Economics - Research Publications
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ItemEndogenous firm heterogeneity and the dynamics of trade liberalization(ELSEVIER, 2008-03-01)
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ItemComputing the Distributions of Economic Models via Simulation(Econometric Society, 2008-03-18)We study a Monte Carlo algorithm for computing marginal and stationary densities of stochastic models with the Markov property, establishing global asymptotic normality and OP(n–1/2) convergence. Asymptotic normality is used to derive error bounds in terms of the distribution of the norm deviation.
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ItemBuyer-supplier interaction, asset specificity, and product choice(ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV, 2007-10-01)
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ItemEconomic progress and skill obsolescence with network effects(Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2005-07)
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ItemResidual wage disparity and coordination unemployment(WILEY, 2006-08-01)
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ItemVertical integration in the presence of upstream competition(WILEY, 2005-09-01)We analyze vertical integration in the case of upstream competition andcompare outcomes to the case where upstream assets are owned by a single agent(i.e., upstream monopoly). In so doing, we make two contributions to themodelling of strategic vertical integration. First, we base industry structure –namely, the ownership of assets – firmly within the property rights approach tofirm boundaries. Second, we model the potential multilateral negotiations using afully specified, non-cooperative bargaining model designed to easily compareoutcomes achieved under upstream competition and monopoly. Given this, wedemonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integratingparties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firmsintegrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. We alsoconsider the potential for integration to internalize competitive externalities in amanner that cannot be achieved under non-integration; i.e., by favouring internalover external supply. We demonstrate that ex post monopolization is more likelyto occur when there is an upstream monopoly than when there is upstreamcompetition. Our general conclusion is that the simple intuition that the presenceof upstream competition can mitigate and reduce the incentives for sociallyundesirable vertical integration is misplaced and, depending upon the strength ofdownstream competition (i.e., product differentiation), the opposite could easilybe the case.
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ItemThe decision to patent, cumulative innovation, and optimal policy(ELSEVIER, 2005-09-01)
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ItemAn integral equation representation for overlapping generations in continuous time(ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2008-11-01)
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ItemBidding for money(ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE, 2008-09-01)