- Arts Collected Works - Theses
Arts Collected Works - Theses
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ItemObject lessons : public history in Melbourne 1887-1935McCubbin, Maryanne. (University of Melbourne, 2000)
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ItemPET soft drink bottle waste managment in Fiji : seeking sustainable solutionsDumaru, Patrina (University of Melbourne, 2005)
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ItemDisease and the deity : medicine and the divine in early Greek literature and mythClark, Brian. (University of Melbourne, 2006)
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ItemUnsheathed : Unveiling our fear of love with Jean-Paul SartreBossi, Larelle Gracienne (University of Melbourne, 2012)
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ItemSufficient graceEspeseth Turner, Amy. (University of Melbourne, 2005)
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ItemThe Sydney Opera House : what does it mean? A study of shifting meanings of the Sydney Opera House in Sydney,1957-73O'Callaghan, Estelle. (University of Melbourne, 2000)
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ItemNo Preview AvailableThe effect of the implementation of the decrees of the second Vatican Council on the art and architecture of Roman Catholic churches in VictoriaDrew, Daniel Francis (University of Melbourne, 2000)
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ItemA new constitutional settlement for the European Union (EU): an assessment of the EU Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon Treaty and the position of the member statesVarano, John. (University of Melbourne, 2010)
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ItemDoes justice require a metanarrative?Nyblom, Claire T. (University of Melbourne, 2010)
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ItemRelativism and Madhyamaka : Candrak�rti on mutual dependence and the basis of conventionWalsh, Elena Inez. (University of Melbourne, 2010)This thesis engages with Candrak�rti�s statement in Prasannapad� that the means to knowledge (pram�na) and the objects of knowlege (prameya) exist in mutual dependence.1 Its textual basis is a section of dialogue in the first chapter of Prasannapad� in which CandrakTrti engages in debate with an unnamed interlocutor whose position resembles that of Dign�ga.2 In the dialogue, CandrakTrti critiques his interlocutor�s attempts to articulate the nature and basis of conventional epistemic practice on the grounds that it is insufficiently informed by an understanding of the mutual dependence of pram�na and prameya. I argue that the dialogue may be understood not only as a critique of the epistemology adhered to by Candrak�rti�s interlocutor, but also as an indication of how the doctrine of the mutual dependence of pram�na and prameya undergirds Candrak�rti�s account of what it means for knowledge to be conventional. I propose that understanding the notion of relativity implicit in the doctrine of mutual dependence is key to understanding the nature of conventional knowledge itself. Specifically, I argue that the doctrine implies that part of what it means to understand knowledge as conventional is to understand knowledge as relative to our conventions. I then consider two possible implications of this view. The first is that, if conventional knowledge is merely knowledge of convention and not knowledge of �the world� (as it exists in and of itself) then perhaps it should not be understood as knowledge at all. The second is that, if conventional knowledge is simply that which is relative to convention, then perhaps knowledge is not a norm which governs rational inquiry in situations in which conventions conflict, or in situations in which we might want to question the appropriateness or pragmatic value of continuing adherence to particular conventions. I argue that neither of these positions are plausible interpretations of what it means for knowledge to be conventional. The argument proceeds via a systematic comparison of conventional knowledge and two recent formulations of epistemic relativism in the analytic tradition, the first of which leads to Cartesian scepticism, and the second of which denies that knowledge may function as an external norm governing rational inquiry. Demonstrating that conventional knowledge is incompatible with both of these formulations of relativism indicates that, though conventional knowledge is indeed relative to our conventions, this need not be taken to suggest that such conventions are merely arbitrary and lacking in rational basis.