Economics - Research Publications
Permanent URI for this collection
Search Results
1 - 4 of 4
-
ItemInefficient policies and incumbency advantage(Elsevier, 2010)We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies.
-
ItemMARKET MAKING OLIGOPOLY*(Wiley, 2008-06)This paper analyzes price competition between market makers who set costly capacity constraints before they intermediate between producers and consumers. The unique equilibrium outcome with pure strategies at the capacity stage is the Cournot outcome. The paper thus provides a rationale for Cournot‐type competition between market makers. This contrasts with previous findings in the literature, where due to the absence of capacity constraints that are set ex ante the Bertrand result typically obtains.
-
Item
-
ItemLearning, public good provision, and the information trap(ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2008-06-01)