School of Social and Political Sciences - Theses
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ItemUS interests in Central Asia under George W Bush: democracy, the war on terror, and energy( 2012)The five post-Soviet states which make up Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) are poorly understood and under-researched, particularly in comparison to their neighbours. This is despite the fact that these states have experienced dramatic political, economic and social changes since the end of the Cold War, produce significant quantities of oil and gas, serve as transit points for substantial amounts of drugs, weapons, hydrocarbons and NATO forces and supplies, host Russian and American military bases, have local militant and political Islamist movements, and are relevant to the national interests of the US, the Europeans, Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, and even India. In this thesis, I examine the George W Bush Administration’s interests and policies in Central Asia. Drawing on Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye’s Complex Interdependence Theory, I argue for the interdependent nature of the US relationship with the region, the non-unitary character of the US government and its Central Asian counterparts, the roles of non-state actors, the internationalisation of traditionally domestic issues, and the administration’s ambiguous hierarchy of interests. The theory works best when supplemented with two observations. First, that instead of regarding its interests as entirely separate and in competition, the administration was influenced by ideas about overlaps between its interests. Second, that Central Asia was neglected and poorly understood in the US, contributing to a lack of a clear administration strategy for the region and greater roles for lower level actors. The Bush Administration’s interests in Central Asia revolved around democracy promotion, the War on Terror, and energy. Generally, the relationships between these interests were positive, although not to the extent claimed by sections of the administration. The administration’s critics emphasised the conflicts between its stated interests, but these claims often failed to differentiate between actual and symbolic tensions. Being in an interdependent relationship with the region, the US was fairly limited in its ability to influence these governments and shape their domestic policies. For example, its capacity for democracy promotion in the region was very limited, regardless of how it stacked that interest against its War on Terror and energy interests. This, in turn, means that the tensions between its interests were often primarily symbolic, rather than being over actual achievable changes. Nonetheless, its experiences showed that symbolism matters in US policy making and has the potential to threaten productive partnerships.