Economics - Research Publications
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ItemDiscrete hours labour supply modelling: Specification, estimation and simulation(John Wiley & Sons, 2005)The assumption behind discrete hours labour supply modelling is that utility-maximising individuals choose from a relatively small number of hours levels, rather than being able to vary hours worked continuously. Such models are becoming widely used in view of their substantial advantages, compared with a continuous hours approach, when estimating and their role in tax policy microsimulation. This paper provides an introduction to the basic analytics of discrete hours labour supply modelling. Special attention is given to model specification, maximum likelihood estimation and microsimulation of tax reforms. The analysis is at each stage illustrated by the use of numerical examples. At the end, an empirical example of a hypothetical policy change to the social security system is given to illustrate the role of discrete hours microsimulation in the analysis of tax and transfer policy changes.
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ItemCAUSAL EFFECTS FROM PANEL DATA IN RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENTS WITH PARTIAL COMPLIANCE(EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED, 2008-01-01)
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ItemModeling and calculating the effect of treatment at baseline from panel outcomes(ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2007-10-01)
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ItemAnalysis of treatment response data from eligibility designs(ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2008-06-01)
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ItemGlobal challenges for land administration and sustainable development( 2006)An important government activity of all nation states is building and maintaining a land administration system (LAS) with the primary objective of supporting an efficient and effective land market. This includes cadastral surveys to identify and subdivide land, land registry systems to support simple land trading (buying, selling, mortgaging and leasing land) and land information systems to facilitate access to the relevant information, increasingly through an Internet enabled e-government environment. For most countries a cadastre is at the core of the LAS providing spatial integrity and unique land parcel identification in support of security of tenure and effective land trading. For many cadastral and land administration officials and for much of society, these are the primary, and in many cases the only roles of the cadastre and LAS. However the role, and particularly the potential of LAS and their core cadastres, have rapidly expanded over the last couple of decades and will continue to change in the future. But what is a land market in a modern economy? Since our LAS were developed, land commodities and trading patterns have undergone substantial changes: they have become complex, corporatised and international. Are our current LAS designed to support a modern land market that trades in complex commodities such as mortgage backed certificates, water rights, land information, time shares, unit and property trusts, resource rights, financial instruments, insurance products, options, corporate development instruments and vertical villages? Modern land markets involve a complex and dynamic range of activities, processes and opportunities, and are impacted upon by a wide range of restrictions and responsibilities imposed on land especially since WW II. These restrictions are continually evolving, primarily in response to economic, energy and sustainable development objectives. They are equally being driven by developments in information and communications techn
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ItemRegional Differences in the Severity of Recessions in the UK(Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 2007)
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ItemThe Optimal Composition of Government Expenditure(Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 2007)
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ItemModelling the composition of government expenditure in democracies(ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2009-03-01)
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ItemThe truncated core for games with limited aspirations(Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 2007)
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ItemInefficient policies and incumbency advantage( 2007-06)We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he chooses inefficient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the voter's induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through ine±cient policies. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes