Economics - Research Publications
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ItemEx post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment(WILEY, 2005-02-01)Abstract. We study the implementation of constrained‐efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching friction. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in a non‐cooperative equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite‐sized markets where the equilibrium‐matching process has decreasing returns to scale – where the ‘Hosios rule’ does not apply – both with and without heterogeneity. JEL classification: D83, J64
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ItemEconomic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects(Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2005-07)
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ItemResidual wage disparity and coordination unemployment(WILEY, 2006-08-01)How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search model with identical workers where firms can create high‐ or low‐productivity jobs and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can conduct on‐the‐job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is hump‐shaped, skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.
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ItemBidding for money(ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2008-09-01)