Economics - Research Publications
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ItemWelfare‐Reducing Mergers in Differentiated Oligopolies with Free Entry(Wiley, 2010)https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2009.00612.x
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ItemPhillips Curve and the Equilibrium Unemployment Rate(Wiley, 2009-12)
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ItemThe role of portfolio shocks in a structural vector autoregressive model of the Australian economy(BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, 2008-03-01)
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ItemOvercoming measurement error problems in the use of survey data on expectations(BLACKWELL PUBLISHING, 2007-09-01)
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ItemSTOCHASTIC APPROACH TO INDEX NUMBERS FOR MULTILATERAL PRICE COMPARISONS AND THEIR STANDARD ERRORS(WILEY, 2010-06-01)The main objective of the paper is to demonstrate that a number of widely used multilateral index numbers for international comparisons of purchasing power parities (PPPs) and real incomes can be derived using the stochastic approach. The paper shows that price index numbers from commonly used methods like the Iklé, the Rao‐weighted, and an additive multilateral system are all estimators of the parameters of the country–product–dummy (CPD) model. The advantage of the stochastic approach is that we can derive standard errors for the estimates of the purchasing power parities (PPPs). The PPPs and the parameters of the stochastic model are estimated using a weighted maximum likelihood procedure under different stochastic specifications for the disturbance term. Estimates of PPPs and their standard errors for OECD countries using the proposed methods are presented. The paper also outlines a method of moments approach to the estimation of PPPs under the stochastic approach. The paper shows how the Geary–Khamis system of multilateral index numbers is a method of moments estimator of the parameters of the CPD model. The paper therefore provides a coherent stochastic framework for the Geary–Khamis system and derives standard errors of the Geary–Khamis PPPs.
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ItemInefficient policies and incumbency advantage(Elsevier, 2010)We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies.
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ItemPropensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore(ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2009-08-01)
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ItemSign and phase asymmetry: News, economic activity and the stock market(ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 2010-12-01)
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