Management and Marketing - Research Publications

Permanent URI for this collection

Search Results

Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
  • Item
    No Preview Available
    Mobilizing the Temporary Organization: The Governance Roles of Selection and Pricing
    Ghazimatin, E ; Mooi, E ; Heide, JB (SAGE Publications, 2021-07-01)
    Many marketing transactions between buyers and suppliers involve short-term collaborations or so-called temporary organizations. Such organizations have considerable value-creation potential, but also face challenges, as evidenced by their mixed performance records. One particular challenge involves relationship governance, and in this respect, temporary organizations represent a conundrum: On the one hand, they pose significant governance problems, due to the need to manage numerous independent specialists under time constraints. At the same time, temporary organizations lack the inherent governance properties of other organizational forms like permanent organizations. The authors conduct an empirical study of 429 business-to-business (B2B) construction projects designed to answer two specific questions: First, how are particular selection and pricing strategies deployed in response to monitoring and coordination problems? Second, does the joint alignment between the two mechanisms and their respective attributes help mitigate cost overruns? We follow up our formal hypotheses tests with a series of in-depth interviews to explore and to gain insight into the validity of our key constructs, explanatory mechanisms, and outcomes. Managerially, the authors answer the long-standing question of how to mobilize a temporary organization. Theoretically, they develop an augmented “discriminating alignment” heuristic for relationship management involving multiple governance mechanisms and attributes.
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    THE ORGANIZATION OF REGIONAL CLUSTERS
    Bell, SJ ; Tracey, P ; Heide, JB (ACAD MANAGEMENT, 2009-10-01)
  • Item
    Thumbnail Image
    Interfirm monitoring, social contracts, and relationship outcomes
    Heide, JB ; Wathne, KH ; Rokkan, AI (SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC, 2007-08-01)
    This article examines the effects of monitoring on interfirm relationships. Whereas some research suggests that monitoring can serve as a control mechanism that reduces exchange partner opportunism, there is also evidence showing that monitoring can actually promote such behavior. The authors propose that the actual effect of monitoring depends on (1) the form of monitoring used (output versus behavior) and (2) the context in which monitoring takes place. With regard to the form of monitoring, the results from a longitudinal field study of buyer–supplier relationships show that output monitoring decreases partner opportunism, as transaction cost and agency theory predict, whereas behavior monitoring, which is a more obtrusive form of control, increases partner opportunism. With regard to the context, the authors find that informal relationship elements in the form of microlevel social contracts serve as buffers that both enhance the effects of output monitoring and permit behavior monitoring to suppress opportunism in the first place.
  • Item