Accounting - Research Publications
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ItemGroup Identity, Performance Transparency, and Employee Performance(American Accounting Association, 2020-09-01)Economics, social psychology, and management studies suggest that group identity plays an important role in directing employee behaviors. On the one hand, strong group identity could motivate high effort by resolving conflicts of interests in the workplace. On the other hand, it could encourage conformity towards group norms. We examine whether the effect of group identity is conditional on managers' performance reporting choices. Drawing on survey and archival data from a field site, we find that when performance transparency is low, the interest alignment effect is more salient and group identity positively relates to employee performance. However, when performance transparency is high, the conformity effect is more salient and higher group identity is associated with more homogeneous, but not necessarily higher, employee performance. Our findings contribute to the management control literature by documenting that managers' performance reporting choices determine whether group identity has positive effects on employee performance.
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ItemExpertise and Discretionary Bonus Decisions(INFORMS, 2020-01-01)We examine the association between managers’ expertise and their discretionary bonus decisions in a hospital setting. We hypothesize that high-expertise managers make decisions that encourage cooperation among their subordinates. However, low-expertise managers cannot do so because their lower levels of knowledge, experience, and domain expertise prevent them from having sufficient personal influence to persuade other professionals to cooperate. We find that high-expertise managers make two types of bonus decisions: (1) keep a smaller share of the bonus pool than what they are entitled to retain and (2) allocate the remainder to subordinates more evenly after adjusting for the underlying heterogeneity in their productivity. We also find evidence that high-expertise managers whose bonus decisions reflect their support for cooperation have higher department performance than all other managers.