

Minerva Access is the Institutional Repository of The University of Melbourne

Author/s:

Rajaratnam, Alisha

Title:

Disjunctivism, Perceptual Capacities and Our Point of View on the World

Date:

2021

Persistent Link:

<https://hdl.handle.net/11343/293061>

Terms and Conditions:

Terms and Conditions: Copyright in works deposited in Minerva Access is retained by the copyright owner. The work may not be altered without permission from the copyright owner. Readers may only download, print and save electronic copies of whole works for their own personal non-commercial use. Any use that exceeds these limits requires permission from the copyright owner. Attribution is essential when quoting or paraphrasing from these works.

Disjunctivism, Perceptual Capacities and Our Point of View on the World

Alisha Rajaratnam

*A Thesis Submitted in Total Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts (Thesis Only)*

*Philosophy Department
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies,
Faculty of Arts
The University of Melbourne
September 2021*

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is original work carried out by myself for the Master of Arts (Thesis Only) in Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or to any other university. All sources have been clearly cited and acknowledged throughout the text and more details can be found in the reference list at the end of the document.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my primary supervisor Howard Sankey for his practical advice and continued support during the course of these two years and those preceding it. I would like to give a special thanks to my secondary supervisor Laura Schroeter for reading through several versions of my drafts and providing valuable & challenging feedback. Many thanks to Matthew Soteriou who supervised me while I was in London during the thick of the pandemic. Very grateful for his warmth and support while I was there in London and was unable to return to Melbourne and for his continued support even after my visit in London had ended and I had returned to Sri Lanka. Finally, I would like to thank him for the virtual supervisions, his encouraging comments and feedback on my drafts.

I would like to thank Margaret Cameron, Holly Lawford Smith, Howard Sankey & Laura Schroeter who were instrumental in the extension of my scholarship and fee waiver for the semester that I was in London and unable to return to Melbourne.

I am grateful to the Hastie fund for the Hastie Scholarship that has supported me in writing this thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents who have supported me in many ways especially emotionally. I would like to thank my mother for sitting through countless conversations and for reading through my drafts. I would like to thank my father for his constant encouragement and optimism.

Abstract

Negative Disjunctivism is a frequently misunderstood position. Disjunctivists of this stripe hold that all that can be said about the phenomenal character of a hallucination of an F is that it is *introspectively indiscriminable* from a veridical perception of an F to a subject (Martin 2004; 2006). Many take this account to be unsatisfying in that it fails to account for the sensory nature of hallucinations. What critics are missing is that *introspective indiscriminability*, when properly interpreted, characterises a subject's apparent point of view which is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. I argue that a positive claim can be derived from Martin's (2006) position, that characterises a subject's apparent perceptual 'point of view' which is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. I argue that the notion of a 'perceptual capacity' can bolster Martin's notion of a 'point of view.'

The following are two constraints that a disjunctivist approach must adhere to:

Constraint 1: The indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception to a subject does not entail that the two share introspectable phenomenal properties in common.

Constraint 2: The phenomenal character of a hallucination must be characterised derivatively from a veridical perception.

I develop a proposal that utilises Schellenberg's (2018) Perceptual Capacity Approach to specify a 'point of view' in terms of a subject exercising perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out. In doing so, I argue that my proposal meets *constraint 1* & *constraint 2*, staying true to Disjunctivism.

Contents

Introduction	9
CHAPTER 1: A Motivation For Disjunctivism: Naïve Realism	13
<i>1.1 Direct Awareness</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>1.2 Relational Awareness</i>	<i>16</i>
CHAPTER 2: The Problem of Hallucination and Negative Disjunctivism	21
<i>2.1 The Argument from Hallucination</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>2.2 The Naïve Realist's Disjunctivist Response</i>	<i>28</i>
<i>2.3 The Causal Argument from Hallucination</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>2.4 The Reverse Causal Argument</i>	<i>40</i>
<i>2.5 Negative Disjunctivism: Hallucinations in terms of indiscriminability</i>	<i>46</i>
<i>2.6 Objections to Martin's Negative Disjunctivism</i>	<i>48</i>
CHAPTER 3: Reinterpreting Introspective Indiscriminability	57
<i>3.1 Introspection and Perceptual Awareness</i>	<i>58</i>
<i>3.2 Introspective awareness and Phenomenal Consciousness</i>	<i>68</i>
<i>3.3 Introspective indiscriminability and Phenomenally Conscious Hallucinations</i>	<i>70</i>
CHAPTER 4: A Minimal Positive Account of Hallucination	75
<i>4.1 What exactly is a point of view?</i>	<i>76</i>
<i>4.2 The Perceptual Capacity Account</i>	<i>87</i>
<i>4.3 Discriminating and Singling out in Hallucinations</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>4.4 Solving the Problem</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>4.5 A Positive Characterization of Hallucinations: Explaining Introspective Indiscriminability</i>	<i>113</i>
<i>4.6 Objections</i>	<i>122</i>

Conclusion	125
References	127

Introduction

Some consider perceiving to be quite unlike hallucinating. When you see a pear, you are looking at something that is green in colour and in the shape of a teardrop. What it is like to see that pear is determined by the pear itself and some of its properties, that it is green for instance. Suppose you were to hallucinate a pear, you would know no better. It would seem as though you are looking at something green in colour and in the shape of a teardrop. But, there would be no pear.

Disjunctivists take the presence of mind-independent objects in perception and its absence in a hallucination to be the essential difference between the two experiences. It should come as no surprise then that Disjunctivists tend to be supporters of naïve realism. A person who endorses naïve realism, takes veridical perception to be fundamentally characterised by a subject standing in a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects. The phenomenal character of veridical perception is constituted by actual bits of the external world.

Return to the case of hallucinating a pear. Such an experience would be indistinguishable from a veridical perception of a pear, as nothing in your experience would reveal to you that you are not truly looking at a pear. This is no minor problem for the naïve realist. If hallucinating a pear is as vivid and credible of an experience as perceiving a pear, then how can the phenomenal character of a veridical perception of a pear be constituted by the pear itself and its properties? How can veridical perception be fundamentally characterised in terms of a relation to external objects?

This is why disjunctivism is so appealing to the naïve realist. The disjunctivist rejects the view that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are the same kinds of psychological events. Instead, the disjunctivist argues that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are essentially distinct. This is not to say that there can be nothing in common between a veridical perception and a hallucination for the disjunctivist. Clearly, the kind of hallucinations that are the source of debate are ones that are indiscriminable from veridical perceptions to a subject so that counts as a shared feature. The Indiscriminability assumption provides support to the Common Kind Thesis. The Indiscriminability assumption states that if two experiences are introspectively indistinguishable then the two must share the same phenomenal character. Consequently, if two experiences share the same phenomenal character then they must be of the same kind of psychological event.

There are many who provide persuasive arguments in favour of the Common Kind Thesis. Sense datum theorists take looking at a pear and hallucinating to involve the common property of being aware of certain sense data which are non-physical entities. *Representationalists* take looking at a pear and hallucinating a pear to involve the common kind of psychological event of representing a pear. I will call those who endorse the Common Kind Thesis, Conjunctivists.

There is a rich variety of views within disjunctivism. I utilise Haddock and Macpherson's (2008) terminology, categorising the views into experiential, epistemological and phenomenal disjunctivism. Experiential disjunctivists (Martin 2004, 2006; Snowdon 1980, 1990, 2005) take mental events to have essences that describe its fundamental kind, so the essence of a veridical perception fundamentally differs from the essence of a

hallucination. Epistemological disjunctivists (Mcdowell 1986;1982; 1995) take it that veridical perceptions situate a subject in a different epistemic state than when hallucinating. In the former a subject is positioned as a knower while in the latter, this is not the case. The focus of this thesis is on phenomenal disjunctivism that the phenomenal character of a veridical perception is fundamentally different from a hallucination. However, as Haddock and Macpherson (2008) observe, phenomenal disjunctivism “ seems to entail experiential disjunctivism”, so I will also inevitably touch on experiential disjunctivism(p.21).

Naive realists such as Martin endorse phenomenal and experiential *negative disjunctivism*, defining the phenomenal character of a hallucination in purely negative epistemic terms. The only thing that can be said about the phenomenal character of a hallucination of, say, a green pear is that it is indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a green pear. Many have found this view to fall short of characterising the sensory nature of hallucinations.

In this thesis, I argue that it is open to the Naïve realist to **provide a minimally positive account of disjunctivism** by appealing to the notions of a **‘point of view’** and a **‘perceptual capacity.’** I argue that a **positive claim can be derived from Martin’s (2006) position**, that characterises a subject’s apparent perceptual point of view which is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. I argue that this positive claim (notion of a point of view) derived from Martin’s position still fails to satisfactorily explain the indiscriminability of a hallucination/ why is it that a subject seems to occupy a point of view. I argue that the notion of a ‘perceptual capacity’ can bolster Martin’s notion of a point of view. I develop a proposal that utilises Schellenberg’s (2018) perceptual capacity

approach to specify a point of view in terms of a subject exercising perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out.

The following is the structure of the thesis. In chapter 1, I introduce the theory of naïve realism as a major motivation for Disjunctivism. Chapter 2 examines the problem of hallucination as a challenge for naïve realism and Martin's negative disjunctivist response. In this chapter, I introduce two constraints that a disjunctivist must adhere to. I argue that though Martin's version of negative disjunctivist upholds the constraints, his account fails to characterise the phenomenal consciousness of hallucinations in a robust and satisfying way. In Chapter 3, I extend Martin's response that the objections raised to his view in Chapter 2 are based on a mistaken conception of introspection. The negative disjunctivist view when properly interpreted allows that hallucinations are phenomenally conscious experiences. I argue that we can utilise Martin's notion of a 'point of view' to do this but also argue that this notion of a 'point of view' still fails to explain why a hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical perception. We need a slightly more positive characterisation of a hallucination. In chapter 4, I argue that Martin's notion of a 'point of view' can be bolstered by utilising parts of Schellenberg's perceptual capacity approach. I arrive at the positive view that a hallucination is a case of the same perceptual capacities being activated in a subject as are activated in a veridical perception. I argue that this is what explains why hallucinations are indiscriminable from veridical perceptions. I contend that this proposal provides a derivative characterisation of hallucinations, meeting *constraint 1* and *constraint 2*, while providing a minimally positive account of hallucination.

CHAPTER 1

A Motivation for Disjunctivism: Naïve Realism

Proponents of Disjunctivism are mostly motivated by a need to safeguard Naïve Realism. In this chapter, I introduce the theory of Naïve Realism and its key commitments. It is important to clarify the kind of metaphysics of perceptual experience that a naïve realist is committed to. As such, I take it that naïve realists endorse two main claims about the metaphysics of perceptual experience:

(1) Direct Awareness

(2) Relational Awareness

In section 1.1, I consider (1)*Direct Awareness*, shedding light on what it means to have direct perceptual awareness of an object. I contrast this with indirect awareness to better clarify the notion of perception providing a subject with direct awareness of mind-independent objects. In section 1.2, I explicate (2)*Relational Awareness* which refers to the manner in which naïve realists take the phenomenal character of experience to be informed by a perceptual relation of awareness to mind-independent objects. In doing so, I highlight the naïve realist's distinctive claim about phenomenal character. In a veridical perception, a subject stands in a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects, where the phenomenal character of a subject's experience is at least partly constituted by the object. I point out that it is important to emphasize that naïve realists do not take the phenomenal character of veridical perception to be wholly characterised by a relation to an object but only partly. This leaves it open to the naïve realist to allow for other factors that influence the phenomenal character of an experience ranging from variations

in facts about a subject, perspectival elements and different ways in which an object might appear to a subject. I briefly mention the numerous ways in which theorists have tried to account for these other elements that affect the phenomenal character of veridical perception over and above the presence of an object.

1.1. Direct awareness

The Naïve realist implicitly endorses *direct realism*, the view that veridical perception brings a subject into direct perceptual awareness with things in his environment. Some of these things are objects, properties, events or individuals. The precise nature of the claim can be formulated in the following way:

(1) *Direct awareness*: In a veridical perception, a subject S is directly aware of X¹.

Understanding the claim will hinge on spelling out what it means to be *directly aware* of a mind-independent object or property. First, let us start with what it means to be aware of something. I might be aware of the fact that there are 7.8 billion people in the world or that water = H²O or that I am in a jovial frame of mind. This is *not* the kind of awareness that is at stake. In fact, these are examples of being aware of beliefs, knowledge claims or emotional mental states.

The kind of awareness at stake is distinctly perceptual in that the perceiver makes use of their sensory modalities when perceiving. What is meant by perceptual is further specified in terms of the various sensory modalities of vision, tactile, olfactory, auditory

¹ Where X is any mind-independent object, property or event.

and gustatory perception. Currently, I am aware of a faint whirring sound on my left which is coming from a standing fan, I am aware of the keys on my laptop through tactile perception as I type this. I am visually aware of the laptop with a white cup of coffee on my right and a blue water bottle all placed on a brown desk with a green felt on top. There are a myriad of other objects in my purview such as a glue stick, a hole puncher, a few pens and notebooks. As I look straight ahead, there is a window which looks out to trees and a blue sky. Since, the window is open, I feel the crisp clean morning air breeze against my face. Thus, perceptual experience in virtue of a subject making use of their sensory modalities provides a subject with direct perceptual awareness of mind-independent objects.

It might still be a little unclear as to what it means to be directly aware of something. We can better understand this claim by contrasting this with what it means to be indirectly aware of something. Consider Rahul's case. A subject Rahul who lives in the Southern part of India, knows a lot about the Taj Mahal. He knows what it looks like and has extensive knowledge of its history but he has never seen the Taj Mahal in person. He has *seen* illustrations of the Taj Mahal in several books, has *viewed* images of the monument online and has *seen* the Taj Mahal in various movies. Here is the first sense in which Rahul has *seen* the Taj Mahal. Now, consider another occasion where Rahul takes a trip to Delhi and visits the Taj Mahal in Agra. Here, it is a different sense in which Rahul has *seen* the Taj Mahal. This second sense is what Naïve realists mean when they use the term direct awareness.

With the case of Rahul, one can say that he was only directly aware of the Taj Mahal when he saw it in person, whilst he was indirectly aware of it when he viewed it in books, online

or in movies. Rahul was aware of the Taj Mahal in virtue of the illustrations in the book, images online, scenes in a movie.

Return now to the case of perceptual experience. Naïve realists endorse the (1) *Direct Awareness*, where veridical perception brings a perceiver into direct contact with mind-independent objects. The commitment to (1) *Direct Awareness* arose out of a purely negative project to counter *indirect realism*, the view that we perceive mind-independent objects in virtue of ideas in the mind or sense data. So, when perceiving we are never aware of the mind-independent objects themselves but are instead aware of intermediaries in the form of sense data.² By an inference to the best explanation, we take ourselves to be aware of mind-independent objects in virtue of sense data.

1.2 Relational Awareness

In 1.1, we considered what a Naïve realist might mean by direct perceptual awareness. This is the claim that a subject has direct unmediated access to mind-independent objects such as tables, chairs and trees. Naïve realists also take the structure of perception to be relational in nature. Perception places a subject in a relation to objects in her environment.

We can specify this relationality in the following way:

(2) *Relational Awareness*: If a subject perceives X, a subject stands in a relation of awareness to X.

² There has been some debate as to whether sense data are physically located or mental images. In contemporary discussions, it tends to be assumed that sense data are mental images.

The claim in this form is one that sense datum theorists would also accept. However, the sense datum theorist would deny (1) that perception provides us with direct access to mind-independent objects. As a sense datum theorist takes perception of mind-independent objects to obtain in virtue of perceiving objects such as sense data. In the past, it has been contested as to whether entities such as sense data are mind-dependent or mind-independent but whatever they are, they are meant to be distinct from ordinary mind-independent objects.

At first glance, it may be difficult to distinguish the difference between claiming that perception is direct, and that perception is relational in nature. One might wonder how the two differ. The claim about direct perceptual awareness can be understood as responding to a question about what the objects of perception are. The claim that perception is relational, on the other hand, responds to the question that concerns what fundamentally characterises the nature and phenomenal character of experience.

As mentioned earlier (1) *Direct awareness* is a claim that the Naïve Realist assumes and is committed to. In addition to this, the naïve realist holds (2) *Relational Awareness* which makes a claim about the phenomenal character of veridical perception. For the Naïve realists, when a subject perceives, she is related to mind-independent objects in her environment. This is a perceptual relation of awareness between a *subject* and an *object*. The phenomenal character of a subject's experience is informed by this perceptual relation which is constituted by mind-independent objects.

“According to naïve realism, the actual objects of perception, the external things such as trees, tables and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties which they can

manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one's conscious experience, and hence determine the phenomenal character of one's experience. This talk of constitution and determination should be taken literally; and a consequence of it is that one could not be having the very experience one has, were the objects perceived not to exist, or were they to lack the features they are perceived to have (Martin 1997, p.3-4)"

The naïve realist claims that some sensory experiences are relations to mind-independent objects. That is to say, taking experiences to be episodes or events, the naïve realist supposes that some such episodes have as constituents mind-independent objects (Martin 2006, p. 1)

So, quite literally speaking, the phenomenal character of a veridical perception is made up of actual bits of the external world being presented to subjects. A consequence of this is that the presence of the mind-independent object is necessary and determines the phenomenal character of a veridical perception for the naïve realist. As a result, a hallucination of an object would have to be a very different kind of experience from a veridical perception of the same object.

However, it must be noted that this does not mean that the Naïve realist is committed to the phenomenal character of veridical perception being *entirely* characterised by bits of the external world. It is quite an austere position to maintain that the presence of mind-independent objects which forms the perceptual relation is *all* that is required in informing the phenomenal character of an experience.

This is why naïve realists emphasize that the phenomenal character of veridical perceptions is *partly* constituted by mind-independent objects. This leaves room for the

naïve realist to say that there are other factors in addition to mind-independent objects that influence the phenomenal character of a veridical perception. One take is by Heather Logue (2012a) who argues that naïve realists should not only pay attention to facts about properties and objects in the external world but also to facts about the *subject* who perceives. Campbell (2009) and Brewer (2011) introduce the notion of a third relatum, which includes one's spatio-temporal orientation and sensory modality, where changes in such factors lead to changes in phenomenal character. Soteriou (2013) observes that there are structural features of perception that inform the phenomenal character of one's experience over and above the objects one is related to. These structural features affect the way in which one is related to mind-independent objects, where differences in these features would lead to changes in phenomenal character. French and Phillips (2020) also emphasize the need to take into account the way in which one is perceptually related to an object and that "facts about perspective and perceptual conditions" can affect the phenomenal character of a perception (p.7).

In terms of characterizing phenomenal character, other theories such as sense datum theorists take the phenomenal character of an experience to be characterized by an awareness of sense datum which are not identical to the mind-independent objects themselves but that we are aware of such objects via an inference to the best explanation. Intentionalists take the phenomenal character of an experience to be characterized or to go hand in hand with content where the content of an experience determines the phenomenal character of an experience. As such an indistinguishable hallucination of an apple would have the same phenomenal character as a veridical perception of an apple since the two would have the same content. Qualia theorists take the phenomenal character of an experience to be subject qualities which are qualities or properties of the

experience. For example, to be aware of a blue object is to be aware of blueness as a property of my experience.

Chapter 2

The Problem of Hallucination and Negative Disjunctivism

In Chapter 1, the main naïve realist commitments were introduced and contrasted with those of sense datum and representational theories of perception. The goal was to highlight what *is distinctive* of the naïve realist's position. In chapter 2, we will find that the naïve realist has to grapple with the problem of hallucination. These are hallucinations that are indiscriminable from perceptions through introspective reflection. The naïve realist can preserve the unique relational element of perception by endorsing *Disjunctivism*, the view that separate accounts need to be given of hallucinations and perceptions. Veridical perception is necessarily understood as the obtaining of a perceptual relation between a subject and mind-independent objects, whilst hallucinations lack this relation. Perceptions and hallucinations cannot be the same kinds of mental events for a naïve realist, disjunctivist theory and neither can the two experiences share the same phenomenal character. We can expect that though the disjunctivist might be able to respond to the simpler versions of the argument, the tenability of the disjunctivist position is called into question as progressively more sophisticated arguments are formulated such as the causal argument from hallucination and finally, the reverse causal argument. The way in which this section is structured is that the arguments get progressively more difficult for the naïve realist to respond to.

In the course of the chapter, I argue that two major constraints arise from the problem of hallucination that a Naïve Realist must take into consideration when formulating a Disjunctivist position.

Constraint 1: The indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception to a subject does not entail that the two share introspectable phenomenal properties in common.

Constraint 2: The phenomenal character of a hallucination must be characterised derivatively from a veridical perception.

Ultimately, I argue that though Martin's Negative Disjunctivism meets the two constraints, it fails to satisfyingly account for the sensory nature of hallucinations and that a slightly more positive characterization of hallucination is needed.

In section 2.1, the argument from hallucination is introduced in its simplest form, I demonstrate the manner in which the argument calls into question the two major commitments of naïve realism (1) *Direct Awareness* and (2) *Relational Awareness*. I introduce a thesis and a few implicit assumptions in the argument, notably the Common Kind Thesis and the Indistinguishability (IND) Assumption. In section 2.2, I argue that the disjunctivist will have to deny both the Common Kind Thesis and the IND Assumption, the denial of which can be captured in *Constraint 1*. In section 2.3, I consider the causal argument as a bolstered case for the Common Kind Thesis and the IND Assumption. In particular, both theses rest on the 'same proximate cause, same immediate effect' principle. I demonstrate the manner in which the 'same proximate cause, same immediate effect' can be significantly weakened to account for the naïve realist's commitment of the external object as a non-causal condition. In section 2.4, I consider Martin's reverse causal argument which rests on this weakened 'same proximate cause, same immediate effect' principle. I argue that the most promising way in which the Disjunctivist can respond to the reverse causal argument and screening off problem is to

provide a derivative characterisation of a hallucination which is expressed in *constraint* 2. In section 2.5, I consider Martin's approach to providing a derivative account of hallucination in terms of the negative epistemic fact of introspective indiscriminability. Section 2.6 examines two crucial objections against Martin's view. The heart of these objections is that a more positive characterisation of the phenomenal character of hallucinations are needed and that introspective indiscriminability fails to account for the conscious nature of hallucinations.

2.1 The Argument from Hallucination

The argument from hallucination calls into question the key tenets of naïve realism. This is the view that takes experience to involve direct and relational awareness to mind-independent objects. Recall the two main naïve realist commitments:

(1) *Direct awareness*: In a veridical perception, a subject S has direct access of X³.

(2) *Relational awareness*: In a veridical perception, a subject is perceptually related to mind-independent objects which partly constitute the phenomenal character of the experience.

While naïve realists hold (1) *direct awareness* & (2) *relational awareness*, direct realists hold (1) *direct awareness* that veridical perception affords a subject with unmediated access to mind-independent objects. It is important to note that the argument from hallucination was originally posed as a challenge to direct realism, as a result, denying (1). But we can reformulate the argument to specifically challenge (2) *relational*

³ Where X is any mind-independent object, property or event.

awareness, a key commitment of naïve realism. The following is one possible reconstruction:

1. Veridical perception is fundamentally characterised by a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects in our environment.
2. Hallucinations that are introspectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptions are possible.
3. The same account must be given of veridical perceptions and introspectively indiscriminable hallucinations.

Therefore, veridical perception is not characterised by a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects in our environment.

First, it is important to clearly demarcate the boundaries of the term ‘introspectively indiscriminable hallucination’ in this debate. When hearing the term ‘hallucination’ what might spring to mind are stories of individuals who see things we do not see. Some examples might be individuals with the Charles Bonnet Syndrome such as Charles Bonnet’s grandfather who “hallucinated crowds in the street” from his window as a result of deteriorating eyesight (Ffytche 2013, p.5). Other cases would be of individuals with Schizophrenia who hear voices that we do not hear⁴. These are examples of partial hallucinations which involve one or two hallucinatory entities in otherwise veridical background conditions. These are *not* the kind of hallucinations that are the focus of this debate. Instead, this argument assumes the conceivability of a particularly extreme

⁴ Though, it is contested as to whether auditory verbal hallucinations are a kind of experience or are simply a result of a patient misidentifying their own internal speech as an external voice (Bentall & Varese 2013).

scenario. This scenario would be reminiscent of Putnam's (1981) well known 'brain in a vat' thought experiment. For example, you might take yourself to be at your desk working hard at your laptop. All seems well to you. Nothing gives away the fact that you are experiencing a wholesale hallucination. But, unbeknownst to you, all you are is a brain placed in a vat of nutrients being controlled by an evil scientist. There are two points that are important to draw out of this familiar example. The first is that this hallucination is a *complete hallucination*, where all the objects of one's experience are hallucinatory. The second is that these complete hallucinations are *introspectively indiscriminable* from veridical perceptions to a subject. These hallucinations are extraordinarily vivid in nature making it impossible to tell by introspection that it is not a genuine case of perception. Hereafter, whenever I make use of the term hallucination, I refer to an introspectively indiscriminable complete hallucination.

The **first premise** of the argument refers to (2) *relational awareness*, the basic naïve realist thesis. This thesis states that the defining feature of a veridical perception is that its phenomenal character is characterised by a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects. By consequence, this relation of awareness also provides a subject with direct access to mind-independent objects in her environment.

The **second premise** which states that introspectively indiscriminable hallucinations from veridical perceptions are possible is referring primarily to metaphysical possibility. This argument is consistent with there being no empirical trace of such hallucinations as "the argument does not require that such hallucinations actually do happen, only that

they are possible” (Crane 2001, p 133). Since, premise 2 is a fairly weak claim⁵, there is no need for the Naïve Realist to block the argument at this stage.

The **third premise** claims that the same account must be given of a veridical perception and a hallucination. Notice, the implicit assumption inherent between the second and the third premise is that a hallucination’s phenomenal character is not characterised by a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects. This is because by definition hallucinations are experiences which lack objects. A claim about the nature of hallucination is used to generalise to the case of veridical perception. The third premise can be reduced to the following thesis:

The Common Kind Thesis (CKT):

Veridical perceptions and hallucinations share a common kind in that these experiences are fundamentally the same kinds of psychological events.

The justification for the Common Kind Thesis, is presumably the fact that introspectively indiscriminable hallucinations seem to be like perceptions ‘from the inside.’ The following assumption makes explicit the reasons for accepting premise 3 or the Common Kind Thesis:

⁵ Though, recently Farid Masrour (2020) challenges this.

The Indiscriminability Assumption (IND):

If two experiences are introspectively indiscriminable to a subject, then the two experiences must share the same phenomenal character (Martin 2008).

By application, an *introspectively indiscriminable hallucination* shares the same phenomenal character as a veridical perception. If the two experiences share the same phenomenal character, then the two experiences must be of the same kinds of psychological events. We saw that the phenomenal character of hallucinations is not informed by a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects so the same would have to be said for veridical perceptions. Thus, Naïve Realism is false.

The IND assumption in conjunction with the Common Kind Thesis lends support to premise 3 that the same account must be given of a veridical perception and a hallucination, presumably in terms of introspectable phenomenal properties in common. An example of such introspectable phenomenal properties might be in terms of sense data. It could be said that if we are aware of sense data in a hallucination, we must be aware of sense data in a veridical perception as well. The presence of sense data characterises the phenomenal character of a hallucination and a veridical perception. As we will see, the Naïve realist rejects premise 3 and by consequence the Common Kind Thesis and the IND assumption. This response is known as Disjunctivism.

2.2 The Naïve Realist's Disjunctivist Response

The Naïve Realist is compelled to endorse Disjunctivism. This is because the conclusion of the argument from hallucination is a direct refutation of the naïve realist thesis. Disjunctivists are committed to the view that the phenomenal character of a hallucination is fundamentally distinct from a veridical perception. The phenomenal character of a hallucination is unlike that of a veridical perception because the phenomenal character of a veridical perception is informed by a relation of awareness to mind-independent objects in one's environment. What makes this challenging for the naïve realist is accounting for how a veridical perception can be fundamentally distinct from a hallucination while allowing for commonalities between the two such as introspective indiscriminability.

Disjunctivists deny the Common Kind Thesis. One might think that the Disjunctivist can accept the IND assumption while denying the Common Kind Thesis. The IND assumption which states that introspectively indiscriminable experiences must share the same phenomenal character while the Common Kind Thesis states that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are the same kinds of psychological events. According to a Disjunctivist, the mere possibility of an introspectively indiscriminable hallucination is no good reason to take veridical perceptions and hallucinations to be of the same kind of psychological event. Even if a hallucination is qualitatively similar to a veridical perception and we decide to characterise a hallucination in terms of an awareness of a non-physical entity, why should we have to provide the same story for the case of

veridical perception? This also seems to be what J.L Austin (1962) tries to articulate in the question “why on earth should it *not* be the case that, in some few instances, perceiving one sort of thing is exactly like perceiving another?” (p.52). Surely, we can think of cases where one object may be introspectively indiscriminable from another while being fundamentally different. For example, an ingeniously designed bar of soap may look exactly like a lemon but is fundamentally distinct from a real lemon. In a parallel manner, why should it be based on the fact that a hallucination may seem to be just like a veridical perception, ‘from the inside’ that we have to provide the same account of the two experiences? After all, hallucinations are delusive experiences while veridical perceptions are not.

The Disjunctivist’s opponent may still insist that this response fails to explain why a hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. As per the IND assumption, if a hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception, the two experiences must share the same phenomenal character. If that is the case, there is something substantial in common between a veridical perception and a hallucination. This commonality cannot just be explained away by insisting that perceiving is unlike hallucinating. This is because as Heather Logue emphasizes “*sameness of phenomenal character would be a reasonably specific, fundamental experiential commonality across the case*”, it would involve the acceptance of a fundamentally common psychological event between the two. Thus, accepting the IND assumption would lead to accepting the Common Kind Thesis, making it incompatible with Disjunctivism.

There is a response that is open to the Disjunctivist that denies the IND assumption. This is one that is provided by Hinton (1967b), who denies that the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination entails that it shares the same phenomenal character with a veridical perception. To allow for the IND assumption is to allow that there could be introspectable phenomenal properties in common between a hallucination and a veridical perception. Hinton (1967b) argues that it is not clear that we have to accept that there are 'worn on the sleeve' phenomenal properties in common between a perception and a hallucination, simply because a hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical perception (p. 225). All that the indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception means is that a hallucination merely seems to have properties in common with a veridical perception. As Hinton mentions 'Why should it not just seem as if they had properties in common?' (p.225). For example, consider a red table and an indistinguishable table with a red light that is being shined on it. Suppose, the two tables are credibly indiscriminable from one another. Hinton's thought is that it does not follow that both tables share a property of redness in common. The table that is illuminated by a red light is indistinguishable from the genuinely red table, but it only seems to possess a common property of redness. It does not actually possess it. The same applies to the case of introspectively indiscriminable hallucinations.

So far, I have shown that the Naïve Realist has a response to the simple argument from hallucination. The Naïve Realist can endorse Disjunctivism by denying the Common Kind Thesis. It was shown that, although, it may initially seem as though the Disjunctivist can deny the Common Kind Thesis while accepting that hallucinations and veridical perceptions have the same phenomenal character, this response is in fact not open to the Disjunctivist. As a result, the Disjunctivist will have to deny the IND assumption and argue

that the phenomenal character of a hallucination is unlike that of a veridical perception. Thus, the Disjunctivist must deny both the Common Kind Thesis and the IND assumption which can be captured by the following constraint:

Constraint 1: The indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception to a subject does not entail that the two share introspectable phenomenal properties in common

2.3 The Causal Argument from Hallucination

We saw that the naïve realist can resist the simple argument from hallucination by adopting a form of disjunctivism about experience. The naïve realist, disjunctivist does not have to accept the Common Kind Thesis and its underlying IND assumption on the basis of a rare situation of a hallucination. As a result, the causal argument is an attempt by the conjunctivist to bolster the support for the Common Kind Thesis.

A compelling case for the Common Kind Thesis can be found in Howard Robinson's (1994) causal argument:

1. It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in a particular type of perception to cause an hallucination which exactly resembles that perception in its subjective character.
2. It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating and perceptual experience when they have the same neural cause. Thus, it is not, for example, plausible to say that the hallucinatory experience involves a mental image or sense

datum, but that the perception does not; if the two have the same proximate- that is, neural- cause.

These two propositions together entail that perceptual processes in the brain produce some object of awareness which cannot be identified with any feature of the external world-that is, the produce sense datum (p.151).

The **first premise** hinges on a theoretical possibility of replicating the same kind of brain state that occurs immediately prior to perceiving. This argument assumes that a perceptual experience is an end product of a lengthy causal chain. If when a subject has a visual experience of a blue water bottle resting on a brown table, light is reflected from the blue water bottle and brown table and absorbed into the subject's retina. This activates the visual cortex inducing a particular brain state. It is possible to fix just that brain state in the absence of the water bottle and table to produce a hallucination that is entirely indiscriminable from a veridical perception.

Notice, that we now have better support for the IND assumption. The conjunctivist has a nice story to tell of how the same proximate neural cause brings about a hallucination that is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. It is easy to imagine that a hallucination and veridical perception share the same phenomenal character. The inclusion of the same proximate neural cause shows that not only do hallucinations share similarities with veridical perceptions in terms of their subjective nature but they also share a substantial metaphysical similarity. Hereafter, whenever I use the term hallucination or causally matching hallucination, I will be referring to one that shares the same proximate neural cause as a veridical perception.

Now, do we have any reason to think that replicating the same brain state in a veridical perception is a theoretical possibility? Consider Smith's diagnosis of the possibility of such a case:

"Perhaps perceptual experience of the same subjective character as genuine perceptions never actually occur in the absence of a normal object. Perhaps it would be fiendishly difficult, or practically impossible, for a neurophysiologist to replicate precisely the conditions for perceptual experience. Is it, though, absolutely impossible that such a thing should occur? If not, the argument is up and running" (Smith 2002, p. 172).

Once again, the reason for accepting this premise is similar to the simple argument from hallucination, since such an experience has not been empirically observed to be possible, this does not mean that it may not be possible to create such an experience in the future is how the reasoning goes. We do not have any reason to think that the possibility of such an experience is entirely impossible. So, the disjunctivist need not deny the first premise.

The **second premise** is an attempt to establish the Common Kind Thesis and to rule out disjunctivism. The key principle behind the support of the Common Kind Thesis is the Same Proximate Cause, Same Immediate Effect Principle:

When two experiences have the same proximate cause then this is sufficient to produce the same type of immediate effect.

If it is possible for a hallucination to share the same brain state as a veridical perception immediately prior to perceiving, then the effects of the two experiences would be the same. This lends support for the Common Kind Thesis; the same account of a veridical perception and hallucination needs to be given because the two experiences share the same proximate cause.

Robinson's account of choice is sense data. The triggered proximate neural cause in a hallucination must be bringing about some kind of mental image, call it sense data. Since, the proximate cause is the same, a veridical perception must also involve awareness of sense data. The same proximate neural cause leads to an awareness of sense data in both hallucination and veridical perception.

Previously, the only support for the Common Kind Thesis was the fact that a hallucination could be introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. The disjunctivist could easily deny this by challenging the conjunctivist's move to generalise from a rare case of an introspectively indiscriminable hallucination to a veridical perception. The same account does not need to be provided as a different explanation can be given for what takes place in a hallucination.

This generalising move from an isolated case of a hallucination to a veridical perception is now supported by the inclusion of the same proximate neural cause. The hallucinating subject seems to be exactly like one who perceives internally, from the skin inwards as it were. Surely, *now* we must say that the experience is the same in every respect, that the two experiences form a common kind of psychological event?

The same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle, does not automatically entail that there can be no differences between a veridical perception and a hallucination. Surely, one can think of cases where the same cause sometimes brings about different effects. We can imagine a case where two people are vaccinated with the Astra Zeneca vaccine at the exact same time and that they are of the same age, sex and ethnicity. Person A develops the side effect of a severe and persistent headache, while person B only develops a fever. Both however now have immunity against the COVID-19 virus. In one sense, the same cause has brought about the same effect. The vaccine has brought about the same effect of immunity against the virus. There is another sense in which it has brought about different effects, a persistent headache in one individual while a fever in another individual.⁶ Pitcher (1971) expresses a similar sentiment when he comments that though this principle ‘may be true for every cause and effect pair, is not true for them *under every description* (p.56).’ Applying this to perception, suppose a person views a red spiky looking rambutan and is subsequently made to hallucinate one. The same brain state has been stimulated to produce a hallucination in the absence of a rambutan. The same immediate effect is generated in that the person might think or say, ‘I seem to see something round, red and spiky.’ This effect can fall under two different descriptions that of ‘hallucinating something round, red and spiky’ or ‘seeing something round, red and spiky.’ This approach allows Pitcher to accept the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle’⁷ while maintaining that there is an important difference between hallucinating and perceiving which can be captured under different

⁶ One might have reservations about this example as any and all side effects person A and B develop would be as part of the list of side effects that fall under the Astrazeneca vaccine. Thus, any unexpected side effects would potentially point to a different cause or may be established as being a new addition to the pre-existing list of side effects.

⁷ Another response that allows for the acceptance of the same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle is taken by Langsam. He argues that the effects require intrinsic changes and a relation cannot be a subject of such changes.

descriptions. So, the disjunctivist can still accept the 'same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle' while denying the Common Kind Thesis.

The Conjunctionist may respond that Pitcher's approach of accommodating the 'same proximate cause, same immediate' effect principle falls prey to vacuity. As Robinson (1994) quite rightly points out there are bound to be some similarities between effects in that 'any effects of some one type of cause will be identical under some description or other(p.151).' It then comes down to a matter of how we describe the effect. Consequently, this does not mean that the effects are identical and if that is the case, they must not have identical causes meaning that the principle has not been satisfied. Robinson's example is useful here. Suppose two nails are hammered side by side into a wall, everything is identical in every respect such as the nails, the wall and the force at which the nails are hammered, *ceteris paribus*. In one case, however the nail has been driven one inch into the wall while in the other, it is two inches. If we describe this case in quite a general manner, all we would say is that 'the nail was driven into the wall.' We can imagine another case, where the second nail bursts into flames. Now, we can characterise these two cases in an equally general manner 'something happened to the nail.' Both the cases, of the nail embedded one inch into the wall and the case of the nail bursting into flames seem to be result in very different effects, yet they have some description in common that is 'something happened to the nail.' According to Robinson, the only way one might save this principle from vacuity would be to appeal to a natural law that allows for quantification.

But, I think that this criticism is missing the point. We do not need to be overly pedantic by getting bogged down by descriptions of the situation. One thought behind Pitcher's

(1971) proposal might be that though hallucinations have a similar effect in that they seem to be just like cases of veridical perceptions, there is an important difference between the two. This difference is tied to each experience's causal history. After all, a hallucination is simply produced by the stimulation of the proximate neural cause. A veridical perception is not just that. It has a causal history goes beyond the stimulation of the proximate neural cause in that it can only be explained by the presence of the distal cause of the mind-independent object and light being reflected off of it. One cannot just ignore that there is something different about the causal history of a veridical perception. This would block the generalizing move being made to establish the Common Kind Thesis that claims that we must provide the same account of hallucination and veridical perception in the form of sense data. But we can also just flat out deny the same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle. Experience and especially the phenomenal character of an experience does not supervene solely on the immediate brain state of a subject.

However, the Disjunctivist's claim that the proximate neural cause is not sufficient to produce identical experiences may need to be further justified. To do this, we can appeal to the debate about externalism and internalism about content. Hilary Putnam's (1973) twin earth is often cited as an example to make an argument for externalism about mental content. Here, two subjects seem to be in the same mental state or seem to have the same beliefs about two different objects. However, the intuition is that they are different beliefs because they refer to different objects. Beliefs, then, cannot be defined as supervening solely on the internal state of a subject but has to take into account the object out there in the world. This argument can be applied to consider whether simulating a brain state to create a hallucinatory experience in an individual is sufficient for it to be identical to a

veridical experience. In other words, the Disjunctivist denies this: that the mental state supervenes on the neural state alone. The mental state of a veridical experience, then, can never be identical to that of a subjectively indiscriminable hallucination because of the presence of a physical object. It seems as though a proper understanding of the implications of accepting this argument may require a discussion of internalism and externalism about content which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The disjunctivist cannot just help herself to this response. The distal cause cannot cause an experience from a distance leading to a sort of action at a distance. The 'same proximate cause, same immediate effect' principle requires that causes and effects be in spatial and temporal proximity to each other. How can an object which is the distal cause bring about an effect from a distance when in between we have the proximate cause of the brain state? The distal cause is only relevant in triggering the brain state, it has no causal effect on the experience; that effect is only brought about by the brain state since it is spatio-temporally in close proximity to the production of an experience. Since, the proximate cause can be produced in the absence of the distal cause of the object, we do not need the presence of the object to bring about the same experience.

Neither is it the case that the brain state can

"look back" and inspect its causal antecedents in order to see what mental act to cause or constitute (Johnston 2004, p. 116).

"The brain state has no way of discriminating between its causes to produce in the one case a veridical perception and in the other case, where there is no object, a hallucination" (Robinson 1994, p. 156; Johnston 2004).

However, the naïve realist need not be committed to action at a distance. One can stress the role of mind-independent objects in characterising the phenomenal character of experience without taking such objects to be causally relevant. This is because, we can emphasize the role of the object as a non-causal necessary condition on having an experience, where “its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event” (Martin 2004 p. 56). The object does not need to be only thought of as the distal cause furthest away in the causal chain that can only bring about another cause in close proximity which is the relevant brain state. The object still figures in our experience in that it constitutes the phenomenal character of our experience, it is a necessary condition which fundamentally characterises the phenomenal character of a veridical perception according to the naïve realist. The “same proximate cause, same immediate effect” principle needs to be weakened to allow for such non-causal conditions. Following Martin, we can weaken the principle to include such conditions:

“Where two situations involve the same proximate causal conditions, and do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurrence of some kind of effect, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both situations” (Martin 2004, p. 53).

Thus, we can grant that only same proximate causes bring about the same effect whilst maintaining that the object figures as a non-causal necessary condition for experience and its phenomenal character.

2.4 The Reverse Causal Argument

As of now, the conjunctivist has *still* not succeeded in establishing the Common Kind Thesis. The disjunctivist is *still* not compelled to accept that the phenomenal character of a veridical perception can be explained by an awareness of sense data in the same way that the phenomenal character of a hallucination can be. Robinson's causal argument leads to the conclusion that the same story must be given of what takes place in a hallucination and a veridical perception by positing sense data. But, as we saw, this argument rests on a strong version of the "same proximate cause, same immediate effect" principle that the Disjunctivist has good reason to reject. This is because in a veridical perception the kind of effect that occurs is necessarily determined by a psychological relation between a subject and an object which is a kind of non-causal condition. In other words, though hallucinations may share the same proximate neural cause, veridical perceptions are nevertheless fundamentally distinct mental events because mind-independent objects figure as necessary constituents. We could not have a veridical perception with its distinctive phenomenal character in the absence of a mind-independent object. Thus, the same proximate cause would only be sufficient in producing the same effects if the non-causal conditions do not differ.

Martin (2004) introduces the reverse causal argument: an argument which rests on this weaker version of the same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle. As we shall see, this argument also leads to a weaker conclusion, that "whatever kind of experience

does occur in situations like h , it is possible that such a kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving” (Martin 2004, p.53).

- (1) “When S sees a pine tree at t , call this situation v ; there is in S ’s body some complete causal condition just prior to t which determined the chance of this event of seeing occurring in v ; call this condition N ;
- (2) It is nomologically possible that N should occur in S even if no candidate object of perception is present and conditions necessary for the occurrence of a perception are not met, and an hallucinatory experience instead occurs; call one such situation h ;
- (3) Where two situations involve the same proximate causal conditions and do not differ in any non-causal conditions for the occurrence of the same kind of effect, then the chances for the occurrence of such an effect are the same in both situations;
- (4) No non-causal condition required for the occurrence of the effects of N is present in h but absent in v ;
- (5) Whatever kind of experience occurs in h , there is the same chance of such an experience occurring in v ;
- (6) Hence, whatever kind of experience does occur in situations like h , it is possible such a kind of experience occurs when one is veridically perceiving” (Martin 2004, p. 53).

Robinson’s (1994) causal argument proceeded to make a claim about the kind of experiential effect that a hallucination could share with a veridical perception and arrived at the conclusion that we must provide the same account to explain the phenomenal character of veridical perception and hallucination. Martin’s (2004) argument leads to a weaker conclusion that though there might be something in common between a hallucination and a veridical perception, there could also be a difference between the two experiences. In other words, if a hallucination is fundamentally of kind F , a veridical

perception will also be of kind of F but fundamentally of kind of F^* . On the surface, this is an extremely attractive conclusion. The naïve realist has enough room to manoeuvre. This allows the naïve realist to say that a veridical perception has certain unique relational properties even while sharing a common property with a hallucination. Thus, accepting the conclusion (6) is consistent with denying the Common Kind Thesis.

Premise (1) begins with the causal account of perception, that the event of perception is caused by a proximate causal condition; Condition N. Following on from Robinson, Martin's reverse causal argument continues with the line of thought that veridical perception is an end product of a long causal chain. Premise (2) states that N could occur in the absence of a mind-independent object bringing about a hallucination or an experience indistinguishable from a perception. Premise (3) takes into account the role of distal causes through the notion of non-causal conditions. Notice that premise (3) rests on the significantly weakened version of the same proximate cause, same immediate effect principle which was introduced at the end of **section 2.3**. This weakened principle only concedes that effect is likely to be the same if the non-causal conditions do not differ. A veridical perception possesses the non-causal condition of an object, while a hallucination does not have such a condition, there is a clear difference in non-causal conditions which blocked Robinson's causal argument. This present argument is meant to show that the experiential effect in a hallucination could be shared with a veridical perception without a difference in non-causal condition. The effect that is produced in a hallucination does not involve a non-causal condition that a veridical perception does not have. If the argument were generalising from perception to a claim about hallucination, then a perception would have a non-causal condition of mind-independent objects which would be absent in a hallucination. But, since the argument generalises from

hallucination to a claim about perception, it is possible that the non-causal conditions in place would be the same to produce the inner experience shared by a causally matching hallucination and a perception. There would be no non-causal condition present in a hallucination which is absent in a perception, so in that sense there would be no difference in non-causal conditions. It has not been ruled out that one cannot generalise from what is true of hallucination to what must be true of perception because it has not been shown that there is a non-causal condition present in hallucination which is absent in perception.

Premise (4) essentially states that the non-causal conditions required to produce the intrinsic experiential event between hallucination and perception are the same. To produce the intrinsic experiential event shared by hallucination and perception, the non-causal conditions required are the same. Again, this is not to say that to produce a perception, the non-causal conditions would be the same.

Since the proximate causal condition between hallucination and perception are the same, along with the non-causal conditions, this leads to premise (5) & premise (6) that there is something in common between hallucination and perception. This conclusion initially appears to be consistent with maintaining that perception has additional characteristics as per naïve realism which causally matching hallucinations do not have.

2.4.1.1. Screening off Problem & a Derivative Account of Hallucination

The disjunctivist might be momentarily relieved to find that there is some room to manoeuvre with the reverse causal argument. Contrary to the causal argument, it is not as though, the disjunctivist is forced to accept that Common Kind thesis, that a hallucination and a veridical perception are the same kinds of psychological events. All that is being granted from this argument is that a veridical perception could share the kind of psychological event that fundamentally characterises a hallucination. There is something in common between a hallucination and a veridical perception, but this allows that a veridical perception might have certain unique features that are absent in a hallucination. It is the thought that a “hallucination can be fundamentally of kind *F* but a veridical perception can share *F* but be fundamentally understood in terms of relational properties to mind-independent objects” (Martin 2004, p. 61). At face-value, the conclusion of the reverse causal argument is consistent with naïve realism.

But, as Martin argues, this reverse causal argument prevents the disjunctivist from providing a positive characterisation of the phenomenal character of a hallucination that is distinct from the naïve realist’s characterisation we would provide of a veridical perception. Let us say that the kind of psychological event and its phenomenal character in a hallucination is to be fundamentally explained in terms of an intentional object. Since, the proximate neural cause of a hallucination and a veridical perception are the same, a veridical perception would also have to be an experience that involves an awareness of an intentional object. This common property that involves an awareness of an intentional object would screen off the unique relational properties of a veridical perception. This renders redundant the naïve realist’s crucial thesis, (2) *Relational Awareness*, we no

longer require the conscious relation of awareness to mind-independent objects to explain the phenomenal character of a veridical perception, we have all we need in the common property of the intentional object. This would apply to any other kind of positive story that the disjunctivist tries to tell of what takes place in a hallucination. Suggest sense data, qualia or representational content as an explanation for the phenomenal character of a hallucination and the disjunctivist is lumped with the screening off problem.

We can now introduce the second constraint of a disjunctivist theory:

Constraint 2: The phenomenal character of a hallucination must be characterised in derivative terms from a veridical perception.

Martin argues that there is one exception to the rule of common properties screening off unique properties and those would be properties that have “inherited or dependent explanatory potential” (2004, p.70). An inherited property is one that wholly derives its explanation from a unique property. To illustrate the notion of an inherited property, consider the following analogy by Fish:

“The property of being an unattended bag in an airport will cause a security alert despite there being nothing intrinsically threatening about an unattended bag. So why does this property cause a security alert? Because of the relation it bears to the property of being a bomb in an airport. Whatever explanatory potential the property of being an unattended bag in an airport has in explaining why there is a security alert is inherited from the property of being a bomb in an airport due to the relationship the two properties bear to one another” (Fish 2009, p. 92).

Thus, the common property of being an unattended bag at the airport does not screen off the unique property of a bag possibly containing a bomb. So, if the disjunctivist can show that the common property shared between a hallucination and a veridical perception is inherited and derivative on the unique property possessed by a veridical perception, then, this common property would not screen off the unique property.

2.5. Negative Disjunctivism: Hallucinations in terms of indiscriminability

Martin argues that for the case of hallucinations and veridical perceptions, this inherited common property is that of indiscriminability. As Martin (2004) mentions, both a hallucination of an F and a veridical perception of an F would be indiscriminable from a veridical perception of an F and that this common property “of being indiscriminable from an F has an explanatory potential which is dependent on the explanatory potential of being an F (p.70).” That hallucinations have these indiscriminability properties is all one can say about the phenomenal character of a hallucination according to Martin.

This is a *derivative* account, because the phenomenal character of a hallucination is being characterised in a manner that is derivative of the phenomenal character of a veridical perception. A hallucination, then, is ontologically parasitic on a veridical perception, where we could not conceive of what it would be like to hallucinate without an understanding of what it is like to genuinely perceive. The oft-mentioned example of a forged dollar note illustrates the manner in which its existence is contingent on a genuine

dollar note and the purpose that it serves, a form of currency that allows for the exchange of goods and services. The two share a common property. The forged note shares the property of being indiscriminable, but this common property can only be explained by making reference to a genuine note. We would not have a forged note if not for the fact that the real dollar note exists, it is in that sense in which just as a forged note is derivative to a dollar note, a hallucination is derivative to a veridical perception. Similarly, a hallucination may be indiscriminable from a veridical perception but genuinely perceiving involves actually being related to mind-independent objects. So, according to Martin there is no need to provide a positive, non-derivative account of a hallucination as a naïve realist can characterise the phenomenal character of a hallucination in terms of indiscriminability and more specifically in negative epistemic terms.

According to Martin, characterising causally matching hallucinations solely in terms of its indiscriminability from a veridical perception amounts to providing a negative epistemic account of a hallucination that is derivative to a veridical perception. What exactly does it mean to describe the phenomenal character of a hallucination in terms of its indiscriminability from a veridical perception? This is what it means: all that need be said about the phenomenal character of a hallucination is that it is introspectively indiscriminable to a subject from a veridical perception, where a subject cannot know through introspective reflection that his experience is not a veridical perception.

$I \Leftrightarrow \neg K_{\{\text{through reflection}\}} \neg VP$: “An experience (hallucination) of an x is indiscriminable from a veridical perception if and only if x is such that it is not possible to know through reflection that it is not one of the veridical perceptions.” (Martin 2006, p. 400).

Notice that the *indiscriminability* of a hallucination from a veridical perception is characterized in terms of it *not being possible* for a subject to *know through introspection*. This involves an *epistemological* claim, as it describes what can be known through introspection about the nature of a hallucination. In particular, it is a *negative epistemic* claim in that it refers to what a subject cannot know through introspection about the phenomenal character of their experience. In a hallucination, a subject cannot know that his experience lacks the phenomenal character of a veridical perception. This is all that can be said about the phenomenal character of causally matching hallucinations. Thus, according to Martin, a causally matching hallucination of a white picket fence is such that it is not possible for a subject to know by introspection that their experience is not a veridical perception of a white picket fence.

2.6 Objections to Martin's Negative Epistemic account of Hallucination

Some have raised worries over the “through reflection” specification of Martin’s account of indiscriminability (Sturgeon 2006; 2008; Conduct 2010). A subject might find out that their experience is a hallucinatory one via their background beliefs so this would be a hallucination even though a subject is able to distinguish it from a perception. Sturgeon provides an example of one occasion where he heard his daughter crying but when he went and checked on his daughter, he found that she was asleep. After a few times, he realises that she could not have been crying and that he was hallucinating the whole time. So, this is a case where he is able to discriminate a hallucination from a veridical perception.

2.6.1.The Dog and the Phenomenal Zombie.

Martin defines a hallucination solely in terms of its indiscriminability from a veridical perception. All we can say about the phenomenal character of a hallucination is that it is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. What does it mean to say that an experience is introspectively indiscriminable from a good case, a true case of perception? This means that when a subject introspectively reflects on her experience she cannot tell or know that her experience is hallucinatory or not a veridical perception. She cannot discriminate, differentiate or distinguish the experience she is having from a veridical perception because subjectively it feels just the same as if she were actually perceiving for the case of a hallucination. A causally matching hallucination is one that shares the same proximate neural cause as a veridical perception. The problem for the disjunctivist as we saw was to allow that there could be something in common between a hallucinatory and a veridical case whilst still allowing that veridical perceptions are fundamentally different in that they are a relation to mind-independent objects.

The Dog Problem:

Susanna Siegel objects that Martin's conception of hallucination does not apply to cognitively unsophisticated creatures that lack the capacity to discriminate and to know but whom we might still want to say are capable of hallucinating.

“Consider a dog that lacks the cognitive equipment needed to form judgements, including ones that count as knowledge. For such a dog, there will be no perceptual experience such that he can know that it is distinct from a veridical perception. So, all of the dog's perceptual experiences will count as indiscriminable from every kind of veridical

perception. If the fact that two experiences share a specific indiscriminability property suffices for them to seem the same to the subject, then by accepting this interpretation of $I \rightarrow E$, disjunctivists predict that all the dog's experiences will seem the same to the dog. That seems plainly wrong." (Siegel 2008, p. 210).

Cognitively unsophisticated creatures such as dogs lack the conceptual capacities necessary to make judgements of sameness and difference. Any experience a dog has would count as indiscriminable from a veridical perception to the dog. All of a dog's experiences would seem the same from a dog's point of view because of its inability to discriminate or make judgements of difference. If a dog is hallucinating a snake, since a dog lacks the capacity to make judgements of difference, then all of the dog's experiences will count as indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a snake, even though not all of a dog's experiences are hallucinations of a snake. Whatever experience a dog has, it will not be possible for the dog to know that it is not having a veridical perception of a snake. So, introspective indiscriminability is not sufficient to grant that a dog is hallucinating a snake.

Moreover, the objection goes, Martin's account fails to account for the possibility that dogs may have different kinds of hallucinations. A dog that hallucinates a snake, will not only find its experience indiscriminable from a veridical perception of a snake but also from that of a butterfly, a cat, rat, bird or any other kind of experience. We do not have a story for how a dog can have different kinds of hallucinations with different kinds of phenomenal characters because a hallucination is being defined in terms of a state of being unable to know, in other words, a negative epistemic state.

Siegel's objection is pressing the disjunctivist to say something positive about the phenomenal character of hallucinations and consequently, to concede that the phenomenal character of a hallucination is the same as that of a veridical perception. Dogs cannot discriminate, so a dog might be hallucinating a snake and would still find its experience indiscriminable from a cat. The opponent is implying that there is *something positive* it is like to hallucinate a snake which is different from what it is like to hallucinate a cat and this difference in the phenomenology of a hallucination cannot be captured by being in an epistemic state of being unable to know through introspection, especially since dogs lack the capacity to discriminate or know.

Impersonal Indiscriminability Response:

The case of the dog points out the limits of Martin's approach in dealing with cognitively unsophisticated creatures that lack the capacity to discriminate. It appears to be the case, that the notion of indiscriminability at stake in Martin's negative epistemic condition is a relative one. Timothy Williamson (1990) proposes a definition of indiscriminability that highlights the manner in which indiscriminability is contingent on the cognitive capacities of a subject and the time and other background conditions in which a subject carries out the act of discriminating.

"*a* is indiscriminable from *b* for a subject at a time if and only if at that time the *subject* is not able to discriminate between *a* and *b*, that is, if and only if at that time the subject is not able to activate or employ the relevant kind of knowledge that *a* and *b* are distinct"
"(Williamson 1990, p.8).

In the above definition, Williamson concentrates on discriminating between objects and properties, but this sentiment can easily be applied to an inability to discriminate one's experience from a veridical perception. If we substitute *a* and *b* with two shades of red, say *scarlet* and *vermillion*, since there is a subtle difference between the two, we can imagine a subject who might fail to discriminate between the two. A subject, Raoul may on a particular occasion be unable to discriminate between the shades *scarlet* and *vermillion* for varying reasons; he may have been tired or exhausted at the time and so not very attentive. Perhaps, he may have had too much to drink and was unable to discriminate when shown these two swatches of red. Maybe, he was looking at the colours in poor lighting conditions. The idea is that simply because, *Raoul* finds *scarlet* and *vermillion* indiscriminable does not entail that the two shades are the same, phenomenally speaking. *Scarlet* and *vermillion* are two distinct shades of red. All that is established is that a particular subject Raoul is unable to discriminate between the two shades of red on a particular occasion. This does not entail that *no one* can discriminate between the two. Someone else on another occasion with better discriminatory capacities and more favourable background conditions may be perfectly capable of distinguishing between the two. We can imagine an accomplished painter who may not only be able to discriminate between the two shades of red but who may be able to pick up on the subtleties and nuances of colour that may be indiscriminable to the untrained eye.

This is the key loophole in Martin's conception of indiscriminability: that it is relative to a subject. We can now see why the situation of the dog poses a problem for the disjunctivist. To address this problem, Martin argues that the Naïve realist can benefit

from specifying indiscriminability in *impersonal* terms. Introspective indiscriminability is impersonal in that we are not making a claim about what a particular subject, an ideal subject or even a group of subjects can or cannot discriminate and consequently know. It is a case of it being *impossible* to discriminate by vision or human perceptual faculties. For something to be impossible to tell apart by vision is a case of *no one* being able to discriminate. Martin utilises an example of invisible mending that might be useful to mention. When clothes are invisibly mended, the mending is not supposed to be visible to anyone. We can think of other examples of invisible entities such as an atom, it is an entity that is not discriminable by the human eye and our perceptual faculties. *No one* can detect an atom. With respect to indiscriminability and experiences, a causally matching hallucination is impersonally indiscriminable in that no one can or would be able to detect that the experience is not a veridical perception. The indiscriminability of a causally matching hallucination is not contingent on some subject's capacities.

How does this address the dog objection? In saying that the dog's experience is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception, we are not making a claim about the dog's capacity to discriminate. Instead, the dog's experience is impersonally indiscriminable from a veridical perception in that no one would be able to tell that the experience is not genuine. This idealized notion of indiscriminability would apply to any subject whether one is a dog, a cognitively sophisticated subject or to an inattentive subject.

However, this response of impersonal indiscriminability inadvertently puts pressure on the disjunctivist to accept a fundamental common factor. It is very tempting to think that the impersonal indiscriminability of one object from another must mean that there is a

shared introspectable phenomenal property in common. Surely, if one is looking at an orange slab of soap that has been ingeniously designed to resemble a real orange, the two must 'share a look.' One might think that there must be some positive phenomenal feature in common if it is the case that no one would be able to discriminate the two objects.

After all, if there truly were a phenomenal difference between a hallucination of an orange and a veridical perception of an orange, then this difference would be introspectively accessible. Since, this difference is not introspectively accessible, the disjunctivist is left with the unsavoury consequence that this phenomenal difference is hidden or inaccessible to the subject undergoing the experience.

The Zombie Problem:

But, what about a subject that cannot have experiences? A subject that is functionally similar to humans but lacks phenomenal consciousness would meet the condition of impersonal indiscriminability. Impersonal indiscriminability is a case where no one would be able to know or discriminate through reflection that one's experience is not a veridical perception. Zombies may satisfy the condition in that they may have the same functionally defined cognitive effects but lack phenomenal consciousness (Sturgeon 2008). A physical duplicate such as a zombie could have an impersonally indiscriminable hallucination of a say tree. However, not only would a zombie be unable to know that its experience is not a veridical perception of a tree but neither would anyone else. But, the zombie's hallucination of a tree would not involve consciousness. So, a zombie could fulfil the condition required for a subject to have a hallucination of a tree without having a conscious experience. So, it would be able to satisfy the condition of impersonal indiscriminability while leading to the conclusion that such a hallucination that is

impersonally indiscriminable is not a phenomenally conscious experience. If this is the case, then it looks like Martin's approach cannot account for the conscious nature of causally matching hallucinations even if we grant that these experiences are impersonally indiscriminable.

From the discussion of the objections above, two conclusions are being put forward by the conjunctivist:

(A) To explain the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a perception, one needs to appeal to shared positive introspectable phenomenal features in common.

(B) Characterising hallucinations solely in terms of their introspective indiscriminability from perceptions is to do so only in terms of cognitive and behavioural effects divorced from phenomenal consciousness.

So far, it seems as though appealing to an impersonal notion of indiscriminability seems to get us (A), if we say that no one can discriminate between the experience one is going through that it is not a veridical perception, that there must be some shared introspectable property in common between a hallucination and perception that must explain why it is that no one can discriminate between the two. The zombie objection gets us (B) subjects that lack phenomenal consciousness can satisfy indiscriminability and so can be hallucinating. Indiscriminability does not seem to require phenomenal consciousness making a purely cognitive notion leading to the unsavoury conclusion that hallucinations lack phenomenal character. The discussion so far seems to be compelling the disjunctivist to provide a more positive account that explains the indiscriminability

from a veridical perception. It is unintuitive to think of indiscriminability in terms of cognitive and behavioural effects divorced from phenomenal consciousness; surely if a hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical perception, there must be a positive explanation and moreover, they must also share the same phenomenal character.

Chapter 3: Reinterpreting Introspective Indiscriminability

In Chapter 2, we considered Martin's negative disjunctivist account of hallucination. We saw that Martin's account provides a derivative characterisation of the phenomenal character of hallucinations in terms of its introspective indiscriminability from a veridical perception. *Prima facie*, the dog and the phenomenal zombie objection seem to establish that introspective indiscriminability does not satisfactorily account for the phenomenal character of hallucinations.

In this chapter, I utilise Martin's notion of a 'point of view' to argue that a minimal positive claim can be derived from introspective indiscriminability: a subject seems to 'occupy a point of view' on the world. I argue that our introspective awareness coincides with our 'point of view' on the world. This 'point of view' is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness, meaning that we cannot think of an introspective awareness without thinking of it as phenomenally conscious. Thus, the negative epistemic condition of introspective indiscriminability is not a higher order belief or judgement; it describes a subject's situation in such a way that introspection *is* possible. If the negative epistemic notion of indiscriminability is the idea that a subject is unable to tell that their experience is not a veridical perception, then this negative epistemic fact in addition to Martin's positive claim about introspection entails that a subject seems to have a point of view on the world.

In section 3.1, I follow Martin in arguing that the dog and the phenomenal zombie objections rest on an inner sense model of introspection which we have reason to reject.

Contrary to the inner sense model, I argue that introspective awareness cannot be understood independently of one's perceptual 'point of view' on the world. In Section 3.2, moreover, occupying a 'point of view' is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness which would mean that our introspective perspective is a phenomenally conscious perspective. In Section 3.3, using Martin's notion of 'point of view', I argue that a minimal positive claim can be derived from introspective indiscriminability: a subject seems to occupy a point of view on the world. Consequently, a hallucination is a case where a subject does possess the introspective perspective of 'seeming to occupy' a 'point of view', as per the arguments made in section 3.2, this would mean that a hallucination does involve phenomenal consciousness.

I end this section by observing that though this reinterpretation of Martin's negative epistemic condition allows for the phenomenally conscious nature of hallucinations, it is still not robust enough to explain why such hallucinations seem to be as vivid as veridical perceptions. This explanation may still be unsatisfying to many as it fails to explain in virtue of what, why such hallucinations are introspectively indiscriminable. So, a slightly more positive characterisation is needed.

3.1 Introspection and Perceptual Awareness

In Chapter 2 we considered the view negative disjunctivism as a way of preserving naïve realism. How do we explain what it is like to hallucinate a yellow bell pepper? By characterising such an experience solely in terms of its introspective indiscriminability from a veridical perception of a yellow bell pepper. A hallucination of a yellow bell pepper

is indistinguishable from an actual experience of a yellow bell pepper in that, when a subject *introspectively reflects* on her experience, she cannot tell that her experience is not a genuine perception of a yellow bell pepper. Nothing in her experience of the yellow bell pepper causes her to suspect otherwise.

One might think that this negative epistemic claim does not provide a satisfying account of the phenomenal character of a hallucination. We need something a bit more positive. It is not *just* that a subject cannot tell that her experience is not a veridical perception of a yellow bell pepper, but it *seems* as though she is having a veridical perception of a yellow bell pepper. This is precisely what will be argued in this chapter: a positive claim can be derived from the negative epistemic condition of indiscriminability and this claim necessitates that phenomenal consciousness *is* present in causally matching hallucinations.

3.1.1 A Recap of the Objections

The dog and the phenomenal zombie objections question the extent to which a negative epistemic judgement can satisfyingly characterise the phenomenal character of a hallucination. In fact, the Disjunctivist is hard-pressed to provide a positive characterization of the phenomenal character of a hallucination in substantial metaphysical terms. But, to do so, would be to run right into the screening off problem.

Roughly, these objections arrive at two conclusions.

(A) To explain the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a perception, one needs to appeal to shared positive introspectable phenomenal features in common.

(B) Characterising hallucinations solely in terms of their introspective indiscriminability from perceptions is to do so only in terms of cognitive and behavioural effects divorced from phenomenal consciousness.

The dog objection arrives at (A) & (B). Dogs could have different kinds of hallucinations of apples, carrots or cucumbers which are indistinguishable from corresponding veridical perceptions. Dogs lack the cognitive capacity to form judgements of sameness and difference and so would not be able to discriminate a hallucination of an apple from a hallucination of a carrot and vice versa. Both hallucinations would be indiscriminable from a dog's point of view. But, clearly, there is a difference between hallucinating an apple and hallucinating a carrot. Yet, for certain subjects such as dogs, this difference is not captured on Martin's account. So, this difference must be explained by positive introspectable phenomenal features that distinguish each experience.

The zombie objection arrives at (B) where on Martin's account, characterising hallucinations in terms of indiscriminability entails that hallucinations lack phenomenal consciousness. This is because it is possible for a subject to possess a state that meets the condition of introspective indiscriminability whilst being entirely devoid of consciousness. Consider zombies that are functional duplicates of humans. A zombie may satisfy the negative epistemic condition of introspective indiscriminability by forming

higher order beliefs when hallucinating but their experience may lack phenomenal consciousness. This is meant to show that Martin's condition of introspective indiscriminability cannot account for the fact that hallucinations are phenomenally conscious experiences.

3.1.2 The Inner Sense Model of Introspection

These objections, however, implicitly assume an Inner Sense model of introspection that is not uncontroversial. As per the Inner Sense conception, introspection is modelled on perception.

A key assumption of *Inner Sense* is what Shoemaker (1994) has called the Independence condition:

(*Independence condition*): A way of coming to know about a domain that is independent of that mode of awareness.

Proponents of *Inner Sense* take the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and introspective reflection to be such that

“in coming to make judgements about how things phenomenally appear to one, one makes judgements about a subject matter that obtains independently of one's being in a position to make those judgements” (Martin 2006 p.25).

On a realist view of perception, when I perceive, I am aware of objects in an external world which exists independently of my being aware of it. If I look at a white coffee mug on a study table, via the means of my perceptual faculties, I am aware of these objects in an external world that exist *independently* of my perceptual awareness of it. By the same

token, the inner sense model assumes that introspection is a case of coming to be aware of an internal realm of phenomenal character through a process of self-scanning, that exists *independently* of my introspective awareness of it. Introspective awareness would involve being aware of the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience of a white coffee mug on a study table. Thus, according to *Inner Sense*, if I hallucinate a white coffee mug on a study table, I make use of my introspective faculty which detects phenomenal properties in common with an actual veridical perception of viewing the same scene.

We can now see how the dog and zombie objections implicitly endorse an inner sense model of introspection. If we grant that this model of introspection is correct, dogs lack the relevant introspective faculty so any experience they have would be introspectively indistinguishable from a veridical perception. The Conjunctivist's reasoning is that dogs can have hallucinations with phenomenal character yet are *introspectively blind* to this because they lack the relevant faculty, but dogs still hallucinate. On the other hand, zombies may possess something like an introspective faculty causing them to judge that they are having experiences with phenomenal character, though this is not the case. In other words, their introspective faculty is producing judgements about phenomenal character in the absence of phenomenal character. By example, if a dog hallucinates a carrot, the dog may have an experience with phenomenal character but since they lack the capacity to introspectively discriminate, they are unable to judge that their experience of a carrot is distinct from that of an apple. While zombies may judge that their experience of a carrot is distinct from that of an apple in the absence of there being any phenomenally conscious experience.

3.1.3 An Allegedly False Assumption about Introspection

Martin denies the *Independence Condition*, and consequently an inner sense model of introspection. For, he takes this to be a mistaken view of the relationship between introspective reflection and phenomenal character. Introspection *does not* involve knowledge of

“facts about phenomenal consciousness.... fixed independently of whether a subject has any perspective on his or her own conscious states and is thereby self-aware of them (Martin 2006, p.25).

Introspection does not have to be thought of as a separate mechanism that produces judgements on the phenomenal character of experience independently of one's introspective access to it. This is because it is a legitimately difficult exercise to conceive of introspective awareness independently of perceptual awareness. In fact, Martin's line of thought seems to be that it is not possible to separate our introspective perspective from our perceptual perspective.

If one accepts the *independence condition* as part of an inner sense model, then one is committed to the phenomenal character of one's experience existing independently of one's introspective access to it. With regards to perception, we know that there are individuals who may lack one of their perceptual faculties in that there are conditions such as blindness, deafness or a loss of taste. Consequently, if a blind person is having an experience of a white coffee mug on a study table, the objects of the white coffee mug and a study table would still exist though the individual would be visually blind to that scene.

By analogy, if one is to accept the *independence condition*, a form of blindness should be equally conceivable with respect to our faculty of introspection. If an individual lacks her introspective faculty, the individual would be blind to the phenomenal character of his experiences. The phenomenal character of her experiences would still exist though the individual would be introspectively blind to it. Thus, we can imagine such an individual who possesses normal perceptual faculties and cognitive functions but lacks the faculty of introspection. This individual lacks introspective awareness of the phenomenal character of their experiences so individuals like her are introspectively or self-blind.

What might explain Martin's denial of the *Independence Condition* is that it is not really possible to have such an individual who is capable of experience yet lacks introspective awareness. It is not really possible for an individual to be self-blind, especially when thinking about the phenomenal character of one's experience. It is odd to think that we can have an experience with phenomenal character without being introspectively aware of that phenomenal character. Consider the following cases. If I am having a visual experience of a red rambutan⁸, I will be aware of what it is like to see something round, red and spiky looking. If I am having an auditory experience of Rachmaninoff's prelude in C-sharp minor on the piano, I will be aware of what it is like to hear deep, loud, resonant chords on the piano. If I am having a tactile experience of petting a Persian cat, I will be aware of what it is like to feel something soft and fluffy. Now consider what it would mean to be introspectively blind⁹ to the phenomenal character of one's experiences. If you ask

⁸ A fruit native to Southeast Asia.

⁹ This is reminiscent of Shoemaker's (1994) thought experiment of a self-blind individual. George is a person who is introspectively blind. When it rains outside, George would say something like 'it is raining but I don't believe that it is raining.' As per Moore's Paradox, this is absurd and surely George as a rational subject would refrain from making such a statement. If asked 'do you believe that it is raining?', he would want to say 'no' but would be forced to say 'yes' and so "nothing in his behaviour, verbal or otherwise, that would give away the fact that he lacks self-acquaintance"(p.36). This argument serves as a kind of

me, are you looking at a red rambutan? I might say, I am not. Ask me, whether I am listening to Rachmaninoff's prelude on the piano, I might say, I don't think I am. Ask me whether I am petting a Persian cat, I might once again display my ignorance. It seems strange, however, to think that I can be capable of having all these visual, auditory and tactile experiences but lack awareness of what it is like to have them. It seems as though being introspectively blind to the phenomenal character of one's experience would carry over to being perceptually blind. It is not really possible for an individual to be self-blind, especially when thinking about the phenomenal character of one's experience. Instead, it seems as though our introspective perspective coincides with our perceptual awareness of the world.

The converse would be equally absurd¹⁰. As I see it, neither is it possible for one to be introspectively aware of the phenomenal character of an experience without being perceptually aware of anything. If I am introspectively aware of looking at a red rambutan in that I form the belief 'I believe that it is a red rambutan', I cannot subsequently say that 'I do not see it.' If I introspectively believe that I am hearing a prelude by Rachmaninoff on the piano, I cannot subsequently say that 'I do not hear it.' Finally, if I believe myself to be petting a Persian cat, I cannot say that 'I don't feel anything.' As Moran (2001) notices, what this shows is that if a subject has formed an introspective belief about matters of the world, there is a sense in which

reductio ad absurdum against *Inner Sense*, where such cases of self-blindness are not really possible. Though, some are sceptical that this argument shows the impossibility of inner sense. Byrne(2005) for one thinks that it merely shows that it is an extravagant view.

¹⁰ Revising Shoemaker's example, this would be: 'It is not raining, but I believe that it is.'

“a claim concerning one’s attitudes counts as a claim about their objects, about the world one’s attitudes are directed on “(Moran, p. 92).

Thus, If I am *incapable* of having an experience with phenomenal character, I would thereby be incapable of possessing introspective awareness.

“It appears to be impossible to comply with the following request: introspect those properties that determine what your experience is an experience of, but make sure you don’t look at anything” (Soteriou 2013, p.193).

Another implicit assumption behind the acceptance of the independence condition, that phenomenal character can exist independently of our introspective awareness of it, is the assumption that phenomenal character can exist independently of one’s perceptual awareness. Thus, one can have an awareness of the properties that make up the phenomenal character of a visual experience of a red rambutan without actually having a visual experience of a red rambutan. But, as Soteriou argues there is a sense in which perceptual awareness and especially the kind that a veridical experience affords is *explanatorily prior*. To have a veridical perception is necessarily to have an experience with phenomenal character. Introspective awareness just is attending to the phenomenal character of a veridical experience. This is why the Disjunctivist denies the independence condition: as we cannot think of introspection independently of our perceptual awareness of the world and we cannot think of perceptual awareness independently of phenomenal character. And since, we cannot conceive of introspective awareness of

phenomenal character independently of perceptual awareness of phenomenal character, introspective awareness depends on and coincides with our perceptual awareness.

“How, then, should we think of introspection? The activity of a subject occupying a perceptual perspective or point of view is what makes up our introspective perspective. Our introspective perspective coincides with our perceptual point of view on the world” (Soteriou 2013, p.194).

For the disjunctivist, in virtue of occupying a perceptual point of view as a self-conscious subject, you are thereby automatically occupying an introspective perspective. But what distinguishes introspective awareness from perceptual awareness?

One might think that the Disjunctivist is conflating the two. Soteriou (2013) argues that “the difference is at the level of the aim and outcome of introspective awareness that differs from perceptual awareness”. If I look out of my window, I see the branches of a frangipani tree spilling over the top of a tall white boundary wall. The aim of perceptual awareness of my experience, involves simply looking at a portion of the tree and boundary wall. The aim of introspective awareness is “that of discovering something about the experience one is having while the outcome of such activity involves judgements’ about what perceptually seems to be the case” (p. 194). Though the aim of introspective awareness differs from perceptual awareness, both cases of perceptual awareness and introspective awareness involve and are based on looking at or noticing whatever it is one is perceiving.

3.2 Introspective awareness and phenomenal consciousness

So far, I have shown that the Disjunctivist is committed to an account of introspection that takes introspective awareness to depend on and coincide with perceptual awareness. In what follows, I argue that introspective awareness involves a kind of phenomenally conscious perspective. First, I begin by showing that the notion of a 'point of view' appears to be inextricably linked to phenomenal character in that occupying such a 'point of view' entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness. This point of view is specifically perceptual in nature, in that we always perceive from a point of view. If a 'point of view' entails that phenomenal consciousness is present then since one's introspective awareness coincides with one's perceptual point of view, one's introspective perspective is a phenomenally conscious perspective.

Phenomenal consciousness is often explained by saying that there is *something it is like* to have an experience. Nagel is known to have popularised the usage of the phrase 'what it is like' to describe the phenomenal consciousness of an experience. Nagel also draws links between 'what it is like' to have an experience with that of occupying a point of view where

"whatever may be the status of facts about what it is like to be a human being, or a bat, or a Martian, these appear to be facts that embody a particular point of view" (Nagel 1974, p. 441).

Nagel's thought seems to be that we cannot think of facts about phenomenal consciousness independently of facts of the relevant perceptual point of view. Consciousness involves experiencing the world from a 'point of view'. This notion of a

'point of view' is not inconsistent with Naïve Realism as we find this thought in Martin's work as well where

"in ascribing consciousness to a creature, we are thereby ascribing to it a point of view or perspective on the world. This is a feature which the naïve realist about perception in particular will want to stress, although its claim on us is recognised far more widely. From a subject's perspective experience is a matter (at least in part) of various objects being apparent to it, some part of the actual world making an appearance to one. The naïve realist, at least in the case of veridical perception, wishes us to understand this way of talking literally: veridical perceptual experience is constituted through one standing in a relation of awareness to the objects of perception" (Martin 2004, p.42).

Phenomenal consciousness involves a subject occupying a certain point of view or perspective on the world which is consistent with naïve realism. This is because the phenomenal character of a veridical perception can only be captured by making reference to *what* it is a point of view on: *mind-independent objects*.

We can see that this point of view is necessarily perceptual as we always perceive from a point of view, where what it is like to perceive a red object involves viewing that object from a point of view. Any human or non-human animal that has a phenomenally conscious experience embodies a point of view on the world. Since, consistent with Naïve Realism, veridical perception involves a subject being in a *relation* of direct awareness of mind-independent objects, this characterises what it is like for a subject to perceive. The subject's point of view is constituted by this relation of direct awareness to mind-independent objects.

Thus, there appears to be a tradition in analytic philosophy that links the notion of a 'point of view' to phenomenal consciousness. What we can extract from the discussion above is that if one has a perceptual point of view, this will entail that phenomenal consciousness is present. As was shown in the latter parts of **section 3.1**, introspective awareness is grounded in perceptual awareness and consequently in a perceptual point of view which means one's introspective perspective involves phenomenal consciousness.

Here is a summary of the argument:

- 1) One's introspective awareness coincides and depends on one's perceptual awareness.
- 2) Perceptual awareness can be analysed in terms of a 'point of view.'
- 3) A 'point of view' is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness.
- 4) One's introspective perspective is phenomenally conscious.

3.3. Introspective indiscriminability and Phenomenally Conscious

Hallucinations

Recall that Martin defines the phenomenal character of a hallucination in terms of its introspective indiscriminability from a veridical perception, where a subject is unable to tell via introspection that his experience is not a veridical perception. The charge was that introspective indiscriminability is a sort of higher order judgement which simply specifies one's cognitive and behavioural effects. In **3.1**, it was argued that introspective awareness coincides and depends on one's perceptual awareness. In **3.2**, we saw that perceptual awareness can be understood in terms of a point of view on the world and

that this notion of a point of view necessarily means that phenomenal consciousness is present.

Martin's negative epistemic condition of introspective indiscriminability is to be understood in such a way where some form of introspective awareness is possible. All that indiscriminability means is, a subject is not in a position to tell that her experience is not genuine. When a subject finds her experience indiscriminable from a veridical perception, she seems to occupy a point of view on the world in that she seems to possess the kind of introspective perspective that can only be had in a veridical perception. Seeming to possess this introspective perspective is not the same as actually *possessing* it. Seeming to occupy a point of view is not the same as actually *occupying* it. But both a veridical perception and a hallucination share this indiscriminability property in that they seem to possess the kind of introspective perspective that is distinctive of having a genuine perceptual experience: *seeming to occupy a point of view* on the world. Since, condition of introspective indiscriminability involves this kind of introspective perspective, this ensures that phenomenal consciousness is present.

Where phenomenal consciousness is not present, the condition of introspective indiscriminability will not be met. Once again, the presence of phenomenal consciousness is linked to the possession of a perceptual point of view. For example, a rock will not satisfy the condition of introspective indiscriminability. A rock is not the kind of subject that is capable of introspective awareness because it lacks the ability to possess a point of view on the world and so lacks consciousness. This is because a rock is an inanimate object. In a parallel manner, the zombie objection poses no real threat to the Disjunctivist, if we read the condition of introspective indiscriminability as requiring a phenomenally

conscious perspective. This is because a zombie would not be the kind of subject similar to an inanimate object such as a rock that is capable of possessing a point of view on the world. If there is no perceptual point of view, there can be no introspective awareness since the latter is based on the former.

On the other hand, unsophisticated hallucinators such as a dog *would* be the kind of subject that can satisfy the condition of introspective indiscriminability. It is true that dogs are incapable of making introspective judgements about their experiences, while humans are capable of making such judgements. However, we still need not endorse an inner sense model of introspection that takes introspective indiscriminability or discriminability to be a matter of identifying phenomenal properties in common or differences that exist independently of our introspective awareness of them. To satisfy introspective awareness and the negative epistemic condition, all that is required, is for a subject to be capable of possessing a phenomenally conscious point of view. Introspective indiscriminability is then seeming to perceive some aspect of the world or possessing a point of view on the world. Dogs are sentient creatures that do possess a phenomenally conscious point of view on the world. If a dog hallucinates a cat, from the dog's point of view, there seems to be a cat, even though, the dog knows no better. A dog seeming to possess a point of view on a cat need not be thought of as a higher order judgement but as a phenomenally conscious perspective on a cat. The hallucinatory experience of a cat seems to be the same as actually perceiving a cat, though the dog may not be able to articulate this as a judgement. We can only tell this by noticing its behaviour in that it might behave the same as it would when actually perceiving a cat: it might try to chase after the cat in both instances.

Can this reinterpretation of introspective indiscriminability respond to the screening off problem? Both hallucinations and veridical perceptions share the common property of being introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception and so one might worry that this screens off the relational properties of a veridical perception. In both cases, a subject seems to have some sort of perceptual point of view on the world.

But this common property of seeming to have a point of view does not screen off the relational properties of a veridical perception to mind-independent objects. A point of view is defined by specifying that it is a perceptually conscious perspective on mind-independent objects. It is not a point of view on sense data, qualia or intentional objects. For example, I might have a veridical perception of a field of sunflowers and so seem to occupy a perceptually conscious view on the scene before me. If I were to have an indistinguishable causally matching hallucination of the same scene, I would also seem to occupy a point of view on a field of sunflowers. But, the common property of seeming to occupy a point of view derives its explanatory potential from actually occupying a point of view. The common property of seeming to occupy a point of view on a field of sunflowers derives its explanatory potential from actually occupying a point of view which is distinctive of a veridical perception.

Arguably, this response may appear to be a case of fiddling with words. Seeming to occupy a 'point of view' is just seeming to perceive. What real difference is there between this reinterpretation and Hinton's original perception-illusion disjuncts? Not much, it seems. There may be some truth in Dancy's (1995) criticism that the disjunctivist describes a hallucination in terms of what it is not. Though, in this case, we are no longer just saying that a hallucination is a case of a subject being unable to know that their experience is not a perception, seeming to occupy a 'point of view' on the

world still does not seem to be explaining very much. A smidgen of a more positive characterisation is needed to explain why a subject seems to occupy a 'point of view.' A slightly more positive account is needed to explain the vivid and believable nature of hallucinations.

The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the notion of a 'point of view' as a phenomenally conscious perspective on the world. Introspective indiscriminability, we saw, is a subject seeming to possess a 'point of view.' In the next chapter, I will define what exactly a 'point of view' is. I will introduce the notion of a perceptual capacity to specify the subject component of a 'point of view.' I will consider whether the notion of a 'perceptual capacity' and a 'point of view' can be used to provide a more positive characterisation of a hallucination.

Chapter 4: A Minimal Positive Account of Hallucination

We saw in chapter 3 that a minimally positive claim can be derived from Martin's negative epistemic condition: seeming to occupy a 'point of view' on the world. Hallucinations are introspectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptions in that these experiences are a case of a subject seeming to occupy a 'point of view' on the world. This notion of a 'point of view' is one that Martin, himself, advocates for and so this reading of introspective indiscriminability is consistent with his view. I argued that, although this positive reading of introspective indiscriminability is able to account for how hallucinations are phenomenally conscious experiences, it still fails to explain why it is that hallucinations appear to be as vivid as veridical perceptions. It fails to provide a narrative for what explains the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception.

In chapter 4, I argue that the notion of a 'perceptual capacity' can bolster Martin's notion of a 'point of view.' I specify the subject component of a 'point of view' in terms of Susanna Schellenberg's approach to perceptual capacities. I argue that the introduction of perceptual capacities can help explain the introspective indiscriminability of hallucinations which is consistent with disjunctivism. So, why is it that when hallucinating a subject is unable to tell that her experience is not a veridical perception? Why is it that a subject seems to occupy a point of view when hallucinating? It is because the same perceptual capacities are activated in a subject as when perceiving. The difference is that when the perceptual capacities are activated in a hallucination, these capacities are malfunctioning while in a veridical perception they are being exercised

successfully. I argue this proposal meets the constraints that were introduced in chapter 2: *constraint 1* and *constraint 2* of a disjunctivist theory.

In section 4.1, I define what exactly this notion of a ‘point of view’ is that was introduced in chapter 3. **Section 4.2** delves into Schellenberg’s perceptual capacity account. I consider what it means to exercise perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out in a veridical perception. **Section 4.4** focuses on the case of hallucination, considering whether we exercise the same perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out when hallucinating. **Section 4.5** connects Martin’s positive reading of introspective indiscriminability: seeming to occupy a point of view on the world with the activation of perceptual capacities. I conclude this section by showing how this proposal satisfies *constraint 1* and *constraint 2*. **Section 4.6** considers and responds to a few potential objections to the proposal.

4.1 What exactly is a point of view?

In **chapter 3**, we saw that facts about phenomenal consciousness tend to involve facts about a perceptual ‘point of view.’ As a result, possessing a ‘point of view’ is sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. Martin characterises introspection as a kind of attention to a perceptual ‘point of view’, where introspective indiscriminability would be a subject seeming to occupy the same ‘point of view’ as he would in a veridical perception. If it appears to the subject as though he is in the same ‘point of view’ as in a veridical perception, then his experience is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception and vice versa. **Section 4.1** is an attempt to clarify the essential components of what makes up our perceptual ‘point of view’ on the world and consequently the

phenomenal character of veridical perceptions. These elements include a subject, the third relatum (spatio-temporal orientation, sensory modality and other background conditions of perception) and finally mind-independent objects. The focus of this section will be on considering the subject and the third relatum component of a 'point of view' and finally, specifying the subject component in terms of perceptual capacities.

4.1.1. A subject:

The phenomenal character of an experience can be characterized in terms of a 'point of view' or perspective. A key component of a 'point of view' involves the *kind* of subject having the experience. This line of thought can be found in Nagel (1974)

"In our own case we occupy the relevant point of view, but we will have as much difficulty understanding our own experience properly if we approach it from another point of view as we would if we tried to understand the experience of another species without taking up its point of view (p.442)."

The above thought seems to be that the type of species in question having the experience plays a role in determining the phenomenal character of its experience. Though, it must be noted that Nagel discusses this in light of the theory of physicalism, where a major objection to physicalists would be how they can account for the subjective nature of consciousness. Adopting this notion of phenomenal character characteristic of a perceiver occupying a point of view on mind-independent objects does not necessarily commit one to an anti-physicalist position.

Recall that, Naïve Realists take the phenomenal character of a veridical perception to be partly constituted by objects. So, it is not inconsistent with naïve realism to allow that other factors such as the kind of perceiver with their particular kind of perceptual capacities can play a role in influencing the phenomenal character of a veridical perception. In fact, Heather Logue (2012) argues that when taking into consideration the phenomenal character of a veridical perception, we should not only consider facts about the mind-independent objects perceived but should also take into account facts about the subject.

“That is, Naive Realism can appeal to *both* relata in accounting for the phenomenal character of veridical experience, as well as to facts about the relation itself” (Logue 2012, p.222).

“For example, the Naive Realist can say that the phenomenal character of my veridical experience of the banana on my desk is determined not just by its yellowness and crescent shapes but *also* by the fact that I *see* these properties (as opposed to perceiving them in some other modality), and by certain facts about my visual system (for instance, that I’m seeing these properties through a simple eye rather than a compound one)” (Logue 2012, p.224).

Consider an example of a red-green colour-blind person looking at a variety of vegetables such as green bell peppers, red bell peppers and carrots; the person would find the colour of the two types of vegetables indiscriminable from the green bell peppers. This is because they have trouble seeing red and shades of orange. The phenomenal consciousness of a person with red-green colour blindness would be influenced by their specific capacities or inability to discriminate. Consequently, the experience of a person

who finds all three vegetables to look “green” in colour would have a different phenomenal character from a person born with normal colour vision. This example can be further extended to the case of a person blind from birth. Such a person would not have access to what it is like to see verdant trees and blue skies. So, the phenomenal character of her experiences would be different in virtue of the deficiency in their visual system but their other sensory modalities may be more enhanced and sensitive such as their tactile perception and auditory perception. These enhanced capacities would involve experiences with much richer detail when it comes to sounds and different textures. The phenomenal consciousness of a blind person’s auditory experience, in general, would be quite different from a person with normal colour vision as a person with normal colour vision may not need to rely predominantly on tactile and auditory perception to the extent that a blind person would.

To recapitulate, the kind of perceptual capacities a subject uses in tracking features of objects in the world determines the phenomenal character and their ‘points of view’ on the world.

4.1.2. The third Relatum:

One’s ‘point of view’ on the world and the phenomenal character of veridical perception is also influenced by other factors such as how objects are presented to us. These other factors include one’s spatial-temporal orientation, sensory modality and other background conditions of perception. Changes in these factors bring about changes in phenomenal character.

This is why some naïve realists consider the initial two place relation between a subject and an object as insufficient in characterising the richness of the phenomenology of perception.

“You always experience an object from a standpoint. And you can experience one and the same object from different standpoints” (Campbell 2011, p.50).

“Perceptual experience is a matter of a person’s conscious acquaintance with various mind-independent physical objects from a given spatiotemporal point of view, in a particular sense modality, and in certain specific circumstances of perception (such as lighting conditions in the case of vision)” (Brewer 2011, p.96).

What is lacking in the two-place analysis of naïve realism is that one’s *spatial-temporal orientation, sensory modality* and other *background conditions of perception* also affects phenomenal character.

To illustrate, suppose I were to focus my attention on a red cup of coffee on my table, my point of view is as follows:

The coffee is black and is piping hot with steam emanating from it. I am partially aware of the three-dimensional object of the cup from a particular distance, not very far off from me as I am seated at the table. I am only able to see the front side of the cup, whilst the back is obscured. As I move closer to the cup, I can see more and more of the black liquid. As I pick up the cup and bring it right under my mouth, I am spatially oriented as *directly above* the cup, and all I see is a circle of black liquid inside the cup, I can no longer see the front or sides of the cup. I slowly lift the mug to my mouth and taste the dark bitter substance scalding my tongue in the process, which influences my ‘point of view.’ The

shock from scalding my tongue causes me spill some of the coffee onto my lap where the hot liquid seeps into my pants. This is a different 'point of view', a tactile experience.

This example can be used to illustrate how one's 'point of view' and phenomenal character varies depending on the spatial orientation, temporal orientation, the relevant sensory modality and other background conditions.

First, let us begin by considering the issue of one's spatial-temporal orientation. A spatial-temporal orientation includes the distance and angle from which an object is viewed as well as the time at which the object or property is viewed. As Campbell (2011) and Brewer (2011) point out, that one and the same object can be viewed from a different spatial-temporal orientation which would correspond with a difference in phenomenology. Three-dimensional mind-independent objects tend to be seen from partial perspectives. What this means is that we see some features of the object whilst other features might be occluded. I only see some features of the red mug such as the front side whilst the back of the mug is not in my line of vision. Thus, the kind of spatial-temporal orientation that situates a subject plays a role in fixing the phenomenology of perception. Second, I am spatially aware of objects in different ways. Brewer (2011) observes that "head-on v. wide-angle experiences, and those of the head side v. tail side involve different spatial points of view" (p.96). Similarly, if I look at a rectangular table from above, my spatial perspective on the table is different from looking at the table from the side or from below. My perspective on the table from above would be of a flat table top whilst my perspective of the table from the side would include the legs of the table joined to a portion of the table top. If we link this to phenomenal character, *what it is like* to look at a table from above would be necessarily different from looking at it from the

side due to a difference in spatial orientation. Third, if I were to look at the cup on Monday when I sit down to work and look at the same cup on a Tuesday, I would be temporally oriented to the cup in different ways. Fourth, the nature of experience is such that objects closer to us tend to look larger in size and take up more of the visual field as opposed to objects farther away from us. Additional capacities of the visual system include size and colour constancy. Finally, experiencing an object or substance from different sensory modalities would mean a difference in phenomenal character and a 'point of view;' for example, the tactile experience of feeling the hot coffee in contrast to tasting the hot coffee. I am encountering the same substance via different sensory modalities, but I am still related to one and the same substance which would be the hot coffee in the red mug. As a result, the 'point of view' and phenomenal character of the same object or entity can differ depending on the sensory modality in question.

Background factors such as lighting conditions also play a role in influencing the phenomenal character of an experience and one's 'point of view.' Suppose, I purchase a piece of orange fabric in a clothing shop. As I walk out, I find that in natural light this fabric is actually pink in colour. There is, arguably, an important sense in which there has been a change in the phenomenal character of my experience as well as my 'point of view' on the piece of fabric.

4.1.3 Point of view in terms of Perceptual Capacities:

So far, the phenomenal character of veridical perception can be understood in terms of a perceptual ‘point of view’ on the world. In addition to mind-independent objects, it has been argued that a ‘point of view’ has two elements, namely the subject and the third relatum (spatio-temporal orientation, sensory modality and other background conditions of perception).

I propose that we further specify the subject component of a perceptual ‘point of view’ by taking into consideration the kind of subject and their perceptual capacity to discriminate. So, the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is partly constituted by this activity of perceptual discrimination in conjunction with being related to mind-independent objects in the external world. This thought is captured by Susanna Schellenberg’s account which I will examine in section 4.4. Schellenberg’s account defines perceptual capacities in terms of an ability to perceptually discriminate and single out.

A subject’s perceptual experience is not only characterized by mind-independent objects in her environment but is also informed by this perceptual capacity to discriminate. If we return to the example of a colour-blind individual looking at different coloured vegetables, the colour-blind individual still has the capacity to discriminate albeit is unable to do so with certain colours such as the colour red or different shades of orange. Though, a colour-blind person’s ‘point of view’ and so phenomenal character might be different from an individual with normal vision, both individuals still have a basic

capacity to discriminate between objects and properties in their environment which enables them to have their perceptual experience.

4.1.4.a. The Interaction between Perceptual Capacities and the Third

Relatum:

How does one's *spatial-temporal orientation* fit in with *perceptual capacities*? How do these two factors characterise our 'point of view' on the world and phenomenal character of veridical perception? Return once more to the example of focusing one's attention on a red mug of coffee on a study table. I am aware of the mug from a particular distance as I am seated at my desk. I am only able to see a particular side of the red mug, whilst the other sides are not in my line of vision. I can just see a sliver of black liquid which is my coffee. In order to have this scene of viewing a red mug of black coffee at my desk, I need to employ certain perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out. How is it that I am able to have this experience of a mug? It is due to a perceptual capacity to discriminate a mug from a desk, to be able to single out the black liquid in the mug and differentiate it from the redness of the mug. To be able to discriminate the black colour of the liquid from the shade of red that the mug is. To be able to discriminate the size and shape of the mug and notice that the table is of an entirely different shape. How can one be aware of the mug without discriminating it from the table without being able to tell that the mug is a distinct object from the table and has something in it which is liquid in nature? Which leads to another example of being able to discriminate the type of object, solid objects from liquids. To notice that the look of a liquid is different from the look of a solid object. Note that this experience itself is from a 'point of view' whilst another 'point of view' would present the mind-independent object in a slightly different manner.

Similarly, if I am to walk into my room, I am presented with a particular scene in front of me. From one side of the room the scene appears to be slightly different from another side of the room, but the experience is of the same mind-independent objects in my environment. From one side of the room if I look at my table, it appears to me from a certain angle whilst if I look at the table from another side, it appears to be from another angle. But, in order to make sense or actually have this 'point of view' on the world, I need to be able to make use of a capacity to discriminate between objects and properties in my environment. To pick out the table, I need to be able to differentiate it from the other objects in my environment.

Whenever we visually perceive, we tend to perceive parts of a three-dimensional scene in front of us. If I look at a rectangular table from *above*, my perspective on the table is different from looking at the table from the *side* or from *below*. My perspective on the table from *above* would be of a flat table top. The legs of the table may not be in my line of vision and so may not be visible to me, even though, I would know that the table has legs. My perspective on the table from the *side* would be quite different in nature. From this perspective, I would be able to see the legs of the table as joined to a portion of the table top. The perspective of looking at a table from above would be different from looking at a table from the side. In turn, one's 'point of view' when looking at a table from above would be different from looking at a table from the side. Even though I am only perceiving partial sides of three-dimensional objects, I am still making use of perceptual capacities to discriminate one object from other surrounding entities. If we link this to phenomenal character, *what it is like* to look at a table from different spatial perspectives is also influenced by one's perceptual capacity to discriminate.

What about *perceptual capacities* and our *sensory modalities*? Different sensory modalities and experiences, whether they be visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory or gustatory experiences, are informed by our perceptual capacity to discriminate. We can discriminate between different tastes or different textures of cloth. We can also discriminate between sounds and smells. We can discriminate visually between different types of objects in our environment whether those be trees, leaves, branches, grass, rocks, people and so on. We can also discriminate between different properties such as colours or different shades of red, green or blue and the myriad other colours on the colour spectrum.

However, it must be noted that some may have a more developed sense of the capacity to discriminate through perceptual learning. For example, a chef or a food critic may have more cultivated gustatory experiences where he might be able to better discriminate between different tastes. For instance, he might be able to taste a subtle hint of vinegar in a dish more readily than a novice. Another example might be a painter who might be able to visually discriminate between different shades of red more easily than a beginner. Finally, a pianist who may be able to discriminate between the sounds of different notes on the piano. We may have varying levels of expertise in our capacities to perceptually discriminate, however, we all have perceptual capacities to discriminate, that form the basis of our perceptual experiences when related to mind-independent objects.

4.2 The Perceptual Capacity Account :

In this section, I consider Schellenberg's (2018) account which states that we have perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out. I consider what it would mean to discriminate and single out in a veridical perception and consider an objection to her view.

4.2.1 Perceptual Capacities to discriminate and single out:

The goal or purpose of a 'perceptual capacity' for Schellenberg is to be able to discriminate and single out mind-independent objects or properties in one's environment. This is how Schellenberg introduces the notion of a perceptual capacity:

"A perceptual capacity is a kind of discriminatory, selective capacity that we employ in perception, hallucination or illusion. It is a low-level mental capacity that functions to differentiate, single out, and in some cases classify mind-independent particulars of a specific type- for example to discriminate and single out instances of red from instances of blue" (Schellenberg 2018, p.31).

It appears as though the function of a perceptual capacity involves the activity of differentiating, singling out and sometimes classifying specific mind-independent particulars. Perceptual capacities are low-level in that exercising them would require no conceptual sophistication on the part of the perceiver. Some examples of perceptual capacities include an ability to discriminate size, quantities, distance, luminance, motion, and pitch.

Since, the main capacity which Schellenberg takes to be necessary for a subject to perceive is the capacity to discriminate and single out, it will be important to fully explicate what she means by discriminating and singling out.

4.2.1.a. What does it mean to discriminate?

One might think that there are certain necessary conditions for perceiving in the form of a subject exercising perceptual capacities. Schellenberg takes perceptual discrimination and (singling out) to be one such capacity. She finds it difficult to conceive of what perception would be like without this capacity to discriminate & (single out). Thus, a subject needs to exercise these capacities in order to have a perceptual experience with phenomenal character and thereby, occupy a point of view on the world.

We can spell out this condition in the following way:

VP: If a subject sees x at t then the subject discriminates & (singles out) x from its surround.

To discriminate is to differentiate an object or property from its surrounding environment. But, that does not tell us what it means to discriminate. It raises the further question: what does it mean to differentiate?

There is some intuitive force to the view that perceiving requires discriminating if we consider the following example.

The Colour blindness Test: The Ishihara Plates test for colour blindness by placing coloured dots in the form of a number against a background of a different colour. Consider the following plate in Figure 1. A number 12 is formed out of orange dots against a green background of dots. An individual with red-green colour blindness would have trouble




Figure 1 (Coombs 2021)

discriminating the orange from the green background and would see the dots to be of a potentially homogenous shade of green. This failure to *discriminate* would lead to a failure to *perceive* the number 12.

Notice with *The Colour Blindness Test*, perceiving the number 12 depends on having the ability to discriminate orange from green. Discriminating involves *differentiating* the colours orange and green. To differentiate is to register that two objects or properties are distinct.

Schellenberg (2018) provides the following example:

Walking through Thick Foliage: “Consider Dylan who is walking through thick foliage. It is unclear how she could be perceptually aware of, say, a leaf without registering how it differs in at least one respect from its surround. More generally, it is unclear how one could be perceptually aware of a particular without registering how it differs in at least one respect from its surround. The basic level of employing perceptual capacities is to

discriminate one particular from another, where this discrimination is understood as registering their differences(p.47).”

To perceive a leaf, Dylan would have to be aware of how the leaf differs from the surrounding objects and properties. For example, Dylan’s visual system might register that the leaf differs from the branches, the roots of trees and from flowers. Without this capacity to discriminate and differentiate, experience would be a homogenous blank slate which is inconceivable.

This capacity to discriminate is relatively *low-level*. Dylan does not need to possess the concept of a leaf to visually differentiate it from the other entities in her visual field. An individual who passes the colour blindness test does not need to possess the concepts of colours in order to visually differentiate orange from green.

A perceptual capacity to discriminate is sometimes an almost *automatic* ability carried out by our sensory system that guides action. Take an individual who opens the door and walks out of a room. The individual is able to automatically tell where the door is. He is able to tell and, in a sense, know that the doorway is distinct from the wall. This capacity does not always require attention. Most of us walk out of rooms automatically. We rarely walk into walls because we failed to tell that the wall was distinct from the door

Such a capacity applies nicely to *non-human animals* too. It seems reasonable to think that not only humans can discriminate between a table and a chair but so can non-human animals. If not for this low-level capacity to differentiate between entities, non-human animals may not be able to get around their environment. Observe a cat as she jumps

from the ground onto the table to go towards her food bowl. The cat is able to discriminate between being on ground level, on top of the table and is able to tell where her food bowl is. She employs a perceptual capacity to discriminate or differentiate her food bowl from the table. She does not mistake an empty glass for her food bowl. Neither does she require a concept of a food bowl to discriminate it from the surrounding objects in her environment.

Sometimes discriminating does seem to require *attention*, where a failure to discriminate is a failure to perceive. Suppose our same cat stalks a chameleon but loses track of it as the lizard crawls up the bark of a tree. The cat does not notice the chameleon because it is perfectly camouflaged against the bark of the tree due to the similarity of colour and pattern. In fact, the cat *looks* straight at the chameleon but fails to *discriminate* and, in a sense, *notice* the lizard. On this account, it seems quite intuitive to say that the cat does not see the chameleon because she could not discriminate it from the tree's bark. Once again, seeing appears to require discriminating but this time it involves a kind of attention.

Schellenberg, though, is quick to stress that her account of perceptual capacities does not require attention. From our assortment of examples, there seems to be good reason to accept that discriminating is an activity that our sensory system does almost automatically. But there are times where we actively discriminate when looking for something.

4.2.1.b. A Capacity to Single Out: What does it mean to single out?

Schellenberg argues that perceptual awareness consists of a joint activity of discriminating and *singling out* objects and properties in a subject's environment. In the previous section, we considered what it might mean to exercise a capacity to discriminate. We now look at what it means to single out.

A capacity to single out refers to the ability of the subject to determine which particular object or property in the world she is related to. Schellenberg provides a useful example:

“Consider Percy who perceives a white cup on a desk. He employs his capacity to discriminate white from other colors and to *single out* white in his environment. He may also employ his capacity to differentiate and single out cup-shapes from other shapes in his environment. He may even employ his capacity to differentiate and single out cups from, say, computers and lamps, or whatever other objects may be in his environment
“(Schellenberg 2019, p. 118).

In this first instance, there is a sense in which one might take singling out to mean *referring* to a particular mind-independent property or object. So, when Percy perceives a white cup on his desk, his experience of the white cup *refers* to the actual material cup in the external world in this instance. His experience of the white cup refers to the very property instance of ‘whiteness’ in the external world.

Schellenberg (2018) is hesitant to call this a kind of referring as she wants to allow for the fact that capacities can be non-conceptual (p.35). This is because some though not all notions of reference presuppose a conceptual or linguistic element to perception like for

example a perceptual experience of a white cup would involve conceptual content to refer to the mind-independent object of the white cup.

Instead, Schellenberg (2018) prefers to describe singling out as a “a proto-conceptual analogue of referring to a particular (p.35).” Singling out is then a rudimentary form of reference that does not involve the use of concepts. This allows non-human animals and infants to possess the capacity to single out particulars since no conceptual sophistication is required.

One might now wonder what exactly a proto-conceptual analogue of referring is. We can take singling out to be a proto conceptual analogue to referring in that it is a capacity to pick out which particular object or property is being perceived in our environment.

One might further wonder what it means to say that in perceiving we employ a capacity to pick out particular objects and properties in our environment. Suppose, Percy leaves his desk to go to the bathroom and upon returning unbeknownst to him someone has replaced his white cup of coffee with another indistinguishable white cup. The second cup looks exactly the same to him as the previous one. Percy is completely oblivious of the switch. He thinks he is aware of cup₁ but he is actually aware of cup₂. There is a sense in which though Percy is employing a perceptual capacity to discriminate the white cup from other surrounding objects, he is actually *singling out* a different object when he is aware of cup₂. Though, Percy takes himself to be aware of cup₁, he is actually picking out cup₂ and consequently he is employing a capacity to single out cup₂ even though he is unaware of this switch.

In what way, then, is singling out distinct from discriminating? Well, in perceiving the white cup, Percy employs a capacity to discriminate in that he can differentiate white from other colours in the vicinity such as blue, white or brown for example. Singling out white is distinct from differentiating white from other colours. This is because singling out white appears to be a capacity to pick out that specific property instance of whiteness in the world. Discriminating is simply differentiating white from other colours whilst singling out is picking out a particular object or property instance on a given occasion.

4.2.1.c An objection:

It is not entirely clear what Schellenberg means by the term singling out. On one understanding of it, it could mean *referring* or *picking out* actual mind-independent objects when veridically perceiving. On another interpretation, it could mean *noticing* or *attending* to mind-independent objects.

Schellenberg is careful to argue that a subject can single out an object or property whether or not she notices it. Byrne (2019) raises the objection that singling out amounts to noticing or attending. If this is the case, it creates an internal tension in Schellenberg's view and might be a superfluous addition.

At times, it is unclear whether Schellenberg's concept of singling out requires attention or whether objects and property instances can be singled out independently of attention. For instance:

“it is a crucial that the function of a perceptual capacity is not just a matter of discriminating particulars, but also of singling them out. Due to this, perceiving an instance of red is distinct from perceiving an instance of blue. Both cases may involve discriminating red from blue, but in the former case an instance of red is singled out, while in the latter case an instance of blue is singled out. So, the capacities employed are distinct, and the perceptual states constituted by employing those capacities differ (Schellenberg 2018, p.36).”

On Byrne’s reading, singling out appears to be a kind of attention: noticing objects or properties in the external world. Byrne (2019) modifies Schellenberg’s example and examines a case where one discriminates between an instance of red and blue but *only singles out* the instance of blue.

“Suppose one discriminates an instance of red from an instance of blue and singles out the instance of blue but not the instance of red.....Does one also perceive both instances? No, because perceiving α requires discriminating and singling out α . The explanation of ‘singling out’ suggests that it amounts to attending to α ”(p. 714).

He finds it natural to think that if one discriminates between red and blue but *only singles out* the instance of blue, then one has *noticed* or focused one’s *attention* on the instance of blue. If one has focused one’s attention on the instance of blue and not red, then one *only perceives* the instance of blue and not the instance red since perceiving requires both discriminating and singling out. Thus, one does not perceive both instances of blue and red.

I can see why Byrne takes singling out to involve attention. On a first reading, it is as though Schellenberg thinks one singles out red *first* and then singles out blue. In singling out red, one first *attends* to red and then shifts one’s attention to the instance of blue. It

is important to note that from this example, it is unclear whether Schellenberg takes an individual to be viewing a swatch of red and a swatch of blue side by side or independently of each other. She seems to think that singling out an instance of red is distinct from singling out an instance of blue. However, it is quite consistent to maintain that a subject can single out red and blue simultaneously even though singling out red is distinct from singling out blue.

The objection rests on the assumption that one can discriminate a particular without also singling it out. Byrne observes that singling out requires discriminating but discriminating does not require singling out. Singling out is a capacity to pick out an object or property in one's environment. It seems to account for the naïve realist's intuition of a subject being perceptually related to an object or property in her environment. A perceptual capacity to single out is a capacity to refer non-conceptually to a particular object or property. Although discriminating and singling out are necessary conditions for perceiving, so is being related to mind-independent entities. If singling out is somehow tied to a subject being related to a particular mind-independent object or property, it is not clear why Byrne takes discriminating to not require singling out. That's why it might be useful to think of discriminating and singling out as joint capacities that are inextricably linked. In discriminating red from blue and various other colours, one singles out red, blue and any other colour in the vicinity. This does not require focusing one's attention on red or blue, it occurs in virtue of being perceptually related to those particular property instances.

For our purposes, we can settle with an understanding of singling out ; say, an instance of red as picking out redness that is a property out there in the world. To single out a

particular instance of redness is an occasional matter. If a subject were to single out an instance of redness at t_1 and then to single out another instance at t_2 , this would be singling out another particular. Singling out is almost drawing a boundary around a property such as redness which depends on which particular is being singled out in that instance. Conceiving of singling out in this way would satisfy the naïve realist. This is because perception now involves a subject being related to that very mind-independent property of redness, which is secured through the exercise of a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out redness.

4.3 Discriminating and Singling out in Hallucinations

Until now, we have been considering what it might mean to exercise perceptual capacities in veridical perceptions. In particular, our focus has been on employing perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out and how that makes up our perceptual ‘point of view’ on the external world. This next section will consider whether these same capacities are exercised in hallucinations, specifically causally matching hallucinations.

4.3.1. The compatibility with Disjunctivism: Are the same capacities employed in hallucinations?

We are now one step closer to solving our problem. With the previous sections under our belts, we are well-placed to consider the viability of adopting the perceptual capacity approach in tandem with espousing disjunctivism. Does one remain a disjunctivist when making use of the resources of the perceptual capacity approach? Answering this first question will hinge on answering this next question: are the same capacities exercised in

a causally matching hallucination? I will consider three possible approaches to answering this second question homing in on what I take to be the most attractive approach to the disjunctivist.

The first approach is one that Schellenberg is committed to:

(1) A subject exercises the same perceptual capacities in a hallucination that she would in a veridical perception.

The starting point of Schellenberg's approach, as was seen in section 3.1, is that there is a sense in which perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out are necessary in enabling us to perceive. As per Schellenberg's view, when hallucinating, one would exercise the same perceptual capacities that are exercised in a veridical perception. Consider what it would mean to exercise the same perceptual capacities in a hallucination that one would exercise in a veridical perception. Suppose I am a casual bystander outside witnessing a deep green auto-rickshaw with a black rooftop almost crash into but swerve past a beige coloured four-wheel drive. I make use of certain perceptual capacities to discriminate the green and black parts of the auto-rickshaw, while also discriminating it from another vehicle, namely the beige coloured four-wheel drive.

Now, picture what would happen if I were to hallucinate this entire scene. This hallucination is also one that shares the same proximate neural cause as a veridical perception. I would make use of those same perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out the auto-rickshaw and the larger vehicle, simultaneously registering the differences in the colour properties of each. As per Schellenberg's approach, I exercise the same perceptual capacities in bad cases of perception. If we apply this to causally matching hallucinations, then I am *discriminating* the green from the black of the auto-

rickshaw. I am even *singling out* something that looks like an auto-rickshaw. As per this approach, perceptual capacities can be exercised unsuccessfully. We are just as likely to perceptually discriminate and single out in a causally matching hallucination.

According to Schellenberg's approach, perceptual capacities involve the obtaining of mental states with representational content. Consequently, veridical perceptions and hallucinations are mental states that share the same representational content brought about by the exercise of perceptual capacities. If this is the case, since veridical perceptions and hallucinations share the same content, it would follow that the two share the same phenomenal character. As it stands, it looks as though her approach would be incompatible with disjunctivism, as naïve realists insist that the phenomenal character of a veridical perception is fundamentally different from that of a hallucination.

But suppose for the sake of argument¹¹ that we can accept Schellenberg's perceptual capacity approach, without having to accept representational content, would the perceptual capacity account be compatible with the disjunctivist's naïve realist commitments?

One might worry that if we can exercise the same perceptual capacities in a hallucination then the exercise of these capacities in a veridical perception do not actually require the presence of the object¹². Prima facie, this might seem problematic for the naïve realist, disjunctivist who wants to maintain that, if we accept that we exercise perceptual capacities in a veridical perception in addition to the relational element, then the presence of the object is still a necessary condition that must constrain the exercise of

¹¹ For the rest of this thesis, I will assume that we can accept perceptual capacities without content and will have to leave providing an argument for this assumption for another occasion.

¹² Also known as the screening off problem (Martin 2004)

those capacities. If we accept that the perceptual capacity to discriminate can be employed in a hallucination, and even more so the capacity to single out, then *actually* discriminating and singling out *an object* is no longer a necessary condition of exercising the capacity to single out. To adopt such an approach would involve conceding to an additional common factor between a perception and a hallucination.

Arguably, this is no problem for the disjunctivist. It is misguided to think that disjunctivism is a view committed to there being no commonalities between perception and hallucination. When responding to the reverse causal argument from hallucination, the disjunctivist is already admitting that there are commonalities between perceptions and hallucinations: the shared proximate neural cause and the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception. What the disjunctivist is denying is that there is a fundamental common factor between a veridical perception and a hallucination. Recall that the reverse causal argument provides the disjunctivist with the logical space to argue that “one thing can be fundamentally F, and something else can be F and yet not be fundamentally F” (Martin 2004, p.61). So, a hallucination can be fundamentally understood in terms of an exercise of perceptual capacities and a veridical perception can also be characterised in terms of an exercise of perceptual capacities but not fundamentally so because perceiving is fundamentally about being *related* to mind-independent objects. Even as veridical perceptions and hallucination can share commonalities, the key question that arises is whether perceptual capacities can screen off the unique relational properties of veridical perception?

Perceptual capacities would only screen off the relational properties of veridical perception, if the notion is utilised to provide a *non-derivative positive* account of a hallucination. What would a *non-derivative positive* account of hallucination that appeals

to perceptual capacities look like? Suppose a subject hallucinates a banana. We could say that in a hallucination of a banana, the subject's visual system successfully exercises a capacity Y which produces a representation as of a banana. We would have to presume that the proximate neural cause is responsible for triggering the exercise of this capacity Y in a hallucination which produces a representation as of a banana. Though, there is no banana that is causing the proximal stimulus, the visual system still does its job. The exercise of this capacity Y in the bad case is not defined as an unsuccessful exercise of anything, capacity Y functions to produce hallucination type experiences. But, since the proximate neural cause is the same, we have to extend the same analysis to a veridical perception. This capacity that functions to represent in a hallucination is also exercised in a veridical perception. This shared capacity Y to represent would screen off the naïve realist's relational properties from explaining the phenomenal character of a veridical perception. The capacity Y is being defined in terms of what it does in the hallucination case or what it functions to do in the hallucination case; when the proximate neural cause is triggered, this causes the activation of capacities which are then exercised leading to the production of a representation so it functions to produce representations. So, if we appeal to perceptual capacities to account for causally matching hallucinations as per disjunctivism, we will need to ensure that the account is characterised derivatively from a veridical perception and that this does not involve positive introspectable features in common.

Derivative Characterisation of Capacities: Function

However, it is possible to accept that the same capacities are exercised in a hallucination, all the while providing a derivative account of the phenomenal character of a hallucination. A derivative account which accepts perceptual capacities as a kind of shared common element between hallucination and veridical perception would be able to circumvent the screening off problem.

This is because we can individuate perceptual capacities on the basis of what they are a function for by tying its function to the case of veridical perception. Thus, the core function of a perceptual capacity is only actualised in a veridical perception, namely, when a subject's visual system discriminates and singles out mind-independent objects.

Incidentally, Schellenberg herself is quite careful to specify that, though, the same capacity is exercised in good and bad cases, there is a function-based difference. Have a look at her fallibility condition:

“If a subject S employs a capacity C_α , C_α can either fulfil its function or fail to fulfil its function, such that *there is no difference at the level of employing C_α* but only a difference at the level of fulfilling its function. The function of C_α is fulfilled if by employing C_α a relevant particular is singled out. The function of C_α fails to be fulfilled if by employing C_α no relevant particular is singled out” (Schellenberg 2018, p. 32).

The function of a capacity is to *actually* pick out or latch onto an object. This is only fulfilled in good cases: veridical perceptions. This does not happen in complete causally-matching hallucinations. We know that these are experiences with no concrete objects.

Consequently, the true function of a hallucinator's capacities are not achieved. All the same, these capacities are *still* exercised.

This allows for human error and fallibility. Whenever we exercise a capacity with a specific function, we do so with the possibility that we may go wrong. Take an archer who shoots an arrow. The archer has a target, yet that target can fail to be achieved. The archer may still have the capacity to meet the target. In both cases, the archer is exercising his capacity but in only one is he actually successful. In that case, he has met the target. In the same way, our perceptual capacities have targets, the target is to latch onto mind-independent objects.

Characterising a hallucination in terms of the exercise of the same perceptual capacities would mean that since there are no objects in the vicinity, the function of the capacity fails to be fulfilled. The phenomenal character of a veridical perception is informed both by a relation to mind-independent objects and a subject's point of view which is explained in terms of perceptual capacities.

The common property of the exercise of perceptual capacities between a hallucination and a veridical perception derives its explanation from a veridical perception. The common property of an exercise of perceptual capacities derives its explanation from what perceptual capacities function in a veridical perception. We can characterise perceptual capacities derivatively in terms of their function in a veridical perception, the common property of the exercise of perceptual capacities does not screen off the relational properties of perception from explaining the phenomenal character of a veridical perception, thus this common property of an exercise of perceptual capacities would not lead to sameness of phenomenal character, since in the veridical case, the

object is still needed to explain the phenomenal character and the function of the perceptual capacities are being defined in terms of the object.

But, is it really possible to exercise a capacity unsuccessfully? As Casey O'Callaghan (2020) maintains, one might think that exercise is necessarily tied to success, so we only exercise a capacity if the function of the capacity is successfully fulfilled.

“Success requires that outcome to occur¹³; it requires doing so. Successfully employing the capacity to φ requires doing φ . Doing φ is a necessary condition for success that stems from the nature of that capacity....in a simple account, a subject employs the capacity to φ only if the subject does φ (p.739).”

Examples of some of our ordinary capacities may lend plausibility to the view that a capacity is only exercised if the outcome is successful. For example, suppose an experienced runner possesses a capacity to finish a marathon, maybe because she has done so numerous times in the past. If on one occasion, our experienced runner stops halfway at 20km in what sense has she exercised her capacity? Well, one might say it depends on how hard she was trying, whether there were external factors that caused her to faint and stop, etc. Intuitions may diverge¹⁴ but can it truly be said that this runner has exercised

¹³ This view does not commit O'Callaghan (2020) to a Megarian view of capacities that Schellenberg is concerned to reject. On the Megarian view, a subject only counts as possessing the capacity when they are actually exercising their capacity so when they are not exercising, they do not possess the capacity. To use an example from Aristotle, a builder only possesses the capacity to build when he is actually carrying out the act of building, when not building, he is incapable of building. Accepting that a necessary condition of employing a capacity is that the outcome is successful. However, this does not commit one to a Megarian view because it seems consistent to say that you may possess a capacity even when not employing it. Consistent with this, in order to employ the capacity, the outcome needs to be successful and the function of the capacity needs to be fulfilled.

¹⁴ One might think that it depends on how you describe the capacity. Here, we seem to be using an example that requires a high standard of success in order to exercise the capacity. We are defining or describing the capacity in a very specific way which makes it seem contingent on the description. If we use something simple such as a capacity to run, if a subject walks instead, it is clear that she has not exercised her capacity. If, however, a subject runs but falls, one would want to say that she has exercised

her capacity to finish a marathon if she stopped halfway or three quarters of the way?
Some might think not.

Let us steer ourselves back to the realm of the perceptual. Suppose I have a capacity to discriminate elm from birch trees, it is not unreasonable to think that I only exercise this capacity when I *in fact* discriminate between the two kinds. It is less convincing to defend the use of the same capacity in an unsuccessful case, where I mistake two trees of entirely different kinds for elm and birch trees. I *exercise* a capacity to discriminate when I in fact *do* discriminate. It is important to note that telling apart an elm from a birch tree is a high-level perceptual capacity that involves recognitional competence. It requires the ability to recognise a tree *as an elm tree* or *as a birch tree* that also seems to involve conceptual competence. This is distinct from the sense in which I have been making use of Schellenberg's perceptual capacity approach which focuses on low-level abilities to discriminate and single out. Nevertheless, one could still surmise that an elm tree is a different kind of tree from a birch tree simply by looking at the difference in the pattern of their leaves without having the capacity to recognise or put a name on this difference as being an elm tree or a birch tree. In other words, without having the capacity to recognise it as an elm tree or as a birch tree.

However, O'Callaghan (2020) especially takes low-level perceptual capacities to "share this character" as how can one "employ the capacity to single out and discriminate α while failing to single out or discriminate α ...? (p.740)." So, if we consider high level perceptual capacities to require success, we might think that the same applies to our low-

her capacity to run even though she fell. Now contrast this with the marathon runner, who fails to finish the marathon and so fails to exercise her capacity to finish the marathon.

level capacities. In particular, the disjunctivist may argue that perceptual capacities to *discriminate* and *single out* may be those capacities which require success. Thus, we only really exercise our perceptual capacities when successful.

As such, the second approach takes success to be a necessary condition of the exercise of a perceptual capacity.

(2) A subject only exercises the perceptual capacity in good cases of perception.

The reasoning is that if the relevant particular is not present, it might be difficult to conceive of how we can employ this capacity to discriminate and especially so when it comes to the capacity to single out. This is because singling out seems to be a kind of capacity that involves latching onto objects in the external world; it involves an almost demonstrative and relational element. If I hallucinate a form that looks like a snake, is it really the case that I am singling out a snake? There is no snake present in the external world so what am I singling out?

One problem that arises from this second approach is that it does not allow for human error and fallibility. If I only exercise a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out in good cases, it does not explain how it is that there are cases where I *merely* seem to exercise the capacity to discriminate and single out. In cases of causally matching hallucinations, it appears to me as though I am discriminating and singling out apparent objects in my environment. Even though, there is nothing out there that corresponds with my experience. One might think that a disjunctivist should maintain that the perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out is *not* being exercised in a hallucination as there are no objects. A capacity to discriminate and single out requires that there be an object which causes an experience.

This view would be akin to the one that Tyler Burge (2005) at one point reads the Disjunctivist as holding. He worries that the Disjunctivist holds a view that

“stymies any natural way of acknowledging the referential fallibility of perceptual states and perceptual beliefs. In a sense disjunctivism counts the “state” of seeing a given object, say a ball, as referentially infallible. For disjunctivism allows no possible situation in which the “state” type that one is in by virtue of seeing that particular ball could be in error about the existence of the object of perception- that particular ball. Nor could the state make reference to any contextually indiscernible duplicate. For one would not be in the “state” of seeing the ball if there were no reference, or a different referent.....what we understand by a capacity’s being referentially fallible is that it is realised in state types that could have been mistaken” (p. 31).

Unappealingly, this would mean that we never go wrong when perceiving.

If we analyse his diagnosis of disjunctivism by merging it with the capacity approach, then what this leaves us with is the following: we never go wrong when employing our perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out. If I have a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out then on an occasion where I might be hallucinating a blue ball, I would not be exercising my capacity to discriminate and single out. I may be engaged in some kind of activity that looks like discriminating and singling out but since I am not actually singling anything out, I would not have exercised my capacity. Thus, we only ever employ our perceptual capacities in paradigmatic good cases of perception.

It is an open question as to what the disjunctivist would say about a hallucination when assuming an infallible approach to capacities. When unsuccessful, we have not employed the perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out. As a result, it may turn out that I

am employing an entirely different capacity when hallucinating. For example, when hallucinating a blue ball, I might be exercising a perceptual capacity that functions to produce a representation of a blue ball. To explain the phenomenal character of a hallucination in terms of a capacity to represent would be to provide a positive non-derivative characterisation leading to the screening off problem. If we describe the phenomenal character of a hallucination in terms of representational activity then we have to apply this to veridical perceptions, this would screen off¹⁵ the relational properties of perception. We would be forced to concede that a hallucination and veridical perception share the same phenomenal character.

So, how do we allow for fallibility? By saying that the same capacity is exercised? Not exactly. Instead, by allowing that the same capacity is activated but is massively malfunctioning in a hallucination.

We have now arrived at the desired approach.

(3) A subject's perceptual capacities are activated in good and bad cases, where in the former it is a successful exercise and, in the latter, it is misfiring.

¹⁵ Another approach would be for the disjunctivist to challenge the screening off worry. The common representational property does not truly screen off the unique relational properties of perception because while in a hallucination the representational property is what fundamentally defines a hallucinatory experience, in a veridical perception that representational property is explained in terms of as Logue (2013) puts it 'a further psychological fact: viz, the fact that I see the banana (p.20).' The disjunctivist does not automatically have to accept that this common property will overshadow the unique properties of perception as while a hallucination is understood fundamentally in terms of representational properties, a veridical perception though it shares the same representational properties is to be explained fundamentally in terms of a subject exercising her perceptual capacity to discriminate and single out objects not to produce representations of objects.

This third approach allows us to hold onto the success notion of exercise that was raised in (2) whilst also allowing that our capacities are fallibly present in bad cases of perception, especially in the case of causally matching hallucinations. This allows for a form of disjunctivism that is not committed to a strong position of infallibility with regards to our capacities. Once again, there is a common factor, but this is not fundamental as the function of the capacity can be characterised in terms of a veridical perception as noted in (1).

This approach will be further developed in the next section, where I will show how this approach is consistent with an account of causally matching hallucinations and the reverse causal argument and how it serves to explain the introspective indiscriminability of hallucinations, all the while meeting constraints 1 & 2 of disjunctivism.

4.4. Solving the Problem

We now have the tools for explaining the negative epistemological condition. Our initial problem was that hallucinations are introspectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptions. Many have interpreted Martin's negative epistemological condition of introspective indiscriminability as a higher *order belief* or *judgement* on the phenomenal character of experience that is independent of one's perceptually conscious experience.

The following was Martin's negative epistemological condition:

H→I: If a subject hallucinates an X, then the hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical experience of an X, where there is no positive psychological/metaphysical characterization of the phenomenal character of the hallucination.

A positive psychological characterization of the phenomenal character of the state might appeal to internal sense data or intentional objects of perception. But Martin denies that we can characterize what it's like to have a hallucination in these positive ways – the phenomenal aspect of hallucinations can *only* be characterized by appealing to the negative claim that they are introspectively indiscriminable from veridical perceptual states to a subject. Martin explains indiscriminability is in terms of what a subject can know on the basis of introspective reflection on their own experiences:

I: An experience (hallucination) x is impersonally indiscriminable from a veridical perception VP if and only if x is such that it is not possible to know through reflection that it is not one of the VPs. (Martin 2006, p.400)

In Chapter 2, it was shown that since Martin's account seems to involve something like a

higher-order judgment about one's experiential state being just like a veridical perception, two notable problems arise which demand a more positive characterisation of the sensory nature of hallucinations. The first is that creatures that lack the capacity to introspectively discriminate, like dogs, would find any experience it has to be introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception. This seems wrong. The second is that creatures that possess the capacity to introspectively discriminate but lack first order phenomenal states, such as zombies, can hallucinate. This also seems wrong.

But, if a disjunctivist provides a more positive characterization in terms of awareness of sense data or intentional object, then it seems like the very awareness of these entities will be active in veridical perception because both share the same proximate neural cause. So, awareness of these shared positive introspectable features would do all the real explanatory work in perception, screening off the relational properties of a veridical perception.

In chapter 3, we saw that Martin claims that phenomenally conscious experience is a *point of view on the world*. So, his account of phenomenal experience is relational in character: it involves internal aspects of a subject's perceptual apparatus, the subject's external environment, and causal and spatial relations linking the two. But as we saw from Schellenberg, perceptual capacities are more specific than this – they involve the ability to discriminate and single out *particular objects* and *particular instances of properties* in one's environment. So, hallucinations might involve a point of view without being a perceptual point of view on any particular features of the world. After all, hallucinations are a case of it being *as if* one's attention is directed towards specific spatial

regions of one's environment – even if they don't latch onto any particular features of that environment. So in a hallucination, it is *as if* one has a point of view on the world.

In Chapter 3, it was argued that a slightly more positive claim can be derived from Martin's negative epistemic condition which allows for phenomenally conscious experience. This positive claim is that of a subject seeming to occupy a point of view on the world. It was argued that emphasis needs to be placed on the connection between phenomenal character and a subject occupying a point of view on the world. Our introspective perspective just is seeming to possess a point of view on the world. It was shown that we can derive the following minimal positive claim from Martin's condition.

I⁺: The introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception entails that a subject *seems* to occupy a point of view on the world.

This claim, I⁺, can apply equally to a case of veridical perception and a case of hallucination. If I perceive a red apple, it will seem to me as though I have a point of view on something round and red. If I hallucinate a red apple, it will equally seem to me as though I have a point of view on something round and red. But for a disjunctivist, this is how one should analyse the notion of *seeming to have a point of view on a red apple*:

(a) either you actually occupy a point of view on a red apple or

(b) you only seem to occupy a point of view on a red apple.

Thus, seeming to have a point of view on a red apple is the common property between a hallucination and a veridical perception but this does not entail that the two are the same

kinds of mental events. The common property of seeming to occupy a point of view is explained by actually occupying a point of view on the world in a veridical perception.

However, in Chapter 3, I also argued that defining introspective indiscriminability as a subject seeming to occupy a point of view on the world still fails to *explain* why a subject cannot discriminate between the two experiences and takes herself to be perceiving. Martin's notion of a point of view can be bolstered by specifying the subject component of a point of view in terms of perceptual capacities.

Consequently, the purpose of introducing perceptual capacities was to provide a more satisfying explanation of why causally matching hallucinations seem to be as vivid as a veridical perception to a subject. The next section will connect the dots between perceptual capacities, point of view and phenomenal character to provide a positive account of a hallucination that explains introspective indiscriminability. It will be argued that this view is able to meet constraints 1 & 2 brought about by the argument from hallucination on the disjunctivist.

4.5. A Positive Characterisation of Hallucinations: Explaining

Introspective Indiscriminability:

If the Disjunctivist is to reject the Common Kind Thesis, what explains the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception? If hallucinations and veridical perceptions do not share a fundamental psychological event in common, what explains the vivid, seemingly veridical nature of hallucinations?

In short, the answer is the activation of the same perceptual capacities in veridical perceptions and hallucinations.

If as per Chapter 3, introspective indiscriminability can be understood in terms of a subject seeming to occupy a point of view on the world, I propose that we specify the subject component of a point of view in terms of perceptual capacities. I propose that we adopt (3) from section 4.3.1 to explain the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination.

(3) A subject's perceptual capacities are activated in good and bad cases, where in the former it is a successful exercise, and, in the latter, it is misfiring.

For approach (3) allows for the fallibility of our perceptual capacities while also preserving the view that a capacity can only be successfully exercised when an object is present. So, seeming to occupy a point of view can be explained by the activation of one's perceptual capacities.

I suggest that what explains why a hallucination is indiscriminable from a veridical perception to a subject is that the same perceptual capacities are activated. With respect to causally matching hallucinations, the same proximate cause that occurs in a perception is simulated in the absence of an object.

In a veridical perception, light is reflected off an object and absorbed into one's retina which triggers the brain state immediately prior to the experience, namely the proximate cause. This proximate cause could precipitate the activation of one's perceptual

capacities to discriminate and single out. Perceptual capacities are functional states that were naturally selected to discriminate and single out particular features of one's environment. Tracking particular objects and properties is the *proper function* of perceptual capacities. Since, external objects¹⁶ are present as non-causal constituents of the experience, these perceptual capacities successfully track and latch onto those objects bringing about a veridical perception.

Conceivably, however, these perceptual capacities do not always function perfectly. Our internal perceptual mechanisms malfunction when we misperceive or hallucinate. But the rest of the cognitive system will not be able to discriminate perceptions from misperceptions. The subject's cognitive system is naturally selected to treat the activation of these perceptual capacities as if they were veridical perceptions.

So, the cognitive system is primed to treat any activation of internal perceptual capacities as veridical perceptions of the world.

A causally matching hallucination is a *misfiring* and *malfunctioning* of one's perceptual capacities. In a causally matching hallucination, the same proximate cause has been triggered in the absence of an object. A similar process occurs, where the proximate cause activates one's perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out, but this activation is not actually locked onto any external object. But the difference is that these capacities are severely malfunctioning. So, these perceptual capacities are activated in a defective way, which does not accord with the way they are naturally selected to function. Nonetheless,

¹⁶ This account is not committed to action at a distance (refer to chapter 2 for the action at a distance worry). The claim is not that external objects cause the successful exercise of perceptual capacities. Instead, external objects figure as a non-causal necessary condition without which the exercise of these perceptual capacities could not be successful. Though, these capacities might be activated in the absence of an object.

the mere activation of these mechanisms will lead to a subject being unable to know that their experience is not a veridical perception. The activation of perceptual capacities will put a subject in such a position that she seems to occupy a point of view on the world, since the activation of these capacities focuses one's attention towards regions of your environment just as it would if there really were objects and properties responsible for the activation of those mechanisms.

To sum up, what explains why it is not possible for a subject know through reflection that her experience is not a veridical perception, when hallucinating? What explains why a subject *seems to occupy a point of view* when hallucinating? Here is our answer: The same perceptual capacities are activated when hallucinating but these capacities misfire.

Finally, seeming to occupy a point of view through the mere activation of perceptual capacities can be had in *both* hallucinations and veridical perceptions. In a causally matching hallucination, it will merely seem as though one is occupying a point of view because the same perceptual capacities are activated. In a veridical perception, it will seem as though one is occupying a point of view in that one's perceptual capacities are activated and it will also be the case that one is actually occupying a point of view because those activated perceptual capacities are successfully latching onto objects.

4.5.1 Derivative characterisation and screening off

Recall the two constraints that the Disjunctivist must uphold:

Constraint 1: The indiscriminability of a hallucination from a veridical perception to a subject does not entail that the two share introspectable phenomenal properties in common.

Constraint 2: The phenomenal character of a hallucination must be characterised derivatively from a veridical perception.

The first constraint is that accepting that a hallucination is indiscriminable from a perception does not involve the acceptance of the same phenomenal character which can be explained by common introspectable properties. Thus, any explanation of the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination must once again ensure that this does not lead to the acceptance of a fundamental common kind of psychological event. The phenomenal character of a hallucination is distinct from a veridical perception in that in the former it only seems as though one is related to an object whilst in the latter one is actually related to an object. This is closely connected to *constraint 2* as the derivative nature of a hallucination needs to be preserved.

The second constraint acknowledges the need that any response to the problem of hallucination should ensure that in whatever manner that the phenomenal character of a hallucination is characterised it must make reference to a veridical perception. In this sense, the phenomenal character of a veridical perception is explanatorily prior whilst whatever account we provide of a hallucination will make reference to what we know

about the nature of perception. This is why Martin's account satisfies *constraint 2* because it characterizes the phenomenal character of a hallucination solely in terms of an epistemic state of being unable to know that one is not veridically perceiving. Any explanation of introspective indiscriminability in a hallucination or the epistemic state of being unable to know must ensure that it derives its explanatory potential from a veridical perception.

This proposal that merges Martin's notion of a 'point of view' with Schellenberg's perceptual capacity account does satisfy *constraint 1*. This is because the activation of perceptual capacities are not some introspectable properties in common between perception and hallucination. We are just providing an explanation for why it may seem to a subject that she occupies a 'point of view' on the world when hallucinating, not that the phenomenal character is the same.

We can connect the dots between perceptual capacities and seeming to occupy a point of view in such a manner that it provides us with a derivative characterisation of the phenomenal character of a hallucination. Perceptual capacities cannot be individuated independently from its function which is only realised in a veridical perception. Our perceptual capacities were shaped by natural selection to discriminate and single out particular features of the subject's environment by latching onto those features. Thus, the function of these perceptual capacities is to relate us to objects by latching onto particular features of the external world. The explanatory potential of a perceptual capacity is derived from what it functions to do in a veridical perception. The activation of these perceptual capacities may not require the presence of an object and so these capacities can also be activated in a hallucination. Even though, there is something in common: the

same capacities are activated, its explanation is derived from the function of perceptual capacities which is only fulfilled in a veridical perception. When one's perceptual capacities are activated in a veridical perception, the capacities are successfully exercised. In a hallucination, even as these same capacities are activated, they are massively malfunctioning and so fail to latch onto anything. Thus, the use of perceptual capacities in a hallucination is being characterised derivatively on the basis of the function of such capacities in a veridical perception.

The activation of perceptual capacities in a hallucination explains why a subject seems to occupy a point of view on the world, in that the subject cannot discriminate their experience from a perception. A subject taking themselves to occupy a point of view is common to veridical perception and hallucination. But, this common property of seeming to occupy a point of view can only be explained by making reference to actually occupying a point of view which is only fulfilled in a veridical perception. So, this satisfies *constraint 2*, as the activation of perceptual capacities and the notion of seeming to occupy a 'point of view' is being characterised derivatively in terms of a veridical perception. Furthermore, the phenomenal character of a hallucination is exhausted by this notion of seeming to occupy a 'point of view' while the phenomenal character of a veridical perception is distinct because a subject seems to occupy a 'point of view' in virtue of being related to mind-independent objects.

Next, let's consider the objection that Martin's account of hallucination in terms of indiscriminability from a veridical perception commits him to implausible reflective judgments about one's own mental states. Recall the Dog objection: dogs lack the capacity to introspectively discriminate or judge their experiences to be the same or different, yet

dogs still hallucinate. Conscious awareness of one's own perceptual states is not a separate introspective faculty of reflective judgment that some beings such as humans possess and others such as dogs lack. Instead, according to Martin, the phenomenal character of an experience is just a first order of point of view on the world. A subject's perceptual point of view upon the world is informed by the exercise of perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out particular features of their environment. This means that the phenomenal character of a subject's experience is partly constituted by the object and partly by a subject's perceptual capacities and other background conditions.

Consider a dog's perception of a blue ball. When a dog's perceptual mechanisms are activated by the ball, it has a point of view on the world – it's primed to understand and react to its environment in characteristic ways. The dog's visual system discriminates and singles out a particular object and a particular color, allowing the dog to track those features in its environment. Perceptually locking onto those features is a prototypical phenomenally conscious state – a specific point of view on the world. According to Martin, there is no need for a higher-order reflective capacity for this perceptual state to be conscious: the perceptual state is conscious just in virtue of constituting the dog's visual perspective on the world.

Now suppose the dog has a hallucination that is exactly like the perception of a blue ball at the neurological level. The dog's internal perceptual capacities are activated in exactly the same way, and so it is primed to understand and react to its environment in just the same ways as it was in the perception. So, the dog has a phenomenally conscious experience: being in that state is exactly *as if* there were a blue ball in front of it. But the

dog's hallucinatory state is radically defective – it doesn't latch onto any particular object or property. To say that the dog cannot discriminate its hallucination from a perceptual state is *not* to say that it has a higher-order introspective faculty that tracks and compares internal states and that this faculty cannot discern a difference. Instead, to say that the dog cannot differentiate its hallucinate from a perceptual state is to say that the dog's low level perceptual capacities are activated. So, a dog can satisfy Martin's condition of indiscriminability without any sophisticated self-reflective abilities.

We also have an easy riposte to the Zombie objection. The objection was based on the assumption that indiscriminability involves higher-order introspective *judgments* about one's internal mental states. In that case, the only way to characterize a hallucination is to say that it is a tacit *judgement* one is having of a veridical perception. So even a phenomenal zombie could hallucinate – just by making an abstract judgment that it is having a veridical perception. In response, however, we can simply deny that indiscriminability involves anything like an abstract higher-order judgment about one's own mental states. As seen in Chapter 3, such an objection rests on a questionable model of introspection. If a zombie lacks a phenomenally conscious perspective then it would fail to have an introspective perspective as we cannot have an introspective perspective without a phenomenally conscious perspective. So, the introspective perspective of seeming to occupy a point of view on the world in a hallucination which is explained by the activation of one's perceptual capacities is a phenomenally conscious perspective that zombies are incapable of having.

4.6 Objections

Objection 1: But surely, there must be an introspectable difference between a hallucination and a veridical perception?

One might think that there must be a phenomenal difference that sets apart causally matching hallucinations which should be evident to a subject. Since, this is not the case, causally matching hallucinations must share the same phenomenal character as veridical perceptions.

The reasoning goes something like this: the disjunctivist wants to say that a causally matching hallucination is introspectively indiscriminable from a veridical perception but does not share the same phenomenal character as a veridical perception. But, surely, if a causally matching hallucination does not share the same phenomenal character as a veridical perception then there must be a phenomenal difference between the two experiences. If there is a phenomenal difference between the two experience, then this should be introspectively discernible to a subject.

In response, the disjunctivist can say: we are once again making the mistake of thinking that we can introspect phenomenal properties that would distinguish a hallucination from a perception independently of seeming to occupy a phenomenally conscious point of view on the world. The phenomenal character of a hallucination is not something that is hidden from a subject and it is also a mistake to think that there could be introspectable phenomenal properties that distinguish a hallucination from a perception.

The phenomenal character of a hallucination and the experience of seeming to occupy a perceptual point of view cannot exist independently of our introspective awareness of it. The phenomenal character of an hallucination is just our introspective perspective on it which coincides with our perceptual perspective. Our perceptual perspective tells us that we seem to occupy a point of view on the world. So that is the phenomenal character of a hallucination, seeming to occupy a point of view that one would occupy if one were actually perceiving. This is precisely what it means to characterise the phenomenal character of a hallucination derivatively in terms of a veridical perception. By specifying the negative epistemological condition as seeming to occupy a point of view, we are defining a hallucination in terms of the point of view we would have in a veridical perception. Holding a point of view or seeming to occupy a point of view is sufficient to grant that the experience is phenomenally consciousness. We can explain why it is that a subject takes herself to occupy a point of view by characterising it in terms of perceptual capacities.

In both cases, we have the activation of perceptual capacities in a hallucination and a veridical perception. This activation of perceptual capacities is once again tied to the function of the capacity, what it functions to do in a veridical perception which is to actually latch onto mind-independent objects. Since this function is not fulfilled, it could be considered to be a failed attempt in a hallucination. We have a derivative characterisation at the level of perceptual capacities which makes up the perceptual point of view. But, we also have a derivative characterisation at the level of point of view. The notion of a point of view can only be understood by making reference to the case of veridical perception where to occupy a point of view is to occupy a point of view on mind-independent objects. All other faulty experiences are failed attempts at actually

occupying a point of view. Since, to be a phenomenally conscious being is to be in the world and occupy a point of view on the world. We also have a derivative characterisation at the level of phenomenal character. Since, a hallucination involves seeming to occupy a point of view on the world which in a veridical perception functions to make up the phenomenal character of an experience informed by objects.

Objection 2: Is a hallucination a point of view on the world at all?

One might wonder whether a hallucination is a point of view on the world at all. One might think Martin is committed to saying that a hallucination is not a point of view on the world. After all, a hallucination is a misfiring of perceptual capacities that lock onto particular features, so one might think that it fails to establish any perceptual relations to your external environment. But Martin cannot say this: on his account, phenomenal character just is a point of view on the world. Since in a hallucination you are having an experience though there is nothing there, even as it seems as though you have a point of view on the world, your point of view is on nothing. So, if there is no point of view on the world, there is no phenomenology.

In response, the Disjunctivist can say that granting that a hallucination is not a point of view on the world is not inconsistent with maintaining that it seems to be a point of view on the world. So, a hallucination is not a point of view on mind-independent reality, but it is only an experience of seeming to possess a point of view on the external world.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I made an attempt to present a starting point for a minimal positive characterisation of a hallucination utilizing the notions of a 'point of view' and a 'perceptual capacity.' I tried to argue that this minimal positive account of hallucination characterises a hallucination derivatively from a veridical perception in two ways. The first was that the phenomenal character of a hallucination is exhausted by the property of *seeming to occupy a 'point of view' on the world*. This common property is inherited from actually occupying a point of view in a veridical perception. The second was that in a hallucination, a subject seems to occupy a 'point of view' because the *same perceptual capacities are activated* as in a veridical perception, this common property is inherited from the function of these capacities which is to perceptually relate subjects to objects.

If my proposal is sound, a key consequence that arises is that providing a derivative characterisation does not have to involve a purely negative epistemic account of a hallucination. We can say something slightly more positive about a hallucination so long as it can be shown that this positive characterisation derives its explanatory potential from a veridical perception. That is so long as *constraint 1 & constraint 2* are satisfied.

Seeming to occupy a 'point of view' also allows that hallucinations are phenomenally conscious episodes. As was shown in chapter 3, if we understand introspective awareness as contingent on one's perceptual 'point of view' and if take a 'point of view' to be sufficient for phenomenal consciousness then introspective awareness would have to be a phenomenally conscious perspective. As it was argued, the negative epistemic condition of introspective indiscriminability is a case where introspective awareness is possible. So, if a subject is unable to know through introspection that her

experience is not a perception, it would mean that she takes herself to be occupying the kind of 'point of view' that she occupies in a veridical perception. She would take herself to be occupying a 'point of view' on the world, though this is not the case. Since, this is a kind of introspective perspective, it would be phenomenally conscious as well.

I end my concluding remarks with an unresolved issue and potential directions for further research. Schellenberg takes perceptual capacities to bring about mental states with representational content. If Schellenberg is correct in her view that representational content is necessary for our conception of perceptual capacities then this may inevitably raise some problems for naïve realism. For this proposal to work, the contrary would have to be established. Thus, a further argument is needed to establish that one can accept perceptual capacities without having to accept representational content. Finally, this proposal is unsurprisingly only relegated to the realm of theory. Further research into its viability might require interdisciplinary work and empirical research on the scope and nature of perceptual capacities. It may so turn out that my answer to the problem of hallucination in terms of the activation of the same perceptual capacities as in a veridical perception is furthest from the truth.

References

Austin, JL 1962, *Sense and sensibilia*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Brewer, B 2011, *Perception and Its Objects*, Oxford University Press, USA.

Burge, T 2005, 'Disjunctivism and perceptual psychology', *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 33, no.1, pp.1-78, accessed 12 May 2020 from JSTOR.

Byrne, A 2005, 'Introspection', *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 33, no.1, pp.79-104, accessed 15 June 2020 from JSTOR.

----- 2019, 'Schellenberg's Capacitism' *Analysis*, vol. 79, no.4, pp.713-719, accessed 22 December 2020 from EBSCO.

-----2018, *Transparency and Self-Knowledge*, pp.26-49, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Campbell, J 2002, 'Consciousness and Reference' in A Beckermann, B McLaughlin and S Walter (eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*, accessed 5 May 2019 from EBSCO.

Crane, T 2001, *Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 133-140, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ffytche, D. H 2013, 'The hallucinating brain: neurobiological insights into the nature of hallucinations', in F Macpherson & D Platchias (eds), *Hallucination*, The MIT Press, pp. 45-64.

Fish, W 2009, *Perception, hallucination, and illusion* [electronic resource], Oxford University Press, Oxford.

French, C & Phillips, I 2020, 'Austerity and illusion', *Philosopher's Imprint*, vol. 20, no. 15, pp. 2-19, accessed 22 January 2021 from EBSCO.

Haddock, A & Macpherson, F 2008, 'Introduction' in A Haddock & F Macpherson (eds), pp. 2-23, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hinton, JM 1967b, 'Visual experiences', *Mind*, pp.217-227, accessed 4 March 2019 from JSTOR.

Image of Ishihara colour blindness test, working well solutions, accessed 2 September 2021 from <<https://workingwellsolutions.com/colour-vision-colour-blindness/>>

Johnston, M 2009, 'The obscure object of hallucination' in A Byrne & H Logue (eds) *Disjunctivism: contemporary readings*, pp. 207-271, The MIT Press, Massachusetts.

Langsam, H 1997, 'The theory of appearing defended', *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy*, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 33-59, accessed 2 May 2021 from JSTOR.

Logue, H 2013, 'Good news for the disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad cases', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, no. 1, pp.105-133, accessed 27 March 2019 from JSTOR.

-----2012, 'Why naive realism?', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. CXII, Part 2, pp. 212-237, accessed 23 April 2019 from JSTOR.

Martin, MGF 2006, 'On being alienated' in TS Gendler & J Hawthorne, (eds), *Perceptual experience*, pp. 355- 408. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

-----2004, 'The limits of self-awareness', *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 120, no.1-3, pp. 37-89, accessed 2 February 2018 from EBSCOhost.

-----2008, 'The reality of appearances', *Disjunctivism: contemporary readings*, pp. 271-318. The MIT Press, Massachusetts.

----- 2002b. 'The Transparency of Experience.' *Mind and Language*, vol.4, no.4, pp. 376–425, accessed 3 March 2019 from EBSCO.

Masrour, F 2020, 'On the possibility of hallucinations', *A Quarterly Review of Philosophy*, vol. 129, no. 515, pp. 737-768, accessed 3 January 2021 from EBSCOhost.

McDowell, J 1982, 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, vol. 68, pp. 455–79, accessed 23 November 2019 from EBSCO.

-----1986, 'Singular Thought and the Extent of 'Inner Space'', in J McDowell & P Pettit, (eds), *Subject, Thought, and Context*, Clarendon Press.

-----1995 'Knowledge and the Internal', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 877–93, accessed 15 July 2019 from JSTOR.

Moran, R 2001, *Authority and Estrangement*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

O'Callaghan, C 2020, 'Perceptual capacities, success, and content', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 100, pp. 738-743, accessed 27 April from EBSCO.

Pitcher, G 1971, *A theory of perception*, Princeton University Press, e-book, accessed 6 June 2021 from EBSCOhost.

Putnam, H 1973, "Meaning and Reference", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 70, no. 19, pp.699-711, accessed 7 February 2020 from EBSCO.

-----1973, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", *Language, Mind and Knowledge* (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science), pp.192-195, accessed 7 February 2020 from EBSCO.

Robinson, H 1994, *Perception*, pp.151-162. Routledge, New York.

Shoemaker, S 1994, 'Self-Knowledge and "Inner-Sense": Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual Model', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 271-290, accessed 5 June 2019 from EBSCO.

-----1994, 'Self-Knowledge and "Inner-Sense": Lecture I: The object perception model', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol.54, no. 2, pp. 249-269, accessed 5 June 2019 from EBSCO.

----- 1994, 'Self-Knowledge and "Inner-Sense": Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 291-314, accessed 5 June 2019 from EBSCO.

Siegel, S 2008, 'The epistemic conception of hallucination' in A Haddock & F Macpherson, (eds), *Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge*, pp. 205-223, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Smith, AD 2002, *The problem of perception*, pp.191-271, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Snowdon, PF 1980, 'Perception, Vision, and Causation.' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 81, pp.175–92, accessed 26 July 2019 from JSTOR.

Snowdon, PF 1990, 'The Objects of Perceptual Experience.' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol 64, pp. 121–50, accessed 26 July 2019 from JSTOR.

Snowdon, PF 2005a, 'Some Reflections on an Argument from Hallucination.' *Philosophical Topics*, vol. 33, no.1, pp. 285–305, accessed 26 July 2019 from JSTOR.

Soteriou, M 2013. *The Mind's Construction: The Ontology of Mind and Mental Action*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Williamson, T 1990, *Identity and discrimination*, pp. 27-87, B. Blackwell, Oxford.