Economics - Research Publications

Permanent URI for this collection

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 13
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: a comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students.
    Alatas, Vivi ; CAMERON, LISA ; Chaudhuri, Ananish ; ERKAL, NISVAN ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2006-10)
    We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants andIndonesian students. Our results suggest that although both subject pools show a high levelof concern with the extent of corruption in Indonesia, the Indonesian public servantsubjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students.We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the publicservants for either engaging in or not engaging in corruption suggest that the differences inbehavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. Forexample, when abstaining from corruption public servants more often cite the need toreduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging incorruption they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evilin the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. Weconclude by arguing that experiments such as the one considered in this paper can be usedto measure forward-looking attitudinal change in society and that results obtained fromdifferent subject pools can complement each other in the determination of such attitudinalchanges.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: a comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
    Alatas, Vivi ; CAMERON, LISA ; Chaudhuri, Ananish ; ERKAL, NISVAN ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2006-10)
    We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants andIndonesian students. Our results suggest that although both subject pools show a high levelof concern with the extent of corruption in Indonesia, the Indonesian public servantsubjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students.We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the publicservants for either engaging in or not engaging in corruption suggest that the differences inbehavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. Forexample, when abstaining from corruption public servants more often cite the need toreduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging incorruption they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evilin the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. Weconclude by arguing that experiments such as the one considered in this paper can be usedto measure forward-looking attitudinal change in society and that results obtained fromdifferent subject pools can complement each other in the determination of such attitudinalchanges.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Gender and corruption: insights from an experimental analysis
    Alatas, Vivi ; CAMERON, LISA ; Chaudhuri, Ananish ; ERKAL, NISVAN ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2006-10)
    In recent years, a substantial body of work has emerged in the social sciences exploringdifferences in the behavior of men and women in various contexts. This paper contributes tothis literature by investigating gender differences in attitudes towards corruption. It departsfrom the previous literature on gender and corruption by using experimental methodology.Attitudes towards corruption play a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Based onexperimental data collected in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) andSingapore, we show that while women in Australia are less tolerant of corruption than men inAustralia, there are no significant gender differences in attitudes towards corruption in India,Indonesia and Singapore. Hence, our findings suggest that the gender differences found in theprevious studies may not be nearly as universal as stated and may be more culture-specific.We also explore behavioral differences by gender across countries and find that there arelarger variations in women’s attitudes towards corruption than in men’s across the countriesin our sample.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Emissions variability in tradable permit markets with imperfect enforcement and banking
    Cason, Timothy ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2004-09)
    Unexpected variation in emissions can have a substantial impact on the prices and efficiency oftradable emission permit markets. In this paper we report results from a laboratory experiment inwhich subjects participate in an emissions trading market in the presence of emissionsuncertainty. Subjects face exogenous, random positive or negative shocks to their emission levelsafter they make production and emission control plans. In some sessions we allow subjects tobank their unused permits for future use. In all sessions, subjects can trade in a reconciliationperiod to buy or sell extra permits following the shock realization. Subjects then report theiremissions to the regulatory authority and they are placed in different inspection groupsdepending on their compliance history. The design of our experiment allows us to identifyimportant interactions between emission shocks, banking, compliance and enforcement. We findthat the relationship between emission shocks and price changes is significantly stronger withoutbanking, so banking helps smooth out the price variability arising from the imperfect control ofemissions. This greater price stability comes at a cost, however, since noncompliance andemissions are significantly greater when banking is allowed.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and RegulatoryEnforcement
    Cason, Timothy ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2004-09)
    Evidence suggests that a large majority of firms and individuals comply with regulationsand tax laws even though the frequency of inspections and audits is often low. Moreover, finesfor noncompliance are also typically low when regulatory violations are discovered. Theseobservations are not consistent with static compliance models. Harrington (1988) modified thesestatic models by specifying a dynamic game in which some agents have an incentive to complyeven when the cost of compliance each period is greater than the expected penalty. This paperreports a laboratory experiment based on the Harrington model framework, in which subjectsmove between two inspection groups that differ in the probability of inspection and severity offine. Subjects decide to comply or not in the presence of low, medium or high compliance costs.Enforcement leverage arises in the Harrington model from movement between the inspectiongroups based on previous observed compliance and noncompliance. Our results indicate thatconsistent with the model, violation rates increase when compliance costs become higher and asthe probability of switching groups becomes lower. Behavior does not change as sharply as themodel predicts, however, since violation rates do not jump from 0 to 1 as parameters vary acrosscritical thresholds. A simple model of bounded rationality explains these deviations from optimalbehavior.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Investment decisions and emissions reductions: results from experiments in emissions trading
    GANGADHARAN, LATA ; Farrell, Alex ; Croson, Rachel ( 2005-07)
    Emissions trading is an important regulatory tool in environmental policy making.Unfortunately the effectiveness of these regulations is difficult to measure in the field due to theunavailability of appropriate data. In contrast, experiments in the laboratory can provideguidance to regulators and legislatures about the performance of different market features inemission trading programs. This paper reports on the implementation of three differentinstitutional designs, and presents experimental results investigating important features ofemissions trading regimes: the ability to make investments in emissions abatement, ability tobank allowances and a declining emissions cap, both with and without uncertainty. Thesefeatures are observed in virtually all existing air pollution emissions trading programs currentlyin place and will almost certainly be part of future applications. Like previous experimentalstudies of emissions trading, this paper shows that the efficiency gains expected from economictheory emerge observationally. We also show reduced efficiency when permits are bankable dueto over-banking and when investments in emissions abatement are possible due to overinvesting.These tendencies do not worsen, however, when emissions caps decline.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Do Attitudes Towards Corruption Differ Across Cultures?Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia andSingapore
    CAMERON, LISA ; Chaudhuri, Ananish ; ERKAL, NISVAN ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2005-07)
    This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysingindividual-decision making in a corrupt experimental environment. Attitudes towards corruptionplay a critical role in the persistence of corruption. Our experiments differentiate between theincentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour andallow us to explore whether, in environments characterized by lower levels of corruption, there isboth a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corruptbehaviour. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta)and Singapore, we find that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corruptbehaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The resultsreveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects inAustralia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly to those in Australia. The subjects inSingapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than the subjects in Australia. Wealso vary our experimental design to examine the impact of a more effective punishment systemand the effect of the perceived cost of bribery.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Salinity in Water Markets: An ExperimentalInvestigation of the Sunraysia Salinity Levy, Victoria
    Duke, Charlotte ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ( 2005-11)
    The estimation of regression models subject to linear restrictions, is a widely appliedtechnique, however, aside from simple examples, the equivalence between the linear restrictedcase to the reparameterization or substitution case is rarely employed. We believe this is due tothe lack of a general transformation method for changing from the definition of restrictions interms of the unrestricted parameters to the equivalent reparameterized model and conversely,from the reparameterized model to the equivalent linear restrictions for the unrestricted model.In many cases the reparameterization method is computationally more efficient especially whenestimation involves an iterative method. But the linear restriction case allows a simple methodfor adding and removal of restrictions.In this paper we derive a general relationship that allows the conversion between the twoforms of the restricted models. Examples involving systems of demand equations, polynomiallagged equations, and splines are given in which the transformation from one form to the otherare demonstrated as well as the combination of both forms of restrictions. In addition, wedemonstrate how an alternative Wald test of the restrictions can be constructed using anaugmented version of the reparameterized model.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    An Experimental Analysis ofGroup Size and Risk Sharing
    Chaudhuri, Ananish ; GANGADHARAN, LATA ; MAITRA, PUSHKAR ( 2005-11)
    We study the relationship between group size and the extent of risk sharing in aninsurance game played over a number of periods with random idiosyncratic andaggregate shocks to income in each period. Risk sharing is attained via agents thatreceive a high endowment in one period making unilateral transfers to agents that receivea low endowment in that period. The complete risk sharing allocation is for all agents toplace their endowments in a common pool, which is then shared equally among membersof the group in every period. Theoretically, the larger the group size, the smaller the percapita dispersion in consumption and greater is the potential value of insurance. Fieldevidence however suggests that smaller groups do better than larger groups as far as risksharing is concerned. Results from our experiments show that the extent of mutualinsurance is significantly higher in smaller groups, though contributions to the pool arenever close to what complete risk sharing requires.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Impact of risk and uncertainty in the provision of local and global environmental goods: an experimental analysis
    GANGADHARAN, LATA ; NEMES, VERONIKA ( 2005-11)
    Uncertainties and risks in the decision making process are abundant in the area ofenvironmental economics, irrespective of whether the problems being discussed are local orglobal. This paper uses laboratory evidence from public goods games to examine how inpayoff equivalent situations, decision makers contribute towards local or globalenvironmental goods, in the presence of risk and uncertainties in the provision of these goods.We use a within subject design that allows for comparisons across seven different treatmentsin which subjects are exposed to internal (strategic) and external (environmental) risk anduncertainty. Our results show that the location of the risk and uncertainty matters, withsubjects moving away from the external uncertainty in favor of internal uncertainty, whenthat uncertainty is associated with the local environmental good. When the uncertainty relatesto the global environmental good, subjects face both external and internal uncertainty on thesame good leading to a significant drop in contributions. We find that in the presence of riskand uncertainty subjects use feedback from other members of their group when decidingabout future contributions. The reward for research and development and innovation iscaptured in the experimental design by the increased probability of obtaining the desiredoutcome in the endogenous probability treatment. Subjects seem to understand this incentiveand contribute more towards global goods in this treatment.