Economics - Research Publications

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Author: Chaudhuri, Ananish × Author: Gangadharan, Lata × End date: 2005 × Start date: 2004 × Type: Preprint ×

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    Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures?Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore
    CAMERON, LISA ; Chaudhuri, Ananish ; ERKAL, NISVAN ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2005-07)
    This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysingindividual-decision making in a corrupt experimental environment. Attitudes towards corruptionplay a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Our experiments differentiate between theincentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour andallow us to explore whether, in environments characterized by lower levels of corruption, there isboth a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corruptbehaviour. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta)and Singapore, we find that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corruptbehaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The resultsreveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects inAustralia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly to those in Australia. The subjects inSingapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than the subjects in Australia. Wealso vary our experimental design to examine the impact of a more effective punishment systemand the effect of the perceived cost of bribery.
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    An Experimental Analysis ofGroup Size and Risk Sharing
    Chaudhuri, Ananish ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ; MAITRA, PUSHKAR ( 2005-11)
    We study the relationship between group size and the extent of risk sharing in aninsurance game played over a number of periods with random idiosyncratic andaggregate shocks to income in each period. Risk sharing is attained via agents thatreceive a high endowment in one period making unilateral transfers to agents that receivea low endowment in that period. The complete risk sharing allocation is for all agents toplace their endowments in a common pool, which is then shared equally among membersof the group in every period. Theoretically, the larger the group size, the smaller the percapita dispersion in consumption and greater is the potential value of insurance. Fieldevidence however suggests that smaller groups do better than larger groups as far as risksharing is concerned. Results from our experiments show that the extent of mutualinsurance is significantly higher in smaller groups, though contributions to the pool arenever close to what complete risk sharing requires.