Accounting - Research Publications
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ItemNo Preview AvailableWhen one size does not fit all: Using ex post subjective ratings to provide parity in risk-adjusted compensation(Elsevier, 2020-12-01)Firms typically use a ‘one-size-fits-all’ (OSFA) compensation contract that specifies a common formulaic relation between performance and compensation (i.e., a performance bonus) for non-executive managers in similar jobs. However, a contract that is appropriate on average, may be suboptimal for individual managers if heterogeneity in the operating environment creates varying compensation risk. We use field data from a retail firm that introduced an OSFA bonus compensation plan for its store managers. The common bonus formula is based on a weighted sum of objective measures of performance and a subjective rating made by supervisors. The firm intended the supervisors’ discretionary subjective rating to evaluate performance on dimensions that are difficult to measure (e.g., store appearance). We test and find that supervisors give uniformly higher subjective ratings to managers whose objective measure of sales performance is measured with greater noise, and to managers who face higher performance target difficulty, the latter assessed both prior to (ex ante) and subsequent to (ex post) the evaluation period. These results obtain after controlling for manager ability and performance, and for alternative mechanisms to mitigate differences in compensation risk (e.g., salary changes, sales target changes, and bonus adjustments). The evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion in subjective ratings to provide manager-specific risk premiums for non-executive managers who are subject to an OSFA contract.
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ItemNo Preview AvailableThe Influence of Performance Measurement on the Processual Dynamics of Strategic Change(INFORMS, 2021-01-01)We draw on a five-year longitudinal dataset to investigate the influence of performance measurement in the processual dynamics of strategic change, and particularly in enacting effective strategic change. Our model examines the role of performance measurement in driving strategy-consistent operational changes and in ensuring that desired objectives of the strategic change process are achieved. We investigate these roles for performance measurement over time and empirically document lags between changes in strategic priorities, changes in operational processes and subsequent changes in firm performance. We find that performance measurement supports the implementation of strategic change by influencing the extent to which changes to operational tasks and activities are made in response to new strategic priorities, as well as influencing the quality and impact of these operational changes, as reflected in improved contemporaneous and future firm performance.
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ItemNo Preview AvailableRenegotiation of joint venture contracts: The influence of boards of directors and prior ties as alternative governance mechanisms(Elsevier, 2020-04-01)Research on alliance governance has pointed out that joint ventures (JVs) are particularly complex forms of collaboration. Partnering firms therefore often face difficulties in anticipating contingencies and collaborative behaviors at the contract negotiation stage. When initial JV contracts are incomplete, renegotiation represents a key strategic opportunity for enhancing contractual safeguards or coordination guidelines over the course of the joint venture. Costs and risks entailed by renegotiating JV arrangements at a later stage are far from trivial, however. Existing research on alliances suggests that practitioners have alternative relational and formal governance solutions at their disposal for handling possible inefficiencies caused by contractual gaps over time. Although insightful, this research does not enable a determination as to whether these alternative relational and formal mechanisms substitute for or facilitate ex post contractual renegotiation. The competing arguments found in the literature provide little guidance to JV practitioners as well. Our results show that the collaborative context within which the JV is embedded (i.e., prior inter-partner ties) obviates the need for enhancing incomplete JV contracts ex post. By contrast, ex post contractual adjustments are fostered and facilitated by the formal and administrative apparatus engaged over the course of the JV (i.e., an involved JV board of directors). Such opposing effects suggest that prior ties can “prevent” the occurrence of inefficiencies caused by contractual gaps, while an involved JV board primarily can act as a mediation and renegotiation platform to “repair” the exchange when inefficiencies occur. Our findings highlight the multidimensional nature of joint venture governance, and in particular the interplay among various formal and informal governance solutions in the execution of joint ventures. By unpacking their complex effects on the decision to renegotiate incomplete JV contracts, our study also holds important value for managers seeking to govern their JVs over time.
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ItemIndustry Self-regulation Under Government Intervention(Springer Verlag, 2020-03-01)Objective: Industry actors (organizations, associations) can influence the way in which firms comply with regulations. This study examines how this influence process is affected by government intervention. Methods: Using official, anonymized data from the entire industry of financial intermediation in the Netherlands (N = 8655 firms), we examine how firms’ affiliations with industry actors relate to (1) voluntary actions aligned with improving regulatory compliance (e.g., requesting audits, attending workshops), and (2) law violations. Industry actors are distinguished between trade associations and the industry’s self-regulatory organization (SRO), which is subject to more government intervention. The analysis employs Poisson regressions to explain count variables, and bootstrapping to assess indirect associations. A series of robustness tests focus on relevant sub-samples, employ exact matching to address possible self-selection, and incorporate lagged dependent variables. Results: The association between affiliations with industry actors and law violations is negative and significant. This association is more indirect for trade associations than for the SRO (i.e., it is more strongly mediated by the voluntary actions firms take and which help to improve compliance). Conclusions: These findings go in line with the theory that government intervention makes industry-self regulation more mandated and less voluntary. Under less government intervention, industry actors may promote more voluntary efforts to comply.
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ItemFirm enablement through outsourcing: a longitudinal analysis of how outsourcing enables process improvement under financial and competence constraints(Elsevier, 2020-10)The dominant view is that outsourcing is driven by efficiency considerations. We demonstrate that a different path to outsourcing originates from critical internal resource shortages. These shortages pose a critical dilemma; on the one hand outsourcing is a reasonably durable approach to solving resource shortages. On the other hand, the same resource shortages complicate the management of outsourcing and may create knowledge and evaluation problems. We empirically examine this dilemma and thereby add to the limited work on the enabling effects of outsourcing under resource constraints. We employ two rich and unique panel datasets of Australian firms observed over five-year periods, to test dynamic change models if firm-level financial and competence constraints induce outsourcing, and if this in turn enables internal process improvement. The results show that outsourcing indeed is associated with both financial and competence constraints, although the impact of these constraints differs over time. In turn, we find that increased outsourcing relates positively to contemporaneous and future process improvement. These findings thus shed a positive light on how outsourcing can enable firms to overcome constraints and realize internal process improvement.