Emotions and Representation.

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Abstract:

Perceptual theories of the emotions aim to give an account of the emotions which has the best features of traditional feelings theories and the best features of traditional cognitivist theories without suffering from the shortcomings of either theory. This means, among other things, getting the right account of the justificatory roles that the emotions can play. This means showing that emotions can noninferentially make contributions to the justification of evaluative beliefs and showing that the justificatory force they impart is available to the emotional agent.

In order for emotions to play these justificatory roles, they must have representational contents which attribute evaluative properties to the objects that the emotions are responses to. The best alternative to the perceptual theories of the emotion which eschews talk of evaluative representation is the attitudinal theory of the emotions. But as a result of the fact that attitudinal theories do not claim emotions have evaluative representational content they cannot vindicate the claim that emotions have noninferential justificatory force that is available to the emotional agent.

So there is good reason to try to make a case for emotions having evaluative representational content. There is no easy path from an analogy between perception and emotion to a view of emotional representation. Emotions cannot get to have representational contents in the same way that perceptions can. Instead emotions get to be about their targets thanks to their connections to the other mental states that make them possible. Emotions get the evaluative side of their content thanks to their connections with our evaluative concepts. Emotions help to individuate our evaluative concepts in the same way that sensory experiences help to individuate our observational concepts. As a result, the emotions themselves are subject to accuracy conditions in terms of the concepts, since by individuating the concepts the emotions institute functional norms that work as accuracy conditions for the emotions. The emotions having these accuracy conditions, and being directed at the objects they are responses to, together suffice for emotions having evaluative representational contents.

Having evaluative representational contents is necessary for emotions to play their justificatory roles, but it is not sufficient. In addition, emotions must have phenomenologies which present their evaluative content as being true. This occurs via a cognitive shaping of the emotional phenomenology which happens as a result of their connections to our concepts.
Declaration.

This thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD. Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used. The thesis is fewer than the maximum word limit in length, exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices.

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Tristram Oliver-Skuse.
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5.1 Emotions and their formal objects
Recent theorising in the philosophy of emotion has been driven, in part, by the tension between forces pulling towards traditional James-Lange feelings theories and opposed forces pulling towards traditional cognitivist theories. These are the two poles of the emotions debate, with the theories people hold scattered across the space in between. Emotions exhibit features that each tradition has a hard time accounting for and this drives the search for a position that captures the good elements of each theory. At the same time, accepting part of the story that one of the poles gives puts theorists under pressure to accept more of the story. Perceptual theories have become prominent because they promise a stable story with the good features of each tradition. Perceptual theories also meet some other desiderata that can be less explicit in the debate but which shape the push and pull of the two poles. These countervailing forces are metaethical and epistemological – they concern the contribution emotions make to our rational lives. Typically these forces crystalize as questions about which theories do a better job explaining the ways in which emotions can play justificatory roles.

In this thesis I aim to defend the core claims of the perceptual theory by providing an account of how emotions get to have evaluative representational content. Before setting out my account I will begin by making it clear what the metaethical and epistemic desiderata are (this chapter), and showing why emotions must have evaluative content in order to play the roles perpetual theories claim they play (this chapter and Chapter 2), and seeing why none of the most obvious approaches to the issue are likely to work (Chapter 3). Then I will pursue the positive part of the thesis, claiming that emotions have their proper object fixed by their phenomenology (Chapter 4), get their formal object thanks to the right sort of integration with our conceptual capacities (Chapter 5) and get the right sort of phenomenological impact thanks to this same integration (Chapter 6). Finally I will consider some objections (Chapter 7) and look at some more speculative applications and areas to extend these ideas into (Chapter 8).

In this chapter I will present bare-bones versions of the two traditional views that set the poles between which the emotions debate takes place and discuss the problems with each that drive the desire to find an alternative (1.1 and 1.2). Next, I’ll briefly look at views that try to find a home for the good features of one of the alternatives within the shell of the other and show some problems that arise with this (1.3). Then, I’ll set out the core elements of perceptual theories of the emotions which promise an attractive alternative (1.4). I discuss some aspects of the ways in which perceptual theories can get the right sort of story about the rational roles of emotions (1.4.1-1.4.3). I will end the chapter by looking at some challenges to the perceptual theory (1.5) and drawing out lessons for what we should want for a perceptual theory to work (1.6).

1 The discussion falls well short of showing that these strategies cannot work. Instead it is just meant to supply the motivation for seeking an alternative.
1.0 What are emotions?

There is a great deal of literature concerning how to define emotions, whether emotions are in fact a homologous kind (Griffiths, 2004) and whether emotions can be reduced to a privileged subset (normally the basic emotions) which are the components out of which anything that deserves to be called an emotion is built (Griffiths, 2002). There are also debates about where to draw the boundaries between affective features of emotions and cognitive features of emotions. These are not the issues I will be focusing on in what is to follow, though the last issues will be implicitly addressed to some extent.

I will simply assume that emotions are a class of affective state that can be discussed on their own. Perhaps the boundaries between emotions and other states are porous and perhaps they are drawn in a fashion that cross-cuts natural kind divisions. This shouldn’t matter for my purposes.

When I talk about emotion I mean affective states that are occurrent, have a phenomenological profile, are directed at particular objects and have a duration. How determinate the objects must be is up for grabs, and the distinction between emotions and moods is drawn in terms of particularity so this distinction might end up being a matter of degrees. Paradigmatic cases of emotion in this sense are fear, anger, joy, amusement and so on.

It is interesting to ask to what extent these paradigm cases are marked off in any real way from similar states that are either non-occurrent, have vaguely defined or diffuse objects, and so on. The literature I am concerned with typically focuses on the subset that I have marked out though, and I will do likewise without worrying about these issues. Even if there is no truly psychological kind that picks out only these states, we can take what follows to concern the relevant subclass of whatever psychological kind comes closest. Furthermore, as will become evident over the course of my thesis, this subclass of occurrent emotions has important epistemic characteristics that it does not share with more diffuse or less conscious affective states.

1.1 Feeling theories

Traditional feelings theories claim that emotion are felt bodily changes. First, environmental stimulation brings about patterns of bodily change that help us deal with the situation. If I am suddenly confronted with a looming presence my heart rate increases, I am flooded with adrenalin, my pupils dilate and a number of other changes occur which ready me to avoid or confront whatever lies ahead. I feel these changes and the feeling of these bodily changes is the emotion. My fear is my recognition of these bodily changes.

This is an appealing picture because it ties the emotion very closely to the bodily change. Emotions do seem to be inherently bodily phenomena. William James offers a subtraction argument for feelings theories that trades on this tight connection between
emotion and bodily feeling (James, 1884). The idea is that if you take away the bodily phenomenology of an emotion then there is no phenomenology left that is genuinely emotional. Fear without a racing heart, dry mouth, etc. isn’t fear so much as a sober realisation that one is in danger. If the distinctively emotional element of the episode is the bodily feeling then why not take the bodily feeling to be the emotion?

Feelings theories are also appealing in that they make emotions something we can clearly share with lesser animals. Any creature that has bodily changes that prepare them to deal with environmental changes and is capable of registering their own bodily changes can be said to have some emotions. Furthermore, given that many paradigmatically emotion-inducing situations tap into fairly basic needs, creatures that face similar sorts of situations to humans and undergo broadly similar bodily changes can be said to experience the same types of emotions that we do. The sorts of bodily changes that many mammals undergo in response to a threat share enough features that we are justified in claiming that other mammals feel fear since they undergo and experience a pattern of bodily changes that is similar to what we undergo. Moreover, since the felt bodily changes are changes that the body undergoes in order to help deal with certain environmental conditions, whenever a similar sort of emotion is shared between two individuals (even across different species) the emotion helps make sense of a similar sort of behaviour. That is, a monkey that feels fear will act similarly to a human that feels fear because in both cases the feeling registers the animals’ bodies getting ready to escape or resist. Finally, the bodily changes are ways that the organism prepares to deal with a situation and this means that the emotion might be useful or not depending on how these changes line up with the situation faced. Such fit or failure of fit is also assessable over the species divide. All of this gels with a sensible naturalistic aversion to human exceptionalism.

However there are also some implausible aspects of feelings theories. For my purposes the most important of these is the fact that felt bodily changes are themselves non-intentional. A pattern of bodily changes just is, it is not about anything. So when I feel the bodily changes, the only sort of intentionality is the way in which the registration of the changes is directed at the changes the body is undergoing. At best the feelings are about the body. But we think of our emotions as being directed out at things in the world. I am sad that I missed the concert and I am afraid of the sudden noise. But the bodily changes cannot straightforwardly be about these things because they are not about anything. The claim that emotions are intentional has become a mainstay of emotions theories and is even thought to be criterial of the distinction between moods and emotions, with moods being affective states like emotions but without intentional objects, or with very vague objects. Furthermore, emotions are thought to be evaluative in some way whereas bodily changes are not evaluative.

Feelings theories have also been thought to do a poor job of individuating emotion types. They individuate emotion types in terms of patterns of felt bodily change (fear feels one way, anger another, and this is thanks to differences in the bodily changes which we undergo). But there is empirical evidence that the felt bodily changes associated with emotions aren’t enough to distinguish one type from each other. In a

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2 See 3.2 for discussion of an attempt to extract some intentionality from felt bodily changes, though it also does not get the bodily changes to be about the worldly objects we think our emotions are directed at.
famous experiment (Schachter & Singer, 1962) subjects were told that they would be given a stimulant and were asked to do some public speaking. Some were given a placebo and when asked to describe their emotions during the speech they said that though they would normally feel nervous, on this occasion they didn’t but merely felt the effects of the drug. So it seems that the pattern of bodily changes associated with nervousness and those expected from amphetamine use were indistinguishable. In this case, genuinely emotional phenomenology was indistinguishable from chemical stimulation. So the physical phenomenology seems to be insufficient to mark out an emotional response from a non-emotional response. Given this, there is no reason to think that the physical phenomenology alone should mark one type of emotion as opposed to another.

Finally, it seems that specific bodily feelings are neither necessary nor sufficient for a given emotion. People who have lost sensation in their bodies can still experience some emotions (even if they are reported as muted). So bodily feeling is not necessary for emotion. Also, for any given set of bodily feelings said to constitute some particular emotion type it seems plausible that they can be induced by non-emotional means (chemical and physical stimulation for instance). So bodily feeling is not sufficient for emotion.

This discussion yields constraints on how a theory of the emotions should look. A theory ought to tie the emotions closely to bodily feelings, since the intuition driving the subtraction argument is surely right in that occurrent emotions have to have their own felt phenomenological profile, but it ought not to claim that purely bodily feelings are either necessary or sufficient for the emotion in question. The theory should give space for a story about how we share emotions with animals and how similar types of emotion explain similar sorts of action, even across the species divide. It should also tie emotion closely to action or action tendencies. But a good theory must also allow that emotions are directed towards things in the world, should say something about how emotions are connected to evaluation and should yield a good way of individuating emotion types.

This yields the following constraints on a theory or the emotions:

- **FEELING**: Emotions are inherently felt – they have a distinctive phenomenological profile.

- **ANIMALS**: Emotions are something we share with animals – we ought not make our story about emotions so cognitively demanding that animals can’t count as having emotions.

- **ACTION**: Emotion is tied to action – we ought to make sense of the ways in which emotions lead to actions, either directly or indirectly.

- **EVALUATION**: Emotions are evaluative in some sense – we ought to make sense of the way in which emotions are connected to our evaluative responses to the world.

### 1.2 Cognitivist theories
Cognitivist theories of the emotions were part of the Stoic tradition and were revitalised in the 20th century by people like Martha Nussbaum (Nussbaum, 2001, Chapter 1) and Robert Solomon (Solomon, 1980). Cognitivist theories in their purest form simply claim that emotions are judgements. In particular they claim emotions are evaluative judgements involving the concept that type-individuates the emotion in question. So my fear of the looming shape is the judgment *the looming shape is dangerous*. DANGEROUS<sup>3</sup> is the evaluative concept that type-individuates fear – that is, any fear is a judgement of danger<sup>4</sup>. The judgment is also about the looming shape – it is intentionally directed. Since the emotion is the judgment, the emotion is directed at the looming shape and the cognitivist succeeds in capturing the emotion’s internationality where the feelings theorist failed. The judgement is itself evaluative, so the emotion’s connection to evaluation is secured. This theory also secures the emotion type-individuation which was a problem for feelings theories. You can tell what type an emotion is by the rational relations it stands in, since its evaluative content fixes its type.

Cognitivist theories have the nice effect of tying emotions to evaluative judgments (they tie them as tightly as one can – by claiming that they are identical). This has intuitive appeal, since there is a clear connection between being amused by a joke and judging the joke to be funny. In particular finding something amusing can play some sort of positive epistemic role vis-à-vis belief that the joke is funny. If the emotion is a judgment that the joke is funny, then whatever epistemic credentials the emotion has supports the belief that the joke is funny via what Brandom refers to as a stuttering inference - *p, therefore p* (R. B. Brandom, 1994, p176). If an emotion is a judgment we form, from then on we can be justified in reiterating the judgment (to the extent that the first judgments was justified). As this thesis progresses we will see more and more detail about just what the relationship between emotion and judgment looks like, but there clearly should be some sort of relationship, and cognitivism secures that. Since a new judgment can put us in touch with a new fact perhaps the cognitivist can give a story about how emotion put us in touch with new evaluative facts.

Finally the cognitivist theory does a nice job of showing how emotions can be assessed in terms of how well they match the way the world is. This makes sense of our intuitions that some emotions are unsuitable because they do not match how the world is. My fear of a harmless dog is misfiring in some way.

However, there are also problems with cognitivist theories. They fail to capture why emotions ought to have any phenomenology, let alone why they have a bodily phenomenology. If emotions are judgments, then there is no reason they ought to feel any particular way. Even to those who are attracted to the idea of cognitive phenomenology, not all judgments have a phenomenological profile, so why should all the emotional ones have a phenomenology? Moreover why do emotional judgments have such specifically bodily phenomenology? In anger our blood boils, in fear our mouth goes dry. No other judgements have such a physical phenomenology.

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<sup>3</sup> Throughout this thesis I will use smallcaps to mark reference to a concept.

<sup>4</sup> I’m riding roughshod over some debates here. There are views that say that fearsomeness is the formal object of fear, there are views with more nuanced relations between formal object, concept and type-individuation. None of these issues matter for the sketch I am providing here. The point is to get to why people are attracted to perceptual theories. Even if some of these sketches are unfair, or if the positions have the resources to respond to the problems levelled against them, this will still give a taste of the attraction that the perceptual theory holds for some.
More worryingly for cognitivists, there are reasons to think that evaluative judgments are actually neither necessary nor sufficient for the emotion in question, let alone identical with them.

Judgements aren’t sufficient for having emotions. I can believe that something is dangerous without fearing it. I believe that driving a car is dangerous, but I am not afraid of driving. As that example shows, these cases needn’t be too odd, or too clearly pathological. But we have a simple formula for generalising such cases. In depression some people suffer from blunted affect. They can form any of the normal evaluative judgments people make, but this does not elicit an emotional response. So for any given emotion-judgement pair we can imagine a case where someone endorses the judgment but lacks the emotion.

Nor is the corresponding judgment necessary for the emotion. I believe that flying is safe, but I feel fear every time my plane takes off. These cases seem easily generalised. For any given evaluative belief there is nothing stopping us coming up with a counterexample where someone has sufficient auxiliary beliefs to rule out their believing it. (We can easily believe that flying is too well-regulated to be dangerous.) Yet it seems that possessing these beliefs needn’t preclude a person from undergoing the associated emotion. (I might still fear flying.) A cognitivist can reject these claims, saying that the judgments are necessary but that they are often implicit and unconscious. In each case I do have whatever tacit beliefs are needed to undergo the relevant emotion. They can also claim that the judgments are sufficient and that some of my emotions are unconscious, so when I believe driving is dangerous but report that I am not afraid of it this just means that I have an unconscious fear of driving. Positing whatever beliefs we need in order to accommodate the cases means that cognitivists must say that when I have recalcitrant emotions I simply contradict myself. If I believe I am safe but feel fear then I simply have two conflicting judgments, which is just part of being a finite and corrigible epistemic agent.

In the case of positing implicit beliefs the most probative response is Patricia Greenspan’s who points out that making this move is theoretically under-motivated. There seems to be no reason to posit these unconscious beliefs that does not presuppose and rely upon the truth of cognitivism (Greenspan, 1980). Given this, it is a significant theoretical cost to have to posit them.

In the case of recalcitrant emotions we can again see that having to convict someone of contradiction when they fear something they believe to be safe is also a cost. This is simply not how we treat people who have recalcitrant emotions. We may think that the emotion is irrational5, but not that the person is making the same sort of mistake as asserting p and not-p. Furthermore, since emotions are at least somewhat passive, happening to us rather than being something we do, this seems like the wrong sort of irrationality to charge someone with.

Recalcitrant emotions also open onto another problem with cognitivist theories. We saw that it is nice to be able to claim that emotions can put us in touch with new evaluative facts. This can be strengthened by saying that sometimes emotions do this

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5 More on this in 1.4.
in cases where our judgement cannot. I will call these Huck Finn cases. These are cases where for some reason we are shut off from forming a certain explicit evaluative judgment but in which our emotions engage with the salient aspects of the situation and so bring us to act in light of those evaluative features, putting us under some pressure to believe that the situation has that evaluative feature. Huck Finn is in this sort of situation when his racist upbringing makes him unable to form the belief that Jim is a person and therefore deserving of freedom but his sympathy simultaneously reacts to Jim as a person, suffering harm, and stops Huck handing Jim over to slave hunters. (Bennett, 1974) But a cognitivist cannot account for how emotions can do this, since emotions are just more judgments, so if Huck can’t form the relevant judgement he shouldn’t be able to form the relevant emotion either. It isn’t clear why emotions can tap into features of our situation that our deliberative faculties cannot.

It is open to a slightly more sophisticated cognitivist to say that part of what is distinctive of emotions and what makes them the type of judgments that they are is that they are only partially integrated with the rest of our judgments and so are formed in a different manner. Where a normal judgment cannot be formed because of countervailing beliefs, perhaps an emotional judgment can be formed. This can also be mobilised to help with the contradiction worry. If emotional judgments are only partially integrated perhaps they aren’t integrated enough to count as being in full-blown contradiction with our other beliefs. These emotional judgments might not always be reflectively available, might not be useable as premises in our reasoning, might not incline us not to believe things to the contrary and so on.

First of all, this line of thought begins to stretch the notion of judgement. Paradigmatic judgments are decisions made by weighing competing considerations in some sort of epistemic central court. If these judgments are formed in another way they begin to look quite different, especially if they have some of the other properties discussed above (not being reflectively available, not being used as premises in reasoning by the agent who forms the judgment and so on). If the special departures for emotional judgments add up too much, it can begin to look like emotions are being compared to judgments, not identified with them. Recall that the cognitivist secures the claim that emotions are both evaluative and intentional simply by pointing to uncontested features of the judgments they equate them with. But once they then point out special properties of the emotional judgments it becomes less clear that these original features all carry over to the emotional case. Though it is perfectly possible that emotions are judgement-like in all the relevant ways to secure these features, while being unlike judgments in all the ways that help avoid counterexamples, it is ad hoc to simply claim as much without an independent argument for the features you want to vindicate.

Even if we grant the cognitivist this extension of the concept of judgment this gives the wrong sort of picture of the rational role of emotions. If emotions are judgments, then no matter how they are formed the agent in the Huck Finn situation is contradicting themselves. They have judged that $p$ and that $\neg p$ and they should try to resolve the problem. But the only court of appeal here is judgement. And since it is only the ordinary form of judgement that is likely to display its evidential relations (because it is the only one formed in the usual manner), it is this judgment that should win out. But we think that in Huck Finn cases sometimes the emotion puts the agent under rational pressure to modify the beliefs that they have arrived at in more typical ways.
The cognitivist theories have a further problem accounting for emotions in more primitive animals. If a dog does not have the relevant concepts then it cannot form judgments. But if emotions are evaluative judgments then a dog cannot have emotions. And this is difficult to believe. (If you believe that dogs have concepts, then just run the argument using whichever creature you think does not have concepts but which is as close as possible to us mentally.)

This discussion yields extra constraints on how a theory of the emotions should look. In addition to the discussion in the last section, a theory of the emotions should provide a story about how emotions can put us in touch with new evaluative features of the world and it should not claim that agents with recalcitrant emotions thereby contradict themselves. It should also make room for the intuition that emotions can get things right in cases where our judgment doesn’t and that in some of these cases they put us under rational pressure to side with the emotion. Finally emotions must be possible somewhat independent of concepts since animals seem to be able to experience some emotions even while lacking the sorts of concepts that are related to the evaluative side of the emotions.

This yields the following desiderata for a theory of the emotions:

**EVALUATIVE CONTACT:** Our emotions seem to give us access to evaluative facts – when they go well they teach us how things are evaluatively speaking.

**JUDGEMENT INDEPENDENCE:** Our emotions can sometimes get things right in spite of our explicit judgements to the contrary – they thereby can put us under some sort of rational pressure to revise our evaluative judgments.

**NONCONTRADICTION:** An agent with an evaluative belief may have an emotion that goes against the belief without thereby contradicting themselves.

**CONCEPT INDEPENDENCE:** Emotions must be somewhat independent of our conceptual capacities because we can share emotions with animals lacking the relevant concepts.

### 1.3 Attempts to get the best of both worlds.

There have been many attempts to combine the insights of one of the two competing theories within the shell of its rival. There are hybrid views which claim that emotions are judgments of a certain sort and that these judgments are accompanied by, or constitutively involve a certain felt bodily component (Oakley, 1992). There are views that take emotions to be bodily feelings that result from judgements (early appraisal theorists like (Lazarus, Averill, & Opton, 1970), as well as (Lyons, 1980)), that take them to be construals (Roberts, 2003, chapter 1) which are like judgments but without the element of assent and so on.

There are too many possible views here to discuss in any detail. Perhaps there are views in this middle ground that can be finessed to avoid the problems of both camps. But it seems that this is likely achieved at the expense of their elegance and perhaps even their plausibility. We saw that cognitivist theories have an elegant way of
explaining how emotions are both evaluative and intentional. They are evaluative and intentional in the same way that evaluative judgments are – by having evaluative content that is about things in the world. There is no further mystery to how emotions get to be evaluative and intentional beyond the mystery of how judgments do. But this is not necessarily true of a hybrid view that claims that emotions are judgments of a certain sort which behave differently to other judgments, necessarily involve a felt bodily component, can be shared with creatures that do not have conceptual capacities, and so on. Given the setup of the debate, concessions to the competing view often cast into doubt the appeal of the view being modified. The views at the two poles are so antithetical to one another that their hybrids tend to look a little strange.

There is one problem with these attempts at a middle ground that warrants a little more attention given the role it will play later. Suppose we take a cognitivist line, but claim that emotions are judgments that are accompanied by certain feelings. This gets some things right: the intentionality, the positive rational role (though it doesn’t yet have anything to say about recalcitrant emotions) and the phenomenology. It even does this without stretching the concept of judgment, since the feeling merely accompanies an otherwise normal judgment.

But if we take an emotion to be a cognitive attitude, along with a phenomenological character we get what Peter Goldie calls an add-on view, and this is the wrong view. What is missing from an add-on view is a way of accounting for the fact that there is something different about the way that an emotional content is experienced as against unemotional content. Goldie asks us to imagine an emotional black and white Mary case. Imagine someone who knows all there is to know about ice and psychology, who therefore knows that ice is dangerous, but she has never been afraid of it herself. Now imagine that she slips on some ice and comes to an emotional realisation that ice is dangerous. (Goldie 2009 p 234). This is not just the same old content with the addition of a non-intentional feeling. There is a sense in which the fear sheds new light on the ice rather than just adding some phenomenology to what she was already aware of. Fearing the ice changes her practical and evaluative relationship with the ice. Put in its strongest form the idea is that the emotion involves a sort of evaluative content about the ice that cannot be entertained in a judgment. (Although exactly how to understand this sort of change will come up again in section 1.4.3 and I will argue that this strong reading is optional.)

1.4 Perceptual theories.

Sabine Döring is a key advocate of perceptual theories ((Döring, 2010), (Döring, 2012), and (Döring, 2007)) and her theory will be my reference point in the following discussion. Christine Tappolet has a similar sort of perceptual theory and makes the standard analogy claims that I will adumbrate, adding that emotions are informationally encapsulated, rationally unconstrained by other emotions and have fine-grained, specific and phenomenal nonconceptual content (Tappolet, Forthcoming-a, pp18-22). She also explicitly claims that emotions have cognitive bases, and so are hooked up to the world via other mental states (unlike perceptions which are conditioned by other mental states, but get their content from informational processing performed on the outputs of dedicated sensory organs). She also claims that emotions are passive and “triggered automatically, in response to the world.” (Tappolet, Forthcoming-a p18) I will largely keep my discussion of the perceptual view neutral on points that Christine Tappolet has a similar sort of perceptual theory and makes the standard analogy claims that I will adumbrate, adding that emotions are informationally encapsulated, rationally unconstrained by other emotions and have fine-grained, specific and phenomenal nonconceptual content (Tappolet, Forthcoming-a, pp18-22). She also explicitly claims that emotions have cognitive bases, and so are hooked up to the world via other mental states (unlike perceptions which are conditioned by other mental states, but get their content from informational processing performed on the outputs of dedicated sensory organs). She also claims that emotions are passive and “triggered automatically, in response to the world.” (Tappolet, Forthcoming-a p18) I will largely keep my discussion of the perceptual view neutral on points that
that tries to get the best features of both theories. The core idea is that emotions are like perceptions. They are responses to the world that present the world in a particular way. Like perceptions, they have their own *sui generis* representational content.\(^7\) According to perceptual theories emotions are somewhat independent of our judgements, and do not require a judgment that agrees with their content in order to occur. Like perceptions, emotions have a phenomenological profile as part of their nature. They are felt states.\(^8\)

According to these views, emotional content is always evaluative and always involves the attribution of an evaluative property to an object. The evaluative property in the content type-individuates the emotion. Take, for example, fear. If I am afraid of a dog then my fear has the representational content *that dog is dangerous*. The representational content can be broken into two parts - the proper-object directedness and the formal-object directedness. The proper object is the worldly object or state of affairs that the emotion is about. In this case the proper object of the emotion is the dog. The fear is fear of the dog. The formal-object directedness is the emotion’s appropriateness condition – the condition that makes the emotion either appropriate or inappropriate depending on the way that the proper object is. Here the formal object is danger. The fear is appropriate if and only if the dog is a danger to me. These two forms of intentionality together suffice for the emotion having its representational content. With both of these in place the emotion is accurate if and only if the proper object has the property that is the emotion’s formal object. Given this the emotion attributes the property to the object.

Perceptual theorists claim that emotions stand in the same sort of rational relations with belief that perceptions do. This amounts to two main things. Firstly, emotions can noninferentially justify beliefs.\(^9\) Secondly, emotions and beliefs exhibit conflict without contradiction.

The first point, that emotions noninferentially justify beliefs, is meant to be the core comparison between emotions and perceptions. Just as perceiving that \(p\) justifies belief that \(p\) in the absence of defeaters,\(^10\) so too having an emotion with the content \(p\) can justify believing \(p\). Like perceptions, accurate emotions reveal how the world is. Under favourable circumstances, if we endorse the contents of affective appearances, we are noninferentially justified in believing them, and can attain knowledge. As with perception, our default stance takes our emotional appearances at face value, only second-guessing them when we believe they may be distorted. This is called the default mode, it is our usual comportment towards the world in which we simply take the way things appear to us, thanks to perception and emotion, to reveal the way things

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\(^7\) There is, of course, controversy about whether or not perceptions themselves have representational content. (Some direct realists like Charles Travis (Travis, 2004) deny it.) There is little dealing with this in the emotions literature, but the analogy implicitly assumes a view of perceptions according to which they do have representational content. In principle a version of the perceptual view of the emotions could work even if perceptions themselves do not have content.

\(^8\) And thus avoid the problems of add-on theories mentioned in the last subsection.

\(^9\) For a little more discussion of the noninferential requirement and its motivation see Chapter 2.

\(^10\) This too is controversial in the perceptions case. A view of perception along the lines of phenomenal conservatism is being assumed here.
are. We simply come to believe the contents of the perceptions and emotions.\textsuperscript{11} We can be pushed out of this default mode by the occurrence of an emotion which we realise presents things to be other than we have reason to believe they are. When we are pushed out of the default mode we are presented with a rational dilemma, believe the emotion or believe whatever makes us think the emotion cannot be right.

The second part of the analogy between emotion and perception is that emotion is like perception in that when an emotion has content that is in conflict with the content of a belief, the two really do conflict with respect to how things are, but an agent with the emotion-belief pair does not thereby contradict themselves. Comparing perceptual illusions with recalcitrant emotions brings out the similarity here. It might look to me that a stick half submerged in water is bent, even though I believe it to be straight. The content of the perception is in tension with the content of the belief (both cannot be true at once) and yet I am not contradicting myself. Likewise, if I am afraid of something it thereby appears dangerous to me. Yet the thing I am afraid of may be obviously harmless and I might sincerely believe that it is harmless. If I am in this predicament my belief and emotion conflict with one another, but I do not contradict myself. (For more detail on the nature of the conflict see 2.2)

These two features ensure that Huck Finn style cases are well accommodated by perceptual theories. Just as a perception can put me in touch with content that is in conflict with my current beliefs, and so put me under pressure to revise my beliefs, so emotions can in evaluative cases. Huck’s sympathy presents Jim as suffering undeservedly. His beliefs conflict with this but do not get automatic precedence. His emotion presents its content in a way that challenges the beliefs. By being in this situation Huck is under some pressure to come to a stable belief in light of the emotional experience, but he is not contradicting himself. We might have background beliefs that block us from arriving at certain judgements, and our emotions might get there in spite of them, becoming the only path by which we can come to some evaluative claim.

To secure these roles, the emotions must have representational content and the content must be housed it in an attitude that presents the content as true. Emotion must assert its content, so to speak. By contrast, wishing does not present its content as true. Huck could believe that Jim was someone’s property and wish that he deserved freedom without that causing any of the right kind of conflict. Huck would be under no pressure to take into account new material relevant to his belief. To get into conflict that attitude housing the content must give the emotions a mind-to-world direction of fit. Emotions are correct when the world is like their representation, not when the world ought to be like their representation.

\textsuperscript{11} For Döring the endorsement must be somewhat active. In the default mode it happens automatically and tacitly, but it is a separate act of endorsement. (Döring in conversation 2014.) This pushes her to a more intellectualist account of emotions than we might want, leading to the possibility of genuine contradiction arising from normal functioning of our emotional endorsements in the default mode. If I believe \( p \) and without noticing endorse \( \neg p \) because I am in the default mode I will have contradicted myself. Her view seems to be driven by the substantive view that for a belief to be an expression of our epistemic agency requires endorsement of quite a strong sort. There isn’t room to discuss the effects of this commitment here, though my hope is to formulate a version of her view that does not insist on a separate act of endorsement, but relies on the direct motivational force of the appearance.
In addition to presenting its content as true, the attitude housing emotional content must also inferentially insulate the content from the content of beliefs (see the next section for a discussion of alternatives to this move that try to locate the insulation in the content of emotions). The emotion cannot house the content in an attitude that is transparent in the way belief is — an attitude that just straightforwardly presents its content as true. If the emotional attitude made no difference to the way the content was presented, compared with the attitude of belief, then emotion would stand in the same rational relations that beliefs do. In that case, believing \( p \) and emoting \( \text{not-}p \) would be to entertain a contradiction.

The attitude must then be something like a seeming where by “seeming” I mean what Michael Huemer means (Huemer, 2001, Chapter VIII). Sometimes seeming is used as a hedging device. Saying that it seems that \( p \) in this sense is saying \( p \) but implying some reservation about \( p \). However, according to the sense of seeming I am appealing to here, a seeming is a propositional attitude that presents its content with mind to world direction of fit but does not rely on the endorsement of the agent entertaining the seeming (unlike belief, since to believe \( p \) is to have accepted \( p \) as true). So the attitude itself does not hedge on the truth of the content, but the agent entertaining the seeming needn’t be committed to its truth. This means that when it seems that \( p \) while \( p \) is false, the state falls foul of its own correctness condition, but the agent needn’t be at fault in any way because they have not endorsed the seeming. For it to seem to me that \( p \) does not require that I accept \( p \). If it seems that \( p \) then \( p \) is presented as true, yet it can seem to me that \( p \) whilst I believe \( \text{not-}p \) and I do not thereby contradict myself.

Emotions are also like perceptions in being somewhat passive. This is connected to the fact that they have a different source to our judgments. We don’t decide which emotions to have in the way that we do decide what to believe (that is when we can weigh and decide what to believe on balance). This helps to motivate taking the attitude in emotion to be a seeming. Because the state can occur without our endorsement it is unsurprising that the attitude falls short of full endorsement.

1.4.1 Two flavours

In the literature there are two different flavours of perceptual theory. There are those that claim that emotions are like perceptions, and use the analogy between the two to guide theorising about the emotions. The core of the analogy view is the claim, discussed above, that emotions play the same sort of rational roles that perceptions do ((de Sousa, 1987), (Döring, 2010), (Tappolet, 2005)). There are also those who claim that emotions literally are perceptions of a certain sort ((Jesse J. Prinz, 2003) and on some readings possibly (Johnston, 2001)).

Theories of the second (literal) form are more problematic than the first. Since they claim that emotions literally are perceptions, they cannot admit any disanalogy between emotions and perception. There are a number of claimed disanalogies in the literature that are hard to explain away. Perceptions themselves are neither justified nor unjustified, yet we often assess the justification of emotions, and this does not seem merely frivolous. (There seems to be something about the emotions that underwrites
this sort of assessment.) Where perceptions have dedicated organs and transducers (that is dedicated bits of biological hardware that take input and convert it for processing) emotions do not. I will discuss this a little more in the next chapter, but for now I will just try to motivate classifying the literal views as sophisticated feelings theories rather than perceptual theories in the sense in which I’m interested in them.

To overcome the organs and transducers disanalogy and the justification disanalogy a literal perceptual theorist must claim that emotions are neither justified nor unjustified and that they do have dedicated organs and transducers. The latter can only really be interoceptive in nature, getting information about what is going on within the body, so that felt bodily changes are what the emotions get to work on.\(^{12}\) If emotions are neither justified nor unjustified, yet stand in important patterns of relation to the outside world then we are best off explaining this in terms of patterns of the bodily response being caused by patterns of environmental situation. This connection is merely causal, so not apt for grounding justification – it is simply a set of regularities between the conditions of the body and the conditions of the environment. But now we have a picture of the emotions as felt bodily changes that are in merely causal contact with the world. There are moves to secure content for these felt bodily changes (see section 3.2) and so establish their intentionality, but this seems more like a feelings theory with extra bells and whistles than it does like a view driven primarily by the desire to account for emotions standing in the same justificatory relations as perceptions.

So I will treat Prinz as a feelings theorist rather than a perceptual theorist. If this short argument has not convinced you, bear with me and read me as simply setting Prinz aside for now. In section 3.2 I will argue that Prinz’s theory cannot meet the desiderata given by the perceptual theory; given this, and given that Prinz is ambivalent about trying to meet them, it seems more charitable to read him as a sophisticated feelings theorist rather than a perceptual theorist in my sense.

Given that the literal view is off the table, a perceptual theorist can just accept that emotions and perception are unlike one another in how they get their inputs. Where the perceptual system is supplied with raw data via organs and transducers, emotions get content via cognitive bases – that is via the mental antecedents to the emotions that put us in touch with the objects the emotions are about. So in order to feel fear of some particular shark I need to be put in touch with that shark. This might be via perception of the shark, via belief (if I believe that there is a shark at the beach), or even via imagination (when I swim over a particularly deep bit of water and can viscerally imagine a shark lurking down there). This is granted as a disanalogy, but a single disanalogy needn’t be fatal to the view.

1.4.2 Insulation: Attitude or Content

As we have seen, if content is housed in the right attitude it can be inferentially insulated from the content of our beliefs so that when it conflicts with that content no contradiction ensues. In this subsection I explore an alternative way of explaining the non-contradiction in terms of the nature of the content of the emotions. The claim is

\(^{12}\) For more detail on this see sections 3.2 and 3.4
that if emotions have nonconceptual content, then they can represent things as being a certain way without their contents being inferentially engaged in the way that the contents of judgement are.\textsuperscript{13}

Tim Crane defines conceptual content as content which one must have certain concepts to entertain (Crane, 1992, p142). Concepts are structural parts of that content, governed by a logic that determines the inferential relations that hold between the larger bits of content. (Crane, 1992, p147). These concepts have a universal character since by their nature they can appear in other bits of content and they give the content its coarse grain\textsuperscript{14} because they make the same contribution to every bit of content they are part of.

Christine Tappolet defends the view that emotions are inferentially insulated by having nonconceptual content (Tappolet, forthcoming-b, section 1.3). She thinks that emotional content is nonconceptual because it has the fine-grained, inherently phenomenological character of perceptual content, as opposed to the course-grained structure of conceptual content. This account of content, which is already plausible given the phenomenology of emotion, explains the noninferentiality of the content since the inferential structure of entertainable bits of conceptual content comes from the inferential structure of the conceptual molecules it is composed of.\textsuperscript{15}

But although claiming emotions have nonconceptual content secures non-contradiction when emotions and beliefs conflict, it does put the perceptual theorist in danger of losing the right to talk about the justificatory role of the emotions.

John McDowell argues that nonconceptual content cannot justify a judgment even in the case of perception (McDowell, 1994). Nonconceptual content cannot stand in the right sorts of relations to belief because for the content to justify the belief, it must be in a rationally structured relation with the belief, and this is only possible when the relationship is governed by our rational capacities – when we can scrutinize the putative relations between the two. If the content has the structure to stand in rational relations to belief, then it has conceptual structure, since conceptual structure is the structure responsible for parts of content having a role in their rational relations (according to Crane (Crane, 1992), Gareth Evans (Evans, 1982), and others). That is, the very way in which nonconceptual content is insulated stops it from entering into the right sort of justificatory relations.

Without rational relations between the contents of perception and belief, only causal relations between perception and belief are possible. But perception merely causing a belief cannot justify the belief, it only exculpates us from responsibility for it. Justification is normative, whereas just because a perception causes a belief doesn’t mean it hasn’t done so in a deviant way. Perception might cause belief in a manner analogous to the way that Davidson imagines a desire to drop my climbing partner

\textsuperscript{13} This view claims an added advantage - it can assign the same content to the emotions of animals and children as it does to adults, since the contents of our emotions do not require conceptual sophistication that they lack.

\textsuperscript{14} “Course grain” is used here in the sense captured by the analogue-digital distinction. So coarse grained content here is content that can present something as, say, green without having to present it as any determinate shade of green. A given course-grained content is compatible with many, more specific, fine grained contents. (Peacocke, 2003, pp111-2)

\textsuperscript{15} Such a view is non-accidentally compatible with Döring's since Döring wants to leave open this option and seems to only refrain from endorsing it to avoid the McDowell objection. She insists only that the content is noninferential, but given this set-up, the content itself can only be noninferential if it is nonconceptual.
causing me to lose my grip on the rope simply due to the agitation the desire causes. (Davidson, 1973) Thus causal relations alone do not guarantee that the perception is a reason for the belief.

McDowell’s alternative story is that perception has conceptual content and so stands in the right sorts of relations to justify beliefs. However, we might worry that this is no alternative at all. On McDowell’s picture, justification stretches right out to the relation between perception and belief. But if we need a justificatory relation between belief and perception, then this raises a question about the connection between the perception and the objects it is a perception of. If the way the object is doesn’t provide a reason for the perception to be as it is, then it looks like the same problem arises here. The belief is not in a normative relation to the object itself, since the relation between the world and our perception of it cannot be a rational one. If a perception which is caused, but not justified, by the world can justify belief, then why can’t a belief that is caused by a perception, but not justified by it, be used to justify beliefs further down the line? In any theory of experience there will be a transition from causal relations to rational relations as we move from the object, through perception, to belief, so McDowell owes us an account of how the transition is made just as much as the believer in nonconceptual perceptual content.

Sometime it looks as though McDowell’s solution here is to take the objects of perception to be partially constituted by being perceived (McDowell, 1994, Lecture II), in which case the relation between object and perception can be shaped by more than just a causal connection between the object and the belief. However if this is McDowell’s solution, we seem to be in danger of losing a sense of perception’s contact with an independent world. Since one of the explicit aims of McDowell’s approach is to show that perception can actually be about the world itself stressing relations to objects that are mind-dependant in some way will not satisfy many readers.

These sorts of issues spill over into the emotional domain. At the end of the day we want to claim that emotions noninferentially justify beliefs. Beliefs uncontroversially have conceptual content. This means we have to examine the relation between the content of the beliefs and that of the emotions that justify them. If the emotional content is nonconceptual then it cannot be the same as the content of the belief, because the content is the wrong sort. The content of the judgement must then be a conceptualized analogue of the content of the emotion, and we need a story about how the transmogrification from nonconceptual to conceptual works. This is difficult and controversial terrain and McDowell’s argument iterates at this level - what justifies one way of conceptualising rather than another? If nothing about the original state can justify one conceptualization, then the state that conceptualises its content might equally have conceptualised it in some other way. Thus the justification the conceptual state provides is undermined, since an alternate conceptualisation mightn’t have given the justificatory force needed, and nothing rules out this alternative. If, however, there is enough structure in the original state to justify one particular conceptualization, then what can this structure be but conceptual structure? So the content was conceptual content all along.

Since any clam about nonconceptual content courts some controversy here, perhaps the better way to secure noninferentiality and justificatory roles is to focus more on the
attitude in which the content is housed. Since the attitude seems like it can do the insulating work already without courting the controversy of calling on nonconceptual content, it seems prudent to take on the less controversial claim.

1.4.3 Why not both?

Döring argues that in addition to the attitude insulating emotional content from full inferential engagement with the contents of judgement, the content itself must be inferentially inert in some way. That is the content itself must be such that it does not stand in inferential relations with conceptual content. This is very controversial terrain, but an example of inferentially inert content might be pictorial content. It is possible that a drawing stands in no inferential relations to statements and it is possible that we ought to understand the potential cognitive significance of a drawing by thinking about the drawing as having a certain sort of content. Combining these two thoughts means holding that drawings have content that is in some propriety pictorial format and that such content does not stand in logical relations with the sort of content that beliefs have.

Many accounts of nonconceptual content treat noninferentiality as criterial for content being nonconceptual (Gunther, 2003a). So if Döring’s argument worked it would put strong pressure on us to take emotions to possess nonconceptual content. This is even more the case since emotional content possesses other markers of nonconceptuality. Emotions are gradable (in that they come in degrees of intensity) and therefore seem likely to have fine-grained analogue content (Dretske, 1981, Chapter 6.). Emotions are often thought to have non-force-independent content, that is content that cannot be divorced from the force which the state imbues it with (Gunther, 2003a, pp12-13), so that we cannot get access to the funniness of a joke just by endorsing some content – the content must be housed in the right attitude.¹⁶ Emotions are also largely passive (they are states whose content is forced upon us rather than being states we arrive at via active reflection).

Döring gives another argument in favour of taking the sort of content emotions have to help insulate emotions from full inferential engagement with the content of judgments. The argument is independent of the claim that emotions having conceptual content would cause all conflict to be contradictory. So if her argument is convincing we have an independent reason to court the controversy inherent in the nonconceptual content claim. But Döring’s argument does not work. Her claim is that arriving at the content requires some sort of a gestalt switch, not just an inference. She has us imagine someone whose behaviour is so annoying that at a certain point it becomes funny to us. Seeing that the behaviour is funny requires a gestalt switch, not an inference. If someone else didn’t find it funny I could only point out funny aspects in the hope that attention to the right details will help them see it in the right way. In order to see the

¹⁶ Goldie makes a version of this claim about emotional content being non-detachable from the emotional attitude. But see the following paragraphs for a little more of a discussion of this.
humour of it we must do more than come to believe some content via inference. We must be amused.\(^\text{17}\)

If this argument worked it would show too much. It start with the claim that properly seeing the amusingness is not possible thanks to inference and concludes on this basis that the content of the amusement must be different to the content of any judgment, since judgments can always be arrived at via inference.

But this doesn’t follow. It could be that the content of the amusement is judgeable, but that properly seeing the funniness requires more than just having the right content – it also requires having the right attitude towards the content. I can get to the content the annoying behaviour is funny by an inference. For instance, I might infer that it is funny based on my friend finding it funny. But it’s still possible to say that I would not see the behaviour as funny, in this case, despite having arrived at the content via inference. Seeing the behaviour as funny might require having that very same content but housed in a different attitude. It might mean emoting that the behaviour is funny, or it might mean having an attitude of seeming towards the content. But this doesn’t force us to think that the content is anything other than the very same judgeable content - the behaviour is funny – so it could be conceptual content. Perhaps the attitude of seeming is what makes us really see the amusingness of the behaviour.

This line is made more plausible by the following case of some clearly conceptual content that can be arrived at by inference, but which we only count as seeing once we have the content in the right sort of attitude. The attitude responsible for us seeing the content presents that content as true, but cannot be brought about by inference alone. Consider the intuition that disjunction introduction is truth-preserving. Imagine a student who is told, by a revered authority, that any time \( p \) is true so is \( p \lor q \). They learn the truth table for disjunction, run through some examples and use the rule in some basic proofs, but they never feel like the move is OK. The student believes that disjunction introduction is truth-preserving, but their intuition still tells them that it isn’t. Later they have an aha! moment and finally see that it is truth preserving. In this later moment they come to have a seeming or an intuition with the content disjunction introduction is truth-preserving. This is conceptual content if ever there was such a thing. When they have the intuition the student is seeing for the first time that disjunction elimination is truth-preserving. Seeing that disjunction elimination is truth-preserving requires not just having the content presented as true, but having it presented as true in the right sort of attitude.

Why not think that the emotional appreciation of something’s being funny is like this - having the very same content as the corresponding judgment, but having it in the right sort of attitude?

\(^{17}\) Note the similarity between this line and Goldie’s cases in favour of feeling towards rather than add-on theories. Goldie points out that fearing ice is not just having a belief about the ice plus some feelings (Goldie 2009, p234). Rather the feeling of the fear is tied into the representation of the ice as dangerous in the right way. But accepting the core of Goldie’s claim does not entail accepting the nonconceptual content view (or the phenomenal concept view that he advocates). As I will discuss, certain attitudes towards some content might have an intrinsic phenomenology without that meaning that the content is different to another state that doesn’t have that phenomenology. The thing to avoid is saying that the phenomenology is a mere accompaniment to the content. On the line I support the phenomenology is intrinsic to the content having the force that it does. An unemotional thought that is dangerous is not part of the emotion that has the content that is dangerous because in the emotion the content is housed in a different sort of attitude to the non-emotional thought.
Claiming that the content of emotions is noninferential courts the controversy that all claims of nonconceptual content court (including the controversy around just what conceptual content is – for more on this see Applications chapter). Foremost among these is the worry that nonconceptual content cannot play the right rationalising roles. Given that this is the main reason that perceptual theorists posit content, it is especially troubling.

We have seen that giving the right sort of account of the attitude that houses emotional content can do the work of insulating the content from full inferential engagement with the content of our beliefs. We have also just seen that a requirement on emotional attitude can account for the distinctive way in which emotional content is arrived at in a manner that is more gestalt-like than inference-like. Given this, it seems prudent to remain neutral with respect to the sort of content emotions have and leave open the possibility that emotions have the same sort of conceptual contents that judgements do.¹⁸

1.5 Challenges to the perceptual theories.

1.5.1 Salmela and Whiting.

A great deal of the critical literature surrounding perceptual theories concern disanalogies between emotion and perception. The less interesting versions of these criticisms simply point out disanalogies that the perceptual theorist is able to acknowledge without abandoning their analogy claim, so long as they grant that the analogy is partial (which they should do anyway).¹⁹ The more interesting versions of these criticisms aim to point out disanalogies between perception and emotion at precisely the point that the perceptual analogist is hoping to exploit the analogy.

Take, for example, the issue of tying the emotional intentionality and feeling together. Views like Döring's attempt to exploit the inseparability of feeling and emotional directedness to avoid the problem of the weird separation between phenomenology and content that besets add-on views (discussed above).

But a disanalogy is in the offering here. Perception is said to be transparent in that describing elements of the perceptual phenomenology always involves describing ways in which the perception represents its object. In this way the feeling and intentionality of the perception are inseparable. Doubt has been cast on whether emotions are like perception in this respect and it is claimed that emotions are opaque in that we can describe their feeling without referring to features of their objects – describing elevated heart rate, discomfort, etc, when talking about the feeling of fear.

¹⁸ In Chapter 8 I will offer some speculative thoughts on how to adjudicate this issue in light of the theoretical tools I offer in the rest of the thesis.
¹⁹ An example is Salmela’s claim that recalcitrant emotions are the exception rather than the rule. Normally when we change our beliefs our emotions fall into line, whereas in perception a recalcitrant perception will not change when our belief changes. This can be simply accepted by the analogist, so long as this is not a respect in which they are claiming the two are analogous. (In this very instance there is actually evidence that in some cases our visual perception of colour changes to accommodate our beliefs about the colour of the object. People are more likely to report that monochrome pictures of bananas look more yellow than the same shade of grey does when it is an abstract shape. (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006)
Mikko Salmela pushes a version of this complaint, claiming that the bodily feelings that get fused to feeling-towards in emotions can be experienced independently of the emotion, and that we can sometimes experience the bodily feelings of an emotion without realising they are emotional. (Salmela, 2011) In these cases we may not be able to work out that they are intentional, and think that they are merely twinge-like feelings. So the phenomenology itself cannot give us that feelings are always intrinsically intentional. Feelings in perception are always intrinsically intentional and are given to us as such.\(^\text{20}\) (Damian Whiting also denies the intentionality of emotional feelings saying that they "do not manifest phenomenally a representational character of content" (Whiting 2012 p97).)

This is an echo of Schacter and Singer’s challenge to feelings theory, since again, we are told that the same phenomenology might occur in a non-intentional state, so the feeling cannot suffice for the intentionality of the state. But the analogist needn’t grant too much here. They can admit that emotions are more opaque than perceptions in general without admitting a difference in kind. Sensory perceptions come in degrees of opacity – with some striking visual experiences, the qualities given in perception are themselves presented as qualities of the experience, not the object. Staring at a vivid sunset has a certain enveloping, intense qualitative character that is not simply presentation of the horizon as colourful. The tactile perception of something as intensely cold presents the temperature of the object, but also has a qualitative character that applies to the experience itself – a tingling sensation. Finally, when attempting to describe the taste of wine we often refer to features of our experience as interlaced with characteristics of the wine – so the way that the tannins make a particular taste linger is experienced as being about our experience of the flavour rather than as the duration of a thing, flavour, that our experience merely puts us in touch with.

Likewise, though emotions may, in general, be more opaque than perceptions, my fear of flying is not simply a twinge-like feeling and some other cognitive stuff, the feeling presents flight as dangerous. When the plane lurches on take-off I feel fear, not simply as an unpleasant somatic sensation, but as a feeling of the danger that the plane will crash. I would be having an introspectively different feeling if I was afraid of the person sitting next to me on the plane. The feeling of fear is bound up with how it orients us towards its intentional object; it does not just accompany the emotion.

1.5.2 Helm.

There is a key challenge to the claim that emotions play the rational roles that drive the perceptual theory. It has been dubbed the Helm objection. The idea is that the perceptual analogy gets the wrong story about how emotions conflict with beliefs. According to the perpetual analogy there is nothing irrational in having an emotion that conflicts with your beliefs. But according to the Helm objection, this is wrong. Perceptions that conflict with beliefs are not irrational but emotions are (consider the

\(^{20}\) Deonna and Teroni also claim that emotions are opaque where perceptions are transparent. (Deonna and Teroni 2012)
person who is afraid of a dog they know to be friendly and harmless). The Helm objection worries that the perceptual analogy explains away the rational conflict.

Tappolet responds to the objection by trying to explain how emotions are different to perceptions such that the difference in irrationality is vindicated but without discarding the analogy. She says that emotions are more plastic than perceptions, so we can learn to get our emotions under control in a way that we can’t get our perceptions under control. This capacity to exert control is what makes the conflict irrational in emotion but not in perception.

Döring challenges this response, denying that we ought to bring our emotions under our control (since recalcitrant emotions might be doing their job perfectly well and since there is no general requirement that we bring all of our states under our control given our finitude and the resources needed to monitor and control those states). She thinks that the salient difference between emotion and perception that explains this difference in the rational status of conflict is that emotions are more intimately connected to motivation than perceptions are. Emotions are said to constitutively involve action tendencies (Frijda, 1987) and so to motivate independently of any beliefs or intentions that they cause. Just feeling fear of a ledge will incline me to back away from it, whether or not I believe there is any danger in falling over it, and irrespective of what intentions I form. Emotions that clash with our beliefs thus incline us toward irrational action (action that does not accord with our intentions) and therefore recalcitrant emotions are irrational in a way that recalcitrant perceptions aren’t.

Döring later revises this defence, claiming instead that the intuition that there is something irrational about recalcitrant emotions is false (Döring, 2015). However, this defence relies on a very narrow reading of irrational, according to which irrationality in the target sense is nothing but coherence (Döring, 2015, p396-7). The claim is that there is no norm of coherence that takes in both beliefs and emotions, so there is no norm of coherence that forbids emotions which clash with beliefs. This may well be true, but it seems to simply define away a problem that will re-emerge under a different name. The Helm objection can still be pressed by claiming that there is something wrong with recalcitrant emotions which is connected to norms governing how an epistemic agent ought to be. The same is not true of recalcitrant perceptions. So this needs to be explained, and we need to admit that the epistemic role (or rational role more broadly construed) of the emotions is therefore different to that of perception. For this reason I prefer Döring’s original treatment of the Helm objection.

1.5.3 Brady.

Michael Brady has a slightly different set of challenges for the perceptual theory that also trade on the way in which emotions get their input from other mental states. He says that this undermines one core claim of perceptual theories – that emotions can justify beliefs. Brady claims that far from offering justification for beliefs emotions “capture and consume attention” thereby directing us toward the search for reasons to believe something. It is only these reasons that can do the justifying work.
Brady argues that because emotions can be based on reasons, and are justified by those reasons, the emotion cannot play exactly the same role as perceptions in justifying belief. This is because we often look for reasons for emotions, whereas we do not do this with perceptions. When someone is angry we ask why, whereas we only ask why someone saw something a particular way if we already think it’s the result of interference.\(^{21}\) According to Brady the fact that emotions can be justified or unjustified makes them unsuitable for justifying beliefs. If an emotion is unjustified it cannot justify us in believing anything. Yet if an emotion is a response to reasons, it responds to the things that genuinely are reasons for evaluations and the emotion cannot justify anything itself. (Brady 2011) The dog’s sharp teeth and raised hackles are reasons to think it is dangerous, and for my being afraid of it. Being afraid of it is not a reason for me to think it’s dangerous, unless my fear is justified by these features, but they justify the belief in dangerousness, with or without the fear. So fear is a spare wheel.

But this is too strong a conclusion. As argued, an emotion may be our only path of access to the things that actually justify the belief (in Huck Finn style cases). To deny justificatory force to emotions because they are not fundamentally reasons for belief is like denying that we can gain justified beliefs from testimony. Receiving testimony may be an epistemic reason to believe x without it being a constitutive reason for x being true. It seems that the blocking move relies on a background foundationalist empiricism about justification. The idea is that what does the real justifying is whatever is apt to justify without itself needing justification – something that can stop a search for reasons. However, this is an optional view of what does real justificatory work as the case of testimony intuitively shows.

Furthermore a perceptual theorist who takes foundationalist empiricism seriously can simply deny that only justified emotions provide reasons for belief. They can claim instead that any emotions that is not subject to defeaters potentially justifies belief and then insist that the sort of defeaters emotion are subject to are more extensive than those perceptions are subject to, so that an emotion informed by a cognitive base that malfunctions is thereby defeated (just as we might say that perception fed by a faulty transducer is thereby subject to a defeater).

Brady also argues that if emotions were reasons for evaluations then a sort of reductio ad absurdum ensues, since they could be reasons for themselves. (M. S. Brady, 2011) Fear is a reason to take the dog to be dangerous, and the dangerousness of the dog consists in the very features of the dog that are reasons for the fear – its sharp teeth and raised hackles. Bootstrapping ensues.

But, the fear is a reason to think the dog is dangerous, not a reason that the dog is dangerous, so it is justified to think the dog is dangerous on the basis of justified fear, but this does not make the dog dangerous. The justified fear is not a constitutive reason for the danger of the dog, like its sharp teeth, but an epistemic reason to take it to be dangerous. Thus we cannot get from justified fear to actual danger. So the fear...

\(^{21}\) Salmela also pushes on this, saying that rational conflict between belief and emotion is possible in a way it isn’t with perception, since there are no rational relations between perception and belief (Salmela, 2011). This is massively controversial as stated, since most people think that perceptions justify beliefs, so perceptions do stand in rational relations to beliefs. We can read him as simply meaning that there are no rational relations going back the other way, whereas in emotion there are. Thus, the thought goes, emotions do not stand in perception-like relations to beliefs because they can be rationally dependent on beliefs.
does not make true the things that would be reasons for it and no bootstrapping ensues.

1.5.4 Summing up.

These challenges encourage limiting the scope of the analogy. For my purposes the perceptual analogy is most interesting if it is taken to stress a partial analogy between perception and emotions the core of which is that they stand in the same rational relations to beliefs that perceptions do.

Here are some disanalogies that will figure prominently. Where perceptions get their inputs from organs and transducers, emotions get theirs from their cognitive bases. Emotions have more defeaters than perceptions – because there are more distorting factors for evaluative claims, because our emotional system is more hair-trigger than our perceptual system in some cases\textsuperscript{22} and because the emotion inherits some of its content from our cognitive bases, and so inherit whatever defeating conditions these bases have. More disanalogies will emerge over the course of my discussion.

1.6 Representation.

We have seen that a perceptual analogy of limited scope is the best version of the perceptual theories of the emotions. But now we come to the issue that I will devote the rest of the thesis to – giving an account of the emotions that shows how they have representational contents. Attempting to do this, while meeting these desiderata, is the fundamental challenge that I aim to address and is largely unaddressed in the literature\textsuperscript{23}. We have seen that getting the contents via the claim that emotion are judgments leads to one set of problems, and getting it via the claim that emotions are perceptions leads to another. This leaves the claim that emotions have sui generis representational contents. It is often treated as unproblematic to claim that emotions have sui generis representational contents. That they do is assumed by many philosophers who aren’t perceptual theorists (Montague, 2014), (M. S. Brady, 2011), (Zamuner, 2015). But the arguments in support of it are suggestive at best and no theory is given of how emotions get to have their representational contents. Simply drawing an analogy between two things doesn’t yet do anything to vindicate the claim that one has properties of the other. Let’s suppose that perceptions do have representational content – this doesn’t yet show that emotions do unless we are making the identity claim. Claiming that emotions are like perceptions in the ways discussed above just gives the desiderata for a theory of the emotions: it must vindicate the claim that emotions can play the same roles that perceptions can. But making an analogy does not yet offer the theory itself. We don’t yet have fully-fledged theory according to which emotions play those roles, just the parameters for what a theory should look like. This is the task I will attempt in the chapters that follow.

\textsuperscript{22} False negatives are often more costly than false positives when it comes to emotional situations since many emotions are set up to detect life-affecting situations.

\textsuperscript{23} Though it is pressed as a problem by Schroeder, Schroeder and Jones (Schroeter, Schroeter, & Jones, 2015)
In the next chapter I will try to vindicate the claim that to meet the *desiderata* of this chapter a theory of the emotions needs to show that emotions have representational content. Without this the emotions cannot play the justificatory roles that PTEs claim for them. I will do this by showing that the most attractive alternative that aims to avoid the need to establish the content claim cannot meet the *desiderata* I have accepted.

1.7 Conclusion.

The core point to take from all of this is that the heart of the perceptual theory is the claim that emotions play the same sort of rational roles that perceptions do. This is an appealing picture and gives desiderata for how a theory of the emotions should work. Crucial to making such a theory work is securing the claim that emotions have representational contents. This is what I shall now attempt to do.
Chapter 2.
Attitudinal theories of the emotions.

2.1 Background.
In my previous chapter I claimed that perceptual theorists of the emotions (PTEs) give a good account of the epistemic and metaethical roles of the emotions but I worried that their way of explaining how emotions can play those roles relies on an account of emotional representation. Attempts to provide this account are largely missing from the literature and so that is the project for the rest of my thesis. In this chapter I will preempt one response to this concern which tries to avoid having to give such an account by accepting an alternative theory of the way in which the emotions are evaluative. I aim to resist the claim that the attitudinal theory of emotions, which does not rely on emotions having evaluative content, can do the work a perceptual theory could if it were equipped with an account of how emotions get representational content. I will argue that attitudinal theories cannot claim that emotions play the same metaethical and epistemic roles that PTEs claim they do. The argument will lean heavily on two desiderata from the perceptual theory – two claims about emotion’s epistemic role that should be vindicated by any theory that tries to account for how emotions are evaluative. The first is that the emotions can (in some cases) noninferentially justify our beliefs. The second is that our emotions can conflict with our beliefs, and that this is rational conflict. These desiderata are at the core of the appeal of the PTE, so part of what makes PTEs attractive is the promise of vindicating them. I will claim that attitudinal theories (AT) cannot vindicate both claims at once. This is not mean to count decisively against the AT itself, since the desiderata themselves are controversial and only internal to the perceptual theories. I hope, however, that my previous chapter has established at least the initial plausibility of the picture these desiderata belong to, so that the argument here will show that there is a cost associated with accepting ATs instead of PTEs.

In what follows I will give an account of the two desiderata – that the emotional justification of beliefs is noninferential (2.2) and emotions can generate rational conflict (2.3). I will then set out Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s account of emotions as evaluative attitudes (2.4). I will give Deonna and Teroni’s account of how emotions justify beliefs (2.4.1 and 2.4.2) then I will show that their claim that emotions are evaluative attitudes cannot vindicate the specific justificatory claims that perceptual theorists make (2.5). I will also quickly compare my argument to another similar argument in the literature (2.6).

2.2 What is noninferential justification and why is it important?
A belief is inferentially justified if it is justified thanks to the agent having an argument at their disposal that starts with premises they are entitled to believe, and has the belief in question as its conclusion. The justification for the belief in inherited from the justification for the premises of the argument. The inference transfers the justification.
The justification is blocked if the agent does not have such an argument at their disposal. An agent can fail to have such an argument at their disposal as a result of further beliefs they have – beliefs that contradict premises that are needed for an argument to go through.

Perceptual theorists want to claim that emotions provide noninferential justification for beliefs. But what is noninferential justification? This is a thorny issue to which there is no univocal answer. Some writers treat justification that does not rely on rehearsal of an explicit chain of reasoning as noninferential (Fricker, 2007, p65). The thought is that many of our belief are arrived at via relatively automatic processes that are nevertheless reason-guided. Making sense of this is thought to require a category of justification that is noninferential. This is not the notion of noninferential justification I will be working with. Suppose I have become proficient with modus ponens and proficient at spotting conditionals which I can accept. If I spot one of these and I believe the antecedent, I automatically come to believe the consequent. According to the notion of noninferential justification that cares about explicitly rehearsing an argument, the beliefs that I form in this automatic fashion will be arrived at noninferentially. When this way of arriving at them provides any justification, the justification will be noninferential. For my purposes, this is just an automated modus ponens, and belongs with paradigmatically inferentially justified beliefs.

The sort of noninferential justification I will be talking about is the sort of justification that does not rely on the subject having an inference available which leads from premises, to which they are entitled, to the putatively justified belief. This alone does not yet adequately characterize noninferential justification though, since on some readings of “available to the agent” the automated modus ponens cases above might not rely on an argument being available to the agent. The argument is not available to the agent in this case, in that it is not a conscious occurrence that can be recalled by them. Using a weaker notion of availability to the agent carves up the space more interestingly though. An argument is available to the agent in my sense if the agent could accept the argument as one that gives entailments which belong to their own way of thinking. It needn’t be that the argument is one that they could explicitly arrive at, but once presented with such an argument, they must be able to recognize it as implicitly accepted by their own thinking (given sufficient careful consideration, possession of the relevant concepts, and whatever other idealizations are needed).

On this view of inferentiality, the automatic modus ponens gives justification that is inferential because the automatically acquired belief depends upon the agent being able to accept that modus ponens is always truth-preserving. Their capacity to accept this is sensitive to their background beliefs. If they move from if $p$ then $q$ to $q$ while believing not-$p$, then this transition does not justify their belief in $q$.

Non-inferential justification obtains between two states in a transition backed by some sort of a disposition of thought. It is a pro tanto rational support relation between the two where the justified thought is given some epistemic normative support by the other state in the relation. Beyond this, no matter how we conceive of noninferential
justification, a very strong marker for it\textsuperscript{24} is that it obtains even when the agent has beliefs that would block the goodness of an argument to putatively justified belief. If B1 is the belief whose justification is at issue, then the agent might have a group of beliefs B2, B3 and B4 which are incompatible with any good argument from premises the agent can accept to B1. Suppose Ed believes he is looking at a red apple. But suppose Ed is an undergraduate in the grip of a quasi-Cartesian scepticism. He believes that no sensory experience can provide evidence for any empirical beliefs. In this case there is plausibly no argument that gets him from premises he can accept, to the conclusion that he is looking at a red apple. By contrast, Tracey, a non sceptical undergraduate, can accept the inference from it looks like a red apple is in front of me to I am looking at a red apple in front of me. On the views of perception that stress perception’s noninferential justificatory force, even Ed is justified in believing he is looking at a red apple (\text{\cite{McDowell1994}, \cite{Brewer1999}, \cite{Huemer2001}, etc}). If this is right, then the justification he has is noninferential in my sense. The justificatory relation holds independently of whatever arguments he can accept.

We arguably get this sort of noninferential justification in cases like accepting testimony and taking perceptions at face value. There is significant debate on both of these points, but for the sake of this argument I will assume that noninferential views of testimony and perception are correct. The role these assumptions play in the arguments that follow is merely elucidatory. I will not claim that the justificatory force of emotions stands or falls with that of perceptions or testimony, rather I am using these comparisons to illustrate the shape of the justificatory power that perceptual theorists claim emotions have. If the reader does not think that testimony and perception justify in this manner, they can read such comparisons as between how perceptual theorists claim emotions are, and the way people like McDowell claim that perceptions and testimony are.

This way of picking out noninferential justification is still not entirely clear-cut. On any sensible view of perceptual justification or justification of testimony there will be defeaters for the justification (\text{\cite{BonJour1980}}). If Ed, mentioned above, has good reason to believe that lighting conditions are abnormal, then perceptual justification might not go through for colour beliefs because bad lighting is a defeater for perceptual justification of colour beliefs. Dividing off the defeating conditions from premises blocking arguments is not a simple matter. After all, Ed might accept a global version of the abnormal lighting claim. (If he is a brain in a vat, then all lighting is abnormal in that all illumination which he is exposed to makes his perceptual judgements about colour unreliable.) So a belief that blocks inferential justification might, on some views, be a defeater that blocks noninferential justification.

Attempting to delineate the two is outside the scope of this project. Suffice to say there are many views in the literature that depend on defeaters for certain sorts of justification being different in kind to beliefs that block inferences, so I am not the only person who wants there to be a gap here. One way the distinction might be drawn is to claim that defeaters are more objective than beliefs. John McDowell thinks that the defeater for a perceptual judgement of colour is the perceiving agent being under

\textsuperscript{24} In fact, I think that what follows could be criterial for justification being noninferential, but I won’t argue this here.
abnormal lighting conditions, not their believing that they are under abnormal conditions (McDowell, 2009, Essay 1.). This yields a division between beliefs that block inferential justification and defeaters that block noninferential justification which would work neatly for my account. To my mind it also yields some counterintuitive verdicts about the justification of perceptual beliefs. But I don’t take McDowell’s story to resolve my issue, instead it gives the shape of the sort of distinction which would resolve it.

There is reason to think that emotions have justificatory force that is noninferential in this sense (see the previous chapter for more details). Let’s think again about Huck Finn. Huck feels sympathy for Jim in spite of believing that Jim is someone’s rightful property and as such has no right to freedom. When he examines his evidence for thinking it would be bad for Jim to be captured by slave hunters he cannot find any good evidence for it, so he doubts that his sympathy is legitimate. Suppose now that he nevertheless comes to form the belief that Jim deserves freedom – he just cannot help but believe it. We are supposing that his sympathy is tracking features of Jim’s situation that escaped his conscious notice, but which display Jim’s real right to freedom. In this case, Huck will be justified in believing Jim should be freed. It’s not just that he doesn’t rehearse an inference from the occurrence of sympathy to the belief that Jim should be freed, rather he cannot rationally accept the inference. Such an inference would not be good by his own lights, since he believes that his sympathy is misleading. This variation on the Huck Finn case is among the sorts of cases for which perceptual theorists want to make room (Döring, 2010). It is a case I will return to.

Let’s contrast this with a view that says emotions justify beliefs via inference. The most obvious way to do this is via a reliability inference. The agent would reason from the belief that they are angry, together with a belief that their anger reliably occurs in response to some particular thing, to the belief that this occurrence is tracking that thing. If I believe that my anger is a reliable indicator of offence, I can infer that x is offensive from an episode of my own anger directed at x.

Such a move from an emotion to a judgement does not involve any noninferential justification. We might be willing to accept that this is the best we can get – emotions playing inferential justificatory roles. But the problem is that even if the inference involved is implicit, justification still relies on metareflective capacities, and it still relies on the agent having a premise about the reliability of their emotions available. If it hasn’t occurred to someone that their anger tracks offense, or if they actually have beliefs to the contrary, we should not attribute an implicit inference to them, involving this claim as one of the premises. So although this route will account for some cases where emotions justify judgements, it will not cover all the cases a PTE wants to cover. It ties the justification too closely to the capacity for fairly abstract thinking and to self-conscious rational monitoring of beliefs.

2.3 Conflict and reasons.

One of the key motivations for perceptual theories of emotion is capturing the nature of the conflict that occurs when emotions and beliefs conflict. The idea is that, like
perception, emotion exhibits “conflict without contradiction” (Döring, 2010, p292)\textsuperscript{25} when it disagrees with belief. If I believe \( p \) and it looks to me like \( \text{not-}p \) then the way that things looks is in conflict with the way that I believe them to be, but I do not contradict myself in the way I would if I believed \( p \) and \( \text{not-}p \). Emotions are meant to be like this too. If I believe I am safe, but feel fear, my fear presents me as in danger, which is in conflict with the belief that I am safe. In the visual case (and by extension in the emotional case), both the way things look and the belief cannot be accurate at once, and I am put in a rational quandary. It is not just that there are two states in my cognitive set that cannot both be jointly satisfied\textsuperscript{26}, in addition I am under pressure to bring the two states into harmony. The “conflict between emotions and judgements are rational conflicts” (Döring, 2010, p292) and so generates rational tension.

The way that the tension works is brought into focus when we look at what Döring calls the default mode. With both perception and emotion we mostly simply come to believe that things are as these faculties present them.\textsuperscript{27} For Döring, this amounts to a string of tacit endorsements of the content of the emotions (Döring, 2010) – someone tells a joke, I am amused, and I endorse the content of my amusement, thereby coming to take the joke to be funny. The state in which we unreflectively endorse the contents of our emotions is the default mode. We are brought out of the default mode when endorsing the content of the emotion would lead us into contradiction\textsuperscript{28} and when we leave the default mode we have to make a choice between taking things to be as the perception (or emotion) makes them seem and taking them to be as we believe them to be. We leave the default mode by being forced to make a judgement to resolve the conflict.

This helps get at what rational conflict is\textsuperscript{29} – a conflict that calls for resolution by our deliberative judgement – the sort of conflict that can only be decided by making a decision about what we ought to believe\textsuperscript{30}. Resolving rational conflict is not just a matter of coming to believe what we have most objective reason to believe, but requires deciding what to believe in light of what we take to be the reasons to believe it. It is a matter of coming to a stable and coherent judgement. For emotions to be able to rationally conflict with beliefs they must represent things as being different to how judgement represents them, and they must generate felt rational tension which needs to be alleviated, either by endorsing the original judgement or by updating it in light of the emotion. The important point for the following argument is that the tension between the emotion and the judgement is a rational conflict in the sense of a conflict regarding

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{25} See also (Döring, 2007).

\textsuperscript{26} This happens all the time, often in ways that do involve contradiction. Simply having competing representations of things is part of being a fallible finite agent.

\textsuperscript{27} This is effectively a form of phenomenal conservatism – the view that when a state presents things as being a certain way we are inclined to take them to be that way and our doing so gives us some sort of prima facie warrant for the belief. (Huemer, 2001)

\textsuperscript{28} Presumably it would be more precise to say we leave the default mode when we notice that we would be lead to contradiction.

\textsuperscript{29} Although see the end of this section for a different view of the nature of rational conflict that Döring now holds.

\textsuperscript{30} Believe or do. I will be focusing here on beliefs, but there are also rational relations between emotions and actions. These will come up in the final section of this chapter.
\end{footnotesize}
what we ought to believe that demands resolution. As a result, emotions must provide some sort of epistemic tug in order for the conflict they generate with judgement to be rational conflict.

By *epistemic tug* I mean that the emotion must strike us as displaying some epistemic force in favour of belief and this must be part of the experience of the emotion. In order for there to be tension between a belief and an emotion which makes it seem to us that things are other than we believe them to be, the emotion must strike us as counting in favour of having an alternative belief (to at least some degree). Furthermore, this must be reflected in what it’s like to undergo the emotion. If emotions were mere dispositions towards belief then they would not generate rational conflict and so would not bring us out of the default mode.

A mere disposition to believe without any epistemically normative force wouldn’t do the work. Suppose I believe *p* but have a strong pang of desire for *not-p* which brings about a disposition to believe *not-p*. This does not generate rational conflict that requires judgement to arbitrate, it just presents us with a challenge to our rational will. We have a mere disposition to believe something alongside a contrary belief we have no reason to question. The rational thing to do is ignore the motivated disposition. This may be more or less hard to do, but it is not rational conflict in the right way. It is not like believing one thing and having it visually seem to you that things are otherwise since it doesn’t leave us with a reason to reflect or search for reasons.

Likewise, an emotion must also *strike us* as counting in favour of beliefs in order to set up rational conflict. Suppose emotions were epistemic forces in favour of beliefs *that don’t strike us as such*. In that case there would be no rational conflict between the emotion and belief, and for the same reason that a mere disposition wouldn’t lead to rational conflict. If something counts in favour of believing *p* without my seeing it as so counting, then I am not put under competing rational pressures, I am (at best) merely subject to distinct objective reasons. There is no tension here that must be resolved by a judgement since nothing is presented to judgement that counts in favour of *p*. There would simply be a belief and a countervailing force that pushes us to believe otherwise, but judgement would have no reason to side with such a countervailing force. There would be no rational conflict between the two.

So the state that brings us out of the default mode, stops us from unreflectively endorsing what is given to us, and forces us to make a deliberative choice must be occurrent and must have a felt rationalising element. This is what is required to secure rational conflict between emotions and beliefs.

One might think that we don’t even need rational conflict between emotions and beliefs. It is true that in a recent paper Döring abandons the claim that conflict between emotion and judgement is rational conflict (Döring, 2015) but this is less of a change than it looks when it comes to the point I am trying to make.31 In that paper Döring defines “rational conflict” more narrowly than previously. When she denies that emotions rationally conflict with judgement there she means that being in the emotional

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31 The real change here is vis-à-vis the Helm objection and amounts to a more thorough-going rejection of the intuition that recalcitrant emotions, but not perceptions, are irrational.
state whilst holding an opposing belief does not fall foul of norms of rational coherence (Döring, 2015, p396). Given that it is already an entrenched presupposition that emotions are cognitive rather than conative this means that emotions do not fall foul of norms of coherence governing judgements, such as “do not judge p and not-p”. But given that, the claim is just that an agent with a belief that \(p\) and an emotion with the content not-\(p\) does not contradict themselves. My claim is not that emotions need to be brought into coherence with judgements (after all emotions are not judgements) instead I am claiming that they are a rational prod towards judgement which needs to be responded to by making a decision. This is not a claim that a PTE can abandon. Claiming that emotions and judgements do not rationally conflict in my weaker sense would mean failing to explain why conflict between emotions and judgements forces us out of the default mode.

So for emotions to provide for rational conflict they must provide the right sort of epistemic tug. I will refer to this as providing internalist justification and by this I mean that emotions provide an epistemically normative force in favour of belief (though not necessarily decisively in favour of it, they are pro tanto reasons to believe) and that this is reflectively available to self-conscious epistemic agents but without this meaning that by that fact there’s any argument available to the agent which offers inferential support for the belief. This contributes to the positive justificatory force that emotions have. It is part of what Döring needs to show that emotions can help us to “act [and believe] for reasons seen as such” (Döring, 2010, p287).

If emotions didn’t provide this sort of internalist justification for beliefs then we could not make sense of them bumping us out of the default mode and forcing a judgement on us in cases where they incline us to believe something that conflicts with our current beliefs. That is to say, without providing internalist justification, emotions cannot yield rational conflict. Since accounting for conflict of this sort is a major part of what drives PTEs, any theory that doesn’t explain how emotions could provide internalist justification for beliefs will not meet the desiderata that PTEs provide.

2.3.1 Both at once?

It is worth quickly clarifying that there is nothing contradictory in thinking that a state can provide justification that is both noninferential and internalist. Internalist justification, in the sense I am targeting here, is justification that a given state lends to a belief via a felt rational pressure to form the belief. It is internalist in the sense that the agent who has such a state is thereby given the resources to cite the state as a reason for the belief. This does not on its own mean that the justification available to the agent depends upon their having an inferential path from the state to the belief. For a justification to be noninferential, in the sense I am targeting, is for its force not to depend on the availability of such an inference to the agent. So we can have noninferential internalist justification.

However, if internalist justification and inferential justification could not be extricated in any cases it might seem that this is because any internalist justification is ipso facto inferential in nature. We might think that if you can cite something as a reason to
believe, then you necessarily have access to an inference you can endorse that goes from the occurrence of the state to the belief in question. But there are cases where internalist justification comes apart from inferential justification.

Suppose a very simple-minded creature who is subject to perceptual states that compel them to believe things, but which lacks the wherewithal to provide even a reliability argument in favour of the beliefs that they form. When they form a belief on the basis of a perception they can tell that they have the belief because of what they saw, and can convey this, but if asked for a reason to think that the perception counts in favour of the belief they can offer nothing. There is no good argument they can rehearse, or even accept as implicit in their own thinking, which starts with the experience and ends in the belief.

An alternative case that divides the two is already on the table in 2.2 - our Huck Finn variant who forms the belief that Jim deserves freedom. He forms the belief on the basis of his emotional response, and feels the emotion applying rational pressure to form the belief. But his background beliefs deny him access to an argument from the occurrence of the emotion to the likely truth of the belief. Because he doubts that his emotions are reliable he cannot endorse any such argument.

So there are cases of internalist justification without inferential justification. So there is no reason to think that internalist justification just is inferential justification. So there is nothing incoherent about the PTE claim that emotions can contribute to justification that is both internalist and noninferential.

2.4 Deonna and Teroni on emotional content.

Attitudinal theories seem to be driven by very similar desiderata to perceptual theories. They aim to account for the rational contribution emotions make to our judgements by giving an account of how emotions justify evaluative beliefs. Their way of doing this involves the claim that emotions have content, though the details differ between the two views.

Whereas perceptual theorists claim that emotions have contents that are evaluative (fear of a spider has content along the lines of that spider is dangerous), Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni claim that emotions are evaluative in a different way (Deonna & Teroni, 2012) and (Deonna & Teroni, 2015). They claim that the contents of emotions are just given to the emotions by their cognitive bases. This means the contents of emotions are just what the emotions are directed at (Döring, 2010, Chapter 7). Fear of a spider has the content that spider whereas fear that the stock market will crash has the content the stock market will crash. The evaluative dimension, according to them, comes in at the level of the attitude. Each emotion is an attitude held towards its content. The emotional attitudes are appropriate if and only if the referent of the content of the emotion has a given evaluative property (either the object or state of affairs that the emotion is directed at must have the evaluative property). The property at issue

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32 See 1.4.1 for an explanation of cognitive bases.
depends on the emotion in question. For instance, any token fear is an instance of an attitude that is appropriate iff the content it is an attitude towards is dangerous. So my fear of the spider is appropriate iff *that spider* is dangerous. The content can be objectual (in the case of fear directed at a spider) or it can be propositional (in the case of fear that the economy is on the verge of collapse). In either case, the evaluative dimension of the emotion comes from the attitude and not from the content.

It can look like attitudinal theories offer an alternative to giving an account of how emotions get evaluative representational contents which will satisfy all the *desiderata* of the PTE and thus get the appealing results without having to embark on the project I set up at the end of chapter one. The content of the emotion is just given by the cognitive bases, so it is not mysterious, and the evaluative dimension just comes in at the level of the attitude. There is nothing mysterious about different attitudes having different appropriateness conditions. Emotions get to be evaluative thanks to their content, together with their attitude type. So perhaps we now have all we needed for an account of emotional content which explains the justificatory roles that perceptual theorists claim for the emotions. In the following sections I will set out how Deonna and Teroni’s proposal for emotional justification works (2.4.1 and 2.4.2), I will emphasize the difference between this and perceptual theories and then argue that attitudinal theories cannot straightforwardly satisfy the twin demands that emotional justification be both internalist and noninferential (2.5 onwards).

### 2.4.1 Justified emotions.

Deonna and Teroni’s explanation of how emotions can justify beliefs goes via their account of how emotions themselves are justified. According to them, an emotion is justified if it is caused by an awareness of properties of the emotion’s target that constitute an instance of the evaluative property given by the emotion’s appropriateness condition. This amounts to a descriptive property making its bearer satisfy an evaluative property. For example possessing sharp teeth is a descriptive property that can make something dangerous. Deonna and Teroni say that “the emotion’s justification depends on the subject being aware, through its cognitive base, of a content apt to justify it” (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, p97). So if my fear of Rufus the dog is caused by properties Rufus has that constitute his dangerousness (the size of his teeth, etc), then my fear is justified.

The first thing to note is that this is an externalist notion of justification, in contrast to the internalist notion I mention in 1.5.2. Deonna and Teroni are careful to claim that the awareness of these properties needn’t be an awareness of them as evaluative properties in order for them to justify the emotion. So if an emotion is caused by awareness of some natural property, and that property is, in fact, a reason to be afraid (if the property makes the thing dangerous), then the fear is justified, whether or not the subject takes the property to be a reason for the fear. So my fear might be justified

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33 It is what Burge would call an entitlement (Burge, 2003). This terminology is nice, but much of the emotions literature uses justification language instead and so long as we are clear about which notions are in play the terminology does no harm. None of my arguments will rest on ruling out justifications that aren’t internalist *per se*, so I will simply retain the justification terminology because it fits better with the way these debates are conducted in the literature.
without my realizing it. The fact that the sort of justification at play here is externalist is actually advantageous for the attempt to give emotions an ineliminable internalist justificatory role. If emotions were only ever justified when we have reasons available to us for being in the emotional state, and if emotions have evaluative accuracy conditions, then whatever justifies the emotion would also justify an evaluative judgement. The justification for an emotionally-based evaluative judgement would fall through the emotion, without the emotion contributing anything. The judgement would be justified if the emotion was, but the emotion would be justified by something that could equally serve as a reason for the judgement, so the judgement would be justified whether or not the emotion had occurred. So the fact emotions themselves get externalist justification is an advantage for Deonna and Teroni. It allows the emotion to be justified (a precondition for the emotion to do any justifying according to Deonna and Teroni) without us having access to a reason that would also justify the belief on its own.

The unalloyed claim that emotions are justified when caused by awareness of any property that realizes an evaluative property will, however, risk generating justification where we would intuitively think there is none.\(^\text{34}\) Suppose I am aware that the rod in the corner of the room is plutonium, but I don’t know that plutonium per se can be harmful. Nevertheless the awareness of that property causes fear in me because I find sciencey stuff frightening, and being plutonium is a way of being sciencey. Yet we might worry that my fear is justified because it is caused by awareness of a descriptive property that realizes the evaluative property of dangerousness.

Perhaps these counterexamples can be avoided by claiming that justification only obtains when an emotion is caused by awareness of an instance of a property under a mode of presentation that is relevant to the danger. That is to say, simply being aware of a property that happens to be dangerous is not sufficient, rather the way that we are aware of the property must display that the property is dangerous. In this case the mode of presentation under which I am aware of the fear causing property is sciencey. Although some sciencey things are dangerous (plutonium is an example) being sciencey does not make an object dangerous. But something’s being plutonium will only cause me fear if I am aware of this property under the sciencey mode of presentation. Consequently my fear is not justified. Since Deonna and Teroni’s claim is about content-relations between the cognitive base and the emotion this move would not be ad hoc, since it simply specifies the level of granularity of the content that is relevant to whether justification obtains.

But notice that if we try to build enough into the mode of presentation to rule out the sorts of pathways to belief that intuitively undermine justification, then we are headed closer to the view that the cognitive base must be evaluative for the emotion to be justified. We are not there yet – something is dangerous in virtue of being plutonium, but being plutonium is not having an evaluative property. There is a danger that we might be pushed all the way there though. Falling under a mode of presentation

\(^{34}\) Deonna and Teroni consider this sort of response, but in a form that is driven by a prior commitment to a fitting attitude theory of evaluative properties (Deonna & Teroni, 2012, p101). However, as this example suggests, the problem might be raised independently of any particular commitments about the nature of evaluative properties.
involving PLUTONIUM\textsuperscript{35} is certainly not sufficient for something being dangerous. Plutonium is not always dangerous; it is only dangerous under certain circumstances. As we add in the relevant conditions to mode of presentation that would guarantee sufficiency, we come closer and closer to an evaluative mode of presentation. Even an object being plutonium that is near me, unshielded and undepleted is not sufficient for it to be a danger to me. I might be wearing a nuke proof suit (Jehst, 2005). The potential defeaters for something being dangerous go on \textit{ad infinitum}, so Deonna and Teroni \textit{shouldn’t} claim that for the content of the cognitive bases to justify an emotion the mode of presentation must be sufficient to always pick out a reference that is dangerous.

But without a requirement concerning the mode of presentation, we are in danger of getting counterintuitive results about which emotions are justified. So we must be aware of the property under some mode of presentation that guarantees \textit{the relevance} of the property to the danger of the object. So Deonna and Teroni should delimit these modes of presentation that rule out counterintuitive justifications without relying on them being sufficient to guarantee that the object is dangerous. Perhaps simply being a mode of presentation that picks out an aspect of the property that is highly correlated with danger is enough. So \textit{being plutonium} is a mode of presentation which, unlike \textit{being sciencey}, is relevant to the object being dangerous because if something is plutonium then it’s more likely to be dangerous than if it’s not. Let us set this issue aside though.

\subsection*{2.4.2 From justified emotion to justified belief}

Let’s grant Deonna and Teroni’s account of externalist justification \textit{for} the emotions. Now they need to get from an externalistically justified emotion to a belief that is internalistically justified. They may give up on this, and instead claim that externalist justification of evaluative beliefs is all that emotions can bring about. This is suggested by some of the claims they make against PTEs – for instance the claim that there is something strange about citing an emotion as a reason for holding an evaluative judgement (Deonna & Teroni, 2012). It is easier to establish the weaker claim that emotions provide externalist justification, and perhaps this is enough. Showing otherwise is not my purpose. All I want to show is that their theory will not meet the \textit{desideratum} of the perceptual theorists. If there is a theory that does, and if both theories can be made to work, then even if both face some \textit{prima facie} challenges, the theory that vindicates the perceptual \textit{desiderata} is worth considering, since it establishes a stronger normative relationship between emotion and beliefs than an attitudinal theory does (since any internalist justification will also be an externalist justification).

The arguments that follow are directed at establishing that even if we grant Deonna and Teroni an account of justified emotions, it will not yield an internalist story about how emotions noninferentially contribute to justifying beliefs. Note that there is no trivial argument that they cannot get there. One might be inclined to think that it is impossible

\footnote{I use smallcaps to mention concepts.}
for something that does not have internalist justification to transfer normative force to something that does. But this is not obviously true. It might be that some state is only externalistically justified, yet provides internalist justification for beliefs. We can imagine that claim being made about perception by foundational empiricists of a certain stripe. They might claim that perceptions get their normative status in a way that is not susceptible to scrutiny or interrogation – the perceptions themselves have a certain sort of warrant thanks to causal links to the environment. There are no answers available to the perceiving agents as to why individual perceptions have this force, so the states themselves have no internalist justification. The perceptions might, nevertheless, be cited as reasons for perceptual beliefs and thereby confer internalist justification on the beliefs. This is foundationalist in that citing a perception stops the chain of why questions with a justifying answer, yet there are no further questions about the item cited in this answer because its justificatory power doesn’t depend on internalist reasons.

According to Deonna and Teroni, an emotion justifies an evaluative judgement when the emotion is itself justified, and when the judgement attributes the evaluative property mentioned in the emotion’s accuracy conditions to the proper object of the emotion. So fear is accurate just in case its object is dangerous. If my fear is justified, fear of this plutonium can justify belief that this plutonium is dangerous, so long as the fear itself is justified. In principle, we can cite our externally justified emotion as a reason for our evaluative belief, yielding an internalist justification.

2.5 How PTE and Attitudinal theories come apart

Implicit in the PTE view of emotional justification is the idea that emotions confer justification on beliefs because the transition from the emotion to the belief is what Peacocke calls a content-endorsing transition (Peacocke, 2004, p59). A content endorsing transition moves from a state that has some epistemic credentials and some content to a judgement that endorses some content. The content the judgement endorses might be the very same content of the initial state, or a conceptualization of that content, or a portion of the content. These last two options are meant to cover cases in which the content of the original state is in a different format or is richer than the content of the belief formed on this basis. Perceptions are often thought to have richer, more fine-grained content than beliefs formed on their basis. As a result, perceptual judgements only endorse part of the content of perceptions. Furthermore, if the content of perception is nonconceptual, then the belief will endorse a conceptualised version of the content. In either case, there is a sense in which the

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36 Something like this idea is behind McDowell’s influential arguments that nonconceptual content cannot play a justificatory role for belief. The idea is that thinking otherwise would fall into the myth of the given, since the conceptual content cannot have a normative standing that is a standing for the agent whose state the content is housed in. See Mind and World for the initial statement of the view and Having the World in View for an updated version, which trades on an argument concerning the inability of nonconceptual content to give reasons for particular conceptualisations of that content. This is an argument for another day though.

37 See (Döring, 2014)

38 I brush over this not because there aren’t issues with these claims (there are) but because they won’t be my issues in this section.
transition simply preserves an epistemic good because nothing new is added to the content of the state that brought about the belief.

Content preserving transitions can contribute to noninferential justification. With transitions of this sort, there is no reasoning, implicit or explicit, that takes the original state as an object then reasons about what follows from it, formulating judgements as a result inferences. An agent without fully-fledged metareflective capacities can undergo a transition of this sort, and so form a judgement based upon the underlying state that inherits warrant from it. All they need to do is endorse what is given to them in the initial state. If the PTE is right that emotions can noninferentially justify beliefs, this explains how they are able to do that. Judgements inherit justification by simply being endorsements of the content of the emotion.

In addition to explaining how the justification conferred by such a transition is noninferential, the content preserving story explains how the justification can be internalist. The agent has a state that has some representational content, they are aware of that content, and they endorse it. This is something they have access to – the initial state with the content is phenomenologically available as a reason for holding the belief. But for the agent to take the endorsement of the content to provide justification for the belief there needs to be an extra element here. If I wonder whether \( p \) and then endorse the content \( p \) on the basis of simply wondering whether \( p \) I will not yet feel that I have a reason to believe \( p \). I might be able think about \( p \) and find a reason to believe it, or it might be that I am reliably set up so that I only ever wonder about things that are likely to be true. In these scenarios I might be able to get inferential justification for believing \( p \), or I might have externalist justification for believing \( p \) any time I believe it because I’ve wondered about it. But I will not have noninferential internalist justification for believing \( p \) thanks to a content preserving transition from the initial state of wondering to the belief. Only some content preserving transition provide the noninferential internalist justifications that perceptual theorists claim emotions provide. So what is distinctive about the transitions that do provide this justification?

The answer is that the content preserving transitions that can play a role in noninferential internalist justification are transitions from what John Bengson calls presentational states (Bengson, 2015). In an extension of the perceptual model which resembles the PTE extension, Bengson says that intuitions are presentational states like perceptions. Being presentational means having representational content, presenting that content as true, and being an occurrence state with a particular phenomenological profile. The phenomenological profile of a presentational state consists of five things (Bengson, 2015, pp720-3). To be presentational a state must be groundless, in that it is not consciously formed on the basis of any other mental state. It must be gradable in that the state comes in various qualitative degrees (vividness, intensity, clarity, etc). It must be non-voluntary, in that it comes unbidden (though we may direct our attention to make certain sort of presentational state more or less likely to occur). Finally it must be compelling and rationalizing. That is, a presentational state compels us, by putting us under some pressure to believe its content and it makes us

\[39\] Some content preserving transitions contribute to noninferential justification but this does not mean all content preserving transitions that justify therefore justify noninferentially. There are also inferential transitions that are content preserving (as when I go from believing \( p \) and \( q \) to believing \( p \) via conjunction elimination).
feel that the belief is justified, should we come to form it, thereby subjectively rationalizing the belief. We can think of a presentational state as requesting assent to the truth of its contents. Enjoying a presentational state has the phenomenology of being shown the truth of the state’s content. This, in turn, makes it feel as though the presentational state supplies us with a reason to believe its contents.

Bengson’s idea is that by virtue of being a presentational state, an intuition can noninferentially justify a belief via a content preserving endorsement in the same way a perception can. Because the intuition is compelling and rationalizing it gives the agent the sense that the belief is justified, just like a perception would. This means that if there is a transmission of justification from the intuition to the belief (i.e. if the intuition is a good one), the transition is made available to the agent simply because of the phenomenology of the intuition is rationalizing and compelling. The agent doesn’t need to think about the state that they are making the transition from, just by having the state they have the phenomenology as of the state supplying justification for a belief.

PTEs have been treating emotions as similar to intuitions in this way. It is no accident that both the PTEs and Bengson draw a comparison between the state they want to claim is presentational and perceptions. Both want the state they are talking about to be given the same sort of epistemic powers as perceptions, and for both this means that the states in question can be cited as reasons for the beliefs formed on their basis, and can therefore provide internalist justification. For both of them we are able to do this without backing away from the state and theorizing about it or having an explicit stance on how reliable it is likely to be, so the justification can be noninferential. If emotions were not presentational, then citing an emotion as a reason for a belief would require making an inferential connection between the occurrence of the emotion and the likely truth of the belief.

This is where the difference between attitudinal theories and perpetual theories hits home. Deonna and Teroni cannot claim that emotions are presentational in Bengson’s sense. Bengson distinguishes merely contentful states from states that present their content as true, which he terms representational. Within the states that are representational, some are presentational and the others are merely representational. Emotions, on Deonna and Teroni’s account, are not even representational in Bengson’s sense. The part of the emotion that does the evaluative work is not the content, but the attitude. The content of the emotion is just what directs it at its proper object. In many cases the content is non-propositional and therefore not judgeable - it is simply the object or state of affairs that the emotion is about (that spider for example). As a result, the content is not truth-apt – nothing is claimed by the contents, so there is no sense in which the content can be true (or false). Even when an emotion has propositional content it is not content that the emotion presents as true – the point of the emotional attitude is to present the content evaluatively. So I can be angry that Tony Abbot was once Prime Minister of Australia, and for Deonna and Teroni this anger has the content Tony Abbott was once Prime Minister of Australia, but it doesn’t

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40 In this sense of “representational” desires are not representational.

41 They are not judgeable in a stronger sense that that in which nonconceptual contents are not judgeable, since they are not just in the wrong format, they are the wrong shape altogether.
present the content as true, rather it presents it as offensive. So by Deonna and Teroni’s lights emotions do not present their contents as true. So they are not representational in Bengson’s sense, much less presentational.

This cuts Deonna and Teroni off from the sort of story about the transition from emotion to judgement that the perceptual analogy appeals to. There cannot be a content-endorsing transition from the emotion, to an evaluative judgement that provides the warrant for the judgement. So if Deonna and Teroni cannot give an account of emotional justification of evaluative beliefs that appeals to taking at face value in order to explain how beliefs can be noninferentially and internalistically justified, then they must either come up with an alternative, or reject the claim that emotions noninferentially justify beliefs internalistically.

2.5.1 How Deonna and Teroni could respond.

For the sake of argument, let’s assume that undergoing a state is enough for the agent to know the content of the state and the state’s accuracy conditions. This assumption gives the AT theory the best chances of being able to give emotions the sorts of internalist justificatory roles we’re after. Let’s also suppose that the awareness of the accuracy conditions does not require the agent to have access to content that makes these accuracy conditions explicit. That is, let’s assume that the state itself needn’t have content that tells us the conditions under which it is accurate. This assumption gives the AT theory the best chance of avoiding being a notational variant on a PTE, because it preserves the idea that the content of an emotion needn’t itself be evaluative to have evaluative accuracy conditions. This second assumption sounds initially plausible. The accuracy conditions of a state aren’t normally contained in the content of the state. A belief presents its contents as true, and we can know that just by having the belief. Yet belief that p does not have the content p is true, its content is just p. Similarly a doubt that p does not have the content p is doubtful, it is just a matter of holding a doubting attitude towards p. The agent doubting p has access both to the content and to the attitude towards the content, just by doing the doubting. So for the sake of argument we can assume that an agent with the necessary metareflective capacities undergoing an emotion is in a position to know a disjunction. They can know that either (i) the emotion is inaccurate, or (ii) the emotion is accurate and its object has the evaluative property that contributes to the emotions accuracy condition.

Perceptual theories of the emotions often claim that we have a default entitlement to take our emotions at face value. If we have a default entitlement to take our emotions to be accurate doesn’t this just get Deonna and Teroni the sort of justification we are looking for? After all, we have a disjunction given to us by undergoing the emotion (that either the emotion is accurate and the object has a property, or it is inaccurate and the object doesn’t), and we have a preexisting default entitlement to one of the disjuncts. The reason this isn’t enough is that we still need an inference to do anything with the disjunction. Because we have a default entitlement to take the emotion to be accurate, we can take the first disjunct to be true. But putting these two pieces together is an inference. If I cannot endorse the disjunction elimination, then I cannot have anything I take to be a reason to believe the disjunct. The knowledge I have about the content
and accuracy conditions of the emotion does nothing on its own to compel me towards belief. Only an inference can explain why I take the first disjunct to be true, and thereby explain why I can cite the emotion as a reason for, rather than against belief. 

This helps bring out what has been lost by not claiming that emotions are presentational. What makes the perceptual account of justification work is the capacity to take emotions at face value. There is nothing available to Deonna and Teroni here which is an analogue of taking at face value. Only presentational states can be taken at face value, because taking a state at face value relies on acquiescing to the compellingness (as set out in section 2.5) of the state. We can only acquiesce to content presented to us as true in a manner that compels belief. For a state to have a face value in this sense is for the state to prompt assent to its contents. Even beliefs aren’t compelling in this sense. They present their content as true, but do not compel belief. They are the product of assent, rather than a state that requests assent. When a belief that \( p \) supports a belief that \( q \), that support is granted inferentially. Doubts, likewise, are not compelling. When I go from doubting \( p \) to believing \( p \) is dubitable, it is an inferential transition. The states in question aren’t in the right format to acquiesce to. So we cannot take them at face value. Without thinking of emotions as presentational there is no way of making sense of taking them at face value.

Perhaps Deonna and Teroni can employ a suggestion Karen Jones makes in “Emotion, Weakness of Will, and the Normative Conception of Agency” (Jones, 2003). Jones claims that in order for a subsystem to provide reasons of a sort that are connected to a normative view of agency, it can be sufficient that the agent in question trusts the relevant subsystem as a whole. Trust in the emotional system (or in a specific emotion type) makes it the case that token emotions provide reasons for action that are connected to our epistemic self-conception. That is to say, the trust in our emotions makes following a particular emotion into an expression of our desire to be guided by what we take to be reasons for acting. This looks promising because no inference needs to be made on a case-by-case basis about the reliability of emotions; simply trusting them coverts their justificatory force into internalist justificatory force. But Deonna and Teroni can’t get what they would need from this view. What they need is an account of trusting the emotions that gets us from their appropriate occurrence to a justified evaluative belief. The mystery here is the noninferential connection between the emotion and the content of the belief that the emotion putatively justifies. Jones provides an antidote to an excessively intellectualist view of the connection between the emotion and its place in our epistemic self-conception — that is she shows how our commitment to acting for reasons can be operative in giving rational force to decisions even when we do not step back from our impulses on a case-by-case basis to see if the impulses constitute reasons. The target is not to tell us how to get from an emotion with no evaluative content, to an evaluative belief, without an inference. 

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42 Note some brute psychological feature might simply cause me to believe one of the disjuncts without my having to endorse the disjunction elimination. This would provide noninferential justification for the belief thanks to the default warrant. However this justification would not be available to me unless I endorse the inference, so it would not be internalist justification.

43 This is something that I (in effect) address in chapter 4, where I give a story about how emotion can become presentational thanks to the right sort of connection with our evaluative concepts.
Perhaps Deonna and Teroni would resist this argument in the following way. They might accept that getting from an emotion with no evaluative content to an evaluative belief must involve some kind of inferential-looking transition. But they might insist that the transition can be unconscious (or subpersonal). They might then claim that as a result it doesn’t qualify as an inference, thereby rejecting my way of carving up the terrain (in section 2.2). This line of argument would depend on delimiting inference in a way that’s quite narrow and such that some transitions from \( p \) and \( \text{if } p \text{ then } q \text{ to } q \) aren’t necessarily inferential transitions. Using “non-inferential” in this way may be perfectly fine, but it won’t block my argument, since the broader notion of the inferential can simply be marked using some term of art and the debate can take place surrounding this notion. The debate would have to shift to involve the wider notion, because it is a wider notion that is at play in the PTE claims, which can be seen by looking at their treatment of Huck Finn cases (discussed in Section 2.2).

Given the broader notion of inference, Deonna and Teroni should claim that the transition from emotion to belief involves inference, but they could claim that this doesn’t necessarily make the belief inferentially justified. Perhaps the beliefs get their justification in some other fashion.

But again, this does not get them what a perceptual theorist is after. It’s not enough that an evaluative belief arrived at via an emotion can be justified in some other way. The PTE claim, that Deonna and Teroni cannot make, is that some evaluative beliefs are justified because they are formed on the basis of emotions without there being any endorsable inference involved. Forming beliefs on the basis of emotions is meant to be a good way of forming these beliefs. The bare possibility that a belief formed on the basis of an emotion might be justified in some other way doesn’t save this claim.\(^{44}\)

2.5.2 Objection

I have claimed that for there to be a noninferential transfer of internalist justification from an occurrent state to a belief, the state must house its content in an attitude that presents the content as true. This is because noninferential internalist justification is always given by a content-preserving transition. Because belief is an attitude that aims at truth it can only take in content that is presented as true if it is to preserve justification in this way.

But this makes it look like noninferential justificatory transfer between a state and a reaction requires the attitude to be transparent, adding nothing to the content, so that the content can do all of the work. Belief is a transparent attitude in this sense – whatever I am justified in believing on the basis of a belief that \( p \) is justified by \( p \) and vice-versa. This objection points out that there are times when a noninferential response to some content depends on the nature of the attitude in which the content is housed.

\(^{44}\) In section 5.4, I give an account of how emotions get to have presentational phenomenology on my view. This line seems open to Deonna and Teroni. See footnote 98 for discussion.
Suppose I desire to eat ice cream. The most direct response to this, which responds to the content's force, is forming the intention to eat an ice cream, not acquiring a belief. The content of the desire - *I eat ice cream* - is given its force precisely by the fact that it is the content of a desire. So its role in my thinking (justifying forming the intention to eat) depends on the content in the context of the force it is given, not on the content alone. A belief that *I eat ice-cream* will not justify the intention to eat. There is a content preserving transition between the desire that *I eat ice cream* and the intention that *I eat ice cream*. The content of the desire is preserved in the intention, and so long as the desire has the right credentials, I will be justified in forming the intention. Yet the content of the desire is not presented as true.

So, the objection goes, attitudes aren’t inert in the transmission of justification. What this objection points to is just more grist for my mill though. In the ice cream case, the force of the desire matches the attitude of intending in the same way that in cases of testimony the force of telling matches the attitude of believing. Telling that *p* presents *p* as true and the belief endorses its truth. Desiring to *p* presents *p* as to-be-done, and forming an intention to *p* endorses the to-be-doneness of *p*. My point was not that the attitude housing the content cannot do any work in determining which noninferential transitions a state justifies, it was just that there must be a match between the force that the content is given in the initial state and the attitude that houses it in the state that inherits the justification. Belief matches attitudes that present their content as true in the same way that intentions match attitudes that present as to-be-done.

This does open onto a problem that I have so far sidelined. I have said that emotions can justify both beliefs and actions and I have been focusing on the beliefs. This initially seemed innocent, but now it begins to look suspicious. I have claimed that for an emotion to contribute to noninferential justification of a belief there must be a match between the attitudes of the emotion and the belief. They must both present their content as true. But PTEs also want to claim that emotions can noninferentially justify actions. But if the force of the emotion matches the attitude of belief, it will fail to match that of the intention to perform an action. Does this mean that emotions can only justify actions inferentially? Do I need to form a judgement about an evaluative property on the basis of the emotion, and then infer that a given action is appropriate on this basis?

This is the way that Döring goes (Döring, 2010, p200). As we saw in my previous chapter (1.5.2), in the discussion of Döring’s response to the Helm objection, emotions have a motivating force that is independent of the endorsement of their content. An emotion may contribute to an action being performed via the emotion’s motivational force. That action may not have been performed had the emotion not made this contribution. The very same emotion might justify an evaluative belief whose content is a reason for the action. In that case, the emotion has made an ineliminable contribution to the justification of the action, even though getting from the evaluative belief to the action involves inference. This contribution is internalist in that the belief can be cited as a reason for the action. The only thing I want to add is that in addition to this path, an emotion may contribute to a noninferentially justified action another way. Emotions provide noninferential, externalist justification for action in cases where the evaluative judgement isn’t formed. An emotion may bring about an action via its motivational element, even if the agent forms no beliefs on the basis of the content of the emotion. The agent might therefore have nothing they can cite as a reason for the action, yet if
the content of the emotion makes the action reasonable, and the emotion has the right credentials, then the action may be externalistically justified.

2.6 A similar argument.

Jérôme Dokic and Stéphane Lemaire recently published an argument that is very similar to the one I have just present (which was arrived at independently). Before I move on, I want to quickly contrast what I say with what they say. Where theirs is intended to be a problem for attitudinal theories in general, mine aims to show only that attitudinal theories cannot vindicate the core claims of the perceptual analogy. The requirements I aim to show that they do not meet are therefore more demanding than those that Dokic and Lemaire take to be sufficiently uncontroversial to launch their argument. As a result I can rely on less controversial moves in my argument and still secure my more modest conclusion.

Dokic and Lemaire’s argument proceeds via a dilemma. Either the attitude involved in an emotion is opaque, or it isn’t. That is, either undergoing the emotion suffices to know its evaluative correctness conditions, or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t, then emotions cannot play the sort of justificatory roles that we are taking them to play, since the agent is not put in touch with the relevantly evaluative side of the emotion. Deonna and Teroni therefore ought to (and in fact do) reject the opaque attitude view (Dokic and Lemaire 2015 p273). They can claim that awareness of an emotion is not simply awareness of the content of the state, but of the content housed in a certain sort of attitude. After all, we do not desire p and mistakenly think that this commits us to the truth of p. So the normative conditions governing the attitude of desire are not opaque. Why should it be different in the case of the emotions?

Rejecting the opaque view pushes attitudinal theorists down the other horn of the dilemma. They must embrace the manifest attitude view according to which emotions are manifestly evaluative - experiencing them suffices for awareness that a particular evaluative property plays a role in their correctness conditions. Dokic and Lemaire claim that embracing this horn risks the attitudinal view collapsing back into the perceptual view by reinserting the emotion’s evaluative dimension into the content (Dokic and Lemaire 2015, p280) or else leaves it obscure how the phenomenology could have the relevant evaluative normativity. If we know just by undergoing an emotion that the emotion’s appropriateness depends on its object having a certain evaluative property doesn’t that mean that the emotion represents the object as having that property? So aren’t we back at an evaluative content view? The idea is that if the experience of the emotions presents its object as having the evaluative property, then the emotion has representational contents involving the evaluative property.

45 Note that it is taken for granted that the emotion is meant to have evaluative correctness conditions such that the emotion is an evaluation of the object rather than merely being a reaction to the object (in the way that a wrinkled nose is a reaction to an unpleasant smell).

46 In a non-technical sense presumably and not in the sense I will set out later in the chapter.
But this move from the agent being conscious of the conditions under which the state is appropriate to the state having contents that make those appropriateness conditions explicit seems too quick. For instance, when I desire \( p \), the state makes it manifest to me that \( p \) is something I want, not something I take to already be the case. The state’s appropriateness transparently depends on whether it is appropriate to want the thing in question, not with anything to do with whether or not \( p \) is the case. Yet it doesn’t straightforwardly follow that desire thereby represents \( p \) as desirable or as desired. The contents of a desire for \( p \) are normally thought to simply be \( p \). What does the work in generating the appropriateness conditions for the desire is the content together with the nature of the attitude housing the content. Why shouldn’t emotions be similar?  

I want to claim that once we get clear on the rational role that emotions are meant to play vis-à-vis judgement even a version of the manifest attitude view that doesn’t run into any problems leaves the attitudinal theorist with the sort of problems that Dokic and Lemaire find with the opaque attitude version of the thesis. Where their argument turns on the dilemma about the availability of the appropriateness conditions mine locates a similar problem by specifying particular rational role that emotions must play which is incompatible with what Deonna and Teroni say about them.

2.7 Summing up.

Unlike a perceptual theory of the emotions, Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal theory of the emotions cannot give emotions noninferential, internalist justificatory force with respect to evaluative judgements. This is because, according to them, the emotions do not contain evaluative content that can be assented to. Instead, emotional content merely directs the emotion at its proper object, while the distinctive attitude that the content is housed in does the evaluative work. This means that emotions are not presentational. They can be taken up as a source of information, but extracting the information requires inference. PTEs claim that emotion are, by contrast, more like testimony in that they can be taken at face value in such a way that their content is endorsed as a belief. This opens the door for them providing justification in such cases, without the justification relying on an inference.

The most attractive alternative to a PTE, augmented with a theory of emotional representation, is an attitudinal theory. But such a theory won’t do the work a PTE wants to. It will give the emotions weaker justificatory roles than the PTE will. Given this, and assuming my first chapter was compelling, we should prefer a perceptual theory to an attitudinal one if all else is equal.

Having shown that there is good reason to try to make PTEs work, the next three chapters will attempt to provide what they lack - a theory of emotional representation.

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Dokic and Lemaire argue that neither the felt-bodily preparedness view of Deonna and Teroni nor a straightforward adverbialist approach to emotions secures a phenomenology that mandates thinking the emotions are subject to an intrinsic evaluative correctness condition. Be this as it may, there are many other strategies for securing the claim that emotions are subject to a correctness condition (my thesis offers discussion of some in section 1.4 and an argument that emotions can be derivatively subject to correctness conditions without this undermining their rational role in chapter 4) so this needn’t be fatal to the claim.
Chapter 3.

Standard ways of thinking about emotional content.

3.1 Introduction

As we saw in the first chapter, perceptual theories of the emotions, like those advocated by Sabine Döring and Christine Tappelet, draw an analogy between emotions and perceptions. They claim that emotions have representational contents and stand in the same sorts of justificatory relations to beliefs as perceptions. This comes down to three core things: Firstly, that under appropriate circumstances emotions can noninferentially justify beliefs. Secondly, emotions can conflict with beliefs in a content-involving manner - that is, they can present the world as being different to how belief presents the world to be. And thirdly, when a person holds a belief, and has a conflicting emotion they do not contradict themselves.

The emotional representation required must, at a minimum, attribute the emotion’s formal object to its proper object. This means that the emotion has to be directed at something (its proper object) and the emotion is made appropriate by its proper object exhibiting some evaluative property (the emotion’s formal object). So for example, my fear of a shark has the shark as its proper object and danger as its formal object. The fear thereby represents the shark as dangerous. It is important that the emotion itself does the representing, so that it forms an autonomous stream of representation that can be recalcitrant in the face of diverging beliefs.

The chief appeal of perceptual theories of the emotions is that they promise a theory on which the emotions exhibit these three features. But for the perceptual theory to succeed, it needs a defence of the claim that emotions have representational contents. A positive account of how emotions get to have representational contents would pay out the promise in that it would yield a fully-fledged theory that gives emotions the right characteristics.

However, rather than offer a positive theory of what gives emotions their representational content, a perceptual theorist might want to appeal to an indispensability argument showing that they must have content. We have seen that emotions do play certain roles in our rational lives and that these roles are best explained by emotions having representational contents. The same roles are not easily explained by emotions having a merely causal role in bringing about beliefs that do the justificatory work, since we can cook up scenarios in which the belief formation is blocked due to auxiliary beliefs. These cases are familiar since they form part of the criticism of cognitive theories of the emotions pursued in the first chapter. Recall that we can cook up cases of, for example, phobic emotions in which the agent doesn’t believe that the object of their fear is dangerous, but fears it anyway.

An indispensability argument for emotions having representational contents here would have to start with a case of an agent with a justified belief and show that an emotion is the only (or best) candidate for doing justificatory work. The argument would have to insist that since the belief is justified, something is doing justificatory work, so the
emotion must be able to do justificatory work on its own. The argument would then contend that only states with content can justify beliefs, so emotions must have content in order to play the justifying role.

If we mount the indispensability argument on the basis of the justificatory roles of emotions, the sort of scenarios that need to be cooked up for such an argument are slightly different to the cases that worked in criticisms of the cognitive theories. The cases that give cognitive theories grief are ones in which a person experiences an emotion without having the belief that the cognitivist claims is identical to the emotion. (Phobic fears are a common example.) It was important that these cases are such that the relevant beliefs fail to be held by the subject even though they experienced the emotion.

The sorts of cases that support an indispensability argument for emotions having content will be a different shape. For these arguments we need to cook up scenarios where the agent has a justified belief that could not be justified by anything other than an emotion. So the cases are of agents who do form a belief on the basis of the emotion, and on no other basis. When it comes to claiming that we can only explain the justificatory power of emotions by granting the emotion itself content, the cases must be ones in which the belief related to the emotion has been formed (or at least could have been formed), since these are the only cases in which justification is at issue. Because the cases in question are cases where an action is/could be performed or a belief is/could be formed, the strategy of showing that an emotion can occur without the relevant belief does not help.

In these cases it will be harder to rule out further beliefs intervening between the emotion and the belief the emotion is meant to justify. If there is nothing to block the agent forming the belief that the emotion putatively justifies, then it is harder to show that the agent cannot have a metareflective belief about their emotion that does the justificatory work we’re trying to claim for the emotion (i.e. explaining their justification for the belief). If I form a belief on the basis of my emotion, then I am trusting my emotion, so there’s no principled reason I shouldn’t form the belief that my emotion provides evidence for my belief.

I am convinced that there need be no metareflective belief about an emotion that forms a justificatory bridge between emotion and action (or belief). This is something I have tried to motivate in the first chapter. It seems that cases with a Huck Finn structure provide some support here. These are cases where the agent has the right emotion but does not trust it, yet is brought to act (or believe) against their better judgment. These cases can show that the emotion itself justifies the action (or belief) that the emotion brings about because the lack of emotional self-trust blocks the intervening metareflective belief, but not the first-order evaluative belief. However, the reasons given there are not so overwhelming as to provide the resources for an indispensability argument. The hope is the more modest one of establishing that there are good reasons to think that emotions on their own justify beliefs and actions thanks to possessing content. This is meant to provide strong prima facie support for the idea that emotions have contents. Pending a plausible story about how they could do so, we ought to believe that emotions have contents. But invoking the justificatory powers of emotions as a datum in an indispensability argument raises the stakes to a point where
more would be needed to show that the phenomenon cannot be handled without admitting that emotions themselves have representational contents.

But perhaps an indispensability argument can be launched from another port. Rather than saying that we need to take emotions to have representational contents in order to understand their justificatory roles, perhaps we can claim that to understand features intrinsic to the emotions themselves we need to posit such contents. To see why this won’t work, consider such a claim made outside of the emotions literature.

The best version of an indispensability argument that starts with intrinsic features of the experience and yields claims about the content of the experience is in the perceptions literature. There, neo-Kantians claim that in order to characterize what it’s like to experience perceptions we need to think of them as perceptions of mind-independent objects. This means that positing perceptual content that attributes properties to the mind-independent objects of perception is indispensable for accounting for the subjectively available features of the perceptions themselves. (E.g. (Strawson, 1975, Part Two) and (Stroud, 1968)) Just accounting for what it’s like to undergo perceptions entails taking them to have content about mind-independent objects.

This is a very different move to claiming that we need to posit representational contents to account for the rational relations between perceptions and beliefs. If the argument works, the indispensability in the neo-Kantian claim is immanent to the nature of perceptions, so there is no possible error theory about the relations that we take the perceptions to stand in that could do away with the indispensability claim. This is not the case when it comes to claiming that emotions must be able to justify beliefs, since, as we saw, someone might try to claim that it is not the emotions which do the justifying, but beliefs about the emotions.

So why not employ a more direct analogue of this neo-Kantian claim and apply it to the emotions? Is there any reason to take representational contents to be indispensable to understanding the experience of emotions themselves? A philosopher like Michelle Montague might claim this. She thinks that emotions “essentially represent objects and states of affairs in an evaluative way” and that as a result, emotions have “their own distinctive sui generis kind of phenomenology … [which is] evaluative” (Montague 33). Given this, emotional phenomenology can only be understood in terms of the emotions evaluatively representing its object. According to the neo-Kantian strategy I’m considering, the only way to explain the very possibility of emotional phenomenology, given that the phenomenology is evaluative, is to see it as having evaluative representational content.48

The problem with this line of thinking is that in the perceptual case, if I am looking at a pink translucent ice cube there is clear sense in which the phenomenology uncontroversially involves pinkness, translucency, and a shape, and clearly these elements are entertained together in some particular way – the pinkness is the pinkness of the ice cube. That is to say, there is an attributional aspect to the perceptual phenomenology, a dimension of the phenomenology that involves the pinkness being applied to the ice cube. A perception of a pink ice cube feels different to

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48 See 4.1.2 for a discussion of a problem that I claim my account avoids, but which put accounts like Montague’s under some pressure.
a perception merely of an ice cube along with the perception of some pinkness. The missing ingredient in the second case is the attributive element. But when it comes to emotional phenomenology, it far from clear that the phenomenology itself involves attributing the evaluative property to the object; in fact it is even controversial that there is an evaluative element to the phenomenology. Some go so far as to find it unobvious that the emotional phenomenology includes directedness at the emotion’s proper object\(^{49}\).

Many people think that the evaluative properties that emotions are related to are response-dependent properties like disgustingness. For these properties we might plausibly think the evaluative property is phenomenally related to the subject of the emotion rather than phenomenally attributed to its object. That is, feeling disgust towards some food may strike me as being a quality of the experience of eating it, rather than the revelation of a feature of the food itself. Feeling disgust in response to an object might be evaluative enough to capture the evaluative phenomenology of disgust without the feeling having to be a feeling of the disgustingness of the object. In other words, if disgustingness is the evaluative property that helps constitute the phenomenology of disgust, maybe simply having a disgust response captures the phenomenological contribution of the evaluation without us needing to posit emotional content which attributes the property to something.

The claimed possibility of explaining the evaluative phenomenology of emotions just in terms of phenomenologically salient reactions from agents helps to explain part of the appeal of reductive sorts of sentimentalism (see (Gibbard, 2003) and (Harman, 1996)). These positions explain the attribution of evaluative properties to objects in terms of an independently intelligible emotional response to those objects – so that to take something to be disgusting is just to be disgusted by it. (By contrast, fitting response theories such as (McDowell, 1985) claim that the disgusting is that which disgust is a fitting response to, so to understand disgust itself we need to understand it as subject to an accuracy conditions in terms of the disgusting.) If the response itself needed to be understood in terms of the attribution of evaluative properties, the strategy would be a non-starter. I am not optimistic about the prospects of such a sentimentalist picture, and Montague’s description of emotional phenomenology strikes me as more apt than descriptions that eschew evaluative representable elements. But the widespread appeal of the sentimentalist projects shows that the attributional element in emotional phenomenology is not a stable platform from which to launch an indispensability argument. Not if the argument is meant to woo skeptics about emotional representation.

The possibility of doing without an attributional element in describing the phenomenology of emotion does not have a viable analogue in the case of perception. To see this consider what adverbialists can say about perception of a pink ice cube. In the same way that reductive sentimentalists try to explain evaluative properties in terms of features of emotional experiences, adverbialists try to explain some properties putatively attributed in perception in terms of features of the phenomenology of perception. Adverbialists (Sellars, 1975) try to move features of the perceptual attribution of properties to objects into an adverbial role that modifies the act of

\(^{49}\) Though I will later argue that there shouldn’t be any controversy here (5.4.3).
perception itself. According to them, perceiving something red should be cashed out as perceiving something redly. Part of the challenge for an adverbialist about perception is showing how perceiving pinkly relates the pinkness to the ice cube in the right sort of way to capture the phenomenology of perception. This is a problem for them since the phenomenology is universally accepted to have an attributional aspect which must be captured in the terminology of adverbialism. We do not just perceive the pinkness and the cube, but rather perceive the cube as pink. (McDowell, 2009, Part I.) There may well be strategies for adverbialists to pull this off, my point is just that in the perceptual case something of this sort clearly needs to be done; in the emotions case however, the phenomenology is less clearly attributional. So though the neo-Kantian move with respect to perception is controversial, its prospects are more rosy than those of a similar move in the emotions case.

So it seems that an indispensability argument won’t work here. But even if an indispensability argument could convince us that we need to posit emotional contents, there’s still space to ask how emotions get to have them. I will be pursuing the task of giving an account of how emotions get representational contents which, as best as possible, vindicates the perceptual story about the emotions, but which is meant to be independently plausible. Later (Chapter 8) I will discuss the extent to which this picture vindicates what Döring and Tappolet claim about the emotions.

If we are looking for a theory of representation for emotion that works with a perceptual theory, there is an obvious first strategy to try. Since it is reasonably plausible that perceptions have representational content, and since the theory draws an analogy between perceptions and emotions, why not just say that emotions get their content in the same way perceptions do?

The idea is that perceptions get their content inherently as a result of how the perceptual system operates considered as a closed system. This is appealing to perceptual theorists of the emotions because if emotions are like this that straightforwardly accounts for how emotions can be a separate stream of representation to our deliberative faculties, and so can go against our judgements. Given independent processing, we can also make sense of cases in which the emotions get things right in a way that our deliberative faculty couldn’t.

There are two straightforward ways to make this work. In the next sections (3.2 - 3.4), I will consider versions of each strategy, and reject both. The first version of this strategy claims that emotions literally are perceptions. Then, if perceptions have contents, emotions do too. This is roughly what Jesse Prinz does, and his picture initially looks congenial to a perceptual theorist in need of a story about representation. I will show why it isn’t. The second version of the strategy is to take your favourite theory of how perceptions get to have representational contents and apply it, mutatis mutandis, to emotions. I will start to explore this by examining the prospects for the most worked-out picture of such acquisition in the perceptions literature – Burge’s (2010) story. I will show that this sort of account will not work for the emotions. Next I will consider a Sellarsian perceptual theory, since it is less demanding with respect to structural features of the emotions themselves. The reasons for thinking this might work will be clearer after I have talked about Prinz. I will show that even this less demanding story
of how perceptions get their content cannot do the work a perceptual theorist of the emotions needs it to do.

The perceptual theory of the emotions (henceforth PTE) literature seems to assume that vindicating the claim that emotions have representational contents means showing that emotions get their contents in the same way as perceptions. Having argued that this strategy cannot work, I will end the chapter with a slightly more speculative conclusion. We must explain the way emotions get their contents differently, in a way that uses features of the emotions that are distinctive of them in contrast to perceptions.

### 3.2 Prinz

The first strategy is to apply what Jesse Prinz says about the emotions and their contents and slot it into the role of vindicating the core claims of the perceptual theorists of the emotions. Prinz claims that emotions literally are perceptions that register bodily changes (Jesse J Prinz, 2004, p58). These bodily changes reliably occur in response to environmental changes that are related to core relational themes - (CRTs) – that is, changes that are relevant to centrally important goals, values and so on (Jesse J Prinz, 2004, p68-9). The emotion has the function of registering the relevant CRT. If I see a shark, my body undergoes changes (higher blood pressure, more agitation, dilation of pupils, etc.), these changes are caused by and register the danger of the shark. Those bodily changes are then themselves perceived through interoceptive channels.

So far this is very much a Jamesian feelings-theory story. But Prinz wants to account for emotional intentionality so he adds a naturalist semantics story along the lines of Fred Dretske’s (Jesse J Prinz, 2004, p53). This says that since the emotion reliably covaries with the CRT, it carries information about it. Furthermore, since the emotion has the function of registering the CRT, it can be wrong (i.e. if my fear responds to something non-dangerous). These two factors: a) carrying information and b) possibly being wrong, jointly suffice for the emotion representing the CRT. This establishes that the emotion is a direct perception of my bodily change and an *indirect perception* of the CRT (Jesse J Prinz, 2006, p158). This gives the emotion intentionality and representational content in the same way that a perception gets representational content (according to Dretske’s theory of perceptual content).

To see why this approach to the problem of emotional representation won’t work we need to see that the claim that emotion is literally perception is vulnerable to criticisms that the analogy isn’t vulnerable to. The vulnerability is that any dissimilarity between emotion and perception will tell against Prinz’s account. One argument that pervades the PTE literature points out that all perceptions have a sensory modality with associated organs and transducers. The organs are dedicated bodily systems that perform functions that enable perception. The transducers are input systems which “are stimulated by non-mental features of the world, and output mental representations in a modality-specific code.” (Jesse J Prinz, 2006, p138) It’s not obvious that emotions have either of these.
Since Prinz claims emotions literally are perceptions he is susceptible to a flat-footed argument which runs:

A. perceptions have specific sensory modalities with dedicated organs and transducers;
B. emotions do not have a specific sensory modality with dedicated organs and transducers;
C. emotions are not perceptions.

Döring and Tappolet can accept the conclusion of this argument and insist that nevertheless the analogy between emotions and perceptions is useful. However, because Prinz thinks emotions literally are perceptions, he must address this alleged difference, and all those like it. He is vulnerable to any argument that tried to show a difference between emotions and perceptions.

So Prinz must argue against the claim that emotions are not perceptions. To resist the argument given above he can reject the first or the second premise. Rejecting the first doesn’t look very promising. One of the things that distinguishes perception from thought is the fact that perception is in more direct causal commerce with its objects thanks a hook-up enabled by our organs and transducers. This will then be reflected in a distinctive sort of phenomenology determined by the sensory modality. So Prinz must deny the second premise instead, arguing that emotions do have a specific sensory modality. The only plausible sensory modality for emotion is interoception, so the information that can be taken in by the emotional modality must be found, firstly, somewhere the body. The sort of input that emotions get to work with are the bodily changes that have been brought about by whatever is going on in the world. The input to the emotions is the elevation of blood pressure, heightened arousal and so on. Even given Prinz’s Dretskean moves linking the goings-on in the body to things outside, the link is not going to be a highly contentful, fine-grained receptivity to the world, as it is in our visual and auditory perception. There is a causal connection back from the bodily changes to changes in the environment, but trying to reconstruct the distal causes from these changes is hopeless. There is nothing about the bodily changes I undergo when I’m afraid that differentiates between fear directed at a mouse and fear directed at a shark. So the proper-object directedness of an emotion cannot come about from emotional processing done on bodily changes. This means that the content of the emotion cannot attribute an evaluative property to anything in particular.

Instead of a picture in which the emotions represent their objects evaluatively, Prinz’s story suggests a picture of the emotions as internal warning lights that go on in the presence of the relevant CRT. This sort of detection of a CRT cannot, on its own, noninferentially justify beliefs other than the nonspecific belief that the relevant CRT is present, since the connection between the CRT and the proper intentional object of the emotion is just not part of this story. For Prinz, “emotions represent their formal objects [the CRTs], not their particular objects.” (Jesse J Prinz, 2004, p62) If I feel fear because

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50 More on this sort of issue in the next section, discussed in relation to Sellars.
I have seen a shark, the emotion tells me I’m in danger, but not that the shark is dangerous. The emotion has an epistemic role (though a very limited one) but on its own it does not represent the shark as the source of the danger – after all, it doesn’t represent the shark at all. Merely representing the presence of danger doesn’t rule out the possibility that the source of the danger is the bit of seaweed floating behind me.

Take the case of Huck Finn. His sympathy for Jim can only detect a CRT. Saying that Huck feels sympathy for Jim assigns Jim as the emotion’s intentional object, but on Prinz’s picture the emotion doesn’t represent Jim, and it certainly doesn’t represent him as a person, deserving of freedom. It isn’t clear that Prinz’s account gives him the resources to explain “representing as …” at all. For him, representation is just the carrying of information, plus the possibility of error, with no requirement that the representation attributes anything to any particular object (Prinz 2004, p65). Prinz’s story makes room for detection-error, not attribution-error - since the emotion doesn’t represent its proper object, it doesn’t attribute the CRT at all, so it couldn’t represent the CRT as applying to its proper object, correctly or otherwise. Thus the thing it represents (danger) it represents by detecting, not by attributing it to the thing that instantiates it (the shark).

Since our desideratum included emotions noninferentially justifying beliefs that attribute evaluative properties to objects in the way that perception do, this won’t do the work a perpetual theorist needs.

3.2.1 Possible Prinzean responses

What stops Prinz from simply saying that the thing triggering the feeling is represented by the emotions as embodying the CRT? First, this falls foul of the famous distinction between the causes of emotions and their objects. Seeing a handkerchief on the table might cause me to feel sad about the absence of its owner. So the handkerchief is the cause of the emotion, but not its object. So just straightforwardly claiming that emotions get to be about what triggers them won’t get the objects right in all cases.

This strategy won’t work even if a more complicated story can be told that points the emotion in the right direction. Prinz’s picture of representation relies on the idea that the state doing the representing has the function of responding to a certain sort of thing. The account has two-parts: For a state to represent something, the representing state must bear information about its object. Secondly the representing state must have the function of doing so. Simply bearing information is far too ubiquitous to give an account of representation, since anything that reliably co-varies with anything else bears information about it. We can stipulate highly disjunctive, unnatural properties (which I will call gruesome properties because they are like Goodman’s property grue (Goodman, 1955, Chapter III), but if necessary they can be even more disjunctive and unnatural). Given that we can stipulate properties like this with any level of complexity we want, we can stipulate them such that any given mental state covaries perfectly with any given object with respect to some such gruesome properties. With respect to some property, any given pair of items covary in some way. But clearly it isn’t right that everything represents everything else.
Getting from information-bearing to representation requires adding in a requirement that the representing states are subject to a correctness condition. There must be a condition that explains the possibility of a gap between a state simply occurring, and the state being appropriate. For a state to be representational, there must be some situations in which its occurrence would be inappropriate, since there must be some situations in which things are not as the state represents them as being. This is what Prinz’s function-talk is meant to get us. If a state has function, it can count as having malfunctioned if it does not fulfil the function. So a state that bears information about an object, and has the function of doing so in a particular way, counts as having malfunctioned if it fails to bear information about the object in the way its function mandates. So if my fear has the function of tracking danger, when it is triggered by something that is not dangerous it is not fulfilling its function. In that case, it has fallen foul of something sufficiently like a correctness condition.

But using this sort of correctness-condition analogue places constraints on what you can say about the content of the representation. Fear can plausibly be said to have the function of tracking danger. Thus it bears information about danger and is malfunctioning when it triggers in response to something safe. But what we want is fear representing the shark as dangerous. That particular shark – the one swimming towards me. My fear does not have as one of its functions covariance with the presence of that shark, or even of sharks in general.

Even though in many cases the emotions are caused by their proper objects, they do not have the function of detecting them. Fear misfires only when it is triggered by the non-dangerous - not when it is triggered by one dangerous thing rather than another dangerous thing. Its function therefore cannot institute a norm with respect to the nature or identity of the feared object. Since emotions function to detect CRTs and not particular objects embodying them, we cannot just help ourselves to a second dimension of Dretske-style naturalist semantics which tries to find accuracy conditions for the emotion in its causal link to the proper object. There is just no functional norm in terms of what the emotion is directed at.

If, in spite of this, one were sympathetic to the Prinzean project the most natural thing to do is suggest adding some more machinery to get the necessary contents in place. But what extra machinery doesn’t look arbitrarily tacked on?

If you have this Dretske-inspired detectionist picture of representation, the most obvious place to look is Dretske himself. He says that a thermometer that is part of a central heating unit does not just represent temperature, but represents the house as having a given temperature. He gets this by appeal to the wiring diagram of the device. If you look at how the thermometer is hooked up to the world, you can tell that the house is the thing being assessed, because it is what provides the relevant input. This sort of story won’t work for the emotions though. Emotions aren’t wired up to their proper objects in the sort of invariant way that would be needed for us to read this feature of their intentionality off their structure51.

51 Unlike perceptions, though the respect in which this is true for perceptions will not become clear until my treatment of Burge (3.3).
It’s hard to see what extra bits of machinery could fit into the Dretskean picture that will get Prinz representation with an attributional character. So maybe the better thing is to use the Prinz setup and replace the Dretskean story with another naturalist semantics. The most promising line here seems to be using a consumer-based teleosemantics in place of the Dretskean story to try to get more finely grained content, since this uses the same sort of conceptual machinery – naturalist teleosemantics – but offers more resources for the institution of norms that might give more detailed contents.

According to Ruth Millikan, some devices acquire functions by virtue of being inputs into other devices (R. Millikan, 1989). This institutes norms that are more finely-grained52 than the sort of detection-norms we get in Dretske’s picture. The well-worn example of the frogs snapping at black specks helps to illustrate this. Frogs have a mechanism that causes them to flick their tongue out at any small darkly coloured shape moving past them at a certain speed. Consider the content of the states that this system produces. We might wonder if the content of these states is there’s a small dark object, there’s a fly, or there’s some food. According to Millikan, answering this question requires seeing the states as produced for consumption by the frog as a system. Once we see the way that the states fit into the animal-level frog system, we see that they have been given a function by being consumed as representations of food/fly. The frog eats whatever it catches with its tongue. Given the way the states play a role in bringing this about, something goes wrong when they are triggered by beebee pellets rather than flies. So there is a norm governing the states that is more fine-grained than the causal account of what brings about the states. Snapping at beebee pellets is not good for the frog, so states that bring this about are malfunctioning relative to the norm instituted by the way that the states are used by the frog. This norm is more discriminating than a norm governing well-functioning of the detection system considered alone, since it is a totally typical causal path that brings about the state in response to beebee pellets. This means that the state represents the beebee pellet as food/fly and so mischaracterises it.

The same sort of strategy could be pursued with the emotions.53 We could take the way that the emotions feed into the activity of the whole organism and see if this gives them a function that helps ground their proper-object directedness.

So long as we restrict our attention to the way that the emotions innately play a role downstream of other systems this looks just as hopeless as getting the Dretske story to work, since the way types of emotions are consumed here doesn’t functionally tie them to particulars. That is, we saw that fear fulfils its function any time it is related to something dangerous, irrespective of what thing it is that embodies the danger. The same is true for its consumption. If we want to think of how the organism consumes its emotions, we are best off thinking about the motivational and action-preparing role emotions can play. Fear has a motivational force that leads to either confronting or fleeing from dangerous things. It also automatically prepares the body for these sorts of activities. Given this, it can have functions derived from how well it contributes to these

52 In that the norm is more determinate – it counts as having been met in a more restricted range of cases.

53 In fact, I will be pursuing basically this strategy in 3.x.x, once I have a few more pieces in place to help extend the range of ways in which an emotion can be consumed as input.
tasks. But fear is not consumed in a way that goes wrong when one particular
dangerous object, rather than another, causes it.\textsuperscript{54} In this way no norm intrinsic to the
emotion ties it to a particular proper object. So long as \textit{something} dangerous is causing
it, it assists the organism via appropriate motivation and useful bodily preparation.\textsuperscript{55} But
this is simply the norm that relates danger to its formal object – danger itself, it doesn’t
yet relate it to its proper object – the specific thing that is dangerous.

But shifting to a Millikan-inspired account allows us access to some of Millikan’s other
devices for getting more specific content. The relevant tool here is her account of
derived proper functions. The idea is that once state types have invariant functions,
individual token states of the type will have adapted proper functions that are specific
instances of the invariant functions (R. Millikan, 1984, p40). In her example, the skin
colour changes of a chameleon have the invariant function of hiding it from predators,
in order to do this token changes in colour must match the skin colour to the particular
item the chameleon is sitting on. Matching those particular colours is the adapted
proper function of the token change. So if fear has the proper function of detecting
danger in general, individual tokens of fear will have adapted proper functions – that of
detecting the dangerousness of particular objects or states of affairs. If this works,
token emotions are subject to norms according to which they malfunction if their
particular objects are not dangerous. This would give them a correctness condition that
involves the combination of object and danger, which would be enough to get
attribution. The problem with this line comes to the fore when we try to say \textit{which}
particular objects this norm is related to. If we restrict our attention to the emotion the
answer is just whichever object the emotion is directed at. The emotion functions well if
its object, whatever object that is, has the relevant evaluative property. But this doesn’t
sound like a case where the adapted proper function gives a norm that relates the
emotion to its proper object. Rather object directedness is already needed in order to
understand the adapted proper function. On the teleofunctionalist approach to
intentionality, the emotion’s intentionality is meant to be \textit{established} by the norm, and
the norm is, in turn, meant to be instituted by a function that the emotion has. But here
the cart seems to be before the horse. We cannot understand adapted proper function
without first having a sense of what the emotion is directed at.

To solve this problem, we can see the norm that ties the emotion to its proper object as
instituted by the consumption of the emotion. Whenever a token fear occurs, the whole
system that the fear is a part of will have to include a representation of the feared
object. We only fear objects we perceive/imagine/etc. If there's a consuming
subsystem whose proper function is to consume the token fear along with the object-
representation (yielding behaviour appropriate if the proper object is dangerous), then

\textsuperscript{54} Here, for ease of expression I have lapsed into treating the proper object of the emotion as its cause. This is harmless
in this case, because the argument against this version of teleosemantics doesn’t hinge on this, and because if the
confilation were legitimate it would make the teleosemantics position easier to hold, since it would directly reduce one
intentional notion to a causal notion.

\textsuperscript{55} As stated, this is not quite true. There are all sort of dangerous things that our fear does not help us deal with, so fear
can fail to be useful to the mechanisms that consume it when it is fear of some sorts of objects. But trying to exploit this
to get an account of functions that institute norms that relate the emotions to particular objects will not work. At best this
will give us a view of fear as representing danger that can be \textit{avoided} via \textit{flight} or \textit{fight} mechanisms, since the only new
malfunction this can put on the table is one that counts against fear being triggered by something dangerous which a
flight or fight mechanism will not help to deal with. There is nothing here that will give my fear a function of attributing
danger to some particular.
the token fear has the function of being well-suited to feed into the subsystem. The emotion is then subject to a norm involving the object that the emotion is directed at, as well as the dangerousness of the object. So the emotion attributes dangerousness to the proper object.

So this version of Prinz, augmented with a Millkanian teleosemantics is the right shape to do the job we want it to do. It’s worth noticing how different this is to Prinz’s version. It requires that the person undergoing the emotion has a capacity to integrate emotional elements and other representational elements and consume them in an appropriate way. In this respect it is unlike the image of an encapsulated perceptual system that Prinz seems to be working with. But there is no principled reason why someone sympathetic to features of Prinz’s account could not adopt this story. However, in the next section I will argue that even this account doesn’t get a PTE the full story that they want.

3.2.1.1 General problems with the teleosemantic strategy.

There is reason to be skeptical that a teleosemantic account of this variety could do the work required by PTEs. The problem is that Millikanian teleosemantics will always yield a story about content that is radically externalist. These views accept that what content a state has is a matter of causal relations largely outside the ken of the creatures that has the state. Given this, the justification that the state can bring about will be externalist, since the creature undergoing the state will not be in a position to tell, from the inside, what the content of the state is, so they will not be able to cite the state as a reason for holding the belief. Since the content of the belief and the content of the emotion are determined independently (by the way that they are consumed) there is no guarantee, from the inside, of any link between the emotion and the belief. So teleosemantics won’t give us account of the content of emotions such that we can take the emotion at face value, since it won’t give us an account on which we will know the content of the emotion just by having it.

To see this, consider what Millikan says about anaerobic bacteria. In the oft-cited example, the bacteria have magnetosomes that help the bacteria move towards magnetic north. Thanks to a contingent correlation between magnetic north and oxygen poor water this makes the bacteria move towards the oxygen poor water they need to be in order to survive. According to Millikan, the content of the states of the magnetosomes involves oxygen poor water rather than magnetic north because the mechanism that use the states in question to draw the bacteria towards magnetic north proliferated because ancestors of the bacteria that moved this way survived more often. They survived more because they moved towards oxygen poor water, not because they moved towards magnetic north. This means that the state’s proper function is to bring the bacteria towards oxygen poor water, not towards magnetic north (R. Millikan, 1984, p28). Since the function determines the content, and the function is determined by the evolutionary history, the content depends on the evolutionary history.
Now suppose there are similar bacteria with cognitive capacities matching our own. These bacteria are self-reflective and care about justification. To know that some of their states are about oxygen poor water, rather than magnetic north, they will need to do some evolutionary biology and discover that movement towards oxygen poor water improved their ancestor’s survival chances, giving these states their proper function. Until they work this out, the bacteria cannot cite their states as reasons to believe anything, since they don’t know the content of their own states. (They could instead trust that certain states they have reliably track certain features of their environment without knowing any of this. In that case they could infer evaluative features of the environment from the occurrence of those states, but this is an inferential transition, not the noninferential justification stressed in 2.2-2.3)

If emotions get their content in this way, we are in the same situation as the bacteria. We might have some inkling of what sort of situations played a causal role in the evolution of our different emotions and so we might guess what their contents might be. But we could be radically wrong. If we are wrong, the emotions have different contents to what we expect, and do not play the sorts of justificatory roles we think they do.

Paul Pietrowski draws out the counterintuitive results of this view (Pietrowski, 1992). Suppose that a herbivorous species, the kimu, evolved a predilection for sensations caused by the presence of red things, such as sunsets, because this attracted them to an area free from their only natural predators, the snorfs. According to Millikan, their detection of red has the proper function of getting them away from snorfs. The states that the detector generates have the content no snorfs there, regardless of what the kimu think.

However bad this is for a theory of content generally56, no such theory can do the work a PTE wants it to do. It will lead to our emotions having content with no principled connection to what we think their content is. Consequently we cannot be sure that an emotion we cite in defence of a belief or action will have relevant content. For all we know we are like the kimu when it comes to some of our emotions. Suppose it turns out that sadness evolved at a distinct point in our evolutionary history and that it proliferated because weeping flushed a certain parasite from our tear ducts. Then our sadness will have the function of causing weeping to flush out the parasites, and the content of our sadness will be get out of my tear ducts you parasites (since it malfunctions only when it fails to flush the parasites out). It cannot, therefore, contribute justification to any beliefs about the value of things we take ourselves to be sad about, such as the loss of a friendship. If our unexpected sadness at such a loss brings it about that we come to believe we have lost something important then the sadness cannot play any justificatory role vis-à-vis this belief.

On this view we could not know, from the first person perspective, whether our states are even relevant to the beliefs we might want to use them to justify because we cannot tell from the first person perspective what content those states have. Given this, how could it be reasonable to cite our emotions as reasons for thinking our ordinary evaluative beliefs are true? If we cannot, then our emotions cannot provide internalist justification for those beliefs. This is not simply a matter of our emotions being fallible

56 Pietrowski gives excellent reasons to think this is a real problem though (275-277).
here, rather we just don’t know what contents our emotions have, so we do not have even *prima facie* reason to think that they justify our evaluative beliefs.

This is more dramatic than the complaint that externalists about mental content deny that we have privileged access to the content of our own thoughts. Externalists like Burge deny that we are the ultimate determiners of the content of our thoughts, but for him the range of things we could mean by our thoughts is dependent on aspects of our thoughts that we have access to. For the teleofunctionalist of this variety, what we think about the contents of our states has no role in determining their content.

So even though Millikan’s machinery looked like it had the right structure to get us closer to the object-directedness a PTE needs for the emotions, it ended up giving a view of content that doesn’t vindicate the justificatory roles we want to claim emotions can play.

### 3.2.2 Conclusion

In general, the Prinzean strategy of claiming that emotions literally are perceptions seems to me to be doomed. The way in which the preceding argument shows that Prinz’s version of the claim cannot work seems both instructive and generalizable to other attempts to make good the claim that emotions literally are perceptions. Much of the negative PTE literature is concerned with pointing out apparent disanalogies between emotions and perception, and each seeming disanalogy gives us a reason to think that such a strategy cannot succeed. I think that these disanalogies are sufficiently many, and sufficiently powerful that such a straightforward strategy faces formidable obstacles, and is unlikely to succeed.

This leaves open the following related alternative – claim that although emotions aren’t literally perceptions, they get their content in the same way that perceptions do. This is the strategy I take to be most in the spirit of the PTE positions. If emotions have a similar rational role to perceptions it makes sense that they would acquire that role in more or less the same way that perceptions acquire theirs. It also makes the PTE look like more than a schematic for what the theory ought to look like in the end, and more of a fully-fledged position. It is the view about content acquisition that the literature seems to assume PTE theorists will endorse. This is the strategy I turn to in sections 3.3 and 3.4.

### 3.3 Burge

The strategy examined in this section doesn’t insist that emotions are *perceptions*; instead it starts with a story about how perceptions get their contents, and applies it to emotions to show that they can get theirs in the same way.

A good place to start here is Tyler Burge’s (2010) picture of what is required for perceptual representation. His conclusion about perceptions is exactly the right shape to fill the hole in a PTE if we can establish the same thing about emotions. According to Burge, the key philosophical task regarding perception is to explain how accurate
perception correctly represents the world. This means showing how perceptions take a proximal stimulus that they work on (for instance a retinal image – something we can think of as a two-dimensional array of colours) to generate a representation that makes claims about the distal environment (for instance the room I am now looking at). This gives us an account of how perceptions get to have representational contents. That is, how they become states whose success depends on how things are in the distal environment. According to Burge our perceptual system does this on its own, so his story is about how a state can inherently have representational contents because of the way it functions.

He claims that:

1. The psychology of perception is a mature science (and we should believe what mature sciences say). (Burge, 2010, p87), (Burge, 2010, p93)
2. The psychology of perception posits perceptual representations. (Burge, 2010, p88)
3. These representations occur subpersonally and preconceptually. (Burge, 2010, p97)
4. They attribute a limited range of perceptual attributives to items in our environment. (Burge, 2010, pp380-3)
5. This attribution is guided by a proximal stimulus that underdetermines the norms that relate the representation to its distal cause – that is, the attributives the representation employs gives more information about the distal object than is given in the proximal stimulus. (As a result, there are ways that the representation can be wrong without there being anything wrong with the information given in the proximal stimulus.) (Burge, 2010, p388)
6. Perceptions thereby institute representational norms that are not reducible to biological norms. The representations themselves are accurate or not, depending on whether the thing they represent as exhibiting a given attribute does or does not exhibit it, irrespective of whether this does, or could, aid the survival of the representer. (Burge, 2010, p75), (Burge, 2010, p300)
7. Such norms have objective purport, in that they are answerable to the world, and so are made accurate or inaccurate by the way the world is (Burge, 2010, p397). So objective purport does not need to be an achievement at the personal level, in particular it does not need to be a conceptual achievement at the personal level. (Burge, 2010, p400)
8. By virtue of being normatively related to the world in this way, the perceptions are intentional. (Burge, 2010, p317)
9. Perception is therefore the home of original intentionality. That is to say, perception establishes its own contact with its objects – introducing them into our psychic economy without reliance on any other states.
10. All other intentionality is reliant on perceptual intentionality. (Burge, 2010, p4)

Perceptions pull off the trick of making claims that go beyond what is given to them in the proximal stimulus thanks to perceptual constancies. Perceptual constancies are ways that the perceptual processing of the proximal stimulus makes bets about which features of the distal environment are changing and which features remain constant,
when the proximal stimulus changes. Perceptual constancies are necessary and sufficient for something to be a perceptual system in this sense - one that generates representations with objective purport (Burge, 2010, p413).

Let's take a very simple example regarding size constancy. Imagine you are looking at a beach-ball coming directly towards you. Ignoring a great many complications, what goes on at the level of your proximal stimulus is that a patterned set of colours in your visual field grows in size. This is compatible with a huge range of causes in the world, but there are two candidates that are the most obvious options. You might be looking at an object that is growing in size, or at an object that is moving towards you. Let us suppose that your visual system uses variation in the lighting the ball is subject to in order to predict that it is the latter. (Note that this requires the employment of colour constancies, since it is largely by processing variation in the colour of the object at the proximal stimulus level that the system can determine that the object is being subject to changing lighting rather than undergoing colour changes.)

The system does two things with this information – it uses it to process further information (having determined that the object is moving towards you, your system can use this information to perform further colour constancy operations) and it supplies you with the information that something of a certain shape, size and colour is moving towards you. That is, the system has generated a representation that is subject to a norm of correctness which relates the representation to the distal stimulus, since if the object in the world is stationary, but changing size, then the processing has been unsuccessful and will lead to false beliefs and less accuracy in other perceptual calculations. The perceptual system itself has staked bets on what is going on in the world that brings about the changes in the shapes and colours that are given as proximal stimulus.

In summary, Burge’s theory of perceptual representation claims that the processing our perceptual systems perform generates a state whose appropriateness depends on how things are in the world. So the system generates a state that has representational content on its own. The state has content inherently – by virtue of being produced by the system in the way that it was.

### 3.3.1 Reasons to think this won’t work for emotions.

I think the reason that adopting this strategy for the emotions won’t work is already on the table. Note that the reason to think that the visual system has generated a representation is that it has generated a state with the right sort of normative relation to environment – a state that is accurate only if there is an object moving towards me, but not if an object is changing size. It does this by going beyond the information given to it and making a prediction about what is going on beyond what is given to it. It takes something without any intentionality – a proximal stimulus, and generates a state with intentionality by instituting a norm relating that state to features of its distal object.

Emotions don’t seem to do the same thing. Take a case of fear of a shark. I see a shark close to me in the water and I feel fear. My senses put me in touch with the shark
and my fear is a reaction to it. My emotion does nothing to establish this connection to the shark. If we want to fit it into the model of perception, the availability of the shark for fear is on the proximal stimulus side of the fence – it is part of what my emotion works on in order to occur, it is not something that the emotion establishes on its own. To see this, imagine a case where the shark is not really there – where I have been subject to a hallucination. In a case like this, we hold the perceptual system responsible, not the emotional system. The fear seems like an appropriate response to what the emotional system was given to work with – namely the seeming presence of a shark.

So the emotion does not acquire its own proper object in a way that makes the emotion subject to a representational norm on that front. But perhaps the fear establishes a norm related to what it says about the object it is given; that is perhaps the emotional system establishes the relation to the formal object?

The problem now is to work out what an emotional constancy mechanism would even look like. In the perceptual case the constancy mechanism allowed calculation of features of the distal object on the basis of computations performed regarding the best explanation for the various changes in proximal stimulus (so that a beach-ball which fills more and more of my visual field while also changing in illumination conditions is more likely to be moving towards me than growing in size). It was the generated explanations that secured the claim that the perceptions have representational contents because it was features that needed to be explained in terms of representational content. But what does an emotional constancy mechanism use as proximal stimulus to calculate distal cause? The place to start is to look at what people claim that emotions represent. Let us take fear and danger as our paradigm. If we are to follow a Burgean path in arguing that fear represents danger, then we must show that our emotional system processes changes in some sort of proximal stimulus in order to work out what the distal cause of the change is, thus overcoming an underdetermination problem by generating a representation of the object as dangerous.

The most obvious candidates for proximal stimulus in the emotions case are bodily changes and sensations. These clearly underdetermine their distal cause. Many of the criticisms of feelings theory point to this, claiming that the feeling component of an emotion cannot individuate emotion types, since the same pattern of arousals, etc. can be shared between cases of excitement and of anger.

So perhaps our emotional faculty processes a proximal stimulus, in the form of changing bodily feeling, in order to predict the distal cause of the changes. Fear results when the prediction is that the distal cause of the changes is danger.

This is the right sort of shape, but how plausible a theory is it? Unfortunately it isn’t very plausible at all. Perceptions can be thought to work on a limited given input, which they extract information from by processing it in accordance with principles built into the

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57 Assuming, of course, that the hallucination is not emotionally caused – say by anxiety about sharks.

58 Notice we cannot just take what the emotions is given to perform the role of proximal stimulus here, because what it is given is already intentional, and the emotion does not institute any new norms on this score that make it about something new.

59 This will be a recurring theme. I put it aside here in order to explore it in more detail in relation to Sellars in the sext subsection.
system itself; emotions cannot. Even ignoring the issue of how emotions get their proper object, the emotional system seems very reliant on other features of our cognitive set in order to generate a particular emotional response to any given object. For instance, our emotional responses to things are highly sensitive to previous experiences with those things. Whether or not I am afraid of the dog coming towards me might depend on whether or not it's the same dog that bit me a year ago. This is not something that my emotional system can calculate on its own.

The only way to push this line would be to say that this sensitivity to previous experiences is accommodated before the bodily sensation that is being treated as proximal stimulus. This would mean saying that which bodily changes occur depends upon these features, but that the emotional processing only works on bodily changes. So a dog that has previously bitten us might cause an accelerated heart rate and so on, whereas one we grew up with wouldn't. So the emotional system has different patterns of bodily feeling to process in the two cases. So the difference in how we respond to things, depending on different features of our mental lives, is brought about only via a shaping of the proximal stimulus that the emotion works on (the bodily changes themselves).

But this looks implausible, since an emotional encounter would go something like this:

1. We encounter an object,
2. Some mental system works out whether it is familiar or not, and compares it to our expectations in order to work out what bodily changes to undergo,
3. Our emotional faculty takes the bodily changes as input and processes them to compute what sort of distal evaluative cause they have,
4. The computation results in a particular emotion which represents its object as being the way that the processing predicts it is.

That just seems too inefficient. There is information that is used by the system at the second step, which would be helpful at third, but if we want to tell a Burgean story, the processing at the third step cannot use that information, because this doesn't fit with the model of a system doing its own computation to overcome an underdetermination problem. But perhaps this is simply an artifact of our weird evolutionary path, and our emotional system does work in this hopelessly inefficient manner.

Even if we accept that our emotions are potentially this inefficient, there is another issue lurking in the wings. There are good reasons to think that no system can perform step 3 with the sort of resources given by just bodily changes. Notice that the picture we have just is the straightforward James-Lang picture discussed in the first chapter. According to this line, we take in some feature of the environment, this causes bodily changes and we experience the bodily changes as an emotion. All that is added is the further claim that the emotional system processes the bodily changes it registers, and generates a representation on their basis.

But if the feelings theories failed because feelings of bodily changes weren't fine-grained enough to account for the right distinctions between emotions types, those very same features could not perform the task of determining representational contents
either. It is claimed that some emotions share a felt bodily profile, while differing radically in emotion type, and so differing radically in evaluative content. Schachter and Singer’s previously discussed 1962 experiment (Schachter & Singer, 1962) is meant to establish that felt bodily changes are not sufficient to distinguish nervousness about a talk from a non-emotional elevation of arousal. Given that the former would count as a representational emotion, and the latter as non-representational, it seems that more than just the felt bodily changes are needed to generate the representational content of emotions.

If bodily changes won’t work as the proximal stimulus that emotions work from to generate a representation, it’s not clear what else could. One charge standardly levelled against the perceptual theories of emotion is that emotions don’t have organs and transducers, so they cannot take sensations as inputs in the way that the senses do. Bodily changes accessed via interoception look like the only real candidate. Perhaps a story could be told about multi-modal inputs, where the bodily changes, together with perceptual inputs and perhaps even memory inputs could do the work. Perhaps this can be made to work, but it departs very dramatically from the perceptual model (since it is not something analogous to dedicated organs and transducers supplying the input).

So, to sum up it looks like Burge’s picture of how perceptions get their contents can’t be turned to the emotions case. It is one of the best worked-out theories of how perceptions get their content inherently, as part of the functioning of a single system. Given the sort of resources available to this picture, even the emotion’s capacity to attribute its formal object seems to require guidance from features outside of what can plausibly be taken as proximal stimulus for emotions. So it just doesn’t seem like emotions do processing on their own proprietary input in the way that perceptions do, so they cannot generate their own representational norms by overcoming underdetermination problems.

3.4 Sellars.

As we saw in the previous section, when it comes to working from a given input to generate a representational output, emotions are at a disadvantage relative to perceptions. For emotions, the feelings that would play the input role (played by sensations in perception) are insufficiently complex or object-directed on their own to do much to pick out the objects of the emotions. So if we want to adapt an account of perceptual representation for use in a theory of emotional representation, then starting with a theory of perception which does not demand too much from perceptual sensation seems prudent. A Sellarsian two-part theory fits the bill here.

According to Sellars, visual perception involves a sensation component and a conceptual component (Coates, 2009, p5). The former is the immediate mental result of a retinal image and consists of nothing but sensation—it is a form of sheer receptivity and is merely a modification of what the flow of experience is like. In Sellars’

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60 Sellars’s terminology here changes between his papers. I chose this term to best hook up this place in his theory with the place Burge gives to sensation in his. For Burge sensation is phylogenetically prior to perception and not subject to the same sort of norms, and therefore isn’t intentional. This much is shared ground for Burge and Sellars.
words sensations are “the end result of the impingement of physical objects and processes on various parts of the body” (Sellars, 1956, Section 60). Sensations constitute the distinctive phenomenal qualities of the perception. The conceptual component supplies the intentionality of the perception by making a claim about the object of perception in a manner analogous to the way that a judgement makes a claim about its object. The intentionality of perception is therefore parasitic upon the intentionality of concepts in judgments.

The qualities involved in the sensation component are intrinsic features of the experience itself, somewhat like qualia (though whether they are introspectively available is complicated). The sensation component is not an object of experience, but is a modification of consciousness – the qualities it has are not qualities of an object, at best they can be analogous to qualities that objects have. It is the conceptual part alone that explains how the perception gets to be about objects and their qualities. The sensation part is just the product of our sensory receptivity and it plays a merely causal role in the experience being of the object.

According to Sellars concepts are given their content by the semantic relations they stand in with other concepts. All semantic relations relate semantic items to other semantic items, rather than to worldly objects. It is only these relations that can be normative. Intentionality necessarily involves a normative element (is “fraught with ought” (R. G. Millikan, 2005)). Thus the intentional dimension of the experience must be on the conceptual side of the equation. The conceptual activity then plays a normative role, making a perception of an object dependent on the object being a certain way for its success.

Sensation gets to play a guiding role vis-à-vis the conceptual elements by standing in a picturing relation to the content that it helps to guide. For Sellars standing in a picturing relation means having structural features which are isomorphic with the structural features of the pictured object. There is an analogical relation between the qualities of the sensory experience (its pinkness and its cubicity) and the concepts (PINK and CUBE). So the sensation involved in my visual perception of a pink ice cube has a cubic element and a pink element and the two elements are related to one another in a way which lines up with the relation between the concept PINK and the concept CUBE that can be asserted in the claim “there is a pink cube”. (Gupta, 2012, p35)

I have glossed over many of the details of this picture because they will not play a role in the argument to come61. Without worrying about how well this theory works for perception, it initially looks like if it worked there it would be the right sort of shape to apply to the emotions case. There doesn’t seem to be any particular obstacles to dividing emotions into the two components – with feeling playing the sensation role, and our conceptual capacities playing the conceptual claiming role. Furthermore, by making the feeling-component a mere causal link in the chain, and allowing the conceptual element to do the semantic work, this picture looks like it might handle the fact that the feeling is less finely responsive to differences in objects than visual sensations are. It can simply by offload that work of finely tuned responsiveness onto the conceptual element. I will argue that this is an illusion though.

61 There are many associated diffculties with Sellars’ view on perception, as well as exegetical controversies, discussion of which would take us too far afield.
We might worry about a Sellarsian theory of emotions because at first it looks like the dreaded add-on view Peter Goldie warns against (ref) – emotions as beliefs plus something feeling-like, with the belief doing the intentional work and the feeling explaining the phenomenology. But this isn’t forced on us. The representational element needn’t be cashed out in terms of belief, and many of the problems add-on views face dealing with recalcitrant emotions and the fear of over-intellectualising emotions needn’t beset the view. Since I will object to this view of emotional representation anyhow, on different grounds, I’ll just take as given that a version of the theory can be made to work in a way that avoids Goldie’s problems.

The Sellarsian theory needs to claim that the feeling-component of an emotion plays a role in making the emotion what it is and in guiding the representational side. As with the sensation component of perception, the feeling will be understood as thoroughly non-intentional. It will have to be a nonrepresentational bit of affect, most plausibly some sort of experienced somatic perturbation. As with sensation in perceptions, if we conceive of feeling in this way it can only play a causal role in guiding the representational element.

There are two things the feeling component would need to guide if emotion represents its proper object as satisfying its formal object (i.e. attributes dangerousness to the shark). The two things are: selection of formal object and the selection proper object. Perhaps something can be done to causally tie the feeling of the emotion to the selection of the emotion’s formal object and perhaps this can establish some sort of picturing relation between elements of the feeling and the evaluative property it detects. Maybe even something along the lines of what Prinz says will fill in some details here.

But now we are left to ask how a raw feel could play a role in making the emotion about its proper object. In the case of perceptions, the sensation component is structured, with parts that can be analogous to parts of the scene perceived. Parts of the sensation (e.g. colour patches) can be analogues of items in the environment (e.g. coloured faces of objects), and these elements are separable from each other. Furthermore the elements of the sensation – shape and colour – stand in structured relation with one another that can be isomorphic with relations in which concepts stand to one another. But it doesn’t seem that emotional feeling is like this. In a given case of fear there might be separable elements of the sensation – agitation level, valence, attention consumption, etc, but it hard to imagine how these aspects could stand in mapping relations with objects in the environment that would help to determine what it is in the environment that I am scared of.

Since it is implausible that structural features of these perturbations in feeling stand in relations to one another that are potentially isomorphic to structural features of the

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62 The view I later endorse (Chapter 4) could, at a high level of generality, be described as a two-part view in the same way as the Sellarsian view of perception. I will argue there that containing a conceptual component needn’t entail becoming an add-on view.

63 There is also the binding of the two to be done – given a property and an object they still need to be brought together in the right way. This is a further difficulty for a Sellarsian view of emotions, but my argument does not rely on its force here.

64 That these two positions come together in this way should not be surprising. The teleosemantic tradition takes inspiration from Sellars and focuses particularly on the picturing half of the equation.

65 If they were able to stand in these mapping relations the then Prinzean theory (see the previous section) might be able to exploit this by suggesting that such elements of the emotions have the function of mapping those features.
world, we cannot claim any picturing relation between the feeling and the represented quality. Given this, it is not clear that the feeling could serve as structured input which could play even a causal role in guiding the conceptual part of the emotion. If this is so, we will not get a theory that explains how emotions get to be about their proper objects.

To see this even more clearly, consider that emotions can be about objects that do not exist. If the only way of understanding the proper-object directedness of the emotion is via a picturing relation grounded in isomorphism with that object, then fear of a non-existent thing shouldn’t be object directed in this way. But if I fear a shark when there is no shark present, the appropriateness of the fear is tied to the shark. The fear is appropriate if the shark I’m afraid of is a danger to me. If I am afraid of a non-existent shark while actually being in danger of being hit by a speed-boat that I don’t know about, then my fear is inappropriate. Even though the shark does not exist, the norm that the emotion is subject to depends on the danger being attributed to the shark.

One immediate response to this problem for the Sellarsian picture is to think that the talk of analogical relations between qualities of experience and of objects is idiosyncratic to the Sellarsian picture. Why not just drop that talk? But we can’t because the analogical relation is in the picture as a way of making the sensation component of a perception do some work in the perceptions, explaining how they are different to merely thinking about objects. In this respect, the role it gives sensation is undemanding. If we just skip this feature of the account for our emotional theory, it leaves it very unclear what role feeling plays in emotion. The danger is that this would make emotions into just another way of thinking about objects. It’s not clear that there is a less demanding role to give sensations in a theory of perception that can then be played by feeling in the emotional theory.

So a perceptual theorist cannot simply plug emotions into a Sellarsian theory of perception to get a story about how emotions get their contents. There is no way that the parts of the emotion (thought of as unintentional) could stand in mapping relations that determine the proper object of the emotion.

3.5 Implications.

I have considered two broad strategies for getting a theory of emotional representation that suits a perceptual theory’s needs, the literal claim that emotions are perceptions (3.2) and the claim that emotions get their contents in the same way perceptions get theirs (3.3 and 3.4). Both strategies have failed. This does not conclusively establish that other approaches in the vicinity won’t succeed. However, I think that what the failures have in common is instructive.

Both fail because they can’t get from the feeling itself to intentionality – to the relevant kinds of contents that attribute evaluative properties to proper objects. For Prinz the feeling of the emotion is a feeling of bodily change, which represents a core relational theme because it covaries with it, and has the function of responding to it. But there is no discrete part of the feeling which covaries with differences in proper object, and certainly no part of the feeling that has the function of doing so. As a result, the emotion cannot represent its proper object. For Burge, perceptual representation occurs when
some non-intentional input is used to calculate what the distal objects are like that caused that input. This institutes a representational norm which is essential for there being representational content. But it doesn’t look like emotions have the right sort of inputs to play this role. For the Sellarsian, the sensation element of perception has qualities that are mere analogues of the qualities of the objects, but the sensation isn’t itself about the object in any way. Emotional feeling, cast in a way that fits this, doesn’t have the requisite internal structure to have qualities that stand in the right relations to one another to yield useful structured inputs, so emotions don’t fit the story that Sellarsians want to tell about perception.

These proposals all fail because they start with emotional feelings, conceived of as utterly non-intentional, then try to supply the machinery to get from these feelings to the intentional features of the emotions. If we take the feelings associated with emotions to be just felt bodily changes, then none of these proposals can make their machinery do the work it needs to. Sensations, even conceived of as utterly intentionally inert, have a complex structure and a richness of information that can plausibly be exploited to form intentional content. Particular elements of the sensations are causally correlated with particular elements of the things the perceptions get to be about. When it comes to intentionally inert emotional feelings things are different. At least when it comes to directedness at the proper objects of emotions, it doesn’t seem that the sort of feelings these theories can appeal to have enough structure to be systematically correlated with features of the objects. They are too coarse-grained to vary in tandem with variations in the objects they are related to. As a result they lack the structure to have functional roles that institute norms of the right sort to ground the attribution of properties to objects.

Another angle from which to view the failures is this: the strategies discussed in this chapter all aim to show that emotions have their content inherently, as part of the functioning of the emotional system. Just like perceptions they are given something non-intentional and work it up into something intentional. It looks, however, like emotions cannot get their contents in this manner.

In the next chapter I will begin on an alternative strategy that uses some elements of the options canvassed so far, but which houses them in a shell which accepts that emotions get their representational contents derivatively. The idea is that although emotions on their own cannot come to have representational contents, they can have representational contents when they are housed in the right sort of mental economy. The task of the next chapter will be spelling out how emotions get to be directed at their proper objects—the things that they are responses to. I will claim that emotions are unlike perceptions which have a form of first intentionality, introducing new objects to our psychic economy. Instead, the emotions are intentional thanks to their capacity to be about objects already given to us. In the subsequent chapter I will argue that emotions become subject to evaluative appropriateness conditions. These two features—being directed at an object and being subject to an accuracy conditions are together sufficient for emotions having representational contents.
Chapter 4
Emotional intentionality - proper objects.

I have claimed that emotions can offer noninferential internalist justification for beliefs and actions and that making sense of this requires positing that the emotions themselves have representational contents. My task is to give an account of how emotions might get such contents. In the previous chapter I argued that no version of the story Burge and others tell about perception can work for the emotions. Perceptions get their representational contents in a way that emotions couldn't get theirs. Perceptions take sensory registrations as input and use perceptual constancies to solve under-determination problems, thereby generating representations of distal objects. Emotions, however, do not get to be representational by performing computations on some non-intentional input in this way. In this chapter, and the next, I will argue that they get their content derivatively instead. In this chapter that will mean showing how emotions get to be about their proper objects – the objects that they are emotional reactions to.

In the emotions literature an account of emotional representation is treated as consisting of two parts – an account of proper-object directedness and an account of formal-object directedness (following largely in the wake of Anthony Kenny (Horsburgh & Kenny, 1994, Chapter 9)). The sort of content people are interested in for emotions are evaluative predications – emotions are said to reveal that the items the emotions are about (the emotion’s proper objects) instantiate evaluative properties (the emotion’s formal objects – the evaluative property x such that the emotion is appropriate iff the emotion’s proper object instantiates x). It is taken as given that if these two dimensions of intentionality are established, then the emotion represents its object as having the evaluative property. I will use the same language, and treat this as the appropriate way to establish emotional representation. If we can show that the state is directed at some object (the proper object) and that the state as a whole is subject to an accuracy condition in terms of some evaluative property (the formal object) such that the state is appropriate if and only if its proper object satisfies its formal object, then it is subject to a representational norm.66

Adopting this language is not intended to signal a commitment to any particular view of intentionality. In particular, it is not meant to signal that emotions have the sort of object-involving contents Gareth Evans talks about (Evans, 1982, Chapter 1). As will become apparent, the talk of intentional objects is intended to be ontologically neutral – something can be the object of an emotion even if it does not exist. If the reader has a view of intentionality in tension with this, the arguments in this chapter are meant to be translatable into the language of mental symbols, or what have you.

66 There is no binding problem here since a state having a formal object already presupposes a structural element that makes the appropriateness of the state depend upon the proper object satisfying the formal object. That is, the formal object is an appropriateness condition that applies to an emotion which is directed at a proper object, so that it is the proper object having a property that determines the appropriateness of the state as a whole.
Given this division of the question of representation into two parts I will tackle each separately. I argue that emotions get each of their intentional objects derivatively, though derivatively in different ways. In this chapter I will show how emotions get to be about their proper objects, then address some objections. The answers to the objections will help to bring out the character of the view. Then, starting in the next chapter I begin what will be the bulk of my work – I construct an argument that even if emotions have no intrinsic appropriateness conditions (in the intrinsic sense I discussed), they are nevertheless directed at their formal objects by virtue of the sorts of roles they play in our mental lives (and this will involve claiming that they have their contents intrinsically in the weaker of the two senses). To do this I modify Christopher Peacocke's (1992) version of conceptual role semantics and apply it to the emotions.

When I say emotions get their contents derivatively, I do not mean that they have as-if content. It might be natural to think that either states have veridicality conditions as part of their natures, or talk of their veridicality is, at best, a useful fiction. To give an example, suppose I have a gammy knee that hurts when it is about to rain (fallibly but reliably enough). The idea is that I can treat pain in my gammy knee as accurate if and only if it is about to rain, but this is just an idle indulgence, not something that gets at anything important about my knee. I can understand all there is to understand here in merely causal terms, so thinking of the pain as having the content it is going to rain is really thinking of it as having as-if content. To show that the knee had real content I would need to show that the accuracy conditions that the pain is subject to are inherent to the state – the sort of accuracy conditions it has as part of its nature. I will argue that this challenge is ambiguous and that depending on how we understand the challenge, it is either trivial to meet, or so difficult to meet that it will rule out some states that everyone thinks have representational content. The ambiguity hinges on what is meant by “as part of their natures”.

One way of understanding the requirement that states have accuracy conditions as part of their nature is that it demands that the states have accuracy conditions in virtue of being the sorts of states they are. On this reading of intrinsicality the states are individuated only in terms of their intrinsic features and not in terms of the sorts of relations they stand in with other states. This would mean that individuation could not involve the location of the states within a larger framework. In this sense of intrinsicality, a state intrinsically has accuracy conditions if and only if it has them in virtue of its nonrelational, metaphysical nature. But sentences are a case that shows us that this version of the demand is too restrictive. On this reading of the requirement, sentences would need to be individuated at the level of their auditory or morphological profile. Relative to this way of picking them out though they are not subject to any accuracy conditions. The same set of noises that constitute my utterance “I’ve almost finished my first draft” could occur purely by accident in the babbling of a brook somewhere and those sounds would not be subject to any accuracy conditions. So the requirement, understood this way, ought to be rejected as too demanding.

On the other reading of intrinsicality, the state has intrinsic accuracy conditions if and only if it has accuracy conditions by virtue of being the sort of state that it is, where the sort of thing that the state is can be specified in terms of the state’s role in a larger system. This allows that a state might be part of a functionally defined kind, and by virtue of being a state of this sort it has accuracy conditions as part of its nature.
This condition is easily met for sentences since part of what makes a certain noise a sentence of a given type, individuated at a semantic level, is the fact that it has semantic properties. These semantic properties are veridicality conditions that are determined by facts about a community’s practices in using tokens of those syntactic types. So long as we are making sensible claims about representation, any state that we are trying to claim has veridicality conditions will fall under some description such that being a state of that sort requires it to have a veridicality condition. (For instance, the position of a metal strip has no veridicality conditions as part of its metaphysical nature, but qua output of a fuel gauge, it does.) So on this reading of the requirement, intrinsicality can be relative to something’s functional role in a larger system. The requirement, on this reading, does little to rule out derived content.

When it comes to emotions (again remember I am focused on occurrent emotions), the sort of things they have intrinsically are their phenomenal characteristics, whatever attention-affecting dispositions they have, their dispositional functional roles and so on. By contrast I claim that their content is acquired derivatively in a similar way to that of sentences. Emotions get to have representational contents by being embedded in a larger system which is set up by the way in which the rest of our cognitive system interacts with them. Emotions can be individuated as functionally defined types in this system and relative to this way of individuating them they intrinsically have accuracy conditions. As with language, this shows that emotions have more than just as-if intentionality – rather the way that they are embedded in a practice makes it the case they represent things.

In order to argue for the possibility of emotions getting their contents derivatively, I will assume the worst case scenario for the position I am defending. What I have shown in the previous chapter does not establish that emotions cannot get their content inherently. It just shows that if Burge is right about perception, then emotions cannot get their contents in the way that perceptions get theirs. Perhaps there is another way that something can intrinsically have content. Perhaps emotions inherently have very vague contents – nonconceptual content that is coarse-grained but which can guide the sorts of roles the emotion can play in our practices. For the sake of the argument, I will assume that this is not the case. For what follows I will assume that emotions have no contents aside from what they can be shown to have via the derivative route I describe here. If emotions do have any content just thanks to the operation of the affective system that only shows that my task should be easier, since it gives me material to talk about why emotions are apt for the treatment that I claim gives them contents.

4.1 Emotions and their proper objects.

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67 See section 6.2 for a discussion of the details of how emotions can be type-individuated in a manner that gives them intrinsic accuracy conditions.

68 This should be enough to show that emotions having contents inherently will not get in the way of the story I am telling here. The other possibility is that it makes my story redundant. In the next chapter I will discuss this possibility under the heading of a discussion of the perceptual analogy. In brief, what I say there is that even perceptions, which have their contents inherently, require this additional layer of content to make sense of some of the common sense things we think we can see and hear. Given that intrinsic emotional contents would - if anything - be more coarse-grained than perceptual contents, this means that my story will not be redundant even if it turns out that emotions can be shown to have some intrinsic veridicality conditions.
In Chapter 3 I discussed Prinz’s theory of emotional representation as well as a Sellarsian approach which tries to get a theory of emotional representation via the perceptual analogy. Both failed to give a PTE what they need because neither contain the resources to see how emotions could be about their proper objects. (Burge’s story didn’t either, though it also didn’t seem to work for an account of how emotions are directed at their formal objects either.) All three theories tried to start with non-intentional material then show that the emotions perform some sort of processing on this material to get themselves in touch with the world. All three treat emotions as a form of first-intentionality – as states that establish intentional contact with aspects of the world that we weren’t previously in contact with. In this section I argue that the mistake is trying to start with non-intentional material and then trying to show how emotions then achieve a directedness. Instead we ought to think of the feeling component of emotions as already intentional.

4.1.1 Feeling towards.

The reason none of the approaches to emotional intentionality canvassed in Chapter 3 works is that both assumed that we need to start our story with inputs into the emotions that can be exhaustively characterised in non-intentional terms. Instead, I claim we ought to start with a felt component that is already intentional. What I have in mind is Peter Goldie’s (2002) notion of “feeling-towards”. In this section I will give some reason to take seriously the idea of feeling-towards. The claim is that emotions have a felt bodily component, but the feeling is felt towards the emotion’s object. The whole emotional feeling is its whole phenomenological profile. This will typically (or maybe always) involve a bodily component like a sinking feeling, boiling blood, or what have you. But it also includes felt directedness or aboutness. Think of this felt intentionality in terms of the phenomenal difference between a pang that is a mere pang, and pang with the same felt bodily profile, but which is brought about by a memory of something you regret, and which, as a result, is felt towards that event. Without feeling different in any bodily sense, it will have a different overall phenomenological profile. The feeling’s directedness is part of its phenomenology, so a change in how an emotion is directed entails a change in how it feels to undergo it (Goldie, 2002, p19). When I am afraid of a shark, the feelings I have are felt towards the shark. Part of undergoing the emotion is having feelings that are about that shark, and these feelings are qualitatively different to other possible feelings that aren’t about the shark. In this way, the feeling component determines the proper-object directedness of the emotion. Rather than the emotional system establishing an intentional relation to the proper object by working on non-intentional material, one component of the emotion is already intentional.

4.1.2 Potential problems.

As will emerge in more detail, I think that is made possible by links between the emotional feeling, and other antecedent states with intentional content that involves the proper object of the emotion. I want to remain neutral about the nature of the content, since I want the story to be compatible with the claim that all such content is representational, so that the feeling gets its aboutness via preservation of representational content from another state, but I also want it to be compatible with views that accept that there can be intentional content that is non-representational (e.g. some forms of direct realism in perception).
The idea that the feeling of the emotion directs us towards the proper object of the emotion has some initial phenomenological plausibility. But it also has a spooky feel about it. In other areas of philosophy the idea that intentional features of mental states can be read off their phenomenology has been largely abandoned. The idea of a phenomenologically available resemblance between ideas and things was last considered plausible by the mainstream in the early days of empiricism (Locke, 1961, essay 2 Chapter VIII). Externalist considerations have ruled out the idea of reading the content of thoughts about natural kinds off the subjectively available features of those thoughts (Burge, 1986). Finally, Kripke has influentially revisited Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the idea of a distinctive feeling of meaning playing a role fixing reference in any domain (Kripke, 1982, pp 41-2). These are all instances of a general turn against the Cartesian view that the mind reveals its intrinsic nature to introspection and we therefore automatically have introspective access to the nature of our own representational state types. This cluster of worries about reading intentional features off phenomenal features I call “spookiness,” because it seems to suggest that something magical is happening – we are going from subjective features of an experience, to intentional features: reading aboutness off of qualia. Subjective qualitative features of an experience look like they are the wrong shape altogether to determine what a state is about. Given that our picture of how emotions get to be evaluative does so via their content, we want to be sure that whatever fixes their content can guarantee determinate evaluative content.

Even more worrying, using the idea of feeling-towards as part of an account of emotional intentionality might just seem to beg the question. Consider what we would think if an explanation of perceptual representation made an analogous claim about the sensations involved in perception. Perception seems like our best candidate for establishing first intentionality – for going from the non-intentional (like a retinal image) to the intentional (like a perception or perceptual judgement) (Burge, 2010). If we are building a theory of first intentionality - a theory about how we become acquainted with the world in the first place - then we cannot help ourselves to the idea of intentionality to describe the feeling component of the perception. This would be building the explanandum into the explananda, since intentionality is what our theory of perception needs to explain. There is a vicious circularity here.

Yet neither the spookiness nor the problem of circularity rules the claim out once it is properly understood. The latter issue, which stresses that we could not make a similar claim about perception, just highlights a difference between emotions and perceptions. Perceptions establish first intentionality on their own, whereas we have good reason from the last chapter to think that emotions do not. Perceptions get their input from organs and transducers; they put us in touch with objects by some combination of perceptual processing and conceptualization. Emotions, on the other hand, get their inputs from what have been called their cognitive bases – from other elements of the psychic economy that inform the emotions and make them possible (Whiting, 2012) (Deonna & Teroni, 2012). To be afraid of a shark I must have already been put in touch with one (real or imagined). I must see one, or think I see one, or imagine one. The proper object is given to me independently of, and antecedent to, the emotional

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70 See Schroeter, Schroeter and Jones for an elaboration of this concern.
experience, and so the feeling involved in the emotion can be a feeling about the shark because the feeling depends on having a shark given to me in some other format – perceptually, imaginatively and so on.

I suggest that whereas the perceptual system achieves its directedness, the proper objects of emotions are given by parts of the agent’s psychic economy that make the emotion possible. Emotional directedness is a form of second intentionality – a directedness at an intentional object that has been made available via some act of first intentionality\(^1\). For example, suppose I see a dog wearing a hat – this brings about a feeling of surprise, and part of the experience of the feeling is that it is directed towards the dog. I don’t just have the belief that the dog caused the feeling, but the feeling latches onto the dog given to me in perception, and is felt as a response to it. This is the sense in which the proper-object directedness is derivative.

The spookiness objection is not fatal to the prospect of using phenomenology to establish directedness for reasons that are connected to this difference between emotions and perceptions. That objection would be on-point if the claim was being made about a direct connection between emotions and worldly objects. The claim I want to make about reading proper-object directedness off the phenomenology is more modest. The idea is that the emotion makes a sort of demonstrative reference to other states and that there can be no error about this aspect of their directedness.

Emotions require cognitive bases in order to occur at all. There needs to be some other state that represents an object in order for us to have an emotion directed at that object. Given the availability of the state, all the emotion needs to do to be directed at an object is piggyback on the first state via a demonstrative reference to whatever that state picks out.

This internal relation is something we are immune to error about\(^2\). I cannot misidentify the object of my emotion in the sense that I cannot be wrong about the link between the emotion and the other state’s represented object. The represented object can be different to how I represent it, or even fail to exist, but the emotion cannot be about some other object.\(^3\)

To see the appeal of this view think about what goes wrong with the object-directedness of an emotion aimed at a misperceived object. Suppose I believe that there is a shark near me when in actually fact what I saw was a dolphin. From the first person perspective it is right to say I am scared of the shark. So something has gone wrong because there is no shark. But the thing that has gone wrong goes wrong before the emotion – we don’t say that my emotion has misfired but that my perception or my recognitional faculties or that I formed a belief too hastily. Whatever object-

\(^{1}\) Or via another act of second intentionality which itself gets its directedness from an act of first intentionality

\(^{2}\) Exactly what this infallibility claim amounts to is hard to formally specify. Certainly the claim cannot be that beliefs we form about the objects of our emotions cannot be wrong. There are almost no bounds on what can be believed on the basis of anything, so it’s certainly possible to form a false belief about the object of our emotions. The claim is something like – the emotion puts us in a position to know its proper object. If we take the emotion at face value we will have a true belief about what its object is.

\(^{3}\) See Campbell for a discussion (Campbell, 1999).
directedness is going on in the emotion seems blameless. Furthermore even in this case there is a very real sense that I am not misguided about which object is the object of my fear, rather I am misguided about what the object is like. There isn’t some other object I am actually afraid of, instead the object I am afraid of has different properties. I think that this holds even if the shark is a hallucination. The emotion is still directed at the object, it is just a hallucinatory object, something with no real existence beyond the hallucinatory state that the emotion makes demonstrative reference to.\textsuperscript{74}

We can picture the way that emotions get their proper objects in terms of the preservation of the contents of mental files\textsuperscript{75}. When I think of, or imagine, or perceive an object, I open a mental file on the object. The point of such a mental file is to organize my thoughts such that different thoughts can be directed at the same objects. All of the content of a mental file have the appearance of \textit{de jure} sameness of topic – by virtue of all being part of the same file the contents strike me as being about the same thing. The sense in which you cannot be wrong about the proper object of your emotion is this: You can know that your emotion is directed at the object that the contents of some particular object file are also about. Anything else that your cognitive base attributes to the object is attributed to the very same object that the emotion responds to and this information is all housed in the same object file. The phenomenology of the emotion does not guarantee \textit{anything} about the connection between those contents and the world. In particular, it does not guarantee that the contents are true of some worldly object\textsuperscript{76}. So what the phenomenology determines is not something that an externalist should object to being determined by what is in the head.\textsuperscript{77}

I have said that we cannot be wrong about which objects are the proper objects of our emotions. The way that the emotion picks out its object should explain this phenomenon. It seems to me that the most plausible way that this could be so is if the emotion picks out its object via something like a demonstrative.\textsuperscript{78} Since emotions are made possible by cognitive states which provide them with access to objects the emotions can be about all the emotion needs to do is piggyback on that representation. Given that the emotion occurs in the context of another state that introduced the object (a perception of it, or an imagining of it, or so on) the emotion can use the other state to make demonstrative reference to the object.

\textsuperscript{74} In the next section I will discuss what seems like a more clear-cut case of mistaken proper objects and claim that even it is not really such a case.

\textsuperscript{75} I borrow this way of talking from (Schroeter, 2012)

\textsuperscript{76} Nor does it guarantee that the self-same worldly object is the source of all the information in the mental file (Schroeter, 2007).

\textsuperscript{77} In fact, see (Burge & Peacocke, 1996) for an attempt to show that an externalist view can guarantee that the seeming sameness of reference between different mental states connected in the right way.

\textsuperscript{78} This is inspired by what John Campbell says about the way that proper names and perceptual demonstratives are alike in having a mode of presentation which does the work of binding together information about a single (putative) object via something that happens at the level of sense (Campbell, 1999, p97).
This should be made more plausible by seeing the way in which such a setup would give the desired resources for a similar position within the philosophy of perception. Conceptualists about perceptual content face the objection that the range and specificity of visual content can outrun that of our concepts (Heck, 2000; McDowell, 1994). We can perceive more shades of red than we have concepts for. The response that McDowell offers is that in addition to our ordinary concepts we have demonstrative concepts like “that shade” which explain how our perceptions can have the content they need to have in order to accommodate the specificity and diversity we know perceptions must be capable of (McDowell, 1994). Many find this unsatisfying because it seems like there must be some acquaintance with the colour in order for our concepts to be able to make demonstrative reference to them. But this acquaintance can only really be perceptual, so we’ve come full circle in a vicious circle (since we cannot now explain the perpetual contact in conceptual terms).

In the emotions case though, because the cognitive bases are already needed for the emotion to occur, the relevant materials to make demonstrative reference to are always at hand. The emotion can demonstrate an object of the relevant cognitive base. The objection in the perceptual case gets its force from the idea that perception is establishing first contact with the colours in question, so there is nothing else for the perception to make reference to, so a demonstrative in the perception could not help hook the perception up to the colours. Since emotions cannot start new object files they don’t need any way of picking out object other than via demonstratives. Emotions don’t need to make contact with their objects via a way of characterising them (as per descriptivists in the debate about the semantics of names) or via any direct causal connection to them. They simply need to establish an indexical link with other mental presentations.

If emotions have their proper object via demonstrative reference this explains the immune to errors of misidentification that emotions display. A demonstrative like “that” guarantees that whatever thought uses it has the same topic as the mental state whose object “that” is pointed at. If I perceive a dog and think “that dog is grey” then the thought cannot help being about the same dog as the one I have perceived. The demonstrative guarantees that the thought is added to the object file associated with the dog I saw. So emotions having a demonstrative way of picking out their proper objects gets the right answer about the sort of infallibility we are subject to.

The claim that emotions make demonstrative reference to their proper objects also gets the right answers about sort of errors we can be subject to. I can be angry at something that doesn’t exist – as when I get angry at the person who put Tony Abbott in charge. There is no one person for this anger to be aimed at but because I have a mental representation of the right sort I can aim my emotion at it.

4.1.3 Emotional opacity and bin-licking dogs

I claim that an emotion’s feeling component is directed towards an object given to it by one of its cognitive bases. This affects the quality of the feeling. The feeling is felt towards its object and this directedness is phenomenally accessible. This means we
cannot be wrong about the directedness of our emotions. But, according to an objection I want to consider, we know that our emotions can be opaque to us, so my account must be wrong.

Take an example: suppose I am applying for jobs while my scholarship is running out. My employment predicament is important to me, I have little control over it, yet I will be somewhat responsible for the outcome. The overall emotional episode I undergo is anxiety. It brings about negative affect, heightened arousal, direction of cognitive attention towards potential for failure, and so on. Now suppose that one morning, while I am making coffee, the only aspects of my emotional state that make their way into my awareness are heightened arousal and negative affect. In this case I may well notice my dog Barry licking the rubbish bin and yell at him. I take myself to be angry with him. But the real object of my emotion is the uncertainty of my job prospects, not Barry.

If this is right, then I have misidentified the proper object of my emotion. But given the way I am using Goldie's notion of feeling-towards, this should be impossible since just having the emotion should be enough to see what it is directed at.

I think that the intuition that this objection rests on is right, and picks out a fundamental truth about emotions. We are sometimes wrong in really important ways about what is going on in our emotional lives. This is distinctive and important aspect of the emotions. By contrast, although we are subject to perceptual illusions, the inward-facing subjective features of perception are not similarly subject to misunderstanding. If I am hallucinating a dagger floating in space I cannot be wrong about the fact that it appears to me as though there is a dagger there. In the case of Barry, the objection claims that I am getting something wrong about intentional features of the emotional experience, not just about whether the experience is putting me in touch with something objective, but about the content of the state itself.

My strategy in this section is to vindicate this intuition about emotional opacity without abandoning the claim that there is a felt difference between emotions directed at different objects or the claim that we are immune to error by misidentification of the proper objects of our emotions. To do this, I want to suggest that the description given above is not the only way to understand such an event, nor even the best way to understand it.

It should be uncontroversial that any given occurrent emotion is part of a larger emotional episode. There are features of my affective life that are causally relevant to the occurrence of a given emotion which are not themselves part of that emotion. Moods uncontroversially influence which occurrent emotions we experience, and how we experience them (Ratcliffe, 2010). These things may evade my notice, especially if I am feeling an intense emotion which (to use Michael Brady’s nice phrase) “captures and consumes attention” (M. Brady, 2013, p92).

In some cases, the affective features that escape notice might be the dominant cause of the occurrent emotion. These affective features can be many and varied – emotions can bring about other emotions, emotions can be brought about and shaped by moods,
sentiments, emotional syndromes, etc. Any of these affective elements can evade our notice while still playing a causal role in shaping an emotional response.  

Now we can return to the case of Barry licking the bin and vindicate the idea that I am importantly wrong about my emotional situation, without denying that I am angry at Barry. In this situation my jobless situation gives rise to a number of affective elements that are part of a larger emotional episode which organizes my emotional responses to a number of things, including Barry licking the bin. The emotional episode plays a role in the causal chain leading to my occurrent emotions, including the anger I feel at Barry, but the emotional episode is not part of the occurrent emotion. Nevertheless, this anxious emotional episode is a precondition for my anger at Barry. Under normal circumstances I have the mental resources to see that although the licking is unpleasant, anger is not an appropriate response. So there are some important elements of my affective state that I am not focused on, but which are playing a role in bringing about my angry response. This does not force us to deny that I really do feel anger at Barry as a result of the episode. I do feel angry at him.

Yet, in cases like my response to Barry, by simply describing myself as angry I display a lack of self-understanding. This has not yet been explained by my story. We do have the ingredients to do so though. If asked why I yelled at Barry, answering that I was angry with him is at best a partial answer. Being reminded that I have been anxious for the last few days might improve my understanding of the situation, without it meaning that I was wrong that my feeling of anger was directed towards Barry. The anxious emotional episode may be a better explanation of my behaviour towards Barry than the occurrent anger. This is true even though elements of my emotional episode really did synchronise in the right sort of way for me to be angry, and these elements really were targeted at Barry in the right sort of way for the anger to be directed at him.

Explaining my response in terms of anxiety is better in at least two ways. It is an explanation that gives me a more agential understanding of what is going on. If I bare my teeth, rock back and forward and make convulsive noises, this can’t be easily explained in terms of beliefs and desires and means-ends calculations. The behaviour can look unintelligible unless it is described as laughter - an emotional response to something funny. Similarly in the case of Barry, attribution of anxiety explains the yelling in terms of things that really do matter to me – career prospects - rather than things that don’t really matter to me – Barry licking the bin. In this way, focusing on my anger at Barry displays a lack of self-understanding even if we grant that I am right about feeling anger towards him.

The explanation in terms of anger also displays a second lack of understanding. Attributing emotions to oneself usually gains us a measure of regulative control over these emotions. Knowing that I am angry lets me know what sorts of things are relevant to the emotion, so it lets me examine whether the situation really does merit my response and whether I can change things to attenuate that response. Consider a person who is asked why they crossed the road. If they answer ‘to get to the other side’

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79 In chapter 6 I will introduce some themes from appraisal theories of the emotions that extends the range of factors that can play this role even further. (6.2)

80 In this way it captures a way in which the response is more proportional than it looks on the shallow explanation.
they are probably telling the truth, but the information isn’t as useful as an answer that mentions the goal that makes crossing the road worthwhile. As well as hiding the agentially explanatory element, their answer hides the features that would be relevant to the regulation of their road crossing behaviour – since it doesn’t mention the goal which could perhaps be moved so as modify my road-crossing behaviour.

Supplying an agential understanding is likely to be the main goal any time we make a self-attributional claim or judgement. When I yell at Barry, and explain this in terms of anger, I am doing a similar thing to the person explaining their road crossing. I don’t present my actions in a light that does very much to make them intelligible as expressions of agency. As a result, by leaving out so much of the relevant causal history of the emotion I give a false impression of my options for emotional regulation. By citing my anger at him, it seems as though my emotions might be attenuated if he stops licking the bin, or if someone points out that he’s not really doing any harm. But really, both of these things are treating peripheral symptoms, rather than dealing with my underlying anxiety. What needs to change for me to be less liable to similar emotional responses has nothing to do with Barry – I just need to be offered a job! In a case where there are different affective elements in play simultaneously (i.e. in most cases) there may be some true self-attributions that are less helpful than others in bringing out these two aspects of the situation. This vindicates the idea that our emotions may be importantly opaque to us, but without admitting that when an occurrent emotion is felt towards an object we can be wrong about what its object is.

I have been assuming when we make self-attributions our goals are not merely theoretical – we do not just want to establish truths about ourselves. Yet even if our interest is only theoretical there are virtues the explanation in terms of anxiety has that the explanation in terms of anger lacks. It is more unifying in that the one explanation covers more incidents from the same morning. It also generates more counterfactually robust predictions – that I will be more likely to forget to put water in the coffee maker than I normally would. These together suggest that the better explanation is more likely to get at the theoretically interesting underlying causal structures.

In this section I pointed out that occurrent emotions are part of a bigger picture, which I might be getting wrong, and which might be more important. I can be right about the emotions I experience without this being as helpful as seeing how they fit into a broader affective picture. If we think of love as an emotional syndrome, then there might be cases where it is more useful to see an action as an expression of love, than as an expression of an occurrent emotion, even when it really is an expression of that emotion. Suppose my partner yells at me for forgetting something. Seeing this action solely in terms of her anger foregrounds certain features of what is driving the response, and these features will not explain how she would respond to another person who forgot the same sort of thing – to see why she responded as she did we need to see how the response fits into the emotional pattern governed by our specific relationship. Any theory that accounts for ways that our occurrent emotions are systematically related to what is important to us will involve higher-order affective state or episodes that play an emotion-organizing role (whether they are character, sentiments, moods, existential feelings, or whatever else, (Charland, 2010; Ratcliffe, 2010)). So any theory that adopts this explanatory burden will provide the resources for a similar sort of account to the one I have offered here.
In this section I considered the chief challenge directed at the feelings-towards account of emotional intentionality – given that we know emotions can be opaque to us, how could we know what they are directed at just by undergoing them? I argued that we can in fact know this, but that this is compatible with a profound ignorance about the very same emotion – how it fits into a broader affective story about ourselves. In the next section I warn against over-reaching here.

4.1.4 Opacity strikes back.

I have been arguing that we can read the proper object off the felt quality of emotional experience and that the sort of opacity to which emotions are subject does not undermine this. I don’t think that this same thought holds for all aspects of emotional intentionality. The other dimension of emotional intentionality that is commonly distinguished from proper-object directedness is formal-object directedness. The formal object is that which determines whether the emotion is appropriate. For example, the formal object of sorrow is loss – sorrow is appropriate when it is directed at something of great value that has been lost. If we could read this off of the phenomenology of the emotion, then the phenomenology would plausibly be enough on its own to establish that emotions are representational. I take it that some people in the literature, including Michelle Montague (Montague, 2014), would endorse this claim.

But it seems far less plausible to me that the formal object can be read off the phenomenology of an emotion. There are live debates about what the formal object of particular emotions are (e.g. (Taylor, 1980)). Is fear appropriate if and only if the feared object is dangerous, or if and only if the feared object is fearsome? Is anger appropriate if and only if its object is offensive or if and only if it is insulting, or even if and only if it is an impediment? If we can read the formal object off the phenomenology, these debates shouldn’t occur.

Likewise, if merely experiencing the emotion were meant to be enough to know what made the emotion appropriate, many of our people-making practices would make no sense. Part of our practice in educating young people is encouraging them to regulate their emotions in certain ways – teaching them to try to fear only the dangerous, admire only the worthy and so on. If merely undergoing the emotion were sufficient to know the appropriateness condition of the emotion, this would be redundant, or, at best, nagging. But it certainly seems to be part of teaching people to have virtuous emotional dispositions.

One explanation for this asymmetry between the two intentional objects harks back to Chapter 3: emotions do not establish contact with their proper objects, but they can give us a new evaluative stance towards that object. Part of the point of seeing emotions as an independent stream of representation is making sense of emotions having the capacity to go against with our beliefs (Döring, 2010). I can judge one thing and yet have an emotional evaluation of the situation that conflicts with this judgement. Here it looks like the emotion itself is bringing something new into the psychic economy. The emotion establishes intentionality of its own. If we accept all of this, which I think we should, we cannot also think that emotional phenomenology can
establish the emotions’ formal object on its own. Thinking that the phenomenology would be sufficient for this falls into the spookiness alluded to in 4.1.2.

This result should not be a surprise. The formal object effectively gives correctness conditions for the emotion. There is no reason that the correctness conditions for an intentional state should be available just by consciously undergoing the state\textsuperscript{81}. Whatever institutes these norms could easily elude the grasp of the person undergoing the emotion. In the next section I will discuss this second form of intentionality.

4.2 Summing up.

I have argued that emotions inherit their proper objects from other mental states and that this makes it possible for them to be felt towards their objects – that an aspect of how it feels to undergo them is the fact that they seem to us to be directed at particular objects. This grounds their proper-object directedness - one aspect of their intentionality. If we can also show that they are subject to an accuracy condition that is evaluative then we have shown that they have evaluative representational contents since this shows that they are accurate if and only if their proper objects have the evaluative property. Giving an account of this second aspect of their intentionality is the task of the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{81} Certainly we should not expect the correctness conditions to be available in the strong sense of the agent being able to give an analysis of them. Nor, I think, should it be assumed that we can have implicit knowledge of the correctness conditions for the state – e.g. that we’re able to identify just those situations in which the emotion is correct. This is especially clear, maybe, if we assume correctness conditions can involve contested evaluative properties like being honourable.
Chapter 5.

Emotional intentionality - formal objects

Giving an account of emotional representation involves showing how emotions get to be about their proper objects and also showing how the emotion becomes subject to an evaluative appropriateness condition – that is how they got to have their formal objects. If we can show both aspects we have shown that the emotion’s appropriateness depends on its proper object exemplifying an evaluative property. Thus the emotion is subject to a representational norm in terms of the evaluative property and so evaluatively represents its proper object. In the previous chapter I argued that emotions can inherit their proper objects from other states – they have a demonstrative element which picks out objects antecedently available to us. In this chapter I will argue that emotions become subject to appropriateness conditions.

If this succeeds I have shown that emotions have the representational contents that the first few chapters showed were necessary for us to be able to understand how emotions could play the noninferential justificatory roles that they play. 82

5.1 Emotions and their formal objects.

The second dimension of emotional intentionality, which I will argue emotions get derivatively, is their formal-object directedness. Having a formal object is being subject to an appropriateness condition. In this section I will argue that emotions get their formal objects derivatively, and in a different way to the way in which they get their proper objects. This different way is also derivative in a different sense.

I will argue that even if emotions have no intrinsic appropriateness conditions they nevertheless get to have formal objects via the way they are integrated into our broader cognitive economies. For the purposes of the argument I will act as though emotions have no intrinsic, appropriateness conditions. Since none of the attempts to explain these appropriateness conditions via the analogy with perception were wholly convincing, I will eschew reliance upon claiming that they have such an appropriateness condition. What we have discussed so far does not rule it out though. By treating emotions as though they were not subject to such conditions in and of themselves I am showing that even the worst case for me they can still get derivative representational contents 83. This argument thereby presupposes as little as possible about how emotions are in and of themselves so readers need not take much on faith to be convinced that emotions can be representational. 84

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82 Though it is not sufficient. In the next chapter I will insist that more is required for the emotional representation to do enable emotions to play a noninferential internally justificatory role and give an account of how emotions can play this role.

83 See footnote 86 for a wrinkle though.

84 As will become clear in (8.2.), even if emotions do have intrinsic veridicality conditions, there would be reason to think that some version of the conceptual role semantics approach I propose would be needed to get the whole story about
I will show that emotions get their formal objects derivatively by showing that the tools of a conceptual role semantics can be applied to the emotions, and that emotions can thereby become subject to norms derived from our conceptual capacities. This essentially gives a more detailed version of what Harman and Greenberg say about gauges (Greenberg & Harman, 2007, section 3.2). They claim that a fuel gauge gets to represent the level of fuel in a tank because of the way it is integrated into the conceptual order—because of ways we treat it as licensing conceptual moves. I want to claim that emotions stand in the right relations with evaluative concepts for the emotions to represent evaluatively. In particular, I claim that some evaluative concepts are partially individuated by practices we have which involve making transitions from undergoing occurs emotions to evaluative judgements, and these individuating relations suffice for emotions becoming subject to appropriateness conditions in terms of those concepts.

One significant advantage of this of account for the appropriateness conditions of the emotions is that it gets around a formidable problem raised by Schroeter, Schroeter and Jones. They worry about how a theory of emotional representation can secure a determinate evaluative property for the appropriateness conditions of the emotions. Why is it that fear becomes subject to an appropriateness condition in terms of danger rather than in terms of the fearsome, or some other nearby evaluative property? By going via evaluative concepts my account allows whatever does the reference determination for concepts to fix the property that is attributed by the emotion.\textsuperscript{85} I will claim that emotions become subject to appropriateness conditions in terms of particular concepts and these concepts pick out the properties that figure in the appropriateness conditions. So if disgust is subject to an appropriateness conditions that employs the concept DISGUSTING, then whatever fixes the reference of the concept generally determines which property it is that figures in the appropriateness condition of the emotion. This means that I do not need an independent theory about evaluative reference determination.

I start with a characterisation of Christopher Peacocke’s 1992 view as applied to perception (in 5.1.1). I show that it can be extended and modified to apply to emotions, and that these changes are friendly to Peacocke’s view—allowing it to avoid some objections his view is subject to (5.1.2.). I then provide the argument that possessing the concept DANGER requires a capacity for fear (5.1.3.). I go on to argue that being in these relations to the concept danger makes the emotion itself subject to a norm (5.2).

5.1.1 Peacocke.
Christopher Peacocke cashes out his version of conceptual role semantics by saying that concepts can be individuated by the conditions a thinker must conform to in order to count as possessing the concepts. These conditions amount to transitions in thought that the thinker must find primitively compelling—that is, transitions in thought that

\textsuperscript{85} See also 8.1.1. for another interesting feature of my position which speaks to this same issue.
seem appropriate to the thinker in a way that doesn’t rely on other commitments that the thinker has (Peacocke, 1992).

One of Peacocke’s key examples is conjunction. To possess the concept of conjunction I must satisfy two requirements. Firstly, if I believe \( p \) as well as believing \( q \), I must find the transition to believing \( p \) and \( q \) primitively compelling. Secondly, I must find the transition from believing \( p \) and \( q \) to believing that \( p \) as well as to believing that \( q \) primitively compelling. (There is some technical footwork used to avoid bad circularity here, but it’s not relevant to what I’m doing, so I’ll skip it. For discussion see (Peacocke, 1992, section 1.5).) If I find these transitions primitively compelling, I count as possessing the concept of conjunction. Any mental symbol that obeys these transition rules is a symbol for conjunction. Furthermore, it is because the symbol obeys these rules that it means AND. The use that the symbol is put to determines its meaning.

I propose using Peacocke’s theory to explain the representational link between emotions and the evaluative beliefs they putatively justify by examining the possession conditions for the concepts that figure in the evaluative beliefs. The clearest way to do this mirrors what Peacocke says about observational concepts.

According to Peacocke’s treatment of observational concepts, in order to count as possessing a given observational concept, one of the transitions the thinker must find primitively compelling is the transition from their being perceptually presented with an observable feature to a belief that the observable feature is instantiated in the perceived environment.

To run this sort of a story in the case of emotions, we would claim that one necessary condition for a thinker to count as employing the concept DANGER is that they find the transition from their experiencing fear of \( x \), to the belief that \( x \) is dangerous primitively compelling. Fear would stand in the same relation to the evaluation of its object as dangerous that the presence of reddish patches in our visual field stands to a belief that I am perceiving something red.

This account trades heavily on the claim that to possess the concept DANGER we must find the transition from fear of \( x \) to “\( x \) is dangerous” primitively compelling. How plausible is this claim?

One way in which it might look implausible is misguided. We might think that the property of dangerousness has nothing to do with something’s causing fear – it has to do with the capacity to cause harm. Fear only contingently detects danger. But notice that Peacocke’s story applied to the emotions doesn’t make any claims about the property of dangerousness. In particular it doesn’t claim that part of what it is for something to be dangerous is that we fear it. This story is about the concept DANGER not the property the concept refers to. Take an analogy. There is nothing about Venus

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66 I take it that the representational connection can be established independently of the justificatory capacity. That first step is analogous to establishing that some bit of speech is testimony and this can be done without thereby settling whether or not the testimony is trustworthy enough to justify beliefs formed on its basis. Establishing the trustworthiness of emotions is the task of a later chapter.

67 Peacocke takes perceptual presentation of observable features to amount to having perceptions with nonconceptual content that is mentioned in the possession conditions for the concept. This is plausibly also how things work with them emotions, but I am treating emotions as though they have no evaluative content of any sort independently of the role they play in our thinking. (I am helping myself to the intrinsic proper-object directedness of emotions though, since I take myself to have established this earlier.) If the link between emotions and concepts seems too tenuous to the reader, perhaps a version of the theory that grants emotions nonconceptual content will more compellingly connect the two.
itself that makes it necessary that it is the first star to appear in the evening. The concept EVENING STAR refers to the same thing, but it does require that if we think of something as the evening star, we find it compelling to think that it is the first star to appear in the evening. The concept DANGER is a mode of presentation of the property danger – that is one particular way of thinking about the property danger - and so it can be necessarily connected to things that the property isn’t necessarily connected to. The concept DANGER could well require that if we find something frightening, then we find it compelling to think that it is dangerous. This is perfectly compatible with the property itself only being contingently linked to our fear response.

But we might still be worried that the posited link between the concept DANGER and the fear response is too strong. Couldn’t I have the concept DANGER and reject the validity of any transition from fear to a belief about danger? This is surely the position a Stoic is in. They think that fear is no guide to danger (in fact they think that no emotions are good guides to anything). But it seems implausible to claim that as a result they don’t possess the concept DANGER. A born-again Stoic could satisfy the possession condition before conversion and nothing about their adoption of Stoicism seems plausibly to rob them of the concept.

In the next section I will suggest some clarifications of Peacocke’s (1992) view and some modifications designed to accommodate this thought. I will argue that the Stoic exploits an issue that is a general problem for Peacocke’s account, not an artifact of the attempt to extend it to cover emotions and evaluative concepts. I will try to show that the modifications strengthen Peacocke’s account as well as allowing me to make the claim about emotions that I want to make.

5.1.2 Modifying Peacocke.

First of all, let’s step back for a moment and ask what possession of a concept is. Peacocke has said that the conditions a thinker must satisfy in order to possess a concept suffice to individuate the concept. So whatever possessing a concept is it is very demanding in that meeting the possession conditions for a concept picks that concept out from all the other concepts. Furthermore, he say that “meeting the possession condition for a concept can be identified with knowing what it is for something to be the concept’s semantic value (its reference).” (Peacocke 1992, p22) So the demandingness is a demand on a thinker’s knowledge – to possess a concept fully, they must have enough understanding to know what it is for something to be its reference. So the understanding must be distinctive enough to pick out the reference from all other possible referential candidates.

So possession of a concept is a sort of understanding. How much understanding? It would not be reasonable to expect that possession of a concept requires enough explicit understanding that the thinker could provide an analysis of the concept. Almost nobody can provide analyses for more than a handful of our concepts, and concept possession oughtn’t to be a rare thing. On the other hand Peacocke has said that the understanding must be sufficient to determine a concept’s reference, so there will need to be a lot of understanding to achieve possession. Meeting the possession conditions – having the right pattern of transitions one finds primitively compelling involving the
concept – would be sufficient for understanding. Perhaps other types of understanding would be sufficient too though, including being able to provide an analysis (I will show later why this is not so straightforward). Having understanding via the analytic capacity is compatible with failing to have it via the primitively compelling dispositions (as the example to come makes clear), so displaying the disposition is not necessary for some sort of understanding of the concept. These issues are discussed later in this section.

But if possession means understanding what it is for something to be the referent of a concept, then how does this fit with Peacocke’s account of the form that possession conditions take? Possession conditions are given by the transitions in belief that the agent must find primitively compelling if they are count as possessing the concept. Possessing the concept CONJUNCTION just was reasoning in accord with its introduction and elimination rules, and doing so in virtue of the form of the transitions making that reasoning primitively compelling.

But how could possession conditions like this be necessary for possession in the sense discussed? It seems that meeting the possession conditions isn’t necessary for understanding. To see this, consider the following case:

SCEPTIC: Emily is a normally sighted, well educated person. She meets the possession conditions for the colour red. Then she goes to university and becomes a colour sceptic. She still knows which transitions in thought would be licenced by the concept, she still knows what it would be for something to be the reference of the concept RED, she just no longer believes that there are any such things as red things. Thus she no longer forms beliefs about things being red thanks to having visual experiences.

We want to say that Emily understands the concept RED without meeting the possession conditions for it. Emily fails to meet the possession conditions because she will not form beliefs about colours based on her experiences. Nevertheless, this doesn’t seem to count against her understanding of the concept. She uncontroversially understood it before she formed some more beliefs about the concept, so how could she lose her understanding?

Notice that there is potential way of reading Peacocke’s account of the form of possession conditions according to which this is not a problem. Peacocke says that to understand the concept RED Emily must find the transition from red patches in her visual field to beliefs about red primitively compelling. This might not demand that she be compelled all the way to belief. There is a way to read the requirement such that so long as Emily is subject to some compulsion to believe, this suffices for her meeting the possession conditions. Plausibly Emily meets the possession conditions given this reading of primitively compelling.

But there is another case that is more problematic:

SUPER-SCEPTIC: Emily+ is in the same position as Emily. However she has now left university, and without exposure to new and interesting ideas she has become a pedant. As a result, she has been working on her belief formation practices and now feels no compulsion towards forming beliefs about colour – not even ones that fall short of bringing about beliefs.
We still want to say that Emily+ understands the concept RED, and for all the same reasons that Emily does. But since she has more control over her belief forming practices she is no longer compelled any way towards belief. She is not subject to the right primitive compulsions.

This case makes us want to shift Peacocke’s account a little bit further. Emily+ is not subject to any inclinations to believe, but she is probably still subject to presentational states with content that attributes redness to things – states that present content as true, are baseless, and both compel and subjectively justify belief in their contents. Emily might, for instance, be subject to presentational states involving redness such as perceptions themselves, which attribute redness to apples and so forth, and perhaps even intuitions such as the intuition that if anything were to be red it would therefore be coloured. These presentational states can have the right sort of content, contained in the right sort of attitude, to count as a seeming that there is something red present. As in Chapter 1, I’m using “seeming” here to mean epistemically pro attitude towards some content, but one that falls short of belief in terms of commitment. Seemings may be occurrent and phenomenologically salient, but also might not. Seemings include states that are like beliefs but fall short – like inclinations to believe. They also include occurrent states of a different kind with representational content – like intuitions, or perceptions. So Emily+’s perception of a ripe apple itself can present things in a way that makes it seem to Emily+ that there is something red there, even if she overrides the inclination to believe – just as there is a sense in which the lines on a Muller-Lyer illusion seem to differ in length, thanks to my perception of them, even though I have no inclination to believe that they do.

So I propose that we think of Peacocke’s requirement for possession conditions in terms of seemings – for an agent to possess the concept conjunction is for the introduction and elimination rules to describe structures in the pattern of their seemings.

This way of carving things up brings with it the advance made in the first case. An inclination to believe p counts as a seeming that p. So if Emily has the inclination to believe p, then she can count as possessing (understanding) the concept even if she has no intuitions or perceptions with the right sort of content. Though having the right sort of presentational states like this might be sufficient for possession, it should not be thought necessary – why would inclinations to believe of the right sort (or fully fledged beliefs) not be sufficient for understanding? So both presentational states and primitive compulsions to believe become special cases of the more general category of seemings. It is the notions of seemings that does the work in giving an account of concept possession.

This way of understanding Peacocke’s account is neat because it avoids problems of the general sort Emily reveals – the beliefs involving a given concept which we find compelling are very sensitive to auxiliary beliefs we have. Many of the relevant auxiliary beliefs don’t look like they bear on whether or not we understand that concept. Seemings are not as sensitive to other beliefs in this way. To reuse the hackneyed example, the lines in Muller-Lyer illusions visually seem to be different lengths to me,

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88 See 2.5 for more discussion.
even though auxiliary beliefs I have mean that I feel no inclination to believe that they are.

So now the proposal is that in order to possess a concept an agent must have seemings that exemplify the sorts of patterns that Peacocke has picked out. These seemings include primitively compelling dispositions to believe as in the case of Emily, but they also include the kind of state that Emily+ has. But there is another Emily who gives grief to this account:

SUPER-DOOPER-SCEPTIC: Emily++ is like Emily+ but she has given up work, sold her house and devoted herself to taming her presentational states in order to expunge red-seemings from her life. She succeeds and has no seemings associated with the red (if this sounds too hard to do, imagine instead that she becomes colour-blind89).

Here it seems like the best thing to do is add a restriction to the sort of understanding that suffices for possession. Notice that although Emily++ can still understand the concept red, her understanding of it is in a sense derivative. Emily++’s way of understanding the concept red is not derivative in the way that some cases Peacocke discusses are. She is not a deferential user of the concept. She can determine what would fall under the concept red on her own and has all the right capacities. However her interest in the pattern of inferences that individuate the concept RED depends on them being patterns that she sees in other people’s thinking. It is because other people believe things are red that there is a pattern of inferences that individuate the concept RED depends on them being patterns that she sees in other people’s thinking. It is because other people believe things are red that there is a pattern of inferences that she has any interest in keeping track of. Her use and understanding of the concept RED depends on others for its raison d’etre, not for the wherewithal to determine what the concept’s reference is. There is just no point in having the concept RED and keeping track of the patterns in thought constituted by it if nobody you know is using it. Imagine a ++ community – a community in which nobody has any of the seemings associated with RED. If Emilio++ has grown up in such a community he will not understand the concept RED because there is no reason for him to attempt to track such a concept.

I suggest that the lesson we should draw from this is that Peacocke’s notion of possessing the concept should be understood as non-derivatively understanding the concept. So the possession-conditions aren’t merely conditions for simply understanding a concept. This is just as well, because why would understanding something be sufficient for finding certain transitions in thought primitively compelling? One can understand something and reject it precisely because one understands it. A colour sceptic believes that colours don’t exist precisely because they know what it would be for something to be the reference of the concept RED; knowing what it is for something to be red is part of what makes them believe that there are no such things. Emily++ understands the concept, but only derivatively, since there is only a concept there for her to understand in virtue patterns in the way that others think. Though her understanding of the concept is undiminished, and she still has the same

89 In the colour-blind Emily** case, she both lacks the compulsions towards belief (thanks to auxiliary beliefs) and lacks any seemings (thanks to her colour-blindness). The two sources here is not neat. For a neater example imagine someone who understands the concept Boche but rejects its inferences and has no relevant seemings either. If you think Boche is not a concept, either because you side with Peacocke in requiring concepts to be truth-preserving, or because you think slurs are merely synonymous with their descriptive element and their evaluative element is conversational implicature then take thick evaluative terms like efficient instead.
understanding that she earned by making first order judgements about redness, her continued interest in the concept RED is derived from patterns in the way that others think. In this respect her understanding counts as derivative and therefore she does not possess the concept.

We can think of this sort of derivative understanding as having a concept of a concept. Just as my concept RED is a concept of the property red – a mode of presentation of that property, so too I can have a concept that is about a concept – a concept that is a mode of presentation of the concept itself. These are meta-level concepts that can be understood or can fail to be understood independently of the concepts that they are about. Suppose I have the concept THE CONCEPT OF PHLOGISTON. I know that the concept phlogiston is the concept that belongs to the debunked scientific theory, which was a concept for something that we would now think of as the absence of oxygen, and so on. I also know that the concept is debunked, so I know many things that follow from its use – sentences involving the concept are normally false or nonsensical, and so on. I probably have enough of this knowledge to count as possessing the second order concept. This would give me a mode of presentation of the first order concept PHLOGISTON. But I could still lack the concept PHLOGISTON. I do not use the concept in my everyday thinking because I couldn’t – I may simply not know enough about phlogiston for the relevant patterns of thought to shape the way I think about the world.

Emily++ has thoughts about the concept RED, and she understands the concept, but having these thoughts is, for her, a matter of having thoughts that use the concept THE CONCEPT OF RED. She has earned possession of this concept by being able to tell instances of thinking that involve the concept RED and knowing what follows from something being an instance of that concept, she may even be able to provide a failsafe analysis of the concept. It is possible that these same abilities could be used to gain possession of the first-order concept RED. But for Emily++ her scepticism stops this happening, because it stops her from having thoughts that use the first-order concept in the right way. This makes her understanding derivative – it depends on there being others who have the concept. Even if she can understand what it would be to be the referent of the concept RED, now that she will not endorse any first order thoughts about redness, her understanding goes via her second-order concept.

So now we have seen why the sort of understanding that consists in being able to provide an analysis of concept isn’t sufficient for possession of the concept. This sort of understanding is enough understanding of the concept, no amount of understanding is sufficient on its own for possession of the concept. What’s needed for someone who understands a concept in this way to possess it is not more understanding, what’s needed is that they use the concept in their own thinking in the right way – i.e. use to think about the world, not just about other people’s thoughts. This is what makes their understanding non-derivative. They need to be disposed, under the right conditions, to make first order claims using the concept itself.

There is another way of derivatively understanding a concept – via deference. I may use a given concept without enough understanding of the concept to individuate it while

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90 And as the phlogiston example shows that even mere understanding of the ground-level concept is not guaranteed by a grasp of the meta-level concept.
having a pattern of ways in which I am willing to defer to others which uniquely specifies the concept. So long as concept possession takes into account patterns in the thinking of others, it looks like I might count as possessing the concept so long as I defer on its use in the right ways. Suppose I think that some things are necessary conditions for other things and that some things are sufficient conditions for others but I am not really all that clear on how to tell which is which. I know only that I mean by “necessary” what various experts mean, and likewise with “sufficient”. If the experts are well-chosen and their patterns of thinking get to count towards my concept possession, then they will uniquely pick out the concepts NECESSARY and SUFFICIENT.

Due to the way that Emily++’s understanding of RED is derivative she does not meet the possession conditions of the concept, but how about in the case of our deferrer? We don’t want to say that they meet the possession conditions either, since the conditions that are meant to individuate the concept are patterns in how things seem to them. If we want to try to individuate a concept in terms of a pattern of seemings undergone by someone whose grasp of that concept is heavily deferential we will have to use patterns in who seems to the deferrer to be worth deferring to, what seems to the deferrer to be an acceptable degree of deference to those people’s testimony, relative to one another, and so on. But this sort of pattern formed by the deferrals that seems right to the deferrer will fail to sort the concept regarding which they are putatively deferring from other concepts. For example, the pattern of deference that is appropriate in the case of NECESSITY is also appropriate for SUFFICIENCY. Someone who is learning the concepts, and is thus deferentially reliant on their tutor and their lecturer for examples, will be prepared to defer to the same extent for each of the concepts. They will take their lecturer and their tutor to possess the same expertise relative to one another on issues about SUFFICIENCY and about NECESSITY. For each concept they will be prepared to depart an equal distance from their original take on what counts as an example for either of the two authorities. Thus the patterns of ways thing seem to the student will be the same between the two as far as the patterns in their deference goes.

So this clarification and extension of Peacocke’s view gets us the results that we want. It thereby vindicates tying concept-possession to patterns of transition in thinking, since if the concept is individuated by the patterns of thinking that an agent must undergo to count as non-derivatively understanding it, then they are patterns that must show up in the agent’s thought.

5.1.3 Does grasping DANGER require fear?

Having cleared some problems out of the way, I now need to make a positive case for thinking that possessing our concept DANGER requires that it seems to the thinker that things that are frightening are dangerous. Here I use the example of fear and DANGER because I take it that this example is harder to establish than many other connections between emotions and their putative formal object. The hope is that any result here should carry over to other emotion-evaluation pairings. For example, the case for possession of the concept of THE DISGUSTING requiring a capacity for disgust almost makes itself. Disgust plays a genetic role in the formation of and grasp of the concept of the disgusting. Danger, on the other hand, is a concept we can plausibly arrive at
independently of fear. If the reader finds the arguments in this section unconvincing, but agrees with the general tenor of my project, then one option is to claim that the formal object of fear is THE FEARSOME. This will make the argument here much easier to make. The only costs are that this makes the evaluative judgments that fear can noninferentially justify a little toothless, and that it makes unclear what actions fear noninferentially justifies (since it’s unclear what actions are justified by something’s being fearsome).

The claim that grasp of the concept DANGER requires fear seems plausible enough to me. Remember that it is a particular mode of presentation of the property danger that we are talking about here, not the property itself. I will provide some reasons to believe this by exploring the way that the connection (presumably) forms part of our teaching practice for the concept danger, and in fixing the goal we are taught to aim for in regulating our emotions. I then discuss a case study that can be used as the basis of a somewhat a priori argument.

When learning to distinguish dangerous and non-dangerous things, fear probably plays some role in the teaching of the concept. Since evolution has done some work in biasing our responses so that we are more likely to fear some things rather than others, and since (at least) historically this has added to our survival chances, it makes sense to employ the fear to help do some of the sorting. It seems that the capacity to tell that we are experiencing fear (and a fairly high hit rate of fear being triggered by danger) will arise long before the capacity to understand concepts for the many sorts of things that can make something a danger, so it seem like harnessing these capacities could be useful in teaching the concept. We're teaching a child to lump together a fairly motley assortment of situations – those in which bodily harm is likely, in which abandonment is likely, in which we might lose possessions, and so on. The thing that ties them together is the possibility of a loss caused by something beyond our control. This is not something a child can grasp easily, so using a shortcut offered by nature as a tool for teaching the concept seems expedient.

We also teach children to attempt to regulate their fear, so that it occurs more in response to danger and less in response to its absence. This involves encouraging children to be afraid of things that are dangerous. We typically try to convince them they should feel fear by showing them that the thing to be feared is dangerous, (or by showing them how it is dangerous). It's a move we treat as an adequate answer to the question “why should I be afraid of it?” This only works so long as there is something in the nature of the concept danger which underwrites this.\(^91\) More realistically, given the early age at which this teaching is likely to start, we are actually just relying on authority and innate emotional contagion to push this transition through, and we are training the child into taking this to be an adequate answer to the why question. We are training them into using a danger concept that underwrites this transition.

These practices of emotional regulation are part of what makes it the case that later in life, if someone doesn’t understand why a thing being dangerous explains a person’s fear, we take them not to understand either DANGER or FEAR (or both). Since not  

\(^91\) Note that this practice is encouraging them to use the conceptually articulated recognition of danger as sufficient to vindicate experiencing fear.
understanding the former counts as an explanation here, there must be something in the nature of the concept that contributes to the explanation.

Let’s clear some more roadblocks to the argument here. We might think that there is an asymmetry between fear and visual appearance of red, since the former is not a canonical way of telling that there is danger, but the latter is a canonical way of telling the something is red. But why think this? In both cases there are two different paths we can take to belief that the property in question is instantiated – a theoretical path and via a state that is receptive to the property. In both cases the theoretical path appeals to things that are closer to getting at the nature of the property – something seeming red is less important to its being red than it having the property that is the categorical base for its seeming red; we only get to the latter via the theoretical route. In both cases the theoretical path requires us to have access to much more information. In both cases the path involving a receptive state is more epistemically adventurous, but the state arises with less cognitive effort.

So why think that fear is any less canonical an input than the presence of red in our visual field? It actually seems like fear plays a similar role to the presence of red in the visual field. It is far from an infallible guide to the presence of danger (in fact it’s less reliable than the presence of red in the visual field), but it is a good enough indicator that the underlying categorical is instantiated. The connection between fear and danger admits of susceptibility to defeaters – just as non-standard lighting upsets the move from presentation of red in our visual field to beliefs about red things.

We have had a scattering of prima facie reasons to believe our core claim, and we have cleared away what looked like reasons not to believe it. Next I will consider a case study involving a patient who has no capacity for fear as further support for my claim. This will involve abstracting from the features of the case and trying to give a somewhat general and a priori reason to think that possessing the concept DANGER requires having fear.

5.1.3.1 Case-study: SM.

Let’s consider a case study for support here. There is a very rare condition known as Urbach-Wiethe Disease which is primarily a skin-disease, but can damage the sufferer’s amygdala in a way that inhibits the fear response (such symptoms are even rarer than the condition itself though, so there aren’t population studies for the condition). If what I have been claiming is correct, people who suffer from this condition will lack our concept of DANGER. How plausible is this?

One person who suffers from the condition, who has been the subject of a case study, is known as SM. Even though she has difficulty detecting fear in others’ facial expressions, she has the concept of FEAR. She experienced it as a child, and has been exposed to other people’s fear. She can use “fear” and its synonyms appropriately, and uses them to make claims about others (and claim fear’s absence in herself when
prompted) that are reasonably accurate. Whether or not we intuitively want to say that she possess the concept DANGER is harder to determine. There is some evidence that she doesn’t, since she has a lot of difficulty avoiding dangerous situations. Feinstein et al reported that “it is evident that SM has great difficulty detecting looming threats in her environment and learning to avoid dangerous situations, features of her behaviour that have in all likelihood contributed to her high incidence of life-threatening encounters.” (Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio, & Tranel, 2011, p36) This gives some intuitive evidence for her lacking the concept, though when assessed at an intuitive level it isn’t conclusive.

However, when we think more specifically about the sense of “possession” discussed in 5.1.2, it becomes clear that she does not possess the concept DANGER. In order to test her emotional response the researchers exposed her to objects which would normally invoke fear – dangerous things which, according to her, she “hates” and “avoids”. Her response to these objects was not avoidance behaviour, but a fascination and attraction. She handled spiders and snakes to the extent that she needed to be stopped due to the danger she was putting herself in.

Whatever pattern of first-order thinking about the world that does the work of individuating DANGER, SM’s behaviour shows that her dispositions fail to conform to that pattern. Thus her behaviour is not compatible with possession of the concept. The concept DANGER uncontroversially involves some sort of an input condition. I am proposing a condition that mentions fear, but anyone hoping to offer an account of danger in Peacockean terms must offer some sort of input condition, even if it is not in the style of an observational input (i.e. if they suggest an input from inside the conceptual order, like claiming that DANGER is the concept such that if I possess it, and believe that something might cause bodily harm, then it seems to me as though it is dangerous). The concept must also licence other transitions in thought on the output end, and these transitions must involve some sort of defeasible inclination to avoid the feared object. Given SM’s lack of avoidance, either one or both of these patterns of transition must be absent from her – either she lacks the normal way of telling that something is dangerous, or she lacks the normal response to something’s being dangerous. In either case she lacks the concept, if it is individuated by a pattern of thought and action that she lacks at least half of.

Does this mean that anyone who lacks fear does not possess the concept of DANGER? That would be a hasty overgeneralisation. But the case study is suggestive, and suggests a more a priori argument: The sort of behaviour SM exhibits is the paradigmatic sort of behaviour we would expect form a person without fear. It is also behaviour that displays the absence of the pattern of thought that gives the possession conditions for DANGER. So our best reasons for thinking that someone lacks fear are reasons to think that they fail to make the transitions in thought that individuate the

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92 Note that here she is using FEAR in her first-order reasoning about the world. She can presumably draw inferences from someone else’s being afraid, to the likelihood that they will avoid something. So she meets the possession conditions for fear, as well as understanding it.

93 An example would be that in order to possess the concept danger a thinker must find the move from something having the potential to cause physical harm (among other things) to its being dangerous primitively compelling.
concept DANGER. Therefore we have good reason to think that the concept DANGER is partially individuated by its connection to fear.

Perhaps this is too quick. Maybe SM’s behaviour can be explained as an idiosyncratic cognitive failure on her part. It’s not up for grabs that SM fails to exhibit the sorts of output the concept danger mandates in situations that merit it. But perhaps she might still exhibit the right patterns of thought to count as possessing the concept, so long as we think that the right thing to say is that she fails to realise that the input conditions have been satisfied. Someone who thinks that danger has the sort of non-observational input I flagged above might run this sort of line. For them, having the right sort of dispositions means going from a conceptual input, to beliefs about danger, and from those beliefs to avoidance. A lack of recognition that one is in the input state can mean that one might have the right dispositional structure, but lack discriminatory ability that allows the dispositions to be expressed. They could claim that she isn’t avoiding spiders because she doesn’t realise that they satisfy the input condition for danger. So suppose I am wrong about the input conditions for DANGER, they don’t mention fear. Instead the concept DANGER is the concept such that a thinker who possesses it must find it primitively compelling to believe that something is dangerous if it is apt to cause physical damage (though this is implausible, it will do for the sake of an example). Furthermore, they must find avoidance of dangerous thing primitively compelling. Then SM might meet these possession conditions, while not thinking spiders are dangerous, simply because she fails to realise that spiders can cause physical damage to her. She simply doesn’t realise that she is in the input condition for the concept.

But the case is one where such a story is just implausible. SM has an IQ in the normal range and displays no impairments in reasoning. So it seems unlikely that her failure to go from something’s being a potential cause of harm, to avoidance can be explained in terms of a failure to realise that the thing can cause harm. Her only abnormality is emotional, so there is no reason to think she would fail to realise that certain situations might cause bodily harm (or that it satisfies whatever input conditions our objector specifies). Instead she lacks the input-output profile that we take to be crucial for attribution of both experiences of fear and of the concept DANGER. SM’s case suggests that in most humans what secures this profile is the fear response.

5.2 Getting from conceptual role semantics to emotional representation

I have argued that the evaluative concept DANGER is partially individuated by its connection to fear. It uses fear as input in the way that observational concepts use perceptual states as inputs and having that very concept of danger requires experiences of fear. My aim is to show that in these cases, the concepts determine the formal objects of the emotions. As a consequence the emotion becomes subject to a representational norm in terms of the concept – that a condition on the appropriateness of token emotions is that their proper objects satisfy the concept that is partially

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94 It seems some such condition here is obligatory. Notice that all of these accounts of input and output conditions are artificially simple for ease of exposition. The important thing here is that the position I am characterising rejects the observational-style account of the concept danger that I am pushing, and so relies only on cognitive elements in the input condition, so that SM might fail to realise that such conditions obtain.
individuated by the emotion type. This, together with my earlier argument showing how emotions get to be about their proper objects, suffices for showing that emotions are representational when they are functionally integrated into our conceptual schemes in the right way. This means that they derivatively represent their proper objects as satisfying their formal objects.95

The argument is, in brief, that by having a concept of danger that mentions fear we give fear the function of tracking danger. Fear occurring in response to the danger satisfies that norm. The tracking is a norm that applies to the fear itself. It is a representational norm, a norm of veridicality relating fear to danger. So having a concept of danger which is individuated by transitions of thought involving fear subjects experiences of fear to a representational norm. This gives an account in which the emotion itself is subjected to a representational norm derivatively — by virtue of something else going on in our mental economy.

It’s important to notice that I need to establish that all occurrent emotions of a given type are subject to such a norm, not just those token emotions which are in fact involved in transitions of thinking that arrive at explicit conceptual representations. If I only established the latter, then there would be some sense in which emotions could help justify beliefs, but I would have failed the Huck Finn test — my story would not show that someone who failed to endorse their emotions, and so failed to form any beliefs, could nevertheless be justified in acting contrary to their beliefs because of the way their emotions represent the situation.

To satisfy this requirement, I want to show how emotions that are caught up in these conceptual relationships are subject to the relevant norms just by virtue of being the sort of thing they are. Here being the sorts of things they are is to be read in the intrinsic sense in that the sorts of things they are is defined by their functional role in our psychic economy (recall Chapter 4). This means showing that in some sense they are a different sort of thing to emotions that are not caught up in these relationships, since emotions not caught up in these relationships may not be subject to any such norm.

My argument for this difference in kind assumes functionalism about mental types. If mental states are functionally defined, something being a certain sort of mental state depends on its functional capacities — on the things that it can do. From here the argument is direct — once emotions become caught up in conceptual norms they can do new things, so they have new powers. Once we have a concept DANGER, which is individuated by the fact that belief that x is dangerous is licensed by our feeling fear of x, the occurrence of fear has a new power — the power to permit belief in the

95 Recall that in chapter 4, footnote 65, I said that my view is not subject to a binding problem since the appropriateness condition applies to the emotional state insofar as it is directed at its object. There is a further sort of problem, connected with the binding problem, which my view is immune to thanks to the way in which I am claiming the emotion picks out its two intentional objects. Because the emotion picks out its proper object by referring to another representational state and its formal object by being connected to a concept, in both cases the emotion picks out its object under a mode of presentation. The Proper object is picked out under whatever mode of presentation it has in the initial state that the emotion get the object from. The formal object is picked out under a concept, and a concept is itself a mode of presentation. This means that my view automatically builds in the idea that we can have emotional responses to some objects only under certain modes of presentation. Suppose I a see a spider and I fear spiders, but I don’t see it well and it only appears to be a blob. I will not be afraid of it under that mode of presentation.
dangerousness of objects. This means this fear's functional profile in normal human adults is different to that in a creature without the relevant concept, so they are different types of state. Thus just by being this sort of state the emotion becomes subject to a representational norm. Fear gets danger as its formal object, because fear becomes appropriate iff the feared thing is dangerous.

5.2.1 Authority.

One might object to this story on the grounds that I haven't given us any reason to think that we can subject our emotions to norms in such a way that they become norms for the emotions, rather than just norms for how we use the emotions. So we cannot make emotions into representations by treating them in some way. This thought is strengthened by the thought that representation is a real category, not a socially-instituted conventional one. Why would something that was true of certain states in and of themselves (like perceptions, which are representational regardless of how we treat them if the story we have accepted from Burge is true) become true of other states by their being treated a certain way? It's one thing to say that something is a faux pas because we treat it as such, another to say that something is a polyvalent antivenom because we treat it as such. Here the difference is surely that the former is a socially instituted kind, and so the sort of thing we have the authority to institute, but the latter is an objective kind, and so not the sort of thing we can institute. We can tell that the former is socially instituted because without our practices nothing would count as a faux pas, whereas irrespective of what we do some things would be polyvalent antivenoms.

Where does the notion of representation fall here? Polyvalent antivenom is a biological kind whose members have certain causal properties defined in terms of biological categories, whereas faux pas is a social kind, defined in terms of social proprieties. I want to claim that representation is an epistemic kind defined in terms of the roles its members can play in thought (broadly construed). Thus if you change the roles that a state plays in your thinking you are changing a feature relevant to its status as a representation.

But this is where the claim that some things are representations regardless of how we treat them comes back to bite. Suppose that Burge is right about perceptions: they are subject to representational norms no matter what we think – to think otherwise is a form of individualism which over-intellectualises perception. In that case, something being a representation can occur behind our backs, in spite of what we do or don’t do. Why would our practices make a difference to something like that? It looks like being a representation is not socially instituted like being a faux pas, it is more like being a polyvalent anti-venom.

But this is too quick. There is room for a category in between these two alternatives. After all, if functionalism is right, then a state is a belief in virtue of the functional role it plays, and this is something that can change depending on how the state is treated by the rest of the cognitive system. If being a belief can depend on these sorts of factors, then being a representation can too.
Saying that whether a state is a belief depends on the functional roles that the state can play does not mean that the only way of treating the state as a belief involves an element of convention. To use the hackneyed example, being a bike lock is having a functionally defined kind – it is having certain capacities and being able to play certain roles. Some of these roles are radically independent of convention. To be a bike lock involves having objectively definable functional capacities, like the capacities to close and reopen under certain circumstances. In this respect being a bike lock is not like being a *faux pas*, it is more like being a polyvalent anti-venom. Being a belief is like being a bike lock. What it takes to be a belief has something like the following shape\(^\text{96}\): the item must contain information which is stable, accessible to the agent, treated as accurate by the agent when it is accessed, and the information must be stored because the agent has endorsed the information. (Clark & Chalmers, 1998)

These features are not like the features that make something a *faux pas*. They are features that a state could have in a Wolf Boy figure – someone beyond the reach of social conventions due to seclusion from society. Crucially such a figure would have states that had or lacked the relevant characteristics independently of how they were treated by others – someone taking the wolf boy to have beliefs, or taking him to lack them, makes no difference to whether their states have this functional profile.

So if we accept that whether or not a state counts as a belief depends on the sort of functional characteristics outlined above it straightforwardly follows that the way that the states are integrated into the rest of our psychic economy makes a difference to whether they are beliefs or not.

By parity of reasoning, whether something is a representation should be able to depend on whether it is part of a certain sort of system. If one system can exploit a state in certain ways that another system couldn’t, then the state will have a different functional profile in the two systems. If we are asking whether the state is a member of a functional kind, then intrinsically identical states in the two systems may well deserve different answers. Why not think that being a representation is a functionally defined thing like this. What matters to whether something is a representation is whether or not it is subject to a representational norm, and this could be something that is instituted by being given certain roles in a psychic economy.

Whether or not our emotions get to be representations is not a matter of our authority over our own states – making them into something else by decree. Instead, because the states in question are parts of a system, the way that the other parts of the system interact with those states makes a difference to what those states are. To return to the bike lock analogy, a given bit of metal is a key to a particular bike lock if the tumblers in the lock rotate when the piece of metal turns. The identity of the key depends on the way that parts of the lock mechanism respond to what they key does. I am claiming that the same goes for a representation – being a representation depends on the way that other states react to the state.

\(^\text{96}\) Controversy about the details don’t matter for this argument, so long as there is some functional characterisation that suffices for something being a belief that appeals to broadly similar sort of capacities rather than conventions about what we class as beliefs, then the argument should work.
5.2.2 What do concepts bring to the party?

I have argued that once the emotions serve as inputs into our conceptually articulated thinking they take on new roles which make them representational. But what is it about this connection to the concepts that makes any sort of a difference? In other words, what do concepts bring to the party?

The answer is that concepts supply a normative heft to the dispositions that individuate the concepts. That is, concepts provide a structure that allows the dispositions that constitute the structure to be imbued with a normative dimension. We might wonder how this could be off the back of the following observation. Concepts have an input-output structure according to what I have said – possessing them amounts to undergoing certain transitions in thought. But why should the fact that there’s a pattern to our thinking make a normative difference to the thinking?

Concepts make a difference by giving us a structure that these dispositions fit into which we can put our stamp on and which thereby becomes our world view. Recall that concepts are individuated by more than just their input conditions. The concept RED has input conditions that mentions the way thing appear to us, but it also has output conditions which tie the concept into a network of other concepts. To possess the concept RED it must seem to me that if something is red then it is coloured. It must also seem that it is not green, and so on. These connections to other concepts add up to a world view. It means that we have a pattern of interlocked concepts that determine paths along which our thoughts can travel. I can get from a red experience to the thought there’s a red object there, to the thought there’s a coloured object there to the thought that there’s a surface there and so on, maybe even right up to I’m not a brain in a vat (if my conceptual scheme is like G.E. Moore thinks it should be (Moore, 1941)).

Clearly the nature of my concepts doesn’t guarantee that these transitions are good, but my continued use of my conceptual scheme, as well as the constant attempt to modify it and bring it into harmony, commits me to the transitions that are built into the conceptual scheme. By using concepts I make myself responsible for the transitions that individuate them. (For more discussion of this take on the normativity of concepts see (R. Brandom, 2000) especially Chapter One and Chapter Five, section I.)

Having concepts subjects the structure of my thinking to norms that are instituted the fact that I am a self-conscious thinker who cares about the accuracy of my thoughts. By shaping my concepts I am trying to bring it about that the patterns in my thinking are the right patterns, most apt to get me onto the truth. I become committed to those patterns in the sense that if there is something wrong with those patterns I have done something wrong. Because of the way I subject myself to reflective scrutiny, because I try to reach an equilibrium in my thinking, concepts aren’t just patterns I find in my thinking, they are patterns I endorse (mostly tacitly and counterfactually of course97).

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97 This is where the sort of position advocated by Jones does work for me. (Jones, 2003)
So what concepts bring to the party is normativity. By being committed to the patterns of thinking embodied in my concepts I take responsibility for them. This is in contrast to patterns I just find myself with. Recently my knees have started hurting after long bike rides. This is a pattern I just find myself caught in, not one I am committed to. I do not take the knee pain to be an apt response to the riding. It is just a pattern of response I have been saddled with. By contrast, thanks to my use of the concept DISJUNCTION I am committed to it being appropriate to infer the truth of $p \lor q$ from the truth of $p$.

5.3 Conclusion:

This concludes my argument for the claim that emotions get their contents in a derivative manner. I have claimed that emotions are given their proper objects by the cognitive bases that make the emotions possible (Chapter 4). This aspect of the emotions shapes their phenomenology such that the feelings involved are felt about the objects of the emotions. In this chapter I claimed that emotions are also given their formal objects derivatively. In this case they are given them by playing a certain role in our cognitive economies. Emotions help to individuate some of our evaluative concepts and this gives them a role in our mental lives which subjects them to appropriateness conditions that mention this concept (5.1-5.2). Being subject to an accuracy condition in this way, and being directed towards their proper objects jointly suffices for the emotions being subject to a representational norm. They are appropriate if and only if their proper object has the evaluative property given by their formal object. In this way I have vindicated the claim that emotions have representational content. This was a necessary condition for vindicating the PTE story about how emotions can noninferentially justify beliefs. In the next chapter I will argue that these ways in which emotional experiences are shaped by changes in the surrounding psychic economy can also shape the experiences in a way that is also necessary for the emotions to plays the sorts of rational roles laid out in Chapter 2. These two results are also jointly sufficient for showing that emotions can play these roles.
Chapter 6. Presentational Phenomenology. (How the evaluative dimension of emotion gets uptake in our thinking.)

I have argued for the claim that emotions are representational and that they represent their proper objects evaluatively. Now I want to build upon this argument by showing how the fact that the emotion is subject to a representational norm gets uptake in experience – how emotions can become capable of noninferentially justifying actions and evaluative beliefs.

The aim of this section is to show that what it is like to experience emotions can be affected by the role that our conceptual scheme gives to them. I have previously shown that emotions get their proper objects from their cognitive bases. I also showed that they can get their formal objects by becoming subject to norms that are instituted because our evaluative concepts are partially individuated by emotional responses (given a certain conceptual training). Now in order to show that emotions can be presentational (in Bengson’s sense discussed in 2.5) I must show that their phenomenology can involve presentation of the proper object as instantiating the formal object. This is important because emotions on their own (given the right background connections to conceptual capacities) are meant to explain and noninferentially justify actions, and beliefs and do so in such a way that their justifying fore is manifest to the agent undergoing the emotion, just in virtue of undergoing it.

Showing that emotional phenomenology can become presentational is required to fulfil the desiderata that emotions be apt to noninferentially justify beliefs on their own, and to make this justification available to the agent undergoing them. A state simply being subject to a representational norm does not yet suffice for it making any contribution to the epistemic standing of the agent whose state it is. Early steps in perceptual processing probably produce states that are subject to representational norms, but these states are sub-personal, never accessible to consciousness, and play no rational role on their own in belief-formation, so they do not shift our epistemic standing. It might be worried that for all I have shown so far, emotions could be like this. Making the case for emotions being able to noninferentially justify beliefs in a way that makes the justification accessible to the agent requires more than just showing that emotions are not epistemically inert like this. (See section 2.2)

Showing that emotions can noninferential justify beliefs in the relevant fashion means showing that the experience of having an emotion is presentational on its own, without the addition of a thought to the effect that “if this emotion is appropriate then ....” (or

98 Note that this addresses the very concern I raised in chapter 2 about Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal theory. As far as I can see the moves I introduce here can be exploited by them, but I take it that they will not want to. They give an account according to which emotions, in and of themselves, are subject to an evaluative correctness condition. They bruit the idea that felt bodily preparedness might do the job here – that is feelings of bodily changes might be enough to determine the evaluative element of the emotions. Given that felt bodily changes play such a significant role in emotional phenomenology this makes it much less appealing to claim that emotions come to have a phenomenology of the right sort to count as presentationally evaluative via their connection to our concepts.
“this emotion tends to be triggered by dangerous things”). Such a thought could form a bridge from a mental state that is evidence for an evaluative claim and the justification of a belief without the state itself having a presentational phenomenology. But it would do so at the expense of making the justification inferential. (Recall that this would give up the PTE’s explanation of how the emotions rationally conflict with judgments. See Chapter 2 for the details.)

It also means showing that emotions have a phenomenology that involves being both compelling and rationalizing. That is, emotions must have a phenomenological profile that includes a force compelling us to believe their representational contents and a felt subjective justification – they feel like they lend rational support to the beliefs they compel us to form (see 2.5).

I have argued that patterns in the ways things seem to us connect our emotions to our evaluative concepts. These seemings are propositional attitudes that are first-personally available and can be occurrent. This might seem to already secure the claim that emotions are presentational, but unfortunately it doesn’t. This is because seemings are not necessarily part of the emotional experience. The pattern of thought required for possession of the evaluative concepts is possible even without the emotional phenomenology reflecting any of this, so long as the right seemings occur outside of the emotional experience.

To see this, consider the most minimalist view someone might have of emotional phenomenology. Someone might think that the phenomenology of the fear itself might be little more than a proper-object-directed startle-response with duration, or a merely physiological disturbance of some similar sort. This is not particularly plausible, but the following argument is aimed at someone who has gone along with me so far, but who believes that the phenomenology of an emotional experience is not presentational. Working with the most minimal sort of phenomenology as my stalking horse allows me to show that I am not presupposing much at all about intrinsic emotional phenomenology. My argument will not rely on the implausibility of this view of phenomenology, so there is no danger of a straw man worry.

So let’s suppose this minimal view of emotional phenomenology and think about someone who doubts that emotional phenomenology is presentational, but who agrees with me that there is the right pattern of seemings for emotions to help individuate our evaluative concepts. They also agree that our emotions are subject to a representational norm because our evaluative concepts are individuated as described. But they doubt that experiencing an emotion involves it seeming to me that any particular evaluative property is being instantiated.

This sort of position can be held by those, like many phenomenal conservatives, who hold that seemings are sui generis propositional attitudes that typically accompany our experiences, or are the result of them, rather than being constitutive parts of the experiences. (For the rationale for holding this in the perceptual case, see (Tucker, 2013)). On a version of this view, applied to the emotions, even if fear brings it about that it seems as though the object is dangerous, that doesn’t necessarily mean that the fear has a presentational phenomenology. My occurrent fear of a shark makes the shark seem dangerous to me in that it makes me have the attitude of seeming towards
the proposition ‘the shark is dangerous’ as a result of experiencing the fear. But this needn’t be a part of what it’s like for me to experience the fear. This means that I can have the requisite structure of seemings without that having any bearing on what it’s like to undergo the emotion. So we might have the right patterns of seemings for the concept individuation claims I am making, without that meaning that occurrent emotions are experienced as revealing values to us.

If I cannot establish that emotions have presentational phenomenology, then I could only give the emotions a triggering role in bringing about evaluative beliefs. If this were the case it would not be given to us that our emotions are relevant to our evaluative beliefs. The emotions could not be cited as reasons to hold the evaluative beliefs and so the epistemic claims made in section (2.3) would not be vindicated.

Rather than arguing that there is an inherent part of an emotional experience that presents the emotional object evaluatively, the following aims to show that even given the worst case scenario for me – emotions whose intrinsic phenomenology is like a startle response – once emotions are enmeshed in our conceptual scheme they can become presentational in character thanks to that connection.

In order to do this I will look at two debates concerning the relation between cognitive and perceptual phenomenology and show that the shared assumptions in both debates are sufficient to support the claim that cognitive elements can shape perceptual phenomenology (6.1 and 6.2.). Once I have shown this, I show that there is no reason to think this doesn’t also hold for emotions (6.3). As a result, there should be nothing controversial about me claiming that emotions get to have presentational phenomenology thanks to their connection to our evaluative concepts.

6.1 Siegel on rich content.

The first debate that I will examine is the rich content debate. In this debate Susanna Siegel claims that visual perceptions have richer content than many people think they do, including contents to do with kinds and causation. In contrast, theorists like Tyler Burge think that visual perception has only an austere range of potential contents, shape, size, colour and the like.

Siegel hopes to show via the method of phenomenal contrast that a visual experience can have contents that are imparted by recognitional capacities and concept possession. These recognitional capacities imbue visual experiences with content such that I can literally see that something is causing a visible effect, such as billiard ball A causing billiard ball B to move by colliding with it. (Siegel, 2011, p118-9)

Her idea is to start with two overall experiences (the experience “broadly construed” (Siegel, 2011, p23)) , which include visual elements, which anybody would agree differ phenomenologically, and then argue that the phenomenal difference is in part a difference in the contents of the visual elements of the two experiences, brought about by recognitional capacities active in one, but not the other.
Let’s start with the example of a pine tree seen before and after the perceiving subject learns to distinguish pine trees from other trees. The two experiences are clearly different. “Experience” here refers to the broadly construed experience, the overall experience. Thus the visual element of the experience is not yet assumed to be the thing that differs between the two.

Siegel argues that the best explanation of the difference between the two experiences, widely conceived, is that it is the visual aspects of the experiences differ, and that the visual aspects differ by virtue of a change in the content of the experiences.

Given the claim that the two overall experiences are different, the argument proceeds with 3 premises (Siegel, 2011, p101):

(1) If the overall experience of seeing the pine tree is phenomenologically different when the subject can recognize the pine tree, then there is a phenomenological difference between the purely visual elements of the experience.

(2) If there is a phenomenological difference between the purely visual elements of the experiences, then the purely visual elements of the experiences differ in content.

(3) If there is a difference in content between the purely visual elements of the experience, it is a difference with respect to the properties that the recognitional abilities are capable of recognizing.

For somebody like Burge most of the action is presumably in premise (1). He thinks that visual perception only attributes visual perceptibles (colour, size, etc.), not natural kinds. Presumably visual phenomenology is either just a reflection of the sensation element in perception (the input that doesn’t vary between the pine tree experiences) or a way of registering the content of perception itself⁹⁹, or some combination of the two. Given this it’s not clear how a natural kind even could figure in the perceptual phenomenology for Burge. He would claim that the phenomenological difference between the cases is to be explained by accompanying cognitive states, and that the perceptual sides of both experiences are identical. Both perceptions employ the same set of size, colour, movement, shape and lighting constancies – in both cases yielding a representation of an object of a certain size, with facing surfaces of a certain colour, moving a little bit, and so on. What changes is that one subject recognizes the shape represented by the visual experience as a pine tree and the other doesn’t.

It might look as though I have to side with Siegel here, because the success of my project rests on the claim that the cognitive stance we take towards my emotions must make a difference to the narrowly considered emotional phenomenology. Making this claim work would mean showing that the change in the experience of fear that takes place after we learn to treat fear as appropriate iff the fear’s object is dangerous is a change in the narrowly construed phenomenology of fear, rather than to the widely construed phenomenology.

⁹⁹ Look at section 3.4 for more detail on what the distinction is between sensation and perception.
Since I intend to show that emotional states are, in appropriately trained people, evaluatively presentational the emotional state itself must make it seem as though the feared object is dangerous, rather than an accompanying cognition stating that the emotion is a sign that the feared object is dangerous. Because they are presentational they can be an autonomous stream of representation which present their content in such a way that we can come to believe it just by assenting to the states, even when our cognition pulls in another direction.\(^{100}\)

However I am not forced to side with Siegel in this way. It is only the wide experience that matters to me. What matters is that the wide experience of the emotion is changed by the emotion getting a certain role in our thinking and that this change is not merely a matter of an accompanying belief or seeming that is independent of the emotion. For their debate it is critical to demarcate what happens in the perceptual subsystem from what happens once its states get uptake in a larger psychic economy. But this is not a debate I need to weigh in on.

As a result, some views that side with Burge's position would also work for my purposes. Consider a result that would count as success for Burge in the perpetual argument. Suppose that he shows that the two cases of seeing a pine tree differ in phenomenology, not because of a difference in the purely perceptual element of the phenomenology, but because of some way that the recognitional capacity affects the overall nature of what it's like to have that visual experience without it being a difference in visual phenomenology. In other words, suppose he successfully locates the phenomenal difference between the experiences widely construed in some accompanying non-perceptual cognitive differences between them which have a phenomenology.

For this to work Burge would need to find a cognitive difference that was not a matter of merely accompanying beliefs. This is because it will be possible to invent scenarios in which the add-on would be absent, but in which the phenomenology of the overall experience would reflect the change that Siegel is claiming takes place. In the pine tree case the additional cognitive state might be a belief that there is a pine tree present. But we can always imagine a scenario in which the agent who can recognize the tree as a pine would not believe that a pine tree is present – perhaps because they have been told that around here there are trees that are indistinguishable from pines but which are actually an unusual breed of cedars.

Siegel treats attempts to supply accompanying states to do this explanatory work as separable into two classes. There are attempts which claim that the accompanying states involve commitment to their contents (i.e. that suggest accompanying states like beliefs) and those that don't (i.e. that suggest accompanying states more along the lines of mere seemings) (Siegel, 2011, p106). The former she dismisses with counterexamples like barn façade cases, which deprive the subject of a reason to commit.\(^{101}\) These I will call splitting examples. They work by showing that if I know I am in Barn Façade County I will not have the sort of cognitive states that would normally

\(^{100}\) Again, see Chapter 2 for details.

\(^{101}\) The pine case is an example of such a move.
accompany barn perception, so one cannot explain the phenomenological change that recognition brings about in terms of these accompanying cognitive states. The example splits the cognitive state off from the perceptual state.

Siegel responds to the alternative suggestion, that the accompanying state is one that doesn’t involve such a commitment on the part of the perceiver, by simply pointing out that seeing something as familiar needn’t involve the seeing along with another state that brings about (or is) the feeling of familiarity (Siegel, 2011, p105). That is, we shouldn’t think of the perception as unchanged by the familiarity and simply augmented by a separable qualia-like feeling of familiarity. After all the familiarity is the familiarity of what is perceived. This way in which Siegel responds to the non-committal additive view is actually the more fundamental. The division of the two sorts of response just shows that versions of the accompanying state claim that rely on committal attitudes are more easily brought unstuck. This is because it is easier to pry the perception and the additional cognitive state apart in these case, but in the end the strategy in both cases is the same. This is a familiar structure to those familiar with Goldie’s diagnosis of the problem of add-on views in the emotions (see 1.3).

Siegel argues convincingly against versions of this add-on picture, including the addition of a feeling of familiarity, etc on introspective grounds. Since the claim is not that the feeling modifies another state, but is itself a stand-alone feeling that accompanies the seeing, the feeling of familiarity ought to be something we can focus our attention on. The difference it makes is due to its own phenomenological impact as an occurrent state, so we ought to be able to foreground this feeling. Yet introspection yields no such stand-alone feeling of familiarity (Siegel, 2011, p106).

Siegel also argues against attempts to characterize the addition as the addition of a standing state that modifies the overall phenomenology otherwise than by simply modifying the sensory aspect of it (Siegel, 2011, p107). She argues that other such standing states, like moods, have a more pervasive phenomenological impact than recognitional capacities and since recognitional capacities lack this we should not think of them as a standing state.

However, Siegel’s argument seems inadequate to deal with all versions of this strategy that a Burgean might pursue. Why not think that the standing states that are responsible here have a dispositional nature, affecting phenomenology only in the presence of the relevant things? This would explain why these particular standing states do not have the pervasive phenomenology of moods. This sort of standing state would only modify our phenomenology under certain circumstances. A certain sort of dislike might serve as an example. Suppose that I have a standing revulsion against patchouli. Whenever I smell patchouli the overall experience of smelling it is shaped by this revulsion, but not by making it smell any different to me, but by virtue of the experience of smelling it becoming unpleasant. We can imagine the wide experience of smelling patchouli becoming infused with a sort of low-grade pain without this meaning that the sensory element of the experience becomes painful. On this view there would be a standing state (revulsion) that modifies the overall phenomenology, without modifying the perceptual phenomenology and which has no pervasive phenomenology (when I am not smelling patchouli, the revulsion doesn’t feel any particular way).
Perhaps one way to conceive of how such a standing state modifies the phenomenology, without modifying the perceptual aspects of the phenomenology is to take there to be two strands to the phenomenology of a state – *the phenomenological contribution of the state itself* and a sort of *ambient phenomenology of undergoing the state*. A bad version of this idea would take the Cartesian theatre of the mind picture very seriously. The phenomenological state's contribution is equated with the light and sound show that is being projected into the theatre, but there is something that it is like in addition to this, which is what it feels like to have such a show projected at one (how comfortable the seats are makes a difference to the experience of watching a movie, although it is not a cinematic difference). Changes to the phenomenology brought about by the acquisition of cognitive capacities might be explained in terms of the what-it's-likeness of these mediating experiential elements. This suggestion seems to make consciousness too much like a second layer of perception, and there is good reason to worry that without doing this there is no room for inserting new aspects of phenomenology between the state and the overall what-it's-likeness of experiencing the state. But perhaps there is a version of this thought that doesn't involve an unappealingly homuncular view of experience.  

Such a position might be able to resist Siegel's arguments against non-committing versions of the claim that the difference in phenomenology between someone with the relevant cognitive capacity, and someone without, is just the phenomenology of accompanying states. How this debate ought to conclude doesn't matter for my project. If Burge can show that the overall phenomenology of perceiving a pine is changed just by cognitive elements of the widely construed phenomenology, then he can head Siegel off at premise (1) and block the claim that perception itself has contents of the rich kind Siegel aims to establish it has. One issue at stake for Siegel is whether or not the difference between the two states is strictly speaking a perceptual difference, but all I care about is whether an agent with emotions appropriately integrated into their conceptual repertoire has the experience of an emotion *widely conceived* changed by that integration.

There are two potentially satisfactory positions on how recognitional capacities affect the phenomenology of perception and either would be sufficient for my purposes if an analogous claim in the emotional case can be established.

The first is Siegel's claim that the phenomenology of perception itself is different between a case of seeing a pine without the recognitional capacity to pick it out as such and seeing it with such a capacity. This is best explained, she thinks, by the thought that the two perceptions have different contents.

The alternative is the Burgean position I advanced that claims that the perceptions have the same contents and, what is more, they have the same strictly perceptual

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102 Perhaps a view that locates the sort of felt unity or disunity of a perceptual experience outside of the proprietary perceptual content could do some work here. Another option is to try to exploit the sorts of features of experience that opponents of representationalism about cognitive phenomenology use to argue that there are phenomenological aspects of perception that aren't transparent. Examples like blurriness, which are aspects of what it's like to see, but which don't present as being aspects of the objects of perception. Any adverb that modifies the way something is seen without implying that the way of seeing attributes anything to the object. Along these lines we can see clearly, indistinctly, and so on. For someone to exploit these ideas here they would need to argue that they aren't aspects of the proprietary perceptual phenomenology, which will be controversial. It might even be possible to make the notion of a felt unity do some work here, though again, deploying it in this setting will be very controversial.
phenomenology. Rather, what differs in the two cases is the widely construed phenomenology – the phenomenology of the narrowly perceptual states and the surrounding cognitive phenomenology. A requirement on this account working is that the changes take place in the overall phenomenology not simply be the addition of another state with its own phenomenology. Rather what it’s like to experience the perceptual state has changed.

On this issue I am more sympathetic to Siegel’s position than to Burge’s, however, all I need to show is that when it comes to the emotions, something at least as permissive as what Burge needs to show for perceptions is true – that having our emotions hooked up to our conceptual scheme in the right way changes what the overall experience of undergoing an emotion. The contours of this debate suggest that this is the minimum view possible here.

If we ported this proposed, minimalist, Burgean view, over to the emotional case the narrowly emotional state would not have conceptually infused evaluative content, but the wider ambient, cognitively infused seeming state would have it. And this would be sufficient for my purposes, since it would allow the occurrence of the emotion to play the right sort of role.

6.2 Cognitive phenomenology.

Let’s now look at a similar debate from the cognitive phenomenology literature. Here the game is reversed somewhat – the target for the liberals is to show that cognitive states themselves have a phenomenology that is not merely sensory phenomenology. Again, my hope is to show that the shared assumptions in this debate suffice to establish for perception that which I want to claim about emotions.

In the cognitive phenomenology debate some, like Pitt (Pitt, 2011) and Horgan and Tienson (Horgan & Tienson, 2002), claim that cognitive states have their own proprietary phenomenology and others, like Michael Tye and Briggs Wright (Tye & Wright, 2011) deny it.

The debate is new enough that there is no obvious consensus about what exactly needs to be shown by the disputants to prove their point. This is partly because the disagreement is surrounded by a large halo of consensus. Nobody denies that there is difference between the overall experiences of someone thinking nothing at all and someone actively thinking about whether a square of a certain size has the same area as a triangle of a certain size. The latter experience uncontroversially might include internal vocalizations and mental imagery that the former wouldn’t. One aspect of the debate is whether there is also a difference between these two experiences that comes down to the presence or absence of the phenomenal aspects of the thinking itself – that is whether, in addition the (quasi)sensory phenomenology of internal vocalizations and so on, there is also the phenomenology of the thoughts themselves.

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103 This mirrors the narrow vs. wide distinction raised above, but now the experience narrowly conceived is the experience of the thinking itself and the widely conceived experience is the overall experience of undergoing a thought.
A further debate is whether or not the (quasi)sensory phenomenology in episodes like this is shaped by thought in a merely causal fashion, or in a constitutive fashion. According to the causal claim, the inner vocalizations and images occur as a result of our thinking – thinking about a triangle causes vocalizations of the word “triangle” and visual imaginings of triangle. On the other hand, if the sensory phenomenology is shaped in a constitutive fashion then the cognitive element of the episode is part of the mix which constitutes the overall phenomenology of the episode. Some critics of cognitive phenomenology¹⁰⁴ take it that establishing that shaping of perceptual phenomenology by thought is constitutive would show that there is a cognitive phenomenology.

This debate over whether the shaping is constitutive as against causal can be focused on gestalt switches for ambiguous figures. Take the duck-rabbit case. When seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck one can, via conscious thought, perform a gestalt switch such that the image appears to be a rabbit. There is clearly a phenomenological change between the two states. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology claim that this shows, at the very least, that cognition can change the phenomenology and content of perceptual states.

Joseph Levine however points out that this does not establish full-blown cognitive penetration since it doesn’t demonstrate that the content of the perception itself is changed by the cognition’s constitutive contribution (Levine, 2011, p110). Instead the gestalt switch could be explained as the result of causal shaping of attention via the thought, rather than by thought’s direct contribution to the phenomenology. According to this line, thought might cause certain features of the figure to become more or less salient, and make some connections between features more or less prominent, and this may bring about the gestalt switch. This does make a difference to the phenomenology of the state, but not the sort that the fan of cognitive phenomenology needs to establish. Instead it merely causes a shift in attention and the shift in attention brings about the change in the phenomenology.

Given the agreement about cognitive shaping of phenomenology that is forced on everyone by cases like the duck-rabbit and the person actively thinking about shapes, there are two issues and two possible positions on these issues on the table. Do cognitive states have their own phenomenology? And, is cognitive shaping of perceptual phenomenology constitutive or merely causal? But we needn’t resolve these questions.

All positions accept the perceptual version of the minimum that I need in the case of emotions – that a change in cognitive set can lead to a change in perceptual phenomenology widely conceived. If cognitive states can have a phenomenology then that can be what shapes the experience of perceptions once they are connected to our concepts. If there is no proprietary cognitive phenomenology, then to accommodate the cases in question we must grant that cognition can shape perceptual experience. Even if the change is causal rather than constitutive, this could account for how the experience of perceptions changes as they are integrated into a conceptual network. Whether or not there is a proprietary cognitive phenomenology that can be had in

¹⁰⁴ (Carruthers & Veillet, 2011, p 37.)
addition to perceptual phenomenology doesn’t matter for my argument. Nor does it matter whether cognitive shaping of perceptual phenomenology is casual or constitutive. The cases that set limits on the debate dictate that any live option must give room for cognition shaping the perceptual experience, broadly construed.

However, the questions seen together raise the possibility of a position that seems absent from the literature, which might be a problem for me. This position claims that there is cognitive phenomenology, but denies that there is such a thing as cognitive shaping of perceptual phenomenology. There is no sensible view that denies both, since there are very clear cases where cognition makes an overall difference to the what-it’s-like of experience (the duck-rabbit and shape comparison), so someone who denies that cognition can change the phenomenology of sensory experience must locate those changes in differences in the cognitive phenomenology.\(^{105}\)

This might not look like a problem for me, since the view lets cognitive phenomenology in, so it can account for cases of a phenomenal difference between the total experiences of identical sensory states combined with differences in cognition. So, one might think, it can accommodate a difference in the total emotional experiences of two subjects separated only by the sort of cognitive difference I am concerned with. But this view actually denies the sort of shaping of emotional phenomenology that I claim occurs. This is because, for such a view, any cognitive shaping of the overall phenomenology is simply a matter of occurrent cognition making its own separate phenomenal contribution to the consciousness of the subject. Any difference between two experiences that is a result of cognition has to be explained as an occurrent cognition adding its own proprietary qualia into the mix. This is effectively another version of the add-on view I rejected in Chapter 1 (1.3) and discussed in relation to Siegel (5.4.1). In the emotion case the only way that emotional phenomenology could be shaped by cognition is if some occurrent cognition with its own phenomenology always accompanied the emotion. If this is the only way that cognition could shape the overall phenomenology of emotions then what I need to show is unattainable. The cases of cognition shaping emotions that I am concerned with involve dispositional cognitive states, not occurrent ones. The idea is that what it is like to undergo an emotion is shaped by the emotion just being subject to an accuracy condition, thanks to belonging to an emotion type which helps individuate an evaluative concept. But the view I am worried about cannot make room for a dispositional state being enough to make a difference to the phenomenology of the occurrent emotion.

I don’t want to just claim that there is a phenomenal difference between feeling fear of a spider versus feeling fear of a spider along with having the occurrent belief that fear is appropriate iff the feared object is dangerous. I want to claim that a dispositional cognitive state (treating fear in general as appropriate iff the feared object is dangerous) can change the feeling of the state. It seems implausible that merely dispositional cognitive states could supply their own proprietary phenomenology to the mix precisely because they are merely dispositional. Not even strong believers in cognitive phenomenology think that our standing beliefs have a phenomenology, only our occurrent beliefs. Otherwise we would be drowning in the phenomenal character of

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\(^{105}\) I will suggest later that this might be more plausible in the emotions case than in the perceptual case.
all our beliefs. So I must argue against the position that there is cognitive phenomenology, but that cognitions cannot shape sensory phenomenology.

The only position that will not do the work I need it, which can even attempt to accommodate the cases we have been discussing, simultaneously accepts that there is a proprietary cognitive phenomenology and denies that any cognitive shaping of perceptual phenomenology is possible. But this is a pretty weird view. Its weirdness comes from the fact that it has almost no intuitive appeal, and gets no introspective support. By contrast, if I claim that there is no such thing as cognitive phenomenology, I can ask you to think about a red triangle and then suggest that once you subtract the visual elements of the phenomenology there is nothing left. When it comes to this view though there is no such claim that can be made, since the inclusion of cognitive phenomenology in the stream of consciousness is meant to make sense of differences that look at first like differences cognition makes to sensory phenomenology. That is, a condition of success for this view is getting cognitive phenomenology to make a difference to what it’s like to perceive things which can be introspectively mistaken for a shaping of perceptual phenomenology. The closest such a theorist could come to getting support via introspection is to take two presentations of an ambiguous figure – say a duck-rabbit, one cognised as a duck, the other as a rabbit, and claim that the difference in the overall phenomenology can be felt to be cognitive, rather than sensory. But if this is the best intuitive pull it has it will need to find support elsewhere.

Presumably this view will predict that only occurrent cognitions get to add to the overall phenomenology. Otherwise it’s not clear why all of our dispositional cognitive states wouldn’t be always shaping our phenomenology. It certainly doesn’t seem like learning to discriminate between aluminium weld beads and steel weld beads made any difference to my subsequent gustatory experiences. But it can’t be only occurrent cognitions which make a difference to the phenomenology of overall experiences that include sensory elements. Dispositional cognitive states must too. We can see this if we think about cases like understood sentences vs not understood ones. We do not have a sensory registration of the sentence, along with a second state that is an occurrent understanding of the sentence – rather our capacity to understand the sentence changes the sensory experience of the sentence in such a way that its meaning is revealed to us by hearing the sentence in the right way. The two-stage story about what is happening in cases of understanding seems to overpopulate our mental lives, but on this view it looks like the only way to accommodate phenomena like understanding.

Carruthers and Veilett actually worry about being accused of holding a two-stage view as a result of claiming that cognitive states merely causally shape perceptual experiences (Carruthers & Veillet, 2011, p40). They worry about cases of recognition – like seeing a plover - and accept that it would be unconvincing to claim that this is a two-part process, involving perception and then recognition. To avoid this, they point out that the causal shaping of perceptual experience by concepts can be via unconscious shaping of attention which comes in at early perceptual processing, which would mean that we could see a bird as a plover without first seeing it under some other description, then recognizing it. (Carruthers & Veillet, 2011, p40) But this is not something that the view under discussion can help itself to, since it is committed to denying even this causal shaping. Rather the difference between the two experiences
can only be due to the presence of an occurrent state – an occurrent state of recognition, which is exactly the position that Carruthers and Veilett are trying to avoid.

Since some minimal degree of cognitive shaping of perception comes so cheaply (via the direction of attention that Levine talks about\(^{106}\)) this view is both weird and unappealing.

Since all the remaining combinations of views are enough to establish that cognition can make a difference to perceptual phenomenology I take the boundaries of this debate to also support the idea that (at the very least) cognition can causally shape how it feels to have a perception.

6.3 From perception to emotion.

I’ve shown what I want to say about emotional phenomenology would be accepted by all sides in two debates that relate the phenomenologies of cognition and perception if I was making the claim about perceptual phenomenology. Now I need to show that the movement from perception to emotion shouldn’t change the verdict.

The first point to make is that in some ways it should be easier to establish these claims for emotions than perceptions, so long as we accept that emotions get their proper objects from their cognitive bases (Chapter 3). The fact that emotions inherit their objects rules out extreme forms of informational encapsulation for emotions, which would constitute a stumbling block for showing that other aspects of the psychic economy affect emotions. Not only this, the claim about cognitive bases shows that some degree of shaping of emotional phenomenology by cognitive states is mandatory, since being directed at different objects makes a phenomenal difference and our cognitive set affects which objects are available for emotions to be directed at. So some degree of the cognitive shaping of phenomenology of emotions is already on the cards for emotions in a way that it isn’t for perceptions.

The concern that I want to address here is that other asymmetries between emotions and perceptions might disrupt the assumption that what has been shown for perceptions can smoothly carry over to the emotions.

The first asymmetry between emotions and perceptions I need to address is that it is conceivable that the phenomenology of emotions involves their directedness at their proper objects but not their directedness at their formal objects, whereas this is not conceivable in the case of perceptions. The object-directedness of an emotion has an obvious place in its phenomenology, but being appropriate under certain circumstances doesn’t so clearly have such a place. This was, after all, the position of the sceptic at the start of section 3.4(?). Furthermore, this thought can receive some support from imagining cases like the following. Dave is angry at Tim. It’s clear to Dave who he’s

\(^{106}\) The general acceptability of such a mode of cognitive shaping of perception suggests a mechanism for at least some of the change in emotional phenomenology that I claim takes place when the emotion is connected to its formal object. Coming to take fear to be appropriate iff the feared object is dangerous shapes our attention in cases of fear such that we assess the feared object for dangerous features. Again this shift needn’t be located in the narrowly emotional phenomenology. It will involve shaping of perception and cognition (and probably of imagination and a host of other mental phenomena).
angry at – the phenomenology of the anger tells him this – the anger feels directed towards Tim. On the other hand Dave might not be sure whether his anger is appropriate if and only if Tim is doing something offensive or if and only if Tim is egregiously blocking Dave’s progress (let’s suppose Tim is doing both). Dave might be unsure of this no matter how much attention he pays to the phenomenology of the emotion because the phenomenology does not settle this.

So it is conceivable that emotional phenomenology might reflect its proper-object directedness but not its formal-object directedness. The analogue claim for perceptions has no plausibility though. If I see a ball as red then redness is a formal object of the experience in that it is a feature the ball could have or lack which the accuracy of the experience depends upon. Redness is uncontroversially a feature of the phenomenology of the perception and in a way that is connected to the accuracy conditions of the perception – the redness of the object appears spread over the object's surface. So the formal object can feature in the phenomenology of a perceptual state. Given the possibility that offensiveness does not feature in the phenomenology in the Tim case we have an asymmetry here between the emotions and perception. It is an asymmetry that might undermine the move from the perceptual result to the emotional claim.

Someone sceptical about emotional phenomenology being shaped by the emotion’s formal object might claim that the asymmetry between perception and emotion is due to the difference in the natures of the formal objects of emotions and perceptions. Emotional formal objects are meant to be evaluative. At least some of them seem to involve the idea of meriting a certain response (disgustingness is often thought to be the formal object of disgust and is often thought to involve the disgusting object meriting the disgust response). Other evaluative concepts might involve similarly sophisticated normative requirements. It isn’t clear that these sorts of things can feature in the phenomenology of an emotional state.

But this way of pushing the asymmetry won’t work. The explanation relies on an unwarranted move from a concept playing a role in the phenomenology of the state to whatever sophisticated features of thought that possession of the concept requires also being reflected in the phenomenology of the state. Just because DISGUSTINGNESS is a concept which is individuated by the transition from objects meriting disgust to the belief that the object is disgusting, doesn’t mean that the phenomenology of entertaining states shaped by DISGUSTINGNESS necessarily have phenomenological content that has anything to do with the meriting – i.e. that the notion of ‘merit’, which figures in an explicit analysis of the basic evaluative concept also has to figure in the phenomenology of the emotional state itself. Peacocke thinks that part of what individuates the concept RED is that the thinker takes redness to be the categorical base for the visual presentations of redness. But this doesn’t mean that thinking that something is red involves explicitly thinking of it as having a property that is the categorical basis for a visual presentation. (Nor would seeing red involving visual presentational of the thing as having such a property even if perception did have conceptual content.)

Instead, states that involve the concept RED just need to stand in the right sorts of relations to the rest of our thinking such that the concept that appears in the beliefs
formed on their basis is involved in the transitions that individuate RED. The same should apply for evaluative concepts. We can be given content involving a concept without the content also presenting us with the resources for an analysis of the concept. Just as entertaining content involving RED does not involve getting access to whatever complex analysis suffices for the concept RED, so too entertaining content involving DISGUSTING does not necessarily involve the notion of meriting, or any of the other elements of a successful analysis of DISGUSTING.

There is another version of this general objection to carrying the results in the perceptual case over to the emotional case. Here the argument against taking the phenomenology to be shaped by the formal object doesn’t rely on differences in the natures of the concepts involved in emotions and perceptions. The objection grants that the accuracy condition could form part of the phenomenology of the emotion, but claims that it isn’t clear why the state having that accuracy condition would be enough to require that it be part of the phenomenology. After all, I have already admitted that there might be perceptual states that occur early in the processing of visual sensations which have accuracy conditions but no presentational phenomenology. Why not think emotions are like this?

But here is the difference between emotions and those states – emotions uncontroversially do have a phenomenological profile. So there is something that it is like for us to have them, and this experience of having the emotion can plausibly be shaped by cognitive features in a way that the occurrence outside of consciousness of a perceptual state could not. Furthermore, since the phenomenological profile is such that it can capture our attention, the sorts of causal shaping of attention by cognition seems like it can get a toehold on our experience of the emotions. So it seems that the burden of proof should be on someone claiming that emotions do not have their phenomenology shaped in this way.

There is another potential asymmetry between emotion and perception which might be a reason for being sceptical of the transition from perceptions to emotions, and I hope my answer to this worry will help to further motivate my response to the previous worry. The claimed asymmetry is that the change that the cognitive state must make to emotions is greater than the change it must make to perceptions. You might think this if you think that emotions themselves are non-presentational (inherently non-presentational), and so the change in their phenomenology that I need to argue for is from raw-feel to presentational state. If you think that in the case of perceptions the change is from a presentational state with austere content to a presentational state with a bit more content then there is a real difference here.

Someone worried about this sort of asymmetry would think that perception already involves an attributive phenomenology. They would think that the sort of content that Burge makes room for – the attribution of perceptible features to objects - is already reflected in the phenomenology of perceptions. If that is so, integrating our perceptions into our conceptual schemes just adds to the range of things that the phenomenology presents as being attributed. So where a given perception in a non-conceptual creature might just present two objects with various spatial properties moving in various directions the same perception in a conceptual endowed creature might present those very objects as billiard balls moving because of an impact. By contrast, we might worry that
emotion starts out utterly non-attributional and so the change that its integration into the conceptual economy needs to make is much larger. If an emotion has a phenomenology that is just something like a startle response then it needs to change a lot in order for its phenomenology to present a given object as dangerous.

This would be a powerful objection if my project were something like Siegel's, where showing that a transition in phenomenology was a stepping-stone on the way to showing that cognitive penetration can change the contents of the proprietary perceptual content. If this were the project then the fact that perceptions begin life as states with content (or so Siegel argues) means that the cognitive penetration does not give a presentational character to a state that otherwise isn’t presentational.

Again, the significant difference between Siegel’s project and mine is that Siegel is focused on changes that take place in the proprietary content of the perception, so the phenomenological change she needs to demonstrate must be a change to specifically perceptual phenomenology (that is a change to the perceptual phenomenology narrowly conceived, what I will call proprietary emotional phenomenology because it is phenomenology of an identifiably emotional sort). I do not need the phenomenological change in emotions to be a change in this specifically emotional phenomenology. A change in the overall phenomenology of undergoing an emotion will suffice for what I am trying to show. As a result, it is more plausible to think that a larger change can take place, since the change can involve phenomenal features that aren’t straightforwardly emotional.

Consider the change in what it’s like to feel jealousy that takes place if you start to believe that jealousy is always misleading (since the content of jealousy seems to involve a claim of entitlement to the affection of another that is illegitimate). Plausibly the proprietary emotional phenomenology of the experience doesn’t change at all (though this depends a little on what you take the borders of the proprietary phenomenology to be). It should be uncontroversial though that the broad phenomenology of the experience has changed. If you become jealous there will be a gnawing sense of uncertainty about the legitimacy of the feeling that will colour the overall experience.

Now consider a tactile case that is analogous to the sort of experience that the sceptic about presentational emotional phenomenology is worrying emotions are like. Imagine being in a dark room and touching various surfaces of an object without any real aim or focus of attention. This might result in a set of loosely connected tactile sensations that are mainly feelings of pressure on your fingertips. We might well think that a this tactile experience is non-presentational. It isn’t clear that the experience compels any belief beyond that there is something resisting my fingers. But that with the right additional cognitive elements the experience of having the tactile feelings, broadly conveyed, can be organized in such a way that the overall experience becomes presentational vis-à-vis the object I am touching. Imagine what changes when it occurs to you that it might be a car battery which you are touching. Now the phenomenology of the overall experience changes, though plausibly the proprietary tactile phenomenal features do not. Now the feelings are given a different structure by the fact that they are directed at assessing whether or not the thing is a car battery – what might have been an experience of even pressure on your fingertips can now become the experience of a
surface without terminals. The changes to the wide phenomenology include changes to the way that we are compelled to move our finger to explore different options and the overall effect is that the wide of phenomenology of the experience could well become something that compels and rationalizes a belief that we are (or are not) holding a car battery.

I see no reason to think that the same sort of organizing of aspects of the *widely Construed* emotional experience mightn’t change what it’s like to undergo the experience in a way that makes its occurrence presentational even if it doesn’t start out being presentational. As with the car battery case, this could plausibly be explained by the sorts of features Levine mentions – focus of attention, felt relatedness and relevance of different aspects of the phenomenology, and so on.

One way to push this asymmetry line is to say that when it comes to emotions it is less obvious that we should expect their phenomenology to be permeable in the way that perceptual phenomenology is. I claimed that such permeability comes cheap in the case of perception – patterns of attention can shift the perpetual phenomenology because elements of the perceptual phenomenology can stand out from other elements, thus shifting their phenomenology. Perhaps emotions aren’t like this.

Why think they aren’t? Perhaps shifts of the sort Levine talks about cannot make the same sort of changes to emotion because the phenomenology of emotions is less structured – it comes in one big block without foreground and background. But this seems implausible. There are a number of elements to emotional phenomenology – a directedness towards an object, various bodily responses, the “capture and consumption” of attention (M. Brady, 2013, p92), emotional valence and intensity, and so on. Why couldn’t these features of the phenomenology be shaped? It is commonplace that when we undergo intense emotion, the object of the emotion looms large for us – Othello’s jealousy making minor and irrelevant incidents take on a power and meaning they wouldn’t normally possess. At other times, the emotion takes us out of the situation – when depression makes everything grey and the world recedes from us. Or the emotion can make the felt bodily aspect dominate all others – when, in embarrassment, the feeling of blushing drives coping strategies out of our minds. These are all features of emotional phenomenology that could predominate or decrease, depending on how the experience is shaped by the concepts we possess.

Furthermore, since it is the broadly construed phenomenology that must become presentational there is no need to limit ourselves to accounting for the change purely in terms of shifts in attention to the specifically affective elements of the experience. Let’s take two cases, one of which is clearly not presentational, but which contains some affective elements, and one which starts with the same affective elements, but is shaped by the sorts of things Levine points to and other aspects of the broad phenomenology. I will try to show that the latter can be presentational.

Suppose I feel the version of fear with which we started earlier – the object-directed startle response. I feel this fear directed at a shark. Suppose it is not presentational at all. Now suppose that another person is in the same situation feels the same proprietary “emotional” phenomenology (i.e. the narrowly conceived phenomenological contribution of the emotions if the sceptic is right about what that is) but their fear is
connected to their concept DANGER. Suppose that this leads to a focus of attention on
the shark and features of it that may or may not be dangerous. As features stand out
that are plausibly danger-making features the startled feeling intensifies and the overall
experience includes an element of cognitive felt appropriateness. Suppose also that
the salience of the concept is activated, so that their thinking is more focused around
danger and ways of responding to danger, and these ways of responding in turn shape
which features of the perceptual scene are more salient and receive more attention.
This seem puts the agent under some rational pressure to believe that they are in
danger and so shapes the phenomenology of the fear in the right way for it to count as
presentational.

None of these attempts to press for an asymmetry between perceptions and emotions
seem to count in favour of thinking that emotions cannot have their phenomenology
shaped in the same way that perceptions can have theirs shaped. In fact, since
perceptions are often thought to be relatively modular and informational encapsulated,
whereas at least the causal shaping of emotions by cognitions is utterly
uncontroversial, it is hard to see why we should doubt that emotions can have their
wide phenomenology shaped by cognitive elements. Since the wide phenomenology of
emotions is at least as apt for cognitive shaping as that of perceptions, the sort of
shared assumptions that underlie the debates in the cognitive phenomenology and
cognitive penetration debates ought to just apply straightforwardly to the shaping of
wide emotional phenomenology by cognitive elements.

6.4 Conclusion.

I have previously argued that emotions get to be about their proper objects by making
demonstrative reference to them via the emotion’s cognitive bases (Chapter 3). I also
argued that emotions become subject to representational norms via their connection to
evaluative concepts. This gives them their formal objects. (Chapter 4). These two
intentional features of emotions - being directed at their proper objects and being
subject to appropriateness conditions that involve their formal objects – together suffice
for emotions having representational content which is evaluative. In this chapter I have
argued that these two intentional features together can make a difference to what it’s
like to undergo the emotion which makes emotions presentational. This means that the
emotions are not just subject to a correctness condition, they also have a
phenomenological profile that makes them present their content as true.

This gives the emotions the epistemologica! features I argued they must have to play
the role perceptual theories want to give them (Chapter 2). Because they are
compelling and rationalizing, emotions put us under rational pressure to believe their
contents. As a result they can play justificatory roles that are both noninferential and
internalist. The emotions present their content in such a way that the agent can assent
to it, thereby forming a belief with the same content. Because of the phenomenology of
emotions that are subject to accuracy conditions it is given to the agent that the
emotion counts in favour of the belief.
Chapter 7.
Objections.

I have claimed that to account for the justificatory roles emotions play, we must give a theory of emotional representation – a theory which explains how emotions get to be about their proper objects and which explains how they become subject to the appropriateness conditions that are their formal objects. I have given a theory according to which emotions get these representational contents derivatively. Emotions get to be about their proper objects thanks to connections that go via the emotions’ cognitive bases. Emotions get to have their formal objects thanks to the ways they are connected with our concepts.

In this chapter I will look at several objections to my account, all of which focus on the claim about concepts, since this is the more controversial claim. The first (7.1) worries that the nature of the account I have given of representational contents will not work to explain emotions justificatory roles since its reliance on conceptual contents gives up the necessary independence of emotions from judgments. The second (7.2) worries about how I can type-individuate emotions in order for them to help individuate concepts. This is a worry because I cannot accept the standard philosophical account of type-individuation. However I argue that the dominant ways of thinking about emotions in the psychological literature give me the resources I need for an account of type-individuation compatible with my view. The final objection (7.3) worries about a problematic human exceptionalism that my account appears to imply. Two of these objections (7.1 and 7.3) are versions of arguments that are given against cognitivist views, reformulated to engage with my position. The other (7.2) is a variant on an objection that was influentially raised against feelings theories.

7.1 Judgement independence.

This whole project aims to supply a philosophical theory that vindicates our view of the epistemic roles that emotions can play. Part of what this mean is giving a theory according to which emotions can rationally conflict with beliefs all on their own – the mere occurrence of an emotion with content that conflicts with our beliefs is enough to create rational tension. The family of objections I will assess here doubt that my account succeeds here. They suspect that the derivative account of emotional representation that I have supplied fails to give emotions the necessary independence from judgement to account for conflict of this sort. This is because of the way that concepts find their natural home in judgments.

There are two versions this worry can take. The first worries about specific cases of evaluation. Can I account for the way that emotions can put rational pressure on people to form different beliefs to the ones that explicit deliberation seems to give them most reason to go for? There are two possible cases – one in which the relevant emotion is hooked up to the relevant concept and one in which it isn’t. To return to the example of fear, in me the emotion is hooked up to the concept DANGER by virtue of
helping to partially individuate it. In another person this might not be the case. They might lack such a concept altogether. In cases like mine, where a conceptual connection is present, I will claim that this does not undermine the independence necessary for the emotion to create rational tension by disagreeing with belief. On the flip-side of this objection is the worry that my view makes it look like emotions not hooked up in this way cannot create such a tension. I will accept this result and try to persuade the reader that this is not a problem.

The second version of this worry is about whether, in the absence of the right sort of conceptual hook-up, an emotion can place us under rational pressure to develop a concept that matches its evaluative dimension of the emotion. Thinking that an emotion can do this on its own is what I will call the first contact view since on such a view the emotion puts us in touch with a new evaluative property, and so puts us in a position to form a concept of that property. I do not think this is a plausible picture, but I have the resources to establish the possibility of something in the ball-park.

7.1.1 Attribution, extension and first contact.

If somebody’s emotion helps to individuate one of their evaluative concepts, then I can account for that emotion helping to justify the attribution of the corresponding evaluative property to its proper object. This is the case even when the agent is unable to deliberatively attribute the property to the object. Take Huck Finn and Jim. Huck’s sympathy helps to individuate his concept HUMAN SUFFERING (let’s say for the sake of easy explanation), so it can be have human suffering as its formal object. Even though Huck cannot countenance Jim as a potential human sufferer, because his background beliefs include racist evaluative beliefs that contradict this claim, when Huck feels sympathy for Jim this sympathy is subject to a representational norm thanks to its connection to the concept. So his sympathy represents Jim as suffering in a distinctively human way. This will put him under some pro tanto rational pressure to believe Jim is suffering, in spite of his beliefs to the contrary. If the emotion has the right rational credentials, (and the countervailing beliefs lack the right credentials) then Huck would be justified in coming to believe that Jim is undergoing distinctively human suffering.

In cases where an emotion isn’t appropriately hooked up to a concept I cannot account for the emotion helping to justifying a belief. Suppose Huck has no concept of human suffering, or that his concept is not individuated by connections to his sympathy. In this case, merely undergoing the emotions does not justify him in believing that Jim suffers (at least not in the internalist sense discussed in Chapter 2). If we can’t even point to regularities in Huck’s practice that he would recognize as putting him under rational pressure to believe the right things, then there is nothing Huck can treat as justification for the belief. So I am willing to say that without the right hook-up, no internalist justification is in the offing.

\[107\] Though it may motivate him to do the sorts of things that are good to do when someone suffers. It may also make others see that such a belief would be justified in his case, because of the reliability with which his sympathy response tracks genuine human suffering.
So I grant that my account cannot give our emotions justificatory roles if those emotions do not help to individuate evaluative concepts. But this doesn’t mean that emotions make a rational contribution that is wholly dependent on our existing concepts or that emotions cannot play any role in shifting our evaluative concepts. The simple story about Huck, with his sympathy hooked up to his concept of human suffering, can be extended to show how his emotions can apply rational pressure to change his concepts. Suppose Huck’s concept is hooked up to this sympathy, taking sympathy as input, but his concept is also such that it only applies to white people. This is a constitutive feature of the concept he uses, not just an opinion he has about it, in the same way that my concept of density only applies to extended things. This might be so thanks to repeated explicit “corrections” of his evaluative judgments during his racist upbringing. Nevertheless, as Huck spends more time with Jim, and has feelings of sympathy that represent Jim as suffering, there will be pressure on his conception of suffering to change so that it can be applied to all people, not merely white people. This is true even if in each case Huck thinks the feeling is erroneous because the concept (by his own lights) only applies to white people. The constant stream of representations of non-white people as suffering is delivered by a faculty that he should trust (since his sympathy lines up with his reflective judgments more often than not), so there is some rational pressure to reassess his concept of suffering. A perceptual analogue of this would be something like the following: my concept of tree requires that for something to be a tree it must have green leaves (let’s say this have been explicitly drilled into me for some strange reason). I travel to Europe in Autumn and see a series of things that look like trees, but which have red leaves. The first few I easily write off as merely looking similar to trees, or as having green leaves that merely look red due to lighting. After a while though, I see more and more things that look like trees, but which have red leaves. As a result, at some point my concept comes up for review. I might change my concept so that it is not a conceptual truth that trees have green leaves.

We might think that emotions can apply other sorts of rational pressure. We might think that our emotions can put us in touch with evaluative properties of which we have no prior inkling, thereby putting pressure on us to form concepts of those properties. This is the first contact view. The idea is that I might have no concept of the disgusting, but my experiences of disgust may have nonconceptual content that attributes disgustingness (the evaluative property) to objects. I can then form a concept on the basis of the emotion which just inherits its content from the emotion.

My story about how emotions get their content locks me out of agreeing here, but this needn’t be damaging. Even on my view there is no reason to think that our emotions couldn’t be tracking an evaluative property in these sorts of cases (that is reliably occurring in response to it). What I cannot say is that tracking it in this way contributes to noninferential internalist justification in the sense I discussed in Chapter 2. But it is hard to see how tracking alone could be relevant to the capacity to play those sorts of justificatory roles. Suppose Alice lacks a concept for being exciting, but she has

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108 This example, and the others I will use, all focus on cases of solo experiences – cases where there is no social coordination or correction involved. Emotions can very clearly play a role in the acquisitions of new concepts in a social setting, but this is very easily shown, and is true even independently of any position about emotional representation. Clearly many of our evaluative concepts are acquired early on via a mix of explicit and implicit emotional coordination and training.
emotions that track the property. She feel drawn to dangerous experiences like sky diving. Without her having a concept here it’s hard to see the emotion as providing her with a justification for any beliefs about the goodness of sky diving. She can justify going sky-diving via explicitly reasoning about the enjoyment she gains from the emotion. She can know that she likes sky diving because she enjoys the feelings it inspires. But this is not the same as her emotion providing an evaluative representation of the activity that can justify beliefs about it. It is only if she has a concept shaping her reaction that the excitement gets to be about the good aspects of sky diving rather than simply being an enjoyable response to the activity.

It is also true that Alice’s emotional response gives her some materials to form a new concept – though not the content to flesh it out. She has had a series of experiences which she enjoys, and she might begin to wonder what all of the experiences have in common. This might lead her to a concept of the exciting, but it won’t be a case of her emotions already having the necessary content, which she simply needs to conceptualise. Instead she needs to think about the activities that elicit the response, what they have in common, and ways in which what they have in common might be something about them that she wants. This is all compatible with my view.

There is the possibility of a case in between the Huck case I can accommodate and the first Alice case that I cannot. It seems that there could be missing shade of blue style case – a case where our emotions put us in touch with an evaluative property that is not presently one that we have a concept for, but which, due to the concepts we already have, is revealed as missing from our conceptual repertoire. The emotion reveals that there is a bit of affective space that our concepts don’t cover. This is another case that I can accommodate.

Suppose we have some emotional responses that are conceptually infused in such a way that they represent their objects as having evaluative properties. Among them are anger and disgust. Now, suppose I have no concept for the contemptible. I have had some emotional experiences that feel part-way between anger and disgust, and I am able to re-identify and group them together. I begin to think about the sorts of situations that have evoked this response. Let’s assume that I am not a very nice person, so the sorts of salient regularities in the situations are deficiencies I perceive in other people. This might mean have a vague notion beginning to emerge of a sort of evaluative property that I can take these responses to be about – something like the contemptible. I can form the relevant concept and treat episodes of this emotion as input into the concept, also accepting that if something satisfies the concept then it is in some way offensive and undeserving of respect.

So an experience of an emotion related in the right subjective ways to other emotions might exert some rational pressure on me to acquire a concept roughly within a certain target area. What is required is that there be similarities between the new experience and some set of old experiences, as well as salient differences. The old experiences must also be hooked up to evaluative concepts so that we get a sense of the conceptual space that the new experience could be related to.

Perhaps there is an easier path to concept formation available here that explains the same phenomena without the detour through thinking about the eliciting conditions.
Suppose I form a response dependant evaluative concept in a trivial manner, just by specifying that the new concept is appropriate when the emotion in question is experienced – or at least when the emotion in question is itself appropriate? Suppose I have a new emotional experience. I dub my new emotion A and form the evaluative concept A-WORTHY, where A-WORTHY is the evaluative concept that it is correct to apply to things that it is appropriate to feel A towards.

This transparently is not yet a fully-fledged evaluative concept. It is far from clear what the output conditions for such a concept should be – though we know when to apply the concept, we don’t know what to infer from it. Although the input is specified in evaluative terms, it is hard to see why the concept should count as evaluative, since it cannot play any sort of role in coming to grips with evaluative features of a situation. Finding that something merits a response is not yet to evaluate the object in any robust sense - remember from the Alice example her response isn’t even about the objects, let alone an evaluation of them.

Even if we take the evaluative input conditions to be sufficient for the concept to count as evaluative, it should be clear that that there is no rational pressure on me to form such a concept on the basis of my experiences. After all, such a concept doesn’t get me anywhere. It is an idle wheel. The emotions can only apply pressure on our concept formation in tandem with some reflection upon the situations that elicit the emotions. In the missing shade of blue case, the rational pressure to form a new concept is a result of the emotion that feels like a combination of anger and disgust helping me notice that there a portion of evaluative space which I don’t have a concept for.

It is tempting to think that emotions are more independent of our thoughts about a situation. We might think that even without the rights sorts of concepts, and even if someone expects a certain shabby treatment, their feelings of anger could represent such treatment as unjust, and justify the belief that it should stop. I don’t think this is the right story about how our emotions put pressure on our evaluative outlooks though. I think that the way that emotions are reliant on concepts explains the political importance of the sorts of rethinking of emotional experiences that Naomi Scheman talks about (Scheman, 1980). She points out that part of what a consciousness raising group does is help people who have pre-existing emotional responses to situations see those responses in a different way. In some cases this means labelling them as anger. Via that labelling the person gains the capacity to think of the emotion as appropriate or inappropriate depending on specific features of their situation. This works because anger has already been connected to evaluative concepts, so coming to see that past emotions were in fact anger puts the person under pressure to assess whether the situation merits the anger, and see for the first time new ways in which the situation can merit anger. To see that this change relies on such conceptual connection, imagine what a consciousness raising group would need to do if there were no culturally available connection between the emotion and the evaluative concept to draw on – the group would need to not only help the person label their emotion as anger, but also help them to see anger as connected to an evaluative concept (or concepts).

7.2 Emotion type-individuation.
My view has a *prima facie* problem regarding emotion type-individuation. I rely upon an account of emotion type-individuation for my account of the way emotions get their representational contents. I claim that some of our evaluative concepts are partially individuated in terms of types of emotion playing an input role for those concepts. DANGER, for instance, is partially individuated by being the concept that things seem to satisfy when we are scared of them. This means that my claim about what individuates the concept DANGER is reliant on an account of what individuates fear.

The problem is that my view is incompatible with the conventional way in which philosophers type-individuate emotions. It is common in the philosophical literature to type-individuate emotions in terms of their formal objects. On this view, a token emotion is an instance of disgust than ks to the emotion being appropriate if and only if its object is disgusting. If the emotion was instead appropriate if and only if its object is dangerous, it would be an instance of fear instead.\(^{109}\)

This account of how to individuate the emotions is typically seen as a significant advance on the limited story that feelings theorists can tell about emotional types. Feelings theorists try to individuate emotional types in terms of the feelings of the emotions, but as we saw in 1.1 and 3.3.1, it is far from clear that feelings will do the job.

It is clear that the conventional story about emotion type-individuation cannot work in the context of my story. I am claiming that emotions get their formal objects by being connected to our concepts, and by acquiring a psychological function thanks to this connection. As a result I cannot take emotion types to be distinguished by their formal objects, since they need to be distinguished type-by-type from one another before they get their formal objects – in order to become connected to our concepts in the right ways.

Fortunately there are resources for giving an alternative story about emotion type-individuation. The alternative is an independently plausible theory which better respects the empirical work being done on emotions, and that it fits my story better than the traditionally philosophical way of individuating emotions. To explain this alternative, I will need to take a lengthy detour to explain appraisal theories of the emotions and to explore one controversy internal to the paradigm that threatens to deny me the resources I need from appraisal theories.\(^{110}\)

### 7.2.1 Appraisal theories: Theoretical assumptions.

It should be uncontroversial that there are causal regularities between the situations people find themselves in and the sorts of emotional episodes that they have, though there is work needed to spell out what the borders of an emotional episode are, and what the borders of a situation are. Moreover, it should be relatively uncontroversial that these regularities concern the relevance of the features of the situation for the

\(^{109}\) For claims to this effect, see (Deonna & Teroni, 2015), (Döring, 2010), (Solomon, 1980) and (Nussbaum, 2001) among many others.

\(^{110}\) I will also describe the theories because they are *really cool* and worthy of some more philosophical scrutiny.
agent undergoing the emotion, rather than merely objective features of the situation. This means that the very same situation may or may not elicit an emotion, depending on features of the agent in question. Although exactly how much emotional causation varies with these changes is controversial, some degree of such variation should not be controversial. If I am hungry enough, then seeing a chain restaurant right next to a secluded place I have been riding through may lead to an initial feeling of happiness, whereas the same situation, when I am well fed, will only lead to irritation. There is also strong empirical support for the importance of the goal-relative properties of a situation coming from satiation experiments.111

Explaining these regularities is the primary goal of appraisal theories of the emotions. As well as assuming that there are such regularities, appraisal theories assume that in order for the situational differences, together with the interests of the agents, to cause different emotions the relevant features of the situation must be processed by the agent at some level (Moors, (Forthcoming) p6). Again, this should be uncontroversial, though the range of acceptable stories about what levels of processing can be used to explain this may not be.

It is worth noting that though this is the explicit explanandum for appraisal theories, commitment to there being something here to explain is actually common ground for most psychological theories of emotion.112 As Klaus Scherer says “Almost all theories of emotion assume, at least implicitly, that the specific kind of emotion experienced depends on the result of an evaluation or appraisal of an event in terms of its significance for the survival and well-being of the organism.” (K. R. Scherer, 2001 p93) The same holds for philosophical theories of the emotions. It is true of James’ theory (implicitly) and of Prinz’s theory (explicitly) which are among the most minimal in terms of what they take the cognitive causes of emotions to be. James says that certain sorts of situation elicit certain sort of bodily changes, and that this is how the emotion gets going (James, 1884). As such we should expect that a situation in which the goals of an agent are threatened should not produce emotions that are calming or pleasant, for instance. Prinz adds more meat to the bones, saying that we have elicitation files associated with each emotion which come pre-stocked with items that elicit the emotional responses. These files are constantly updated across the life of the organism113 so that we can have our emotions triggered by abstract occurrences (like downturns in the stock market). The point of the elicitation files is to make sure that the emotion caused by a given situation helps the organism deal with that situation.

111 In (Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2013) subjects were tested for affective attention capture. They were conditioned to associate a neutral stimulus with a reward (i.e. a neutral stimulus was made goal relative) and then subjected to the stimulus too quickly for conscious recognition (to rule out eh possibility that any attention capture was mediated by conscious, nonemotional appraisal) and a marked increase in attention capture was recorded. Then without changing any features of the stimulus the reward that was associated with it was devalued via satiation, and an immediate reduction in attention capture was recorded. This shows that the attention capture and consumption aspect of emotional experience is mediated by the value of the stimulus for the agent at the time of the emotion. So some processing of this must be performed by the organism before the emotion, or early on in its initiation.

112 Including (Scherer claims) all parties to the Lazarus-Zajonc debate. See below.

113 It would be interesting to look at how well his story here handles the results of satiation experiments, since it seems unlikely that constantly updating emotional elicitation files in response to short term variations in organismic conditions would be an efficient way of ensuring that a hungry animal responds differently and appropriately to food compared with a sated animal.
According to Agnes Moors these theoretical starting points are the dominant starting point and the biggest challenge aimed at them in the psychological literature comes from theorists who are reluctant to attribute causal powers to mental states (Moors, 2009). I take it that few philosophers would share this worry. It makes good methodological sense for psychologists to account for as much as possible without attributing causal powers to particular mental states, but I take it that the legitimacy of doing so, under the right circumstances, is not an open question for many philosophers. I take it as a given that mental states can have causal powers.

So let us just grant these starting points for appraisal theories. The idea is that the best way of meeting the explanatory desiderata that appraisal theories work towards, given these starting points, will yield a picture of emotion type-individuation that suffices for my purposes.

### 7.2.2 Stimulus Evaluation Checks.

Appraisal theories are the currently dominant psychological theory explaining regularities between features of situations that have relevance to agents, and the emotional episodes the agent undergoes (Moors, 2009). They do this by positing a set of appraisals that the agent makes of their situation, which shape the emotions that are undergone. This appraisal process precedes the emotion, and is responsible for its fit with the eliciting situation. This means that in some cases the appraisal must be extremely quick. When we see something paradigmatically frightening we respond with fear very quickly. In these cases the appraisal must also be computationally frugal, so (for example) it might consist in simply matching the stimulus with some pre-set and invariant schemata. On the other hand, we can also have quite nuanced emotional responses to things which seem to require a level of processing that is not well explained as a fast and frugal stimulus response – the response might depend upon explicitly evaluating the potential consequences of an event and comparing it to our conception of our own goals. These sorts of responses cannot be explained via the mechanism that matches the situation to an invariant schema, since the potential eliciting situations are too varied and too abstract for us to plausibly have a schema for each – we can become frightened at the reading given by a fuel gauge or by the realization that the only way out of an airport we aren’t even in involves an elevator.

The best explanation for how such a wide variety eliciting situations can be handled involves models that posit a sequence of stimulus evaluation checks (SECs) that start with computationally undemanding SECs and then get progressively more demanding. The later checks are only performed if the earlier ones suggest the stimulus warrants it. An emotional episode can be initiated after only a few of these checks, rather than requiring that the full range of checks be performed. It is thought that these SECs are performed in the order of their development, and that the order of development is both the phylogenetic order and the ontogenetic order.

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114 Though some versions of the theory say that the appraisal is part of the emotional episode this is largely a definitional matter concerning the boundaries of the emotional episode. Occurrent emotions themselves, on any of the theories, are results of the appraisals and the appraisals come first.
Scherer says that

Since the early SECs, ... seem to be present in most animals as well as
new-born humans, one could argue that these low-level processing
mechanisms take precedence as part of our hard-wired detection
 capacities and occur very rapidly after the occurrence of the stimulus
event. ..... More complex evaluation mechanisms are successively
developed at more advanced levels of phylogenetic and ontogenetic
development (K. R. Scherer, 2001 pp100-102).

The SECs are efficient, scanning all incoming stimuli and only triggering further
emotionally relevant appraisals if the results of the early checks warrant it, so as not to
waste computational resources. The majority of the stimuli we are exposed to are not
relevant to us, and so not worth appraising in great depth.

On Scherer's model (which is fairly representative of appraisal theories), there are also
three different levels at which appraisal takes place: the sensory-motor level, the
schematic level and the conceptual level. The sensorimotor level is very quick and
works via pattern matching. It is mostly genetically determined and relatively inflexible.
It happens far too quickly to be accessible to consciousness. It is the level at which
prototypic unconditioned fear is processed and so helps to explain how we can
persistently feel emotions that result from an appraisal pattern that we would not
reflectively endorse. (K. R. Scherer, 2001 p 102) The schematic level is the result of
social learning, it is fairly automatic, and typically happens outside of consciousness.
As a result of these features, it can process appraisals in a way we would not endorse,
just like the first level. Finally, the conceptual level is propositional-symbolic, it is
typically conscious, and it is much more volitional. (K. R. Scherer, 2001 p103). This
also makes it much slower and more resource-consuming. These higher levels of
processing are only called upon if lower levels cannot handle some particular stimulus
which merits appraisal – that is if the stimulus cannot be matched to a pattern that will
activate a given sort of sensorimotor preparation it gets passed along to the schematic
level, and so on.

This is an important feature of the appraisal model, because it helps to account for the
way that emotions can be caused quickly, but also for the fact that they can be caused
by very abstract things, like the possibility of a stock-market crash. Situations like a
sudden loss of footing require quick mobilisation of resources and the costs of failing to
respond are greater than the costs of overreacting, so the SECs can take place at the
sensorimotor level so that the affective response can be prepared quickly. But no
sensorimotor pattern matching will be sophisticated enough to trigger the appropriate
responses in complex social environments (K. R. Scherer, 1994b p129), or in cases of
very abstract eliciting situations (such as a stock market crash), so the schematic and
the conceptual levels of processing are required to process appraisals adequate to
these situations.

This division into levels of processing is also meant to help navigate the Lazarus-
Zajonc debate about the cognitive prerequisites for emotional experience. All parties to
this debate accept that there is some appraisal-like processing required for emotional
causation, but disagree about the level at which the processing takes place. (K. R.
Scherer, 1994a pp227-229) With the story about the three levels in place there is room to insist that some emotions are caused by appraisals that take place only at the sensorimotor level, without admitting too great a difference in kind between these appraisals and explicit conceptually mediated appraisals.

7.2.3 Emotional components.

It is now important to stress a distinction drawn by many psychologists, particularly those in the appraisals tradition. The distinction is between an emotion and an emotional episode. How exactly the distinction is drawn varies from theorist to theorist, but the details do not matter for my purposes. An emotional episode has a number of components. It includes emotions as parts, it might also include other affective phenomena like moods, and it will include affective elements that have not been sufficiently unified to count as either emotions or moods, such as action tendencies (particularly described in terms of approach/avoidance), patterns of attention, arousal, affective valence, action tendencies, facial expressions, variation in skin conductance, narrowing or widening of attention, and so on. What philosophers talk of as occurrent emotions occur within emotional episodes, they are a group of these emotional components that are unified in a way that gives them a unified phenomenological profile.

I will say more about the components, as well as what gives them their unity when they form an emotion, when I talk about Scherer’s model. The point to notice is that just as appraisals can largely happen below the personal level, outside of consciousness, many aspects of the emotional episode that these appraisals trigger take place outside of conscious awareness when they are not unified in the right ways. Occurrent emotions are only parts of an ongoing stream of appraisal and modification of emotional components that mostly takes place in the background – directing attention more than consuming it.

7.2.4 Controversies.

The two major controversies within appraisal theory are a) what the different dimensions of appraisal are, as well as in what sequence they are performed, and b) how these dimension of appraisal shape the emotions in question.

Variations in answers to the first question are largely irrelevant for my purpose. The idea in this psychological debate is to posit the minimum number of dimension of appraisal needed to explain the found variation in emotional episodes (K. R. Scherer, 2001 p94). Theorising is constrained by a priori theorising about what sorts of appraisals are needed to distinguish types of experience, and about what would be most computationally efficient, as well as empirical work generating and testing predictions based on the different lists of dimensions and orders of processing that theorists subscribe to. To give the sense of an appraisal theory I will briefly set out Scherer’s model, which is one leading contender, though nothing in my project turns on the assumption that his is the best appraisal model.
Scherer's model makes claims about the different appraisals necessary to distinguish emotional experiences. He claims that there is a fixed order to the appraisals since there is nothing about incoming stimuli itself which determines whether it merits appraisal, but it would be inefficient to fully appraise all incoming stimuli, so the system must have a mechanism which sorts between stimuli worthy of further appraisal and that which isn’t. Such sorting is a form of appraisal, so it is best thought of as being performed by the early SECs in the appraisal sequence. All incoming stimuli are subject to these checks, but a given stimulus is only passed on to the more computationally demanding subsequent checks if it is sufficiently interesting.

The appraisal processes is meant to establish enough to answer four major questions about a given event:

(a) How relevant is this event for me? Does it directly affect me or my social reference group? (relevance); (b) What are the implications or consequences of this event and how do they affect my well-being and my immediate or long-term goals? (implications); (c) How well can I cope with or adjust to these consequences? (coping potential); (d) What is the significance of this event for my self-concept and for social norms and values? (normative significance). (K. R. Scherer, 2009 p1309)

It is broken down into the sequences of checks depicted in Scherer’s diagram that follows (K. R. Scherer, 2001 p1314)
Along with these dimensions of appraisal, Scherer has specific claims about the emotional components. They are very diverse and include autonomic physiological changes, action tendencies, motor expressions, subjective feelings and cognitive tendencies. Empirical work with the model associates specific emotional components with specific results for certain appraisal checks. So that we might find (e.g.) that particular values for skin conductance correlate with particular results for the appraisal of urgency. This empirical work has yielded some interesting testable predictions that take facial expressions and predict the sorts of eliciting situation that brought these about on the basis of the appraisal outcomes that the model claims lead to that facial expression (K. R. Scherer & Grandjean, 2008).

The second controversy within appraisal theory initially appears relevant to how I want to employ the theory. This controversy concerns how the dimensions of appraisal shape the emotional episodes. Views here divide into two main families, which Moors dubs flavour one and flavour two (Moors, [Forthcoming]). I will refer to them as “Neapolitan” and “rainbow swirl”. According to Neapolitan flavoured theories the phenomena to be explained by the theory is how features in the environment regularly give rise to particular discrete emotions, like fear or anger. The idea is to posit enough dimensions of appraisal such that they can yield distinct appraisal-profiles which can trigger the distinct emotions. According to Rainbow Swirl flavoured theories, the explanadum is the causation of emotional components with specific values along different dimensions of affective variation. These are variations in valence, arousal and attentional focus, and so on rather than variation in emotion-type. The resulting picture is of an affective space defined by these different dimensions that is either continuous, or at least very finely grained, so that the possible positions within the space are far greater in number than the words we have for particular types of emotion. Our words for particular emotions name attractors within this space – certain configurations that often re-occur and which are useful to talk about when explain each other’s emotional actions and motivations. According to rainbow swirl theorists, fear is just a region of affective space that is characterised by negative affect, high arousal, avoidance tendencies (for the most part), etc. The emotion type fear does no theoretical work for the model, for instance fear does not mediate between the appraisals and the action tendencies. Different instances of fear are not instances of the same natural kind with differentiating features, but simply affective states that are similar enough to be classified together.

There are different ways in which Neapolitan flavoured theories can tell their story about how a range of gradable variables gives rise to a finite pallet of emotions. Core relational themes might mediate between appraisals and emotions. According to this line, CRTs map one-to-one onto emotion types and a sufficient match between the set of appraisal outcomes and a given CRT triggers the corresponding emotion. Another suggestion is that there might just be a fixed, finite range of emotions which the appraisal results can trigger once they are sufficiently integrated into a pattern with the right shape. (Moors, [Forthcoming] p6)

How the debates between different configurations of Neapolitan flavour are resolved does not matter for what I want to say. They all result in a picture where the specific type of emotion caused can (under optimal conditions, with training, etc) be distinguished from other emotion types. All variations on the Neapolitan flavour of
theory generate discrete emotion types that can be given roles individuating evaluative concepts. Suppose anger is always caused by a core relational theme like offense, which is detected when a situation is appraised as goal incongruent, caused by another, susceptible to my control and so on. In this case, I can learn to treat occurrences of anger as input to my reasoning about whether something is offensive. The story is much the same if another variation on Neapolitan flavour is right and anger is directly caused by a set of appraisals which trigger anger because they form the right sort of pattern. As such, I will set aside debates internal to the Neapolitan flavour since they are all compatible with my model of how emotions help individuate evaluative concepts. But it’s not obvious that the same can be said for rainbow swirl accounts.

7.2.5 Why rainbow swirl theories look problematic for me, but aren’t in the end.

To see why rainbow swirl theories might be a problem for me, I should say again why I have taken this detour into a description of the appraisals theories. I need an account of emotion type-individuation that type-individuates the emotions independently of their formal object (since I believe that the formal objects are given to the emotions once the emotion type is used to help individuate an evaluative concept).

If the rainbow swirl flavoured theories are right, it is less clear that emotions can be type-individuated prior to their acquisition of a formal object. If there are no discrete emotions that the emotional landscape decomposes into, then how can I learn to treat anger as an input condition for the concept DANGER?

To answer this question it’s important to again stress the distinction between an emotional episode and an occurrent emotion, and to look more closely at Scherer’s idea that consciousness plays a monitoring role in emotions. Rainbow swirl theories typically have some element in their story that accounts for our sense of emotional types. Since these theories claim that the emotion processing is iterative, they allow components of emotional episode to influence one another. That is, since previous affective elements can form part of the endogenous input that gives rise to the next set of affective elements, the reapplication of the appraisal process can allow that some affective elements bring about patterns in the overall affective state. The appraisal theories also allow the labelling of emotions to have an impact on the emotional experience (Moors, 2009). Furthermore they claim that there are certain attractor basins that form in the emotional landscape defined by variation in the different emotional components. These are affective areas of particular relevance and that are particularly likely to reoccur. Scherer calls these the modal emotions, and though emotions that fall under these types are not any different in kind to emotions that do not, they are affected by being easily re-identifiable and easily attributable to others. This is one factor that makes emotions more likely to cohere enough become objects of attention. Since the feeling component of emotion, around which emotions cohere into occurrent emotions, is meant to play a monitoring role in our emotional life (K. R. Scherer, 2009 p1318), it is useful for it to allow different emotions to be grouped together. In order for reflective awareness of my emotions to be helpful I need to be able to sort them.
The parts of the emotional episodes I want to focus on are the intersection of the conscious elements and the elements that have a sufficient unity to form an occurrent emotion. These are the parts of our emotional experience that are legitimate targets of self-report. (Scherer 2009) Regarding this zone of emotional components, it turns out that Neapolitan flavour and rainbow swirl flavour agree more than we might have initially thought. Scherer claims that the conscious feeling of occurrent emotions serves regulatory, communicative and cognitive functions and that the requirements of these different functions leads to a filtering and chunking of emotional components that get expressed in occurrent emotions. He says:

Although a richly textured conscious feeling that fits the situation a person experiences like a glove is highly functional for fine-tuned adaptation and regulation, it is less well suited for cognitive manipulation, memorisation, or communication. (K. R. Scherer, 2009 p1318)

So in order to be useful to us, our experience of occurrent emotions must be less finely grained than what is actually going on, and our emotions must be sorted into types. In order to enter into our psychic economies at the personal level, in a way that facilitates thinking, emotion must be stereotyped to some extent. This means that in this realm, emotions are once again apt to be given an input role that helps individuate evaluative concepts. Although emotions themselves are many and varied and cannot be typed in a way that makes them useful for concept individuation, the emotions that can figure in our thinking in the right sorts of ways get to figure in it precisely thanks to being typed in this more coarse-grained fashion.

The emotions that get this coarse-grained typing are therefore fit to stand in concept individuating roles. The tokens of these types that are had by agents with the right emotional conceptual embedding are representational. Relying on the more coarse-grained individuation of this subset of our emotions for my story about how emotions get representational contents means that I am claiming that emotions cannot get representational content without coalescing in the right way. Since the representational side of emotions is only necessary for them to be used to justify belief, they needn’t have representational contents to do the rest of their work (that is the work of bringing about the affective features that suit the situation in the way appraisal theories talk about). As a result, I claim that from the perspective of belief justification, the distinction between rainbow swirl and Neapolitan flavours collapses. This is because even for rainbow swirl flavours, the range of emotional components that are valid targets for self-report are the occurrent emotions that we are able to classify. But only emotions that we can validly report ourselves to be undergoing can be supplied as justifications for beliefs and actions anyway. Recall that the motivation for showing that emotions have representational contents is vindicating their justificatory roles. So any emotion which a perceptual theorist would want to have representational content (because they would want to claim justificatory power for it) is going to be one which we are able to classify. This means it will also be one that falls under a type which we can use to partially individuate an evaluative concept. So even though emotional types only fall out of rainbow swirl flavoured accounts at the end, rather than playing an explanatory role,  

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115 Remember from Chapter 1 that this is generally the focus of PTEs — occurrent emotions.
they still form an epistemically relevant kind. That is: particular emotions are apt for playing distinctive epistemic roles in virtue of falling under the emotion type that they fall under, and in this way occurrent emotions are epistemically different from the parts of emotional episodes that don’t coalesce into occurrent typed emotions.

This response to the worries engendered by rainbow swirl flavours seems to rely on a form of justificatory internalism which claims that only internalist justification (in the sense given in Chapter 2) is really justificatory. This apparent reliance is illusory though. What I am saying is that that we needn’t worry about the representational contents of parts of emotions that are not available for reflection, because the desiderata that drove us to posit emotional representation does not apply to them. These emotional components cannot be used to justify beliefs in the ways discussed in Chapter 2, thanks merely to the fact that they cannot be reliably self-reported. As a result we don’t need to give an account of their representational contents, since the need to give an account of the representational contents of emotions is just driven by the need to explain their justificatory roles. Since these emotional components can’t have justificatory roles of the right sort, for independent reasons, we don’t owe an account of how they get to have representational contents.

7.3 Animals and infants.

There is another family of objections that I ought to address which are variants on objections which beset the cognitivist views. One might object to my view on the grounds that it is problematically tied to a view of human exceptionalism. The worry is that part of what makes emotions interesting is that they are states that we share with animals and pre-conceptual infants. Given this, any view that ties the emotions too closely to concepts must be wrong. The objection needs precisification though, and each way of sharpening the point that I can come up with can either be evaded by my view, or allows me bite the bullet without any great cost.

There is a flat-footed version of this objection that gives a sense of the general character of the objection, but it simply misses engaging with my claims. This objection suggests that having emotions does not require having concepts – since animals and infants have emotions, but no concepts. So emotions cannot be tied to concepts. But this misses the mark. I claim that emotions precede our concepts and are used to partially individuate them, so I actually rely on the claim that undergoing those emotions does not require possessing concepts.

A version of the objection that doesn’t miss the mark suggests that I cannot account for the emotions of animals and infants having representational contents. This means I cannot account for animal emotions (and infant emotions, but henceforth I will stick to just talking about animal emotions for the sake of brevity) playing the justificatory roles that I am so concerned with establishing in the case of adult humans.

116 And in fact with people who lack our evaluative concepts.
This is an objection I am willing to bite the bullet on.\footnote{\textsuperscript{117} There is a caveat here. I have tried to show that emotions get to have contents, even in the worst case scenario. If it can be show that emotions intrinsically have content then animals and infant may well have access to this sort of content. What I cannot account for is animal and infants having emotions with the specific evaluative content that they get from integration with conceptual schemes.} It seems plausible to me that animal emotions don’t have representational contents. The reason to posit representational contents was to explain how emotions can justify beliefs and actions. This isn’t an issue for animals, since justification is an activity that inherently involves self-consciousness, and as such is not the sort of thing animals do.

Those were the two poles of ways the objection might be precisified – the first shooting too high, and missing my claim, the second shooting too low, and lacking sufficient force, even though it accurately characterises my view. But there are more interesting cases that fall in between these two versions and so stand a chance of being hitting their mark while still having some force.

The next version of this objection points out that according to my view the way in which emotions lead to actions in adult humans cannot be the same as the way in which they lead to actions in animals. The objection takes this to be a damaging result.

Perhaps the picture of emotional action in human adults that this criticism sees as emerging from my claims is something like this:

1. Person A, is in a situation which triggers a certain emotion (belonging to a certain type).
2. The emotion is hooked up to A’s concepts in such a way that it presents its object evaluatively.
3. A is moved by that evaluative representation, and acts in accordance with it.

This is certainly a scenario which I think is possible and which my view aims to explain. However, by my lights, the situation is under-described in a way that disguises what it shares with animal actions driven by emotions.

The under-description occurs in step 1. I invoked appraisal theories of the emotions in response to the earlier objection that my view cannot handle emotion type-individuation (7.2). Appraisal theories account for regularities between environmental conditions and features of the emotions that are caused. These regularities explain how the emotions systematically guide action. A lot of this happens before any concepts are involved and when concepts are added to the mix they often do nothing more than add a representational dimension to the very same motivational impetus built into the emotions. The affective profile of a given emotion is what determines what type of emotion it is. This affective profile includes a number of valanced dimensions. Among these are approach-avoidance tendencies, cognitive biases, focus of attention, and activation of schematized action scripts. These dimensions of the emotion are sufficient on their own for action causation.

So in step one of the process described above – the step that we share with animals – there is already the potential for emotional action. Given this, animals being motivated to do roughly what we are motivated to do by their emotions is exactly what we should expect given my theory. Furthermore, just like in animals our emotional system has
evolved to provide these motivations, so we should expect them to motivate us appropriately to whatever extent our current situation is similar to the situations under which selection took place.

In human adults there is a capacity to step back from these elements of the emotion itself to assess whether they are compelling enough to issue in action. This happens at step 3. The action-guiding elements, built into the emotions themselves, form the core of emotions that we share with animals. It would be a problematic form of human exceptionalism to think that this core cannot directly incite action in humans, since it would suggest that there is nothing in common between emotional action in adult humans and emotional action in animals. But this implausible view is not forced on me by what I have said. All that I am say here is that there is another possible route from emotion to action in adult humans that is unique to us which involves steps 2 and 3.

In fact, there are theoretical gains to be made elsewhere by exploiting the fact that emotions can motivate independently of their contribution to the justification of an end. Döring responds to an objection Bennett Helm levels against perceptual theories in a way that relies on these two paths to emotional action. Helm claims that perceptual theories of the emotions go too far in insulating emotions from judgements. According to him, it is a datum that when an emotion persists in spite of a rational belief that presents things in a way that conflicts with the content of the emotion, the emotion is irrational. But the perceptual theory cannot accommodate this, since there is nothing irrational about believing that two lines are the same length, and also being subject to the appearance that one is longer than the other. (Helm, 2001)

Döring replies by denying that it is a datum that the difference between emotions and perceptions is that there is contradiction-like irrationality in the emotional case. According to her, the datum is instead that in cases like this the emotion is more disruptive than the perception. This is due to the direct pathway from emotion to action, which allows an emotion to bypass the conflict with judgement and cause action on its own. Emotions, unlike perceptions, involve a motivational element distinct from their representational element, and this means that they can lead to the wrong action via the direct path. (See (Döring, 2010), (Döring, 2015) for an even stronger claim along these lines, and 1.5.2. for my discussion.)

Another possible version of the objection from human exceptionalism is the worry that my theory will be subject to a complaint made against the cognitivist theories of the ’70s. By accounting for emotional representation in a way that relies on conceptual capacities, don’t I fail to account for another shared dimension of animal and human emotion – their intentionality. We want to be able to say that when a dog (call him Barry) is scared of a cardboard box, Barry’s fear is directed at the cardboard box. A classic cognitivist cannot easily say this because their account of emotional intentionality is parasitic upon an account of the intentionality of judgement, and presumably Barry is not making a judgement.

But again, this worry misses the mark because of what my account of the emotions claims about their proper objects. Part of my picture is that emotions get their proper-object directedness from their cognitive bases, not from their connection to my concepts. This is something Barry and I share. His fear gets to be about the cardboard
box because the box is given to him by his perceptual faculties as an item he can fear. So this dimension of his emotional intentionality is the dimension we share. The second dimension of my emotional intentionality I do have to deny that we share. But on its own this is not obviously a problem, unless one of the versions of the objects above can be made to stick.

7.4 Conclusion.

None of the three objections I have looked at are damaging to my theory. My theory gives emotions enough independence from our standing judgments to account for ways in which emotion can shape our evaluative outlooks (7.1). The dominant psychological theory gives us the resources to type-individuate the emotions sufficiently well for my claim that emotions help to individuate evaluative concepts (7.2). Finally, my view does not rely on a problematic human exceptionalism, even though it does theonise about some distinctively human capacities (7.3)
Chapter 8.
Perception and emotion.

In this final chapter I would like to briefly explore some the comparison between perception and emotion in light of my views on emotional representation. These thoughts are largely avenues for further research rather than fully worked out positions. The idea is to use some of the theoretical machinery I have developed to see how my view emotional representation best fits into a broader philosophical framework. I have accepted that perception has nonconceptual contents, but have not shown that emotions do. In this chapter will try to show that the difference between the two is smaller than this makes it look. Looking at question of conceptual vs. nonconceptual content in both emotion and perception I will claim that emotional representation has some of the features we associate with nonconceptual representation (8.1). I will also directly assess the extent to which the view I have outlined is compatible with the perceptual analogy view of the emotions. I will claim that even in the case of perceptions, to fully understand their contribution to our rational lives we must countenance conceptual contents that augment the nonconceptual contents they earn themselves. As such, perception and emotion are more similar than it might initially seem.

8.1 Conceptual content

Many take perceptions to have nonconceptual content (Burge, 2010), (Crane, 1992), (Evans, 1982), (Peacocke, 2003) among numerous others. The claim is controversial, but it seems that if any domain is likely to have nonconceptual contents perception is such a domain.

Richard Heck separates out two ways of distinguishing conceptual and nonconceptual views of representation. These are the content view of conceptuality and the state view of conceptuality (Heck, 2000, p485). The content view claims that conceptual representation and nonconceptual representation ought to distinguished in terms of types of content. (For example, perhaps nonconceptual content is analogue where conceptual content is digital, or perhaps nonconceptual content is spatially and egocentrically structured.) The state view claims that the distinction is between states that can be entertained only by creatures with the relevant concepts and states that can be entertained by creatures without the relevant concepts. So on this view, beliefs are conceptual representations, since one cannot believe that Elvis is alive without having a concept of Elvis. Perception, on the other hand, might not have conceptual content on this view, since plausibly one may perceive something to be red before one acquires the concept RED.

If we think about the conceptual-nonconceptual distinction in line with the state view, then the debate about whether or not a given type of state conceptually or
nonconceptually represents just comes down to whether or not states of the given type are concept-dependent or concept-independent.

I have tried to remain neutral on the conceptual content debate vis-à-vis emotions when it is understood in terms of the content view. I said we ought to leave open the possibility that emotions have conceptual content, and claimed that we can do this by stressing the way that the attitude housing the emotion’s content can insulate the emotion from full inferential engagement with our beliefs (1.4.2). But since I have given a theory that claims that emotions become subject to representational norms by becoming involved in our conceptual scheme, I have taken on a commitment about the sort of content emotions have if we carve things up as the state view suggests.

Heck puts the nonconceptual view of perceptions like this: “the contents of a thinker’s perceptual states can, while the contents of her beliefs cannot, involve concepts she does not possess” (Heck, 2000, p485). The story I have given so suggests that in order to represent familiar evaluative properties, emotions must be integrated into the possession conditions of evaluative concepts. For my fear to be subject to a representational norm in terms of DANGER I must have that concept. So the evaluative content of emotional states is conceptual in the state sense—it depends on the subject’s possessing concepts that represent the relevant evaluative properties. If what Burge says about perception is correct, then in this respect, emotions are unlike perceptions, since perceptions can represent their objects as having certain properties irrespective of our possession of relevant concepts.

Before discussing this difference I want to stress that this dissimilarity does not threaten what I have taken to be the core attraction of the perceptual analogy. The chief motivation for the perceptual analogy is getting the right justificatory relations between emotions, on the one hand, and beliefs and actions, on the other. Even if perception stands in a different relation to belief and action because perception can justify in the absence of conceptual capacities, where emotion cannot, this would not be fatal to the project. Once the connection between emotions and concepts is established in the right way, having an emotion gives the agent new epistemic responsibilities and entitlements (as Sellars would say, it shifts their place in the space of reasons). All things being equal, if I feel fear of a shark I have acquired a responsibility to determine whether the fear is rational given the way its proper object is\textsuperscript{118}, and (under good circumstances) I have a default entitlement to believe the shark to be dangerous. Fleeing is now an understandable, and perhaps even rational response, just in virtue of my being afraid. In this respect the perceptual analogy holds.

8.1.1 Conceptual content without subtitles.

The sort of evaluative content that I have secured for the emotions is clearly conceptual content, given the state view of conceptuality. Yet many think emotions must have nonconceptual content. We saw that Döring’s reason to think this doesn’t hold up—just

\textsuperscript{118} All things being are often unequal, since fear is often experienced in situations where speed of response is more important than precision about the rational credential of the fear. So the responsibility is normally not one I rationally should discharge at the time.
because an emotion cannot be inferred into being doesn’t mean its content cannot be conceptual (1.4.2). But one thought that might underwrite Döring’s claim is more compelling. It seems that an emotion conveys more than is captured by a single belief formed on its basis. That is, the conceptual content that is most closely related to the emotion (since it can be believed on the basis of the emotion) is missing something that the emotion has. The emotion is richer than the belief. (Representational richness is widely taken to be characteristic nonconceptually structured contents by proponents of that view in the perception literature.)

This richness is something that I am in a position to explain in the case of emotions, and I hope that this explanation may offer resources for some debates surrounding whether other states involve conceptually structured contents. We are often told that perceptual content must be different in kind to conceptual content because it is analogue content (and conceptual content is digital). Analogue content cannot avoid taking a stance on some things which digital content can avoid taking a stance on. The claim “there is a bird in front of me” tells us something about what there is and where that thing is in relation to me, but nothing more. By contrast, seeing a bird in front of me cannot avoid containing more information – it will contain information about the size, colour and shape of the bird (and other things besides). Perhaps the extra content that emotions have over and above the conceptual content of the beliefs that they justify is due to the emotions having analogue content.

I would like to explain why an emotion says more than any given belief based on it in another way. My explanation is that an emotion can be subject to indefinitely many of the sort of conceptual norms that I have discussed, but any given belief formed on the basis of an emotion is likely to only pick up on some of those norms. In this respect the emotion has the potential for richer content than any of the particular (conceptually structured) beliefs based upon it, and so it resembles analogue content.

Let me spell out why we should expect a given emotion to be subject to more content-introducing norms than are captured by the beliefs formed on the basis of the emotion. Consider our case of fear of a shark. I am afraid of a shark and I form the belief the shark is dangerous. Since fear partially individuates the concept DANGER the belief is justified by the emotion having matching content. But there is nothing stopping fear from individuation more than one concept. My concept of THE FEARSOME is almost certainly also individuated by fear. Part of what it is to think something is fearsome is to be prone to fear of it. Fear might play a role partially individuating indefinitely many more concepts –THE INTIMIDATING, THE THRILLING, THE OVERWHELMING, GOOD HORROR MOVIE, and so on. This means that my occurrent fear of the shark could be subject to norms in terms of each of these concepts as well as that in terms of the concept DANGER. Furthermore, the token mental state that is my fear of the shark is also an instance of many other state types that might help individuate other concepts. The particular state of fear is also more nuanced than is captured by just calling fear. It will have a specific intensity, duration, etc and so it might individuate other concepts thanks to more specific typings. Perhaps this fear is intense enough to belong to the type of state that helps individuate the concept TERRIFYING or PANIC-INDUCING. It is also a state that belongs to more general kinds. It is an occurrent emotion, and occurrent emotions might help to individuate the concept EMOTION, the concept SELF-CONSCIOUS MENTAL STATE, and so on. So long as the state is subject to representation norms thanks to its
connections to these further concepts, it has derivative content involving all of them, not just involving the concept DANGER. So even if my fear of the shark only has conceptually structured content, it could still have conceptual content that massively outruns the content of any given belief I am likely to form on its basis.

Notice that this content will have some of the features of analogue content (though I do not claim that what I have said establishes that the emotion itself actually has analogue content). Since there will be a number of attributes that the emotions have to varying degrees (intensity, arousal, positive-negative valence and so on) we may well have concepts which institute representational norms which relate to these degrees, so the emotion might be subject to arbitrarily fine-grained scalar representational norms. Furthermore, so long as the agents undergoing them have certain concepts, all emotions might have axes along which they cannot help but have some content, just like with perceptions. Just as a visual representation of a house cannot help but represent it as some particular shape, it is possible that no emotion can help but represent the goal congruence of its proper object, or where it falls on the pleasantness-unpleasantness spectrum (because if we have the right concept of these evaluative features it might be that any given emotion we can have helps to individuate the concepts and so is subject to a resulting representational norm).

Views that claim perceptions have conceptual content are often ridiculed as giving an account of experience with subtitles already built in. The idea is that if the experience involves the concepts that build up the representational contents of the perception, then what is given in the experience could be captured by a statement of what is being experienced. The proposition that serves as the content for the perception could, in principle, simply be captured in a statement. The content of the perception could be given by a subtitle embedded in the perception and any belief that can be formed on the basis of the perception must be just part of that subtitle. But the fact that a single experience (emotional or perceptual) can be subject to a plethora of representational norms undermines the idea that a single subtitle - looking something like a perceptual belief - could ever capture all that the experience represents. An emotion, it seems, is worth a thousand subtitles.

The claim that emotions can become subject to multiple correctness conditions by being connected to multiple concepts also gives my position something to say to one of the challenges Schroeter, Schroeter and Jones (2015) propose for theorists wanting to claim emotions have representational contents. They ask for a principled reason to take any given emotion to have an appropriateness condition involving one evaluative property rather than another. This is a difficult task, since it will be hard to say why an emotion like fear should have an appropriateness condition involving danger rather than fearsomeness. My response is that there is no principled reason to select one over the other because the emotion can simply be subject to both and so have contents in terms of both properties.

8.2 The perceptual analogy revisited.
My starting point for this thesis was a view of emotions that draws an analogy between emotions and perceptions. In defence of this view, I have argued that emotions have conceptual contents because they help to individuate our evaluative concepts. I do this having accepted Burge’s claims about perception, according to which perceptions get to have nonconceptual content thanks solely to the operation of the perceptual system, considered on its own. When it comes to the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content I am talking about state conceptualism – so if Burge is right that perception can have representational contents irrespective of the concepts the perceiver possesses, then perceptions have nonconceptual content. Whereas perceptions get their content in a bottom up way (as a result of the computation the perpetual system does on proximal stimulus), emotions, on my picture, get their contents in a manner that is more top-down (by being related to concepts possessed by the agent). Given this disanalogy between perception and emotion (and given the other points at which I have emphasized differences between perceptions and emotions 1.5.3 and 4.1.2) it is worth asking to what extent the position I am advocating is still a variation on the perceptual analogy.

I have argued that in spite of these differences my account preserves the core claims of the perceptual analogy concerning the justificatory roles of the emotions. We wanted a picture of the emotions according to which they can (noninferentially) justify beliefs and actions and exhibit conflict without contradiction, and on which there is something like a default-mode – a stance which we naturally adopt that allows us to be straightforwardly informed about the world via our emotional responses to it. This is a stance that we are only bumped out of when rational conflict is generated between how things appear and how we believe them to be. This much has been vindicated by my view. But now I would like to say a little more about a further sense in which we might take the perceptual analogy seriously.

In spite of accepting Burge’s bottom-up account of perceptual content and its contribution to the justification of beliefs, I want to claim that in order to give a full account of the way in which what we see can justify what we believe even perception must be integrated with concepts in the same sort of way I have claimed emotions are. That is, I want to claim that even Burge will need to accept something that does the work of observational concepts in the Peacocke theory I have advanced. Recall that observational concepts are concepts which are partially individuated by input conditions that are specified in terms of perceptual experiences – Peacocke’s favourite example is the concept RED which has reddish patches in the visual field as an input condition. These observational concepts then have output conditions that explain the role they can have in justifying various beliefs. RED is a concept that entitles and requires us to take anything that we take to be red to be coloured. So long as we have the concept RED we can get justification for believing something is coloured from the fact that it occupies a reddish patch of our visual field.

The vast majority of the important beliefs we form on the basis of our perceptions involve concepts that go beyond the content of perception as Burge conceives it. It’s not very interesting that there is a grey object three meters long moving beside me, remaining constant in size and so on. But I might form an important belief because of a perceptual episode with those contents – namely that I am being circled by a shark. The perceptual episode somehow needs to be connected to this belief in a way that
grants entitlement to the belief. The work is not done by what Burge has put on the table in *Origins of Objectivity*, since the only contents the perceptions can have, in and of themselves, is built up out perceptual attributives. We only get the grey object, not the shark. The gap between the perception and belief is bridged, in Peacocke’s story, by observational concepts. My concept SHARK might have as some of its input conditions the sorts of visual experiences I have when I see a shark, and so the visual experience entitles me to belief I am being circled by a shark.

It should be uncontroversial that there is some sense in which I can see things like sharks (as well as a myriad of other things that cannot be the content of perception). Even if Burge is right that perceptions are representational in and of themselves, coming with accuracy conditions built into them that our inferential commitments have no bearing on, this just means that there is room for a notion of seeing which is not simply visual perception.

Let’s take an example. Suppose I am watching the tennis. I see that Nadal has just missed Wrawrinka’s return. In this case I have seen something that, by Burge’s lights, is not fit to be the content of a perception. This is not just a representation of something as exhibiting some set of the primitive attributives that perceptions have available. No combination of representations of surfaces, colours, changes in spatial position and orientation, etc, suffices for the representation to be a representation of Nadal (let alone Nadal missing Wrawrinka’s return). I am seeing something which is veridical if and only if a particular person just did a particular thing. The veridicality of my perception does not just depend on a complex of sensible attributes is possessed by a number of objects.

Even having accepted Burge’s definition of perception, this should be an uncontroversial case of our ordinary notion of seeing. It is the occurrence of a state in me, which is responsive to the world, via a visual sensory pathway. It is a state that noninferentially justifies my believing that Nadal missed Wrawrinka’s return. This state is itself subject to a norm of veridicality – if Nadal did in fact miss the ball that Wrawrinka just returned (and if his doing so is causally hooked up to me) then I have veridically seen that Nadal missed the ball. If Nadal hit the ball, (or if he missed it, but he was behind a screen which the ball passed through, which has old footage of Nadal projected onto it) then I have not seen that Nadal missed the ball.

The fact that I have not perceived any of this, in the technical sense we have accepted, can be appreciated if we examine the differences between the normative relations that the ordinary notion of seeing bears to the world and those that can be instituted by perception. Perceptions have a limited range of attributives, so the normative relations instantiated by perceptions can only make the perception answerable to the world in terms of this range of attributives. A perception can only be right or wrong about the things it can claim about the world – that is it can only be right or wrong about the way it applies its pallet of attributives. This seeing, on the other hand, is normatively related to the world in terms of items from our broader conception of the world – it is answerable to it being Nadal who I see, and whether I see missing a return, and so on.

Presumably there is a story that can be told about the connection between ordinary seeing and perceptions – in particular there is an asymmetrical dependence relation
between the two. I can only see Nadal miss because of the subpersonal processing of
perception, whereas these subpersonal processes could take place without me seeing
Nadal missing – if I don’t know who Nadal is, I would not have a visual experience
whose verticality depends on Nadal in any way.

But, this relation should not be thought to mean that the materials that can feature in
such seeings must be worked up out of the materials given in perceptions alone (that
the seeing is reducible to the perceptions it is dependent upon). Just because this
ability is dependent on my perceptual capacities does not mean that learning to see
new things is learning a computational function that takes the norms of perceptions,
and relations between them as input, and yields complex patterns of these norms
which correspond to the norms I am subject to in seeing Nadal. That is, having a state
that is subject to norms of Nadal-representation is not having a state that is the result of
computations made on proximal stimulus that generate the prediction that the distal
cause of that proximal stimulus is Nadal. There’s more to seeing someone as Nadal
than just seeing someone as looking and sounding Nadalesque.

What is more, the dependence relation between seeing and perception is not even one
of supervenience, since there can be a difference in seeing without a difference in
perception. Someone who doesn’t know how to “read” a cloud chamber cannot see a
_Mu Meson_ in one, even given the same perceptual state as someone who can see one.

### 8.2.1 How to see things you cannot perceive

So how can it be that a seeing gets to institute these norms that are related to things
that cannot be the content of perceptions? The answer I want to push is that the
visual episodes get these normative characteristics in the same way that I have
claimed emotions get theirs.

According to this line (which is basically just Peacocke’s line), hooking vision up to my
conceptual capacities institutes new representational norms – the norms surrounding
Nadal’s missed return are not simply long complicated strings of the norms about
angles, faces, colours, edges and so on that figure in perception. Instead they are
norms related to my concept _NADAL_. According to this story my concept _NADAL_
has visual input conditions and so the visual experiences that serves as those inputs
become subject to a representational norm in terms of the concept _NADAL_ in the same
way that my experience of fear becomes subject to a norm in terms of my concept
_DANGER_. Because of the way my concept _NADAL_ works, if the person I saw trying to hit
the return was born to different parents then I have not seen Nadal fail to hit a ball, and
this is so even if all the perceptibles are exactly the same as they would be, were it
Nadal himself I was seeing. Again, the possession of the concept has instituted new

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119 I am telling this story in terms of visual perception but the same holds for other sensory modalities. If I know anything
about jazz or classical music I can hear a trumpet blast, if I know anything about death metal I can hear a blast beat.
These are cases of auditory perception being embedded in my conceptual capacities in the same sort of ways and so
opening up the range of things that I can hear.
representational norms that do not supervene on the norms instituted by the perceptions. The play of shapes, colours, etc can remain the same (along with the norms they institute) while the norms instituted by my concept of Nadal can change the conditions under which the seeing is veridical.

Peacocke is explicit that the conceptual content we can extract from perception depends on relations between the nonconceptual content of the perceptions themselves and observational concepts. Presumably Burge will want to tell a somewhat similar story too. In “Perceptual Entitlement” he says that “in being part of a system of belief, perceptual representation becomes subject to epistemic norms” (Burge, 2003, p521). This grants that the perception itself is subject to norms that depend on belief. Since belief is a paradigmatically conceptual thing we should expect such shaping to draw on the conceptual nature of the conceptual relata (belief). There is also a gap in Burge’s story at exactly this point. As discussed above, perceptual norms cannot add up to the sort of norms that relate my sensory experience to a particular person (like Nadal). Yet presumably Burge will agree that there is a sense in which I can see Nadal. So both Peacocke and Burge will say that perceptions can become subject to conceptual norms in addition to having whatever nonconceptual content they have.

8.2.2 Objection.

Perhaps it might be objected that I am moving too quickly from the fact that we can justify beliefs on the basis of sensory experiences to the claim that those experiences themselves becomes subject to norms. Maybe what is actually happening here is that the perceptions are being construed a certain way. So the seeing is actually just the boring old perception, with is a separate act of judgement on top which goes from the perception of shape, size, movement etc, to a judgement that it is Nadal being perceived.

There are two ways of cashing this out (or rather a continuum with two poles), and my response will depend upon which reading is employed. On the one hand we might think that what is posited here are two different mental events - a perception of the relevant perceptible features, plus a judgement about Nadal, along with an evidential relation between the two (after all, the perception of a red sweatband, on an object the size and shape of Nadal is evidence that Nadal is there, given the appropriate background beliefs). Call this the two-state view. The alternative is a view that replaces a separate judgement with a construal of the perception. Call this the construal view.

In response to the construal view, I am inclined to say that that is simply another way of putting my view. The construal is built into the sensory state – it is not a separable item, so it sounds like a construed perception is just a redescriptions of what I am advocating – a conceptually infused seeing. On this proposal the sensory state combines perceptual elements (in the narrow sense) with the activation of concepts, to yield a state which has appropriateness conditions dependent on those supplied by the conceptual part. And that is just my view.
The other alternative is the two-state view, which I reject, and think that we all ought to reject. This view paints a strange picture of what it is like to visually encounter the world. It suggests that we make a series of judgments about our environment rather than merely seeing it – we do not just sense things in such a way that our environment is presented a certain way, rather we have perceptions and then, via ampliative inference, form judgements that extend beyond the content of the perception in ways that are really quite adventurous (I go from a three dimensional object presented as having certain sensible features, to a judgement about Nadal which has modal properties radically unrelated to those of the collection of colours and shapes I saw). Such a view would have a hard time explaining why these judgments are warranted, and since they are separate events it would seem up for grabs whether or not we ought to indulge in them.

So that version of the two-state view won’t work. Another version claims that instead of forming the judgment “I am seeing Nadal” we form the judgement “I am seeing what seems to be Nadal.” This alleviates the worry about the epistemically adventurous nature of the judgments we form. However, it does so at the cost of requiring that to see things like Nadal we must have metareflective judgments about our perceptions seeming to be perceptions of Nadal.

Secondly, it presents the perception side of the equation as something that has an implausibly independent life in our conscious mental activity. It suggests that there are conscious states in us that are bare perceptions – states with normative standings that rest only on the instantiation of common perceptibles – and that we make judgments about them, or based upon them. It seems to me that our conscious sensory experience is presented almost entirely as openness to a familiar environment. The primary objects of experience in this sense are medium-sized ordinary objects – first and foremost we see chairs and tables, not brown shapes. If there were two distinct states it would be hard to see why effort is required to shift gears to bring the perceptual attributives into focus. Normally we see through them, to the objects. If there were two independent states, and we formed judgments on the basis of the perceptions themselves we would expect that the perceptions themselves come into consciousness naturally. If so, it is hard to see how effort would be required to focus on just the perceivable aspects of the experience.

Thirdly, this view mischaracterises illusions that involve the attribution of properties that are not common perceptibles. If I see what looks like a bent stick in water the perception itself is illusory. The content of the visual experience is false since it attributes bentness to the stick. But now consider an illusion caused by the malfunction of my facial recognition capacities. These capacities do not attribute perceptual attributives. Suppose that suddenly everyone I see looks like Barry Taylor to me, even though nothing changes at the level of perceptual attributives. Notice that on the first version of the two-state view there is nothing the matter with my sensory experience, all that goes wrong is that I form judgements I oughtn’t to on their basis\textsuperscript{120}. But this won’t do as a characterisation, since I might easily overcome the

\textsuperscript{120} Note that if this were to happen, in the absence of any other cognitive malfunction, I would quickly stop forming judgements about who was and wasn’t Barry Taylor. But this needn’t be a problem for the two-state view. They can simply claim that the judgments that are relevant are “seems ….” judgments, or “looks like….” Judgments.
inclination to believe I am seeing Barry Taylor, yet the seemings remain. When it comes to working out which state is subject to which norm we can use these illusions to ask who to blame for what has gone wrong. In this case the nonverdicality is not the fault of the belief system – after all I am not inclined to believe I am seeing Barry Taylor. The sensory system (broadly construed, with its links to our conceptual scheme) is responsible for the misleading information. Since the sensory system is the appropriate part of the overall system to blame, it is the sensory system that is subject to the relevant norm. There is not some second step of construing which is subject to the norm. (Just like in the Huck Finn case, where the sympathy itself is subject to the norm, not something Huck thinks about the sympathy.)

The second version of the two-state view does even worse here. It claims that I form judgements that each person I see seems to be Barry Taylor. There is nothing wrong with the perception itself – remember it just presents the surfaces, etc, and nothing has changed here. But there is also nothing wrong with the judgement – everyone does visually seem to me to be Barry Taylor. So this version of the two-state view struggles to even count me as being subject to an illusion.

So it looks like only the construal view can do the work needed and it seems like a notational variant on my view.

8.2.3 Why think the new norms are conceptual norms?

There is a reason to think the non-perceptual norms that seeings are subject to are conceptually-based which is independent of the plausibility of the story I have told, via Peacocke, about the emotions. The reason is that the norms are inferentially structured.

Once my perceptual capacities are suitably connected to my conceptual repertoire, merely having a visual experience of a dog wearing a hat shifts my normative standing. I now have some justification for believing that there is a hat-wearing dog there and, given the surprising content, I have some responsibility to check that things are as they look (again all things being equal, given sufficient time and interest). The normative shift is also inferentially structured. I receive an entitlement that is inferentially structured. I have permission to believe that there is a dog in a hat as well as things that follow from it – that there is a dog, that there is a hat, that animals sometimes wear hats, and so on. My responsibilities are also affected in an inferentially articulable manner. The observation puts me under some sort of an obligation to check that its contents are accurate, and that anything that follows from its contents is accurate. These responsibilities are also dependent on inferential relations to my background beliefs. If I have good reason to believe that there are no hats in my vicinity, I am more culpable for not checking the accuracy of what I saw.

There is good reason to think that since the normative status we enter into on seeing something is inferentially articulated in this way, it involves conceptual content. Inferential articulation is standardly taken to be the test for determining whether content is conceptual (Crane, 1992), (Gunther, 2003b, Introduction). However, I don’t intend this to take a stand on whether or not emotions and perceptions themselves must have
conceptual contents, partly because different participants in this debate seem to mean different things by this. What I am claiming is meant to be neutral between McDowell’s claim that perceptions are themselves conceptually structured and Peacocke’s claim that the perceptions themselves have nonconceptual content, but that our concepts are individuated in a manner that refers to distinctions within that nonconceptual content, such that our having the perception give us a conceptually structured epistemic standing. The thing I am insisting on is that more happens when a creature with conceptual capacities hooked up to their perceptions sees something than happens when a creature without conceptual capacities perceives the same thing.

So it seems that we have good reason to think that the sort of norms that seeings are subject to which go beyond the norms of perception proper are conceptually structured.

8.2.4 The perceptual analogy?

At the end of all of this I have talked a number of times about analogies between emotions and perceptions. I have exploited both similarities and differences in order to make the case for emotional representation. I have claimed that emotions and perceptions stand in the same sort of justifying relations to beliefs (Chapter 1). But I have also claimed that emotions cannot get their content in the way that perceptions get theirs (Chapter 3). Instead they must get their contents in the way that perceptions get an extended sort of content – content involving observational concepts. This leaves me with the idea that the analogy between perception and emotion is useful so long as we don’t read too much into it. In particular we shouldn’t read the perceptual analogy between emotion and perception strictly so-called (i.e in the narrow Burgean sense). Instead, given what I am claiming, an analogy with conceptually infused perception would be more apt.

Perhaps perceptual theorists of the emotions will want to sit somewhere in between. They may well want to claim that emotions can be compared to perceptions properly so-called but that perceptions properly so-called have the sort of contents that I am claiming only cognitively infused perceptions can (albeit nonconceptually). So far I have simply accepted Burge’s account of perception properly so-called rather than arguing for it. It should be noted that both Burge and McDowell would agree that perception cannot get to have these sorts of contents without a connection to the conceptual. (They could disagree on whether or not this connection to the conceptual holds in such a way that perceptions do get to have those sorts of contents. McDowell will claim they do and Burge may claim that they do not.) Given this agreement between two figures who diverge so dramatically in other respects, I am inclined to think the perception needs these sorts of connections with the conceptual in order to acquire the sorts of contents that advocates of the perceptual analogy for the emotions will be interested in. But this is a topic for another day.

8.3 Conclusion.
The core difference between what I have accepted about perception and what I have shown about emotion is that perception, but not emotion, has nonconceptual representational content that it earns on its own. In this chapter I have tried to show that this difference is not as great as it might look. Emotional representation has some of the features we associate with nonconceptual representation (8.1) and to fully understand the rational contribution that perception makes to our rational lives we must also countenance conceptual contents which augment the contents of the perceptions themselves.
Conclusion.

Over the course of this thesis I have argued that emotions have representational contents and can play the sorts of justificatory roles that perceptual theorist claim for them (Explained in Chapters 1 and 2). Emotions have representational contents that divide into two dimensions of intentionality – their proper-object directedness and their formal-object directedness. The analogy between perception and emotion cannot be used to give an account of how emotion achieves both these intentional aspects. Rather, the emotions take their proper object from their cognitive bases – the other mental states which make the emotions possible in the first place (Chapter 4). They get their formal objects thanks to norms instituted by the evaluative concepts which the emotions help to individuate (Chapter 5). This makes them subject to representational norms such that they are appropriate if and only if their proper object satisfies their formal object. The fact that they have these representational contents, combined with the way the emotional phenomenology widely conceived is shaped, explains how emotions can play the sorts of justificatory roles that perceptual theorist claim they can (Chapter 6). Because the emotions have their own contents, they can introduce evaluations that aren’t available to us via deliberation. This explains how they can play a role that doesn’t merely reduce to the role of our other cognitions. They can also play a role that is both internalist and non-inferential thanks to the way their phenomenology can become presentational. They can put us under rational pressure to believe their contents, and this means that when they conflict with our beliefs we are forced to make a decision about whether the emotion or the belief gets things right. This explains how conflict between emotions and judgements can bump us out of our default engagement with the world in which we take how things seem to us at face value.

I have also dealt with some potential objections to the account I have offered (Chapter 7). Finally I have looked at whether this way of vindicating the core justificatory claims made by perceptual theories is still best thought of as a vindication of the perceptual analogy itself. I claim that it can be thought of in this way, so long as we allow that the sort of perception that emotions should be compared to are cognitively infused perceptions (Chapter 8).
One explanatory virtue the view I have advocated has is that it gives us something philosophically interesting to say about relations between emotion types. Take as an example emotional-type inclusion questions like whether or not insecurity is a form of shame. This feels to me like an interesting and substantial question about which philosophy could have something to say. But this intuition is not as easily accommodated as it might initially look. I will talk about two other attempts to show that philosophy has something to say about questions like this, then I will offer my story about what philosophy can say about questions like this, which relies on some of the claims I have made so far.

Perceptual theories of the emotions typically claim (along with cognitive theories) that emotions inherently have formal objects, and that these formal objects individuate the emotion types. If this way of type-individuating emotions is right, we can rely on logical relations between the emotions’ formal objects in order to say which emotion types are included in other emotion types. For instance, suppose that the formal object of shame is *incapacity that reflects poorly on the agent* (perhaps this is implausible, but it doesn’t matter since I’m using this story just to show how such a debate ought to go, not trying to take a side). Suppose also that the formal object of insecurity is *incapacity of the agent in facing an identity defining task that they are engaged in (which reflects poorly on the agent)*. In that case, given the logical relation between the formal objects of the two, it is clear that the formal object for insecurity is a special case of the formal object for shame. Given that these formal objects define what the emotions in question are the inclusion relation between the formal objects tells us about the inclusion of one emotion type within the other. If these are the right formal objects, and if formal object individuate emotions types, then insecurity is a form of shame.

However, things aren’t as rosy as this makes it look. Remember from Chapter 1 that the extant perceptual theories claim that the contents of emotions are non-conceptual in order to avoid putting the contents of emotions into logical relations with the contents of judgements on pain of having the emotions generate contradiction when they conflict with beliefs. Remember also that specifying a formal object and a proper object is meant to suffice for an account of emotional representation. So the content of the emotion is determined by these two features. If these two features are conceptually articulated, then so should be the content that they determine. That is, if the formal object is specified in an inferentially articulable manner, then if the proper object is presented as satisfying this formal object, it is also presented as satisfying any further requirements that are its logical consequents. So if my fear presents something as dangerous, and the dangerousness in question is conceptually structured, then the fear presents the object as satisfying anything that is a conceptual consequence of something being dangerous – for instance that it is to be avoided. Therefore we have content that cannot exhibit the wanted conflict without contradiction.

121 Though Döring does not commit herself on this issue directly she does commit to the contents of emotions being non-inferential and this amounts to the same thing, according to almost every participant in the nonconceptual content debate.

122 I argued that this can all be handled at the level of attitude rather than content, but the views on the table demur (1.4.2).
So the formal object must be involved in a nonconceptual manner. But now the formal object, which these theories take to individuate the emotion types, is not something which can stand in logical relations with other formal objects. (That is the whole point of insisting on nonconceptuality). So we cannot get an account of logical relations between emotion types out of logical relations between their formal objects.

So the first option doesn’t work. How about simply taking my story about emotional individuation, which I borrowed from the appraisals theory literature? This is the obvious place for me to look for an answer, since whether insecurity is a form of shame is surely a matter of whether insecurity is individuated in a way that is a proper part of how shame is individuated. So does the story about individuation that I have endorsed, on its own, give us the resources to answer this question?

Unfortunately it doesn’t give us a philosophically interesting way of answering the question. The rainbow swirl flavour of appraisal theory says that emotion types are merely our names for regions of the total possible affective space. Suppose that we specify all the salient aspects of insecurity (the feelings involved, the sorts of cognitive biases it entails, and so on) and then map it onto the space of possible affective states. Now suppose that having done this we find that it falls into a region that is surrounded on all sides by cases of what we are inclined to call shame. This is our best bet for a positive answer to the question of whether insecurity is shame given this view. But this doesn’t seem very philosophically interesting. Even given this finding we could chose to claim that insecurity is not a form of shame. After all, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) is not a part of New South Wales (NSW), even though it is surrounded by it on all sides. For the same sort of reasons that ACT is a different state to NSW we might think that insecurity deserves to be counted as separate from shame – because we give it a different status, which is as important to the question of what type of emotion it is as its location in space. The rainbow swirl claim is not that the affective space sets out regions that can be gridded to discover the real essences of emotion types, after-all rainbow swirl theorist don’t think emotion types are important theoretical tools and do not get at important distinctions in reality. So this putatively positive answer remains somewhat neutral on the question of emotional type inclusion.

Suppose we were to take the appraisal theoretic answer to inclusion questions to be all there was to say – being in the right region is all there is to say about whether one emotion type is a subtype of another emotion type. This way of understanding types of emotions does not straightforwardly give philosophers anything useful to say about questions like that concerning insecurity and shame. Just because the ACT is bounded by NSW doesn’t mean that anything that is entitled or forbidden in NSW is entitled or forbidden in the ACT. Fireworks can be legally purchased in the ACT but not in NSW. What is of philosophical interest in emotional inclusion claims are what we can learn about the normative statuses instituted by the different emotion types and mere location in affective space does not tell us anything about this.

However, I will claim that the rest of my machinery does give us something interesting to talk about when faced with the question about shame and insecurity, though it involves some rephrasing of the question. I have claimed that emotions become subject to conceptual norms thanks to their integration into our thinking. This is the claim I will exploit in giving a story about how philosophers can have something to say
to these questions. Notice that on this view, unlike on the standard perceptual view, the formal objects of emotions get full inferential articulation, so part-whole relations, and other logical relation between formal objects are available to be discussed. However I am not claiming that these formal objects individuate the emotions, so the fact that they stand in part-whole relations does not mean that the emotions themselves do.

This rules out giving a direct answer to the question, literally conceived, along these lines. Part-whole relations between emotion types are surely determined by what individuate the emotions. But the question about the relation between shame and insecurity is getting at something philosophically interesting. It seems that answers to this question could have important implications for ethical and rational self-governance. If insecurity turns out to be a sort of shame (in some sense), and if we have views about when shame is appropriate, then this ought to be helpful in thinking about when insecurity is appropriate. There are types of emotion we might think are always inappropriate, so if some emotion turns out to be a subtype of that emotion, then we have reason to think it is inappropriate. (If jealousy is never appropriate, then no subtype of shame will ever be appropriate.)

To exploit the resources given by my picture of the emotions in addressing these sorts of issues I suggest reading questions of part-whole relations between emotions as indirect ways of asking about part-whole relations between the roles emotions play in our thinking. Read this way, the question of whether insecurity is a type of shame is really just the question whether the role insecurity should play in our thinking is precisification of the role that shame plays in our thinking. Given the Peacockean story told about conceptual individuation, we can give a more precise gloss on this question – the question can become whether the concept that partially individuates one emotion is a precisification of the concept that partially individuates the other. One concept C1 being a precisification of another concept C2 can naturally be thought of as C1 having a strictly more restricted set of circumstances entitling application of the concept than C2, and application of C1 entitling all the committal thoughts that application of C2 of does, and perhaps more. So SCARLET is a precisification of RED because all in cases where it is appropriate to apply the concept SCARLET it would be appropriate to apply the concept RED, and anything that follows from something being red follows from it being scarlet. This means that application of C1 to x entitles us to apply C2 to x.

Our understanding of the question whether or not insecurity is a form of shame becomes whether or not the concept, A, that shame entitles us to apply to x licenses the belief that x satisfies the concept, B, that insecurity entitles us to apply. This is something that can be philosophically illuminating and also something about which philosophers can plausibly have something interesting to say.

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123 The requirement is that the application entitles a larger range of committal thoughts rather than just thoughts because the application of more precise concepts entitle one to fewer suppositions compared to less precise concepts. I can suppose that a red book is maroon, but I cannot suppose that a red book is scarlet.
Appendix 2. Emotional irrationality and higher order affective states.

I argued in chapter 3 that emotions are subject to an opacity with respect to their causal history. I said it was possible to undergo an emotion without knowing that it was brought about, in part, by other affective features of your life. I have argued that emotions get to be presentational and present their objects as instantiating evaluative properties. Taken together, these two features give a neat account of one recognizable way in which emotions can contribute to irrationality.

If emotions present themselves to us as responses to their objects which reveal evaluative properties of the objects they have a perceptual character. It feels like they are ways of being put in touch with the evaluative feature of the object in question. If emotions get to have a phenomenology that include a rationalizing dimension, a felt sense that the emotion provides epistemic support for evaluative judgements, then emotions will seem to us to be straightforward apprehension of values. It will seem that an emotion opens onto evaluative features of the world and reveals them to us by making them present to us.

If this is what the phenomenology is like, and if emotions are brought about in part by causal links with other affective states (including other emotions) then the reality of their etiology is very different what we would expect if we take their phenomenology at face value.

This can explain one way in which we can be swept away by our emotions. Take a scenario:

I drop my coffee pot while making the first brew of the day and it breaks. This annoys me. As a result of the annoyance I become more irritable. This causes me to have more anger-biased responses to things. By mid-morning these response have piled up and now minor inconveniences elicit fully-fledged moralised anger in me – so that when some traffic lights don’t work this strikes me as a deliberate affront to civilised society (and to myself in particular).

This mid-morning moralised anger presents itself to me as a response to the traffic lights which transparently reveals an evaluative feature of the scene – the offensiveness of the neglect that brought it about. But if I had examined the causal history of the emotion, I would see that the anger was brought about (at least in part) by a series of affective states that are unrelated to any evaluation of the traffic lights.

This susceptibility to irrationality is distinctive of the emotions. However, it is not unique to them. Beliefs are justified by other beliefs, so a body of bad theory can bolster further bad beliefs. Even within the perceptual system there is a similar phenomenon. When the perceptual system uses perceptual constancies to get from proximal stimulus to a representation of a distal cause, it uses the results of one mechanism as data to help with the operations of another. So if my size constancy mechanism delivers a finding that an object is remaining uniform in size, that counts in favour of results for the location constancy mechanism that are compatible with uniformity of size. So if the object is the same size between t1 and t2 but the sensory registration associated with it
takes up more of the visual field at t2 than at t1, then results of location processing which suggest that the object is moving towards us are given more weight than those that suggest that it isn’t. In this way a false value assigned by one constancy mechanism early in the visual processing could ramify through the system, biasing later results in favour of confirmation of the earlier response.

Although there is thus no difference in kind here between emotions and perceptions, there is clearly a huge difference in degree. The perceptual system is very god at not being dragged off course by such inaccurate results, whereas the emotional scenario described above is all too easily imaginable. This is probably because of the large number of interlocking perceptual constancies and the resulting tight constrains on the results that can lead to a representation which satisfies the data given to all the mechanisms. It is plausible that there are less checks and balances on the emotional system and because the emotional system does some work in shaping attention, it can get in the way of external cognitive factors intervening in useful ways.

I take it to be a virtue of my picture that my claims about the phenomenology of emotions and their liability to such causal shaping are in this sort of tension. It is a tension that explains this way in which the emotions can go wrong and lead us astray.

I take it to be a further virtue that this yields a fluid boundary between what are taken to be paradigmatic occurring emotions and what many take to be paradigmatic moods. A mood is often thought to be a higher-level affective state without any particular object which shapes the occurrence of ground-level emotions. But now we can see that the situation can be described in either direction – on the one hand a mood biasing a series of emotional responses, or on the other hand a mood simply being an emergent feature of a series of ground-level occurring emotions. A series of negative occurring emotions, each of which focuses our attention on negative features of situations could easily add up to a negative mood which takes on a life of its own and sweeps us away.
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