School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemSome questions arising from Kant's concept of the will( 1962)The questions dealt with in this essay concern what is in fact involved in the exercise of the will. The answers to them are intended as a contribution not to moral philosophy or to Kantian scholarship, but to the philosophy of action. Kant's contentions are mainly used as points from which to begin a discussion of the will itself and related concepts. Although his views are critically assessed, the major part of the essay is taken up with an independent examination of the concepts used in philosophical enquiries into human action. The essay falls into three Parts. The first consists in a survey of Kant's views about the nature of the will and a statement of what he presupposes and implies. His central contention is that the will is practical reason. The second Part consists in a discussion of the adequacy of this characterisation of the will. It is argued that it is adequate and alternative views are disposed of. The third Part consists in a detailed investigation of how the will is practical reason. It is shown that the initiation of actions necessarily involves rational activities and judgements, and that this fact warrants an agent rejecting causal explanations for his intentional behaviour. I have found confirmation of several points made in the third Part, in some of the monographs in the series 'Studies in Philosophical Psychology', in Stuart Hampshire's book 'Thought and Action', and in published papers by several others. The page numbers in my references to these papers, are of the Journals listed in the short bibliography at the end of the essay.