Economics - Research Publications
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ItemOverriding in Teams: The Role of Beliefs, Social Image, and Gender(INFORMS, 2023-04)To shed light on the factors that affect who speaks up in teams in the workplace, we study willingness to speak up after someone has raised an opinion. We call voicing disagreement overriding and study this behavior in a laboratory experiment where participants answer multiple choice questions in pairs. In a control treatment, participants interact anonymously. In a photo treatment, both participants see the photo of the person they are matched with at the beginning of the group task. Using a series of incentivized tasks, we elicit beliefs about the likelihood that each possible answer option to a question is correct. This allows us to measure disagreement and to tease apart the role of disagreement versus preferences in the decision to override ideas in teams. Results show that anonymity increases overriding. This treatment effect is driven by social image costs. Analysis of heterogeneity in behavior by gender reveals no differences between the likelihood that men and women override. However, we find some evidence that men and women are treated differently; when participants disagree with their partner, they are more likely to override a woman than a man. Preferences seem to in part explain the differential treatment of men and women. Studying group performance, we find that overriding helps groups on average, while the gender composition of teams does not affect team performance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by the University of Melbourne and the Australian Research Council [Grant DE190100585]. J. Guo received a Kinsman Studentship from the University of Melbourne to conduct this research. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4434 .
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ItemCharitable Giving in the Laboratory: Advantages of the Piecewise Linear Public Goods Game(The MIT Press, 2018)The vast majority of US households make significant charitable contributions. When examining the effectiveness of the mechanisms fundraisers use to solicit such funds, it is often essential that researchers elicit or control the donor’s return from giving. While much can be gained from examining data on actual donations, insights on giving increasingly result from laboratory studies. An advantage of the laboratory is that it permits control of the donor’s return from giving and thus facilitates the identification of donor motives as well as their responses to different fundraising or solicitation strategies (see Vesterlund 2016 for a review).
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ItemNo Preview AvailableFollow the leader? A field experiment on social influence(ELSEVIER, 2021-08)
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ItemMeasurement of Intra-household Resource Control: Exploring the Validity of Experimental Measures(International Food Policy Research Institute, 2020-12-01)We study the validity of experimental methods designed to measure preferences for intra-household resource control among spouses in Ghana and Uganda. We implement two incentivized tasks; (1) a game that measures willingness to pay to control resources, and (2) private and joint dictator games that measure preferences for resource allocation and the extent to which those preferences are reflected in joint decisions. Behavior in the two tasks is correlated, suggesting that they describe similar underlying latent variables. In Uganda the experimental measures are robustly correlated with a range of household survey measures of resource control and women’s empowerment and suggest that simple private dictator games may be as informative as more sophisticated tasks. In Ghana, the experimental measures are not predictive of survey indicators, suggesting that context may be an important element of whether experimental measures are informative.
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ItemGender Differences in Negotiation and Policy for Improvement(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020-12-01)Men more than women succeed when negotiating over labor-market outcomes, and gender differences in negotiation likely contribute to the gender wage gap and to horizontal and vertical segregation in the labor market. We review the evidence on the many initiatives that have been put in place to reduce the effect of gender differences in negotiation. Categorizing these as either ‘fix-the-women’ or ‘fix-the-institutions’ initiatives we find serious challenges to the former. Women do not appear to be broken and encouraging them to negotiate more and differently often backfires. The evidence suggests that ‘fix-the-institution’ initiatives are more effective in reducing gender differences in outcomes. Concerns of adverse effects of banning negotiations or salary history requests have not materialized, and preliminary evidence points to reductions in the gender differences in negotiation outcomes. The strongest evidence on effectiveness in narrowing gender disparities is found for policies that increase transparency. Numerous studies find that gender differences in negotiation diminish when it is clear what to expect from the negotiation and suggest that initiatives which improve transparency are likely to help equalize opportunities at the bargaining table.
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ItemError-prone inference from response time: The case of intuitive generosity in public-good games(Elsevier, 2018-04-01)Previous research on public-good games revealed greater contributions by fast decision-makers than by slow decision-makers. Interpreting greater contributions as generosity, this has been seen as evidence of generosity being intuitive. We caution that fast decisions are more prone to error, and that mistakes, rather than preferences, may drive the observed comparative static. Varying the location of the equilibrium in public-good games with a unique dominant strategy, we show that the location of the equilibrium determines whether contributions are larger for fast decision-makers than for slow decision-makers. Replicating previous results, we find that fast decision-makers give more than slow decision-makers when the equilibrium is below the mid-point of the strategy set, but that this result is reversed when the equilibrium is above the mid-point. Consistent with fast decisions being more prone to error, we find that individuals who make (or have to make) fast decisions are insensitive to incentives, more often make mistakes, and are less likely to make equilibrium contributions. These findings make clear that we must control for the rate of errors if we are to draw inference on preferences from response time.