69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors}, 180.)
\bibitem{402} Plutarch, \textit{Otho}, 1-4.
\end{thebibliography}

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Pannonia as well as *III Gallica, VII Claudia*, and *VIII Augusta* in Moesia which, by the second week of February, had declared unequivocally for Otho. There was also, of course, the concern of Vitellius’ legionary strength – which had gained remarkable momentum in the lower Rhine and now encompassed some seven legions, including legions *V Alaudae* and *XV Primigenia* at Vetera, legions *XVI* and *I* at Novaesium and Bonna, *IV Macedonica* and *XXII Primigenia* at Moguntiacum and finally *XXI Rapax* at Vindonissa. By February, Vitellius had secured the support of not only the neighbouring tribes – the Usipetes, Tungri, Treveri and Lingones, but also the governors of Britain, along with *II Augusta, IX Hispana*, and *XX Valeria*, as well as the governors of the Belgic and Lugdunensian Gauls and Raetia. The forces of the East were paltry in comparison – including only the two Egyptian legions, the Judaean legions and the three Syrian legions. It is understandable, therefore, why Vespasian, in the face of such legionary strength and in the wake of Galba’s assassination, was loath to enact any concrete plans for his own accession.

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403 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.76.
Even so, while neither Vespasian nor his colleagues made an overt challenge to the throne during the first half of 69 AD, it is evident from the sources that preparations for a potential revolt were continuing behind the scenes. By the death of Otho and accession of Vitellius in May, the Flavian activities in the East had already generated no small number of rumours which, according to Tacitus, had even reached the ears of Vitellius himself.\(^{405}\) Almost nothing is said explicitly in the sources of the nature of the Flavian preparations during the period of February to June 69. Certainly, Tacitus and Suetonius insinuate that Vespasian was loathe to enact any arrangements for his accession personally – behaviour which, by Suetonius’ account, was characteristic of Vespasian’s lack of ambition.\(^{406}\) Who, then, were the primary movers behind these, seemingly covert, preparations? Titus comes to mind – especially given the fact that he was the first to conceive of a Flavian Principate. Unfortunately, however, from February to June 69, almost nothing is heard of Titus. We might speculate that he continued acting in a diplomatic capacity in dealings with Mucianus and Tiberius Alexander. The evidence for this derives, first, from Tacitus’ observation that, in May 69, Mucianus had ‘no dislike for Vespasian’ but was ‘strongly inclined towards Titus’.\(^{407}\) Second, it is also notable that Tiberius Alexander was transferred from Egypt to become Titus’ chief-of-staff during the Judaean war and, later, would attain the position of praefectus praetorio under the same Titus Caesar.\(^{408}\) Titus may also have had a hand in

\(^{405}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.73.
\(^{406}\) Apparently exhausted by the sluggish procession of his 71 AD Judaean triumph, he allegedly complained that ‘he was rightly served, for having in his old age been so silly as to desire a triumph; as if it was either due to his ancestors, or had ever been expected by himself.’ (Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 12.) See also Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.74. for Vespasian’s reticence.
\(^{407}\) Ibid.
\(^{408}\) Jones, B., *The Emperor Titus*, 46. Cf. Josephus, *BJ.*, 5.45-46. for Tiberius Alexander as Titus’ chief-of-staff and advisor. It is often assumed that Alexander served as *praefectus castrorum* (prefect of the camp) in Judaea on the basis of Josephus, *BJ.*, 6.237. and *MW*, 330 = *IGLS*, 7.4011. (See, for instance, Sullivan, R.D., “The Dynasty of Judaea in the First Century,” in *ANRW*, vol. 2.8 (1978), 341.) In fact, Josephus’ designation of Alexander’s position in Judaea is somewhat vague. Suffice to say that he indicates that Alexander was second-in-command to Titus and held authority over all of the Roman force in Judaea. The latter inscription also refers to Alexander as the ‘prefect of the Judaean...
negotiations with the eastern monarchs – Agrippa and Berenice in Caesarea Phillipi, Antiochus IV in Commagene and Sohaemus in Emesa. Pre-existing connections between the Flavian and Herodian houses should have made Titus admirably suited to conducting preliminary discussions with the client monarchs that would culminate in the spectacular demonstration of eastern unanimity at Berytus in July.\(^{409}\)

On the other hand, we have Mucianus. We know from Tacitus that Vespasian continued to consult with Mucianus on frequent occasions in private during the first half of 69.\(^{410}\) Unlike Vespasian, Mucianus’ enthusiasm for the instigation of a Flavian Principate is patent – as evidenced by his lengthy oration persuading Vespasian to accept nomination in June of 69.\(^{411}\) He was also in a decidedly advantageous position to promote the Flavian cause. Mucianus had the benefit not only of his prestigious Syrian command but also his own exemplary administrative and rhetorical skills. He also had a further unique advantage, however. It has long been asserted, first by Syme and, most recently, by Vervaet that the former officers and legions of Domitius Corbulo served as key supporters of Vespasian’s elevation in 69.\(^{412}\) The forced suicide of Corbulo in 67 AD had a

\(^{409}\) On Agrippa see no. 321, and Titus’ affair with Berenice (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.2.). Titus, it seems, may have promised both Agrippa and Sohaemus significant honours for his support. Both would join Titus on his Jewish campaign (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 5.1., Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 3.68.). Agrippa, furthermore, received the \textit{ornamenta praetoria} (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.15.) and Sohaemus the \textit{ornamenta consularia} (\textit{ILS}, 8958). Antiochus is a trickier proposition. He too joined Titus on his Jewish campaign (Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 5.460-463.) and the clemency Vespasian displayed towards him after his short rebellion in 72 (ibid., 7.238, 243.) indicates that his contributions to the Flavian cause were considered significant. However, it is by no means certain that Titus succeeded in gaining his support. It is noticeable that Antiochus was heavily indebted to Corbulo – having assisted the general against the Parthians and receiving tracts of Armenia in return (Josephus, \textit{AJ.}, 13.7, 37, 14.26.) Mucianus, then, could well have exploited this fact to secure his support (see below).

\(^{410}\) Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.76.

\(^{411}\) Ibid., 2.76-77.

disastrous effect on the Eastern legions. This was, first and foremost, because it had denied the senatorial and equestrian officers as well as the centurions a powerful patron and, second, because Nero dispatched the remnants of the Corbulonian legions across Moesia (III Gallica), Judaea (XI Frentensis) and Syria (VI Ferrata). Mucianus had been fortunate. He acquired the prestigious Syrian governorship thanks to the intervention of Nero. The soldiers of the third, sixth and tenth legions, on the other hand, were facing an uncertain future after Corbulo’s death – a fact which might well be reflected by the undisciplined conduct of the Syrian legions upon Vespasian’s arrival in the province in 67 AD. Nor did the situation improve for the Danubian legions in 69. Upon

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413 As Nicols observes, Corbulo’s cautious campaigning methods, stressing strategic and tactical advantage over pitched battles, did not offer much opportunity for loot, hence the exercise in patronage in promotion, for praetorian legates to the consulship, for centurions to the tribunate and for common soldiers to the centurionate, took on an added significance. With Corbulo’s death for what one might call treason, the hopes of these men were destroyed and connection with Corbulo could even be considered a point against advancement. (Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianiæ*, 118. But see also no. 423 below) On Nero’s conflict with the Senate and the eventual forced suicide of Corbulo see particularly Vervaet, F., “Domitius Corbulo and the Senatorial Opposition to the Reign of Nero.” *Ancient Society: Journal of Ancient History of the Greek, Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* 32 (2002): 135-193.

414 As previously noted, Suetonius asserts that, when Vespasian arrived in Syria, it was necessary for him to reform the discipline of the soldiers: *correcta statim castroru disciplina.* (‘[he] at once reformed the discipline of the camps’ – Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 4.6.) We should be wary of making too much of Suetonius’ statement here. The lax discipline of the Syrian legions is a literary *topos* which appears in the works of Tacitus, Dio and later authors such as Marcus Cornelius Fronto and Ammianus Marcellinus. (Wheeler, E.L., “The Laxity of the Syrian Legions,” in D.L. Kennedy (ed.), *The Roman Army in the East* (Michigan: Ann Arbor), 229-276. Cf., for instance, Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.35., *Hist.*, 2.80., *Dio, Hist.*, 78.3., 80.4.) Even were we to take Dio and Tacitus’ assessment of the state of the Syrian legions in 55 on face value (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.35., *Dio, Hist.*, 62.19.), the latter author emphasizes that Corbulo promptly restored discipline in the camp through strict measures. (Cf. also Frontinus, *Strat.*, 4.1.21, 28, 4.2.3., 4.7.2. for Corbulo’s harsh methods) As Nicols notes, it appears unlikely that the standard of discipline dropped significantly in the short time between Corbulo’s recall in 66 and Vespasian’s arrival in Syria in 67. If it had, Tacitus would surely have included a more scathing estimation of the Syrian legions’ capabilities than his minor jibes at their luxurious living standards. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.80, 82.) On the contrary, Josephus emphasizes that the legions involved in the Jewish War under Vespasian, including *X Fretensis*, held themselves to the highest standards. (Josephus, *BJ.*, 1.21., 3.71f.) More likely, Suetonius’ statement alludes to a generally negative reaction to Vespasian’s arrival in Syria stemming from several factors. First, morale must have already been low after Cestius Gallus’ failure during the preceding years. (Wheeler, E.L., “The Laxity of the Syrian Legions,” in D.L. Kennedy (ed.), *The Roman Army in the East*, 255.) Second, news from the west of Corbulo’s death must have arrived just prior or soon after Vespasian’s arrival in the region during mid-67. Hence, with the concurrent death of Cestius Gallus, Vespasian was placed in the awkward position of appearing as an imperially-sanctioned replacement of the Syrian legions’ former benefactor – a circumstance which cannot have endeared him to the soldiery. (Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianiæ*, 119. And ‘2.7 Mucianus’ Syrian Governorship’)

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his victory over Otho in May, Vitellius rewarded only his victorious Rhine legions and summarily alienated the Illyrian and Danubian armies.\textsuperscript{415} It has been suggested by Nicols that it was Vespasian himself who succeeded in winning the confidence of the officers and men of the Syrian legions, including \textit{III Gallica}, because he was able to directly restore the soldiers’ hopes for patronage in the half-year wherein he controlled all seven legions.\textsuperscript{416} This would seem an unlikely conclusion on two counts. Initially, as de Kleijn observes, half a year would seem a remarkably short time for a new commander to win the loyalty of soldiers who had undergone such a momentous disaster – especially given the fact that Vespasian had no prior connection with the Eastern legions. Second, despite Vespasian’s alleged soldierly excellence, from the point of view of the Syrian legions, there was little tangible evidence to substantiate such claims.\textsuperscript{417} Vespasian’s previous military command had been over twenty years prior – and as \textit{legatus} of \textit{II Augusta} in Britain, on the opposite side of the Empire. Hence, for the eastern legions, Vespasian constituted little more than an imperially-sanctioned usurper with little recent military experience – an impression which Vespasian clearly sought to rectify through his personal involvement in the rapid subjugation of Galilee.\textsuperscript{418}

\textsuperscript{415} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.60.
\textsuperscript{416} It was for this reason, according to Nicols, that Vespasian was later able to regard \textit{III Gallica} as ‘his’: \textit{suam numerabat} (‘[he] counted \textit{III Gallica} as his own’). (ibid., 2.74. and Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 114, 119.) There is no reason, however, to assume that this phrase should refer to Vespasian’s personal influence over the third legion. It is notable that Vespasian is only able to reckon \textit{III Gallica} as ‘his own’ after he has, in Tacitus’ words, conducted a ‘general survey of the chances of a campaign and of his resources both immediate and remote’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.70.) – a process which, as we shall see, was likely spearheaded by Mucianus.
\textsuperscript{418} That Vespasian made himself a highly visible participant in the Jewish War is a fact frequently emphasized by both Tacitus and Josephus. Tacitus’ description is particularly pertinent: ‘He headed the column, chose the camping-ground, never ceasing by night or day to use strategy, and, if need be, the sword to thwart the enemy. He ate what he could get, and dressed almost like a common soldier.’ (ibid., 2.5.)
A more likely candidate may be found in the figure of Mucianus. We know from our discussion in chapter two of this thesis that Mucianus had served in the ranks of Corbulo’s forces in Armenia at some point prior to 60 AD – likely as legate of VI Ferrata. If our conclusion is correct then, with the advent of his Syrian post in 67, Mucianus would have become the most senior member of a vast cadre of formerly-Corbulonian clientela – spanning from Judaea to the Danube. It is probable, therefore, that Mucianus, with Titus’ support, was instrumental in winning over at least the preliminary support of several of Corbulo’s leading men. The basis for this assumption is fourfold. In the first place, it is clear from the sources that several leading members of Corbulo’s former officers were systematically rewarded for their support of Vespasian in 69. In the decade following Vespasian’s accession, they received consulships, praetorian prefectures, adlection inter patricios and prestigious provincial commands. Second, that the Flavians achieved a remarkable cohesion among the eastern legati by July 69, with no recorded dissent, indicates that much of the groundwork for the legati amicique existed prior to 69. Third, as few references are found in the sources indicating further services supplied to Vespasian by Corbulo’s former clientes after 69, it appears likely that the key contributions of these men to the Flavian cause eventuated prior to Vespasian’s elevation. Finally, it is also evident from the sources that the figure of Corbulo was

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419 ‘No other group of legati, the Danube command included, was so highly honoured’ as the ‘Corbulonians’. (Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 108., cf. Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.” for a list of the men involved and the rewards given.) One of the slowest advancements to high office among the so-called ‘Corbulonians’ after the accession of Vespasian was Caesennius Gallus (*cos suff.* ca. 76-79), the legate of the Syrian legion, XII Fulminata (maybe due to his prior association with the disaster which befell Cestius Gallus in 66) – and yet, even he was elevated to the position of governor of Cappadocia-Galatia by 80-81 as successor of Marcus Hirrius Fronto Neratius Pansa (*cos suff.* ca. 73-76). (cf. *CIL*, 3.312., *PIR2*, C, 170.)

420 See here particularly the emphasis on the eastern legates at Carmel (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.76.) and at the declarations for Vespasian in early July (ibid., 2.81.). See also ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’ below.

421 Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 108. It is true that some members of this group ingratiated themselves with Domitianus Caesar after 70, although this should not have served as the sole justification for such extraordinary careers as the likes of Rutilius Gallicus. (cf. Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.”: 443-444, esp. n. 36. on Gallicus’ friendship with Domitian.)
pervasive in the rhetoric leading up to Vespasian’s elevation. Mucianus, as we shall see below, was careful to remind his colleagues of the fate of the general while imploring Vespasian to accept the position of Emperor.\footnote{Ibid., 2.76. See also ‘3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel’ below.}

The means through which Mucianus acquired the support of the ‘Corbulonians’ are vague. It has been suggested that Mucianus’ status as the senior consular member of the group, along with his ties to Vespasian, restored prospects of advancement through patronage for the Corbulonians.\footnote{De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Leader in a Time of Crisis.”: 319. There is an important distinction to be made here. As noted by Vervaet, it is imprudent to assume, as Nicols does, that Nero removed all hope of advancement for Corbulo’s clientela after the latter’s death. Indeed, Mucianus’ own appointment as legatus Augusti pro praetore in 67, should be evidence enough of the enduring, but reduced, potential for advancement. (Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.”: 453-454. contra. Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 118.) Further, one must also question the political expediency of alienating a powerful cadre that both had numerous legions at its disposal and stretched from Britain to Syria. It is more likely that Mucianus simply bargained on the fact that the ‘Corbulonians’ no longer could avail of the rapid advancement afforded by a powerful patron – nor would their prospects improve in a scenario wherein a group of Vitellian clientela could monopolise the most prestigious offices of the Empire.}

Another factor may also have served as a key advantage in Mucianus’ negotiations. As Nicols notes, Vespasian and Corbulo may have had more than a passing relationship by virtue of the common armies they commanded.\footnote{Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 119.}

We know from Suetonius that, immediately following Vitellius death, Vespasian’s younger son, Domitian, married Domitia Longina, the youngest daughter of Corbulo himself.\footnote{Dio, Hist., 66.3., Suetonius, Div. Dom., 1.3., Suetonius, Div. Dom., 3. And Martial, Ep., 4.3.}

The marriage began as a courtship between the months after Vitellius’ fall and Vespasian’s arrival in Rome in 70 and persisted for the entire length of Domitian’s reign.\footnote{Ibid. 3., Dio, Hist., 66.3.} In 73, Domitia gave birth to a son, who died at a young age, and then to a daughter and, according to Martial, was expecting another child in 90 AD.\footnote{Ibid., 2.76. See also ‘3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel’ below. As Nicols highlights, the intended role of Domitia’s off-spring, and Corbulo’s grand-children, may be inferred from the...}
fact that Titus did not re-marry after 69. Seemingly, Vespasian’s plans for the Flavian succession stipulated that his eldest son, Titus, was to be followed by the children of Domitian and Longina. It is not possible to determine when Vespasian planned the marriage between Domitian and Longina. Suetonius’ insinuation that the original plan was for Domitian to marry his niece appears suspect. The advantages offered though a union between Domitian and Longina were patent. Her ties, not only to her father’s name and reputation, but also those of her brother-in-law, Annius Vinicianus and his brother Annius Pollio could imbue the Flavian house with a nobility that it sorely lacked and simultaneously distance the Flavians from the Neronian regime. It would also allow Vespasian to subvert the uncomfortable perception that the progression of his own career was inadvertently assisted by the demise of Corbulo. For Mucianus’ purposes, the promise of a rehabilitation of Corbulo’s legacy through Domitia Longina may have functioned as a convenient bargaining chip during his initial efforts to gather support from Corbulo’s former adherents.

Regardless, several names should be highlighted. Initially, and most importantly, we have Tiberius Alexander. In 63 AD, he had served in a diplomatic capacity as minister bello datus under Corbulo. Subsequently, in 66, he had been promoted to the office of praefectus Aegypti and

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428 Nichols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 119. This is contrary to the assertion of Crook (Crook, J.A., “Titus and Berenice.”: 162.) that Titus fully expected to marry Berenice.


430 Even prior to their execution during the *coniuratio Viniciana*, Annius Pollio and L. Annius Vinicianus were indicted for *maiestas* under Tiberius. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 6.9.) If Vespasian sought to give the impression early on that *delatores* such as Marcus Aquilius Regulus, Vibius Crispus or Gaius (?) Pacius Africanus (*cos. suff.* 67) would not hold significant sway in the Senate, establishing connections with these men would be a useful first step. (cf. Rudich, V., *Political Dissidence Under Nero: The Price of Dissimulation*, 200. for a discussion of the *coniuratio Viniciana*) It is also worth noting that Domitia Longina offered further secondary connections. Annius Pollio had been married to Servilia, the daughter of the illustrious Quintus Marcius Barea Soranus (*cos. suff.* 52) – the latter of whom too met an unfortunate fate at the hands of the informer Publius Egnatius Celer in 65 or 66. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 16.23., 16.30-33.)

431 Cf. Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 25. for the argument that Corbulo, if not for his unfortunate fate, might have taken over the command in Judaea.

commanded the legions *III Cyrenaica* and *XXII Deiotariana*.\(^{433}\) It was probably at the behest of Mucianus and Titus in concert that Alexander allied with Vespasian at some point soon after Titus’ return to Caesarea in February of 69.\(^{434}\) Moreover, it was Tiberius Alexander who would take the initiative in July to become the first commander to openly declare for Vespasian.\(^{435}\) Second, we also have Titus Aurelius Fulvus, commander of the legion *III Gallica* – a legion he had remained in charge of since 64 and which, along with Mucianus’ legion, *VI Ferrata*, had served under Corbulo for ten years.\(^{436}\) It is clear from the combined testimony of both Tacitus and Suetonius that it was Fulvus, along with the soldiers and officers of *III Gallica* who influenced the Illyrian legions to join the Flavian cause and, moreover, that they did so prior to any overt Flavian challenge to the throne. As we hear from Suetonius, it was at Aquileia, immediately upon the death of Otho, that ‘two thousand men, drawn out of three legions in the Moesian army’, upon conferring with one another, chose, as their new Emperor, Vespasian and ‘extolled him in the highest terms’. The historian adds that the Moesian troops even went so far as to inscribe Vespasian’s name on their standards.\(^{437}\) The declaration for Vespasian was hastily quashed, presumably to avoid evoking any suspicion in the Vitellian camp prior to concrete plans for Vespasian’s accession in the East being put in place.\(^{438}\) Nevertheless, Tacitus adds that it was the third legion which was

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\(^{434}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.74.

\(^{435}\) See below ‘3.7 The Declarations for Vespasian in the East’

\(^{436}\) On Fulvus’ career see Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.”: 444. And Franke, T., *Die Legionslegaten der römischen Armee in der Zeit von Augustus bis Traian*, 246. Fulvus was *legatus Augusti pro praetore Hispaniae Tarraconensis* ca. 75-78 and thereafter seems to have been a close *amicus* of Domitian – serving an ordinary consulship with the Emperor in 85. (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.” *The Classical Quarterly* 31:1 (1986): 216.)


\(^{438}\) Suetonius himself records that ‘the design was nevertheless quashed for a time, the troops being brought to submit to Vitellius a little longer’ however does not inform us explicitly who was behind the suppression of the minor rebellion. (ibid., 6.) Nevertheless, Vespasian stands as the most likely candidate. Apart from his refusal to publicly
enamoured towards Vespasian and that it was hoped in the Flavian camp that ‘the other legions of Illyricum would follow its example.’

Finally, we also have Arrius Varus. Unlike Fulvus and Alexander, Varus’ status as an integral member of the ‘Corbulonian’ group is ambiguous. We know from Tacitus that Varus served as praefectus cohortis under Corbulo as early as the year 55 and that it was Varus’ communications with Nero that eventually lead to the general’s downfall. According to Tacitus, Varus was promoted to the position of primipilus of the legion III Gallica, with which he seems to have had a continuing relationship during 69, judging by the historian’s description of the third legion as familiaris Arrio Varo miles. That Varus was still on familiar terms with III Gallica so late in the proceedings suggests that his treachery, at least until the end of 69, had remained a secret.

Evidently, he was in Pannonia in 69, as he was able to attend the meeting between Vespasian’s Danubian supporters at Poetovio at the end of August. Nicols believes he was a cavalry

enact his own rebellion early in 69, it is also evident that Vespasian was particularly well-informed about the happenings in the Western Empire thanks to the favourable etesian winds. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.98.)

Ibid., 2.74. Tacitus’ statement is reflected by a similar assertion on the part of Suetonius who, just preceding his account of the short-lived rebellion of the Moesian legions, observes that Vespasian was encouraged by ‘by the fortuitous aid of persons unknown to him and at a distance.’ (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 6.)

Tacitus, Ann., 13.9. Nicols suggests that Varus’ behavior may be indicative of a more general trend concerning Corbulo’s treatment of his officers and soldiers. (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 123.) Aside from the hope of patronage, as noted above, soldiers in Corbulo’s army had little to gain and, if Tacitus is to be believed, they were subject to Corbulo’s legendary insistence on discipline: feruntque militem quia vallum non accinctus, atque alium quia pugione tantum accinctus foderet, morte punitos. quae ninia et incertum an falso iacta originem tamen e severitate ducis traxere; intentumque et magnis delictis inesorabilem scias cui tantum asperitatis etiam adversus levia credebatur. (‘One soldier, it was said, had suffered death for working at the trenches without his sword, another for wearing nothing as he dug, but his poniard. These extreme and possibly false stories at least had their origin in the general’s real severity. We may be sure that he was strict and implacable to serious offences, when such sternness in regard to trifles could be believed of him.’ – Tacitus, Ann., 11.18.) Hence, the denigration effected by individuals such as Varus, which would eventually result in Corbulo’s death may reflect a wider sense of dissatisfaction among the officers of the eastern legions.

‘Troops who were friendly towards Arrius Varus’. (Tacitus, Hist., 4.39.) Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 123. Rutledge, S.H., Imperial Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants from Tiberius to Domitian, 199.


Tacitus, Hist., 3.6.
commander at this time on the basis of the fact that Tacitus describes Varus as leading a cavalry force under the authority of Antonius Primus at Cremona. Whether Mucianus contacted Varus and actively sought his allegiance to the Flavian cause, on the other hand, is questionable. It is true that Varus, along with Antonius Primus, would later effect a successful, albeit unauthorised, invasion of Italia. Nevertheless, the fact that Mucianus was able to nullify Varus’ influence by removing him from the position of praetorian prefect following Vitellius’ defeat later in 69, without any repercussions from other ‘Corbulonians’, would seemingly indicate that Varus himself was not especially firmly entrenched in the Corbulonian camp. Nor did Mucianus have any reason to appeal to Varus if he had harboured any hope that the loyalty of III Gallica and, indeed, the remainder of the Illyrian legions could be secured through the influence of Fulvus, the legate of III Gallica itself.

While not as momentous as the contributions of Fulvus and Alexander, it is also likely that Mucianus engendered some degree of tacit support from other Corbulonian veterans. M. Vettius Bolanus, praetorian legate of one of the Armenian legions perhaps as early as 58 AD and seeming close amicus of Corbulo himself, was appointed to replace Marcus Trebellius Maximus (cos suff. 56) as the governor of Britain in April-May 69 by Vitellius. Despite his ostensible affiliation with the usurper, however, he would later contribute to Vitellius’ defeat by refusing to dispatch auxiliary reinforcements in a timely fashion. In fact, Tacitus goes so far as to indicate that

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444 Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 123. citing Tacitus, Hist., 3.16.
446 One cannot imagine, given his previous relationship with Corbulo, that Varus would have been overly receptive to any invocation of Corbulo’s legacy on the part of Mucianus. It is more likely, instead, that Varus entered the Flavian camp by default – because of his position in the Pannonian legions rather than any particular affinity towards Mucianus and his former compatriots.
447 Ibid., 2.65., 2.97.
448 See Tacitus, Ann., 15.3. for Bolanus’ praetorian legateship and Tacitus, Hist., 2.97, 3.41. for his refusal to send timely reinforcements. See also previous chapter for Bolanus’ career under Corbulo.
Bolanus’ allegiance to Vitellius was already wavering by the summer of 69 AD – suggesting, perhaps, that Mucianus had dispatched a communiqué urging his old colleague to join Vespasian as early as the beginning of spring of the same year. Others can be identified by their later careers under the Flavian Principate. For instance, C. Rutilius Gallicus, who had served as governor of Galatia in the 60s – judging by his exceptional career following the accession of Vespasian which included a suffect consulship as early as 70 AD, was likely one of the early adherents to the Flavian cause in the first half of 69, while he was serving as legatus pro praetore of Asia. Similarly, Sextus Julius Frontinus, a senator adlected under Galba, achieved a remarkably rapid ascendency after Vespasian’s rise to power in late 69. Tacitus records that Frontinus was elected praetor urbanus in 70, an office which he promptly vacated for Domitian. Subsequently, he probably took up a governorship in Germany and, received a suffect consulship only three years after his praetorship in 73 and finally a further legateship in Britain – replacing Quintus Petillius Cerealis Caesius Rufus (cos suff. 70, II 74). Unfortunately, Frontinus’ service

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449 Tacitus tells us explicitly that ‘Hordeonius Flaccus, who was beginning to suspect the Batavians, feared that he should have a war on his own hands, and Vettius Bolanus had in Britain a province never very quiet; and both these officers were wavering in their allegiance.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 2.97.) If Bolanus had indeed received a message from Mucianus by the beginning of the summer of 69, then, allowing for a month and a half’s travel time between Syria and Britain, Mucianus likely dispatched the message during the first half of April.

450 See Statius, Silvae, 1.4.80. for Gallicus’ governorship in Asia. Gallicus, in Gallivan’s reckoning, held the suffect consulship in 70 – immediately after Mucianus and in concert with Marcus Ulpius Traianus (cos suff. 70). (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 200, 213.) Eck thinks 71 or 72 are more likely. (Eck, W., “Statius Silvae 1.4 und C. Rutilius Gallicus als Proconsul Asiae II.” American Journal of Philology 106 (1985): 482.) 71 would seemingly be too crowded to fit in another suffect consulship and epigraphic evidence, in the form of a series of boundary markers delimiting the frontiers between the two provinces of Africa, ascribes the task to Gallicus cos. (ILS, 5955.) He must have been suffect consul in 70. For the remainder of the honours handed to Gallicus, see Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.”: 443. And Eck, W., Die Statthalter der germanischen Provinzen vom 1. -3. Jahrhundert (Cologne-Bonn: Rheinland-Verlag, 1985), 481-2. He acquired two successive propraetorian governorships – the first in Africa ca. 73/74 and the second in Germania Inferior ca. 76/77-79. He was consul II in 85 and praefectus urbi in 89.

451 Tacitus, Hist., 4.39. and see ‘4.7 Mucianus and the Senate’.

452 PIR2, J, 322. See also Alfödy, G., Die Legionslegaten der Römischen Rheinarmeen, 15, n. 18. And Tacitus, Agr., 1.17.
under Corbulo is merely conjectural – suggested by the legate’s frequent asides on the subject of the general’s activities in Armenia.453

3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel

It was, therefore, likely thanks to Mucianus’ efforts to rally support from his former colleagues that, by the middle of May, Vespasian was imbued with a growing degree of confidence in his own cause. Certainly, we hear from Tacitus that Vespasian was compelled to conduct a ‘general survey of the chances of a campaign and of his resources both immediate and remote.’454 It is also at this point that we hear of the results of Mucianus and Titus’ efforts during February to May 69. As Tacitus informs us, Vespasian concluded, to his delight, that he could count with confidence on the support of nine legions, including not only Mucianus’ Syrian legions, but also Tiberius Alexander’s Egyptian legions as well as the third legion in Moesia. Moreover, through the indirect influence of III Gallica, he could also hope for the allegiance of the remainder of the Danubian legions – including those in Dalmatia, Pannonia and Moesia.455 Yet, again, however, it seems that

453 For instance, Frontinus, *Strat.*, 2.9.5, 4.1.21, 4.1.28., 4.2.3, 4.7.2. This argument was originally put forward by Syme (Syme, R., “Partisans of Galba.” *Historia* 31 (1982): 472., cf. Birley, A.R., *The Fasti of Roman Britain*, 70.) however rejected by Flaig. (Flaig, E., *Den Kaiser herausfordern: die Usurpation im Römischen Reich*, 580.) The present author is inclined to follow Syme’s argument on the basis of the preponderance of anecdotes dealing with Corbulo in Frontinus’ text. A final, albeit less convincing, connection can also be drawn between the Flavian camp and Bolanus’ co-commander in Armenia during 60-62 AD, L. Verulanus Severus. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 15.3.) According to Nicols and Sherwin-White, Severus can be positively associated with Vespasian by means of the *legatus*’ daughter, one Verulana Gratilla. (Sherwin-White, A.W., *The letters of Pliny: a historical and social commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 2430. And Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 121.) We hear from Tacitus that Verulana Gratilla was in the camp of the Flavians on the Capitoline Hill when the Vitellians besieged it. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.96.) Aside from the decidedly insubstantial link between Severus and Verulana Gratilla, however, one finds it difficult to imagine the circumstances within which Gratilla might have become so close to Vespasian as to directly influence his decisions – especially given that Severus himself is only given a passing mention by Tacitus and the historian cites no explicit link between Gratilla and the Emperor.

454 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.70.

455 Ibid. That Vespasian himself was confident of the loyalty of the Danubian legions is perhaps reflected by Josephus’ dubious account of the deliberations leading up to the declarations for Vespasian in July. (see ‘Appendix II: Josephus’ Dating of Vespasian’s Elevation’) According to Josephus, the men of the Judaean legions were confident of the support of ‘all the armies in the East’ and ‘also those in Europe’. (Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.201)
Vespasian was unwilling to act definitively on the preparations enacted by Mucianus and Titus. According to Tacitus, dogged by fears of defeat or assassination, Vespasian was ‘at one moment high in hope, and at another disposed to reflect on the chances of failure’. Subsequently, in a fashion consistent with his behaviour after the accessions of Galba and Otho, Vespasian declared for Vitellius – a move which seems to have provoked no small level of disappointment among his soldiers, as evidenced by their silence as it was administered.\(^\text{456}\)

A further direct intervention from Mucianus was required. Thus, at some point soon after the declaration for Vitellius, Vespasian and Mucianus met. Neither the exact date nor the place of this meeting is known, although the conventionally-accepted location is Mount Carmel, or at least nearby.\(^\text{457}\) Tacitus states that, in conjunction with his meeting with Mucianus, Vespasian also consulted the deities at Carmel. The historian then adds that it was from this location, just north of Caesarea, that the two leaders departed back to their respective headquarters.\(^\text{458}\) The meeting itself must have taken place at least prior to the middle of June as, by the beginning of July, both Vespasian and Mucianus had both returned to Antioch and Caesarea and conducted preparations for the public declarations of Vespasian’s emperorship.\(^\text{459}\) Nicols thinks that it eventuated significantly earlier as, according to Tacitus, when the legions of Judaea saluted Vespasian on 3 July, they did not even wait for the return of Titus from Syria where, it seems, Titus had been sent for further consultation with Mucianus after the Carmel meeting.\(^\text{460}\) Since Titus had time to return to Caesarea after Carmel and then travel on to Antioch preceding 3 July, the conference should be

\(^{456}\) Tacitus, Hist., 2.74.
\(^{458}\) Ibid., 2.78-79., cf. Josephus, BJ., 3.35.
\(^{459}\) Cf. below ‘3.7 The Declarations for Vespasian in the East’.
\(^{460}\) Ibid., 2.79.
dated to the beginning of June, if not the end of May. Regardless, it is clear that a meeting took place between Mucianus and Vespasian at Carmel and, subsequently, before a large congregation of eastern legates and other senior officers, Mucianus made a formal appeal to Vespasian to accept nomination.

The formal appeal, which is cited in a roundabout fashion by Dio, Josephus and Suetonius alike, is dealt with in acute detail by Tacitus. In a lengthy oration, spanning two chapters of Tacitus’ Historiae, the author has Mucianus set about systematically resolving Vespasian’s remaining fears. In the Tacitean version of his speech, Mucianus makes two central points: initially, that the removal of Vitellius is both feasible and necessary, and second, that Mucianus, as a core proponent of the overthrow of Vitellius, is trustworthy and willing to undergo the dangers that such an action would entail. Consequently, the amicus begins by downplaying the risk associated with openly challenging Vitellius. He disparages the usurper as possessing neither the prestige associated with an imperial lineage, such as the likes of Nero, Claudius or Caligula, nor the cunning of Augustus

461 Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 72. It should be noted, however, that the absence of any dating for Titus departure for Antioch again makes this conclusion shaky. Ash (Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 309.) and Levick (Levick, B., Vespasian, 47.), citing Flaig (Flaig, E., Den Kaiser herausfordern: die Usurpation im Römischen Reich, 365, n. 36.), believe Titus must have departed Caesarea relatively late, ca. 25 June. Tacitus’ phrase: quamvis Iudaicus exercitus quinto nonas Iulias apud ipsum iurasset, eo ardore ut ne Titus quidem filius expectaretur (‘though the army of Judaea on July 3rd took the oath to Vespasian in person with such eager alacrity that they would not wait for the return of his son Titus’) insinuates that Titus was expected at the proclamation in Judaea. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.79.) Surely, he must have already embarked on the return journey from Antioch at this point. Given that the round-trip between the two cities constitutes around ten to twelve days, somewhere between 22 and 27 June would seem reasonable. (cf. Hoehner, H.W., Herod Antipas: A Contemporary of Jesus Christ (United States: Zondervan, 1999), 34. for a discussion of the travel time between the two cities) Thus, we are yet again left without a firm basis for the dating of the Carmel meeting.

462 That it is not merely a literary fabrication on the part of Tacitus is confirmed by the three former authors. Cassius Dio says little, simply asserting that ‘Mucianus urged him strongly, hoping that Vespasian should get the name of Emperor and that he as a result of the other’s good nature should enjoy an equal share of power.’ (Dio, Hist., 65.9.1.) Josephus speaks of the ‘exhortations of Mucianus, and the other commanders, that [Vespasian] would accept of the Empire’. (Josephus, BJ., 4.10.5.) Suetonius does not mention Mucianus specifically but nonetheless leaves us with the general statement: ‘[Vespasian] made, however, no attempt upon the sovereignty, though his friends were very ready to support him, and even pressed him to the enterprise’. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 6.) Cf. Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Historiae Book II, 290f. for a detailed analysis of Mucianus’ appeal.
or the subtlety of Tiberius. Second, he warns Vespasian that he could no longer remain free from suspicion of coveting imperial power – he had already acquired too much renown to continue to be ignored by Vitellius and that to remain inactive would be tantamount to ‘indolence and cowardice’.

Third, Mucianus dismisses any notion that Vespasian’s nobilitas, or lack thereof, poses any real impediment to the Flavian plans – an important consideration, not only because of Vespasian’s decidedly undistinguished lineage, but also because of the existence of other notable individuals who, at least by title, had a better claim to the Principate. He adds that Vitellius’ elevation is proof that an army is sufficient to make an Emperor, regardless of military reputation or nobility of birth, and that ‘the man who is afraid sees distinction enough in any one whom he fears’.

Subsequently, Mucianus invokes the memory of Corbulo – ostensibly for the benefit of the other legionary legates in attendance, which likely included at the very least a representative of Tiberius Alexander and, perhaps, several other former officers of Corbulo, such as Marcus Ulpius Traianus, former commander of legio X Fretensis, Pompeius Collega of legio IV Scythica and Caesennius Gallus, who was almost certainly commanding XII Fulminata in 69.

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463 As the Tacitean Mucianus unequivocally states: ‘to persist in inaction, and to leave the State to degradation and ruin, would look like indolence and cowardice, even supposing that servitude were as safe for you as it would be infamous. The time has gone by and passed away when you might have endured the suspicion of having coveted Imperial power. That power is now your only refuge.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 2.76.)

464 Levick (Levick, B., Vespasian, 55.) cites several examples, including Tiberius Plautius Silvanus Aelianus (cos suff. 45, II 74), Nero’s ‘distinguished general’ (cf. ILS, 986. And Hofmann, K., RE, vol. 21, 35. for his career), Gaius Suetonius Paullinus (cos ord. 66), a former general of Otho (Tacitus, Hist., 1.46.) and Vespasian’s own brother, Sabinus, who, as the author states, he ‘senior in consulship, he had been richer and more influential; and he was more popular with the troops’. Cf. ibid., 3.65., 3.75. for Tacitus’ estimation of Sabinus. His comment at ibid., 3.75. is illuminating: ante principatum Vespasiani decus domus penes Sabinum erat. (‘before the accession of Vespasian, the distinction of the family was centred in Sabinus.’)

465 This argument rings somewhat hollow. As Ash notes, Vitellius’ ‘aristocratic credentials’ outstripped Vespasian’s by a considerable margin. His father was consul three times and Valens had much earlier played on Vitellius’ pedigree to induce him to contest the purple. (Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 295. citing Tacitus, Hist., 1.52.)

466 Gnaeus Pompeius Collega (cos suff. ca. 73) was the legate of IV Scythica in 70 (Josephus, BJ., 7.28) and almost certainly for a period before. As he was promoted to a suffect consulship, likely in 73, he was undoubtedly an early supporter of Flavian interests. (MW, 7. And Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 107.) A. Caesennius Gallus (PIR2, C, 170.) is known from Josephus to have been legatus legionis XII Fulminatae under Cestius Gallus in Judaea
Mucianus assures Vespasian of the unreserved support of nine of the eastern legions – legions which, according to the Syrian legate, held advantages over the Vitellian legions in terms of both their unwavering loyalty to the Flavian cause as well as their discipline and experience in war.467 Finally, and most importantly, Mucianus anticipates his own role in the Flavian rebellion and his reward for acting on Vespasian’s behalf. He insists upon his position as Vespasian’s chief adherent – equivalent to the stations held by both Caecina and Valens under Vitellius, and he openly requests a military command as ‘I would rather have you, as is the better policy, direct your armies, and leave to me the conduct of the war and the hazards of battle.’468 On the subject of his reward,

during autumn 66. (Josephus, BJ, 2.510) As Vervaet points out, he might have assumed the command during the spring of 63 at the earliest, having accompanied Cestius Gallus to Syria with the intention of replacing Calavius Sabinus, but cannot have served for more than two years under Corbulo’s over-riding authority – between the summer of 63 and that of 65. (Vervaet, F.J., “Domitius Corbulo and the Rise of the Flavian Dynasty.”: 454.) Whether Gallus continued to serve in this capacity is not known – although Josephus mentions XII Fulminata during the final stages of the siege of Jerusalem, no legate for the legion is mentioned in Titus’ staff. (ibid., 2.510 and 5.41.) Even so, the fact that Gallus was granted the governorship of Cappadocia-Galatia in 80/81 AD – after Collega and Neratius Pansa (see no. 419), the other legates of the Syrian legions, suggests that he continued to serve at least until Vespasian’s elevation in 69. M. Ulpius Traianus presents a more difficult case. Father of the Emperor Trajan, he is the earliest commander of X Fretensis to turn up in the sources – operating under Vespasian in Galilee in 67. (ibid., 3.289) Nothing is known of his early career, but, as Syme notes, he must have been of senior praetorian rank in 66 in order to acquire the position of consul suffect in 70 AD. (Syme, R., Tacitus, 789.) Although he is not mentioned in the sources as legatus under Corbulo there are some grounds for believing that he was in command of X Fretensis prior to Vespasian’s appointment in the East. Initially, as Vespasian had no experience in eastern warfare, it stands to reason that Nero would have assigned him legati with experience in the area – and, in fact, Traianus’ later commands under Vespasian suggests that the Emperor considered him to be an authority on eastern affairs. (Bowersock, G.W., “Syria under Vespasian.” The Journal of Roman Studies 63 (1973): 133, 140.) Second, although the length of his tenure as legatus is not known, the fact that he, unlike Cerealis, did not finish the war in the same post (the last mention of his tenure as legate of X Fretensis is in June 68 – Josephus, BJ, 3.237) implies that he was active in the East for a significant period prior to Vespasian’s arrival. It is not known what his specific role in Vespasian’s cause was after 68. Nevertheless, his services to Vespasian must have been valuable, for he was given a suffect consulship in 70 and was adlected inter patricios in 73. (Morris, J., “The Consulate of the Elder Trajan.” The Journal of Roman Studies 43 (1953): 79. and Eck, W., Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian (Munich: Beck, 1970), 109.) An alternative view is given by Flaig who thinks Traianus must have been in Baetica from the summer of 68 onwards yet, if this were the case, one would find the comprehensive and early appointments given to him by Vespasian after 69 somewhat strange. (Flaig, E., Den Kaiser herausfordern: die Usurpaton im Römischen Reich, 578.)

467 Tacitus, Hist., 2.76.  
468 Cf. Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 297. who observes Mucianus’ artful use of the first-person plural: nobis nihil ultra adrogabo quam ne post Valentem et Caecinam numeremur (‘For myself I will claim nothing more than not to be reckoned inferior to Valens and Caecina.’). Mucianus is suggesting that, despite being only one man, he will be more valuable than either Caecina or Valens.
Mucianus remains at least superficially unassuming and he expresses only a vague appeal for an honourary position in Vespasian’s regime: ‘If we are victorious. I shall have whatever honour you think fit to bestow on me’. Mucianus’ words reportedly prompted an immediate and enthusiastic response from the legati present and, judging by the words of Tacitus – *haud dubia destinatione discessere, Mucianus Antiochiam, Vespasianus Caesaream: illa Syriae, hoc Iudaeae caput est*, having achieved a consensus, the Flavian party departed to their respective headquarters to prepare for Vespasian’s elevation.469

It is curious that in Tacitus’ account of the Carmel meeting, Vespasian himself is accorded a role as merely a passive observer. In Tacitus’ reckoning, it was Mucianus and the other unnamed legati amicique who were the active participants in the meeting. To the former, the historian attributes a dramatic exhortation, while of the latter individuals Tacitus asserts that they ‘crowded round Vespasian with fresh confidence, encouraging him, and reminding him of the responses of prophets and the movements of the heavenly bodies.’470 On the other hand, in the face of the momentous decision of publicly declaring the Flavian rebellion, Vespasian says nothing. He even remains conspicuously silent in reference to prophecies hailing his success, despite the fact that they had allegedly captured the popular imagination:

*has ambages et statim exceperat fama et tunc aperiebat; nec quicquam magis in ore vulgi. crebriores apud ipsum sermones, quanto sperantibus plura dicuntur.*471

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469 ‘With purposes no longer doubtful they parted, Mucianus for Antioch, Vespasian for Caesarea. These cities are the capitals of Syria and Judaea respectively.’ (ibid., 2.78.)

470 Ibid.

471 ‘These ambiguous intimations popular rumour had at once pounced on, and now began to reveal the meaning. Nothing was more talked about by the common people. In Vespasian's presence the topic was more frequently discussed, because to the aspirant himself men have more to say.’ (ibid.)
It is perhaps for this reason that Tacitus’ account of the Carmel meeting has frequently been deemed a fiction by modern scholars. Even so, two explanations might be offered for Vespasian’s apparent absence from the early preparations and, indeed, his seemingly passive role in at the meeting. One theory, offered by Morgan, attributes Vespasian’s passivity to a literary strategy employed by Tacitus. Tacitus, Morgan asserts, identified three key problems with the timing of Vespasian’s accession in early July. Initially, Vespasian was first hailed Emperor on 1 July, when Vitellius had not even reached Rome – so there were few, if any, excesses to report, let alone to arouse sufficient disgust to justify treasonous behaviour on the part of Vespasian. Second, Tacitus found it difficult to credit Vespasian’s hesitation during the first half of 69 as having been a result of his love of the state or from a particular feeling that he was unfit to be Emperor. Finally, when Vespasian believed resolutely in leading his army from the front, it made little sense that he allotted the most important military task to Mucianus. Thus, to resolve these difficulties, Tacitus established an elaborate account of the meeting in which ‘Vespasian’s doubts ran so wide and deep that he had to seek reassurances of every kind’. According to Morgan, by May 69, Vespasian could count on some advantages for his cause – ‘on the spirit of his own men; on the support of Mucianus and Tiberius Alexander; on legion III Gallica in Moesia, because it had been based in Syria until

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472 See below ‘3.7 The Declarations for Vespasian in the East’
473 It was the middle of July when Vitellius entered Rome almost as if it were a captured city. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.89.) Tacitus does not give an exact date, noting that the grain was ready for the harvest (ibid., 2.87.). In one of Pliny’s letters, we learn that this was about the middle of July. (Pliny, Ep., 8.21.) Thus, Carmel was held well and truly before Vitellius arrived in Rome and, indeed, before any excesses could be committed and news of them transmitted across the Empire. It is no accident that Tacitus situates his discussion of Vitellius’ excesses, both in the provinces and in Rome itself, after that of Vespasian’s accession and even Mucianus’ departure with the 6th legion. See here Tacitus’ lengthy discussion from Tacitus, Hist., 2.87-2.95. which begins with the statement: Dum haec per provincias a Vespasiano ducibusque partium geruntur, Vitellius contemptior in dies segniorque, ad omnis municipiorum villarumque amoenitates resistens, gravi urbem agmine petebat. (‘While Vespasian and the generals of his party were thus occupied in the provinces, Vitellius was daily becoming more contemptible and indolent, halting to enjoy the pleasures of every town and villa in his way, as with his cumbrous host he advanced towards the capital.’)
474 Ibid., 2.83. See also ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’
nearly the end of Nero’s reign; and on its being able perhaps to win over other legions in the Balkans’. Against these advantages, however, Vespasian had to balance two main concerns – initially, that failure would destroy both himself and his two sons, both of whom were old enough to be considered threats in their own right. Second, that, although he could rely on most of his men, there was always a risk that one would sell him out – for prestige or wealth. In the Tacitean account of Carmel, the lead is taken by Mucianus who, although he cannot respond directly to the Vespasian’s fears, since they have been expressed in an ‘interior monologue’, artfully resolves them through his desire to gratify his own ambition. Consumed by his own yearnings for military glory, Mucianus offers to lead the Flavian vanguard to Italy – to ‘leave to [him] the conduct of the war and the hazards of battle’, and once he makes this offer, it cannot be rejected for fear of damaging the friendship. Thus, according to Morgan, Mucianus conveniently releases Vespasian from his indecision. Vespasian’s acceptance of the offer frees him from the fear of assassination by one of his own men – for neither he nor his men will have to contend with the pressure of waging war on the Roman citizenry. Simultaneously, Mucianus’ attempt to diminish the risk associated with challenging the Vitellian forces by first asserting that the Vitellians are

475 Morgan, M.G., 69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors, 182.
476 See Tacitus, Hist., 2.74: et Vespasianus modo in spem erectus, aliquando adversa reputabat: quis ille dies foret quo sexaginta annos et duos filios iuvenes bello permitteret? esse privatis cogitationibus progressum et, prout velint, plus minusve sumi ex fortuna: imperium cupientibus nihil medium inter summa aut praecipitia. (‘…and Vespasian, at one moment inspired with hope, would at times ponder over the obstacles. What could that day be on which he should entrust his sixty years and his two young sons to the fortune of war? He reflected that private plans allow one to advance or retreat and permit the individual to take that measure of Fortune’s gifts that he will; but when a man aims at the imperial power, there is no alternative to the highest success and utter downfall.’) Certainly, there was precedent for fearing an assassination attempt from within his own ranks – Lucius Arruntius Camillus Scribonianus (cos ord. 32) the governor of Dalmatia who had risen against Claudius in 42 AD, fell victim to his troops’ wrath and was forced to flee to the island of Issa. (Dio, Hist., 60.15.)
477 Tacitus, Hist., 2.77.
enveloped in indolence and indiscipline and second that Vespasian’s forces, by contrast, are both experienced and enthusiastic in war frees the future Emperor from his fear of failure.\(^{478}\)

Morgan’s theory is attractive, however he may be giving too much credit to Tacitus’ literary manoeuvring.\(^{479}\) In fact, the evidence suggests that Mucianus functioned as more than a mere foil to Vespasian’s unspoken concerns at Carmel. If Mucianus’ prior efforts were as comprehensive as the later organisation of the *partes Flaivanae* implies, then it is also peculiar that no mention is made of Vespasian’s role in the preparations behind the scenes beyond his reticence to act publicly. Given that rumours of a Flavian conspiracy had spread as far as Rome itself, he cannot have been ignorant of Mucianus’ attempts to gather support for the Flavian cause, nor can Mucianus have been acting without sanction from the future Emperor. If Vespasian was truly fearful for either his own fate or his sons’, then one finds it strange that he did not call a halt to the preparations earlier in the year. Certainly, Vespasian’s sudden attack of cold feet makes little sense within the context of Tacitus’ narrative – given that the historian earlier emphasises the zeal with which both Mucianus and Vespasian had resolved for concerted action.\(^{480}\) One further, and more practical, explanation might therefore be offered for Vespasian’s absence from the earlier covert preparations and, indeed, his seemingly passive role in the meeting at Carmel – namely, that Vespasian was simply hedging his bets. Through communications facilitated by Titus, Vespasian had employed Mucianus to gauge the degree of support he could expect for his cause should he


\(^{479}\) And thus overstating Tacitus’ alteration of the events at Carmel.

\(^{480}\) *igitur arma in occasionem distulere, Vespasianus Mucianusque nuper, ceteri olim mixtis consiliis; optimus quisque amore rei publicae, multos dulcedo praedarum stimulabat, alios ambiguae domi res: ita boni malique causis diversis, studio pari, bellum omnes cupiebant.* (‘They therefore postponed the war until a more fitting opportunity, and though Vespasian and Mucianus had but lately resolved on concerted action, the others had done so long before. The worthiest among them were moved by patriotism; many were wrought upon by the attractions of plunder; some by their private embarrassments. And so, good and bad, from different motives, but with equal zeal, were all eager for war.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.7)
publicly launch a Flavian coup. Immediately prior to the conference at Carmel, at several private meetings with Mucianus, Vespasian and the amicus had conferred, agreed that sufficient support had been gathered and decided on a plan for publicly effecting Vespasian’s accession. Further, that Vespasian would remain a passive observer was by design. It was decided that Mucianus would incur the odium of publicly demanding the perpetuation of the civil war and, in return, he would be provided with the military command of a Flavian expeditionary force to Italy.481 In support of this latter theory is Josephus’ intimation that some level of strategic planning had taken place at Carmel. As we hear from the historian, it was upon the ‘exhortations of Mucianus, and the other commanders’ that Vespasian was considering the initial phase of the Flavian coup – gaining dominion over Alexandria and, by extension, over the distribution of grain to the Roman capital.482 That Tacitus, despite his detailed account of the Carmel meeting, does not mention these strategic considerations is significant. It is possible that the latter historian was simply ignorant, while Josephus, thanks to his access to Vespasian’s memoirs, was better informed.483 Nevertheless, a plan of action must almost certainly have been formulated by Mucianus and Vespasian, likely in private immediately prior to the meeting – especially given the prompt instigation of Vespasian’s accession at the beginning of July and, subsequently, the brisk pace at which the Flavians instigated operations to levy troops, gather funds and recall veterans afterward.484 One cannot imagine, in

481 And honours after the fact (See ‘4.11 Rationalising Mucianus’ Support for the Flavian Cause’). Thus, also, Mucianus’ anticipation of his military command in ibid., 2.77., a command which is later confirmed at 2.83.
482Josephus, BJ., 4.105. As is addressed in Appendix II, Josephus’ chronology for the accession of Vespasian is problematic – in fact, he does not cite the meeting at Carmel by name. Nevertheless, it is significant that he links Vespasian’s considerations directly to the ‘exhortations of Mucianus’ rather than the later strategic meeting at Berytus, which he does cite by name. (ibid., 4.107)
483 Cf. no. 144.
484 Tacitus, Hist., 2.82. See also ‘3.8 The Meeting at Berytus’.
any case, given what we know of Vespasian’s nature as the most cautious of generals, that he would have been immediately persuaded by an impetuous outburst from Mucianus. 485

3.7 The Declarations for Vespasian in the East

The culmination of the plans made at Carmel came on 1 July when the legions of Alexandria, under instructions from the prefect Tiberius Alexander, took an oath of loyalty to Vespasian. On 3 July, the legions of Judaea followed suit. By 15 July, the legions and civilians of Syria, too, had declared for Vespasian.486 Josephus, in his typical style, goes to great lengths to emphasise the spontaneity of the proclamations of early July. He depicts them as an impulsive movement of angry and patriotic soldiers who had just learned of depredations wrought by Vitellius and his confidantes in Rome and who were apparently disturbed by the alleged intentions of Vitellius to relocate the Syrian legions to the German frontier.487 According to Josephus, the Judaean legions met in several companies and consulted with one another over the state of affairs at Rome. Among other things, they denounced the lascivious behaviour of Vitellius while extolling the capabilities of an experienced governor such as Vespasian. Moreover, they reckoned the presence of Titus as well as of Flavius Sabinus in the Flavian camp as a categorical advantage – the former for the security he offered as imperial heir and the latter as a candidate to be ‘entrusted with the government of the city’. Finally, they once again invoked the exploits of Corbulo’s legions, exclaiming: ‘they are themselves more deserving than those that made the other Emperors; for that they have undergone as great wars as have the troops that come from Germany; nor are they

485 On Vespasian’s cautious nature see particularly Nicols’ discussion of his Judaean campaigns. (Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 48-52, 54-57 and 62-64.)
486 Tacitus, Hist., 2.79-81.
inferior in war to those that have brought that tyrant to Rome.’

It was following these deliberations, we hear from Josephus that the reluctant Vespasian, unaware of his soldiers’ intentions, had the Empire forced down upon him.

There is every indication, however, that the proclamations of Vespasian’s Principate in the East were far from accidental. For one, the fact that, in the reckoning of Tacitus, each of the acclamations eventuated sequentially and within the space of a relatively short time indicates that they were more than mere coincidence. It has often been argued, most notably by Wellesley, that the Judaean legions were motivated by the news that the Egyptian legions had sworn for Vespasian. This seems improbable on two counts. Initially, the distance between Alexandria and Caesarea indicates independent acclamations given the time-frame. Second, there is little reason to assume that Tiberius Alexander would have notified Vespasian of his intentions after the fact. There are also further reasons to believe that the proclamations were more than mere chance. It is notable, for instance, that the accounts of the manner in which the declarations in Alexandria, Caesarea and Antioch were carried out, recorded both in the ancient sources and in

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488 Ibid., 4.601.
489 ‘These were the discourses the soldiers had in their several companies; after which they got together in a great body, and, encouraging one another, they declared Vespasian Emperor, and exhorted him to save the government, which was now in danger’. (ibid.)
489 There are also wider issues with Josephus’ account of the proclamations in July – most notably with reference to the chronology that Josephus sets out from April onwards. See here ‘Appendix II: Josephus’ Dating of Vespasian’s Elevation’.
491 Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 121.
492 Even assuming a travel speed on the higher end of five knots per hour or more, evidence from comparable voyages during the period suggests a travel time of at least four days. A useful survey of ancient voyages and estimated speeds of travel is provided by Casson, L., Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World, 284f.
493 Nichols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flaviae, 72. contra. Heubner, H., Fauth, W. (eds.), P. Cornelius Tacitus, Die Historien, vol. 2, 256. Initiating the acclamation of a new emperor was not a light undertaking. As Ash highlights, ‘whoever publicly proclaimed Vespasian as emperor would irreversibly commit himself to the cause and if the proposal misfired, could face danger.’ (Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 310.) Valens served as the scapegoat for Vitellius, but only after the latter had already dispatched envoys, presumably with explicit instructions about how to handle the affair. (Tacitus, Hist., 1.56-57.)
epigraphic evidence, bear a great deal of resemblance. A mutilated account of the acclamations of 1 July has survived in a small papyrus document, now found in the collection of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina:

**Figure 2: Papyrus document detailing acclamations of 1 July 69 AD. (P. Fouad, 8 = MW, 41 = CPJ, 2.418a)**

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Its fragmented state makes it difficult to give more than a partial reconstruction of the acclamations. Nevertheless, according to the remnants of the account, on the day of the
proclamation, Tiberius Alexander gathered a large portion of the civil population together in the hippodrome in Alexandria. Likely having already administered the oath to the troops, he entered into a lengthy speech in which, among other things, he seems to have addressed his ‘Lord Caesar’ and referred to him in dramatic terms as the ‘Son of Ammon’ and the ‘one saviour and benefactor’. Subsequently, the crowd answered with a refrain: ‘O Lord Augustus’.\(^{495}\) Only two days later, in Judaea, Vespasian followed a remarkably similar pattern. According to Tacitus, after the oath had been administered to his soldiers, Vespasian addressed a crowd of both the local populace and his personal guard and was, in return, greeted with refrain of ‘Caesar’ and ‘Augustus’.\(^{496}\) The same pattern was again repeated by Mucianus. As we hear from Tacitus, he ‘at once administered to the eager soldiers the oath of allegiance to Vespasian’ and, in turn, ‘he entered the theatre at Antioch, where it is customary for the citizens to hold their public deliberations, and as they crowded together with profuse expressions of flattery, he addressed them’.\(^{497}\) In a manner consistent with


\(^{496}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.80.

\(^{497}\) Ibid.
his characterisation by Tacitus as an able administrator and eloquent orator, Mucianus gave his speech in fluent Greek and ‘thanks to his feeling for style he set off to best advantage everything he said and did.’ Subsequently, seemingly well aware that the accusation would spread rapidly through the province, Mucianus insisted that Vitellius had determined to reward the German legions with a transfer to Syria, simultaneously displacing the legions of Syria to the harsh German frontier.\textsuperscript{498} If there is any conclusion to be gained from this, it is that the acclamations were planned beforehand, either at Carmel, or, alternatively, by Vespasian himself and orders for their execution disseminated to Tiberius Alexander and to Mucianus – the latter by Titus’ hand, towards the end of June. Upon receiving the orders, both Mucianus and Tiberius Alexander executed the proclamation in the manner specified – namely, by means of an initial oath administered to the troops and, subsequently, a formal address to the civil populace. If the intention of Mucianus and Vespasian was indeed to give the impression of a spontaneous ‘wave’ of support – stretching from Alexandria to Syria, then they almost certainly succeeded as they appear to have even fooled Tacitus, who concludes on the matter that ‘all this was done by the impulsive action of the soldiers without the preliminary of a formal harangue or any concentration of the legions.’\textsuperscript{499}

3.8 The Meeting at Berytus

Following the acclamations in July, representatives from all of the eastern provinces and client states, including Mucianus and Vespasian, met in the city of Berytus. The date of the conference

\textsuperscript{498} Mucianus appears to have exploited the common practice of sounding local grievances in acclamations. (Roueché, C., “Acclamations in the Later Roman Empire: New Evidence from Aphrodisias.” \textit{The Journal of Roman Studies} 74 (1984): 183.) The ‘grievance’ here is an invention. (Ash, R. (ed.), \textit{Tacitus: Histories Book II}, 313.) His accusation was clearly calculated to incense the soldiers and the citizenry alike, as Tacitus emphasises: ‘Nothing excited the provincials and the army so much as the assertion of Mucianus that Vitellius had determined to remove the legions of Germany to Syria, to an easy and lucrative service, while the armies of Syria were to have given them in exchange the encampments of Germany with their inclement climate and their harassing toils.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.80.)

\textsuperscript{499} Ibid., 2.79.
is not given by either Tacitus or Josephus, however scholars have typically placed it at some point towards the end of July.500 The participants in the conference, on the other hand, are detailed by both Josephus and Tacitus. They included the dependent rulers Sohaemus of Emesa and Antiochus IV of Commagene, as well as Agrippa II and Queen Berenice. Embassies also came from Syria, from the provinces of Asia Minor and from Achaea.501 Finally, Mucianus arrived with a vast company of legates and tribunes and ‘all the most distinguished centurions and soldiers’ including no small number of troops abstracted from the Judaean legions. Thus, according to Tacitus, ‘such a vast assemblage of cavalry and infantry, and the pomp of the kings that strove to rival each other in magnificence, presented an appearance of Imperial splendour.’502 It is certain that numerous strategic decisions were made at Berytus – none of which are specified in the sources but which can nonetheless be extrapolated from the context surrounding the meeting.503 The most important of these decisions concerned the official allocation of responsibilities.504 Titus would take charge


501 See Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.616.: ‘Vespasian then removed from Cesarea to Berytus, where many embassages came to him from Syria, and many from other provinces, bringing with them from every city crowns, and the congratulations of the people. Mucianus came also, who was the president of the province, and told him with what alacrity the people [received the news of his advancement], and how the people of every city had taken the oath of fidelity to him.’ See also Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.81. Agrippa, it seems, had received word of the declarations for Vespasian prior to their occurrence – as Tacitus states, he had abandoned Rome before even Vitellius himself had heard of the events in the east.

502 Ibid., 2.81.

503 Tacitus himself emphasizes that, despite the ostentation, the business of the meeting was severe – as he says explicitly, the conference itself was held ‘to deliberate on the general conduct of the war.’ (ibid., 2.81.) In Ash’s opinion, Tacitus’ omission of the specific details of the Flavian discussions at the *consilium* can be accounted for, initially, by the fact that he desired to avoid slowing the momentum of his account and, second, by the fact that the decisions taken at the meeting were eventually rendered moot by the intervention of Antonius Primus. (Ash, R. (ed.), *Tacitus: Histories Book II*, 317.)

504 As Josephus asserts, when Vespasian had received the embassages at Berytus, he ‘disposed of the places of power justly’. (Jos, *BJ.*, 4.630.) Tacitus further observes, during his account of Berytus, that Cappadocia itself had no legions. Thus, the conduct of the war against Vitellius, as well as the security of the Eastern borders of the Empire would fall to Vespasian, Mucianus and Titus respectively. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.81.)
of the Jewish War with Tiberius Alexander as his second-in-command, while Mucianus would lead the Flavian forces in the West towards Italy with the intention of seizing the capital – leaving the civil administration of Syria to Pompeius Collega, previously legate of *legio IV Scythica*.\(^{505}\) It is also likely it was at this point that Mucianus was granted the authority to act as Vespasian’s deputy in Rome at the conclusion of the campaign.\(^{506}\) Vespasian, as he had resolved to do at Carmel in May, continued to hedge his bets. Reticent to risk his own reputation in the struggle with Vitellius, he would remain in the east to consolidate his hold over Syria and Egypt.\(^{507}\)

Upon the conclusion of the conference at Berytus, Vespasian and Mucianus conducted one final meeting at Antioch.\(^{508}\) There, the two generals supervised the final preparations for the coming war. Among other things, the two men oversaw the raising of new levies in the eastern provinces, the recall of veterans to the Flavian colours, the manufacture of arms at the ‘strongest’ cities and the minting of new gold and silver coin at Antioch to pay for them. Each of these tasks, Tacitus informs us, was ‘vigorously carried on in its appointed place by properly qualified agents’.\(^{509}\) Consistent with Tacitus’ characterisation of the Emperor, Vespasian personally oversaw the preparations at every quarter – and he rewarded his adherents with prefectures and procuratorships.

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\(^{506}\) This is likely the inspiration for the exchange detailed by Dio at *Hist.*, 66.2.

\(^{507}\) Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 47. for the division of responsibilities. As Tacitus asserts: ‘It was arranged that Titus should pursue the war in Judaea, while Vespasian should secure the passes into Egypt. To cope with Vitellius, a portion of the army, the generalship of Mucianus, the prestige of Vespasian's name, and the destiny before which all difficulties vanish, seemed sufficient.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.82.) Similarly, Dio, while he does not mention Berytus, states that Vespasian ‘sent Mucianus to Italy against Vitellius, while he himself, after taking a look at affairs in Syria and entrusting to others the conduct of the war against the Jews, proceeded to Egypt.’ (Dio, *Hist.*, 65.9.)

\(^{508}\) Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.630.

\(^{509}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.82. That such experts were immediately available is indicative of the considered and long-winded approach taken by both Mucianus and Vespasian.
and promotions to the rank of senator. That such rewards were handed out liberally was not inconsequential – as Tacitus also indicates, the Flavian’s financial situation was of particular concern. He asserts that Vespasian exercised restraint when it came to rewarding his troops for, although Mucianus had only held out moderate hopes for a donative during his speech at Carmel, the Emperor ‘offered no more in the civil war than others had done in times of peace’. Even so, Mucianus demanded enormous sums from the nearby provinces and he even contributed directly from his own considerable wealth.\(^{510}\) Vespasian’s *amici* were expected to follow suit, albeit with no hope of reimbursement outside of the promise of future promotions and commendations.\(^{511}\) Furthermore, there was also the question of the security of the eastern borders – which would soon be weakened with the departure of the Flavian forces for civil war. Thus, Vespasian dispatched an embassy to the Parthian King Volgaeses I to seek assurances of non-intervention in Syria or Asia Minor. The King promised nothing, however, judging by his gift of forty thousand mounted archers to the Emperor towards the end of 69, he had no intention of bringing upon himself the wrath of a victorious Vespasian, who would still have substantial military forces stationed in the Orient.\(^{512}\)

### 3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus

Finally, around early to mid-August, Mucianus set out from Antioch with a force of about eighteen thousand soldiers.\(^{513}\) We are informed directly by Tacitus that Mucianus took with him the entirety

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\(^{510}\) Although Tacitus adds the addendum that he did so with expectations of regaining his lost wealth from the State. (ibid., 2.84.)

\(^{511}\) Ibid., Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 48, 63-64.


of the legion *VI Ferrata* along with thirteen thousand *vexillari* – ostensibly including several elements from the Judaean legions.\(^{514}\) No auxiliaries are mentioned. Tacitus either included them in the thirteen thousand or, otherwise, they should be added to the figure.\(^{515}\) On the other hand, two core problems with the beginning of Mucianus’ march present themselves. The first of these concerns the timing of Mucianus’ departure. The precise date of this is not given in the sources yet sometime around 15 August would seem a reasonable assumption on the basis that Mucianus had likely arrived at the camp of the Moesian legion *VII Claudia* in Viminacium, or at least nearby, when he learned of the battle of Cremona.\(^{516}\)

The route which Mucianus used for the initial stages of his march is difficult to ascertain with the source material available. Nevertheless, some effort towards clarifying the issue is furnished by Syme. As the latter author observes, from the Cilician Gates to the Propontis, the *amicus* ‘had a choice of routes, and he may have divided his forces’.\(^{517}\) In Tacitus’ account, Mucianus had the choice of avoiding Moesia entirely on his way to Rome, instead moving directly to Dyrrachium –

\(^{514}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.83. Thanks to an inscription published by Torelli, it is possible to identify the legate of *VI Ferrata* under Mucianus as M. Hirrius Fronto Neratius Pansa, a native of Saepinum in Samnium. Although the inscription does it mention the legateship explicitly, it is noticeable that Pansa’s series of appointments during the early stages of Vespasian’s rule followed the same pattern as the other Syrian and Judaean legates such as Fulvus and Traianus. He was adlected *inter patricios*, won the *dona militaria* and was appointed to an early consulship in either 73 or 76. On Neratius Pansa see Torelli, M., “The Cursus Honorum of M. Hirrius Fronto Neratius Pansa.” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 58:1/2 (1968): 174. See also Hall, A.S., “An unidentified governor of Lycia-Pamphylia under Vespasian.” *Epigraphica Anatolica* 4 (1984): 33 and Flaig, E., *Den Kaiser herausfordern: die Usurpation im Römischen Reich*, 545.


\(^{516}\) Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 74. Mucianus heard of Cremona when he arrived in Moesia. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.46.) For the location of Mucianus’ base camp see Appendix III. Word of the battle, which was fought on 24-25 October, must have reached Mucianus during the first week of November. (Wellesley, K., “Moonshine in Tacitus.” *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 100 (1957): 250. for the date of Cremona. And Wellesley, K., *Cornelius Tacitus. The Histories. Book III* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1972), 211-15. for the approximate timing of the arrival of the news in Moesia.)

presumably through Byzantium, along the *Via Egnatia* and crossing to Brundisium or Tarentum or one of the other harbours in south-eastern Italy. However, in Syme’s reckoning, Mucianus chose not to do so and likely resolved to cross the Hellespont at Cyzicus or Abydus in order to avoid congestion at Byzantium. Subsequently, it can be assumed that Mucianus took the imperial highway to Italy, including the *Via Militaris* which ran through Philippolis, Serdica and Naissus to Viminacium. The entire journey, from Antioch to Viminacium, calculates to around two thousand kilometres. Even marching at a speed that reached some twenty-five kilometres per day, and Tacitus assures us that Mucianus maintained a carefully modified rate, he would have required at least eighty days to reach Viminacium.

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518 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.83. See also below for Mucianus’ initial plan and his decision to march through Moesia instead.
519 Syme, R., “The March of Mucianus,” in *Roman Papers*, vol. 3, 1002. Mucianus had access to shipping in the region, as he had ordered the Black Sea fleet to concentrate at Byzantium. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.83.)
520 As Syme notes, the highway was probably in good repair as ‘only a few years earlier the government had been improving facilities on two laterals of communication in the Thracian sector’. (Syme, R., “The March of Mucianus,” in *Roman Papers*, vol. 3, 1002.) Cf. Wellesley, K., *Cornelius Tacitus. The Histories. Book III*, 212.
521 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.83. The exact speed at which Mucianus was travelling is difficult to discern given that Tacitus only gives us a vague indication. Several reference points for the marching speed of legionaries can be found in the sources. Vegetius, in his discussion of the training of recruits, states that ‘They should march with the common military step twenty miles in five summer-hours, and with the full step, which is quicker, twenty-four miles in the same number of hours.’ (Vegetius, *De Re Militari*, 1.) At Caesar, *BG.*, 5.46-47. we hear that Caesar had marches his legionaries 20 miles in a day to rescue Quintus Tullius Cicero, after waiting to be relieved by Marcus Licinius Crassus, who had marched 25 miles between midnight and the third hour (around nine hours). A rapid forced-march is also recorded by Livy. According to the latter author, Gaius Claudius Nero (cos ord. 207 BC) marched some 250 miles in six days to reinforce Marcus Livius Drusus Salinator (cos ord. 219, II 207 BC) at Metaurus – averaging out to about 35.7 miles per day. Livy states that ‘there was no loitering, no straggling, no halt except while taking food; they marched day and night; they gave to rest hardly enough time for the needs of their bodies.’ (Livy, *Hist.*, 27.43-49.) Two final, particularly relevant comparisons can also be drawn with the marching speeds given for both the Vitellian forces and the Moesian legions under Antonius Primus during the latter half of 69. At *Hist.*, 3.21. Tacitus informs us that ‘the six legions of Vitellius and the entire army which had been quartered at Hostilia had on that very day marched a distance of thirty miles’. Similarly, at 3.78-9., the Moesian legions marched from Oriculum to Saxa Rubra – a distance of about 35 miles, in a single day. A marching speed of 25 kilometres per day, on the part of Mucianus, appears extremely moderate by comparison.
The second major problem concerns the manner in which Mucianus himself envisioned his campaign. Tacitus, in his account of the beginning of Mucianus’ march, offers the following commentary:

*Mucianus cum expedita manu, socium magis imperii quam ministrum agens, non lento itinere, ne cunctari videretur, neque tamen properans, gliscere famam ipso spatio sinebat, gnarus modicas vires sibi et maiora credi de absentibus; sed legio sexta et tredecim vex-illariorum milia ingenti agmine sequebantur. classem e Ponto Byzantium adigi iusserat, ambiguus consilii, num omissa Moesia Dyrrachium pedite atque equite, simul longis navibus versum in Italiam mare clauderet, tuta pone tergum Achaia Asiaque, quas inermes exponi Vitellio, ni praesidiis firmarentur; atque ipsum Vitellium in incerto fore, quam partem Italiae protegeret, si sibi Brundisium Tarentumque et Calabriae Lucaniaeque litora infestis classibus peterentur.*

Several peculiarities of Tacitus’ account were identified by Morgan, and they deserve to be elucidated in further detail. The first of these peculiarities concerns the pace at which Mucianus set out on his march. As Tacitus informs us, Mucianus traveled *cum expedita manu* – as an advance guard without a baggage train, such that would allow him to travel at a rapid pace. However,

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522 ‘Mucianus, who acted more as a partner in Empire than as a subordinate, moved on with some light-armed troops, not indeed at a tardy pace so as to give the appearance of delay, yet not with extraordinary speed. Thus he allowed rumour to gather fresh strength by distance, well aware that his force was but small, and that exaggerated notions are formed about what is not seen. Behind him, however, came in a vast body the 6th legion and 13,000 veterans. He had given directions that the fleet from the Pontus should concentrate at Byzantium, in two minds about the strategy, whether, avoiding Moesia, he should move on Dyrrachium with his infantry and cavalry, and at the same time blockade the sea on the side of Italy with his ships of war, thus leaving Asia and Achaia safe in his rear, which, being bare of troops, would be left at the mercy of Vitellius, unless they were occupied with proper garrisons. And thus too Vitellius himself, finding Brundisium, Tarentum, and the shores of Calabria and Lucania menaced by hostile fleets, would be in utter perplexity as to which part of Italy he should protect.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.83.)

Mucianus did not hurry as expected, and instead adopted a moderate pace.\textsuperscript{524} Further, as Tacitus phrases it, in choosing the pace, Mucianus was acting in his capacity as Vespasian’s \textit{socius} rather than as his subordinate.\textsuperscript{525} So he formulated a strategy wherein he would not march too slowly as doing so would give the appearance of delay.\textsuperscript{526} Nor would he advance too quickly, for he desired the rumour of his advance and the moderate size of his force to grow through distance and exaggeration.\textsuperscript{527} Mucianus’ posturing bears something of a resemblance to Gnaeus Julius Agricola’s artful demonstration in Britain: \textit{Ipse peditem atque equites lento itinere, quo novarum gentium animi ipsa transitus mora terrerentur, in hibernis locavit}.\textsuperscript{528} Equally, his strategy is contrasted with the behaviour of the Pannonian and Dalmatian legions earlier in the year. Unlike Mucianus’ carefully calculated march, the tardiness displayed by the Danubian legions arose out of excessive self-confidence and resulted in disastrous consequences.\textsuperscript{529}

\textsuperscript{524} Cf., for instance, Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, 2.7. for Germanicus dispatching Gaius Silius (\textit{cos.} 13) \textit{cum expedita manu}, so that he might make swift inroads against the Chatti.

\textsuperscript{525} As Morgan notes, the phrase \textit{socium magis imperii quam ministrum agens} (’[Mucianus] acted more as a partner in Empire than as a subordinate’) indicates that Mucianus had, at the very least, licence to determine the rate of his advance, the route he would take and, possibly, serves as a commentary on the manner in which Mucianus would conduct himself both prior to, during and following his march. (Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”: 167.) Tacitus’ usage of \textit{agere}, further, carries theatrical connotations, perhaps indicating dissimulation – although this is not borne out anywhere else in Tacitus’ text. (ibid., 167, n. 5. Cf. Ash, R. (ed.), \textit{Tacitus: Histories Book II}, 324., Wolff, E.P., \textit{P.Cornelii Taciti Historiarum libri quar supersunt, Buch I und. II} (Berlin: Weidmann, 1914), 267.) The historian’s use of \textit{agere} is more likely simply a jibe at the disjunction between Mucianus’ status as a \textit{privatus} and his public behaviour. That Mucianus behaved as an equal to the Emperor is clear from his conduct in chapter 84 wherein it is Mucianus who takes the lead when extracting monetary contributions from the provinces – with Vespasian’s \textit{amici} and, indeed, Vespasian himself, only following afterwards. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.84.) It is similarly evident in his conduct upon reaching Rome in December 69 – whereupon he would behave as a \textit{princeps} and exercise power as such without assuming the title itself. (ibid., 4.11.)

\textsuperscript{526} \textit{non lento itinere, ne cunctari videretur, neque tamen properans…} (‘not indeed at a tardy pace so as to give the appearance of delay…’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.83.)

\textsuperscript{527} \textit{…gliscere famam ipso spatio sinebat, gnarus modicas viris sibi et maiora credi de absentibus.} (‘…yet not with extraordinary speed. Thus he allowed rumour to gather fresh strength by distance, well aware that his force was but small, and that exaggerated notions are formed about what is not seen.’ – ibid.)

\textsuperscript{528} [Agricola himself], leading his infantry and cavalry by slow marches, so as to overawe the newly-conquered tribes by the very tardiness of his progress, brought them into winter-quarters.’ (Ash, R. (ed.), \textit{Tacitus: Histories Book II}, 324. Citing Tacitus, \textit{Agr.}, 38.)

\textsuperscript{529} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.11.
The question remains, however – who was supposed to be overawed by Mucianus’ elaborate procedure? As Morgan asserts, practical considerations should indicate that the primary targets were the denizens of Asia Minor, rather than the Vitellians, for, although they had already sworn an oath to support Vespasian, the Flavian campaign demanded significant monetary contributions from the eastern provinces and thus their cooperation needed to be ensured through intimidation.530 Contrary to Morgan’s argument, however, there is some suggestion that Mucianus’ march had already generated rumours in Italy by the end of October. Tacitus records that word of Mucianus’ impending arrival in Italy spread immediately prior to the second battle of Cremona, although he cannot have travelled further than Moesia.531 Evidently, the rumours had gained sufficient momentum such that Antonius Primus could convince the soldiers that both armies had already exchanged salutations and that fresh reinforcements were imminent.532 Although Mucianus cannot have foreseen this outcome, it does highlight the possibility that the amicus intended the impact of his march to be felt in Italy and perhaps further.533 If not Vitellius himself, there were other

531 See below.
533 Morgan notes that Vitellius had an exceedingly difficult time uncovering any intelligence about the Flavians’ movements in the east because while prevailing winds were favourable towards the swift transmission of news from Italy to the East, they were against expeditious voyages in the opposite direction. (Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”: 168. Citing Tacitus, Hist., 2.98.) However, Mucianus would not arrive in Italy until late November-December, which left some three months for word of his advance to arrive in the region. Consider, also, the over-arching pattern of Tacitus’ narrative through books two and three. Vitellius is depicted as desperately suppressing rumours of impending civil war in Rome – which only causes the gossip to flourish and spread. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.96.) Elsewhere, he is depicted as stamping out dissent in Gaul and Raetia. (ibid., 2.98.) Although he is surrounded by rumours and gossip, Vitellius is ignorant of the Flavian manoeuvres in the east. In Tacitus’ account, his ignorance is not due to lack of opportunity, but rather due to the emperor’s supineness: ita Vitellii paratus noscebantur, Vespasiani consiliorum pleraque ignota, primum socordia Vitellii, dein Pannonicae Alpes praesidii insessae nuntios retinebant. (‘Thus the preparations of Vitellius became known, while the plans of Vespasian were for the most part kept secret. At first the supineness of Vitellius was in fault; afterwards the occupation of the Pannonian Alps with troops stopped all intelligence.’ – ibid.) In the meantime, Mucianus persists as an ominous figure in the background, slowly advancing across Asia Minor as a ‘wave’ of dissent against the Vitellians sweeps through Asia Minor, Dalmatia, Pannonia, Spain and Britain. (ibid., 2.96-98.)
candidates. The praetorians were a worthy target. Tacitus records that they maintained a special dislike for Vitellius and the Flavians dispatched letters after Berytus with promises of renewed military service.\textsuperscript{534} Accordingly, detachments from the praetorians fought at Cremona.\textsuperscript{535} Equally, one might also point to the legions of Spain and Britain. Although Tacitus makes it clear that Bolanus’ loyalty was wavering during the second half of 69, he had only been governor of Britain for a few months – hardly enough time to ensure that the legions would follow his lead.\textsuperscript{536} The formerly Othonian legions of Spain, meanwhile, in the absence of their commanding officer, demonstrated no enthusiasm for Vitellius’ cause.\textsuperscript{537} The immediate point of contention was the emperor’s failing fortunes.\textsuperscript{538} Rumours of Mucianus’ advance from the east could have laid the groundwork for their defection, but the tipping point came with the news of the Flavian victory at Cremona in late October.\textsuperscript{539}

The second major peculiarity with Tacitus’ commentary begins with the phrase \textit{classem e Ponto Byzantium adigi iusserat}.\textsuperscript{540} Several points are significant here. First, contrary to the suggestion of some authors, there is no reason to assume that Mucianus was still unsure about his strategy during the initial stages of his march. As Morgan observes, Tacitus’ syntax implies otherwise. The words \textit{ambiguus consilii} and the subsequent phrase, \textit{num omissa Moesia Dyrrachium pedite atque equite, simul longis navibus versum in Italiam mare clauderet, tuta pone tergum Achaia Asiaque}, refers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{534} Ibid., 2.82.
\item \textsuperscript{535} Ibid., 3.21.
\item \textsuperscript{536} Ash, R. (ed.), \textit{Tacitus: Histories Book II}, 369.
\item \textsuperscript{537} Cluvius Rufus, governor of Spain, had already departed to join Vitellius and now commanded the province \textit{in abstentia}. (ibid., citing Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.65.)
\item \textsuperscript{538} ‘...trium legionum legati, pares iure et prosperis Vitellii rebus certaturi ad obsequium, adversam eius fortunam ex aequo detrectabant. ‘...the legates of the three legions, equal in authority, and ready, while Vitellius was prosperous, to vie in obedience, stood aloof with one consent from his falling fortunes.’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.97.)
\item \textsuperscript{539} Not the capture of Fabius Valens. (Martin, R.H., \textit{Tacitus}, 89.)
\item \textsuperscript{540} ‘He had given directions that the fleet from the Pontus should concentrate at Byzantium.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.83.)
\end{itemize}
to the time at which Mucianus ordered the Pontic fleet to Byzantium; and the pluperfect *iuss
erat* definitively sets that time to a period prior to the beginning of Mucianus’ march.\textsuperscript{541} Second, the decision to remove the Pontic fleet from Trapezus cannot have been taken lightly. The ramifications were significant. The *classis Pontica* served a critical role policing the northern Anatolian coast against Colchian pirates.\textsuperscript{542} Further, it served as the primary method of supplying Roman troops campaigning in Armenia.\textsuperscript{543} Earlier precautions were taken, perhaps with the future absence of the fleet in mind, to warn against Parthian incursion.\textsuperscript{544} However, the removal of the fleet would have consequences later in the year in the form of a rebellion in Pontus that resulted in the destruction of an entire cohort at the largely undefended city of Trapezus.\textsuperscript{545} The fact that orders were dispatched to the fleet to move to Byzantium prior to Mucianus’ departure from Antioch suggests two things. First, Mucianus planned his strategy during the months prior – perhaps as early as Carmel.\textsuperscript{546} Second, Mucianus must have intended to execute his campaign prior


\textsuperscript{544} Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.82.

\textsuperscript{545} Ibid., 3.47.

\textsuperscript{546} Henderson, Wellesley and Ash think that the main strategic discussions must have taken place at Berytus. (Henderson, B.W., *Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire A.D. 69-70: A Companion to the ‘Histories’ of Tacitus*, 146., Ash, R. (ed.), *Tacitus: Histories Book II*, 326., Wellesley, K., *The Year of the Four Emperors*, 122.) Morgan gives no definitive judgement other than that ‘the plan must have been formulated some months earlier’. (Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”, 168.) However, see above ‘3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel’ for the suggestion that Mucianus and Vespasian were engaging in strategic planning at Carmel, and perhaps earlier.
to the end of the year. 547 Otherwise there was little reason to order the Pontic fleet to concentrate at Byzantium by the start of August. 548

Mucianus’ strategy, then, prior to his departure in August, becomes clear. In the broadest sense, he planned to march his modest force across Anatolia to Dyrrachium, whereupon he would utilise the Pontic fleet, consisting of forty fast galleys and some three thousand sailors, to cross to Southern Italy. 549 The plan had historical precedent. Sulla, wielding a fleet of some twelve hundred ships, successfully crossed from Dyrrachium to Brundisium to march on Rome in 83 BC. 550 But Sulla had overwhelming numbers, Mucianus did not. Tacitus neglects to mention how Mucianus planned to deal with potentially concerted opposition from the considerably larger Misene and Ravennate fleets. 551 It is this latter omission that has prompted some scholars to dismiss Mucianus’

547 This is contrary to the suggestion of Wellesley, who states definitively that ‘what was envisaged was a spring campaign’. (Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 124.) The notion that the Mucianus intended to delay his campaign in Italy until the following spring has persisted in modern scholarship – for instance, Wiedemann, T.E.J., “From Nero to Vespasian,” in Alan K. Bowman, Edward Champlin, Andrew Lintott (eds.) The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed., vol. 10, 276.

548 Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”, 168. This point is undermined somewhat by the fact that the Pontic fleet remained in Byzantium even after Mucianus had bypassed the region. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.47.) An explanation may be found in the notion that the Flavians preserved the fleet’s location as a contingency in case the civil war came down to a blockade of Italy. In the latter situation, the Pontic fleet could potentially be used to cut off grain supplies from Africa (see below on the Flavians’ ‘bloodless’ strategy). Alternatively, if large portions of the Ravennate and Misene fleets could be drawn off into fighting on the mainland, the smaller Pontic fleet would be allowed free reign over the Adriatic.


551 The relative sizes of the Italian fleets are not known. Estimates place the size of the Misene fleet at eighty ships or more, and the Ravennate fleet at about half that number (Rankov, B., “Military Forces,” in P. Sabin, et al., The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 57., Starr, C.G., The Roman Imperial Navy ,16-21.) Nero and his successors drew off portions of the fleets to form three new legions which may have resulted in significantly reduced fighting capacity. (Saddington, P., “Classes. The Evolution of the Roman Imperial Fleets,” in P. Erdkamp (ed.), A Companion to the Roman Army (United Kingdom, 2011), 246.) Whether the fleets themselves may have, by virtue of their ties to Otho, refrained from taking Vitellius’ side against Vespasian, or whether they were already considering a change of allegiance in August is difficult to ascertain. Wellesley certainly thinks this may have been a possibility. (Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 123., cf. Starr, C.G., The Roman Imperial Navy, 183-4.) Morgan, citing Henderson, believes that Mucianus could no more
plan entirely – particularly Chilver, who deems Mucianus’ plan as part of a later Flavian myth that ‘Vespasian’s victory could have been incruenta’. 552 Even so, the phrase ambiguus consilii does not appear to indicate that Mucianus’ scheme was one about which he was doubtful. 553 It does, however, highlight that the plan was by no means ideal and required concerted action and precise timing. One major risk that Mucianus appears to have foreseen is a scenario wherein Vitellius could cross the Adriatic and menace the defenceless Asia and Achaea. However, in Mucianus’ estimation, the more likely outcome was that Vitellius would not use the Italian fleets to blockade Dyrrachium or, indeed, attempt a crossing of his own. Instead, he would divide and distribute the fleets in a defensive formation around southern Italy: atque ipsum Vitellium in incerto fore, quam partem Italiae protegeret, si sibi Brundisium Tarentumque et Calabriae Lucaniaeque litora

552 Chilver, G.E.F., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories I and II, 245. Chilver’s argument, however, appears to be based on the mistaken notion that Mucianus intended to blockade Italy at Dyrrachium, rather than attempt a crossing (cf. Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 122., Penwill, J., “Imperial encomia in Flavian epic,” in G. Manuwald, A. Voigt, Flavian Epic Interactions (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013), 35. for the same opinions).

553 Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”, 169. Citing Henderson, B.W., Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire A.D. 69-70: A Companion to the ‘Histories’ of Tacitus, 149., cf. Tacitus, Hist., 3.2.) In fact, the elliptical nature of the Flavian negotiations during this period render a definitive judgement impossible. Mucianus might have hoped, from an early date, that the men of the fleets, by virtue of the former Othonian ties, and the prevalence of natives of Pannonia and Dalmatia among their ranks, that they could be drawn to the Flavian cause. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.12.) However, the movement to defect would ultimately be induced by the officers, not the troops. Lucilius Bassus was not a reliable prospect. A former cavalry commander from the Rhine, Vitellius had promoted him to an extraordinary command over both the Ravennate and Misene fleets – perhaps with the promise of a further appointment as praetorian prefect. (cf. Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 378. for the opinion that the prestigious joint command of the fleets was merely an interim appointment.) Primus apparently retained sufficient doubts about the Ravennate fleet to leave a force at Altinum to prevent it from threatening his supply lines. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.6.) Bassus’ betrayal, then, appears to have been a relatively late development. Tacitus’ attributes it to impatience over a lack of promotion, however it seems more likely that Bassus ‘saw the forest from the trees’ upon Primus’ incursion into northern Italy and immediately arranged for his defection. (ibid., 2.100.) Accordingly, Primus replaced him with the more reliable Cornelius Fuscus. (ibid., 3.12.)
infestis classibus peterentur. Tacitus, again, does not explain how Mucianus came to this conclusion. Morgan thinks that Mucianus simply assumed that executing his crossing before the end of the summer sailing season in 69 would force the Vitellians on to the defensive as, in the short time since their arrival in the capital in mid-July, they would not have been able to secure control of southern Italy. There must be more to it. Even if he were to manage a landing in southern Italy, the odds were not in Mucianus’ favour. Apart from the Italian fleets, Vitellius still held vast numerical superiority on the mainland. So, Henderson’s estimation must be closer to the truth. Mucianus must have anticipated that, by the time of his arrival in Dyrrachium, reinforcements from III Gallica and the remainder of the Danubian legions could be mobilised and dispatched to threaten northern Italy. The emperor, then, would be left with few choices. Either he could dispatch the larger portion of his forces to the north to contest the Danubian host – in which case, Mucianus would make a swift crossing to Brundisium or Tarentum, and immediately march to the capital along the via Appia. Alternatively, he could withdraw his troops to the capital, effectively sacrificing the remainder of the mainland. Finally, he could divide his forces and attempt to fight on multiple fronts. In the latter scenario, he risked being outflanked by an invading force converging on all sides.

That Mucianus’ strategy was not ultimately put into action could be a result of several factors. Henderson believes that objections must have been raised at Berytus about the relative sizes of the

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554 ‘And thus too Vitellius himself, finding Brundisium, Tarentum, and the shores of Calabria and Lucania menaced by hostile fleets, would be in utter perplexity as to which part of Italy he should protect.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 2.83.)
556 See below for estimates of 50-60,000 troops or more.
557 Henderson, B.W., Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire A.D. 69-70: A Companion to the ‘Histories’ of Tacitus, 147.
558 Forces, which, as we shall see, declared for Vespasian throughout the period from late August until early October.
559 In Henderson’s words, ‘[Vitellius’] resistance to the vigorous attack on both sides was likely to be but an enfeebled one.’ (ibid.)
Flavian and Vitellian fleets. It is difficult to imagine, however, that Mucianus, in the months of planning beforehand, had not foreseen this problem. It is equally unlikely that, as Garzetti suggests, Mucianus still held doubts about the Danubian legions after he departed Antioch and only abandoned his initial strategy once their loyalty had been assured. A hint may be found in Josephus’ statement that Mucianus already feared transporting his troops by sea during the middle of winter. One critical factor of Mucianus’ plan was that the Misene and Ravennate fleets had to be outmanoeuvred in the Adriatic. The Pontic fleet, although vastly smaller, was aptly suited to this endeavour by virtue of the fact that it almost consisted largely of nimble liburnae. By contrast, the fleets at Misenum and Ravenna included predominantly larger quadriremes, quinqueremes and triremes. However, deft manoeuvring would prove challenging, if not outright suicidal, in the depths of winter. Time was against Mucianus. The etesian winds would allow the Pontic fleet to make relatively quick headway through the Aegean, although progress would be slow around the Peloponnese. On the other hand, Mucianus had little hope of marching

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560 Ibid., 149.
562 This is what Josephus reports at *BJ*, 4.632: ‘yet was Mucianus afraid of going by sea, because it was the middle of winter, and so he led his army on foot through Cappadocia and Phrygia.’ The chronology is again muddled. Mucianus departed in late summer and arrived in Thrace in early-mid autumn. The statement could well be referring to the amicus’ fears of attempting a crossing from Dyrrachium. Elsewhere in Josephus’ text, Titus displays a similar reticence to attempt a winter crossing. (ibid., 7.1.)
565 Storms would be the least of Mucianus’ problems. Poor visibility, violent winds and rain or snow also heightened the risk of shipwreck during the winter months. (Casson, L., *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*, 271f.) The risk of winter storms is frequently exaggerated by ancient writers. More likely, the key concern for Mucianus was the highly variable wind conditions during the winter months which could make the crossing to Italy highly unpredictable. Erratic winds could force sailors to rapidly adapt routes, constantly set and trim the sails in response to the conditions and make it difficult to maintain a set itinerary. (Beresford, J., *The Ancient Sailing Season* (Boston: Leiden, 2013), 79f.) The conditions, then, rendered a strategy that required precise manoeuvring and timing untenable.
566 Until early-mid autumn north-westerly winds and sea currents flowing to the south made for rapid voyages through the Aegean in a southerly direction. (Casson, L., *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World*, 272.) Concurrently, sailing around the Peloponnese would slow the fleet’s progress as they were forced to sail into the face of the prevailing
his forces overland from Antioch, through Asia Minor and down the Via Egnatia to reach Dyrrachium, some two thousand kilometres, before the beginning of November and the close of the sailing season.\(^{567}\) Mucianus’ initial plan, then, came to nothing, however it could well have been feasible if he had departed Antioch one month earlier – in which case, he might have arrived in Dyrrachium at the beginning of October and attempted an autumn crossing.\(^{568}\)

It is unsurprising, then, that Vespasian, realising that Mucianus’ scheme had been put out of commission by the time he left Antioch, implemented an alternative plan.\(^{569}\) Thus comes the alleged ‘bloodless’ strategy of the Flavians. This secondary plan had two phases. Initially, according to Tacitus and Dio, after ‘taking a look at affairs in Syria and entrusting to others the conduct of the war against the Jews’, Vespasian planned to depart for Alexandria where he would ‘secure the passes to Egypt’.\(^{570}\) Vespasian’s choice of headquarters is significant for two main reasons. First, it was the best vantage point from which he could continue his negotiations with winds. However, this situation would steadily change through the mid-late autumn and winter months, as southerly winds became more frequent. (Beresford, J., *The Ancient Sailing Season* (Boston: Leiden, 2013), 81-82.)

As highlighted above, even travelling at a pace of 25 kilometres per day, it would take Mucianus at least eighty days to travel the two thousand kilometres to Dyrrachium.\(^{567}\) As Morgan and Henderson recognise, the scheme, which entailed a great deal of ‘haste and risk’, does not cohere with Vespasian’s established character as a cautious general. (Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.45., 4.368, 4.373. on Vespasian’s cautious nature) Henderson thinks Vespasian definitively put an end to the plan at Berytus. (Henderson, B.W., *Civil War and Rebellion in the Roman Empire A.D. 69-70: A Companion to the ‘Histories’ of Tacitus*, 147.) Morgan believes that Vespasian must have made his distaste known at Berytus but left the final decision to Mucianus. (Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”, 170.) Vespasian, even if he expressed nominal approval in the months before, was undoubtedly not particularly enamoured of the scheme. This could well account for the somewhat repetitive nature of the meetings between Mucianus and Vespasian from May onwards. Even so, the fact that he allowed the Pontic fleet to transfer to Byzantium at all suggests that Vespasian at least accepted the merits of the plan on face value. One should question the practicality of allowing Mucianus to formulate such an elaborate plan of invasion if, as Morgan suggests, he fully anticipated that the strategy would be ‘put out of court by the passage of time’. (ibid., 170.)

\(^{567}\) As highlighted above, even travelling at a pace of 25 kilometres per day, it would take Mucianus at least eighty days to travel the two thousand kilometres to Dyrrachium.

\(^{568}\) Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”, 170. The extent to which Vespasian approved of Mucianus’ strategy is questionable. Certainly, Tacitus emphasises that it was Mucianus, acting in his capacity as socium inagis imperii quam ministram, who was responsible for formulating the strategy in the first place.

\(^{569}\) Albeit one he had discussed with Mucianus as early as Carmel – if we are to take Josephus on face value. See Josephus’ description of the Egyptian blockade in connection with Carmel at BJ., 4.605., cited above.

Volgaes to the east and to communicate with Mucianus while he marched through Asia Minor. Second, he could spend the winter in Alexandria as not only was it a ‘natural centre of communications’, but it was also a defensible location.\footnote{Morgan, M.G., 69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors, 187. Josephus’ description is instructive: ‘[Alexandria] hath on the west the dry deserts of Libya; and on the south Siene, that divides it from Ethiopia, as well as the cataracts of the Nile, that cannot be sailed over; and on the east the Red Sea extended as far as Coptus; and it is fortified on the north by the land that reaches to Syria, together with that called the Egyptian Sea, having no havens in it for ships. And thus is Egypt walled about on every side.’ (Josephus, BJ., 4.605.)}\footnote{Josephus, BJ., 4.605-606., Morgan, M.G., 69 A.D.: The Year of the Four Emperors, 187.}\footnote{On Vitellius’ ties to Africa see Suetonius, Div. Vit., 7. where he governed Africa with exceptional integrity and was appointed to Germania Inferior by Galba as a result. See also Tacitus, Hist., 2.97. for the proconsulship and Clodius Macer’s levies from the province. Gaius Calpetanus Rantius Quirinalis Valerius Festus (cos suff. 71), the legate, seemingly was communicating with Vespasian in private however did not act publicly. (see here also ‘4.6 Mucianus and the Provincial “Usurpers”’) That Vespasian’s efforts had a considerable negative effect on the grain supply to Rome is demonstrated by the fact that, when the Flavian troops entered Rome, late in 69, the capital only had ten days’ grain supplies left. (On the shortage see Garnsey, P., Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and Crisis, 218-27.) Vespasian responded by dispatching a fleet from Alexandria as soon as the sailing season opened in April 70. (Dio, Hist., 65.9.) Nevertheless, as Josephus himself tells us, North African grain exports ran currently at twice the level of those of Egypt – and fed Rome for eight months of the year. (Josephus,
Consequently, despite Josephus’ attestation that ‘Egypt was of the greatest consequence, in order to obtain the entire government, because of its supplying of corn [to Rome]’, neither Vespasian nor Mucianus were under any delusions that the initial phase of their plan would be sufficient.\textsuperscript{574}

So Mucianus and Vespasian resolved on the second phase of their plan – securing and gathering troops directly from the Danubian legions. Although Vespasian was acclaimed Emperor in the East in July, he was not officially recognised by the Danubian legions until August.\textsuperscript{575} Most likely, the Moesian army delayed recognising Vespasian until it had received word of the Flavians’ intended strategy and that Mucianus had set out with reinforcements.\textsuperscript{576} Even so, word spread quickly. \textit{III Gallica}, under the newly-instated legate Gaius Dillius Aponianus (\textit{cos suff.} ca. 71-73), was the first to declare for Vespasian – and their defection was immediately reported to Vitellius by the governor Marcus Aponius Saturninus (\textit{cos suff.} ca. 55).\textsuperscript{577} When the legions \textit{VIII Augusta} and \textit{VII Claudia} of Novae and Viminacium, lead by Numisius Lupus and Lucius Vipstanus Messalla, immediately followed the third legion’s commitment to Vespasian’s cause, Aponius

\textsuperscript{574} Josephus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.605. It is odd that Tacitus seemingly subscribes to the same hypothesis as Josephus at \textit{Hist.}, 3.8.

\textsuperscript{575} Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vit.}, 15.

\textsuperscript{576} Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 75.

\textsuperscript{577} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.85. See also 3.10. for Dillius Aponianus’ leadership. On Saturninus’ warning to Vitellius see 2.96. Saturninus’ warning was delivered after Vitellius’ birthday on 7 September – an event which was celebrated on an enormous scale by his chief commanders, Valens and Caecina. (ibid., 2.96.) According to Tacitus, immediately following the celebrations, the letter arrived from Saturninus announcing the defection of \textit{III Gallica}. (ibid., 2.96.)
transferred his allegiance – however his authority over the legions had degenerated.\textsuperscript{578} The Moesian legions then jointly sent dispatches demanding the allegiance of Pannonia and Dalmatia. When Vespasian’s appeal arrived, both of the Pannonian legions \textit{VII ‘Galbiana’} and \textit{XIII Gemina} were together perhaps, as Wellesley suggests, conducting joint military exercises.\textsuperscript{579} Despite the reticence of some officers, Tacitus says that the legions joined the third, eighth and seventh legions without hesitation. Antonius Primus, the legate of \textit{VII Galbiana}, served as the prime mover behind the immediate assent of the Pannonian legions – and he was supported, in turn, by Cornelius Fuscus, the procurator of Illyricum, who ‘lent the movement the stimulus of a fiery zeal’.\textsuperscript{580} In Dalmatia, meanwhile, \textit{XI Claudia}, under Lucius Annius Bassus (\textit{cos suff. 70}), too joined the Flavian cause – although the legion would later hesitate and would not take part in the invasion of Italy.\textsuperscript{581}

The instructions given by Vespasian to the Danubian legions would be later illuminated at a meeting between the Moesian \textit{legati} at Poetovio.\textsuperscript{582} According to Tacitus, to wait, and move no farther than Aquileia – and to blockade the Pannonian Alps against any further reinforcements from the north, was the course recommended to the legions by Vespasian.\textsuperscript{583} Mucianus’ path then, was clear. After passing through Byzantium he would divert through Thrace and Illyricum to

\textsuperscript{578} See here ibid., 2.85. On Lupus see 1.79., 3.10. On Messalla see 3.9. On Aponius’ loss of authority over the Moesia legions see 3.10-11.
\textsuperscript{579} Ibid. 2.98 for Vespasian’s messages. As Wellesley notes, it was the practice to hold late summer manoeuvres of the legionary forces of Pannonia in Ljubljana – ostensibly an exercise to test the defences of the Birnbaumer Wald (Hrusica). It is likely that a similar exercise was taking place in the summer of 69 between \textit{VII Galbiana} and \textit{XIII Gemina}. (Wellesley, K., \textit{The Year of the Four Emperors}, 127.)
\textsuperscript{580} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.86. The legate of \textit{XIII Gemina} was Vedius Aquila (ibid., 3.7.) and Suetonius’ father was one of the tribunes (Suetonius, \textit{Div. Oth.}, 10.1.)
\textsuperscript{581} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.50. (See below)
\textsuperscript{582} See below.
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid., 3.8. According to Tacitus, Vespasian’s instructions were unequivocal (ibid., 3.3.) See also Tacitus, 2.98 for the occupation of the Pannonian Alps.
northern Italy, whereupon he would consolidate the newly-gathered Danubian forces in the city of Aquileia and, subsequently, serve as supreme commander of what would become a vast Flavian host of some seven legions and an unknown number of auxiliaries. The Vitellian forces already available in Italy were not insubstantial. In September, Caecina was capable of setting out with detachments of the legions I (Germania), IV, XV, and XVI, as well as the entirety of VAlandae and XXII Primigenia. This army was augmented by vexillationes from legio XXI Rapax and legio I Italica, further legionaries and auxiliaries drawn from the British legions and a large cavalry force – amounting to some fifty to sixty thousand men. Moreover, as Antonius Primus would later highlight, the Flavian blockade in the Pannonian Alps would do little to prevent further Vitellian reinforcements from the Rhine through Raetia. By the beginning of winter, as Wellesley notes, the Flavian forces might easily be vastly numerically inferior to the Vitellians. Confronting Vitellius’ force in Italy, therefore, would need to be conducted in a timely fashion, at least by early November.

One final issue needs to be dealt with – Tacitus’ reasons for mentioning Mucianus’ initial plan at all if it never actually went into effect. Undoubtedly, the historian’s introduction of the plan serves as a vehicle for characterising Mucianus’ relationship with Vespasian – namely, that Mucianus had sufficient freedom, acting as Vespasian’s socius, to both formulate and execute a plan of

584 Tacitus, Hist., 2.100. The exact number is open to debate. Nicols estimates 60,000 (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 79.), as does Levick. (Levick, B., Vespasian, 93.) Wellesley cites an effective force of 30,000. (Wellesley, K., Year of the Four Emperors, 125.) The number cited by Tacitus is 60,000 at Hist., 2.87. Possibly, one might opt for a smaller number depending on how we interpret Tacitus’ assertion that Vitellius created sixteen praetorian cohorts and four urban cohorts from his own army and replaced existing troops that were discharged. (cf. Tacitus, Hist., 2.67., 2.93.) The number of men siphoned off from the legions to the Guard could have amounted to 20,000. (cf. Keppie, L.J.F., Legions and Veterans: Roman Army Papers 1971-2000 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2000), 110.) Given that an unknown number of reinforcements from Britain joined Caecina’s force (Tacitus, Hist., 2.100.), a safe bet might be around 50,000.

585 Tacitus, Hist., 3.2.

Yet, even if he had not known when, precisely, Mucianus hatched his initial strategy, it is curious that he did not mention it at Berytus or Antioch in July/August at the very least. As Morgan observes, Tacitus was concerned with decisions that were actually made – not by plans that were rendered moot by extenuating circumstances. That the *ex cursus* appears at the beginning of Tacitus’ account of Mucianus’ march ‘can be justified by assuming that Mucianus abandoned it once for all only as he left Antioch’. On the other hand, it is noticeable that Tacitus takes great pains, first, to emphasise that Mucianus had seriously contemplated a violent incursion into southern Italy and, second, that he had the capacity to execute the plan on his own authority. A hint of the historian’s reasoning is found in his scathing judgement at the end of book two:

*Scriptores temporum, qui potente rerum Flavia domo monimenta belli huiusce composuerunt, curam pacis et amorem rei publicae, corruptas in adulationem causas, tradidere.*

The criticism is aimed at contemporary estimations of Caecina and Bassus, however similar censure might easily be aimed at those of Mucianus and Vespasian. As Ash notes, Tacitus places emphasis on the fact that Vitellius persistently treated Italy as a foreign conquest. Thus, Vitellius and his adherents are depicted as ‘plundering’ Italy ‘like an enemy’s territory’, marching into Rome ‘like a captured city’ and, elsewhere, Vitellius is shown addressing the populace of Rome ‘as if they were of another State’. Mucianus, simultaneously, does not display concern for the current state of Rome, but is instead depicted as ruminating on the potential risks to the peoples of Asia and Achaea while contemplating the most effective method of conquering the heart of the

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589 ‘The historians of the period, who during the ascendancy of the Flavian family composed the chronicles of this war, have in the distorted representations of flattery assigned as the motives of these men a regard for peace and a love of their country.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.101.)
Empire. The final outcome, as we shall see, will be that Primus’ intervention brings a Swift, if brutal, end to the civil war. Vespasian washed his hands of the situation after Berytus, Mucianus will not be directly involved in the final stages of the war. Thus, Primus, rather than Mucianus, will bear the blame for wreaking destruction through northern Italy. The Flavians could later claim that the ‘real’ plan promised a solution that was *incruenta*. Ironically, this latter plan entailed perhaps even greater repercussions – the starvation of Rome over the winter season and the potential of a violent clash between the Vitellians and Flavians that could very well expand across Germania and the Danube if sufficient Vitellian reinforcements could be brought in. So, Tacitus is not merely content to relate the events of the war as they unfold. He is also intent on reminding us, first, that none of the major players are blameless. Second, he is pointing out the attendant irony that the hypothetical scenarios that might have resulted if Mucianus and, indeed, Vespasian had successfully enacted their schemes presupposed equivalent, if not greater degrees of destruction than that perpetrated by Primus.

592 Cicero vehemently criticises Pompey for contemplating a similar scheme: *Nec vero dubito, quin exitiosum bellum impendeat; cuius initium ducentur a fame. Et me tamen doleo non interesse huic bello! In quo tanta vis sceleris futura est ut, cum parentis non alere nefarium sit, nostri principes antiquissimam et sanctissimam parentem, patriam, fame necandam patent.* (‘And I have no doubt a disastrous war is imminent, which will be ushered in by famine. And here I am lamenting that I have no hand in the war, a war which will be so criminal, that though it is wicked not to support one’s parents, yet our chiefs will not hesitate to destroy by starvation their country, that most reverent and holiest of parents!’ – Cicero, *ad Att.*, 9.9.3.) Ironically, in Tacitus’ account, the sole individual who recognises the potential repercussions of Vespasian’s latter scheme is the contemptible commander of Germania Superior, Marcus Hordeonius Flaccus (*cos suff.* 47): *Flaccus...inclinato in Vespasianum animo et rei publicae cura, cui excidium adventabat, si redintegratum bellum et tot armatorum milia Italiam inrupissent.* (‘Flaccus...had a bias towards Vespasian, and feared for the Empire, the utter ruin of which would be very near, were a fresh war with so many thousands of armed men to burst upon Italy.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.13.)
593 Or even Vitellius. Hence, Tacitus’ digression on Mucianus’ plan at *Hist.*, 2.83. functions as more than simply a comparison of the mindsets exhibited by Mucianus and Primus. (Morgan, M.G., “Tacitus Histories 2.83-84: Content and Positioning.”, 170-171.) It serves as a means of highlighting a key paradox of the civil war – that its expeditious conclusion will be brought about not through careful strategic planning, but through precipitous violence and treachery.
Regardless, by September of 69, Mucianus and Vespasian’s secondary plan had also come to nought. At a conference held near the end of August at the winter quarters of the legion XIII Gemina at Poetovio, the ambitious Antonius Primus successfully advocated invading Italy immediately without waiting for Mucianus’ forces.\textsuperscript{594} The meeting itself, as determined by Heubner and Wellesley, included only members of the Pannonian forces, with no representatives from the Moesian army, and was likely held during the final days of August or the beginning of September.\textsuperscript{595} Much like he had done for Mucianus at Carmel, Tacitus places in the mouth of Primus a lengthy speech in support of the decision to engage the Vitellian forces at once.\textsuperscript{596} According to the historian, Primus’ reasoning for moving immediately was threefold. Initially, since Vitellius’ arrival in Rome in mid-July, both he and his forces had been languishing in supineness, ‘emasculated by the circus, the theatre, and the allurements of the capital’ or ‘worn out by sickness’. The Danubian forces, by contrast, having been, in Primus’ words, ‘cheated’ out of an earlier conflict with Vitellius under Otho, were ‘hastening to rise again for vengeance’ with ‘unimpaired strength’. Second, Primus asserts that the Danubian legions should not content themselves with simply blockading north-eastern Italy at the Pannonian Alps. That obstruction could be easily evaded by Vitellian forces coming from the Rhine through Raetia, whose governor remained loyal, and from Britain, as well as allowing Vitellius to retain his five legions which already resided in Italy.\textsuperscript{597} In Tacitus’ account, Primus dismisses the concerns raised by his compatriots about the numerical superiority of the five Vitellian legions and extols the relative

\textsuperscript{594} Ibid., 3.1-2.


\textsuperscript{596} Like Mucianus, Tacitus describes Primus as a fierce orator who ‘poured out such a torrent of these and similar words, that he carried away even the cautious and prudent, while the general voice of the multitude extolled him as the one man, the one general in the army, and spurned the inaction of the others.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.3.)

\textsuperscript{597} Whether Primus was aware of the communiqués between Mucianus and Bolanus is difficult to determine. Bolanus himself had not declared for Vespasian. Primus was undoubtedly suspicious of his intentions.
discipline of the Danubian forces: ‘if you reckon the number of soldiers, rather than that of legions, we have greater strength, and no vices, for our very humiliation has been most helpful to our discipline’. He emphasises the prowess of the Moesian and Pannonian cavalry, two squadrons of which, according to Primus, had previously broken through the Vitellian lines in service of Otho.\footnote{equites vero ne tum quidem victos, sed quamquam rebus adversis disiectam Vitellii aciem. ‘duae tunc Pannonicae ac Moesicae alae perrupere hostem: nunc sedecim alarum coniuncta signa pulsu sonituque et nube ipsa operient ac superfundent oblitos proeliorum equites equosque...’} Finally, like Mucianus before him, the general shifts responsibility on to his own shoulders, affirming that ‘unless any one hinders me, I who suggest will execute the plan’.\footnote{Ibid., 3.2.} According to Tacitus, he demanded only the light cohorts to carry out his scheme, with the two immediately-available legions, \textit{VII ‘Galbiana’} and \textit{XIII Gemina}, remaining behind in Pannonia.\footnote{Perhaps under the authority of Vedius Aquila.} Primus, then, having dealt with no small amount of dissent among his colleagues, advanced immediately with a mostly auxiliary striking force and some elements of the Pannonian cavalry. Orders were simultaneously dispatched to Aponius Saturninus to immediately bring up the three Moesian legions. By mid-September, Primus’ force had already reached the Po river and routed three Vitellian cohorts and one cavalry squadron. By the end of the month, with the assistance of the

\footnote{The dissent is recorded by Tacitus at ibid., 3.1. The command of the auxiliary force was given to the previously mentioned centurion, Arrius Varus. (ibid., 3.6.)}

\footnote{Ibid., 3.5.}

\footnote{Ibid., 3.6.}
two Pannonian legions, Primus’ force occupied Patavium and Verona – the latter of which would serve as their headquarters for the coming campaign.604

This was not what Vespasian or Mucianus had in mind in early August.605 The behaviour of both the Pannonian and Dalmatian governors in addition to that of legio XI Claudia suggests that, in his letters to the Danubian legions in August, Vespasian had unequivocally ordered the legions to remain in Aquileia. Lucius Tampius Flavianus (cos suff. 45/46, II 76), the consular governor of Pannonia, and Marcus Pompeius Silvanus Staberius Flavinus II (cos suff. 45, II ca. 76), governor of Dalmatia, apparently placed themselves in an awkward position prior to Cremona. Flavianus, a natura ac senecta cunctator, raised sufficient objections to Primus’ scheme at Poetovio to incur charges of overt disloyalty.606 Some days later, Pompeius Silvanus too conspired, through words and wasted opportunities for action, to delay the advance of the Dalmatian legion XI Claudia.607 Tacitus’ account of the eleventh legion’s role in the final stages of the war is abrupt, however he asserts that XI Claudia hesitated prior to Cremona and only joined Primus’ force in Italy after the

604 Ibid., 3.7-8. Tacitus, thereafter, records a series of auspicious defections including, most notably, that of Aulus Caecina Alienus and the fleet at Ravenna, which consisted largely of former Othonians, and was commanded by Sextus Lucilius Bassus. (ibid., 3.12-14., BJ., 4.641-3., Dio, Hist., 64.10.) There is no room to furnish the details of these defections nor, for that matter, the Battle of Cremona on 24/25 October – which resulted in a decisive Flavian victory. (See here Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 139f.) Suffice to say that Caecina’s defection does not appear to have been a result of Mucianus’ intervention – but was instead wrought by a growing enmity between Caecina and Valens which, according to Tacitus, was also emblematic of the differences between the armies of upper and lower Germany. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.93. and Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 77-79.) Furthermore, word of the victory at Bedriacum, which had placed the Flavian forces firmly in control of Italy east of the Apennines, spread rapidly throughout the West reaching Mucianus, who was able to respond almost immediately. Communiques from the amicus would arrive just after Cremona as Primus was still in Umbria. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.52.)


606 [A man] whose nature and years disposed him to hesitation’. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.4.)

607 Ibid., 3.4, 3.10, 3.50. In Tacitus’ account, the behaviour of Flavianus and Silvanus bears out the historian’s decidedly unfavourable portrait of both men as indolent, indecisive and cowardly. It is not known to what extent pro-Antonian sources influenced this portion of Tacitus’ text, although there is every indication that both men acted in accordance with Vespasian’s orders. Flavianus, it seems, achieved significant distinctions after 70. Curator aquarum from 74-75 (Frontinus, Aq., 102.), he received a second suffect consulship in 76 (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 201). Silvanus’ career followed an almost identical trajectory. (cf. no. 614.).
battle had been fought. The historian does not state the reason for the legion’s hesitation, but only their motivation for rousing to action – namely, that they feared being denied a share in the successes effected by Primus in Vespasian’s name: *prosperis rebus anxia quod defuisset.*

Analogous passages in the *Historiae* might lead one to believe that the loyalties of the eleventh legion were wavering until the course of the civil war swayed definitively in the Flavians’ favour after Cremona. There are practical considerations that render this interpretation questionable, however. First, the fact that the *XI Claudia* covered in excess of six hundred kilometres to arrive at Cremona during the first week of November suggests that it must have declared for Vespasian long before the battle took place. Second, the legionary legate, Annius Bassus, appears to have been another early adherent of the Flavians. He was an officer under Vespasian during the Jewish campaign and received a suffect consulship almost immediately after the conclusion of the civil war. In Tacitus’ reckoning, it was Bassus who retained effective control over the legion in 69: *vis consiliorum penes Annium Bassum legionis legatum.* It is probable, in any case, that the legion’s hesitation should not be put down to wavering loyalties nor, indeed, the supineness of the

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608 ‘…now in the hour of success [the legion] felt alarm at having stood aloof.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.50.)

609 Compare this section of Tacitus’ text with another passage at *Hist.*, 2.97.: *…trium legionum legati, pares iure et prosperis Vitellii rebus certaturi ad obsequium, adversam eius fortunam ex aequo detrectabant.* (‘…the legates of the three legions, equal in authority, and ready, while Vitellius was prosperous, to vie in obedience, stood aloof with one consent from his falling fortunes.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.97.) Again, the ablative construction *prosperis…rebus* is used with reference to Vitellius and his relationship with the legions in Spain.

610 Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 140. *XI Claudia* had been stationed at Burnum in Dalmatia from 9 onward, and there it remained until a detachment from the legion either fought for Otho at Bedriacum or turned up after the battle. Vitellius returned the legion to its Dalmatian quarters after the battle. (ibid., 2.67.) Morgan seemingly thinks that the legion was slow to join Primus’ forces because of the obstruction of the province’s governor, Pompeius Silvanus, but the legionary legate Annius Bassus got it moving after Cremona. (ibid., 3.50., Morgan, M.G., *69 A.D.: The Year of Four Emperors*, 228.) The timing of the legion’s arrival in Cremona and the distance it had travelled to get there, however, invariably suggest that it had made the decision to depart at a much earlier date. There were, in any case, no doubts about the eleventh legion’s loyalty to Vespasian. (ibid., 2.86.)


612 ‘…the real direction of affairs was in the hands of Annius Bassus, the legionary legate.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.50.)
provincial governor, Pompeius Silvanus, but rather unwillingness of its leaders to join Primus’ unauthorised expedition into Italy.\textsuperscript{613} The mere fact that Flavianus, Silvanus and Bassus alike were summarily rewarded and persisted as Flavian \textit{amici} after 70, despite their non-existent role at Cremona, indicates that they had abided by Vespasian’s commands – unlike Primus.\textsuperscript{614}

It is thus unsurprising that there is evidence to suggest that Vespasian and Mucianus learned of Primus’ invasion of Italy and made an attempt to head him off before the battle of Cremona was fought. We know from Tacitus that Tampius Flavianus fled his province after attracting the ire of the legions at Poetovio – only to be rescued by a letter from Vespasian which absolved Flavianus of any disloyalty.\textsuperscript{615} As Nicols argues, this incident implies that Vespasian had learned of Flavianus’ escape from and subsequent return to Pannonia and he could respond before 24 October. Consequently, if Vespasian had been notified of Primus’ plans following the Poetovio meeting – and he almost certainly was, he would have had sufficient time to countermand them.\textsuperscript{616}

Certainly, we know from Tacitus that Mucianus sent frequent dispatches of his own accord to

\textsuperscript{613} Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 142.
\textsuperscript{614} Ibid., 143. on Bassus’ loyalty. Relatively little is known of Bassus’ career outside of his short appearance in Tacitus’ account of 69 and his subsequent suffect consulship. Evidently, he was sufficiently distinguished for Pliny the Younger to describe him as a man of well-known merit (Pliny, \textit{Ep.}, 7.31.5.) and one of his clients, Tiberius Claudius Pollio, composed a biography of Bassus under Domitian. (Cf. Syme, R., \textit{Tacitus}, 178f.) Nicols lays emphasis on Bassus’ role in directing the movements of the eleventh legion but we should not underestimate Silvanus. Primus and Fuscus had already displayed a considerable talent for provoking implacable enthusiasm among the Danubian legions. Moderating the zeal of the Dalmatian soldiery likely required a judicious approach. Hence, the combination of Silvanus’ ‘endless talk’ and Bassus’ careful diplomacy contrived to delay the legion’s march. Certainly, for a man who purportedly obstructed \textit{XI Claudia} from reinforcing Primus in Italy (cf. Morgan, M.G., \textit{69 A.D.: The Year of Four Emperors}, 228.), Silvanus achieved remarkable distinction after 70. Mucianus apparently trusted Silvanus enough to leave the critical task of repairing the state’s financial situation in his hands. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.47.) He was \textit{curator aquarum} between 71 and 73 and suffect consul in 76 for a second time. (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 201.) Jones believes he was a member of Titus’ \textit{amici} (Jones, B.W., \textit{The Emperor Titus}, 135.). Eck and Jones cite Silvanus as the \textit{delator} mentioned by Juvenal under Domitian. (cf. Juvenal, \textit{Sat.}, 4.109-10., Jones, B.W., \textit{The Emperor Domitian} (London: Routledge, 1992), 135., Eck, W., “Pompeius Silvanus, consul designates tertium, ein Vertrauter Vespasians und Domitians.” \textit{Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik} 9 (1972): 272.) Possibly, also, he was designated for a third consulship in 83. (ibid., 259. contra. Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 209.)

\textsuperscript{615} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.10.
\textsuperscript{616} Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 142.
Primus. The historian reports the receipt of such communiqués several times – the first as early as the second half of September, when the Danubian forces had already occupied Verona, and the last as late as December 17, when the troops lingered at Ocriculum.617 As Syme notes, these latter dispatches represent a particularly curious part of Tacitus’ narrative – not merely because Mucianus is reduced to a background role, ‘issuing admonition all in vain’, but because, even while absent, the amicus continues to exert an ‘ominously potent’ influence right up until the point where he dominates the political sphere in Rome.618 Regardless, it is notable that Mucianus continued to play his cards carefully up until his arrival in the capital in December. Well aware of Primus’ success at Cremona and yet still wary of the disaster that might follow, Mucianus advocated further action from Primus while simultaneously emphasising the advantages of staying his hand and halting his legions’ victorious march towards Rome.619 Mucianus’ dissimulation was deliberate. Conscious of the fact that Primus himself had assumed direct responsibility for the incursion into Italy at Poetovio, the amicus placed himself in a position wherein he could either eschew a disastrous policy or claim ultimate responsibility for a successful one, according to the subsequent events. Judging from Tacitus’ commentary, it is apparent that Mucianus also dispatched similarly ambiguous letters to the leading men of the Moesian and Pannonian legions intended to undermine Primus’ authority. The historian adds that, for some of the legionary commanders, Mucianus had successfully influenced a growing wariness of Primus’ precipitancy and rash behaviour.620 To other trusted legates, including the newly-raised Lucius Plotius Grigraphus,

618 Ibid. For Mucianus in Rome see Tacitus, Hist., 4.11.1. and chapter four of this thesis.
619 Tacitus, Hist., 3.52.
620 According to Tacitus, some among the generals contrived for delays for ‘Antonius in fact was now becoming too great a man, and their hopes from Mucianus were more definite’ (ibid.)
Mucianus revealed his intentions directly – instructing them explicitly to dispatch messages of their own to Vespasian decrying Primus’ hasty invasion and depreciating his success.621

3.10 Mucianus in Moesia

In the meantime, Mucianus had come across an opportunity for a more rewarding command. Having arrived in Thrace in October, he discovered a Dacian attack on the fortresses of Oescus and Novae – and he dispatched the legion VI Ferrata against them. Tacitus says little of Mucianus’ Moesian campaign and, if Wellesley is to be believed, this is symptomatic of Tacitus’ equivocal view of the amicus.622 Certainly, Tacitus’ account offers few specifics concerning the magnitude

621 It is unclear which legion Griphus commanded. The most logical candidate would be VII Claudia, on the grounds that Vipstanus Messalla, the interim legatus of VII Claudia after Lucius Tettius Julianus’ (cos suff. 83) flight from the legion after August 69, was not officially sanctioned. (ibid., 2.85.) Griphus was, nonetheless, a favoured friend of Mucianus and would be appointed praetor in the following year. (ibid., 4.39.) It should be noted that, even if his intentions were not genuine, Mucianus was right to advocate caution to Primus. Following Cremona, the Vitellian formations remained intact and the stragglers were rounded up and dispatched to all corners of the Empire. To the undermanned Danubian line went I Italica and V Alaudae and probably the remains of the drafts from Germany (legions I, IV, XV and XVI). For the time being, XXI Rapax likely returned to the legionary camp at Vindonissa while the Flavian VII Claudia departed for Viiminacium. XXII Primigenia likely replaced VII Galbiana in Pannonia. Even so, although the Vitellian legions had been given marching orders, they still remained in close proximity and might still turn about on Primus’ force. Simultaneously, although the Alpine passes in north-eastern Italy had been sealed off by Flavian troops placed north of Verona, Vitellian loyalists might still conceivably attempt to penetrate northern Italy. (Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 153.) There was also Valens. Despite the dearth of troops available to him post-Cremona, it is clear from Tacitus that Valens had swiftly formulated a secondary plan which might have disastrous consequences for the Flavians. According to Tacitus, he had resolved to secure shipping and depart for Gallia Narbonensis where he would attempt to incite the Gallic provinces and the depleted German garrisons to resume the war. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.40-41.) It would not be until late November that his plan would fail, ultimately resulting in his own execution in Urbinum. (ibid., 3.62.)

622 As Wellesley asserts, ‘Tacitus blurs the whole story of the invasions, because to have narrated it fully would have forced him to recognize the value of Mucianus’ services to Rome; but Mucianus is cast for the role of the villain, because he is the creator of the Flavian dynasty.’ (Wellesley, K., Cornelius Tacitus. The Histories. Book III, 209, cf. 15.) Wellesley’s argument is a vast overestimation, however. As Syme would later point out, there were good reasons for only recording a cursory examination of Mucianus’ Dacian episode. For one, in the grand scheme of Dacian incursions, Mucianus’ campaign was relatively insignificant and, while he would later be awarded the ornamenta triumphalia, his commendation would be subject to criticism from Tacitus. (Tacitus, Hist., 4.4.) The Dacians had not successfully captured Oescus and Novae. VI Ferrata dispersed them, and there may have been no actual fighting. By contrast, in book one of the Historiae, Tacitus had already recounted another incursion across the Danube, effected by the Sarmatians, and a proper battle. (ibid., 1.79.) It is true that Tacitus would later neglect a more significant conflict in the region in the form of Domitian’s Dacian wars however his motives in the latter case are easier to discern – he
nor the precise location of the invasion outside of the observations that the Dacian force was able to ‘storm the winter quarters of the auxiliary infantry and cavalry and occupied both banks of the Danube’ and that ‘they were then preparing to destroy the camp of the legions.’

Mucianus’ Moesian campaign was almost certainly trivial compared to both Plautius Silvanus Aelianus’ remarkable efforts several years prior as well as Titus Aurelius Fulvus’ campaign earlier in the year. Contrary to Wellesley’s assertion, Tacitus probably ascribes greater importance to the incident than was deserved – if only to corroborate his moralisation at the outset of the chapter: *Turbata per eosdem dies Germania, et socordia ducum, seditione legionum, externa vi, perfidia sociali prope adflicta Romana res.*

As Syme highlights, the trajectory of the invasion can be readily determined from both Tacitus’ short account and the historical context of the region. The Dacian bands came out of Transylvania, likely through the Rotenturm Pass down the river Olt. The crux of their attack would have fallen initially upon the auxiliary camps on the northern bank had a personal stake in the latter episode by virtue of the involvement of Agricola. (Tacitus, Agr., 41) Second, it might also be highlighted that Tacitus’ primary interest in book three of the *Historiae* is on the warfare, action and movement conducted by those armies involved in the civil war. For all of the spectacle and preparations carried out at Carmel and Berytus, Mucianus did not determine the final outcome. Antonius Primus was instead the focus of Tacitus’ interest. (Syme, R., “The March of Mucianus,” in *Roman Papers*, vol. 3, 1010-11.)

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623 Tac. *Hist.*, 3.46.
624 Evidence from the titulus of Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, the legate of Moesia who followed Flavius Sabinus in 60/61, attests extensive and successful operations in Moesia including the transferral of over one hundred thousand *Transdanuviani* across the Danube ad praestanda tributa and the suppression of an incipient disturbance of the Sarmatians. (*ILS*, 986., cf. also *ILS*, 6385 for Plautius Silvanus’ suffect consulship in 45 AD. On the career of Plautius Silvanus see Shotter, D., “Irregular Legionary Commands.” *The Classical Quarterly*, 19:2 (1969): 371. as well as Conole, P., Milns, R.D., “Neronian Frontier Policy in the Balkans: The Career of Ti. Plautius Silvanus.” *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte*, 32:2 (1983): 183-200.) At the beginning of 69, the Rhoxolani made a violent incursion into Moesia with nine thousand horsemens. Tacitus himself gives us a lengthy and colourful account of the invasion. He described the mailed cavalry and the long heavy lances wielded by the riders. Caught unawares by the third legion, *III Gallica* under Fulvus successfully dispersed the invading force. The legate was awarded a triumphal statue and the *consularia ornamenta* was bestowed upon all three legionary legates in the region. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.79.)
625 ‘About the same time, Germany suffered from the supineness of our generals and the mutinous conduct of our legions; the assaults of enemies and the perfidy of allies all but overthrew the power of Rome.’ (ibid., 3.46.)
626 And likely some through the Vulkan pass further to the west. (Syme, R., “The March of Mucianus,” in *Roman Papers*, vol. 3, 1006.)
of the Danube which had remained under Roman control up until that time.\textsuperscript{627} Subsequently, the Dacian force would have come within striking distance of the legionary camps of Oescus and Novae: \textit{iamque castra legionum excindere parabant}.\textsuperscript{628} Even so, the magnitude of the invasion, while it cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy, does not appear to have been significant.\textsuperscript{629} Syme notes that the prompt intervention of \textit{VI Ferrata} alone ‘sufficed as a deterrent’.\textsuperscript{630} His opinion can be corroborated by the fact that Tacitus does not describe a battle, if one even occurred. This is a striking omission in light of the fact that Tacitus has already constructed an image of an Empire assailed on all sides. So, if there was a battle, it could only have borne out Tacitus’ moralisation, and the historian would surely have described it in painstaking detail. In any case, the Dacian incursion appears to have been an unexpected event.\textsuperscript{631} The \textit{dux Dacorum} until this time, Scorilo, was a cautious man who had adopted a policy of non-intervention during periods of turmoil in the Empire.\textsuperscript{632} Either he had changed his mind or the Dacians were under new management.\textsuperscript{633} Most likely, it was a probing attack initiated by a newly-instated \textit{dux Dacorum}.\textsuperscript{634} This attack served as a precursor to a period of renewed aggression that would in turn result in disastrous consequences for the legions stationed along the Danube from 70 onwards.\textsuperscript{635}

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{627} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{628} ‘They were already preparing to destroy the camps of the legions…” (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.46.)
\item\textsuperscript{630} Syme, R., “The March of Mucianus,” in \textit{Roman Papers}, vol. 3, 1006.
\item\textsuperscript{631} Hence, Tacitus’ comment: \textit{mota et Dacorum gens numquam fida}, which seemingly implies some form of pre-existing non-aggression pact. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.46.)
\item\textsuperscript{632} Frontinus, \textit{Strat.}, 1.10.
\item\textsuperscript{633} Daicoviciu, C., “Dakien und Rom in der Prinzipatszeit,” in \textit{ANRW}, vol. 2.6 (1977), 914.
\item\textsuperscript{634} The new king was Duras, who ruled until 87, whereupon he was replaced by Decebalius. (Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 67.6.) Cf. Bărbulescu, M., et al., \textit{The History of Transylvania}, vol. 1 (Romania: Romanian Cultural Institute, 2005), 90.
\item\textsuperscript{635} After the end of Vitellius, Tacitus records current rumours about Sarmatian and Dacian activities: \textit{volgato rumore a Sarmatis Dacisque Moesica ac Pannonica hiberna circumsideri; paria de Britannia fingebantur.} (‘…for a report was rife that our winter camps in Moesia and Pannonia were hemmed in by the Sarmatians and Dacians.’ – Tacitus,
\end{itemize}
One further issue needs to be dealt with in relation to Mucianus’ sojourn in Moesia. This relates to the timing of Mucianus’ intervention in the Dacian invasion. Superficially, Tacitus’ commentary is straightforward in this respect. At the outset of his description of the incursion, the historian explicitly informs us that, when the legions of Moesia departed for Aquileia, the Dacians remained quiet for a period but when they heard of the fighting in northern Italy, they were incited to cross the Danube. Tacitus adds that Mucianus already knew of the Flavian victory at Cremona before he threw VI Ferrata against the invaders: *Cremonensis victoriae gnarus.* This reconstruction, however, has not been accepted by all commentators. Wellesley, building upon earlier suggestions of Hartmann, prefers to emend Tacitus’ text to instead read: *Cremonensis victoriae ignarus.* Thus, Mucianus had not heard of the victory at Cremona when he sent the Sixth Legion against the Dacians. Wellesley accords over-riding importance to this emendation and he adapts an entire time-line to suit his conjecture. According to Wellesley, news of Cremona is unlikely to have reached Moesia before November 5. Furthermore, he postulates a stay of thirty days on the Danube, beginning in early October. In Wellesley’s reckoning, therefore, Mucianus must have reached Viminacium around October 7. Wellesley’s emendation does not stand up to scrutiny. Initially, the chronology which he sets out does not fit with the dating of the Flavian conference at

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*Hist.*, 4.54.) Early in 70, Fonteius Agrippa, a consular legate and previously proconsul of Asia whom Mucianus himself had previous appointed legate of Moesia on his way to Italy (ibid., 3.46.), fell in combat against the Sarmatians. (Josephus, *BJ.*, 7.90.) The Dacian king, Duras, was subsequently responsible for the incursion into Moesia in 85 that would result in the destruction of *V Alaudae* and the murder of the consular legate, Gaius Oppius Sabinus (*cos ord.* 84). (Suetonius, *Div. Dom.*, 6., Eutropius, *Hist.*, 7.23.).

636 ‘…he had knowledge of the victory at Cremona.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.46.)

637 Vürtheim’s conjecture was reported originally in Hartmann, J.J., *Analecta Tacitea* (Leiden: Brill), 279.

638 The phrase would therefore read: ‘although he was ignorant of the victory at Cremona.’ As Wellesley states, whether *gnarus* or *ignarus* should be read ‘must be settled, if it can be settled, by the reconstruction of chronology’. (Wellesley, K., *Cornelius Tacitus. The Histories. Book III*, 209.) He therefore includes an extensive discussion of the time-table involved with Mucianus’ Moesian campaign in the form of the lengthiest appendix in his entire volume. (“Appendix VI. Events in Moesia in A.D. 69-70,” in ibid., 208-15.).

639 Ibid., 211-15.
Berytus nor, by extension, the date of Mucianus’ departure from Antioch in mid-August. Wellesley works backwards from Mucianus’ arrival in Rome, which he sets at December 25. According to the historian, Mucianus required at least forty-nine days to travel from Viminacium to Rome, the distance of which he sets at eight hundred and eighty-five miles. Mucianus, therefore, cannot have departed Moesia later than 7 November. As we have already observed, however, marching at a moderate rate, Mucianus required at least eighty days to march from Antioch to Moesia. Even if he had departed Antioch at a relatively early point after Berytus, prior to 15 August, he cannot have arrived in Moesia before at least late October and, more likely, early November. Second, Wellesley’s emended text does not cohere with the remainder of the commentary. As Syme highlights, the following sentence continues with a co-ordinative and gives a secondary reason for Mucianus’ actions in Moesia: *ac ne externa moles utrimque ingrueret, si Dacus Germanusque diversi inrupissent*. Thus, Mucianus knew about Cremona and resolved to defend the legionary camps in Moesia so the Empire would not be exposed to attacks on two fronts. Even if one were to dispute the timing of Mucianus’ arrival in Moesia – that is, whether he arrived in early October and remained until the beginning of November, or arrived at some point after 5 November, *gnarus* should nonetheless be retained in order to render Tacitus’ account intelligible.

640 A date which is reasonable, given that Mucianus was only just behind Primus when the latter paused at the Umbrian city of Ocriculum for the Saturnalia – 17-21 December. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.49., 3.78.)
641 Forty-nine days is perhaps a little generous. As highlighted below, the journey might be completed in around thirty-five to forty days. Mucianus, however, delayed after Aquileia.
642 Wellesley, however, contradicts himself in the annotation to the text where he states that Mucianus departed ‘c. 12 November’.
643 Thus, the entire sentence should read: ‘They were then preparing to destroy the camp of the legions, but Mucianus sent the 6th legion against them, for he had knowledge of the victory at Cremona and he feared that two hordes of foreigners might assail the Empire, if the Dacians and Germans should break in on opposite sides.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.46.)
Tacitus offers few hints as to the trajectory of Mucianus’ march after Moesia. One assumes that the *amicus* no longer marched *cum expedita manu*. He was unencumbered by the sixth legion and, apparently disturbed by the notion of another claiming credit for the Flavian victories in Italy, attempting to delay Primus’ advance to the capital through a steady stream of ambiguously-worded letters dispatched during the latter half of his march.\(^{645}\) Mucianus’ route, therefore, reflected his rapid pace. From Viminacium, or thereabouts, Mucianus continued along the imperial highway through Singidunum, Sirmium, Cibalae, Siscia, Emona and finally Aquileia. When he arrived at Aquileia, further transport could be offered by the now Flavian fleet at Ravenna to either Fanum or Ancona.\(^{646}\) The distance from Viminacium to Aquileia amounts to about seven hundred kilometres. If Mucianus averaged around thirty kilometres per day then he would have required at least twenty-four days to reach Aquileia. The journey from Aquileia to Rome, at least by sea, could be completed in less than nine days, Aquileia to Ancona in only two or three. Drusus Julius Caesar (*cos ord. 15, II 21*) completed a similar journey, albeit in reverse, in September of 14 AD.\(^{647}\) This timeline would place Mucianus on the *Via Flaminia* considerably early, in early-to-mid December, while Primus and the Flavian forces were only at Carsulae, fourteen kilometres north of Narnia, on 13 December.\(^{648}\) It is likely instead that Mucianus delayed after Aquileia.\(^{649}\) There were

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645 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.78.


647 Drusus Caesar was present at the deification of Augustus on 17 September 14 AD. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 1.14.) He was subsequently dispatched with two cohorts of the Guard to deal with an uprising in Pannonia. (ibid., 24.1.) He must have reached the summer camp of the legions near Emona by September 26, as an eclipse occurred early the next day.


649 Tacitus confirms that Mucianus was close behind Primus while he was advancing south through Italy. (ibid., 3.49.) Mucianus would not, however, arrive in the capital until after Primus, despite the fact that the latter individual halted at Ocriculum. (ibid., 3.78.)
certainly good reasons to do so. The situation with the Senate was predictably delicate. A dispatch from Mucianus read out at the first session of the Senate provoked no small amount of criticism:

*quae materiam sermonibus praebuere. si privatus esset, cur publice loqueretur? potuisse eadem paucos post dies loco sententiae dici*

Mucianus was undoubtedly maintaining close contact with Flavian agents in the capital – particularly Sabinus, Vespasian’s own brother, who remained in contact with the Flavian generals first through covert means and later through undisguised channels. There was also Quintus Petillius Cerealis, former legate of IX Hispana and friend of Vespasian who, according to Tacitus, ‘had escaped the sentries of Vitellius by a rustic disguise and by his knowledge of the country’. Despite the best efforts of Sabinus, intelligence garnered from the capital indicated that the prospect of a peaceful transition of imperial power was becoming increasingly unlikely. We hear from Tacitus that Sabinus ‘held frequent conferences with Vitellius to discuss the question of peace and the cessation of hostilities upon certain conditions’ and he ordered the tribunes of the cohorts to stay their hand when rumours that Vitellius had renounced his Imperial claim began to spread. Vitellius’ own authority, meanwhile, was steadily diminishing. Mucianus, Primus and Sabinus alike urged Vitellius to abdicate peacefully with offers of ‘personal safety, the enjoyment of wealth, and a quiet retreat in Campania, provided he would lay down his arms and surrender

\[\text{650} \quad \text{‘Why, if he is a private citizen, does he speak like a public man? In a few days' time he might have said the very same words in his place as a Senator’ (ibid., 4.4.) The Senate’s reaction to Mucianus’ arrival will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter four. Mucianus undoubtedly had little desire to further antagonise the Senate or, for that matter, the populace of Rome prior to the former’s ratification of Vespasian’s (and Mucianus’) powers in late December. (ibid., 4.4.)} \]

\[\text{651} \quad \text{See ibid., 3.59 for the covert communication between Sabinus and Antonius Primus.} \]

\[\text{652} \quad \text{Tacitus adds that ‘there was a near relationship between Cerialis and Vespasian, and he was not without reputation as a soldier.’ (ibid., 3.59)} \]

\[\text{653} \quad \text{Ibid., 3.65., 3.68.} \]
himself and his children to Vespasian. Any notion of surrender, however, was summarily rejected by Vitellius’ partisans. According to Tacitus, Vitellius’ adherents ‘pointed out the danger and disgrace of a submission in which the caprice of the conqueror would be their sole guarantee’ and, furthermore, that Vespasian, Primus, Fuscus and Mucianus alike would not rest until all rivalry had been extinguished. Further public melodrama on the part of Vitellius did not help the situation and Sabinus, along with ‘the leading men of the Senate, many of the equestrian order, with all the city soldiery and the watch’ feared the threatening attitude of the German cohorts. Despite pleading from other members of the Senate, Flavius Sabinus would not gather the city cohorts and act to resolve the situation in his own right. A man of mild temper, Tacitus says he ‘shrank from bloodshed and slaughter’, instead preferring to continue counselling Vitellius on the cessation of hostilities. The job would necessarily be left to Flavian forces beyond the city boundaries, yet Mucianus, understandably, had no desire to incur the odium of a violent incursion into the capital nor cause any further aversion to his character among the leading men of the state. As Sabinus would point out: ‘Peace and harmony bring advantage to the conquered, but only credit to the conqueror.’

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654 Ibid., 3.63.
655 Ibid., 3.66.
656 Ibid., 3.68-9
657 Ibid. 3.64.
658 Ibid., 3.70. Antonius Primus, it seems, was similarly wary of the consequences of a violent conclusion to the civil war. As we hear of the Flavian conference at Carsulae in mid-December: ‘Antonius summoned them to an assembly, and explained to them that Vitellius had still forces, which would waver in their loyalty if they had time to reflect, but would be fierce foes if driven to despair. “The opening of a civil war must,” he said, “be left to chance; the final triumph is perfected by wise counsels and skill. The fleet of Misenum and the fairest portion of Campania have already revolted, and out of the whole world Vitellius has nothing left but the country between Tarracina and Narnia. From our victory at Cremona sufficient glory has accrued to us, and from the destruction of that city only too much disgrace. Let us not be eager to capture rather than to preserve the capital. Greater will be our reward, far higher our reputation, if we secure without bloodshed the safety of the Senate and of the people of Rome.”’ (Ibid., 3.60.)
Consequently, by mid-December, Mucianus was not far behind Antonius Primus but just too late to join him at Ocriculum, where the Flavian forces had halted to celebrate the Saturnalia (17-21 December). Mucianus would not arrive in the capital until at least several days after Primus – time enough, according to Tacitus, for Primus’ forces and the Vitellians alike to wreak havoc. Tacitus vividly recalls the failed attack of the Flavian advance guard of one thousand cavalry under Cerealis, and the desperate response of Vitellius’ followers who stormed the Capitol as the Temple Jupiter Optimus Maximus burned to the ground. By 20 December, Sabinus, who had been forced to retreat to the Capitol, was dead, the Vitellian praetorians who had resolved to fight to the last were slaughtered. Authority to execute Vitellius had been given to neither Mucianus or Primus, yet the Emperor was dragged out of the palace and murdered in the same place on the Gemonian Stairs where Sabinus had met his demise. South of the capital, the execution of Lucius Vitellius (cos suff. 48), the Emperor’s brother, followed soon after. The merit of having finished the war and claiming the capital would belong to Primus, but there would be ample reason to discredit him after the fact.

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659 Ibid., 3.78.
660 As Josephus recalls: ‘This battle was fought on the third day of the month Apelleus [Casleu]; on the next day Mucianus came into the city with his army, and ordered Antonius and his men to leave off killing’. (Josephus, BJ., 6.654) Josephus is probably compressing the events here. Given that the Senate was able to hold a session and bestow honours on Primus, Varus and Fuscus prior to Mucianus’ arrival (Tacitus, Hist., 4.4.), the amicus likely arrived at least a few days after Primus entered Rome.
661 For the march on Rome, embassies and capture see Tacitus, Hist., 3.79-84.
662 Ibid., 3.71. for Sabinus’ demise and 3.84. for the decimation of the German cohorts.
663 Ibid., 3.85.
664 Ibid., 4.2.
665 The carnage, even after Vitellius’ death is recalled by Tacitus at ibid., 4.1. Josephus puts the total deaths in the capital at fifty thousand. (Josephus, BJ., 4.654.) Mucianus’ arrival in Rome and his relationship with Antonius Primus will be dealt with in greater detail in chapter four.
3.11 Conclusion

Contrary to the assertions of Josephus, the proclamation of Vespasian in July 69 was far from an adventitious occurrence. It was a result of planning which, thanks to the combined efforts of Mucianus and Titus, had been undertaken months before. Mucianus was indispensible. By June of 69, he had succeeded in winning the support of several former adherents of Domitius Corbulo, including legati on both sides of the Empire – in Asia Minor, Egypt and Britain and, most importantly, in Illyria, the home of the former Othonian legions. At the conference in Carmel in June, it was Mucianus who took the lead. In a public exhortation for the benefit of the eastern legati, he deliberately incurred the odium of advocating civil war. Tacitus, like Josephus, stresses the zeal of soldiers at Caesarea. They did not wait to be harangued by their officers, work which had undoubtedly been done beforehand, but saluted Vespasian as he emerged from his bedroom.

The exercise was carefully calculated at Carmel and likely carried out immediately upon the covert orders of Vespasian during the first half of the following month. The strategy for the campaign against the Vitellians, meanwhile, was formulated in a similar fashion. In private meetings with the future Emperor before and after Carmel, Mucianus devised a bold strategy in which he would advance with a small strike force across Anatolia with the intention of crossing from Dyrrachium to south-eastern Italy. Despite the speed of the Flavian preparations between June and August, however, Mucianus’ plan was rendered unfeasible by the impending conclusion of the sailing season for 69. Consequently, a more conservative plan was put in place. Departing Antioch in early-to-mid August, Mucianus sought to utilise his earlier diplomatic efforts to gather the forces of the Danubian legions under the Flavian banner. Thanks to the intervention of Antonius Primus, Mucianus’ secondary plan too came to nought. Mucianus would play no direct part in the Flavian incursion into Italy. Even so, despite his distance,
Mucianus exerted an overbearing influence over the Danubian *legati*. From the middle of August until his sojourn in Moesia in early November; and finally until his arrival in Italy in December, Mucianus remained in covert contact with leading members of the Moesian, Pannonian and Dalmatian legions. His secret negotiations did not go unheeded and, if Tacitus is to be believed, Mucianus engendered severe doubts about the behaviour and ambitions of Primus.
Chapter Four: Mucianus in Rome

4.1 Introduction

In December of 69, Mucianus concluded the final leg of his march to Rome. He had neither an army at his back nor could he claim responsibility for concluding the civil war with Vitellius. Nevertheless, he carried with him the mandate of Vespasian which was officially granted to him at Berytus in August. From December 69 until the autumn of the following year, Mucianus would rule the Empire in Vespasian’s stead, as de facto head of state, while the latter remained in Alexandria. The Ancient sources offer several divergent accounts of the period immediately following Mucianus’ entry into Rome. Dio is unequivocal – while Vespasian remained in Egypt, Mucianus ‘administered all the details of government with the help of Domitian’ and ‘he had authority to decide every question that he liked without the Emperor's express approval and could issue written orders by merely adding his superior's name’. He does not go into extensive detail, however observes that Mucianus wore the imperial ring to authorize documents and that he, along with Domitian, appointed governors, procurators, prefects and consuls. 666 Suetonius and Josephus, by contrast, pay little attention to Mucianus at all. Suetonius does not mention Mucianus and instead states that Domitian alone assumed the office of praetor of the city ‘with consular authority’ and was responsible for both appointing and dismissing large numbers of officials within the capital. 667 Josephus, similarly, mentions Mucianus only in passing as the man responsible for coaxing Domitian out of his hiding place and recommending him to the people as temporary princeps until Vespasian’s return from the East. 668 Tacitus, on the other hand, gives the most

666 Dio, Hist., 66.2.
667 Suetonius, Div. Dom., 1.3.
668 Josephus, BJ., 6.654.
elaborate picture of Mucianus’ rulership. According to the latter historian, while Domitian’s name was placed at the head of dispatches and edicts, ‘the real authority was in the hands of Mucianus’. 669 Thus, we hear from Tacitus that Mucianus was able to bestow tribuneships and praetorships upon his friends, outline the composition of the Praetorian Guard, order the execution of alleged Vitellian adherents and remove rivals from office. 670

Modern scholars have, broadly speaking, tended to follow Tacitus with some minor variations. The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, as early as the mid-nineteenth century, recorded that Mucianus ‘acted with full authority, for Vespasian had given him all powers’. 671 More recently, Chilver and Townend, citing the senatorial designation of Mucianus as privatus, describe Mucianus as ‘legatus Augusti, with delegated imperium’. 672 Jones states simply that Mucianus functioned as ‘de facto head of state in 70’. 673 Murison, meanwhile, affirms that ‘most of the power lay with Mucianus’, but emphasises that the amicus exercised executive power only ‘in practice’, without a legal designation of imperium. 674 Some authors, on the other hand, have raised questions about the extent of Mucianus’ personal agency while Vespasian was absent from Rome. Crook, in particular, remarks that Mucianus ‘behaved as de facto temporary head of

672 Tacitus, Hist., 4.4.: si privatus esset, cur publice loqueretur? (‘Why, if he is a private citizen, does he speak like a public man?’) Chilver and Townend interpret privatus as an indication that Mucianus held no other office other than legatus Augusti. The authors note similar distinctions made by Tacitus for Galba at Hist., 1.49.: maior privato visus dum privatus fuit… (‘he seemed greater than a private citizen while he was yet a private citizen…’) Tacitus also makes a distinction between the Emperor and the legatus at Agr., 39.2.: Id sibi maxime formidolosum, privati hominis nomen supra principem attolli… (‘It was, he thought, a very alarming thing for him that the name of a private citizen should be raised above that of the Emperor’) See Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V, 25-6.
the State’ however he also concludes that a further key element of Mucianus’ regime was the gathering of his own adherents, in the form of Aulus Alienus Caecina and Titus Clodius Eprius Marcellus. More recently, other authors have emphasized the transient nature of Mucianus’ rulership over Rome. Edwards states that Mucianus ‘serv[ed] as a transitional figure between Antonius, the unsuccessful deuotus and Flavian scapegoat, and Vespasian himself’. Rogers reiterates that Mucianus ‘was in control during the early months of A. D. 70 when he appointed commanders and eliminated any possible pretenders to the throne’, however suggests that, when Vespasian returned to the capital in Autumn of 70, Mucianus’ individual assertions of power ended decisively. De Kleijn, similarly, asserts that ‘from the beginning Mucianus presented himself as the person in charge’. She also notes, however, that there is ‘no way of knowing exactly up to when or to what extent Mucianus acted on his own discretion.’

This chapter, therefore, will examine several facets of Mucianus’ leadership in Rome and of the little that can be gleaned from the sources about the amicus’ activity after Vespasian’s arrival in the capital in July 70. In particular, it will seek to answer four key questions. Initially, how did the Senate and, indeed, Tacitus react to Mucianus’ arrival in the capital? What were the challenges Mucianus faced in Rome? What were Vespasian and Titus’ estimations of Mucianus’ behavior in Rome? Finally, what were Mucianus’ primary motives for supporting both the Flavian rebellion in 69 and the Flavian administration in early 70 AD; and, more importantly, why did Mucianus choose to assist Vespasian’s cause rather than advance his own?

677 Rogers, P.M., “Titus, Berenice and Mucianus.”: 86-95. This issue will be dealt with primarily below in ‘4.9 Vespasian, Titus and Mucianus’.
4.2 The State of Rome and Vespasian’s Confirmation

Vitellius’ death on 20 December ended the civil war, but it did not signal the end of the violence of 69.\(^{679}\) At the outset of book four of the *Historiae*, Tacitus includes a lengthy account of the victors terrorizing Rome.\(^{680}\) As noted by numerous modern historians, linguistic parallels between this section and previous books abound.\(^{681}\) During the entrance of each of the previous three emperors into the capital, Tacitus adopts the same contemptuous language. So, for instance, Tacitus repeats the word *trucidare*, suggesting cruelty and brutality, with reference to the slaughter of Nero’s soldiery just prior to Galba’s entrance into Rome, the executions of Galba and Piso and, finally, upon Primus’ appearance in the capital.\(^{682}\) In each of these instances, the leaders are almost entirely absent. Cingonius Varro and Publius Petronius Turpilianus perish before Galba has even reached the capital.\(^{683}\) Otho’s role, meanwhile, is reduced to that of an observer – the mob arms itself without his consent: *Othoni tamen armari plebem nuntiabatur*, and, thereafter, we are treated to a chaotic scene wherein Otho’s soldiers are charging out of control in the Forum.\(^{684}\) Vitellius is warned of the potential dangers of entering Rome *ut captam urben*, however makes only a token

\(^{679}\) *Interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat quam pax coeperat.* (‘When Vitellius was dead, the war had indeed come to an end, but peace had yet to begin.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.1.)


\(^{682}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.6, 1.37, 1.40, 1.43. (Babcock, C.L., “Principe Interfecto.” In S.K. Dickison, J.P. Hallet (eds.), *Rome and Her Monuments: Essays on the City and Literature of Rome in Honor of Katherine A. Geffcken* (Illinois: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers Inc.: 2000), 565., n. 4.) The word *trucidare* (‘to slaughter’) has already been used to foreshadow the death of Galba and will again appear during the historian’s account of the ‘Flavian’ terror. (Joseph, T.A., *Tacitus the Epic Successor: Virgil, Lucan, and the Narrative of Civil War in the Histories*, 48.) Mucianus, in Tacitus’ account, has already used the word to refer to death of Domitius Corbulo: *trucidatus Corbulo* – a curious usage in light of the fact that, technically speaking, Corbulo died by his own hand. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.76.)

\(^{683}\) Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.6.

\(^{684}\) ‘Otho received word that the mob was being armed’. (ibid., 1.40.)
gesture to restrain his retinue.\textsuperscript{685} As Ash notes, the leaders of Vitellius’ retinue, Caecina and Valens, are nowhere to be seen.\textsuperscript{686} In December 69, the leaders once again are almost entirely absent.\textsuperscript{687} Arrius Varus is accorded only a token remark in Tacitus’ account – now prefect of the Praetorian Guard, he is undoubtedly too busy attempting to restore order inside the camp. Antonius Primus, on the other hand, appears intermittently, and not to restore control over the rampant soldiery, but to claim his own share of the ‘spoils’ of Rome.\textsuperscript{688} Further, upon each instance of an ‘incursion’ into the capital, Tacitus ‘ups the ante’. The gruesome slaughter effected by Galba ceases upon his arrival in Rome and the worst Tacitus can say is that his entrance was ‘ill-omened’.\textsuperscript{689} In Otho’s case, the Forum ‘runs red with blood’, however the number of recorded fatalities is remarkably slim.\textsuperscript{690} The Vitellians are accorded a more severe treatment. Reacting to a perceived offence, they fall upon the country populace and cause mass-panic in the capital.\textsuperscript{691} Yet, while the Vitellians held back from wantonly attacking innocents: \textit{temperatum ab innoxiis}, Primus’ forces display no such proclivities: \textit{obtruncare nullo militum aut populi discrimine}.\textsuperscript{692} The Vitellian soldiers are able to finally exert self-control of their own accord. Primus’ forces, however, fail to even accomplish that – and the terror in the capital only ceases as the soldiers depart the city with the promise of further violence.\textsuperscript{693} This ‘crescendo’ of carnage parallels that of the wider civil

\textsuperscript{685} ‘…as if it were a captured city.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.89.)
\textsuperscript{687} \textit{duces partium accendendo civili bello acres, temperandae victoriae impares}. (‘The generals of the Flavian party, who had been energetic in kindling civil war, were unequal to the task of tempering their victory.’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.1.)
\textsuperscript{688} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.2.
\textsuperscript{689} Ibid., 1.6.
\textsuperscript{690} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.47., Babcock, C.L., “Principe Interfecto.”, 565.
\textsuperscript{691} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.88-89.
\textsuperscript{692} ‘[The Vitellian soldiers] spared the innocent crowd.’ (ibid., 2.88.), ‘[Primus’ forces] made no distinction between soldiers and civilians.’ (ibid., 4.1.)
\textsuperscript{693} ‘The soldiers leave the city in search of Lucius Vitellius. (ibid., 4.1.) Tacitus’ judgement is definitive: \textit{ubique lamenta, conclamationes et fortuna captae urbis, adeo ut Othoniani Vitellianique militis invidiosa antea petulantia}'}
war. In Tacitus’ account, the war spreads from the *castra praetoria* to Gallia, the Rhine and the eastern provinces. The latter stages are characterised by increasing numbers of rogue elements on all sides. Finally, the civil war reaches its nadir, not with the second clash at Cremona as might be expected, but with what amounts to a foreign occupation of the capital with no *princeps* in sight.

In the midst of the bloodshed in the capital, the Senate met. On the evening of 20 December, it had undoubtedly been impossible to convene the Senate. As Morgan notes, however, this merely underlines the fact that what was safe for Domitian was not safe for others, regardless of their rank. According to Tacitus, it was only during the following day when the Flavian army moved out south-eastwards from the capital to meet the advancing forces of Lucius Vitellius that the Senate came out of hiding. Thus, the Senators attended a meeting on 21 December and fell into arguments amongst themselves. Tacitus’ narrative, however, takes a strange turn here. He informs us that letters from both Vespasian and Mucianus were read out loud in the chamber – the latter of whom likely conveyed instructions about how to proceed. Mucianus’ letters, in particular, were cause for consternation. The Senate voiced several objections. Initially, as a senator himself, Mucianus was entitled to

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*desideraretur.* (‘Everywhere were lamentations, and wailings, and all the miseries of a captured city, till the licence of the Vitellianist and Othonianist soldiery, once so odious, was remembered with regret.’ – ibid.)


Morgan, M.G., *69 A.D. The Year of the Four Emperors*, 256.

As Morgan notes, Tacitus, either unwilling to draw attention to the fact or the attendant irony that Lucius Vitellius had done something to inadvertently help the populace of Rome, instead puts the Danubians organizing themselves and departing the city down to ‘frenzied pleas’ from the city they were terrorizing. (Morgan, M.G., *69 A.D. The Year of the Four Emperors*, 256.)
speak in person in the Senate, but as a private citizen, he had little right to communicate directly with the Senate by letter. Second, it was an insult to the *res publica* and *princeps* alike that Mucianus himself claimed to have conveyed the Empire to Vespasian, as if it were his to give in the first place.\(^{698}\) Finally, the Senate offered the objection that Mucianus’ criticism of Vitellius came too late and demonstrated no audaciousness in the name of liberty.\(^ {699}\) Contrary to the Senate’s negative reception to Mucianus’ letters, their reaction to Vespasian’s letters was overwhelmingly positive. In the previous chapter of the *Historiae*, Tacitus says that a letter from Vespasian, written *civilia de se et rei publicae egregia*, provoked no small amount of obsequiousness on the part of the Senate.\(^ {700}\)

The divergent reactions to the letters are somewhat paradoxical. Haynes, in her 2003 book, identifies several key disjunctions inherent in the Senate’s response. Three of these are particularly pertinent. First, if Vespasian had composed his letter without knowledge that the war was over, then, like Mucianus, Vespasian was speaking not as a *princeps* but as a ‘general in the field that defers authority to the Senate’.\(^ {701}\) But Tacitus asserts that Vespasian ‘expressed himself as an Emperor’ while simultaneously lauding the Republic and speaking modestly about himself. Second, unlike Vespasian who as yet had no knowledge of Vitellius’ death, Mucianus’ letter technically spoke in accordance with current circumstances. Even if, as a *privatus*, Mucianus was

\(^{698}\) Tacitus places these objections directly in the mouth of the Senate: ‘In a few days' time [Mucianus] might have said the very same words in his place as a senator. And even the invective against Vitellius comes too late, and is ungenerous; while certainly it is arrogance to the State and an insult to the Emperor to boast that he had the Imperial power in his hands, and made a present of it to Vespasian.’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.4.)

\(^{699}\) *ipsa quoque insectatio in Vitellium sera et sine libertate.* (‘Even his attack on Vitellius comes too late and demonstrates little independence of thought.’ – ibid.) The implicit criticism here is that Mucianus only criticised Vitellius after his defeat when he had little to fear in the way of repercussions.

\(^{700}\) ‘[He wrote] modestly about himself and magnificently of the State.’ (ibid., 4.3.)

not entitled to dispatch a letter to the Senate, by the end of the senatorial session of 20 December 69, the Senate would ratify his ability to do so.\textsuperscript{702} Furthermore, Mucianus’ assertion that he had conferred the full, independent imperatorial \textit{imperium} on Vespasian was no less than the truth. As we have seen, it was Mucianus who was responsible not only for gathering the larger part of the \textit{partes Flavianae} in the East but also for enacting a formal appeal to Vespasian to seize imperial power. Finally, the Senate’s accusation that Mucianus displayed arrogance to the state and the \textit{princeps} alike represents a ‘spurious dichotomy’. As Haynes notes, Mucianus cannot logically have offered an insult to both parties at the same time – either the Republic still persists, and therefore the \textit{princeps} is the anomaly or Vespasian is the \textit{princeps}, and therefore he and the State are contiguous.\textsuperscript{703}

These paradoxical elements in Tacitus’ account are not easy to rationalise. Haynes offers only the explanation that Mucianus, as the immediate reminder of imperial power, was simply an easy target for criticism.\textsuperscript{704} It should be emphasised that, to some extent, Vespasian’s letter followed established procedure. Gaius too maintained the façade of a \textit{privatus} at first, before taking ‘in one day all those honours which Augustus had with difficulty secured’.\textsuperscript{705} Claudius displayed similarly appropriate reticence upon the eve of his accession.\textsuperscript{706} However, Vespasian and Mucianus, at least initially, went to extra lengths to obfuscate the reality of imperial autocracy behind a republican façade. M.P. Charlesworth, several decades ago, made the curious observation that, in all appearances of Claudius’ name in the \textit{lex de imperio Vespasiani}, the prefix \textit{divus} is absent – suggesting, perhaps, that the cult, and indeed the memory of the Julio-Claudians down from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{702} Ibid., 155.
\item \textsuperscript{703} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{704} Ibid., 154-155.
\item \textsuperscript{705} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 59.3.
\item \textsuperscript{706} Ibid., 60.1.
\end{itemize}
Tiberius might be neglected and eventually forgotten.\textsuperscript{707} Notably, one of the initial measures discussed by the Senate, perhaps at Mucianus’ suggestion, will be restoration of the Capitoline temple according to its Republican heritage.\textsuperscript{708} Thereafter, significant air time in the chamber will be devoted to exposing and condemning Neronian \textit{delatores}. Tacitus implies that the senators held out genuine hope that action might be taken against the informers, however their endeavours will be curbed at every opportunity.\textsuperscript{709} These observations reveal something of the propaganda strategy employed by Vespasian and Mucianus during the early months of Flavian rule. For Vespasian, giving the impression, however speciously, that the authority of the Senate and the Principate might reach some level of parity under the new regime held significant advantages – first, to ensure the least resistance to Mucianus’ leadership in the capital and, second, to ensure that, when that ‘parity’ was inevitably contravened during the early months of 70, the blame would be firmly laid at Mucianus’ feet. However, senatorial pontification and abortive assertions of \textit{libertas} could only be tolerated briefly upon the conclusion of the civil war. Mucianus had real work to do. Hence, the \textit{amicus} was left to candidly remind the Senate that their \textit{libertas} was transitory and their endorsement of the \textit{princeps} a mere formality. In Tacitus’ text, the reality of the Senate’s situation is announced by a known \textit{delator} – that even a ‘good’ emperor would demand checks on the Senate’s freedom.\textsuperscript{710}

\textsuperscript{707} A paradigm which will subsequently not be borne out by Vespasian. (Charlesworth, M.P., “Flaviana.” \textit{Journal of Roman Studies} 27:1 (1937): 58.) Cf. below on the \textit{lex}.

\textsuperscript{708} \textit{mox deos respexere; restitui Capitolium placuit}. (‘Then they remembered the Gods. It was determined that the Capitol should be restored.’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.4.) The sentiment is only fleeting, however, and the Senate immediately returns to the task of conveying honours to the foreign occupiers of Rome.

\textsuperscript{709} \textit{signo ultionis in accusatores dato}… (‘The signal for vengeance on the informers having been thus given…’ – ibid., 4.40.) The senators will be denied access to the \textit{commentarii principales}. (ibid.) Ultimately, Mucianus will put a definitive halt to the rampant accusations. (ibid., 4.44.)

\textsuperscript{710} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.8.
Consequently, despite their objections to Mucianus’ behaviour, as they had done at the beginning of Otho’s reign in January, and at Vitellius’ in April, the Senate decided to hedge its bets. Whether the honours handed out to Vespasian and the Flavian adherents were a result of instructions directly from Mucianus is not clear. That they were granted with such little argument and in such a short amount of time, however, suggests that the Senate was adhering to a blueprint of some description. The consul designate, Decimus Valerius Asiaticus, a former adherent of Vitellius, was particularly active at the meeting of 20 December – and it was he who proposed that Vespasian be consul designate for the following year. It is likely that Mucianus, preying on Asiaticus’ anxiousness to erase any memory of the fact that he had been Vitellius’ choice for son-in-law, compelled him to act on his and Vespasian’s behalf. He would certainly have been the perfect candidate – as he had the right to be first called upon to formulate a motion in the Senate. Regardless, in Tacitus’ account, the Senate voted honours to all those who might hold influence in the capital. To Antonius Primus they granted the insignia and rank of a consular and to Cornelius Fuscus and Arrius Varus praetorian honours. Despite the relative insignificance of Mucianus’

711 In Tacitus’ words, ‘Their dislike [for Mucianus], however, was concealed; their adulation was open enough.’ (ibid., 4.4.)
713 It should be noted that Tacitus is somewhat vague about the honours handed down to Primus, Fuscus and Varus. The statement he gives is as follows: *adduntur Primo Antonio consularia, Cornelio Fusco et Arrio Varo praetoria insignia.* (ibid., 4.4.) The phrase is typically translated as: ‘On Antonius Primus were bestowed the insignia of consular rank, on Arrius Varus and Cornelius Fuscus praetorian honours.’ (Church, A.J., Brodribb, W.J. (trans.), *The History of Tacitus: Translated into English with Notes and a Map.*) Wellesley, moreover, states without qualification that ‘Antonius Primus was given the insignia of a consul, and Cornelius Fuscus and Arrius Varus those of praetors.’ (Wellesley, K., *The Year of the Four Emperors*, 206). One notes however that Tacitus has already stated that Varus assumed the office of praefectus praetorio on Primus’ suggestion. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.2.) Furthermore, Suetonius notes Fuscus’ death in Dacia as praefectus praetorio in Dacia in 86. (Suetonius, *Div. Dom.*, 6.1.) That Primus was only given the insignia (without the rank) of a consular seems unlikely within the context of Tacitus’ narrative – in which ‘by degrees [Primus] came to be thought of less weight and worth’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.80. and see below ‘4.5 Mucianus and Antonius Primus’). Primus should have objected earlier if he had only received the insignia consularia. On the balance of probability, one assumes therefore that Primus was adlected inter consularis and the latter individuals were adlected inter praetorios.
November campaign against the Dacians in Moesia, the honours bestowed upon the amicus nonetheless mirrored those given to Titus Aurelius Fulvus earlier in the year.\(^{714}\) According to Tacitus, Mucianus was granted the *ornamenta triumphalia* for an ‘expedition against the Sarmatae’ – an honour which the historian rightly indicates was farcical.\(^{715}\) To Vespasian himself, the Senate voted the titles of *Imperator*, the *nomina Augusta*, *Caesaris*, and the *tribunicia postestas*.\(^{716}\) It was also decided that the *princeps*, along with Titus, would hold the ordinary consulship for the year 70 *in abstentia*. To some extent, the terms under which the powers given to Vespasian were conveyed can be discerned from epigraphic evidence in the form of the so-called *Lex de imperio Vespasiani* or *Lex regia*.\(^{717}\) Broadly speaking, the document delineates a number of powers to be

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\(^{714}\) See no. 624.

\(^{715}\) As Tacitus baldly states: ‘In most flattering language they voted a triumph to Mucianus, a triumph for a civil war, though the expedition against the Sarmatae was the pretext.’ The Sarmatians, if Tacitus’ earlier account of Mucianus’ expedition through Moesia is to be believed, had no involvement in the conflict. (ibid., 3.46.) It is likely, as Tacitus implies, that the specifics of the triumph were immaterial. The Senate sought only to flatter.

\(^{716}\) In Tacitus’ words, the Senate voted *cuncta principibus solita* (‘all the honours usually bestowed upon the Emperors’). Thus, all of the prerogatives conferred on Vespasian conformed to the precedents set from Augustus to Claudius. (ibid., 4.4.) As Brunt highlights, given the circumstances of December 69, there is little reason to doubt Tacitus’ suggestion that Vespasian received no special powers. The alternative is to suppose that the Senate sought either to enlarge or limit Vespasian’s powers. The latter scenario seems unlikely. As Brunt observes, detractors in the Senate such as Helvidius Priscus might have found such a course of action particularly agreeable but there is no evidence that he urged the limitation of imperial authority nor, for that matter, that the Senate was disposed to taking up the independent role that he advocated. (Brunt, P.A., “Lex de Imperio Vespasiani.” *The Journal of Roman Studies* 67 (1977): 102. Cf. Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.7.) One should highlight, however, that, even if we were to assume that the powers invested in Vespasian followed precedent, this does not necessarily imply that the Senate anticipated the manner of their execution. As will be noted below, the wording of the *lex* allowed significant latitude for an amicus such as Mucianus to exercise the critical prerogatives by proxy. On the *Lex de imperio Vespasiani* in general see also Hurlet, F., “La ‘Lex de imperio Vespasiani’ et la légitimité augustéenne.” *Latomus* 52:2 (April-June, 1993): 261-280. And Pabst, A., “Annäherungen an die lex de imperio Vespasiani,” in W. Dahlheim et al. (eds.), *Xenia: Festschrift für Robert Werner, Konstanzer alt- und historische Vorträge und Forschungen*, Vol. 22 (Konstanz: Konstanz Universitätsverlag, 1989), 125-148.

\(^{717}\) *CIL*, 6.930 = *ILS*, 244. In its surviving form, this tablet resumes under eight heads and a final *sanctio* (Exemption from Penalty) a part of the legislative work of December 69. In fact, as P.A. Brunt has argued, the *Lex de imperio Vespasiani* is best understood as a preservation of part of the *senatus consultum* passed on 21 December 69 rather than a later grant enlarging Vespasian’s rights. (Brunt, P.A., “Lex de Imperio Vespasiani.”: 95.) The dating of the document to December 69 is also supported by Gagé, J., “Vespasien et la mémoire de Galba,” in *REA*, vol. 54 (1952), 290. A translation and further analysis may also be found in Hellems’ 1902 dissertation (Hellems, F.B.R., “Lex de imperio Vespasiani; a consideration of some of the constitutional aspects of the principate at Rome.” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1902).}
granted to Vespasian – several of which were already conferred upon Augustus, Tiberius and Claudius. Among other things, the law guarantees Vespasian’s right to make treaties, to convoke the Senate, to refer matters to it for counsel or decision, to recommend candidates for office, to adjust the boundaries of the pomerium and the Emperor’s exemption from ‘whatsoever laws and plebiscites were declared not to be binding on the deified Augustus, Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus, or Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus, or Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus’. Notably, the lex also guarantees the legitimacy of the acta performed by Vespasian or at his orders ‘before the passage of this law’. While seemingly odd, this clause likely served several functions. First, Vespasian had made a number of appointments at and following Berytus which required retroactive validation. Second, as Brunt observes, the clause might also assume that Vespasian’s Principate should be back-dated to early July. Certainly, he cannot have been imbued with the tribunicia postestas in July – that power could only be granted at Rome. Even so, Vespasian had already assumed the nomenclature Imperator Caesar Vespasinus Augustus –

718 Unsurprisingly, the lex omits Gaius, Nero, Otho and Vitellius. The aforementioned suffered varying forms of what would later be termed damnatio memoriae.

719 This particular clause was not an innovation. Lucius Cornelius Sulla set the precedent in 82 BC when he was termed dictator legibus scribundis et rei publicae constituentiae (‘the dictator responsible for drawing up the laws and establishing the Republic’) as a consequence of the lex Valeria. (Appian, BC., 1.99.) Appian adds, prior to his discussion of the debate in the Senate over Sulla’s dictatorship (ibid., 1.98.), that ‘everything that Sulla had done as consul, or proconsul, was ratified’. (ibid., 1.97.) cf. Plutarch, Sulla, 33.1. where Plutarch confirms that the Valerian law ratified all of Sulla’s past (pro)consular acta. In general, on Sulla and the lex Valeria see Vervaet, F., “The lex Valeria and Sulla’s empowerment as dictator (82-79 BCE).” Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 15 (2005): 37-84.

720 Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 206., cf. Tacitus, Hist., 2.82. It might also be added that the clause was required to validate any instructions given to Mucianus prior to his departure in August or later orders dispatched by Vespasian to his adherents in October, November and December 69.


722 Augustus himself regarded the tribunician power as summi fastigii vocabulum (‘the highest pinnacle [of power]’ – Tacitus, Ann., 3.56.). Thus, the Lex de imperio Vespasiani, which would have been ratified by the comitia tribuniciae potestatis, granted tribunician power, imperium and every other imperial prerogative simultaneously. (Cf. Hellem, F.B.R., “Lex de imperio Vespasiani; a consideration of some of the constitutional aspects of the principate at Rome.”, 10f. for the argument that the rights granted in the second clause refer explicitly to the tribunicia potestas. contra. Mommsen, T., Römisches Staatsrecht, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1887), 896-897. who thinks that the clause conveyed special powers separate from those of the tribunicia potestas)
as expressed by his soldiers in July and which is also recorded on epigraphic evidence dated to 69.\footnote{Tacitus, Hist., 2.80. and Isaac, B.H., Roll, I. (eds.) “A Milestone of A.D. 69 from Judaea: the Elder Trajan and Vespasian.” Journal of Roman Studies 66 (1976): 15. The editors note that Vespasian’s coins omit the tribunician title. It is also significant that Vespasian would later assume 1 July as his dies imperii. (Suet, Div. Vesp., 6.3., Tacitus, Hist., 2.79.)} As a corollary, this clause also served the purpose of invalidating at least the latter half of Vitellius’ reign.\footnote{Given that Vitellius had taken as his dies imperii 19 April (Acta Frarum Arvalium in MW, 14.), this would reduce Vitellius’ tenure as Emperor to less than a month and a half. This process of invalidation would later be formalized through the removal of both Vitellius’ and Otho’s beneficia from the record. (Brunt, P.A., “Lex de Imperio Vespasiani.”: 103., n. 45.)} Finally, and more important from Mucianus’ perspective, is the fact that such a clause was required to exonerate both Mucianus and Vespasian from the treasonable behaviour they had exhibited by minting new coinage and redistributing troops in the autumn of 69.\footnote{Tacitus, Hist., 2.82-4.}

In addition to the discussion over the honours that should be bestowed upon the partes Flavianae, Tacitus also offers us a sketch of a renewed debate between two of the great senatorial opponents of the period – Helvidius Priscus and Eprius Marcellus.\footnote{Ibid., 4.7-8. These two figures feature heavily in Tacitus’ narrative in book four.} According to the historian, the two individuals engaged in a ‘sharp altercation’ over the composition of a senatorial delegation that was to be dispatched to Vespasian.\footnote{Ibid.} Tacitus states that the opponents’ speeches were ‘long and bitter’ and ‘delivered with much vehemence on both sides’.\footnote{continuas et infestas… magnis utrimque contentionibus lactata (ibid.)} The debate illustrates, to great effect, the manner in which the relationship between the Senate and the princeps had developed over the previous year and, indeed, how the Senate will function under Mucianus. Priscus argued that the envoys should be elected as it would ensure that only men of integrity and character would be included in the delegation. While seemingly a minor issue, Tacitus implies that Priscus had ulterior motives: pertinere ad Vespasiani hominem, occurrere illi quos innocentissimos senatus
habeat, qui honestis sermonibus auris imperatoris imbuant. As Birley argues, if the Senate were to elect the candidates, ‘this is in effect an attempt to provide the emperor with a consilium’. Hence, the ‘ultimate aim of Helvidius’ motion [was], accordingly, to strengthen the authority of the Senate in relation to the new princeps. Primus’ proposal was, of course, futile. The imperial amici were already long-established, in no small part due to Mucianus’ efforts. The irony is captured in Primus’ statement: nullum maius boni imperii instrumentum quam bonos amicos esse. The cares of government will indeed be carried out by a bonus amicus, but not one chosen or endorsed by the Senate. It is doubtful, in any case, whether the Senate was up to the task of governing. Tacitus suggests that it was incapable of taking the initiative in any respect. Thus, further debate ensues over the coming chapters. We hear that ‘another contest followed’ in which Helvidius expressed dissent over the consul elect, Valerius Asiaticus, and the tribune Vulcatius Tertullinus’ decision that state expenditure, and the restoration of the Capitol, should require imperial approval. Simultaneously, Tacitus records an attack launched by Gaius Musonius Rufus on the Neronian delator Publius Egnatius Celer – which revived ‘all the hatreds of the days of the informers’. In the end, no further decisions are made and the senators’ failed attempt to exercise libertas leads only to discordia:

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729 ‘It concerns the interests of the Commonwealth, it concerns the honour due to Vespasian, that he should be met by those whom the Senate counts to be peculiarly blameless, and who may fill the Emperor's ear with honourable counsels.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.7.)


732 Cf. ‘3.8 The Meeting at Berytus’

733 ‘There can be no more effectual instrument of good government than good friends.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.7.)

734 Ibid., 4.10.
With this state of affairs – when there was discord in the Senate, anger among the conquered, no authority among the conquerors, and in the state as a whole no laws, no Emperor – Mucianus entered the city and pulled everything all at once to himself.’ (ibid., 4.11.)

That Mucianus was the deciding factor in the conclusion of the discord in Rome is implied in Tacitus’ statement at the beginning of Hist., 4.11.

Josephus, BJ., 4.654.

Ibid., 4.4.

Dio, Hist., 65.22.

Given that Mucianus cannot have been far from the capital on 20 December, however, January would seem too late. The Senate, after all, had already had time to meet for the first time, form its collective opinion of the amicus and make the most important decisions about the future of the Flavian party by 22 December. Mucianus may have waited for word of the confirmation of Vespasian’s Emperorship in the Senate – but this cannot have been more than a few days. Chilver and Townend, however, suggest that the confusion over the timing of Mucianus’ arrival in Rome may indicate some dispute over who should be personally blamed, Antonius or Mucianus, for the carnage in the city after Vitellius’ death. This interpretation, however, does not fit with the relatively restrained criticism of Mucianus in the Senate nor the lengths to which Tacitus goes to illuminate Mucianus’ initial plans for the Flavian invasion of Italy as a co-ordinate to Primus’ violent incursion in October-December.

Nevertheless, while there is no indication in Tacitus’ text that Mucianus may have been at least partially responsible for the atrocities after Vitellius’ death, it is significant that the historian introduces Mucianus’ arrival into Rome with an ominous note. Tacitus signposts his arrival in Rome with the phrase urbem ingressus. As Joseph observes, ingredior is a verb that Tacitus

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742 As previously suggested, Mucianus likely delayed his entrance into the capital. Given that the worst of the fighting must have been over by late on 21 December and, furthermore, that the key decisions had already been made, it makes little sense that Mucianus delayed a further ten or more days.
744 For all of the disparagement hurled at Mucianus upon the Senate’s receipt of his letter, there is no mention of Mucianus’ involvement in the violence in Rome. It is doubtful that Tacitus would have omitted such a criticism. See also ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’ for the discussion of Tacitus’ earlier account of Mucianus’ initial plan for carrying out the Flavian rebellion.
745 ‘[Mucianus] entered the capital…’ (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.11.)
elsewhere uses as a synonym for *adgredior* (‘to attack’). Furthermore, the other appearances of the collocation *ingredior* and *urbs* in the *Historiae* are loaded ones. Thus, for instance, Otho’s recollection of Galba’s bloody entrance into Rome, Vitellius’ march into Rome with his legions ‘as if it were a captured city’ and, finally, Primus’ arrival in the city in December 69. In Joseph’s reckoning, Tacitus’ use of ominous imagery here is deliberate. The historian utilizes Mucianus in an elaborate literary scheme in which he foreshadows the violence and intrigue, not only of Mucianus’ short tenure as head of state, but also the Principates of Vespasian, Titus and Domitian.

There is an alternative, more immediate, explanation however. Tacitus was understandably suspicious of the indeterminate nature of Mucianus’ power. Hence, earlier in the *Historiae*, Tacitus likens Mucianus’ *potentia* to that already exercised by Otho, Vitellius and their underlings. Yet, while the aforementioned individuals exercised legal authority either through the imperial prerogatives or through magistracies and high office, Mucianus assumed no office upon entering the city and, indeed, eschewed all titles until his acquisition of the consulship in July 70. This

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746 *Ut vero Latinium Latiarem ingressus est, accusator ac reus iuxta invisi gratissimum spectaculum praebebantur.* (‘As soon as he attacked Latinus Latiaris, accuser and accused, both alike objects of execration, presented a most welcome spectacle.’ – Tacitus, *Ann.*, 6.4.)


749 *magna et misera civitas, eodem anno Othonem Vitellium passa, inter Vinios Fabios Icelos Asiaticos varia et pudenda sorte agebat, donec successere Mucianus et Marcellus et magis alii homines quam alii mores.* (‘Rome, as miserable as she was great, afflicted in one year by an Otho and a Vitellius, what with the Vinii, the Fabii, the Iceli, and the Asiatici, passed through all vicissitudes of infamy, till there came Mucianus and Marcellus, and different men rather than a different morality.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.95.)

750 See ‘4.10 Mucianus’ Career After 70’. 
raises the question of how we should characterise Mucianus’ potentia in Rome. One notes, initially, that Tacitus is relatively vague about the extent of Mucianus’ authority upon entering the city – we hear only that he ‘drew all power into his own hands’.\(^{751}\) There are, however, hints contained within the Lex Vespasiani. The surviving third head of the lex reads:

\[
\text{utique, cum ex voluntae auctoritateve iussu mandatuve eius | praesenteve eo senatus habebitur,}
\]
\[
\text{omnium rerum us perinde | habeatur, servant, ac si e lege senatus edictus esset habereturque}^{752}\]

Wellesley, a number of years ago, made two key points about this passage. First, the wording of the passage appears to be intended to ward against any situation wherein the legality of the senatorial proceedings could be questioned by censorious individuals such as Priscus. Second, the clause implies that Mucianus, in Vespasian’s absence, had the right to be ‘heard and heeded’ as the mouthpiece of the Emperor. That is, the third clause ‘conveys in legal language the authority vested in his supporter by Vespasian in person’ – in Dio’s words ‘that he was called "brother" by him, and that he had authority to decide every question that he liked without the Emperor's express approval and could issue written orders by merely adding his superior's name’.\(^{753}\) In fact, the third clause is curious for a further reason. It makes no reference to precedent which implies one of two scenarios – either the clause is a Flavian innovation or it is of Neronian origins and the exemplum is absent due to official memory sanctions.\(^{754}\) If we assume the former scenario for a moment, the

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\(^{751}\) Tacitus, Hist., 4.11. Tacitus uses the same formulation (\textit{cuncta…trahere}) when relating the powers assumed by Augustus: \textit{cunctos dulcedine oti pellexit, insurgere paulatim, munia senatus magnificatum legum in se trahere}. (‘[Augustus] won over all men by the sweetness of peace, and so grew greater by degrees, while he drew unto himself the functions of the Senate, the magistrates, and the laws.’ – Tacitus, Ann., 1.2.)

\(^{752}\) ‘And that, when a meeting of the Senate shall be held in accordance with his pleasure or authority, by his order or injunction, or in his presence, all proceedings at such a meeting shall be accounted valid and observance shall be due them, just as if the meeting of the Senate had been announced and held in accordance with ordinary procedure [etc.]’

\(^{753}\) Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 207. citing Dio, Hist., 66.2.

\(^{754}\) Brunt believes the clause is of Neronian origins. (Brunt, P.A., “Lex de Imperio Vespasiani.”: 103-104.) This is not a necessary conclusion, however – as has been acknowledged by later authors. (Cf. Peachin, M., “Exemplary
clause makes particular sense as an addendum to the previous clause, which explicitly sets out the rights of the emperor with reference to convening the Senate. More specifically, the third clause functions as a means of legitimising the exercise, by an authorised deputy such as Mucianus, of the preceding powers in the absence of the emperor – by means of an official mandate or simply by virtue of the latter’s status as an imperial amicus. The alternative is to suppose that the third clause is a redundant elaboration on the right already delineated at the beginning of the second clause: senatum habere.

In light of these observations, Tacitus’ earlier statement that the Senate voted powers to Vespasian cuncta principibus solita becomes more significant. In fact, Tacitus’ complaint is explicitly set out at 4.11. He states that Mucianus ‘ceased not, with his magnificence, his proud bearing, and his guards, to grasp at the power, while he waived the titles of Empire’. In a broad sense, Mucianus’ role should have been equivalent to that of Lucius Salvius Otho Titianus (cos. ord. 52, suff. II 69),


755 utique ei senatum habere, rationem facere, remittere senatus | consulta per relationem dicessionemque facere liceat, | ita uti liciuit divo Aug(uasto), Ti(berio) Iulio Caesari Aug(uasto), Tiberio) Claudio Caesari | Augusto Germanico. (‘And that it shall be lawful for him to convoke the Senate, to propose a matter for discussion, to transmit to it a question submitted to him and to procure a decree of the Senate by the proposal of a bill and a division of the house, as it was lawful for the deified Augustus, for Tiberius Julius Caesar Augustus and for Tiberius Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus.’)

756 The distinction drawn between meetings of the Senate convened cum ex voluntate auctoritateve iussu mandatuve (‘in accordance with his pleasure or authority, by his order or injunction’) and those convened praesente eo (‘in his presence’) is significant. It might be inferred that the clause was intended precisely to cover situations wherein the princeps was absent and could not be immediately consulted for decisions that required his authority. This is possibly the context for Dio’s comment that Mucianus possessed Vespasian’s seal and could use it to authorise documents. That is, he could submit written requests (rationem facere) to the Senate in Vespasian’s name. (Dio, Hist., 66.2.) Given the distance between Rome and Alexandria, a method along these lines would have been critical to expedite urgent business.

757 ‘To convoke the Senate’. Hence, the third clause does not actually convey any additional rights to Vespasian beyond those already established through precedent in the second clause – that is, Vespasian is already accorded the right of convening the Senate according to his own pleasure.

758 Tacitus, Hist., 4.3. Strictly speaking, the rights conferred upon Vespasian’s person followed precedent. The specific innovation Tacitus objects to concerns the manner of their execution – by an individual who was not the princeps.
earlier in the year – and yet the latter individual is accorded no criticism in Tacitus’ account.\(^759\)

That can be accounted for by Titianus’ relatively short tenure.\(^760\) On the other hand, it is difficult not to notice the parallels between Tacitus’ objection to Mucianus and the scathing criticism afforded by Dio to the Imperial freedman, Helius. As the latter historian informs us, Nero left the freedman in charge of the capital such that he could confiscate, banish, or execute, ‘before even consulting Nero’. The wording of Dio’s pronouncement implies that Helius received a formal endowment of discretionary powers. Hence, ‘the Roman domain was at that time a slave to two emperors at once’ and ‘the freedman of Claudius was emulating Caesars’.\(^761\) Surely, Mucianus, a *consularis*, must have been more palatable than a Helius, yet, this is not the impression given by Tacitus. It may be inferred that Tacitus’ distaste stems from several factors. First, from the innovation implied in clause three of the *lex* – namely, that Mucianus, as a virtual embodiment of Vespasian’s *auctoritas*, held the right to convene an extraordinary meeting of the Senate. Second, that, in accordance with the rights set out in the second clause, Mucianus could exercise effective control over the proceedings of the Senate by proposing matters of discussion in Vespasian’s name and procuring senatorial decrees through a division of the house.\(^762\) Third, one might also point to the provisions contained within the fourth clause of the *lex*. This latter clause, which again makes no reference to precedent, endows Vespasian with the right of extraordinary commendation of the offices of state, including its highest magistracy.\(^763\) The peculiarly vague language of the clause

\(^{759}\) Titianus’ *consulare imperium* had ceased by the beginning of March. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.77.) He managed the affairs of the capital and the Empire during Otho’s absence later in the month. (ibid., 1.90.) The lack of criticism is a somewhat unexpected turn of events, given the severe treatment accorded to Titianus elsewhere. (Tacitus, *Agr.*, 6.)

\(^{760}\) Otho sent for his brother late in March and gave him chief command of the war. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.77.)

\(^{761}\) Dio, *Hist.*, 63.11-12.

\(^{762}\) In practice, Mucianus ceded the right of first address to Domitian except in cases where Antonius Primus or Arrius Varus were involved. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.44, 4.68.)

\(^{763}\) *utique, quos magistratum, postestatem, imperium curationemve cuius rei petentes senatori populoque Romano commendaverit, quibusque sufragationem suam dederit, promiserit, eorum comitis quibusque extra ordinem ratio habeatur* (‘And that, whatsoever candidates for office, power, authority, or charge of any matter he shall have
implies significant latitude with reference to its execution. Accordingly, Mucianus will exploit this latitude on more than one occasion to appoint or exclude candidates from office – most notably including Arrius Varus.

Thus, in contrast with the powers given to Vespasian, which, as Tacitus takes pains to point out, followed precedent, Mucianus was an anomaly. The impotence of the Senate during the military struggles of 69 was objectionable enough, but Otho and Vitellius at least retained some measure of constitutional legitimacy through the imperial powers. Mucianus had not been officially imbued with either independent imperium or the tribunicia potestas, yet as Vespasian’s viceroy he nonetheless retained complete discretion to propose, control or nullify the proceedings of the Senate. In effect, Mucianus was covering all bases. De iure, as Vespasian’s proxy, he could claim formal authority over the Senate with the attendant prerogatives of senatum habere, relationem facere, relationem remittere and commendatio. De facto leadership would be a trickier proposition. Mucianus lacked the military clout to enforce his authority in the capital. If he arrived in Rome with a force at all, it cannot have been sizeable. Potentially, he could rely on the legates recommended to the Roman Senate and people, and to whomsoever he shall have given or promised his support, account shall be taken extraordinarily of them at any comitia whatsoever.’

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764 The phrase quibusque suffragationem suam dederit, promiserit, eorum (‘and to whomsoever he shall have given or promised his support’) appears to be worded such that commendations promised at Berytus (and perhaps earlier – cf. Josephus, BJ, 4.630.) could be fulfilled without challenge. The specific right to extraordinarily commend a consul could well have been a Neronian innovation. Certainly, it cannot have been Claudian. Cf. Hellems, F.B.R., “Lex de imperio Vespasiani; a consideration of some of the constitutional aspects of the principate at Rome.”, 14. who assigns the right to Vespasian. contra. Mommsen, T., Römisches Staatsrecht, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1887), 923. who believes it was a Neronian innovation.

765 Tacitus, Hist., 4.68. The case of Varus is significant because Tacitus implies that his ejection from office took place entirely at Mucianus’ discretion: eum Mucianus pulsum loco (‘Mucianus ejected him from office’).

766 The right to convene the Senate, ‘the right to propose a matter for discussion’, ‘the right to withdraw a matter submitted to the Senate’, ‘the right of commendation of the elective offices of the state’.

767 There is no mention of troops arriving with Mucianus in Rome in Tacitus’ text. VI Ferrata, we know, had remained in Moesia to deal with the Dacian question. (See Appendix III: The Location of Mucianus’ Base Camp in Moesia’) On the other hand, Josephus claims that Mucianus arrived with an ‘army’ in the capital. (Josephus, BJ, 6.654.) It is likely that Mucianus was escorted by a relatively small force including only the remaining detachments of IV Scythica, V Macedonica, X Fretensis, XII Fulminata and XV Apollinaris.
of VII Claudia and XI Claudia, but the larger portion of the occupying Danubian army lay in the hands of Antonius Primus and his subordinates.\textsuperscript{768} Mucianus, therefore, required the support of the praetorians and the people. Further, he would have to dispense with troublemakers and potential political rivals such as Antonius Primus and Helvidius Priscus and fill the most important offices of state with trusted men.

\textbf{4.4 Mucianus and the Praetorians}

Upon entering Rome, Mucianus found himself faced with a myriad of crises stemming from the conclusion of the civil war. First and foremost among these was the enormous number of soldiers who now occupied the capital. Apart from the Danubian legions which had marched through northern Italy, including no less than four legions, there was also the remainder of the Vitellian forces which had not already been dispatched to Moesia or Pannonia.\textsuperscript{769} More concerning, however, was the extraordinary size of the Praetorian Guard.\textsuperscript{770} The precise number of men involved defies estimates. Nevertheless, it is clear that, by the beginning of 70, there were three main groups claiming service in the praetorianam militiam. First, the members of the nine cohorts of Othonian praetorians discharged by Vitellius earlier in 69.\textsuperscript{771} These men had fought on the side of the Flavians at Cremona and, undoubtedly, had received promises of reinstatement from Vespasian or Mucianus earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{772} Second, the remainder of Vitellius' sixteen cohorts,
including men from both of his legions, the auxilia, and perhaps also some of the earlier praetorians. Finally, there were also men from Antonius Primus’ legions who had been promised service in the Guard. Possibly, also, Mucianus might have anticipated the addition of further praetorians drawn from his own legions and those of Vespasian at a later date. Apart from the risk that such a large concentration of soldiers from disparate factions posed to the stability of the capital, the size of the Guard represented an untenable financial burden. State finances were already in a dire state and Mucianus, like Otho and Vitellius before him, had to contend with the exorbitant donative promised in Galba’s name.

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773 Ibid., 2.93., 3.55.
775 Hence, Tacitus’ statement: sed immensa pecunia tanta vis hominum retinenda erat. (‘But the money required for retaining in the service so vast a body of men was immensely large.’ – Tacitus, Hist., 4.46.) At this point in time, annual pay for the praetorians was 750 denarii per annum, the soldiers of the urban cohorts 375 and the legionaries 225. Payment was made in three instalments per year. (Domaszewski, A. von., “Der Truppenfeld der kaiserzeit.” Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher 10 (1900): 220f., Durry, M., Les Cohortes Prétoriennes, 264f., Brunt, P.A., “Pay and Superannuation in the Roman Army.” Papers of the British School at Rome 18 (1950): 55f.)
776 Nymphidius Sabinus initiated a trend by promising, in Galba’s name, the sum of 7,500 denarii for each praetorian and 1,250 for each legionary. (Plutarch, Galba., 2.) Murison places the final donative at some 180 million HS. (Murison, C.L., Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies, 57, n. 37.) A reference point may be found in Macrinus’ estimation of the entire cost of the army under Caracalla – which amounted to 280 million HS. (Dio, Hist., 79.36.) The donative in 68 was the largest ever promised. Augustus only gave 5,000 denarii to each of his soldiers in 42 BC. (Dio, Hist., 47.42.) Claudius and Nero each gave 3,750 denarii. (Suetonius, Div. Claud., 10., Tacitus, Ann., 12.69., Dio, Hist., 51.3.) Galba refused to pay any reparations at all. (Tacitus, Hist., 1.18.) Otho paid no donative until mutiny forced his hand (for the riot of the Urban Cohort XVII, ibid., 1.80-82., Suetonius, Div Oth., 8., Plutarch, Otho, 3.). Vitellius, too, could not pay a donative to the additional troops he had brought with him to Italy. (ibid., 2.97.) The result was the utter breakdown of discipline among the soldiers in the capital (Tacitus, Hist., 2.93-94.). Vespasian apparently only offered a modest donative. (ibid., 2.82., Dio, Hist., 66.10.) Undoubtedly, accounting for additional rewards promised by Vitellius, the donative still owing to the Othonian legions in addition to the regular payment – which had itself been inflated by the expansion of the urban cohorts and Guard, the final amount owing was utterly untenable. The feeble state of the imperial finances is epitomised by Vespasian’s assertion, at the beginning of his principate, that he required 40,000 million HS to carry on the government. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 16.) His methods for recouping the money were ruthlessly efficient. (Levick, B., Vespasian, 95f.)
Mucianus took immediate action. According to Tacitus, he personally entered the camp to examine the claims of each individual man. Subsequently, he divided the soldiers into two main groups. The victorious Danubian troops, who wore their proper insignia and arms, he drew together in a tight formation. The Vitellians, who were 'brought forth almost naked’, he divided into sub-groups based on the provincial origins of the legions in which they had been included. The Vitellian soldiers, doubtless worried about recriminations from the Danubians, reacted in a predictable fashion. According to Tacitus, frozen with fear at the prospect of a slaughter effected by the ‘hostile array’ before them, they entreated Mucianus and the Emperor to spare them from an ignominious fate.\footnote{Tacitus, \emph{Hist.}, 4.46.} This was clearly the intended effect. Mucianus may have had little to fear from the remainder of the Vitellian cohorts or, for that matter, the Senate itself, but the inhabitants of the capital were a different matter altogether. During the final days of his reign, the population of Rome had substantially supported Vitellius – even successfully staving off the Emperor’s abdication on 18 December.\footnote{See ibid., 4.68. for the local populace allegedly barring Vitellius’ passage to a private house and instead forcing him to return to the palace. Note also in 4.69. the apprehension of Sabinus and his colleagues over the ‘enthusiasm of the populace and of the threatening attitude of the German cohorts.’} Only a few days later, encouraged by Cerealis’ defeat, a mob of city residents armed themselves in preparation for a Flavian incursion north of the city – before even the Vitellian soldiers had organized their defence.\footnote{Ibid., 3.80.} It would not be surprising if the local population continued to distrust Vespasian even after the demise of Vitellius. After all, as de Kleijn notes, they knew almost nothing of the new Emperor, save that he was the brother of the former praefectus urbi and that his adherents had ostensibly been responsible for the sacking of two cities.\footnote{De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome.”; 441.} Consequently, Mucianus resorted to a strategy of dissimulation. By giving the appearance of impending decimation in the praetorian camp, he could terrify the remaining Vitellians into
submission and, subsequently, adopt a policy of leniency – thus ensuring that the remaining Vitellian element of the guard might be nullified without outside repercussions.\textsuperscript{781} If Tacitus is to be believed, the \textit{amicus’} efforts were remarkably successful. None of the reparations promised by the preceding emperors were paid, nor was there any dissent when Domitian entered the camp only a few days later. Dio adds that the soldiers were paid a stipend of twenty-five \textit{denarii} – an amount which accounted for only one-third of a regular payment for a legionary, let alone a praetorian.\textsuperscript{782} Furthermore, through a series of honourable discharges and dismissals for misconduct, Mucianus reduced the size of the Guard to nine cohorts, apparently without incident.\textsuperscript{783}

\textsuperscript{781} The opinion that Mucianus was deliberately evoking the practice of decimation is given by Ash, R., \textit{Ordering Anarchy: Leaders and Armies in Tacitus’ Histories}, 49-50. and noted also by De Kleijn, G., ”C. Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome.”: 443, n. 54. Vitellius’ earlier tactic of simply granting an honourable discharge was clearly insufficient. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.67.) The same cohorts joined the Flavian cause later in the year. (ibid., 2.67.) So Mucianus resorted to more stringent measures. By the imperial period, decimation was a rare and archaic punishment (see Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, 3.21. who dubs it ‘exceptional…and derived from old tradition’), however, Galba had conveniently revived the punishment in recent times. (Suetonius, \textit{Galba}, 12., Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.5-6., Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 64.3.) Galba’s example, too, had indicated that only the barest of justifications was required for decimation. (Cf. Phang, S.E., \textit{Roman Military Service: Ideologies of Discipline in the Late Republic and Early Principate} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128.) Undoubtedly, Mucianus’ behaviour in the \textit{castra praetoria} was precisely planned to evoke Galba’s precedent. Hence, Tacitus’ deliberate insertion of the statement that the Vitellian cohorts had fled from Bovillae to hide in the capital and its surrounding neighbourhoods appears as a potential pretext for cowardice and, thus, legitimate grounds for decimation. Cf. Suetonius, \textit{Div Aug.}, 24., Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 49.38. for Augustus’ decimation of cohorts that had fled from battle.

\textsuperscript{782} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 65.22. Cf. no. 775.

\textsuperscript{783} Chilver and Townend regard Mucianus’ efforts as a considerable feat. Epigraphic evidence from the late 70s AD indicates a reduction of the guard to nine cohorts. (Diploma of 76 AD – \textit{ILS}, 1993 = \textit{MW}, 400.), Mucianus seemingly selected the members of the guard from the Flavian, Othonian and Vitellians alike – perhaps to ensure little chance of a unified purpose among the new cohorts (for the remaining Vitellians see \textit{ILS}, 2034-5.). (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., \textit{A Historical Commentary on Tacitus ‘Histories IV and V}, 57.) It is interesting to note that Suetonius seemingly abstracts Mucianus from the process of dealing with the praetorians – he instead asserts that, after he returned to Rome in mid-to-late 70, Vespasian ‘disbanded many of Vitellius’ soldiers, and punished others.’ (\textit{Div. Vesp.}, 8.2.) The historian does not say whether the praetorians were included in this group, suffice to say that Vespasian may only have been able to remove the remaining Vitellians without incident thanks to the earlier efforts of Mucianus.
4.5 Mucianus and Antonius Primus

Mucianus applied a similar philosophy to another problem – the continued influence of Antonius Primus in the capital. As previously highlighted, the enmity between Mucianus and Primus is well documented by Tacitus. It has been argued by some authors that the animosity between the two individuals had grown over time, and that they had perhaps been colleagues under Corbulo’s command. This is likely an overstatement. Tacitus invariably suggests that Primus only made the fatal mistake of incurring Mucianus’ wrath after Cremona when the former individual overstepped the boundaries of Mucianus’ good grace. Mucianus initially tolerated Primus’ rash decision to disregard Vespasian’s order to remain at Aquileia – if only because of Primus’ initial success. He would not, on the other hand, allow Primus to treat the Pannonian legions as suae, nor, for that matter, allow him to hand out donatives at his own discretion:

*ut captam Italiam persultare, ut suas legiones colere; omnibus dictis factisque viam sibi ad potentiam struere. utque licentia militem imbueret interfectorum centurionum ordines legionibus offerebat.*

That he did so threatened the compact Flavian leadership group established prior to Carmel and following Berytus – a group which, as of the end of 69, only included Vespasian, Titus and

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785 De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Leader in a Time of Crisis.”: 13. citing Wellesley (Wellesley, K., *Cornelius Tacitus. The Histories. Book III*, 218-9.), suggests that Primus may have been *primus pilus* of *III Gallica* during Corbulo’s Armenian campaign of 62-3. Even if there were any direct evidence to support this claim, it would nonetheless have been too late for Mucianus and Primus to serve together.
786 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.49. See also 3.53. where Tacitus explicitly states that ‘there arose a deadly feud, cherished by Antonius with frankness, by Mucianus with reserve, and therefore with the greater bitterness.’
787 And, by extension, the fact that Mucianus could appropriate Primus’ success for his own ends once he reached Rome.
788 ‘He swept through Italy as if it were a conquered country and caressed the legions as if they were his own; by all his words and acts he sought to pave for himself the way to power. To imbue the army with a spirit of licence, he offered to the legions the commissions of the centurions killed in the war.’ (ibid., 3.49.)
Mucianus. Primus’ reaction to Mucianus’ aforementioned attempts to sow distrust of the general among the Flavian legati, while understandable, only furthered the amicus’ suspicions. According to Tacitus, Primus responded aggressively, and may have outwardly insulted Vespasian: litteras ad Vespasionum composuit iactantius quam ad principem.789 Furthermore, a rumour circulating in Rome after Mucianus’ arrival that Primus intended to support the claim of another to imperial power – Scribonianus Crassus, while of doubtful validity, only confirmed in the amicus’ mind that Primus had become an intolerable nuisance.790 In short, Primus had revealed himself to be both insubordinate and untrustworthy, although there is no sign in the sources of overt disloyalty.791 Dispensing with Primus, however, would be a difficult proposition. As rightly noted by Nicols, condonation would be unfeasible both because of Primus’ ‘stubborn independence’ and because it was convenient, from Mucianus’ perspective, to lay the blame for the destruction wrought by the Flavian forces in Italy at Primus’ feet.792

At the outset of Tacitus’ account of the Flavian domination of Rome, the historian unequivocally states that Mucianus’ arrival broke the power of Primus. This does not signal however, that Primus

789 ‘He wrote a letter to Vespasian in terms more arrogant than should be addressed to an Emperor.’ (ibid., 3.52-3.)
790 Tacitus, Hist., 4.39. That Tacitus prefaces the rumour with the words et ferebatur would seemingly indicate that it was not to be believed.
791 The charge of overt disloyalty, as cited by Nicols, is a stretch. While Primus certainly acted without regard for the wishes of both Mucianus and Vespasian, there is no reliable evidence to suggest that the legatus intended to appropriate the ‘Flavian’ victory to establish a rival party – outside of the rumour briefly cited by Tacitus. (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 145.)
792 Ibid., 144. The charge in the sources that Primus allowed discipline to degenerate in the Flavian forces, and that he was therefore responsible for the depredation of Italy and the death of Sabinus, while of unquestionable concern to Vespasian, was likely ancillary to Mucianus’ misgivings about the legatus. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.49.) For one, Mucianus probably considered Sabinus’ death to be a convenient outcome – Tacitus himself suggests that, had Sabinus survived, he and Mucianus would have been at loggerheads: caedem eius laetam fuisse Muciano accepimus. ferebant plerique etiam paci consultum, dirempta aemulatione inter duos, quorum alter se fratrem imperatoris, alter consortem imperii cogitaret. (‘I have heard that his death gratified Mucianus, and many indeed asserted that the interests of peace were promoted by the removal of the rivalry between these two men, one of whom felt himself to be the brother of the Emperor, while the other thought himself his colleague.’ – ibid., 3.75.) On the other hand, Mucianus, by virtue of the fact that he had no involvement in Cremona and arrived in Rome after the worst of the fighting had ceased, might easily have used Primus as a scapegoat.
ceased to be a powerful element in Rome, nor that Mucianus took action against the legate immediately. Much like he did with the praetorians, Mucianus took a more considered approach. His action against Primus was swift and uncompromising, yet he retained a façade of appreciation for the legate’s achievements on the Flavians’ behalf. Tacitus would not be fooled. From Mucianus’ perspective, potential opposition within the Danubian camp was not an issue – he had done sufficient work beforehand to ensure no remonstration on the part of the legates Dillius Aponianus of III Gallica, Annius Bassus of XI Claudia and Plotius Griphus of VII Claudia. The remaining Danubian legati – especially those who might have supported Primus, or whose loyalties were suspect, such as Vedius Aquila of XIII Gemina, Numisius Lupus of VIII Augusta and Vipstanus Messalla, formerly of VII Claudia, could easily be rendered politically insignificant. On the other hand, III Gallica, the very legion which Vespasian had considered

793 igitur Mucianus, quia propalam opprimi Antonius nequibat, multis in senatu laudibus cumulatum secretis promissis onerat... (‘Therefore, Mucianus, seeing that Antonius could not be openly crushed, heaped many praises upon him in the Senate, and loaded him with promises in secret…’ – ibid., 4.39.)

794 See here the discussion in ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’ and Tacitus, Hist, 3.52. Only Plotius Griphus is mentioned by name as having sent communiqués decrying Primus’ behavior to Vespasian. The other candidates, however, might easily be deduced from the honours handed out by Vespasian from 70 onwards. Aponianus’ career, in particular, advanced rapidly under Vespasian. He was consul suffect before 73, held a governorship over an unknown province (MW, 269.) and is attested as curator riparum et alvei Tiberis for the period 1 July-Dec. 73 (CIL, 4.31547 = ILS, 5928.). (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 201.)

795 That none of these latter generals appear to have reached the consulship or any further honours after 70 AD is probably no accident. (Nics, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 144-145.) Vedius Aquila (PIR1, V, 212.), apparently still in control of XIII Gemina in late 69, despite the defiance of his troops after the first battle of Bedriacum (Tacitus, Hist., 2.44.), disappears completely from any historical record thereafter. The legate of VIII Augusta, Numisius Lupus (ibid., 3.10.) was a decorated officer, having acquired the ornamenta consularis for his efforts against the Rheoxolani, (ibid., 1.79.) and yet he too disappears from the sources after 70. Possibly, he also held familial ties to Numisius Rufus, the commander of the Vitellian legion XVI Gallica, which likely did not count as a point in his favour. (PIR2, N, 210., Hofmann, H., RE, vol. 17.2 (1937), 1399, Nics, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 136, cf. Syme, R., “Partisans of Galba.”: 468, n. 48. for the origins of the Numisii.) Vipstanus Messalla, who replaced Lucius Tettius Julianus (cos suff. 83) as legate of VII Claudia (and was then probably replaced in turn by Plotius Griphus), served as a principal source for Tacitus’ account of Cremona (Tacitus, Hist., 3.28., cf. Syme, R., Tacitus, 177.) as well as a central character in the author’s Dialogus – and his vigorous defence of his brother Marcus Aquilius Regulus earned high praise from Tacitus. (ibid., 4.42.) That no further honours for the legate are cited in the sources, despite his seeming ability as both an orator and general, has prompted much speculation. (cf. Cornell, T.J., et al. (eds.), The Fragments of the Roman Historians, 566-567., Rudich, V., Political Dissidence Under Nero: The Price of
sua, and Primus’ own legion VII Galbiana might prove more problematic. Both still resided in Italy and both supported Primus. While Aponianus might have been at the helm of III Gallica, Tacitus emphasizes that it was Arrius Varus, Primus’ key supporter from August 69 onward, who ruled the hearts and minds of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{796} Thus, Mucianus formulated a multi-stage plan. Initially, he set about nullifying any semblance of military support for Primus in Italy without raising any suspicions among the soldiery. According to Tacitus, Mucianus first spoke encouragingly of Primus’ achievements in public, and suggested that Primus might occupy the recently vacated governorship of Hispania Citerior in private.\textsuperscript{797} Second, Tacitus asserts that Mucianus, perhaps in an attempt to usurp Primus’ closest supporters, handed out an unknown number of tribuneships and prefectures to the latter’s amici. Finally, Mucianus took concerted action – dispatching both VII Galbiana and III Gallica to Pannonia and Syria respectively in January of 70. This latter action was undoubtedly carried out under the guise of necessity – the sole defence of Pannonia at this time being the remnants of XXI Primigenia and that of Syria only consisting of the remaining elements of IV Scythica.\textsuperscript{798}

\textsuperscript{796} On Varus’ contributions to Primus’ campaign in Italy see Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 3.6., 3.16., 3.61. As Tacitus observes, Primus and Varus alike were ‘distinguished by great achievements and by the attachment of the soldiery’. Furthermore, the historian notes that \textit{VII Galbiana} was still closely attached to Primus, while \textit{III Gallica}, as previously highlighted, is described, even as late as December 69, as \textit{familiaris Arrio Varo miles} (‘troops who were friendly towards Arrius Varus’). (ibid., 4.39)

\textsuperscript{797} Ibid. The former governor, Cluvius Rufus, while seemingly still retaining his provincial command, had left Spain to clear himself of charges of plotting against Vitellius (ibid., 2.65.) and he had remained among Vitellius’ close circle of advisors. (ibid., 3.65.) It is unclear whether Mucianus had the right to grant such an appointment to Primus. As was suggested by our earlier discussion, the \textit{lex Vespasiani} includes a provision for earlier appointments effected by Vespasian in clause IV. (\textit{CIL}, 6.930 = \textit{ILS}, 244.) Given that neither Vespasian nor Mucianus foresaw Primus’ actions, however, it seems unlikely that express permission had come directly from the Emperor. In any case, Tacitus implies that the offer was not intended to be taken seriously.

\textsuperscript{798} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.39. Of the three Syrian legions which Mucianus had controlled during his tenure in the province, only the elements of IV Scythica which he did not appropriate for his march remained. \textit{VI Ferrata} still remained in Moesia, while \textit{XII Fulminata} had departed for Judaea under Titus.
The second phase of Mucianus’ plan, meanwhile, had a more insidious objective – dissolving or rendering superficial the personal and political ties between Primus and the Flavian house. Mucianus enacted two further measures. First, in the summer of 70, Mucianus, overruling the objections of Domitian – who had become friends with Arrius Varus, deprived Varus of the office of prefect of the Praetorian Guard in favour of a consolatory appointment as praefectus annonae.799

The significance of Varus’ change of prefectures, while not explicitly laid out by Tacitus, is apparent from the surrounding context. The historian intimates a connection between Domitian’s new-found friendship with Varus and the young Caesar’s desire to exercise autonomous authority in the capital. Domitian might have hoped to establish an alliance with Varus and, by extension, Primus himself with the intention of over-ruling Mucianus’ authority when the latter individual departed Rome to assist with the suppression of the Germanic rebels.800 Mucianus’ appointment of Marcus Arreclus Clemens (cos suff. 73, II 85) to the praetorian prefecture, while not objectionable from Domitian’s perspective, ensured first that the restructured Praetorian Guard would remain loyal to the Flavian house and second, that any contentious behavior from Domitian would immediately be reported to Mucianus.801 Unsurprisingly, then, the final measure which

799 Tacitus, Hist., 4.68.
800 Thus, Tacitus’ comment that ‘men feared the ungoverned passions of Domitian, while Primus Antonius and Varus Arrius were also, as I have said, objects of suspicion.’ Tacitus records this statement in the same context as he gives Mucianus’ fears about Domitian – that he ‘might be led by the recklessness of youth or by bad advisers to compromise at once the prospects of war and of peace’. (ibid., 4.68.) On the insurgency in Germania and Domitian’s energetic attempts to assist with an expedition to the region see below ‘4.6 Mucianus and the Provincial ‘Usurpers’’ and ‘4.8 Mucianus and Domitian.’
801 Subsequently, as will be detailed below, Mucianus took the step of removing Domitian from Rome altogether. As Tacitus tells us, he kept Domitian close at hand during his march north and closely supervised the appointment of his attendants. (Tacitus, Hist., 4.68. and ‘4.8 Mucianus and Domitian’) The significance of Mucianus’ choice of Clemens for the prefecture derives primarily from the fact that he was both connected to the Flavian house by virtue of his sister Arrecina Tertulla’s earlier marriage to Titus and from the fact that Domitian held a particular affection for the man. Clemens may also have been attached to Vespasian’s family on the paternal side. The Emperor’s grandmother bore the cognomen Tertulla – a cognomen also held by Clemens’ sister and mother. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 2., and Div. Tit., 4.) He was thus the perfect candidate to both assuage Domitian’s misgivings about the removal of Varus while
Mucianus took against Primus was to sever the general entirely from Domitian’s inner circle – the amicus ‘would not suffer Antonius Primus to be taken into the number of Domitian's attendants, for he felt uneasy at his popularity with the troops, and feared the proud spirit of the man, who could not endure an equal, much less a superior’. Thus, while the initial phase of Mucianus’ plan had rendered any prospect of usurpation on the part of Primus unlikely, a notion which Primus had probably not considered seriously in any case, the second phase rendered any hope of further advancement or honours uncertain. As Tacitus observes, ‘by degrees he came to be thought of less weight and worth, though his friendship with the Emperor to all appearance remained the same’. Predictably, Primus reacted poorly to these developments. He dispatched a letter to Vespasian decrying those who inveighed against him, and reminded the Emperor in no uncertain terms that he had been responsible for the termination of the civil war. Despite appearances to the contrary, no intervention came from Vespasian. The final success of Mucianus’ scheme is revealed by Martial, who indicates that Primus was eventually forced to retire without further honours to Tolosa where he would reside for the remainder of his life.

simultaneously remaining un-swayed by any contentious requests from the Caesar. (Tacitus, Hist., 4.68., Suetonius, Div. Dom., 11.)

802 Tacitus, Hist., 4.80.
803 Ibid.
804 Ibid. It is curious that Mucianus name does not appear explicitly among Primus’ complaints – only Caecina rates a mention as a ‘captive and prisoner of war’. This is indicative of Mucianus’ strategy. Mucianus shielded himself from criticism by refraining from publicly censuring Primus or taking action against his supporters that could not be readily justified. Even so, as Wellesley points out, through ‘manipulating public opinion by court scribblers’ and allowing Primus himself to engage in outspoken and impatient complaint, the amicus nonetheless provoked an overwhelmingly negative response towards Primus’ behaviour from the other leading members of the state. (Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 213.)
805 While it is unlikely that Mucianus was acting directly on the orders of Vespasian, given that Tacitus suggests that the amicus set about dealing with Primus’ influence as soon as he entered Rome, he had undoubtedly dispatched letters earlier detailing his plan for neutralising Primus. If Vespasian had objected, the scheme would have been cut short. On the contrary, Vespasian’s policy for dealing with Primus seems to have mirrored Mucianus’ – namely, that in public he would continue to express his appreciation for Primus’ efforts on the Flavians’ behalf while simultaneously sanctioning in private Primus’ abstraction from any form of authority in the capital.
Apart from the problem of Flavian agitators in the capital, there was also the issue of ensuring loyalty to the Flavians in the provinces and, moreover, warding against further usurpers in Germania and Britannia. As previously discussed, before Mucianus set out on his march in August 69, at a meeting in the city of Berytus, Mucianus, Titus and Vespasian met to determine the responsibilities that would be assigned to each man. As de Kleijn observes, they must have discussed the extent of Vitellius’ influence over the provinces in the north-west of the Empire and in Africa – and the manner in which these provinces might be brought under the Flavian banner. Gallia and Hispania were uncertain factors. The legions in Hispania had served under Otho, the residents of Gallia had supported Galba, however Tacitus suggests that their allegiances were wavering until October 69. Even so, when fortune swayed away from Vitellius, they did not hesitate to come over to the Flavians. The legions of Britannia, meanwhile, offered superficial support to Vitellius yet, probably at the behest of Vettius Bolanus, they dispatched reinforcements tardily, and finally, thanks to the direct intervention of Vespasian’s former legion, II Augusta, Britain too attached itself to Vespasian. The sole recorded dissent among the British legions seems to have stemmed primarily from the twentieth legion, Valeria Victrix, and perhaps also from the legion IX Hispana. Mucianus, for his part, only considered the legio XX Valeria Victrix as a

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808 Illyricis exercitibus palam desciscentibus, ceteris fortunam secuturis. (‘The armies of Illyricum were already in open revolt, and the rest were waiting only the signal of success.’ – Tacitus, Hist., 2.86, cf. 2.97.)
809 Tacitus, Hist., 3.13., 3.44.
810 Ibid., 3.41., 3.44. The legion was later incorporated into Primus’ legions after Cremona (ibid., 3.50.)
811 Ibid., 3.44., Tacitus, Agr., 7. Of the four legions stationed in Britannia, legio II Augusta seems to have harboured a sense of allegiance to Vespasian even decades after the Emperor’s service in the region in 41. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.44.) In fact, that the legion included active members of the Flavian party in 69 is further suggested by the later careers of its officers. Lucius Antistius Rusticus (cos suff. 90), for instance, a tribunus lati clavius of II Augusta, would be addicted inter patricios in 73. (PIR2, A, 765.) Legio XIV Gemina, which had fought for Otho at Bedriacum and thereafter been ordered to Britain by Vitellius, would have almost certainly been anti-Vitellian and perhaps pro-Flavian by the time
potential threat – by virtue of the fact that the legion had taken an unreasonable length of time to declare for Vespasian.\footnote{812} It is unclear whether the reluctance of the legion to take the oath was thanks to, or in spite of, the influence of the legion’s legate, Marcus Roscius Coelius (\textit{cos suff. 81}).\footnote{813} The truth of the situation was likely inconsequential to Mucianus. Coelius had earlier displayed sufficient licence in the region, not only to cause the deterioration of discipline among the soldiers, but also to entirely displace a provincial governor.\footnote{814} Consequently, Mucianus turned towards a surer bet to replace the unruly legate, in the form of Gnaeus Julius Agricola (\textit{cos suff. 77}) – a man who, if Tacitus is to be believed, joined the Flavian party in Narbonensis even before the outcome of Cremona was known.\footnote{815}

In contrast with the legions in Britannia, Gallia and Hispania, the loyalties of Africa and Germania were precarious. It is unclear how much of the Roman army remained on the Rhine after Vitellius departed Germania Inferior in the spring of 69. As Nicols observes, as of the end of 69, four legions were present in the region – \textit{XVI Gallica} at Novaesium, \textit{XV Primigenia} at Vetera, \textit{I Germanica} at Bonna and \textit{IV Macedonica} at Moguntiacum. The legions were particularly vulnerable, not only because Vitellius had extracted the most effective cohorts, but also because he had replaced them of Cremona. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.66.) The loyalties of \textit{legio IX Hispana} and \textit{XX Valeria Victrix} were more suspect, however. Both of these latter legions had remained in Britain since the invasion of Claudius. Of the competing Emperors of 69, their sole public interaction had been with Vitellius – to whom they had dispatched soldiers just prior to the defeat of Otho. (ibid., 2.57.)

\footnote{812} Tacitus, \textit{Agr.}, 7.
\footnote{813} Tacitus does not specify. It is notable however that Coelius had previously been accused of mutinous behavior by Marcus Trebellius Maximus (\textit{cos suff. 55}) while serving under the banner of Vitellius. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.60.) Whether there was any truth to the accusation or not, Coelius’ later suffect consulship under Titus in 81 seemingly suggests that the fault lay with his troops rather than the legate himself.
\footnote{814} Ibid., 1.60. Tacitus observes not only that the infantry and cavalry were inured to Coelius, but that even among the legates, ‘the audacity of Caelius made him the more powerful.’
\footnote{815} This is suggested by Tacitus comment that it was when ‘tidings that Vespasian was aiming at the throne’ arrived in Narbonensis, that Agricola ‘at once joined his party’. (Tacitus, \textit{Agr.}, 7.)
with a levy of inexperienced soldiers. Efforts had been made to turn the legions of Germania to the Flavian cause at an early date, likely in September 69 – and they had been met with some success. Nevertheless, the departure of Verginius Rufus in late 68 had caused agitation among the soldiers in Germania. Nor had the succeeding legatus superioris exercitus in Germania, Marcus Hordeonius Flaccus (cos suff. 47), gained the trust of the Germanic legions. Old and infirm, his lack of character and authority provoked scorn from the troops. He had also displayed a propensity to shift his allegiance according to circumstances. The date and reasoning for Flaccus’ defection to the Flavian party is a matter of scholarly discussion. Tacitus asserts that Flaccus, along with the legati, were favourably disposed towards Vespasian in October 69, although the loyalties of the common soldiers of Germania Inferior lay firmly with Vitellius.

817 On the efforts of the Flavian insidiatores on the Rhine see Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 98 and 146-7.
818 Germanici exercitus, quod periculosissimum in tantis viribus, solliciti et irate...dux deerrat ab ducto Verginio per simulationem amicitiae: quem non remitti atque etiam reum esse tam quam suum crimen accipiebant. ('The armies of Germany were at once alarmed and angry, a most dangerous temper when allied with such strength...they had no leader, for Verginius had been withdrawn on the pretext of his friendship with the Emperor. That he was not sent back, and that he was even impeached, they regarded as an accusation against themselves.' – Tacitus, Hist., 1.8.) Cf. Murison, C.L., Galba, Otho and Vitellius: Careers and Controversies, 15f., 52f. for Verginius Rufus and his replacement by Flaccus.
819 Ibid., 1.9.
820 Apparently lacking the nerve to intervene in the mutinous behavior of IV Macedonica and XXII Primigenia, he transferred his allegiance from Galba to Vitellius in January 69. (ibid., 1.56.)
821 J.H. D’Arms’ discussion is illuminating (D’Arms, J.H., “Tacitus, ‘Histories’ 4.13 and the Municipal Origins of Hordeonius Flaccus.” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 23:4 (1974): 497-504.). In the author’s reckoning, Flaccus’ favourable disposition towards the Flavians stemmed from his personal connections to the Italian municipium, Puteoli, which was itself sympathetic towards Vespasian – due, in part, to the fact that the port relied on the East for its profits and, second, to the fact that the city’s fortunes were necessarily bound up with those of the nearby fleet at Misenum. The argument is plausible, although one should make the point that the revolt of the Misene fleet eventuated in early November – and Tacitus definitively ties this event to the defection of the surrounding settlements, including Puteoli: a quibus municipia coloniaeque impulsae, praecipuo Puteolanorum in Vespasianum studio (‘By these men the colonies and municipal towns were drawn into the movement, and as Puteoli was particularly zealous for Vespasian’ – Tacitus, Hist., 3.57.). Given that Tacitus implies Flaccus was waver ing during mid-October (ibid., 4.13.), we should question whether his ‘Flavian sympathies’ should instead be put down to the earlier efforts of Flavian insidiatores.
822 eadem Hordeonius Flaccus praesens monuerat, inclinato in Vespasianum... ('The same policy was suggested by Hordeonius in person; he had a bias towards Vespasian...’ – ibid., 4.13.) Cf. ibid., 4.27.
Thereafter, the situation on the Rhine became increasingly unstable. Tacitus reports that the soldiers were suspicious of their officers’ loyalty prior to Cremona, and even expected that they would be betrayed to the purported Flavian sympathizer Gaius Julius Civilis – the commander of the Batavian auxiliary troops on the Rhine.\(^{823}\) Finally, the division between the soldiers and the officers came to a head in November – when the officers openly declared for Vespasian and secured the oath of allegiance from the reluctant soldiery.\(^{824}\) The breaking point seemingly came after Flaccus offered, in Vespasian’s name, a donative sent by Vitellius. The troops at Novaesium, augmented by members of \textit{V Alaudae} and \textit{XV Primigenia}, responded by murdering Flaccus.\(^{825}\) There was also a more serious crisis beginning to take root on the Rhine. By the beginning of 70, the uprising of the Batavi and several other Germanic and Celtic tribes from Gallia Belgica, headed by Julius Civilis, had taken a serious toll on the Roman defenders, including the destruction of an entire legion.\(^{826}\)

In contrast with the negligible measures taken by Mucianus in response to the dissent in Britain, his response to the crises on the Rhine was overwhelming. As Levick observes, ‘safe men were sent and safe troops, in revealingly crushing numbers’.\(^{827}\) To some extent, Mucianus probably regarded the devastation of \textit{XV Primigenia} at Vetera and, for that matter, the beleaguered state of

\(^{823}\) Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.19.  
\(^{824}\) Ibid., 4.31., 4.37.  
\(^{825}\) Ibid., 4.36-4.55-58.  
\(^{826}\) There is no room to detail the origins and consequences of the Batavian Revolt here. Suffice to say that, by spring of 70, the Roman presence on the Rhine had been all but nullified by Civilis and his supporters – including the Treveran prince Julius Classicus, Julius Tutor, a Vitellian Prefect, Sabinus the Ligonian and several Ubians and Tungrs. At Moguntiacum, the murder of the officers of the fourth legion \textit{Macedonica} as well as the legiary legate of \textit{XXII Primigenia} and commander of Upper Germany, Gaius Dillius Vocula, resulted in confusion and inaction, while Julius Classicus completed a lengthy siege of Vetera – after which the garrison of \textit{XV Primigenia} and the remnants of \textit{V Alaudae} were massacred. (ibid., 4.57-9.) Both Levick (Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 108-113.) and Brunt (Brunt, P.A., “Tacitus on the Batavian Revolt.” \textit{Latomus}, 19 (1960): 494.) offer substantial analyses of the disturbances in Germany.  
\(^{827}\) Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 110.
the remainder of the legions in Germania as a fortunate turn of events. At the very least, he had an opportunity to dilute the largest concentration of Vitellian loyalists outside of Italy. It is likely with this objective in mind that he carefully chose the legions that would be dispatched to the Rhine. From Italy itself, Mucianus dispatched the formerly Danubian legions *VIII Augusta*, *XI Claudia* and *XIII Gemina* along with *II Adiutrix*, a legion composed from marines of the Vitellian-turned-Flavian Ravenna fleet. From Britain and Spain, Mucianus appropriated four of the formerly Othonian legions, *I Adiutrix*, *VI Victrix*, *X Gemina* and *XIV Gemina*. The sole legion of Vitellian allegiance dispatched was *XXI Rapax* – apparently only as a matter of convenience, given that it had been dispatched in December 69 to Vindonissa. Mucianus applied a similar policy to selecting the replacements for Flaccus and Vocula as commanders of Upper and Lower Germany. The candidate for Lower Germany, Q. Petillius Cerealis, was an unequivocal member of the Flavian party. According to Dio and Tacitus alike, Cerealis was connected by marriage to Vespasian, likely through the latter’s daughter Domitilla. Furthermore, if Townend’s suppositions are correct, Cerealis may have been an early friend of the Flavii – perhaps as early as the British revolt of 60-61, wherein Titus served as military tribune under Cerealis’ command. It is certain, in any case, that he supported the Flavians, albeit unsuccessfully, through an ill-conceived attempt to rescue Sabinus in December 69. He may also have served as a key source of intelligence for Mucianus during his march towards Italy. The candidate for Upper Germany, Ap. Annius Gallus, on the other hand, remains something of an enigma. It is uncertain whether he was an adherent of the Flavians prior to 70. He had been a partisan of Otho and he had

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829 Ibid., 4.68.
831 Brunt, P.A., “Tacitus on the Batavian Revolt.”: 58, n. 16.
832 See ‘3.10 Mucianus in Moesia’
commanded a large force of some ten thousand men in northern Italy prior to Vitellius’ victory at Bedriacum. In Tacitus’ reckoning, Gallus was a talented and dependable commander – and he was particularly adept at rallying troops after a defeat. It is possibly for this latter attribute that Mucianus chose Gallus. Given that Cerealis’ abilities as a military commander were questionable at best, he may have dispatched Gallus simply as a stabilizing influence against the Batavians.

The province of Africa presented an even more complex issue. Vespasian had been unpopular during his governorship of the region in 63/64, possibly due to measures he took to stave off the grain supply crisis of 63. On the other hand, Vitellius’ tenure in the province in 60/61 had earned him a reputation as a governor of honesty and integrity. Furthermore, in 69, the province was occupied by the ostensibly Vitellian legion III Augusta and perhaps also the short-lived legio I Macriana Liberatrix under the command of the imperial legatus pro praetore exercitus Africae, Valerius Festus. Festus was not problematic. Even before Cremona, although publicly supporting Vitellius, he had been in contact with Vespasian and intended to follow whichever side prevailed. The zeal of the civilian population’s reverence for Vitellius and its aversion to Vespasian, on the other hand, is explicitly recorded by Tacitus:

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834 Tacitus, Hist., 1.87., Plutarch, Otho, 5.5.
835 Tacitus describes Gallus as an egregius dux. (4.68.) He is depicted at 2.44. as being capable of maintaining control of his forces after the disaster at Bedriacum. Evidently, he was an old veteran with years of military experience. (Damon, C., Tacitus: Histories Book I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 284.)
836 This is Nicols’ conclusion, citing Swoboda, RE, vol. 19, 1138. for Cerealis’ military career. (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 31.) It is the only rationale that can be ascertained from the evidence available. Little is known of Gallus’ early career outside of the fact that he was suffect consul in 66. (Gallivan, P.A., “Some Comments on the Fasti for the Reign of Nero.”: 294, 303-305.) Several of Corbulo’s men were honoured with suffect consulships during the same period including Mucianus himself. It is possible that Mucianus knew Gallus through Corbulo. Nothing can be said with certainty.
837 See no. 317.
838 On the honesty and integrity of Vitellius’ governorship and the ‘infamous and odious’ nature of Vespasian’s government see Tacitus, Hist., 2.97.
839 Ibid., 2.97-8.
840 Ibid.
nec ambigitur provinciam et militem alienato erga Vespasianum animo fuisse...

It is unclear whether the dissension in the province extended all the way to the proconsul in charge, Lucius Calpurnius Piso. Tacitus records that he was guilty only of previous association with Vitellius by virtue of his station and his substantial popularity among the local populace. In fact, that Africa still harboured parties of indeterminate loyalty such as Piso would not have been of immediate concern to Mucianus if not for two factors. Initially, and most importantly, by the time of Mucianus’ arrival in Rome, the grain shortage in the capital had reached a critical level – and Vespasian could not relieve the situation with shipments of his own from Egypt until the opening of the sailing season in April 70. Even if, as Tacitus claims, the shipment from Africa had been delayed by severe weather, Mucianus could not afford any further disruptions for fear of public outcry. Second, rumours abounded that, already at the start of 70, Lucius Piso had induced his province to rebel against the Flavians. Meanwhile, his cousin and son-in-law, Calpurnius Galerianus, was subject to idle rumours in Rome; and it was said that many would

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841 ‘There is no doubt that the province and the troops entertained feelings of hostility to Vespasian…’ (ibid., 4.49.) See also Tacitus’ vivid description of the enthusiastic manner in which the populace of Carthage venerated the governor, Piso: gaudio clamoribusque cuncta miscebant, indiligentia veri et adulandi libidine. (‘They threw everything into an uproar with their clamorous shouts of joy, careless of the truth, and only eager to flatter.’)
842 PIR2, L, 294.
843 As Tacitus sets out, since the time of Gaius, real power in the region had been in the hands of the propraetorian legate, rather than the proconsular governor. (Tacitus, Hist., 4.48.) Festus’ loyalty, it seems, had already been assured. 844 Ibid., 4.52. As previously noted, the grain supplies of Africa were of utmost importance to the capital – more so than those of Egypt. That the residual Vitellian influence in Africa might prevent the prompt dispatch of grain supplies to Rome was undoubtedly suspected by both Mucianus and Vespasian – judging by the latter’s planned occupation of the region. (see no. 573) That the job of pacifying the region was carried out by Mucianus by proxy rather than Vespasian was likely due to the distances involved and the urgency of the grain situation – the distance between Rome and Carthage by sea was approximately one third of the distance between Carthage and Alexandria. (De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome.”: 16.)
845 ‘Cheap corn was the sole subject of public interest, feared and believed that the ports had been closed and the supplies stopped, the Vitellianists, who had not yet given up their party feelings, helping to spread the report’. (ibid., 4.39.)
846 Ibid., 4.38.
prefer to elevate the ‘noble name and youthful beauty’ of Galerianus rather than Vespasian.\textsuperscript{847}

Finally, as previously mentioned, L. Piso’s brother-in-law, Crassus Scribonianus, was also alleged to be in close contact with Antonius Primus.\textsuperscript{848} Tacitus dismisses each of these rumours as specious. In the historian’s opinion, there was no evidence that the grain shipments had or would be sabotaged at L. Piso’s orders, nor was there any reason to suspect that a man of such moderate disposition would be disposed to rebellion.\textsuperscript{849} Even so, Mucianus could not abide idle talk of usurpers – much less those of the Pisos’ pedigree.\textsuperscript{850} Consequently, much as he had done with Primus, Mucianus ordered praises to be heaped upon Lucius Piso while he plotted in private.\textsuperscript{851} However, unlike Primus, who was somewhat protected by his popularity within the Danubian soldiery, Piso had no such luxury. Mucianus, probably exploiting the fact that, like Tampius Flavianus, Festus was connected to Vitellius through marriage – a fact which had caused Festus no small amount of anxiety about his future under the Flavians, compelled the legate to become

\textsuperscript{847} Ibid., 4.11.
\textsuperscript{848} Ibid., 4.39. and see above ‘4.5 Mucianus and Antonius Primus’.
\textsuperscript{849} Ibid., 4.38.
\textsuperscript{850} Famously, the father of Calpurnius Galerianus, Gaius Calpurnius Piso (\textit{cos suff.} 41), was the focal figure in the Pisonian conspiracy of 65 AD – a wide-ranging plot against the Emperor Nero. (\textit{PIR2}, C, 284.) L. Calpurnius Piso, meanwhile, was the son of a distinguished public figure – the older Lucius Calpurnius Piso (\textit{PIR2}, C, 293.) was an ordinary consul in 27 and, like his son, served as the proconsular governor of Africa under Gaius. Crassus Scribonianus, apart from being the brother-in-law of L. Calpurnius Piso through his sister, Licinia Magna (\textit{PIR2}, L, 269.) was also descended from a distinguished family. (Syme, R., “Piso Frugi and Crassus Frugi.” \textit{The Journal of Roman Studies} 50 (1960): 12.). Scribonianus’ brother, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus was adopted by Galba (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.14.) and Scribonianus himself was offered the Empire at a later date. (ibid., 4.39.) In light of the familial backgrounds of each of these individuals – which are fraught with intrigue and earlier claims to imperial power, it is easy to understand why Mucianus might have considered their presence in both Rome and the unstable province of Africa untenable. Furthermore, even discounting their dubious backgrounds, Tacitus indicates that Galerianus and L. Calpurnius Piso, in particular, were held in great esteem by the civilian populace in Rome and Carthage alike. (ibid., 4.11., 4.49.)
\textsuperscript{851} Tacitus records that Papirius, a centurion dispatched to Carthage by Mucianus, ‘raised his voice, and invoked in succession all blessings on the head of Piso, as if he were Emperor, and bade the bystanders, who were astonished by this sudden and strange proceeding, take up the same cry.’ (ibid., 4.49.)
involved in a plot to assassinate Piso.\textsuperscript{852} In concert with the procurator Baebius Massa, Festus accomplished the assassination in the winter of 70.\textsuperscript{853} Nor did Mucianus confine his efforts to the immediate offending party in Africa. In Rome, the other remaining members of L. Piso’s extended family met a similar fate. Galerianus was escorted from Rome and killed on the Appian Way at Mucianus’ order while Crassus Scribonianus mysteriously disappears from the sources – probably indicating either his murder or exile.\textsuperscript{854}

4.7 Mucianus and the Senate

The Senate, apparently excluded from any decisions concerning the conduct of the war in Germania or the appointment of new officials in the provinces or the capital, remained embroiled in internal skirmishes. If Tacitus’ account of the senatorial meetings in December of 69 and January of 70 is complete, three separate sessions may be assumed – the first, as previously mentioned, a special meeting called just after the death of Vitellius on 20 December; the second, as the historian explicitly states, on 1 January 70; and the third seemingly on the regular date of

\textsuperscript{852} Ibid. See also ibid., 3.4. for Flavianus’ connection to Vitellius. The relationship of both Flavianus and Festus with Vitellius is described as being one of \textit{adfinitas} (‘relationship by marriage’). (Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 153.) Festus’ involvement was likely a contingency plan. In Tacitus’ reckoning, Mucianus originally delegated the job of murdering Piso to the centurion Papirius – a scheme which was foiled by the intervention of the prefect Claudius Sagitta – apparently of the horse corps \textit{ala Petrina}, which would later be moved to Britain from the Rhineland at some point during the reign of the Flavians. (The evidence for the movements of the \textit{ala Petriana} are detailed in Maxfield, V.A., \textit{The Military Decorations of the Roman Army}, 224-226.) Tacitus neglects to mention how Sagitta became involved in the affair, suffice to say that the squadron appears to have been directly utilized by Caecina as an element of his advance guard during the latter’s march through Helvetia and then the central Alps into Italy early in 69. (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 1.70.) Sagitta, most probably, was still in Rome upon Mucianus’ arrival.

\textsuperscript{853} This assumption about the timing of Piso’s murder is based on Tacitus’ statement that it took place contemporaneously with both Mucianus’ reorganization of the Praetorian Guard and the third meeting of the Senate – which, as noted below, likely occurred in the middle of January. (ibid., 4.48-50.) It is clear that rewards were promised by Mucianus for the assassination – and subsequently fulfilled by Vespasian. Baebius Massa (\textit{PIR2}, B, 26.) was adlected into the senatorial order while Festus enjoyed a distinguished career first as suffect consul in 71 and then as governor of Pannonia and finally of Hispania Citerior. (\textit{ILS}, 989.)

\textsuperscript{854} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.11.
the Ides of January. Furthermore, as P.M. Rogers points out, if the first three of these meetings can be identified with any degree of accuracy, then it also stands to reason that a subsequent meeting should be assumed for the Kalends of February. At each successive meeting, in concert with Domitian, Mucianus reshuffled public appointments and assigned new officials. Dio records, without specifics, that Domitian appointed ‘offices and procuratorships to many persons, appointing prefect after prefect and even consuls’. Tacitus, on the other hand, identifies a few key appointments. According to the latter historian, during the first meeting of 70, unaware that Tettius Julianus had fled from his command over legio VII Claudia to seek refuge with Vespasian in August 69, Mucianus stripped him of his praetorship and handed it to the trustworthy Plotius Griphus. Having received a communiqué from Vespasian revealing the truth of Julianus’ flight, however, Mucianus reinstated the former legate to his praetorship without removing Griphus at the second meeting of January. More importantly, Julius Frontinus, the praetor of the city, was compelled to abdicate the position in favour of Domitian. Given Domitian’s young age and inexperience, as well as Mucianus’ later reticence to allow the Caesar to intervene in the Roman command in Germania, it is probable that this latter appointment was carried out by means of a lex

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855 Ibid., 4.39. for the dating of the second meeting and Suetonius, Div. Aug., 35.3. for the regular date of the middle of January.
857 Dio, Hist., 66.2.
858 That these appointments were effected by Mucianus is not specifically stated. Even so, Tacitus’ statement that ‘[Domitian’s] name was put at the head of despatches and edicts, but the real authority was in the hands of Mucianus’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.39.) suggests that Mucianus was invariably in charge of proceedings.
859 Ibid., 4.39. and no. 621.
860 Ibid., 4.40. As Chilver and Townend observe, the restoration of Julianus cannot have taken place at the same meeting as 1 January – when it was generally believed that he had deserted Vespasian’s side. (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V, 50.) There must have been time for a message to arrive from Vespasian. If the truth of the situation had been available at the time, Tacitus would not have neglected to criticize Domitian or Mucianus for mismanagement.
861 Tacitus, Hist., 4.39. As previously noted, Frontinus was probably a member of Corbulo’s former adherents and thus likely an early supporter of the Flavian cause.
which meticulously stipulated the conditions under which Domitian might use his authority.\textsuperscript{862} The appointment had two key functions. First, as Wellesley notes, it was intended to avoid conflicts of authority between Domitian and praetors appointed under the preceding emperors by virtue of the fact that it allowed Domitian \textit{ad hoc} consular \textit{imperium}, which in turn allowed him to veto the decisions of praetorian or lesser magistrates.\textsuperscript{863} Second, Domitian’s appointment might also have served as a contingency plan. Domitian could remain dormant in Rome as \textit{praetor proconsule sine provincia} but, in the event of a disaster befalling Titus and Vespasian, he could take command of the Guard in order to salvage the dynasty.\textsuperscript{864}

Apart from the appointment of several officials at Mucianus’ behest, however, the order of the day was the Neronian \textit{delatores}. Tacitus dedicates the greater part of his seven chapters on the senatorial business of January-February 70 to the rightful treatment of informers.\textsuperscript{865} The battle in the Senate was sparked by a request from one Junius Mauricus to open the imperial archives to scrutiny so that the names of the informers under Nero might be revealed.\textsuperscript{866} Undoubtedly acting on Mucianus’ instructions, Domitian candidly denied the request. The \textit{amicus} was attempting to avoid the recriminations that had followed the death of Nero.\textsuperscript{867} Even so, Mucianus’ strategy was only partially successful. The senators responded by demanding that all in their number swear before the gods that they had not profited from the ruin of fellow citizens. Several well-known Neronian informers were not able to do so without perjuring themselves and, as a result, were

\textsuperscript{862} See ‘4.8 Mucianus and Domitian’
\textsuperscript{863} But not merely those ‘owing their election to Vitellius’, as Wellesley asserts. (Wellesley, K., \textit{The Year of the Four Emperors}, 213.) Helvidius Priscus, the praetor elect for 70, seemingly owed his appointment to Galba. (Cf. no. 383)
\textsuperscript{864} One assumes that the \textit{lex} would have contained a discretionary emergency clause for just such a situation.
\textsuperscript{865} Ibid., 4.39-45.
\textsuperscript{866} Ibid., 4.40.
\textsuperscript{867} The battle between Priscus and Marcellus extended all the way back to the beginning of Galba’s reign wherein the debate ‘divided the Senate into two parties; for, if Marcellus fell, a whole army of fellow culprits was struck down.’ (ibid., 4.6.)
attacked vehemently by their colleagues.868 This was followed by a concerted effort by several senators to prosecute more of their fellows for practising delation under Nero. The main event of the proceedings of January 70 was a speech by Curtius Montanus which assailed Aquilius Regulus, a prosperous informer under Nero, after the latter’s half-brother brother, Vipstanus Messalla had spoken on Regulus’ behalf.869 Montanus’ ‘savage speech’ charged Regulus with offering money to the murderer of Galba’s adoptive son, L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi Licinianus.870 Subsequently, encouraged by the enthusiastic reaction of the Senate to Montanus’ speech, Helvidius Priscus joined in and renewed his own accusations of delation against Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus – prompting the latter two individuals to abandon the chamber entirely. Mucianus’ response to these developments was decisive. At the senatorial meeting of 1 February, he terminated the proceedings by speaking in favour of the accused and admonishing those, such as Priscus and Montanus, who were reviving earlier indictments.871 Mucianus’ intervention was successful and this time, the senators, seeing that they were openly opposed by the amicus, ‘relinquished the liberty which they had begun to exercise’. The only concession offered by Mucianus was the return of two minor informers, Octavius Sagitta and Antistius Sosianus, to their place of exile.872

868 As Tacitus asserts, ‘This public censure, as it might be called, fell with especial severity on three men, Sariolenus Vocula, Nonnius Attianus, and Cestius Severus, all of them infamous for having practised the trade of the informer in the days of Nero. Sariolenus indeed laboured under an imputation of recent date.’ (ibid., 4.41.)
869 Regulus, according to Tacitus, had undertaken the prosecution of the families of the Crassi and Orfitus – which included another brother of Scribonianus, M. Licinius Crassus Frugi (PIR2, L., 191.).
871 Mucianus’ criticism here is intended to remind Priscus that he contravened the SC Turpilianum of 61 AD – which forbade a prosecutor who abandoned a case to reopen a second case with the same charges. The law was enacted for the purpose of preventing praeveracatio – the fraudulent or collusive abandonment of a criminal charge for the purpose of obstructing justice. (See Tacitus, Ann., 14.44, for applications of the law, also Justinian, Dig., 48.16 and Mommsen, T., Römisches Strafrecht (Leipzig, Duncker & Humblot, 1899), 498-501.) That Mucianus invokes the law here is little more than a technicality to render any further indictment of Marcellus by Priscus inadmissible.
872 Tacitus, Hist., 4.44.
Why did Mucianus decide to support Eprius Marcellus, Vipstanus Messalla, Aquilius Regulus and Vibius Crispus against Hevidius Priscus and Curtius Montanus in the Senate? Modern scholars have offered several explanations. In Evans’ reckoning, in the aftermath of the civil war a purge of the Senate was not part of the design of Vespasian and the fact that Montanus and Priscus gained so much traction in the Senate was merely symptomatic of the fact that Mucianus had momentarily lost control of proceedings. Consequently, he utilized a legal technicality to silence any further accusations while simultaneously avoiding a direct confrontation with either Priscus or Montanus.873 Nicols, on the other hand, highlights the fact that it was convenient for Mucianus’ government to maintain the loyalties of Marcellus and Crispus on account of their administrative abilities and great wealth.874 Rudich, similarly, asserts that the ‘political potential’ of gaining the allegiance of a group of shrewd informers was not lost on Mucianus and he therefore took the opportunity to simultaneously silence Priscus while securing the loyalty of Marcellus.875 De Kleijn, meanwhile, draws attention to the fact that Montanus, on several occasions, had taken a stand for the Piso family and had thus ‘called suspicion on himself of supporting a possible bid for power from a member of the Piso family.’876 Probably, several factors contributed to Mucianus’ decision. Initially, as previously highlighted, Mucianus had no intention of allowing a repeat of the intrigue and mutual recriminations which had eventuated after Nero’s death.877 Furthermore, while Mucianus held no particular affection for Vipstanus Messalla or his half-brother Aquilius Regulus, Montanus was in the unfortunate position of having publicly favoured members of the

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873 Evans, J.K., “The Trial of P. Egnatius Celer.” Classical Quarterly 29 (1979): 199-200. Evans offers the addendum that Mucianus may have risked his own auctoritas if he could not bring the Senate under control.
874 Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 172.
877 See, for instance Plutarch, Galba, 8. for the murder of Aponius, a Neronian informer. See also Tacitus, Hist., 2.10. for Crispus’ accusations against Annius Faustus and a Senatus Consultum, apparently passed during the reign of Galba, intended to facilitate the investigation of accusatores under Nero.
Piso family – a faction which Mucianus was in the process of systematically dismantling on the grounds that certain members might be potential usurpers or otherwise unreliable.\footnote{See above ‘4.6 Mucianus and the Provincial “Usurpers”’. That the specific charge leveled at Regulus had to do with his payment to the murderer of Piso Frugi probably saved him from prosecution as long as Mucianus was in charge. Any other charge may not have been looked upon as kindly.} This would also account for the fact that, during the first meeting of January 70, Montanus’ proposal that Piso Frugi should be honoured like his adoptive father, while passed by the Senate, was never carried out.\footnote{Ibid., 4.40.} Finally, there were also more pragmatic concerns. Competent administrators who were not overtly attached to Vitellius were in short supply in 70.\footnote{It is noticeable that irregular, make-shift commands were handed out to equestrians or under-qualified senators by the Flavians and Vitellians alike on more than one occasion during 69. Plotius Grifus springs to mind (see no. 621), as does the ex-quaestor Aulus Larcius Lepidus Sulpicianus, who became the legate of X Fretensis. (CIL, 10.6659 = ILS, 987.) Similarly, Caecina, who had skipped from the quaestorship to the command of legio IV Macedonica. (Tacitus, Hist., 1.53.) Note also Lucilius Bassus, the former cavalry commander who acquired the unprecedented command over the fleets at both Ravenna and Misenum. (Ibid., 2.100.) Reliable senatorial candidates were clearly in short supply.} In this respect, Marcellus’ career mirrored Mucianus’ own. Praetor in 48, praetorian legate of Lycia-Pamphylia ca. 57 and suffect consul in 62, Mucianus judged Marcellus an ideal candidate to serve as proconsul in Asia from July 70 until July 73.\footnote{For Marcellus’ career see PIR2, E, 84. and Eck, W., Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian, 89, 115. The fact that he became proconsul in July 70 indicates that it was probably Mucianus who made the appointment. Even so, Vespasian seems to have approved, as Marcellus remained in office.} The latter was an extraordinary appointment, but it might be easily justified by the fact that such a lengthy tenure served the secondary purpose of abstracting Marcellus from the capital until the debates in the Senate had subsided.\footnote{See also no. 935.} Similarly, Vibius Crispus, who had held a consulship under Nero and perhaps the position of proconsul of Africa between 62 and 68/9, also served as the legate of Hispania Citerior in 71-73 – probably at the behest of Mucianus.\footnote{PIR1, V, 379. There is some dispute over the ordering of Crispus’ career. Eck assigns Crispus the post of curator aquarum from 68-71 and a proconsulship in Africa from 72-73. (Eck, W., Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian, 58, 225.) Bosworth, more recently, places Crispus’ proconsulship during the mid-60s AD and assigns Crispus a suffect consulship in 74. (Bosworth, A.B., ”Vespasian and the Provinces: Some Problems of the Early 70’s A. D.” Athenaeum}
4.8 Mucianus and Domitian

The relationship between Mucianus and Domitian, during the period of Mucianus’ authority in Rome, appears to have largely functioned efficiently. While Tacitus emphasizes the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the two men, along with Dio, he nonetheless records several episodes in which Domitian complemented Mucianus’ authority effectively. Thus, for instance, in the case of the restructuring of the Praetorian Guard, Mucianus instructed Domitian to harangue the soldiers – seemingly to test the outcome of his chicanery. Domitian also served as Mucianus’ primary mouthpiece in the Senate. At the meeting of 1 January, Tacitus records that Domitian ‘made a brief and measured speech in reference to the absence of his father and brother, and to his own youth’, proposed that Imperial honours should be restored to Galba, that the consulships conferred by Vitellius should be retracted and, subsequently, that the honours of a censor’s funeral should be paid to Sabinus. In fact, Mucianus himself did not interfere directly in senatorial proceedings until after Domitian’s tactful attempts to head off any further pursuit of the Neronian delatores went unheeded.

As far as can be determined, the sole instance in which Mucianus and Domitian were at loggerheads involves the instigation of the German campaign against the Batavian uprising and Mucianus’ appointment of Cerealis and Annius Gallus as commanders of the region. Tacitus

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51 (1973): 49- 78.) Crispus was dispatched to Hispania Citerior by Vespasian – although likely after consultation with Mucianus.

884 Dio, Hist., 65.22., Tacitus, Hist., 4.46. See also above ‘4.4 Mucianus and the Praetorians’. As Tacitus informs us, Mucianus had done all of the work a few days prior. He then sent Domitian to speak in front of the praetorians, at which point, the young Caesar was ‘received with greater confidence’ and ‘land that was offered them they contemptuously rejected’ and they ‘begged for regular service and pay’.

885 Ibid., 4.40.

886 Ibid., 4.40. and 4.44. for Mucianus and Domitian speaking in concert against renewing earlier charges against the informers.
records that Mucianus, having received exaggerated reports of disasters in Germania, resolved to depart the capital to assist with the conduct of the war. Several concerns hedged against his immediate departure, however. Initially, he was anxious about departing for the Rhine without leaving a caretaker in charge of Rome during his absence. Tacitus does not mention that Mucianus found a successor to Flavius Sabinus as praefectus urbi. If he appointed one at all, it must have been a trusted man – perhaps with familial connections to the Flavians. Further, Tacitus asserts that the people feared Domitian’s indomitae libidines in the absence of any supervision. Probably, the larger concern from Mucianus’ perspective was the influence of both Primus and Varus over the young Caesar. Varus, it seems, had made significant progress towards ingratiating himself with Domitian. As previously mentioned, Mucianus acted decisively against Varus, displacing him from the praetorian prefecture and replacing him with Arrecinus Clemens, a relative of Vespasian and already a close friend of Domitian. It was also around this time that he ordered the execution of the remaining member of Vitellius’ immediate family – the former Emperor’s younger son. Subsequently, at the beginning of June 70, he began to prepare for the march north, taking Domitian with him but, much like his first march from Antioch to Rome,

887 Could we suppose a candidate such as Titus Flavius Sabinus (cos suff. 69, II 72)? Little is known of his career after 69, although it appears that he served as a curator of public works at some point during the 70s AD. (Cf. CIL, 6.814., Jones, B.W., The Emperor Domitian, 45.) The next known praefectus urbi is Tiberius Plautius Silvanus Aelianus (MW, 261.), although it appears the latter governed Spain during this time. It is not unreasonable, although highly conjectural, to suggest that Sabinus served as praefectus urbi from 70 until 72, whereupon he received a second consulship. If we should place his curatorship after 72 (rather than before, as Jones assumes), this should account for the time lapse between the apparent approval of the temple site and the construction of the temple delineated in CIL, 6.814.

888 Ibid., 4.38. Whether we should take this particular assertion seriously is up for debate. The phrase indomitae libidines (‘ungoverned passions’) reveals itself as a humorous jibe at the future emperor. (Plass, P., Wit and the Writing of History: The Rhetoric of Historiography in Imperial Rome (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 63.) Until this point, we have relatively little tangible evidence of Domitian ‘acting out’ against Mucianus, or indeed Vespasian’s wishes. Even so, common sense dictated that leaving an impressionable twenty-year-old in charge of the cares of government was questionable at best.

889 Ibid., 4.80.
displaying no haste. That Mucianus did not rush to the aid of Cerealis and Gallus can be easily rationalized. Mucianus was caught in a difficult position – he could not entrust the administration of Rome to Domitian, especially when the latter was clearly susceptible to outside influence. Nor could he allow the untested younger Caesar who, by all accounts, was now clamouring for a military command to complement his new appointment to the position of praetor urbanus – and the consular imperium which came with it, to undermine the war effort in Germania. Thus, as Tacitus informs us, Mucianus contrived delays for fear that, should Domitian ‘intrude himself upon the army, might be led by the recklessness of youth or by bad advisers to compromise at once the prospects of war and of peace’.

As it turned out, however, fortune was on Mucianus’ side. Before he and Domitian had even reached the Alps, word arrived from the frontier that the outcome of the conflict with the Batavii and Treverii had already been decided in favour of the Roman forces. According to Tacitus, Mucianus then took measure to halt the march entirely – and he places in the amicus’ mouth another elaborate speech in which he implores Domitian to surrender his military ambitions and remain at Lugdunum: quoniam benignitate deum fractae hostium vires forent, parum decore Domitianum confec to prope bello alienae gloriae interventurum. Domitian would not be deterred, however, and Tacitus goes on to record an alleged scheme, formulated by the Caesar, in

890 hic moras nectens quis flagrantem retineret… (‘[Mucianus] contriving delays to check the other’s ardour…’ – ibid., 4.68.) The timing of Mucianus’ departure from Rome can be determined from ibid., 4.53.
891 Titus, if Josephus is to be believed, demonstrated similar enthusiasm only a few months earlier. When Titus and his senior officers were supervising the fighting in Jerusalem from the Antonia, Titus was eager to descend to help his men but ‘was restrained by his friends on account of the gravity of the risk…they remarked that he would achieve more by sitting still on the Antonia as director of the contest’ – a warning which was later mirrored by Mucianus’ plea to Domitian to remain at Lugdunum. (Josephus, BJ., 6.132-3 and see below)
892 Tacitus, Hist., 4.68. Levick, by contrast, does not believe that Mucianus’ delay was intentional. She instead cites Mucianus’ ‘pressing domestic duties’ as the primary reason for his slow progress. (Levick, B., Vespasian, 189.)
893 ‘By the blessing of the Gods the strength of the enemy has been broken, it would little become Domitian, now that the war is all but finished, to interfere with the glory of others.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.85.)
which he dispatched secret emissaries to Cerealis requesting that the command of the Roman forces in Germania be handed over to him. The truth of the existence of Domitian’s scheme initially appears suspect in Tacitus’ narrative – as the historian prefaces his recollection of the scheme with the word *creditur*. As Chilver and Townend observe, however, while Tacitus does not commit himself to the belief of the existence of Domitian’s plan he nonetheless establishes its legitimacy by questioning Domitian’s motives (*in incerto fuit*). Furthermore, the scheme is also recalled by Suetonius who cites an ‘unnecessary expedition against the advice of [Domitian’s] father’s friends’ which was undertaken ‘with the view of equaling his brother in military achievements and glory.’ The existence of Domitian’s scheme should therefore not be doubted, however the extent of the Caesar’s ambition is questionable. Tacitus leaves doubtful, for instance, the notion that Domitian ever contemplated raising an army against his father or, for that matter, soldiers and funds to be used against his brother. Probably, Domitian hoped only for a chance to command troops in the field and for the salutation that would accompany victory in Germania.

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894 ‘[Domitian’s motives] were uncertain’. As Chilver and Townend note, a similar technique is used at Tacitus, Hist., 4.52. where the word *ferunt* (‘reported’) leaves Titus’ address to Vespasian doubtful but *iubet* (‘ordered’) asserts his father’s reply as fact. (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V*, 87.) Thus, the fundamental truth of the exchange is established while the content is left in doubt. This is likely indicative of the fact that Tacitus’ sources for the evidentially confidential conversation between Titus and Vespasian were dubious. Vespasian may have revealed what he said, or it may have reached Tacitus through Pliny or Mucianus, or perhaps Titus simply claimed that he had earlier shown loyalty to his brother at a time when Domitian was allegedly planning against him (Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 9.3.)


896 These appear to be claims derived from an unknown secondary source – probably the same one that Suetonius used. As Chilver and Townend point out, Suetonius’ statement: *ut fratri se et opibus et dignatione adaequaret* (‘merely that he might make himself equal to his brother in power and rank’) bears a striking resemblance to Tacitus’ slightly more ‘litigious’ wording: *opes virisque adversus fratrem* (‘to gain control of] resources and troops in order to oppose his brother’) – indicating that both historians probably drew from the same source. (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., *A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V*, 87.) If Domitian had seriously considered rebelling against his father, Tacitus would have undoubtedly refrained from reducing such an important detail to a cursory observation.

897 As Vervaet highlights, the ‘the possession of independent imperium auspiciumque was the basic requirement for a victorious Roman commander to qualify for full triumphal honours’. He also observes that ‘it was sufficient that the victory had been won *suis auspiciis*, i.e. under his own *summum imperium auspiciumque*, irrespective of the question whether or not he had also undertaken the physical *ductus* of the victorious army’. As the author notes, it is also
Cerealis, in any case, responded precisely as might be expected from a man attached to Vespasian along familial lines and a confidant of Mucianus himself. He eluded Domitian’s request ut vana pueriliter cupientem. Mucianus appears to have been similarly content to simply overlook Domitian’s overtures to Cerealis in favour of a diplomatic solution to the situation – judging by Tacitus statement: Intellegebantur artes, sed pars obsequii in eo ne deprehenderentur.

apparent that even an imperator who conquered in aliena provincia could still take full credit in terms of triumphal honours – as long as he had personally participated in the decisive engagement. In the case of C. Claudius Nero and M. Helvius in 207 BC, both were granted the right to an equal triumph, despite the fact that the former individual had acted in concert with Helvius outside the boundaries of his own province. (Vervaet, F., The High Command in the Roman Republic: The Principle of the summum imperium auspiciumque from 509 to 19 BC (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2014), 78f., esp. 117f. for a full discussion of Roman triumphal law and the requirements for full triumphal honours. Cf. also Livy, Hist., 28.9.1-10. And Maximus, Valerius, Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX, 4.1.9. for Nero and Helvius). See also Syme, R., “Some Imperial Salutations.” Phoenix 33 (1979): 310f. and Hurlet, F., “Recherches sur la durée de l’imperium des co-regents sous les principats d’Auguste et de Tibère.” Cahiers du Centre Gustave Glotz 5 (1994): 265, n. 43. who also includes a list of scholars who discuss the requirements for a triumph. In Domitian’s case, it seems likely that, as a holder of independent imperium and thus auspices of his own, albeit sine provincia, the Caesar could hope for full triumphal honours if he could secure a command in Germania prior to the conclusion of the war. Certainly, an Emperor might break the conventional requirements for a public triumph on rare occasions. Even Caesar displayed sufficient licence to do so at Dio, 43.41-42. wherein the legates Quintus Fabius Maximus (cos suff. 45 BC) and Quintus Pedius (cos suff. 43 BC) are allowed public triumphs although they had ‘merely been his legates and had achieved no personal success’. However, it is difficult to imagine Vespasian, who was by all accounts a stickler for tradition, ever doing so. Domitian’s unsuccessful attempt to intervene in the conflict was played up later during his reign – as is clearly done so by Frontinus. (Frontinus, Strat., 4.3.14.)

898 ‘…as prompted by idle and childish ambition.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.86.)

899 ‘[Domitian’s] artifices were understood, but it was a part of his deference not to expose them.’ Contrary to the suggestion of some authors (see Heraeus, K. (ed.), Cornelii Taciti: Historiarum Libri Qui Supersunt, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Duck und Verlag von B.G. Teubner, 1899), 185.), the obsequium (‘deference’, ‘diplomacy’) here is clearly Mucianus’, rather than Domitian’s. (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V, 87.) In typical style, Mucianus sought to baulk Domitian’s efforts to win military distinction without offending the Caesar. Whether Mucianus’ efforts were a direct result of instructions from Vespasian is difficult to tell. Levick thinks that the episode might be regarded as evidence for the ‘determination on the part of Vespasian and Titus to not allow Domitian serious advancement’ and the fact that they ‘blatantly continu[ed] to keep him out of contact with the military’. (Levick, B., Vespasian, 189.) Thus, also, Vespasian’s refusal to dispatch either of his sons in 75, when Vologaesus I of Parthia requested assistance against the Alan invaders. (Suetonius, Div. Dom., 2.2.) One might assume, however, that Domitian’s young age and his utter inexperience in 70 would have been justification enough to keep him from interfering in the war effort in Germania.
4.9 Vespasian, Titus and Mucianus

Vespasian, curiously, remains largely absent from Tacitus’ narrative throughout the segment dealing with late 69 to early 70. Short of cursory allusions to the Emperor as part of senatorial proceedings in Rome or current events in Germania, the Emperor himself does not appear again until the second half of the fourth book of the *Historiae*, when Tacitus reverts to the events of the winter of 69/70 AD. According to the historian, it was during this period that Vespasian received news that the Flavian armies had been victorious at Cremona, that they had successfully entered the capital and brought about the downfall of Vitellius. One might expect that Vespasian would hurry to Rome or, at the very least, resume military action against the insurrection in Judaea or against the revolting peoples of the Northern provinces. Contrary to such expectations, after Mucianus’ departure from Antioch, Vespasian traveled to Alexandria where he would remain from November 69 until August of the following year. The news of Vitellius’ death on 20 December and the end of the civil war reached Vespasian early in the new year, likely before the end of January. The news of the victory at Cremona had arrived much earlier – apparently just after

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901 As Tacitus asserts, ‘Vespasian had heard of the victory of Cremona, and had received favourable tidings from all quarters, and he was now informed of the fall of Vitellius by many persons of every rank, who, with a good fortune equal to their courage, risked the perils of the wintry sea.’ (ibid., 4.51.)
902 More specifically, Civilis’ rebellion in Germania.
903 Josephus (*BJ.*, 4.656.) offers a general chronology without specifics – however he does state that Vespasian sought to return to Rome at the end of the winter of 69/70. Evidently, Vespasian spent several months regulating affairs in Syria and Palestine after Mucianus’ departure in August. The approximate timing of Vespasian’s departure from Alexandria is difficult to determine. One might assume first from Tacitus’ assertion that Vespasian dispatched grain vessels at the very beginning of the sailing season ‘and committed them to the perils of the still stormy sea’ (*Tacitus, Hist.*, 4.52.) and Dio’s statement that he did so just prior to leaving Alexandria (*Dio, Hist.*, 66.9.) that his departure should be placed around April. However, as the most immediate source for Vespasian’s departure, Josephus does not support this conclusion. According to the latter historian, Vespasian had left before the news of the fall of Jerusalem (in the last week of September) arrived in Alexandria. (*Josephus, BJ.*, 12.21.) Dio adds that Vespasian left at some point while the siege of Jerusalem (which had only begun in mid-April) was still going on. (*Dio, Hist.*, 66.9.) Finally, Josephus also notes that Titus received news of his father’s arrival in Rome after he had celebrated Vespasian’s birthday on 17 November. (*Josephus, BJ.*, 7.39, 7.63.) Probably, as Chambalu notes, Vespasian utilised the favourable
the princeps had arrived in Egypt. Sparse information is available concerning Vespasian’s activities in the East during this period, suffice to say that propaganda and diplomacy appear to have been first on his agenda. According to Tacitus, Vespasian in Alexandria both received and dispatched letters, particularly to the Parthian Volgaeses, whose neutrality by this time had been assured. The historian also records that Vespasian visited the temple of Serapis, where he would witness a divine apparition and miraculously cure some disabled residents of the city. Dio adds that Vespasian spent his time gathering money from the Alexandrians and that he reorganized the Egyptian taxation system. New coin issues in Rome, Asia Minor, Illyricum, Gaul and Tarraco already in the winter of 69/70, undoubtedly ordered by Vespasian himself, were probably carried out through letters dispatched from Alexandria. Moreover, minor uprisings in the region – in Armenia, Cappadocia and Pontus, may also have been expected. As it turned out, however, only one incident required an intervention from Vespasian. According to Tacitus, a revolt in Pontus, lead by the freedman Anicetus, attracted the attention of the Emperor. He did not involve himself


904 This is Tacitus’ interpretation. (Tacitus, Hist., 3.48.) His view is not shared by Josephus or Suetonius. Josephus asserts that, while serving in Vespasian’s entourage in Egypt (Josephus, Vita, 415.), he only heard the news of Vitellius’ death upon reaching Alexandria. (Josephus, BJ., 4.656.) Suetonius asserts that Vespasian was in Alexandria when he heard of Cremona and that Vitellius was dead. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 7.) If one were to follow the latter two historians, then Vespasian did not arrive in Alexandria until January at the very earliest. Tacitus, nonetheless, has generally been preferred for the reasons set out at Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flaviae, 84-85. The most likely scenario is that Vespasian learned of Cremona in November and of the Senate’s recognition in January. (Cf. Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V, 61-62. for corroborration).

905 See ‘3.8 The Meeting at Berytus’ for Vespasian’s initial communication with the monarch. (Tacitus, Hist., 2.82.) In Alexandria, Vespasian received an offer of 40,000 Parthian cavalry from the monarch. According to Tacitus, he declined and instead recommended that Volgaeses dispatch envoys to the Senate.

906 Tacitus, Hist., 2.81. Suetonius elaborates that the divine apparition, a man named Basilides, conferred upon Vespasian certain objects – loaves, crowns and boughs – that were associated with Ptolemaic royalty. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 7.1.) See also Dio, Hist., 66.8. for corroborration of Vespasian’s miraculous healing of two individuals.

907 Ibid.

personally, however, and instead dispatched a force of veterans drawn from his own legions under Virdius Geminus.  

Vespasian’s remarkable passivity between November and August was clearly recognized by the sources and Tacitus, Suetonius and Dio all felt compelled to give some explanation for the Emperor’s behaviour. Tacitus cites only the importance of Egyptian grain to the war and insinuates that the Emperor may have also contemplated the possibility of leading the Egyptian legions across North Africa to join Valerius Festus to decisively shut off all grain shipments to Rome. Such a plan, however, while it may have created real shortages for the Vitellians then bottled up in Italy, was never carried out. Suetonius, by contrast, suggests that Vespasian’s primary concern was ‘want[ing] something which might clothe him with divine majesty and authority’ and that the miracles he allegedly effected in Alexandria served his purposes admirably. Dio states that the Alexandrians expected to be rewarded as ‘they had taken the first steps in making him Emperor, but instead of securing anything they had additional contributions levied upon them’. According to Dio, Vespasian remained in Alexandria to subdue the Egyptian population while awaiting Titus’ return from Judaea – so the two might return to Rome together. In fact, Suetonius’ judgment of the situation might be closest to the truth. In August of 69, Mucianus had incurred the dangerous and ungratifying job of marching West with the intention of securing Italy and Rome, where he then faced the inherently divisive task of restoring law and order and paving the way for the

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909 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.47. See ibid., 2.82. for possible expectation of uprisings – ‘Envoys were sent to Parthia and Armenia, and precautions were taken that, when the legions were engaged in the civil war, the country in their rear might not be exposed to attack.’

910 Ibid., 3.48.

911 See no. 573, 844. As previously stated, word of the victory at Cremona had already arrived soon after Vespasian’s arrival at Alexandria. It was this news which prompted Vespasian’s consideration of a scheme to invade Africa.


914 Ibid., 66.9.
Flavians’ return. While it is true that Mucianus personally requested that he be given responsibility for the Flavian march through Asia Minor, the job probably should have gone to Titus. After all, Titus was Vespasian’s imperial successor-designate and already had military experience as the quaestor legate of XV Apollinaris. Furthermore, the conduct of the Jewish War might easily have been left to the likes of Traianus or Sextus Vettulenus Cerealis – both of whom had extensive military experience in the region and both of whom were of praetorian standing prior to 66.915

The fact remains, however, that much of the dirty work was completed by Mucianus prior to Vespasian’s arrival in Rome. Mucianus, for instance, systematically eliminated any potential claimants to the imperial power – such as Calpurnius Galerianus and Vitellius’ seven-year-old son, on the grounds that ‘discord would remain, if he did not check the growth of the seeds of war’.916 He also drew vast sums of money into the imperial treasury from every quarter so that Vespasian might be ‘relieved of the censure which such a proceeding caused’.917 Vespasian, by contrast, would later offer superficial compensation to the victims of Mucianus’ ruthlessness. According to Suetonius, he provided a match in a noble family for the daughter of Vitellius, Vitellia, and conferred upon her a handsome dowry.918 Otherwise, he demonstrated greater clemency than even Claudius – he refrained from punishing those who were believed to be plotting against him, bestowed gifts upon the soldiery and populace, delivered the property of his enemies to their

915 Sextus Vettulenus Cerealis (PIR1, V, 351.) was the legate of V Macedonica. As Nicols notes, given how quickly he acquired the suffect consulship (ca. 73), he would have to have been of praetorian standing in 66. (Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 103., see also Eck, W., Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian, 92. on the dating of the suffect consulship) Similarly, on Traianus’ praetorian standing and experience in the region, see no. 466. Of course, although the conduct of the war might have been left to these individuals, Titus nonetheless required justification for the double-triumph he would celebrate with his father upon reaching Rome. (Suetonius, Div. Tit., 6.)

916 Tacitus, Hist., 4.80.

917 Dio, Hist., 66.2.

descendants and repealed the largest debts owed to the public treasury.\textsuperscript{919} Vespasian was thus enabled to disassociate himself from the measures taken under Mucianus while simultaneously imbuing himself with a near-mythical status in the popular imagination – thanks to the undoubtedly steady stream of rumours flowing into Rome from the East.\textsuperscript{920} The Emperor might then play the part of the reluctant, benign \textit{senex} who could return to a capital in which ‘all elements of disturbance being removed…the laws, and the jurisdiction of the magistrates, were once more restored.’\textsuperscript{921}

Nevertheless, in August of 70 AD, Vespasian departed for Rome in a hurry.\textsuperscript{922} The immediate rationale given by Tacitus for Vespasian’s departure is a concerning report detailing the behaviour of his younger son, Domitian:

\textit{Vespasianus in Italiam resque urbis intentus adversam de Domitiano famam accipit, tamquam terminos aetatis et concessa filio egrederetur}\textsuperscript{923}

Tacitus continues by asserting that Titus and Vespasian engaged in a lengthy interview prior to Vespasian’s departure in which the former expressed concern over Domitian’s conduct and implored his father to be lenient with the younger Caesar.\textsuperscript{924} Tacitus’ explanation, along with the

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\item 919 Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.10. and Suetonius, \textit{Div. Vesp.}, 14-18. Note the comparison with Suetonius’ earlier statement that Mucianus, during his tenure in Rome, ‘gathered into the public treasury from every possible quarter vast sums of money, showing an entire readiness to relieve Vespasian of the censure which such a proceeding caused.’ (ibid., 2.)
\item 920 That all of the key sources mention the miracles in the temple of Serapis is likely no accident.
\item 921 Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.39.
\item 922 Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 66.9.
\item 923 ‘While Vespasian’s thoughts were fixed on Italy and on the state of the Capital, he heard an unfavourable account of Domitian, which represented him as overstepping the limits of his age and the privileges of a son.’ (Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.52.)
\item 924 \textit{Titum, antequam digrederetur, multo apud patrem sermonem orasse ferunt ne criminantium nuntiis temere accederetur integrumque se ac placabilem filio praestaret.} (‘It was said that Titus before his departure had a long interview with his father, in which he implored him not to let himself be easily excited by the reports of slanderers, but to shew an impartial and forgiving temper towards his son.’ – Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 4.53.)
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offhand comment attributed to Vespasian by Dio, in which the Emperor allegedly expressed surprise that Domitian himself had not dethroned him, has given rise to significant consternation and misinterpretation among modern scholars.\footnote{Dio, Hist., 66.2.} In the first place, Tacitus does not tell us whether Titus criticized Domitian for anything other than the relatively minor indiscretions mentioned by Suetonius and Tacitus.\footnote{See Tacitus, Hist., 4.85-6. and Suetonius, Div. Dom., 2.1. wherein the historian asserts that Domitian used ‘his absolute power so licentiously, that even then he plainly discovered what sort of prince he was likely to prove. Not to go into details, after he had made free with the wives of many men of distinction, he took Domitia Longina from her husband, Aelias Lamia, and married her; and in one day disposed of above twenty offices in the city and the provinces.’ See also Tacitus, Hist., 4.85-6. And the above discussion about Domitian’s ill-advised attempt to arrange a military command in Germania.} Domitian’s offences cannot have been significant, or Vespasian would not have been so easily influenced to act in such an amiable manner towards his son; or allow him to retain any positions of responsibility. Furthermore, as Chilver and Townend note, the words concessa filio imply that Domitian was merely ‘throwing his weight around’ – as in Suetonius, Dio and Tacitus’ descriptions of his appointment and dismissal of large numbers of officials and in his attempt to acquire a military command from Cerealis.\footnote{Ibid., 4.85., Dio, Hist., 66.2, 9., Suetonius, Div. Dom., 1. Chilver and Townend also add that the word igitur does imply some causal connection between Vespasian’s departure and the news of Domitian’s behavior. Nevertheless, as the authors highlight, it might merely be a slight concession to anti-Domitianic propaganda which does not fit in with the rest of the narrative. (Chilver, G.E.F., Townend, G.B., A Historical Commentary on Tacitus’ Histories IV and V, 62.)}

If this interpretation is correct, however, then the inclusion of Titus’ alleged concerns about Domitian in Tacitus’ narrative at all is rather perplexing.\footnote{Although generally consistent with Tacitus’ mordant view of Domitian.} It is for this reason that Crook suggests an alternative explanation – namely that Titus was not concerned about his brother’s conduct, but was instead disturbed over Mucianus’ growing influence in the capital.\footnote{Crook’s position is also partially supported by Levick, B., Vespasian, 193-4.} This would also account for Titus’ rapid return to Rome in 71, in which he sailed from Rhegium to Puteoli in a commercial
vessel, sacrificing his chance for a triumphal procession overland from Brundisium.\textsuperscript{930} The basis for Crook’s explanation is as follows: initially, according to the author, from the very beginning of Mucianus’ involvement in the Flavian uprising, the \textit{amicus} and Titus were destined ‘to be involved in a clash of ambitions’. This only became more evident after 71 when Titus became ‘in practice, if not in theory’ co-Emperor with Vespasian and, furthermore, received other additions to his consular \textit{imperium} including the praetorian prefecture and the \textit{tribunicia potestas}.\textsuperscript{931} Mucianus, by contrast, would be forced to cede his extraordinary authority over the capital in late 70 and content himself with no further offices other than two additional suffect consulships.\textsuperscript{932} According to Crook, Mucianus foresaw these developments and resolved to build his own ‘defence’ against Titus’ influence. Consequently, during the course of his rulership over Rome and, more specifically, the way in which Mucianus dealt with the indictment of the informers in the Senate, the \textit{amicus} sought to create his own power base by cultivating the affections of leading members of the State. These men, according to Crook, included the likes of Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus – those who Mucianus had personally defended in the Senate and who had Mucianus to thank for their proconsular appointments. Additionally, in Crook’s reckoning, Titus’ appointment to the praetorian prefecture and the removal of Clemens is not adequately explained by an additional precaution to safeguard the Flavian regime but is better understood as a concession requested by Titus to counteract the power of Mucianus.\textsuperscript{933} Furthermore, Crook also insists that

\textsuperscript{930} Crook, J.A., “Titus and Berenice.”: 165. In fact, Titus’ haste can probably be put down to the fact that the siege of Jerusalem had taken longer than expected and that he intended to celebrate a double-triumph with his father in Rome. He may also have been keen to dispel rumours that he intended to set himself up as emperor of the East. (Suetonius, \textit{Div. Tit.}, 5.)

\textsuperscript{931} Ibid., 6. And Crook, J.A., “Titus and Berenice.”: 164.

\textsuperscript{932} As Crook says, ‘Mucianus can hardly have intended to leave his own ambitions so little elbow-room’. (Crook, J.A., “Titus and Berenice.”: 164.) See below ‘4.10 Mucianus’ Career After 70 AD’ on the \textit{amicus’} later career under Vespasian.

\textsuperscript{933} The implication is that Clemens was Mucianus’ ‘man’ after the former individual’s appointment to the praetorian prefecture at Mucianus’ behest.
much of Titus’ behavior throughout the 70s can be rationalized in terms of his efforts to keep Mucianus’ group of supporters in check. Crook speculates, for instance, that the arrival of Titus’ mistress, the Herodian princess Julia Berenice, in Rome – some four years after Titus himself had arrived, can be justified by the fact that Mucianus’ protégés ‘still carr[ied] the day in court’ and that their influence prevented Titus from bringing his mistress to Rome.\footnote{According to Crook, that Berenice finally arrived in 75, can be put down to Mucianus’ death which allegedly caused a ‘significant change in the political background’. (ibid., 166.) Mucianus’ reason for ever having desired to prevent Berenice from entering Rome in the first place is not specified by Crook.} Similarly, Crook also argues that, even after Mucianus’ death around 75, his adherents continued to engage in political skirmishes with Titus – culminating in the Caecina-Marcellus conspiracy in 79 in which the latter two individuals met their demise.\footnote{Ibid., 169-170. See Dio, Hist., 66.16. and Suetonius, Div. Tit., 6. on the conspiracy in which Titus invited Caecina to dinner and, upon his departure, had him stabbed to death by the guard on the grounds that Caecina intended to address the troops personally at a time when Vespasian was failing and the Flavian succession might have been called into question. Dio adds that Marcellus was involved in the conspiracy and subsequently committed suicide when confronted in the Senate. Crook regards the entire affair as a trumped up case against Mucianus’ alleged supporters. According to the author, Marcellus and Caecina had earlier facilitated the return of the philosophers Diogenes and Heras to Rome, whereupon they had set about criticizing Titus and Berenice. (Diogenes was flogged and Heras beheaded – Dio, Hist., 66.15.) Subsequently, Crook asserts that, in 79, Titus responded definitively by engineering a plot to eliminate both individuals.}

While it makes for a captivating story, Crook’s theory is not convincing and his interpretation of the Tacitean passage detailing Titus’ apprehension about Domitian’s behavior corroborates only his pre-conceived and unfounded conclusions.\footnote{A full rebuttal is offered by Rogers. (Rogers, P.M., “Titus, Berenice and Mucianus.”) However, several salient points should still be highlighted.} Apart from the fact that Crook never specifies precisely what Mucianus’ ‘ambitions’ actually entailed, there is nothing in Mucianus’ documented behavior prior to Vespasian’s arrival in Rome that suggests that he was unwilling to accept Flavian supremacy. In fact, the sources invariably suggest the opposite scenario. Mucianus and Vespasian had reached an understanding long before Vespasian’s elevation that Mucianus would remain...
clearly subordinate to the Emperor in the event of their success: *Nobis nihil ultra adrogabo quam ne post Valentinem et Caecinam numeremur: ne tamen Mucianum socium spreveris, quia aemulum non experiris. me Vitellio anteo, te mihi.*

937 Crook’s invocation of Tacitus’ statement that, by 74, Crispus and Marcellus ‘were leading men in the Emperor’s friendship and carried all before them’, as evidence of Mucianus’ patronage is also misleading. 938 As is highlighted by our previous discussion, these men actually owed their positions to Vespasian’s patronage rather than Mucianus’ although Mucianus might have supported them out of necessity. 939 Additionally, in the case of Clemens, Crook overlooks the fact that he was an unusual appointment and probably never intended to be a permanent resident of the position. Clemens was a senator and likely only appointed as a temporary measure to abstract Varus from the Praetorian Guard. That Mucianus chose him at all can be put down to the fact that he was one of the few in Rome who was immediately related to the Flavian house and who could thus be trusted without hesitation. 940 It

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937 ‘For myself I will claim nothing more than not to be reckoned inferior to Valens and Caecina. But do not spurn Mucianus as an associate, because you do not find in him a rival. I count myself better than Vitellius; I count you better than myself.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 2.77.)


939 Mucianus might have suggested both individuals as ideal candidates for provincial governorships and directly appointed Marcellus to the position of proconsular governor of Asia. Even so, that Marcellus persisted in his position until 73 and that Crispus was directly appointed by Vespasian himself would seemingly suggest that both individuals were approved by the Emperor. Marcellus, in particular, represented an extraordinary case. As pointed out by McElderry, two renewals of the proconsulship could only be effected by the Emperor and extra-annual proconsulships were rare. Only three previous cases can be identified – that of Potitus Valerius Messalla (cos suff. 29 BC) under Augustus, that of Gaius Vibius Postumus (cos suff. 5) from 13-16 AD and that of Publius Petronius (cos suff. 19) under Tiberius. (McElderry, R.K., “Some Conjectures on the Reign of Vespasian.” The Journal of Roman Studies 3 (1913): 118.) That Marcellus and Crispus were favoured by Vespasian is further suggested by Tacitus’ depiction of the two men in the *Dialogus*. Both are presented in high favour in the text and are even venerated by the Emperor on occasion. (Tacitus, Dial., 1.8., for instance) Syme suggests that Crispus’ agreeable nature – his judiciousness and good humour, made Vespasian reluctant to allow him to remain too long abroad. (Syme, R., “Ministers of the Caesars,” in Roman Papers, vol. 7, 530.)

940 It should be remembered that Mucianus was strapped for time when he appointed Clemens. Urgent rumours had arrived from the East and he had to find a suitable replacement for the unreliable Varus before his departure for Germania. Undoubtedly, there were suitable equestrians available for the position, but perhaps none who could be immediately trusted such as a man who was overtly connected to the Flavian family by marriage.
also does not stand to reason that Titus displaced Clemens simply as a means of hedging against Mucianus’ alleged influence – especially given the fact that Clemens himself was comprehensively compensated for his removal after the fact.\footnote{Clemens went on to reach the consulate relatively quickly (CIL, 6.2016., 14.2242.), attained the governorship of Hispania Citerior in 81 and a second consulship ca. 85. (AE, 1947, 40. And CIL, 12.3637) He appears to have only lost favour after 85 – whereupon he was executed. (Suetonius, Div. Dom., 11.1.) An analysis of his career was published by Jones and Devlin. (Devlin, R., Jones, B.W., “M. Arrecinus Clemens.” Antichthon 10 (1076): 79-83.)} Furthermore, in the case of Caecina, Crook does not specify how Mucianus might have been attached to him outside of the \textit{circulus in probando} that Marcellus, a dubious associate of Mucianus, was attached to Caecina during the 79 conspiracy.\footnote{That Marcellus and Caecina acted in concert for their own benefit is demonstrated by Rogers. (Devlin, R., Jones, B.W., “M. Arrecinus Clemens.”: 93-94.)} One observes, finally, that Mucianus had little reason nor capacity to establish a group of adherents in the capital. In the first place, Mucianus’ authority in Rome was entirely contingent upon Vepasian’s position as Emperor. Thus, as previously noted, Mucianus took no official office upon entering the capital and instead derived his authority implicitly, if not legally, from Vespasian’s \textit{imperium}.\footnote{See the previous discussion of the third clause of the \textit{lex Vespasiani} and Dio’s statement that Mucianus ‘had authority to decide every question that he liked without the Emperor’s express approval and could issue written orders by merely adding his superior’s name.’ (Dio, Hist., 66.2. and ‘4.3 Mucianus’ Arrival in Rome’) Mucianus had the right to convene and control meetings of the Senate, but only insofar as the meetings were ‘held in accordance with [Vespasian’s] pleasure or authority’.} Second, if Mucianus had ever intended to strike out on his own to exercise authority independent of the \textit{princeps}, he would have undoubtedly run into immediate resistance from the likes of Primus and, indeed, Vespasian and Titus themselves. Yet, there is no indication of such in the sources. Primus apparently found it difficult to criticize Mucianus at all in his complaints to Vespasian during the first half of 70 – and he instead resorted to censuring Caecina.\footnote{See no 793. Primus would have undoubtedly been only too keen to report any misconduct on the part of Mucianus.} Titus, meanwhile, even if he had harboured fears about Mucianus’ conduct, displayed no unusual behaviour that might denote as much upon his arrival in Rome. As earlier planned, he celebrated a double triumph with his father and assumed the offices appropriate to his position as Caesar and
princeps iuventutis. Additionally, Vespasian, despite Zonaras’ assertions, seemingly returned to Rome only at a moderate pace. If he had truly been concerned about Mucianus’ behaviour, he might easily have departed Alexandria at the very beginning of the sailing season in April and reached the capital before the end of June. That he chose to delay his departure until the second half of the year makes little sense in the context of any power-mongering on the part of Mucianus.

4.10 Mucianus’ Career After 70 AD

In any case, by October of 70 AD, Vespasian had arrived back at Rome, and Mucianus’ relatively discretionary assertions of power must have ceased. In Dio’s account, the definitive termination of Mucianus’ autonomous authority came upon Vespasian’s arrival in Brundisium, where he met with Mucianus and other prominent men of the state. According to the historian, although he expressed himself as a privatus towards his colleagues, he nonetheless acted as Emperor as soon as he entered Rome. Little is known about Mucianus’ career after Vespasian’s arrival in the capital. Tacitus’ narrative breaks off in the same year and Mucianus himself would meet his end.

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945 Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 6. Thus also the the reason for Titus’ appointment as consul in abstentia in 70. (See below ‘4.10 Mucianus’ Career After 70 AD’) Both Titus and his father held auspices of their own and had been involved in decisive engagements in Judaea. A double triumph could be easily justified. (See Vervaet, F., *The High Command in the Roman Republic: The Principle of the summum imperium auspiciunque from 509 to 19 BCE*, 71ff., 117f.)

946 He evidently did not, however, as Tacitus indicates that he was not in Rome on 21 June. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.53.)

947 Compare Vespasian’s relatively placid behavior to Tiberius’ response to Lucius Aelius Sejanus’ (cos ord. 31) attempts to ingratiate himself with the Julian family line. Dio and Suetonius record that Tiberius immediately dispatched a series of letters from Capri to gauge the degree of Sejanus’ influence in Rome. Subsequently, the Emperor forced Sejanus from his consulship and ensured that he would become alienated from his amici. Finally, he replaced Sejanus with Quintus Naevius Cordus Sutorius Macro as prefect of the Praetorian Guard – the latter of whom conducted Sejanus’ execution. (Suetonius, *Div. Tib.*, 65., Dio, *Hist.*, 58.9-10.) Mucianus himself must have been only too aware of the consequences that had befallen Sejanus after the latter had overstepped the boundaries of his delegated imperium.

948 Dio, *Hist.*, 66.9.: ‘Vespasian…greeted all the rest not like an Emperor but like a private person.’ But also see *Hist.*, 66.10. wherein ‘he bestowed gifts upon both soldiers and populace; he made repairs in the sacred precincts and upon those public works which showed signs of wear and tear’.
sometime during the next half-decade. Thanks to Tacitus and Pliny, we know that Mucianus was still alive as of 75 and certainly dead by 77. Nevertheless, cursory details about the final phase of the amicus’ career can be gleaned from both alternative literary sources such as Dio and Suetonius, as well as epigraphic evidence. Initially, we learn from Dio that Mucianus continued to function in an advisory capacity under Vespasian and that he had a hand in purging further opposition to the Flavian regime from Rome. According to the historian, it was at Mucianus’ urging that Vespasian expelled many philosophers from the city on the grounds that they were ‘using the name of philosophy to teach publicly many things that were not appropriate for the times’. The removal of the alleged ‘Stoic’ malcontents from the capital seems to have been part of a wider scheme – possibly instigated and overseen by Mucianus during 71-2, to remove the ‘articulate opposition’ to the monarchy. The expulsion included prominent men, such as

949 See Tacitus, Dial., 37.2. The dramatic date of the Dialogus is established at ibid., 17.3. as the sixth year of Vespasian’s reign. As Syme notes, this has variously been calculated as either 74 or 75 – depending on the date one accepts as the beginning of Vespasian’s reign. (Syme, R., Tacitus, 670-71.) As Murgia observes, however, the other calculations in the chapter add up to a total of 118 years after the death of Cicero – which brings us to the year 75. Regardless of the date that Vespasian reckoned as his dies imperii, Tacitus seemingly counted 70 as the first year of Vespasian’s reign. (Murgia, C.E., “The Date of Tacitus’ Dialogus.” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 84 (1980): 101, n. 11.) The death of Mucianus is dated thanks to Pliny’s wording at NH., 32.62. (frag. 29) wherein the historian refers to Mucianus in the past tense: ‘I shall do so in the words of another, one who was a great connoisseur of such matters in our time. These are the words of Mucianus [etc.].’ Given that the Naturalis Historia was published in 77, one must assume Mucianus to have been dead at least by that year.

950 Dio also implies that Mucianus had taken personal offence to criticism aimed at himself rather than Vespasian. He records in the same context the comment that: ‘Mucianus desired to be honored by all and beyond all, so that he was displeased not merely if a man insulted him but even if anyone failed to extol him greatly.’ (Dio, Hist., 66.13.)

951 Levick, B., Vespasian, 89. Levick points out that the philosophers Dio mentions had more in common with the Cynics than with the Stoics, despite the historian’s best efforts to conflate the two groups by remarking that Demetrius the Cynic was actuated by Stoic principles. Stoics had no objections to the principle of a monarchy – provided that it did not turn into tyranny, while Cynics ultimately left nothing unquestioned. (Ibid. and Homo, L., Vespasien, L’Empereur du bon Sens, 294. for the distinction between the sects) As Griffin notes, however, Mucianus had no reason to pay close attention to the philosophical leanings of the opponents of the Flavian regime. (Griffin, M.T., “Cynicism and the Romans: Attraction and Repulsion,” in M. Goulet-Cazé, R.B. Branham (eds.) The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy (California: University of California Press, 1996), 195.) The precise date of the purge is not known. Sherwin-White places it before 74 (Sherwin-White, A.W., The letters of Pliny: a historical and social commentary. on Pliny, Ep., 3.11.), however, if we are to judge from Dio’s emphasis on Mucianus’ denouncement of the philosophers that Mucianus was responsible for overseeing the scheme, then it would seem logical to place it during Mucianus’ suffect consulship in May-December 72. (See no. 956.)
Demetrius and C. Tutilius Julius Hostilianus of Cortona with the momentary exception of Musonius – and it also included a number of astrologers who were banished prior to Vespasian’s arrival in Rome in 70. That Mucianus continued to enjoy a relatively favoured position under Vespasian is also supported by the existence of further epigraphic evidence in the forum of two lead fistulae, stamped with Mucianus’ name, found on the Palatine. As de Kleijn highlights, such fistulae were part of a private water supply leading to a private residence, the owner of which was inscribed in the genitive case upon the pipes. Curiously, Mucianus’ fistulae are the only ones found to date on the Palatine which do not cite the name of a member of the imperial family – indicating, at the very least, that Mucianus was allowed the outward appearance of a member of the imperial court. Finally, we can also determine from literary evidence contained within Mucianus’ fragments in the *Naturalis Historia* that he held two further consulships during the 70s.

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952 Dio, *Hist.*, 66.13, for the ‘Stoics’ and 66.9, for the banishment of astrologers from Rome on Vespasian’s orders. The latter is not linked to Mucianus yet one would assume that he was also directly responsible for the astrologers’ removal since Dio records the event contemporaneously with Vespasian’s residence in Alexandria. See also Pliny, *Ep.*, 3.11, for Pliny the Younger’s later complaints about the purge. Musonius was excepted briefly before he too was exiled – only to be recalled during Titus’ reign. (Eusebius, Helm, R. (ed.), *Die Chronik des Hieronymous/Hieronymi Chronicum*, Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der Ersten Jahrhunderte, 47 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956), 189.) Ultimately, the scheme also resulted in the exile and subsequent trial and execution of the most outspoken critic of Vespasian’s regime, Helvidius Priscus. (see Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 15. And Dio, *Hist.*, 66.12.) Nothing is known of Priscus’ trial, however Rutledge speculates that the ‘purge’ of the philosophers may have represented a concerted attempt to nullify the intellectual leadership within Helvidius’ circle of supporters. (Rutledge, S.H., *Imperial Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants from Tiberius to Domitian*, 127., contra. Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 89., Griffin, M.T., “Cynicism and the Romans: Attraction and Repulsion,” in M. Goulet-Cazé, R.B. Branham (eds.) *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy*, 194-196. And Brunt, P.A., *Studies in Stoicism*, ed. M.T. Griffin, Alison Samuels (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 300-301.) Alternatively, given the aforementioned confusion over the precise nature of the philosophers in Dio’s text, it is also possible that Mucianus was content to simply lump Priscus in with a more general group of detractors regardless of the senator’s affiliations. As Priscus had proven himself a substantial irritation during the course of Mucianus short-lived tenure as administrator of Rome, one would assume that the amicus would have been only too happy to advocate Priscus’ prosecution under the *lex Cornelia de iniuriis* (Justinian, *Dig.*, 47.10.5.8-9. And Smith, R.E., “The Law of Libel at Rome.” *The Classical Quarterly* 1:3-4 (1951): 173-6.) for his ‘verbal abuse’ of Vespasian and his amici. (Rutledge, S.H., *Imperial Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants from Tiberius to Domitian*, 127.)


954 Ibid., 146. And De Kleijn, G., “C. licinius Mucianus, Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome.”: 5.
AD. Additionally, thanks to evidence contained within the fragments of the *Fasti Ostienses*, the *Acta Arvalium* and *Tabula Feriarum Latinarum* we know that these later consulships, like the first, were suffect rather than ordinary and that they came in 70 and 72 respectively.

Upon first inspection, Mucianus’ career after 70 appears unimpressive. As far as can be determined from the sources, although he technically acquired the so-called *summum fastigium* – the consulship for the third time, the *amicus* was rewarded with neither a proconsulship, an urban prefecture, the *tribunica potestas* nor even an ordinary consulship prior to 77. In fact, if one were to refer back to analogous careers under previous Emperors, the dearth of honours offered to Mucianus would appear particularly strange. Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa (*cos ord. 37, II 28, III 27 BC*), by contrast, was exemplary. Like Mucianus, he was of modest birth and little is known of his early career until his appearance as a companion of the future-Emperor Octavian at Apollonia, in Illyria, around the time of Julius Caesar’s death in 44 BC. Between 44 and 35, Agrippa assisted first in a successful campaign against Lucius Antonius (*cos ord. 41 BC*) and thereafter held the urban praetorship in 40, conducted two further campaigns in Aquitania and on the Rhine River.

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955 See frag. 1 (*Pliny, NH.*, 2.231.), 2 (ibid., 3.59.), 12 (ibid., 8.6.), 21 (ibid., 12.9.), 22 (ibid., 13.88.), 23 (ibid., 14.54.), 25 (ibid., 19.12.), 30 (ibid., 34.36.) wherein Pliny identifies three consulships.

956 The *fasti* for the 70s is determined by Gallivan. (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 187-191.) For Mucianus’ 70 suffect consulship we have the Fragments XI of the *Fasti Ostienses* which reveal the following text: [IMP.C AES.V ]ESPASIAN[USA UG II T. CAESAR AUG. F.] [IDIB. IAN?]C. LICIN[IUS MUCIANUS II].... [... M.UL]PIUS TR[AIANUS....]. (See Bowersock, G.W., “Syria Under Vespasian.”: 13. for confirmation of the dating of the fragment to 70) Mucianus undoubtedly replaced Vespasian in July of 70 and was in turn replaced relatively soon after by Traianus. In November of the same year as two further suffect consuls are also attested – L. Annius Bassus and C. Laecanius Bassus Caecina Paetus. (*CIL*, 4.200.) Mucianus’ tenure as consul then cannot have been more than a few months. Possibly, he may have stepped down on Vespasian’s suggestion to give way to Traianus. Mucianus’ 72 suffect consulship in concert with T. Flavius Sabinus is attested in two inscriptions (*CIL*, 6.2016., 6.2053.). He appears to have succeeded Vespasian in May of 72.

957 Contra. De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Leader in a Time of Crisis.”: 457. who thinks, with little qualification, that Vespasian lived up to his ‘promises’ and that the Emperor ‘never criticized (Mucianus)’. De Kleijn also appears to think that Mucianus’ dual-consulships during the early 70s were all that was promised from the start and were, furthermore, sufficient compensation in Mucianus’ reckoning.

958 *Pliny, Ep.*, 2.1. for the *summum fastigium* – the so-called pinnacle of the senatorial career.
and received a consulship in 37. In 35-34 he was engaged in the Illyrian Wars as Octavian’s immediate subordinate, serving as a commander within the latter’s victorious fleet at Actium in 31. Subsequently, during Octavian’s absence from Rome after Actium, like Mucianus, Agrippa managed affairs in Rome – albeit in concert with another of Octavian’s lieutenants, Gaius Cilnius Maecenas. The rewards offered to Agrippa for his services both in the field and as administrator of the Roman capital, in contrast with Mucianus, however, were momentous. Co-censor with Octavian in 29-28, he held two further ordinary consulships in 28 and 27, both in concert with Octavian. Thereafter, from 23 onwards, he held consular imperium over, at the very least, the domain of the princeps, both east and west – and he may also have possessed imperium maius over the provinces of the Senate. In 18, his imperium pro consule was extended for five years and he was also granted the tribunicia potestas. If he had not already been granted imperium maius previously, he certainly received it in 13 along with a renewal of his tribuncia potestas – thus combining a series of powers which placed him on almost equal footing with Augustus. The career of the elder Lucius Vitellius (cos ord. 34, II 43, III 47), under the Emperor Claudius, while not as distinguished as Agrippa’s, was nonetheless equally exceptional. Having acquired an

961 The exact nature of Agrippa’s imperium in 23 is uncertain and has been cause for some debate among modern scholars. Dio says nothing of any grant of imperium to Agrippa in 23 however Koenen argues, on the basis of a papyrus fragment detailing Augustus’ funeral laudation of Agrippa, that the latter individual was granted imperium maius in 23. (Koenen, L., “Die "Laudatio funebris" des Augustus für Agrippa auf einem neuen Papyrus (P. Colon. inv. nr. 4701).” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 5 (1970): 217-283.) This conclusion has subsequently been disputed by several authors, including E.W. Gray (Gray, E.W., “The Imperium of M. Agrippa. A Note on P. Colon. inv. nr. 4701.” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 6 (1970): 227). Reinhold, in his earlier biography of Agrippa, instead argues that Agrippa’s consular imperium extended for five years from 23 onwards and covered all but the provinces of the Senate. (Rheinhold, M., Marcus Agrippa: A Biography (New York: Humphrey Press, 1933), 167.)
ordinary consulship in 34, he served as legate of Syria from 35 to 37. Thereafter, having become a trusted colleague of Claudius, he acquired an ordinary consulship in 43 wherein he managed the affairs in Rome while the Emperor was absent in Britannia. In 47-8, he concluded his career with an ordinary third consulship and censorship – both served in concert with Claudius. Even Sejanus, Tiberius’ infamous socius laborum and adiutor imperii might be said to have exceeded Mucianus in some aspects. In 31, he shared the consulship with Tiberius in absentia and otherwise managed Rome during the period of Tiberius’ absence from 26. His career advanced rapidly. During the years preceding 31, he had served only as praefectus praetorio. By 31, however, Sejanus held proconsular authority and may well have been on the cusp of acquiring the tribunicia potestas along with the implicit promise that he would become the heir apparent to Tiberius.

Several factors may account for the fact that Mucianus was not honoured to the same extent as the aforementioned imperial deputies. Initially, it is entirely possible that he simply died too early. One observes that the ‘Corbulonians’ who were honoured under the Flavians received exceptional honours generally from 82 onwards. Thus, for instance, Rutilius Gallicus who, in Eck’s

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963 On Lucius Vitellius the Elder’s career see Josephus, AJ., 18.88-90, 18.97-99, 18.104-105, 18.115-120, 18.125-126., Tacitus, Hist., 1.9., Ann., 12.41., Dio, Hist., 59.26., 60.17, 60.21., Suetonius, Div. Vit., 2. For a comparison between Vitellius and Agrippa, as well as other senators who held the consulship twice see Levick, B., Claudius (United Kingdom: B.T. Batsford Limited, 1990), 95.
964 ‘Partner of his labours’, ‘assistant in power’. (Tacitus, Ann., 4.2., 4.7.)
965 Champlin’s discussion of Sejanus’ status is illuminating. As the author asserts, ‘from the beginning [Sejanus] had magna auctoritas with Tiberius. Tiberius advanced him to summa potentia.’ Champlin argues convincingly that Sejanus constituted more than merely an ‘all-powerful praetorian prefect’ who served as regent in Tiberius’ absence. On the contrary, by January of 31, he was the junior colleague of Tiberius and ‘insofar as the role existed, the heir apparent of the princeps.’ (Champlin, E., “Seianus Augustus.” Chiron 42 (2012): 366f., citing, on Sejanus’ proconsular imperium, Dio, Hist., 58.7., and, on his hope for the tribunicia potestas, Dio, Hist., 58.9, Suetonius, Div Tib., 65.)
966 That is, to say, ordinary consulships and proconsular appointments, although propraetorian legateships are on record for the 70s.
reckoning, served as *proconsul provinciae Asiae II* in 82/83 and 83/84. Thereafter, he became *consul II* in 85, as a reward for his services as proconsul and, subsequently, took up the office of *praefectus urbi* during the latter half of the 80s.\(^{967}\) Similarly, Titus Aurelius Fulvus, who became *consul II ordinarius* ca. 85 and *praefectus urbi* at an indeterminate date.\(^{968}\) Perhaps, then, Mucianus simply delayed a proconsular appointment until he had achieved his third consulship and, given that he served as the most senior member of the Corbulonian group, might have expected such an appointment during the latter half of the 70s at the very latest. There is one case which makes this assumption problematic however. M. Vettius Bolanus, the *legatus Augusti pro praetore provinciae Britanniae* who Mucianus had been in contact with early in 69 and who would later tardily dispatch reinforcements to Vitellius, acquired the position of *proconsul provinciae Asiae* ca. 75-6.\(^{969}\) This latter appointment is peculiar on two counts. First, because Bolanus’ contribution to the Flavian uprising cannot have been considered more significant than Mucianus’. Second, because the timing of Bolanus’ proconsular governorship is especially strange given that Mucianus was in an ideal position to take responsibility for the command personally. Mucianus had both experience in the region by virtue of his earlier appointment as governor of the neighbouring province of Lycia-Pamphylia and he had already completed his third consulship three years prior.\(^{970}\)

Consequently, an alternative explanation beckons. It is more likely that the dearth of honours offered to Mucianus is indicative of a key difference between Vespasian and the members of the

\(^{967}\) On Rutilius Gallicus see ‘2.5 Mucianus’ Governorship of Lycia-Pamphilia’ and ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’. See also no. 450. The assumption that his second consulship functioned as a reward for his services as proconsul comes from Eck (Eck, W., “Eck, W., “Statius Silvae I.4 und C. Rutilius Gallicus als Proconsul Asiae II.” 481.)

\(^{968}\) See no. 332, 436.


\(^{970}\) One also notes that a proconsulship around this time would have almost flawlessly coincided with the normal ten-year gap between a consulship and a proconsular appointment.
Julio-Claudian line. This divergence was one of succession and, more specifically, the fact that Vespasian was the first of the Emperors to rise to power already with an adult son who might serve as the imperial heir. Augustus had no offspring to speak of in 23 BC, when the question of imperial succession was first seriously considered and Agrippa first received his proconsulship; and he even expressed a preference that Agrippa should serve as his successor-designate. Claudius, upon his accession in 41, had only his young son Britannicus who would not reach manhood until 55. In fact, Claudius did not seriously consider the question of succession until after the conspiracy of Messalina and Silius in 48, whereupon he adopted the more reliable prospect in the form of Nero. By contrast, Vespasian appears to have decided relatively early on that the Flavian succession would be strictly determined along hereditary lines – albeit following the Augustan pattern of setting up another as a secondary princeps prior to his death. In early 70, Tacitus has Vespasian allocating powers between himself and Titus in a manner which recalls the division of responsibility between Augustus and Tiberius after 4 AD. Titus was to ‘aggrandise the State by war and deeds of arms’ while Vespasian would deal with domestic concerns. From 70 onwards,

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971 By 70, Titus was thirty-one and and Domitian twenty.
972 And, in fact, never would thanks to his death early in the year.
973 Prior to 48, Claudius had little reason to fear an immediate rivalry between his biological son and the much older Vitellius given that the elder Vitellius was well into his mid-50s by the time of his third consulship. The case might have been different had Nero been in play prior to 48 or if Valeria Messalina and Gaius Silius had revealed their hand earlier. Even so, Vitellius’ health deteriorated after 48 and he died soon after in 51. (Suetonius, Div. Vit., 3. And Syme, R., Tacitus, 415. on his public funeral) Nor is there evidence that Vitellius aimed at supreme power despite the specious charges brought against him by Junius Lupus in 51. (Levick, B., Claudius, 75.) Claudius, in the meantime, took steps to magnify the prestige of Nero soon after his adoption in 51 – along with an extraordinary proconsulship he also acquired membership of each of the priestly colleges which each Emperor enjoyed. (Tacitus, Ann., 12.41. and RIC, vol. 1, 125, n. 76; 129, n. 107. for coinage depicting a decree co-opting Nero as supernumerary member of the augural and pontifical colleges and as a member of the septemviri epulonum and quindecemviri sacris faciundis)
975 Levick, B., Vespasian, 185. citing Tacitus, Hist., 4.52.
Titus received extraordinary honours. He took up one of the eponymous consulships of 70 in absentia and, during the remainder of the 70s, he virtually monopolized the consulatus ordinarius along with his father.\footnote{As far as can be determined, the sole exceptions to the Flavian monopoly of the ordinary consulship prior to Mucianus’ death ca. 77 came in 71 and 73, wherein three other individuals are attested as consules ordinarii. (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”: 187-189.) The first of these individuals was Domitian who, seemingly, only took up the ordinary consulship in 73 as a result of the fact that his brother and father were occupied with the censorship during the same year. (see no. 978) Otherwise, we have the future Emperor Marcus Cocceius Nerva (PIR2, C, 1227.) who served as consul ordinarius with Vespasian in 71. (CIL, 6.10, 6.11.) We also have one Lucius Valerius Catullus Messallinus (cos ord. 73, suff. II 85) who served with Domitian in the same capacity in 73. (PIR1, V, 41., CIL, 5.7236.) The significance of these latter two anomalous ordinarii should not be overstated. Both were conspicuously unthreatening men who, in Syme’s words, were ‘smooth and acceptable persons’ and ‘useful in Senate or cabinet but not (so far as known) governors of any consular provinces’. (Syme, R., Tacitus, 594.) Both men were of high birth and had connections to the Julio-Claudian house. Nerva too was likely an earlier amicus of Vespasian during the reign of Nero and was possibly also responsible for watching over Domitian while his father resided in the East. (Suet, Div. Dom., 1.1.) Murison also speculates that Nerva may have been an early supporter of the Flavians and ‘worked quietly on Vespasian’s behalf in the latter part of 69’. (Murison, C.L., “M. Cocceius Nerva and the Flavians.” Transactions of the American Philological Association 133 (2003): 147-150.) That Nerva received the ordinary consulship in 71 in concert with Vespasian was likely merely a result of the fact that Titus was still absent from the capital at the beginning of the year and Vespasian judged that a second consecutive consulship held in absentia would be a needless impropriety. Furthermore, Messalinus’ appearance in the fasti as Domitian’s partner in 73 can perhaps simply be put down to an inoffensive concession to Domitian on the part of Vespasian. Judging by Messalinus’ later role as a notorious member of Domitian’s advisory council the former individual was a close friend of Domitian in 73. (Tacitus, Agr., 45.1, Pliny, Ep., 4.22.5., Juvenal, Sat., 4.113-122.)} Subsequently, in 73-4, Titus held the censorship in concert with Vespasian.\footnote{Hence, in Josephus’ account, Titus and Vespasian are depicted as riding side-by-side in the traditional four-hourse chariots at the rear of the procession. Both are dressed in purple and are wearing laurel crowns. (Josephus, BJ., 7124. And 121-157. for the entire triumph)} Through Titus, the link between the equestrian order and the Principate was formalized and, as previously noted, he took up the mantle of the praefectus praetorio.\footnote{Vespasian and Titus’ censorship is known from inscriptions from Baetica (CIL, 2.1049, 2.1050) and coins. (RIC, vol. 2, 532-562. and RIC, vol. 2, 643-670) For both Titus and Vespasian, censor remained part of their official titles – for Vespasian see the military diplomas contained within CIL, 1.16. and for Titus see, for instance, his coins issued in 77-78 (RIC, vol. 2, 780-790.) and military diplomas from the years 79-81. (CIL, 16.24.)} Apart from the prefecture, his simultaneous accumulation of both the consulship and...
the title *princeps iuventutis* was only broadly speaking in line with the precedent set by earlier Emperors. The end result was that, from July 71, Titus functioned essentially as co-regent, much as the model of Agrippa and Tiberius, although, as Levick notes, he ‘lacked an independent administrative apparatus’. In Vespasian’s scheme, there was no room for other imperial colleagues – not even his younger son. Domitian was forced to accept the position of potential future heir of Titus, rather than that of a third imperial colleague. In the 70s he held only suffect consulships, with the exception of a single ordinary consulship in 73. Moreover, while Titus’ portrait appears on obverses of coinage as holder of the tribunician power in 71, Domitian would have to wait until 73. Other titles are also on record, Domitian was *augur, frater arvalis, magister frater arvalium, pontifex and sacerdos collegiorum omnium* – reflecting, at least in part, (Dio, Hist., 60.9.), new prefectures (Tacitus, Ann., 12.23.) and granted praetorian prefects with the ornaments of a consular post. (Dio, Hist., 60.23.) Claudius, along with his legates, was also granted powers to establish treaties with the power of the Senate as well as the people of Rome. (Dio, Hist., 60.23.) If there was any ambiguity concerning Claudius’ affiliation with the equestrian order, however, there certainly was none with Titus’. The relationship between the imperial family and the equestrian order was rendered tangible through his advancement to the supreme equestrian post.

When Gaius and Nero received this title, it was only with the promise of a consulship within the following years. (Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 187.) Hence, Gaius ceased to be *princeps iuventutis* when he received the consulship in 1 AD. (Swan, P.M., *The Augustan Succession: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio’s Roman History Books 55-56 (9 B.C.-A.D. 14)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 90. Cf. for the title in general, Beringer, W., “Princeps Iuventutis,” in *RE*, vol. 22.2 (1954), 2296-2311.)

Levick describes these latter honours as ‘gross and historically inconsistent’. (Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 187.)

Thus, he became analogous to Gaius and Lucius Caesar in 5 BC – 2 AD. (ibid., 188) Although, if the previous suggestion that Vespasian intended Titus to be succeeded by the children of Domitian and Domitia Longina is correct (‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’), the Emperor may have anticipated that Domitian’s line would continue the succession rather than Titus’.

See no. 976.

Further, while Titus discarded the title of *princeps iuventutis* within two years, Domitian retained it. (ibid., 188.) Cf. *MW*, 117., BMCRE, vol. 2, 29, n. 154-156.; 46-47, n. 260-270.; 66, n. 73.; 100, n. 481., *RIC*, vol. 2, 4, n. 233.; 42, n. 239.; 43, n. 243-246.; 60, n. 380.; 100, n. 728. The significance of this is not immediately clear. However, it is evident that a similar strategy was used by Gaius to abstract his cousin, Tiberius Gemellus, who had been left as co-heir in Tiberius’ will, from power. Gaius declared that he was too young to rule and conferred upon him the title that Gaius and Lucius Caesar had shared. Gemellus was shortly afterwards disposed of. (Levick, B., *Tiberius the Politician*, 177, 220., cf. Suetonius, *Div. Gai.*, 15., Dio, *Hist.*, 59.8.)
the honours handed down to Nero after 50. Additionally, given our earlier observations concerning Domitian’s appointment as praetor urbanus consular cum imperio, it is also possible that he was appointed praetor and given a five-year consular imperium sine provincia, on the model of earlier precedents set by the Julio-Claudians – which might also explain his disappointment at being barred from assisting Volgaeses in 75. Even so, the ultimate indication of his lot came in the form of his father’s will – from which he still received no tribunicia potestas, nor any further honours.

Mucianus, then, presented as something of an inconvenience to Vespasian after 70. His usefulness as an administrator had ceased upon Vespasian’s arrival in the capital and bestowing further honours on the amicus would signal too overtly that he had played an indispensable and decisive role in the Flavian uprising through both gathering allies to the Flavian cause and managing the capital in Vespasian’s absence. Additionally, regardless of Mucianus’ intention to compete for imperial power, or lack thereof, it would also have the inadvertent effect of setting Mucianus up as a potential future rival of Titus. Already in 70, Mucianus had a head-start over the successor-

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985 The evidence for Domitian’s titles is contained within Jones, B.W., “Preparation for the Principate.” La parola del passato 139 (1971): 269, n. 38-44.
986 Suetonius, Div. Dom., 2.2. Given that Domitian’s urban praetorship must have expired within a year, if he made a serious attempt to procure the Parthian command, as Suetonius suggests, a pre-existing (pro)consular appointment would seem logical. It would certainly follow on from the earlier suggestion that Domitian’s initial appointment as praetor urbanus served as a contingency plan in the event of a disaster befalling Vespasian and Titus. We know that there was a precedent for Imperial princes holding consular imperium without a military commission. For instance, Nero, as consul-elect, received a proconsulate without a formal provincia in 51. (Tacitus, Ann., 12.41.) A similar model might also have applied to Nero Claudius Drusus Germanicus (cos ord. 9 BC) and Tiberius Julius Caesar – the latter held the praetura urbana (and was perhaps in turn invested with quinquennial imperia consularia) from 16 until 11 BC, whereupon the office was transferred to Drusus. (Dio, Hist., 54.19.)
987 Domitian’s frustration is epitomized by his accusation that Titus had tampered with the document. (Suetonius, Div. Dom., 2.) Titus was supposedly an expert forger. (Suetonius, Div. Tit., 3.2.)
988 An impression which would only be magnified by the fact that Titus was entirely absent from Rome until 71.
989 Vespasian was, to a certain extent, right to be wary. Even discounting the dubious conspiracy allegedly effected by the trusted man Eprius Marcellus (Suetonius, Div. Tit., 6.2., Dio, Hist., 16.3-4.), Suetonius also informs us that Vespasian’s reign was rife with conspiracy. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 25.)
designate in terms of his previous suffect consulship and two propraetorian legateships; and he had also received the *ornamenta triumphalia*. By virtue of his association with Corbulo, Mucianus also still held connections to some of the most powerful men of the state. By 71, the likes of Rutilius Gallicus, Aulus Marius Celsus (*cos suff*. 69) and M. Vettius Bolanus each held provincial propraetorian legateships and probably also the promise of further consulships and proconsular appointments. Vespasian may have served as the benefactor of these men from 70 onwards, but the Emperor’s death might easily see Corbulo’s former *clientes* seek Mucianus out as recourse. Nor did Mucianus help his own position. On several occasions we hear that he boasted both publicly and privately that he was personally responsible for conveying the Empire to Vespasian. The honours handed down to Mucianus were thus carefully considered so that the imperial succession would never be in doubt. In fact, if one is to examine the *fasti* for the first half of the 70s AD – a clear order of honours is evident. By 76 AD, Vespasian was *consul VII*, Titus *consul V* and Domitian *consul IV*. Mucianus then followed as the sole *consul III*. Vespasian’s nephew, T. Flavius Sabinus, along with Cerealis and Eprius Marcellus functioned as the next ‘tier’ – each serving as consuls for the second time.

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991 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.4. and see Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 13 and Dio, *Hist.*, 66.13. for Mucianus’ rude assertion of his services and his demand for honours. Others had met ignominious fates for daring to boast in such a manner to the Emperor. Gaius Silius Aulus Caecina Largus (*cos ord*. 13) made the mistake of asserting that Tiberius owed his throne to the fidelity of Silius’ legions in 14 AD. His boast gained him no favour during Sejanus’ treason trials and, faced with overwhelming numbers of false witnesses declaring that he had pillaged the Gallic provinces, he committed suicide in 24 AD. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 4.18-19.) A similar fate befell the elder Gaius Vibius Serenus, who was exiled to Amorgos after being condemned for provincial maladministration. (ibid., 4.13.) Tacitus records that Serenus incurred the disfavor of Tiberius after he asserted that the *princeps* was in his debt for his previous services. (ibid., 4.29.)

4.11 Rationalising Mucianus’ Support for the Flavian Cause

It is unsurprising, in light of our previous discussions, that Mucianus has been frequently termed as the ‘kingmaker’ by modern historians. As Tacitus explicitly informs us, Mucianus was more inclined to bestow the imperial power than to hold it. It is only natural to see in Mucianus and Vespasian’s relationship the example established by Agrippa and Augustus some decades earlier. The similarities are patent. Both Agrippa and Mucianus served as deputies in a devastating civil war, both were judicious administrators and talented diplomats, and both allegedly eschewed personal ambitions in favour of supporting another’s claim to power. Yet, while Mucianus could only claim to act as Vespasian’s associate in the supreme power, through Agrippa, the role was formalised through a simultaneous endowment of the five-year power of imperium proconsulare and the tribunicia potestas. Why, then, did Mucianus accept the role of ‘kingmaker’? De Kleijn, in her 2009 article, largely follows Tacitus’ account of the motives which Mucianus attributes directly to himself – namely, in her words, the ‘recovery of the res publica’ and, by extension, his ‘opinion that the state would be best served by Titus as Emperor’.

993 Levick (Levick, B., Vespasian, 53.) disputes L. Homo’s assertion that Mucianus lacked ambition and instead suggests that Mucianus, made the realistic choice of supporting Vespasian – ‘with the chance of substantial gains, and of being swept away’. Wellesley, meanwhile, states that ‘his talent for diplomacy, intrigue and organization was employed to make an Emperor of another, not of himself’. (Wellesley, K., The Year of the Four Emperors, 117.)

994 Tacitus, Hist., 1.10.

995 Mucianus claimed the role of an associate in imperial power (ibid., 2.77.) but held no formal authority after Vespasian’s arrival in 70. (cf. above) Agrippa’s role as socius potestatis was formalised through a grant of tribunician potestas and a renewal of imperium proconsulare for five years. (Tacitus, Ann., 3.56., Cf. Dio, Hist., 54.12., Southern, P., Augustus, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge), 209-10 for a summary of the various arguments over the nature of Agrippa’s imperium) Mucianus received the ‘short end of the stick’ however Tacitus highlights the futility of an imperial ‘colleague’ in no uncertain terms. Hence, in the case of Agrippa, Tacitus notes, somewhat cynically, id summi fastigii vocabulum Augustus repperit, ne regis aut dictatoris nomen adsumeret ac tamen appellatione aliqua cetera imperia praemineret. (‘This was a phrase which Augustus devised as a designation of supremacy, so that without assuming the name of king or dictator he might have some title to mark his elevation above all other authority.’ – Tacitus, Ann., 3.56.) Designating a socius potestatis is a convenient method of hiding the true nature of the emperor’s power: dominatio. (cf. Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 324.) Both Agrippa and Augustus could well have held essentially identical executive powers, but the real auctoritas lay with Augustus.

thoughts on the matter of Flavian accession, however, was likely not even half so high-minded. Several factors should be highlighted. Initially, from the point of view of military resources, Mucianus was in a disadvantageous position. One observes that, by the beginning of 69, both Vespasian and Mucianus directly controlled three legions each, and were thus superficially on equal footing. Another consideration intervenes, however – namely, Tiberius Alexander, the praefectus Aegypti, who controlled another two legions. Referring back to our previous discussion concerning the organisation of the Eastern legions, it is likely that it was Mucianus, perhaps in concert with Titus, who made the initial diplomatic overture to Alexander after February of 69. On the other hand, there are hints that Alexander’s aspirations conformed more readily with Vespasian’s elevation, rather than Mucianus’. A partially-extant papyrus document from the period 70 until ca. 130, which perhaps originally took the form of an epicrisis certificate, offers significant evidence for the career of Alexander during and after 70 AD:

997 See ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’.
Although fragmentary, the document reveals a subsequent office after Alexander’s Egyptian prefecture – that of the praefectus praetorio. Two central interpretations of this document have arisen in modern years. The first, epitomised by Renier, assumes that ἐπάρχου πραιτωρίου

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constitutes the official title of Alexander’s position in Titus’ staff during the Jewish war. This initial interpretation is attended by Josephus’ description of Alexander as πάντων τῶν στρατευμάτων ἐπάρχοντος. The second major interpretation, advanced by Turner, asserts that the document instead refers to a later appointment wherein Alexander became prefect of the Praetorian Guard in Rome – in concert with Titus after 71. Probably, the latter scenario is more likely. As Turner highlights, it would have been a radical innovation to give Alexander the title of praefectus praetorio in the East – whether to standardize his de facto position as second-in-command under Titus or to imbue him with special delegated military authority. Additionally, a further inscription from Aradus, attributed by some to Pliny the Elder, refers to Alexander only as ἐπάρχου τῶν Ἰουδαίων στρατοῦ, with no sign of the term πραιτωρίου. The exclusion of any reference to Alexander’s role as praefectus praetorio in the latter inscription, especially when it is explicitly linked to the Judaean command, would be particularly strange if, in fact, he had served as such.

1000 ‘The commander [under the general] of the whole army’. (Josephus, BJ, 6.237.)
1002 Ibid., 62. The title would have required an explicit delegation of imperium from Vespasian himself. As Turner observes, later praetorian prefects would command on the frontiers, sometimes in concert with their Emperors, or with a ‘delegated command vice principis’. Thus, the case of Fuscus under Domitian (Suetonius, Div. Dom., 6.1.) and Tiberius Iulius Castricius Saturninus Claudius Livianus (PIR2, C, 913.), the amicus of Trajan and Hadrian (SHA, Had., 4.2.), who served as Trajan’s praefectus praetorio who also served on the frontier and went with Sura to arrange the submission of Decebalus. Even so, there were no praetorian cohorts fighting in the war in Judaea, nor was the princeps himself there in person. It is difficult to see any rationale for such a delegation on the part of an Emperor who habitually avoided radical innovation.
1003 MW, 330 = IGLS, 7.4011. Mommsen reconstructs the inscription and designates Alexander as praefectus exercitus Judaici. (Mommsen, T., “Eine Inschrift des Älteren Plinius.” Hermes 19 (1884), 645.) His reconstruction is followed by Burr (Burr, V., Tiberius Iulius Alexander (Bonn: R. Habelt, 1995), 67f. The latter author, it should be noted, is apparently unaware of the existence of the aforementioned papyrus document.
1004 Turner notes that, if one assumes that Josephus simply gives an abridged version of a Latin title such as praefectus omnium exercituum qui sunt in Judaea, then this latter inscription can easily be made to cohere with the former’s text. (Turner, E.G., “Tiberivs Ivlivs Alexander.”: 62.)
Whichever interpretation inspires confidence, Alexander must have realised early on that it would be expedient to attach himself to Titus, rather than Mucianus. He could render his services to Titus and Vespasian in the Judaean War and achieve a personal attachment to the younger prince along with the promise of a future appointment as *praefectus praetorio*. It is also possible that he anticipated a share of the *ornamenta triumphalia* during Titus’ triumph of 71 and, otherwise, adlection into the Senate. Alexander’s personal relationships made him admirably suited to ingratiating himself with Titus, more so than Mucianus, and he probably recognised as much. Even discounting his possible connection, by proxy, with Vespasian through the house of Claudius and

1005 Alexander’s later acquisition of the praetorian prefecture anticipates the changing hierarchy of the equestrian posts during the Flavian period. Thereafter, the *praefectus Aegypti* would no longer serve as the *fastigium equestre* and would instead be replaced by the office of *praefectus praetorio* in Rome. (Sablayrolles, R., *“Fastigium equestre. Les grades prefectures équestres,”* in S. Demougin, H. Devijver, M-T., Rapsaet-Charlier (eds.), L’Ordre Equestre: Histoire d’une Aristocratie (Rome: Ile Siécle Av. J.-C. – IIe Siécle AP. J.-C., 1995), 368f.) Alexander had good reasons for coveting the office in Rome in his own right. For one, he may have desired the influence and extended powers that had been demonstrated to be within the grasp of a *praefectus praetorio* in late 68 and 69. Cornelius Laco had apparently held an unhealthy level of influence over Galba (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 1.6.) while Plotius Firmus and Licinius Procclus rose to the post seemingly through the influence of the soldiery alone. (ibid., 1.46.) Probably, also, Alexander sought to dispel the disadvantages afforded by his status as both an Alexandrian and of Jewish origin. His entire known career up until this point consists of appointments in the Eastern half of the Empire—beginning with the position of *epistrategus* of the Thebaid ca. 42. (*OGIS*, 663.) It is therefore likely that Alexander foresaw an opportunity to insert himself into the ruling classes in the capital. That he eventually succeeded in doing so is evidenced by the appearance of another Tiberius Julius Alexander Iulianus in the sources, probably the son or grandson of the Egyptian prefect, who served as praetorian legate under Trajan. (Turner, E.G., “Tiberivs Ivlivs Alexander.”: 63., Dio, *Hist.*, 68.30., *CIL*, 6.32374.)

1006 This suggestion is derived from Juvenal, *Sat.*, 1.131. Although the individual here is generally accepted to be Alexander, it is unclear from the author’s wording whether he in fact had a share of the *ornamenta triumphalia* or is simply being criticized for ‘hob-nobbing with the triumphales’. (Turner, E.G., “Tiberivs Ivlivs Alexander.”: 63.) That Alexander was allowed the right to a statue and an inscription in the Forum invariably suggests the affirmative, however. Certainly, Nero was subject to the criticism from Suetonius that he handed out triumphal honours to those of quaestorian rank and even equestrians. (Suetonius, *Div. Ner.*, 15.) It is perhaps likely that Vespasian followed the model of Claudius (Dio, *Hist.*, 60.23.) wherein, contemporaneously with his triumph, the latter Emperor handed out more special honours to those of lower rank than was strictly appropriate. Referring back to an alleged Augustan precedent, Claudius adlected the praetorian prefect Rufrius Pollio into the Senate, offered the same reward to the equestrian procurator Publius Graecinius Laco (along with the *ornamenta consularia* as confirmed by *CIL*, 5.3370 = *ILS*, 1336.) and honoured the imperial freedman Marcus Antonius Pallas with the *ornamenta praetoria*. It would not be excessively outside the boundaries of normality if Alexander was offered a seat in the Senate along with the *ornamenta triumphalia* and, perhaps, the *ornamenta consularia* – a reward which would have aptly suited his ambitions.
Antonia Minor, he was the brother of the former husband of Berenice and a friend of Agrippa II; and perhaps also he was responsible for facilitating or promoting the liaison between Titus and the princess. Nor would Vespasian have disapproved of the pairing between the two men. Alexander offered military expertise born of his extensive experience under Corbulo and perhaps also as a result of an earlier, unknown, military post in the Eastern half of the Empire. If nothing else, the older Alexander could offer a temporising influence over the impetuous and inexperienced Titus. It is likely that Alexander, recognising the potential benefits of a close attachment to Titus, resolved to align himself and, by extension, the two legions which he commanded, with Vespasian early in 69. This development was either foreseen by or quickly revealed to Mucianus through the latter’s presumed communications with the Egyptian prefect after February. Either way, Alexander’s alignment with Vespasian tipped the balance of power away from Mucianus toward the Flavians. The amicus could only reckon the immediate support of three legions versus the combined five of Alexander and Vespasian.

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[1007] See also ‘2.7 Mucianus’ Syrian Command’. It is difficult to discern the extent to which Alexander might have encouraged or tolerated Titus’ more odious behavior – particularly with reference to the latter’s relationship with Berenice. Tacitus either neglected to give a character sketch of Alexander or he did so in book five or six of the Historiae and it has been lost. Turner thinks that Alexander might be implicitly included in Suetonius’ uncomplimentary remarks at Div Tit., 7. (Turner, E.G., “Tiberivs Ivlivs Alexander.”: 64.)

[1008] If one can be assumed between the years of 42 and 63.

[1009] B.W. Jones’ assessment of Titus’ role in the Jewish War is enlightening. Contrary to the impression given by Josephus, Titus’ military achievements during the first two years of the campaign were minimal and, in most of the five sieges wherein he was present (Jotapata, Japha, Tarichaeae, Gamala and Gischala), his role in the victory ‘was earlier nominal or else subsidiary’. In most cases, Vespasian dispatched the senior officers, Traianus and Cerialis, to take care of the most important tasks. (cf. Josephus, BJ, 4.450. on Traianus subjugation of Peraea and ibid., 3.310-315, 4.552-554. on Cerialis’ campaign against the Samaritans and Idumeans) The only instance of Titus serving as sole commander of a siege during 67-68 was at the small town of Gischala – wherein he botched the operation, allowing the rebels to flee to safety. (Josephus, BJ, 4.116.) Hence, as Jones notes, Vespasian understood the importance of providing his son with a reliable and experienced deputy prior to handing over the command of the war to Titus. Alexander was an ideal candidate. (Jones, B.W., “Titus in Judaea, A.D. 67.” Latomus 48:1 (1989): 127-134.)
There are further observations to be made. As highlighted in the previous chapter, Nicols’ suggestion that the loyalty of the legion *III Gallica* was firmly entrenched in Vespasian’s camp is unfounded.\footnote{Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 114. Cf. ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’. That Tacitus excludes Mucianus or any other intermediary in his assertion of the relationship between *III Gallica* and Vespasian in 69: *tertiam legionem, quod e Syria in Moesiam transisset, suam numerabat* (*The third legion, as it had passed over from Syria to Moesia, Vespasian counted upon as devoted to himself* – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.74.), is not indicative of any particular personal relationship between the future Emperor and the legion but is likely instead simply a statement about the shifting loyalties of the third legion and, by extension, the remainder of the Danubian legions towards the Flavian camp, despite their outward appearance to the contrary.}

Even so, though it was thanks to Mucianus’ efforts that Vespasian could reckon the third legion as *suam*, the loyalty of Corbulo’s former associates had only been secured through the *amicus’* promises that Vespasian would provide patronage.\footnote{See ‘3.5 Mucianus and the Organisation of the Eastern Legions’.} Furthermore, at least by mid-69, following his successful campaigns in Judaea, Vespasian was the more attractive candidate to the soldiers of the eastern armies.\footnote{Cf. Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 115.} In the first place, if the Syrian legions held any doubts concerning Vespasian’s military ability in 67, he had quickly rectified any possible concerns about his present capabilities with his successes in Judaea. Both Tacitus and Josephus construct an image of Vespasian as an ideal commander. In Tacitus’ account, Vespasian balances *fortitudo*, *ratio* and *consilium*.\footnote{Tacitus has Antonius Primus cite *ratio* (‘reason’) and *consilium* (‘deliberation’) as the essential qualities of a general. (Ash, R. (ed.), *Tacitus: Histories Book II*, 87. citing Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.20.) Cf. Cicero, *De Re Pub.*, 3.18. wherein Cicero attributes the same traits to Pompey.} He marches at the front of the formation but does not engage the enemy directly unless the occasion demands it. He dresses as a common soldier, carefully chooses the location of the camp and remains energetic in warfare by day or night.\footnote{Vespasianus acer militiae anteire agmen, locum castris capere, noctu duque consilio ac, si res posceret, manu hostibus obniti, cibo fortuito, veste habituque vix a gregario milite discrepans. (*Vespasian was an energetic soldier; he could march at the head of his army, choose the place for his camp, and bring by night and day his skill, or, if the occasion required, his personal courage to oppose the foe.* – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.5.) Vespasian here demonstrates *prudentia* (‘foresight’), *fortitudo* (‘fortitude’, ‘courage’) and *simplicitas* (‘modesty’). (Cf. Cicero, *De Off.*, 1.15, 1.19-23.)} Much of Tacitus’ description...
parallels that already afforded to Corbulo. Vespasian, like Corbulo, is included among the ranks of the *viri militares* – a resonant term elsewhere applied to men with exceptional expertise and reputation in warfare. Vespasian’s exemplary military qualities are also borne out in Josephus’ account of the Jewish campaign. So, Josephus introduces Vespasian into his account with a record of the general’s past military achievements. Thereafter, Vespasian demonstrates strategic expertise and martial skill alike. He takes a cautious approach to siege warfare and carefully deliberates upon the plan of attack. In the face of defeat, he rouses the morale of the troops and offers pragmatic advice for renewed efforts. On multiple occasions, Josephus depicts the general fighting at the front and, in one instance, being wounded – prompting genuine alarm from the surrounding soldiers.

Considerably less important than Vespasian’s palpable military ability demonstrated in his Judaean campaigns, but possibly still relevant, is the influence of his earlier military achievements and, more specifically, the impact on the Eastern legions of Vespasian being *senex triumphalis* as a

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1015 In Tacitus’ account, Corbulo associates directly with the soldiers, clothes himself in a simple fashion and maintains strict discipline in the camp. (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.35.) He is capable of detecting treachery among his enemies (ibid, 13.38., cf. Frontinus, *Strat.*, 2.1.17. for Vespasian’s similar quality). He chooses his plan of attack carefully and leads the assault on the strongest fortress (Tacitus, *Ann.*, 13.39.).


1017 Josephus, *BJ.*, 3.4-7.

1018 Ibid., 3.161f.

1019 Ibid., 4.39-49.

1020 Vespasian advances with the infantry: ibid., 31.150-151. Vespasian fights at the front and stands his ground in the face of imminent danger: ibid., 4.31. Vespasian is wounded with an arrow to the foot, causing a commotion among the Romans: ibid., 3.238. Not so for Agrippa, who is also wounded, but the soldiers display more concern for their own welfare than their commanding officer: ibid., 4.14. Cf. Suetonius, *Div Vesp.*, 3. for Vespasian engaging the enemy personally, being wounded, and in danger of being struck by arrows.
result of the Claudian invasion of Britain. As Nicols notes, Tacitus refers to this honour on two separate occasions – first, during Mucianus’ speech at Carmel in June of 69, wherein the legate lays emphasis on the fact that he reckoned Vespasian superior to himself, first and foremost because Vespasian was a triumphalis.\(^\text{1021}\) The second mention of the honour appears during the year 70, when, during a senatorial debate, Eprius Marcellus stresses Vespasian’s auctoritas by naming him senex triumphalio.\(^\text{1022}\) In Nicols’ reckoning, the use of this term in these contexts is more than mere coincidence. In the first case, it is employed by Mucianus himself at the critical moment of the decision to revolt, and, in the second instance, it is used to highlight the first discussion of Vespasian and his powers in the Senate.\(^\text{1023}\) This is, however, again an overstatement. If our earlier assumptions about the unrest in the Eastern legions are correct then Vespasian’s status as senex triumphalis may not have been of any particular interest to the soldiers. On the other hand, we also know that Domitius Corbulo, like Vespasian, was recalled by Claudius in 47 and granted the ornamenta, ostensibly because the Emperor feared that Corbulo would instigate another Germanic war.\(^\text{1024}\) It is likely, therefore, that Mucianus’ original allusion to Vespasian’s accomplishment was simply intended to function as a point of comparison between the two generals – primarily for the benefit of the Eastern legati.\(^\text{1025}\) Nevertheless, Vespasian’s capabilities and reputation as a military commander should not be doubted. The available evidence suggests that he was an able leader, maintained an excellent cadre of officers and was adept at cultivating popularity among the soldiery. By contrast, short of a brief stint under Corbulo, Mucianus did not

\(^{1021}\) Tacitus, Hist., 2.77.
\(^{1022}\) Ibid., 4.8., Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 116.
\(^{1023}\) Ibid.
\(^{1024}\) Tacitus, Ann., 11.19-20.
\(^{1025}\) That Vespasian’s achievements in Britain resonated with the legati is confirmed by Dio: ‘his reputation won in Britain, his fame derived from the war under way, his kindheartedness and prudence, all led them to desire to have him at their head.’ (Dio, Hist., 65.9.)
have a great deal of recent military experience – and he could only claim the *ornamenta trimphalia* late in 69 on somewhat dubious grounds.\(^{1026}\) In fact, Tacitus pointedly characterises Mucianus in a manner antithetical to a *vir militaris*. Hence, Mucianus’ eloquence and his calculated manoeuvring of the *legati* at Carmel and populace at Antioch contrasts directly with Vespasian’s silence during the entire affair.\(^{1027}\) In Tacitus’ account, he displays finesse in civilian affairs and is distinguished, not through military action, but through his capabilities in matters of money and government.\(^{1028}\)

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\(^{1026}\) It should be clarified here – what Mucianus lacked was a military reputation. We should be wary of dismissing Mucianus’ military ability entirely. (cf. Nicols, J., *Vespasian and the partes Flavianae*, 117.) It is true that Tacitus lays heavy emphasis on the *amicus*’ rhetorical talents but Corbulo was not known for producing incapable generals. At the very least, Vespasian must have had sufficient faith in Mucianus’ abilities to support his candidature as head of the Flavian vanguard. Political expediency should have only counted for so much. Failure to defeat Vitellius in the field entailed deadly consequences – not only for Mucianus, but also for Vespasian himself, along with his offspring.

\(^{1027}\) Mucianus summons Vespasian to *imperium* in a magnificent fashion, prompting the *legati* to encourage Vespasian to the endeavour. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.76-78. Cf. ‘3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel’) Later, Mucianus is depicted as actively cajoling the crowd at Antioch to great effect. Meanwhile, in Judaea, Vespasian’s reputation among the soldiery does the work for him and he only responds after the salutations in a ‘soldier-like fashion’. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.80. cf. ‘3.6 The Meeting at Mount Carmel’ for Vespasian’s ‘silence’) Hence, also, Corbulo who speaks *multa auctoritate, quae viro militari pro facundia erat.* (‘with much authority, which in him, as a military man, was as good as eloquence.’ – Tacitus, *Ann.*, 15.26.) The ‘military man’ Subrius Flavus is effective but blunt: *ipsa rettuli verba, quia non, ut Senecae, vulgata erant, nec minus nosci debeat militaris viri sensus incomptos et validos,* (‘I have given the man’s very words, because they were not, like those of Seneca, generally published, though the rough and vigorous sentiments of a soldier ought to be no less known.’ – ibid., 15.67.) Aemilius is an enthusiastic but poor orator: *Aemilius e militari viris, dum studio probandi cuncta refert et quamquam inter obstrepentis magna adserentis magna adseveratione militur.* (‘Aemilius, a military man, in his eagerness to prove the case, repeated the whole story and amid angry clamour struggled on with loud assertion.’ – ibid., 4.42.) Military men are envied and disliked by civilians: *Ceterum uti militare nomen, grave inter otiosos, aliis virtutibus temperaret…* (‘For the rest, in order that he might mitigate by other merits the offence to civilians of a soldier’s fame…’ – Tacitus, *Agr.*, 40.) However, Mucianus is adept at appealing to their sensibilities: *tum Antiochensium theatrum ingressus, ubi illis consultare mos est, concurrentis et in adulationem effusos adloquitur, satis decorum et Graeca facundia, omniumque quae diceret et ageret arte quadam ostentator.* (‘Then he entered the theatre at Antioch, where it is customary for the citizens to hold their public deliberations, and as they crowded together with profitable expressions of flattery, he addressed them. He could speak Greek with considerable grace, and in all that he did and said he had the art of displaying himself to advantage.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.80.)

\(^{1028}\) Mucianus displays finesse in civil affairs. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.5.) By contrast, the *vir militaris* lacks subtlety: *Credunt plerique militaribus ingenii subtilitatem deesse, quia castrensis iurisdiction secuta et obtusior ac plura manu agens calitudatem fori non exercet.* (‘Many think the genius of the soldier wants subtlety, because military law, which is summary and blunt, and apt to appeal to the sword, finds no exercise for the refinements of the forum.’ – Tacitus, *Agr.*, 9.) Mucianus knows how to gather money, Vespasian does not. (Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.80.) Vespasian has only the
Yet, even Mucianus’ distinct disadvantage in terms of recent proven military ability should not have served as a definitive obstruction to his own candidature. Military reputation, if it were lacking, could be won post-accession. The decisive factor, on the contrary, was the dynastic advantage offered to Vespasian through the existence of his two adult sons. Mucianus had no offspring nor, it seems, any wife to speak of; and he had acquired a salacious reputation as a result. This distinction is of paramount importance. The significance of a smooth succession had already been illuminated by the fate of Galba and Licinianus earlier in the year. The Augustan example, some decades earlier, had demonstrated the necessity of setting up multiple candidates to hedge against untimely deaths – a policy that Vespasian appears to have adopted through the investiture in both his sons of consular imperium. So too, do the key sources recognise Vespasian’s dynastic advantages. Josephus prophesies the Empire for both Vespasian and Titus. Further, when describing the spontaneous acclamation of the soldiers, he has them

limited experience and knowledge of a military man: Versabatur ante oculos Germanici exercitus robur, notum viro militari. (‘The strength of the army of Germany, with which as a military man he was well acquainted, was continually before his eyes.’ – Tacitus, Hist., 2.75., cf. Campbell, B., “Who Were the ‘Viri Militares’?:” 11.) Mucianus and Vespasian represent two sides of an ideal emperor: egregium principatus temperamentum, si demptis utriusque vitiis solae virtutes miscerentur. (‘It would have been a rare combination for an emperor, if, with their respective faults removed, their virtues only could have been united in one man.’ – Tacitus, Hist., 2.5.) Curiously, Antonius Primus displays equal aptitude in both rhetoric and military affairs: strenuous manu, sermon promptus. (‘[He was] brave in battle, ready of speech’ – Ash, R. (ed.), Tacitus: Histories Book II, 89. citing Tacitus, Hist., 2.87.)

Neither Claudius nor Domitian had extensive military experience when they came to power and each compensated by launching a campaign. (Cf. Murison, C.L., “The Revolt of Saturninus in Upper Germany, A.D. 89,” Echos du Monde Classique 29:1 (1985): 32-34.) Undoubtedly, the dubious military abilities of Augustus were made up for by his capable amicus Agrippa. So, too, could Mucianus avail of any number of former Corbulonian commanders, if not the likes of Vespasian himself.


See ‘2.3 Early Career and Exile Under the Emperor Claudius’.

Tacitus credits Galba with choosing his heir according to merit (Tacitus, Hist., 1.15-16.), but the results are dire (ibid., 1.43.). Otho and Vitellius, too, had made abortive attempts at establishing a successor (Plutarch, Otho, 16., Tacitus, Hist., 2.59.).

Domitian’s extended consular imperium is purely speculative, however, as previously argued, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to indicate its existence.

Josephus, BJ., 3.399-402.
declare that Vespasian is preferable to the childless Vitellius and that the best hope for stability is that the sons of emperors should succeed their fathers. Suetonius, when describing the factors that lead Vespasian to the throne, has the emperor declare that ‘either his sons would succeed him, or nobody.’ Equally, Tacitus, when allowing Mucianus to extol the superiority of Vespasian at Carmel, has the amicus reflect that the Flavian house already ‘has two youthful sons, one of which is already equal to the cares of Empire’.

In the middle of book four of the Historiae, Tacitus has Vespasian and Titus weigh the value of fides, the friendship of capable men such as Mucianus, versus that of pietas, the irrevocable bond between kin:

\[
\text{nam amicos tempore, fortuna, cupidinibus aliquando aut erroribus imminui, transferri, desinere:}

\text{suum cuique sanguinem indiscretum, sed maxime principibus, quorum prosperis et alii fruantur,}

\text{adversa ad iunctissimos pertineant. ne fratribus quidem mansuram concordiam, ni parens}

\text{exemplum praebisset.}\]

The point is clear. Men such as Mucianus and Primus might be useful in the short-term due to their exemplary abilities, but they were not reliable long-term prospects. The same emphasis on filial piety endures through the early years of Vespasian’s reign. The coinage of 69-71 bears witness to Vespasian’s intention to establish a new ruling dynasty. Titus’ merits as a successor are barely worth repeating. He was both accomplished and charismatic, a gifted orator and a gallant, if naïve,

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1035 Ibid., 4.596.
1036 Suetonius, Div Vesp., 25.
1037 Tacitus, Hist., 2.77.
1038 ‘As for friends, time, altered fortunes, perhaps their passions or their errors, may weaken, may change, may even destroy, their affection. A man’s own blood can never be dissociated from him, least of all by princes, whose prosperity is shared by others, but whose misfortunes touch but their nearest kin. Even between brothers there can be no lasting affection, except if the father sets the example.’ (Tacitus, Hist., 4.52.)
1039 Damon, C., “Potior utroque Vespasianus: Vespasian and His Predecessors in Tacitus’s Histories.” Arethusa 39:2 (2006): 266. The same might have been said of Vespasian, had Mucianus and Vespasian’s positions been reversed.
soldier. Further, he had achieved a remarkably rapid ascendency to high office despite his modest military achievements – having become quaestorian legate of the legion *XV Apollinaris* under Nero.

Mucianus, then, was hardly in a position, from the beginning of 69, to vie for the purple. As the *amicus* himself reflected during his speech at Carmel, in reference to Vespasian, ‘you have a soldiery hardened by habits of warfare and victory over foreign foes; you have strong fleets, auxiliaries both horse and foot, kings most faithful to your cause, and an experience in which you excel all other men.’ Even so, while he could not hope to make a successful bid for the throne, Mucianus nonetheless expected to benefit from his contribution – judging by his comments at Carmel: ‘If we are victorious. I shall have whatever honour you think fit to bestow on me’, and those of Dio: ‘Mucianus desired to be honored by all and beyond all’. The extent of the honours that he ultimately expected is unclear. Probably he hoped to become something of an Agrippa or L. Vitellius, complete with appointments to, at the very least, an ordinary consulship and perhaps even an extraordinary proconsulship or co-censorship with the Emperor. Certainly, Mucianus may

1041 Titus’ extraordinary qualities are frequently attested in the sources. See, for instance, Suetonius, *Div. Tit.*, 3., Pliny’s dedication at *NH.*, 1.1. in which he describes Titus as ‘gifted with the most splendid eloquence and the most accomplished mind’. See also Victor, *Ep. Caes.*, 10.1-2., Eutropius, Hist., 7.21. In Tacitus’ *Historiae*, Titus’ military abilities mirror those of Vespasian: *Atque ipse, ut super fortunam crederetur, decorum se promptumque in armis ostendebat, comitate et adloquiis officia provocans ac plerumque in opere, in agmine gregario militi mixtus, incorrupto ducis honore.* (‘The young man himself, anxious to be thought superior to his station, was ever displaying his gracefulness and his energy in war. By his courtesy and affability he called forth a willing obedience, and he often mixed with the common soldiers, while working or marching, without impairing his dignity as general.’ – Tacitus, *Hist.*, 5.1.) Titus’ gallantry and charisma were not in question. His strategic ability and prudence in warfare were another matter. (Jones, B.W., *“Titus in Judaea, A.D. 67.”*: 127-134.)


1044 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 2.76. See also Dio, *Hist.*, 65.9.: ‘But people favored him greatly: his reputation won in Britain, his fame derived from the war under way, his kindheartedness and prudence, all led them to desire to have him at their head. Likewise, Mucianus urged him strongly, hoping that Vespasian should get the name of Emperor and that he as a result of the other's good nature should enjoy an equal share of power.’

have imagined parallels between his own career and those of the aforementioned individuals. L. Vitellius and Agrippa, like Mucianus, had served as governors of Syria – L. Vitellius immediately following his initial consulship in 35 and Agrippa by proxy from 23 onwards. L. Vitellius, too, had earlier served as a military commander in Armenia in 18 AD, where he had successfully kept the Parthian king Artabanus in check. Moreover, in 23 BC, Agrippa also received the signet ring of Augustus as a symbolic gesture of the latter’s intention to adopt Agrippa as imperial successor. Mucianus was under no delusion that he would receive the same offer from Vespasian, but he might easily have perceived his receipt of the Emperor’s seal as a similarly symbolic gesture of future ascendancy. That Tacitus was aware of these parallels is perhaps also evidenced by Mucianus’ assertion, in the Tacitean account, that he should be considered Vespasian’s socius. Elsewhere, in Tacitus’ Historiae, we hear that, in the course of Augustus’ selection of his potestatis collega, he chose Agrippa as his socius potestatis. We also hear from Tacitus that Tiberius regarded Sejanus as his socius laborum. Alternatively, it is also possible also that Mucianus, if he did not anticipate further honours under Vespasian, might have hoped for personal ascendancy under Titus. At the very least, Mucianus established a personal rapport with the prince early in 69. Possibly, then, the ‘common interests’ which Tacitus refers to included the promise of a distinguished career beyond the death of the aging Vespasian.

1046 Ibid., 59.27.
1047 Ibid., 53.30-31.
1048 Ibid., 66.2.
1049 Tacitus, Hist., 2.77. And, as noted in the previous chapter, during the course of the planning and execution of his march, Mucianus was indeed capable of acting as an equal to Vespasian. (See ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’)
1050 Tacitus, Ann., 3.56.
1051 Ibid., 4.2. Cf. Pliny, Pan., 9.1. where Trajan is praised for serving as the elder Nerva’s socius imperii.
1052 Tacitus, Hist., 2.5. Hence also Mucianus’ pointed statement that, if he were in Vespasian’s shoes, he would make Titus his successor. (ibid., 2.77.) Ironically, if Domitian is any indication, it is doubtful whether Titus would have ever followed through with his promise. As Jones notes, Titus continued to enable Domitian’s subordination throughout
As it turned out, however, Mucianus never saw the beginning of Titus’ reign and the circumstances of the Flavian succession combined, ironically, with the advantages which Mucianus personally offered to the Flavian cause – namely, the extensive Corbulonian network of which he was the most senior member as well as his services as administrator of Rome in Vespasian’s absence, ensured that he would be marginalized by Vespasian. It is in light of this that Mucianus’ alleged frustration with Vespasian after 71 becomes intelligible. In Suetonius’ account, he came to speak of Vespasian with contempt, apparently recounting frequently his claim to further honours and asserting his own services to Vespasian in 69 – both in the field and as an orator. Vespasian, likely to Mucianus’ further frustration, bore his comments with good humour – as Levick rightly observes, the Emperor implied when he complained about Mucianus’ grousing to a good friend, ‘bound to report the remark back’ to the amicus, that Mucianus’ homosexuality and his childlessness made him a ‘no-hoper’: ego tamen vir sum.\(^{1053}\) Certainly, it might be asserted that Mucianus’ aspirations towards further honours in spite of the existence of Titus and Domitian were indicative of a degree of naivety which does not cohere with the amicus’ demonstrable political acumen. Even so, the dynastic situation of the Flavians was unprecedented and Mucianus, to his credit, seemingly realized relatively quickly that his career, at least under Vespasian, would ultimately amount to no more than the minimum distinctions necessary to reward his critical

\(^{1053}\) ‘I, at least, am a man.’ (Suetonius, *Div. Vesp.*, 13.) As Levick notes, Vespasian may have been paraphrasing an earlier remark about the ‘countrified’ Marius: ‘a boor, but a real man’. (Levick, B., *Vespasian*, 90.)
services in 69-70. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the last we hear of the novus homo indicates that he resigned his final years to retirement and the pursuit of his literary interests.\textsuperscript{1054}

\textbf{4.12 Conclusion}

Several key themes can be extrapolated from Mucianus’ administration of Rome in 70 AD and, for that matter, his handling of the praetorians, the potential usurpers both in the provinces and in Rome itself; and the obstinance of the imperial son, Domitian. First, the resolution of each of these crises effectively demonstrated Mucianus’ \textit{potentia}, and the comparative insignificance of the Senate and Domitian in these measures. Although others, by virtue of their office, might have been more qualified to deal with the Praetorian problem – namely Varus, who appears to be have been entirely abstracted from the process of restructuring the guard, Mucianus took charge without concerted opposition. The amicus’ methods also demonstrated his exemplary diplomatic abilities as well as his propensity to act with ruthless efficiency when necessary. In the case of Primus and Lucius Piso, Mucianus displayed both traits equally – earning him both admiration and harsh criticism from Tacitus. De Kleijn’s conclusion that Mucianus saw the ‘danger of usurpation from two sides’ – from the remnants of the Vitellians who might organize around the former Emperor’s son and from the Piso family, and that he ‘must have realized that tact, diplomacy and display of power would not suffice to remove this danger’ is an overstatement.\textsuperscript{1055} Tacitus invariably suggests that the alleged threats posed by the Pisos, Primus and the remaining Vitellians alike were without merit – a fact which must have been noted by Mucianus. Even so, he took no chances. Each of the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{1054} This conclusion can be deduced both from Tacitus’ reference in the \textit{Dialogus} to Mucianus’ efforts to collate material from the Republic (Tacitus, \textit{Dial.}, 37.2.) as well as from our earlier discussion concerning the dating of the composition of Mucianus’ unknown text to some point during the early 70s AD. (‘1.2 The Fragments of Mucianus in Pliny the Elder’s \textit{Naturalis Historia}’) A tentative dating for the final text might be placed around late 72 until 76.
\textsuperscript{1055} De Kleijn, G., “C. Licinius Mucianus, Vespasian’s Co-Ruler in Rome.”: 457.
\end{flushright}
measures he took were carried out with a single objective in mind – guaranteeing the stability of the Flavian regime and hedging against the possibility of future insurrection. In the case of the Senate, Mucianus restrained the calumnies of Helvidius Priscus and Curtius Montanus and, with the assistance of Domitian, restored the regular operation of the government. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Mucianus sought to make his position in the capital permanent. Contrary to the suggestions of authors such as Crook, Mucianus ceded his authority immediately upon Vespasian’s arrival in Brundisium and there is no evidence to suggest that he cultivated an alliance with Marcellus or Caecina above and beyond that which was necessary to ensure their unequivocal support for the regime. That Mucianus acted as an exemplary deputy to Vespasian until the end of 70, then, is not in question. His reasons for doing so, on the other hand, are somewhat dubious. Two key factors contributed to his decision. First, he must have realized early in 69 that Vespasian, by virtue of his military resources, experience and familial situation, was in a comparatively advantageous position to the childless and recently untested Mucianus. Second, Mucianus probably harboured hopes of his own for advancement along the same lines as men such as Agrippa or L. Vitellius the Elder, who had previously served as second-in-command to their respective Emperors. That his aspirations were ultimately not met is easy to rationalize. Vespasian had no reason to elevate a man who might hypothetically serve as a rival imperial successor with Titus. Unwisely, Mucianus pushed the issue, and he was met with resistance from Vespasian – although it is clear he received some compensation in the form of a third, albeit suffect, consulship. Other men would meet a less fortunate fate. Arrius Varus, Antonius Primus and their Moesian adherents were disposed of in 70 or shortly thereafter – no further offices or honours on record.1056

1056 See ‘4.5 Mucianus and Antonius Primus’.
Conclusion

The subject of this study is Gaius Licinius Mucianus’ political career. It includes his *cursus honorum* until 69, his role as both facilitator and organiser of Vespasian’s elevation to the Principate through the Flavian rebellion of 69, as well as his position as administrator of Rome in 70 and the final stage of his career under Vespasian until his death ca. 74-77 AD.

In chapter one of this thesis, the ancient sources for Mucianus’ career were analysed. Several conclusions were elucidated. First, it became clear that Mucianus’ own text, contained in a fragmentary form within Pliny’s *Naturalis Historia*, is useful both as a source for his career until 69 and his relationship with Vespasian after 70 AD. Second, this chapter also identified a number of key problems with the remaining literary sources. Tacitus’ *Historiae* undoubtedly constitutes the most reliable source for Mucianus’ career, but his account of the year 69 is coloured by his pessimistic assessment of the civil war. Thus, he accords Mucianus an ambiguous portrayal as a capable diplomat and talented politician but also as a man guilty of avarice and salacious behaviour in private. Similarly, Josephus, although he was an eyewitness and otherwise had access to the personal writings of Vespasian, nonetheless distorts his account of the year 69 to suit his own pro-Flavian inclination. Furthermore, Josephus’ text displays an extremely limited capacity to convey an impression either of Mucianus’ character or his exploits – doubtless due to the fact that he had experienced little in the way of personal contact with the *amicus*. Consequently, the *Bellum Judaicum* is of limited usefulness when investigating Mucianus’ later career, including his administration of Rome in 70 AD. On the other hand, while he was not a contemporary of Mucianus, Cassius Dio’s sources should not be regarded as suspect – at least to the extent that he did not make significant use of Tacitus. Even so, his history is again comparatively limited for the
purposes of this study – as he frequently skips over the most significant of Mucianus’ contributions to the Flavian cause and typically relegates Mucianus to a secondary position behind the likes of Domitian, Titus and Vespasian.

In chapter two, the period of Mucianus’ early career (ca. 20-22 until 69) was examined. Although the evidence is sparse, it is nonetheless possible to reconstruct his cursus honorum almost entirely from the extant literary and epigraphical material. Furthermore, contrary to the impressions given by modern authors such as Levick and Wellesley, Mucianus advanced swiftly through the cursus honorum. Having returned from exile after Nero’s accession, Mucianus almost certainly took up a post as legatus legionis under Domitius Corbulo ca. 58 AD. Thereafter, perhaps as a result of Corbulo’s influence, he became legatus Augusti pro praetore Lyciae et Pamphyliae ca. 60, consul suffectus in 64 and legatus Augusti pro praetore provinciae Syriae in 67. Consequently, by the beginning of 69, Mucianus had not only exceeded his former colleagues – becoming the senior consular member of the now-defunct Corbulonian command, but he also controlled a sizeable force in his own right, including three legions: IV Scythica, VI Ferrata and XII Fulminata.

In chapter three, Mucianus’ role in the civil war of 69 was investigated. This discussion took the form of a chronological narrative of Mucianus’ involvement in the Flavian rebellion. Emphasis was placed on three key points. First, despite the impression given by Josephus, the preparations for the Flavian rebellion began as early as February of 69 and, furthermore, it was Titus who first resolved to entreat his father and Mucianus to make a bid for imperial power. Second, the covert Flavian preparations, which primarily involved cultivating support among the Danubian legions, were spearheaded by Mucianus. The latter individual, by virtue of his earlier connection with Corbulo as well as his exemplary diplomatic abilities, was in an ideal position to ensure the cooperation particularly of the legion III Gallica and its former ‘Corbulonian’ legate, Titus Aurelius
Fulvus. It is similarly likely that Mucianus was responsible for engendering support from other former adherents of Corbulo, including the governor of Britain, M. Vettius Bolanus and Sextus Julius Frontinus, the propraetorian legate of Asia. Additionally, it is apparent that Mucianus formulated an initial strategy for challenging the Vitellians in Italy in which he would conduct a small strike force composed of *legio VI Ferrata* and *vexillationes* of the Judaean and Syrian legions across Anatolia with the intention of crossing from Dyrrachium to Southern Italy. His strategy was never put into effect, however Mucianus thereafter lead the Flavian vanguard through Asia Minor with the intention of serving as supreme commander of the combined Danubian legions at Aquileia. The final major conclusion elucidated in this chapter concerns Mucianus’ relationship with the Pannonian legate, Antonius Primus. Following the latter’s decision to disregard Vespasian’s order to remain at Aquileia in August, it is clear from the sources that Mucianus initiated a rigorous campaign intended to undermine Primus’ standing among the Danubian legates. Furthermore, when it became clear that Primus would have to incur the *odium* of a violent incursion into Rome, Mucianus delayed his approach – a decision which ultimately resulted in his arrival in the Roman capital several days after Primus himself.

In chapter four of this thesis, Mucianus’ behaviour in his capacity as both *de facto* head-of-state and, subsequently, as advisor and suffect consul under Vespasian after 70 was discussed. Several conclusions were illuminated. Initially, the Senate’s reaction to Mucianus’ approach in late December 69 was an overwhelming feeling of dismay. The reason for this is patent – while Vespasian was absent in the East, Mucianus was the immediate and explicit reminder of imperial autocracy in the Roman capital. No office is on record for Mucianus at the beginning of 70 and thus the nature of his authority in Rome is suspect. However, it was noted that, by virtue of the powers invested in Vespasian by the Senate; and contained within the *Lex de imperio Vespasiani,*
the amicus had the legal capacity to function as Vespasian’s viceroy – with the correlative ability to both convene and control the proceedings of the Senate. Second, while Mucianus was in control of the capital, he dealt with numerous crises stemming from the conclusion of the civil war. Through diplomacy, discretion and ruthlessness alike, Mucianus effected the re-organisation of the over-inflated Praetorian Guard, the elimination or dispersion of the remaining Vitellian elements and other potential usurpers in both the capital and the provinces, the suppression of Senatorial dissent in Rome and, finally, the nullification of obstinate members of the ‘opportunist’ Flavian party – particularly Antonius Primus. Additionally, he successfully placated the younger Caesar, Domitian – thwarting the latter’s attempts to appropriate a military command in Germania.

By carrying out these measures, Mucianus restored the regular operation of the government and ensured that the risk of usurpation from former Vitellianists or other questionable parties was rendered negligible. Additionally, he exempted Vespasian from incurring the odium of violently dispatching censorious or untrustworthy individuals under his own auspices.

The second half of this final chapter, meanwhile, dealt with two main issues. Initially, the manner in which Mucianus was rewarded for his services to the Flavians in both 69 and 70 was analysed. Two central conclusions were advanced. First, Mucianus should have expected, at the very least, an ordinary consulship and perhaps also a proconsular appointment for his exemplary services to the Flavians. That he received neither is not consistent with what we know of prior analogous careers – such as those of M. Vipsanius Agrippa and the elder Lucius Vitellius. Second, the dearth of honours offered to Mucianus can be readily justified by the unique dynastic situation of the Flavians and, more specifically, the fact that Vespasian had no desire to set up a rival to his chosen imperial successor, Titus. The final issue dealt with by this chapter concerns Mucianus’ own rationalisations for joining the partes Flaviae and, furthermore, accepting the role of
‘kingmaker’ of Vespasian. Several factors were highlighted. Initially, from the point of view of both his military resources and experience, as well as his familial situation, Vespasian was in a comparatively favourable position to make a bid for imperial power. Second, Mucianus, conscious of the parallels between his own career and those of his predecessors, Agrippa and L. Vitellius, likely anticipated similar ascendancy for himself – either under Vespasian or Titus.

There is, of course, an inherent problem in any study which focuses on a single individual in that its own protagonist may be viewed as more important than he really was. Mucianus was neither the first to serve as an imperial deputy nor the last; and others were more substantially honoured for their contributions. Agrippa set the precedent from 41 onwards – serving first as military commander under Octavian and then as administrator of Rome in the latter’s absence; and he was rewarded handsomely for his efforts. Less than a quarter of a century after Mucianus’ death, L. Licinius Sura too could claim the title of ‘kingmaker’ after he induced Trajan to seize imperial power and thereafter served dutifully in Trajan’s high command until at least 108. He too exceeded Mucianus and was rewarded with two ordinary consulships. It is nonetheless striking that Mucianus, a man who suffered significant disadvantages in the form of an undignified birth, the disfavour of a princeps and the absence of a family and heir, was capable of attaching himself to the leading men of the state and serving a momentous role in the organisation of a successful rebellion. Furthermore, that he succeeded in joining the small group of consulares who achieved

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1057 Erudite, enquiring and eloquent in his own right, Sura too provides a compelling parallel with Mucianus, although even less is known about his career. (see no. 194 and 195, also Pliny, Ep., 4.30.11. for Sura’s character) The date of his first (suffект) consulship is not known, although Syme argues for 97 (Syme, R., Tacitus, 640-642. contra. Sherwin-White, A.W., The letters of Pliny: a historical and social commentary, 309-310. And Barnes, T.D., “The Horoscope of Licinius Sura.” Phoenix 30 (1976): 76-79, who argues for 86 or earlier). The latter two (ordinary) consulships are dated to 102 and 107 respectively and Sura appears to have also received the ornamenta triumphalia in 107. (CIL, 2.4508. and see also Jones, C.P., “Sura and Senecio.” The Journal of Roman Studies 60 (1970): 98-104. for further discussion of his career)
a consulship for the third time – including L. Vitellius, Vibius Crispus, Aulus Didius Gallus Fabricius Veiento (cos suff., ca. 71-79, II 80, III ca. 82-84) and, to a lesser degree, Lucius Verginius Rufus, Julius Frontinus and Titus Vestricius Spurinna (cos suff. 72, II 98, III ca. 100), should not be underestimated.\textsuperscript{1058} It is a testament not only to his eloquence and aptitude in both the administrative and diplomatic arts alike, but also the efficacy with which Mucianus complemented his colleagues – including Vespasian, Titus and Domitian. It is unfortunate that we are not given a clearer picture of his ultimate fate, but such circumstances are not unusual within the histories of the Emperors.

\textsuperscript{1058} Given the lack of evidence for his career, the exact dates for Veiento’s consulships are not known, although it is certain that he held the consulship three times. (Statius,\textit{ Schol. Iuv.}, 4.94. and\textit{ ILS}, 1010 = MW, 155.) The debate over his consulships is summarised in Jones, B.W., “Fabricius Veiento Again.”\textit{ The American Journal of Philology} 92:3 (1971): 476-478. The dates given here follow Gallivan (Gallivan, P.A., “The Fasti for A.D. 70-96.”). For Spurinna’s third consulship see Syme, R.,\textit{ Tacitus}, 642-644.
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Appendix I: Lycia and Pamphylia Under Nero

Cassius Dio, in reference to the year 43 AD, states that the Emperor Claudius ‘reduced to servitude the Lycians, who rising in revolt had slain some Romans, and merged them in the prefecture of Pamphylia.’\textsuperscript{1059} Scholars have traditionally rejected this statement on the part of Dio and have typically refused to acknowledge a unified province of Lycia-Pamphylia. Their reasoning is that in 50 AD a procurator is attested in Pamphylia.\textsuperscript{1060} Scholars such as Groag and Dessau have all utilized the inscription to justify the assumption that Pamphylia must have been a procuratorial province ca. 50 AD.\textsuperscript{1061} Syme, on the other hand and, more recently, Levick have refused to accept this conclusion. Syme, in particular, points out that both Lycia and Pamphylia appear to have been considered too small in area to constitute a separate province either under Augustus or his predecessors.\textsuperscript{1062} Additionally, he notes that the procurator who allegedly repaired the roads in 50 AD need not be the praesidial procurator of Pamphylia itself, but may well have been financial procurator of Galatia instead.\textsuperscript{1063} There is considerable evidence to suggest that administrative and financial provinces frequently overlapped during the Empire. Even during the reign of Hadrian, when Lycia-Pamphylia and Galatia were separate provinces, each governed by a separate imperial legate, they nonetheless belonged to the financial jurisdiction of a single procurator.\textsuperscript{1064}

\textsuperscript{1059} Dio, Hist., 50.17.
\textsuperscript{1060} ILS, 215.
\textsuperscript{1062} As early as Augustus we have the testimony of Strabo. The geographer, who was familiar with Asia Minor from birth and who lived through the Augustan age, explicitly defines the limits of the province of Galatia. According to his testimony, the whole area which had formerly been subject to Amyntas was made into a Roman province (Strabo, Geog., 12.5.1.) and that, soon after the formation of the Galatian province in 25 BC, the area of Cilicia Trachaea was given to Archelaus, king of Cappadocia. (Strabo, Geog., 14.5.6.) Thus, during the reign of Augustus, the province of Galatia not only included Galatia proper, but also the home of the three tribes Pisidia, Isauria and Lycaonia and, at least partially, Pamphylia. (Levick, B., Roman Colonies in Southern Asia Minor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 29-32.)
\textsuperscript{1063} Syme, R., “Pamphylia from Augustus to Vespasian,” in Roman Papers, vol. 1., 43-44.
\textsuperscript{1064} Ibid. citing CIL, 3.431 = ILS, 1449.
Consequently, as Syme rightly highlights, there is little reason to assume that Lycia and Pamphylia constituted separate provinces during the early 50s AD – nor, by extension, that Pamphylia had been governed independently by a procurator. It is instead more likely that, as Dio seemingly implies, Claudius severed the region of Pamphylia from Galatia in ca. 50 AD and immediately attached it to the region of Lycia – forming a new province – ‘Lycia-Pamphylia’.\textsuperscript{1065} There is also a further problem, however. It has often been asserted, most famously by Groag, that Pamphylia may have been attached to Corbulo’s special command of Cappadocia-Galatia in 55 AD.\textsuperscript{1066} The basis for this assertion is a panegyric of C. Rutilius Gallicus – authored by Statius, which reads:

\begin{quote}
 hunc Galatea vigens ausa est incessere bello (me quoque), perque novem timuit Pamphylia messes Pannonisque ferox arcuque horrenda fugaci Armenia et patiens Latii iam pontis Araxes.
\end{quote}

We know, almost for certain, thanks to epigraphic evidence found in Ephesus, that Gallicus served as \textit{legatus provinciae Galatiae} (as opposed to \textit{legatus pro praetore}) under Corbulo at least as early as 57 AD.\textsuperscript{1068} According to Syme, there is no reason to believe, however, that Statius’ testimony should be considered as indicative of the addition of Pamphylia to the Corbulonian province of Cappadocia-Galatia. After all, Statius’ trustworthiness concerning the specifics of Gallicus’ career is highly suspect. Contrary to Statius’ assertion, for instance, we know that Rutilius’ command in Pannonia, as legate of \textit{XV Apollinaris} ca. 54 AD, preceded, not followed, his service in Galatia.\textsuperscript{1069}

\textsuperscript{1065} See no. 1062 for the evidence for Pamphylia’s attachment to Galatia from Augustus to Claudius.

\textsuperscript{1066} Groag, E., \textit{RE}, vol. 1, col. 1257f.

\textsuperscript{1067} Statius, \textit{Silvae}, 1.4.76. – ‘Galatia’s lusty Gauls dared to make war against him (As once against me!); for nine harvests Pamphylia feared him, bold Pannonians and Armenians, skilled with the bow, and Araxes now with its Roman bridge.’


\textsuperscript{1069} \textit{ILS}, 9499 and \textit{CIL}, 3.4591. See here Syme, R., “Pamphylia from Augustus to Vespasian,” in \textit{Roman Papers}, vol. 1, 45. Syme also sees no strategic purpose for attaching Pamphylia to Galatia – as he says, ‘Pamphylia and Galatia go
In this, Syme should not necessarily be followed. As Rémy and, more recently, Vervaet have highlighted, it is patent from the sources that, upon the inauguration of Corbulo’s command in 55, a significant restructuring of the Anatolian provinces took place. Initially, as Vervaet notes, each of the locations mentioned in the aforementioned panegyric are historically relevant to Corbulo and, indeed, Gallicus’ command.\textsuperscript{1070} We know that Gallicus’ authority extended over both Pannonia and Galatia at different points and it is significant that Statius refers to both Armenia and Araxes – both sites of Corbulonian victories. The mere fact that Statius was capable of citing the geographical specifics of Corbulo’s campaign – ostensibly in an attempt to associate Gallicus’ career with the glories won by Corbulo, would seemingly render Syme’s suggestion that Statius neither ‘knew or cared about the exact territorial limits of Rutilius’ official function’ an underestimation. Second, there were also good reasons for including Pamphylia in the Corbulonian command. As Rémy notes, contrary to the land-locked Cappadocia, Pamphylia had numerous ports – including the likes of Perge and Side.\textsuperscript{1071} Vervaet adds the observation that if, as Tacitus indicates, Corbulo’s army was supplied by means of a maritime route through the \textit{Pontus Euxinus} (The Black Sea) from the city of Trapezus, and, by extension, if one accepts the probability that Corbulo’s reinforcements and supplies arrived via the Mediterranean, then the coastal strip of Pamphylia may have indeed represented a strategic necessity.\textsuperscript{1072} It is reasonable to conclude,

\textsuperscript{1070} Vervaet, F.J., “CIL ix 3426: A new light on Corbulo’s career, with special reference to his official mandate in the East from AD 55 to AD 63.”: 383-386.
\textsuperscript{1071} Remy, B., \textit{L’Évolution administrative de l’ Anato"{l}ie aux trois premiers siècles de notre ère}, Centre d'études romaines et gallo-romaines (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1986), 22.
\textsuperscript{1072} Vervaet, F.J., “CIL ix 3426: A new light on Corbulo’s career, with special reference to his official mandate in the East from AD 55 to AD 63.”: 585-6. Particularly n. 42. See here also Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, 13.39.: ‘The king either suspecting a stratagem from these simultaneous movements in different directions, or intending to cut off our supplies as they were coming up from the sea of Pontus and the town of Trapezus, hastily withdrew. He could not however make any attack on the supplies, as they were brought over mountains in the occupation of our forces.’ As Vervaet further notes, both Pamphylia and Cilicia Pedias held claim to the only ‘wide and fertile coastal plains’ along the Anatolian coast.
therefore, that there may have indeed been a temporary union between Pamphylia and Galatia during the period of Gallicus’ tenure as *legatus provinciae Galatiae*.\textsuperscript{1073}
Appendix II: Josephus’ Dating of Vespasian’s Elevation

Josephus’ chronology of the months leading up to the proclamation of Vespasian, as has been noted by a number of scholars including Niese, Weber, Nicols and Levick, is problematic. Josephus himself does not date Vespasian’s elevation however situates the event after Vitellius’ arrival in Rome in the middle of July. The closest explicit date that can be found in Josephus’ text is that which he gives to the beginning of Vespasian’s final Judaean campaign – 5 Daisos 69. Josephus’ narrative, however, is not consistent with this initial date. According to the historian, it was after the defeat of Otho, the date of which we know to be 17 April 69, that Vespasian departed Caesarea and advanced into Judaea for the second time with two columns. Subsequently, after briefly expounding upon the unfortunate condition of Italy under the Vitellian legions, Josephus states that it was after Vespasian arrived back in Caesarea following his incursion into Judaea, which resulted in his successful acquisition of the Samaria-Jerusalem road and the Idumaea-Jerusalem road as well as the cities of Gophna, Acrabatta, Bethel and Ephraim, that he learned of Vitellius’ elevation. Thereafter, according to the historian, having been acclaimed Emperor by his troops, Vespasian openly discussed civil war with his colleagues, including Mucianus, at an unspecified location, and dispatched a message to Tiberius Alexander soliciting the latter’s support. Alexander then acquiesced, promptly applying the oath of fidelity

1074 Josephus, BJ., 4.585.
1075 This date may be equated with either 5, 14 or 23 June, depending on which calendar system Josephus adhered to. Cf. Nicols, J., Vespasian and the partes Flavianae, 42. and Samuel, A.E., Greek and Roman Chronology: Calendars and Years in Classical Antiquity (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1972), 156.
1076 On Otho’s suicide see Tacitus, Hist., 2.46-56. After detailing the beginning of Vespasian’s campaign, Josephus further confuses the chronology by describing the sedition in Jerusalem (Josephus, BJ., 4.577.), which he dates to the month of Xanthikos (12 April – 11 May).
1077 Given that Josephus speaks of the ‘exhortations of Mucianus, and the other commanders, that he would accept of the Empire, and upon that of the rest of the army, who cried out that they were willing to be led against all his opposers’, one must assume that he is referring to the Carmel meeting, which he seemingly postdates from the beginning of June (or end of May) until sometime in mid-to-late July. (ibid., 4.605.)
to his troops which ‘willingly complied with him, as already acquainted with the courage of the man, from his conduct in their neighbourhood.’ As is highlighted by Niese and Nicols, even if one accepts the dubious date given to the beginning of Vespasian’s final campaign in Judaea, it is impossible to fit all of these events in the period from mid-June to 1 July, the date of Vespasian’s accession.

Various solutions for this problem have been offered by scholars. B. Niese’s solution was to place the entirety of Vespasian’s Judaean campaign back in 68, however Josephus’ account of the campaign, although only loosely connected with the events of January-April 69 at its beginning, is interspersed with digressions on the state of the civil wars, and the conclusion of his narrative is firmly linked with Vitellius’ victory. Weber, partially following Niese’s chronology, preferred to assign the date of 5 Daisos, which he interprets as 23 June, to the end of Vespasian’s campaign and his return to Caesarea from his operations in Jerusalem. Yet again, however, Weber’s interpretation does not match the impression given by Josephus. The context given by the historian at the beginning of the campaign implies that Vespasian departed from Caesarea at a time contemporaneous with or prior to the events of April 69. Nicols also offers two alternative

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1078 Ibid., 4.585-88.
1080 Ibid. See here Josephus’ summary of the civil wars of 69, extending from the accession of Galba to the fall of Vitellius, which he situates prior to his description of Simon b. Gioras’ activities in Jerusalem as well as Vespasian’s final campaign. (Josephus, *BJ.*, 4.545.) See also his subsequent digression on the death of Galba and the conflict between Vitellius and Otho. Josephus explicitly connects this latter digression with the turmoil in Jerusalem, prior to Vespasian’s campaign – ‘But now sedition and civil war prevailed, not only over Judea, but in Italy also; for now Galba was slain in the midst of the Roman market-place; then was Otho made Emperor, and fought against Vitellius, who set up for Emperor also’. (ibid., 4.945.) Finally, see ibid., 4.588. where the author explicitly ties the conclusion of Vespasian’s campaign to Vitellius’ accession – ‘But when Vespasian had overthrown all the places that were near to Jerusalem, he returned to Caesarea, and heard of the troubles that were at Rome, and that Vitellius was Emperor.’
solutions. Initially, according to the author, it is possible that 5 Daesius should instead be read as 5 Dystrus (March) – thus placing Vespasian’s campaign three months earlier. Second, it is possible that Josephus deliberately falsified the chronology to give the impression that Vespasian’s elevation was both spontaneous and that it originated among his personal legions.\textsuperscript{1083} This would seem a more reasonable solution given what we know about Josephus’ pro-Flavian proclivities, yet Nicols is perhaps overstating the situation. As Levick rightly notes, the second solution is unlikely – even as a falsehood derived from Vespasian’s own memoir, there were too many surviving witnesses.\textsuperscript{1084} Additionally, there is no reason to discount Daesius. We know that Vespasian suspended his operations in Judaea upon the accession of Galba in 68 and likely only resumed preparations for his campaign when he heard of Vitellius’ victory, during which time Mucianus was conducting covert preparations for his own accession.\textsuperscript{1085} In fact, it is more likely that Josephus’ did not seek to establish a cogent chronology for the first half of 69 at all. He simply half-heartedly muddled the course of events – post-dating Vespasian’s knowledge of Vitellius’ accession, which took place in mid-April, by failing to mention it at the beginning of Vespasian’s Judaean campaign and emphasising it at the end of the campaign.

On the other hand, Josephus’ account of the events leading up to Vespasian’s elevation, as well as the acclamations themselves is directly contradicted by the Latin sources. Tacitus, for his part, situates Vespasian’s elevation prior to Vitellius’ arrival in Rome and subsequent to the Carmel meeting.\textsuperscript{1086} Unlike Josephus, Tacitus designates three separate dates – July 1, July 3 and July 15

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  \item \textsuperscript{1083} Nicols, J., \textit{Vespasian and the partes Flavianae}, 63, 73.
  \item \textsuperscript{1084} Levick, B., \textit{Vespasian}, 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{1085} Josephus, \textit{BJ.}, 4.502.: ‘And now they were both in suspense about the public affairs, the Roman Empire being then in a fluctuating condition, and did not go on with their expedition against the Jews, but thought that to make any attack upon foreigners was now unseasonable, on account of the solicitude they were in for their own country.’
  \item \textsuperscript{1086} Tacitus, \textit{Hist.}, 2.74-81. See also 2.89 for Vitellius’ arrival in Rome.
\end{itemize}
on which each of the declarations for Vespasian eventuated. Suetonius follows suit, albeit with some minor modification. Like Tacitus, he cites the initial declaration as occurring on 1 July under Alexander’s supervision in Egypt however he does not record an explicit date for Mucianus’ declaration and repositions the Judaean legions’ declaration to ‘the fifth of the ides of the same month’. Tacitus would seem to offer the most logical chronology. The compressed and convoluted nature of the Jewish War’s version of events throws Josephus’ account into doubt. Moreover, Suetonius’ account, while partially consistent with Tacitus’, places the declaration of the Judaean legions too late. Like Josephus’ account, one finds it difficult to imagine that Vespasian and Mucianus conducted the remainder of their preparations for the Flavian rebellion, which, according to Tacitus, included the dispatch of envoys to Parthia and Armenia, the manufacture of arms and minting of new coinage, the recall of veteran troops and the organisation of a major strategic conference at Berytus – after 28 July and preceding Mucianus’ departure for Italy in mid-August.  

1087 The 28th July. (Suetonius, Div. Vesp., 6.) The full quote is ‘However, the fact becoming known, Tiberius Alexander, governor of Egypt, first obliged the legions under his command to swear obedience to Vespasian as their Emperor, on the calends [the 1st] of July, which was observed ever after as the day of his accession to the Empire; and upon the fifth of the ides of the same month [the 28th July], the army in Judaea, where he then was, also swore allegiance to him… Moreover, amongst the governors of provinces, Licinius Mucianus dropping the grudge arising from a jealousy of which he had hitherto made no secret, promised to join him with the Syrian army, and, among the allied kings, Volugesus, king of the Parthians, offered him a reinforcement of forty thousand archers.’

1088 On the conference at Berytus and date of Mucianus’ departure, see ‘3.8 The Meeting at Berytus’ and ‘3.9 The Flavian Strategy and the March of Mucianus’
Appendix III: The Location of Mucianus’ Base Camp in Moesia

In his 1972 analysis of book three of Tacitus’ *Historiae*, Wellesley postulated Viminacium, the camp of *VII Claudia*, around fifty Roman miles south of Singidium, as the most likely location of Mucianus’ camp during his brief sojourn in Moesia. Syme concurred in 1977 with some caveats. Given that Tacitus cites Oescus and Novae as the *castra legionum* threatened by the Dacians in 69, Viminacium, or at least nearby, must have logically served as Mucianus’ base of operations. There are also some further considerations, however. One observes, in the first place, that *VI Ferrata* and its adjoining *vexillari* are entirely absent upon Mucianus’ arrival in Rome. At which point Mucianus decided to detach the legion, however, is difficult to determine. It seems logical that he separated himself from the legion in Moesia, likely with instructions to return to Syria after the Dacian incursion had been put down. Mucianus had little reason to retain the services of *VI Ferrata* after Cremona. The Vitellian forces were already in a state of dissolution and, if Tacitus is to be believed, Mucianus had little to fear from the influence of Primus over the Flavian legions already in Italy. As Syme observes, for the relief of the legionary camps at Oescus and Novae, several routes come into play. Initially, from the cities of Philippolis and Serdica, two easy routes to Oescus can be identified – the first across the Trojan Pass and the

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1089 Wellesley, K., *Cornelius Tacitus. The Histories. Book III*, 211. As *III Gallica* dealt with the Sarmatian menace earlier in the year, it had occupied the camp furthest to the east – Novae. When the Moesian army joined the Flavian force later in the year, both *III Gallica* and *VIII Augusta* (the latter presumably occupying Oescus) arrived after *VII Claudia*, as it had travelled from Viminacium instead.


1091 Tacitus, *Hist.*, 4.11.

1092 See no. 621 for the dissolution of the Vitellian forces. According to Tacitus, thanks to a steady stream of letters from the *amicus* denigrating Primus’ achievements, Mucianus had not only delayed Primus from entering the capital but had also engendered no small amount of disapproval of Primus’ behavior among the Danubian legates. (see here Tacitus, *Hist.*, 3.52, 3.78. and ‘4.5 Mucianus and Antonius Primus’)

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second an unattested connection which has generally been assumed in maps and manuals. There is also Viminacium. Viminacium was the based used when a Roman army invaded Dacia from the south-west, marching across the Banat towards Sarmizegethusa. Tettius Julianus, general under Domitian in 88, marched from Viminacium to Tapae on the Iron Gates of Transylvania. Similarly, Trajan, during the First Dacian War, departed Viminacium and crossed the Danube, marching towards the Dacian camp at Tapae and, subsequently, towards the capital of Sarmizegethusa. Finally, we have the city of Naissus. Little is known about the history of Naissus prior to the mid-third century, however it is evident that five roads met at Naissus. They came from Lissus on the Adriatic coast, from Serdica in Thrace, from Singidunum, from Thessalonica in the south and from Ratiaria on the Danube – the latter being a city west of Oescus on the Danube. Naissus was a valuable strategic position – particularly during the latter centuries of the Empire when it served as an imperial residence. As Syme records, an army stationed at Naissus dictated communications in the Balkans – it could co-operate with the legions in Illyricum, dispatch troops southeastwards into Thrace or northwestwards to Ratiaria on the

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1096 Some have conjectured that Ratiaria itself was a legionary camp at one point or another. (Syme, R., “Rhine and Danube Legions under Domitian.” Journal of Roman Studies 18 (1928): 49, and Mocsy, A., Pannonia and Upper Moesia: A History of the Middle Danube Provinces of the Roman Empire (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Books, 1974), 51, 82.) Syme notes that nothing can be confirmed for certain, however he points out that when Aurelian abandoned the Roman dominion north of the Danube, legions were stationed at Ratiaria and Oesucsm in the newly created province of Dacia ripensis. (Syme, R., The Provincial at Rome and Rome and the Balkans 80BC-AD14 (Exeter: Exeter University Press), 219.)
Danube and thus be in a position to repel invaders in Moesia and simultaneously be able to prevent them from uniting with the Thracians to the south.\textsuperscript{1097} Relatively soon after Mucianus’ march through the region, in 85 AD, Domitian may also have chosen Naissus as his base camp when he came to the Danube after the disaster incurred by Oppius Sabinus. According to Dio, Domitian resided in a city in Moesia while he dispatched others to fight the enemy.\textsuperscript{1098} No definite conclusion can be made, however if we follow Syme’s observations then the most likely scenario would see Mucianus, in his march along the imperial highway, detach \textit{VI Ferrata} at Philippolis, Serdica or at Naissus, and would furthermore either remain at Naissus or travel on to Viminacium where, contrary to Wellesley’s assertion, he would wait for short period of less than ten days.\textsuperscript{1099} In the meantime, Mucianus would send word to Fonteius Agrippa, then governor of the province of Asia, to take over command in Moesia with the support of further reinforcements abstracted from the Vitellian legions \textit{I Italica} and \textit{V Alaudae} after Cremona.\textsuperscript{1100}

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\textsuperscript{1097} Ibid., 207. \\
\textsuperscript{1098} Dio, \textit{Hist.}, 57.6. \\
\textsuperscript{1100} Fonteius Agrippa ex Asia (pro consule eam provinciam anuo imperio tenuerat) Moesiae praepositus est, additis copiis e Vitelliano exercitu, quem spargi per provincias et externo bello inligari pars consilii pacisque erat. (‘Fonteius Agrippa was removed from Asia (which province he had governed as proconsul for a year) to Moesia, and had some troops given him from the army of Vitellius. That this army should be dispersed through the provinces and closely occupied with foreign wars, was sound policy and essential to peace.’ – Tacitus, Hist, 3.46.)
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