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Economics - Research Publications
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ItemCAUSAL EFFECTS FROM PANEL DATA IN RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENTS WITH PARTIAL COMPLIANCEChib, S ; Jacobi, L ; Chib, S ; Griffiths, W ; Koop, G ; Terrell, D (EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LIMITED, 2008)
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ItemModeling and calculating the effect of treatment at baseline from panel outcomesChib, S ; Jacobi, L (ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2007-10)
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ItemAnalysis of treatment response data from eligibility designsChib, S ; Jacobi, L (ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2008-06)
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ItemRegional Differences in the Severity of Recessions in the UKDIXON, R (Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 2007)
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ItemThe Optimal Composition of Government ExpenditureCREEDY, J ; MOSLEHI, SS (Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 2007)
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ItemModelling the composition of government expenditure in democraciesCreedy, J ; Moslehi, S (ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2009-03)
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ItemThe truncated core for games with limited aspirationsVAN DEN NOUWELAND, C ; Carente, L ; Casas-Mendez, B ; Carcia-Jurado, I (Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 2007)
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ItemInefficient policies and incumbency advantageHODLER, ROLAND ; LOERTSCHER, SIMON ; Rohner, Dominic ( 2007-06)We study incumbency advantage in a dynamic game with incomplete information between an incumbent and a voter. The incumbent knows the true state of the world, e.g., the severity of an economic recession or the level of criminal activities, and can choose the quality of his policy. This quality and the state of the world determine the policy outcome, i.e., the economic growth rate or the number of crimes committed. The voter only observes the policy outcome and then decides whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Her preferences are such that she would reelect the incumbent under full information if and only if the state of the world is above a given threshold level. In equilibrium, the incumbent is reelected in more states of the world than he would be under full information. In particular, he chooses inefficient policies and generates mediocre policy outcomes whenever the voter's induced belief distribution will be such that her expected utility of reelecting the incumbent exceeds her expected utility of electing the opposition candidate. Hence, there is an incumbency advantage through ine±cient policies. We provide empirical evidence consistent with the prediction that reelection concerns may induce incumbents to generate mediocre outcomes
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ItemFalse alarm? terror alerts and reelectionHODLER, ROLAND ; LOERTSCHER, SIMON ; Rohner, Dominic ( 2007)We study a game with asymmetric information to analyze whether an incumbent can improve his reelection prospects using distorted terror alerts. The voters’ preferred candidate depends on the true terror threat level, and the voters are rational and therefore aware of the incumbent’s incentive to distort alerts. In equilibrium, a moderately “Machiavellian” incumbent reports low and high threat levels truthfully, but issues the same distorted alert for a range of intermediate threat levels. He thereby ensures his reelection for some threat levels at which he would not be reelected under full information.
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ItemAn Analysis of the Questions on University Teaching Surveys and the Universities that Use Them: The Australian ExperienceDavies, Martin ; Hirschberg, Joe ; Lye, Jenny ; Johnston, Carol ( 2007-05)This paper is the first attempt to perform an analysis of the internal Quality of TeachingSurveys (QTS) used in all Australian Universities by investigating how they compareacross Universities. We categorize the questions on each university’s QTS into one of 18types and then define a proximity measure between the surveys. We then use anagglomerative cluster analysis to establish groupings of these institutions on the basis ofthe similarity of their QTSs as well as groupings of question types by their frequency ofuse. In addition, we also determine if the form of the survey is related to the responsesrecorded by the Course Evaluation Questionnaire (CEQ) that is administered to allgraduates of Australian Universities. This was done by the use of regression analysis toestablish if the form of the questionnaire is related to the overall good teaching scoresearned by the universities from the CEQ..