School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemRealism( 1989)This thesis argues for realism. It argues for realism on the basis of considerations of language. It does not assert that we can know realism to be correct, so it is realism as a possible position. It does argue that we can have every confidence that what our language tells us about our world is accurate (with an important proviso in the realm of science). Consequently, I dub it a "possible strong realism". It is a form of realism because it argues fur the proposition that our language is the world at one remove, that it metaphorically is the world, and that our use of language is good evidence both that we are getting the way the world is, right, and that there is a world in what we describe. If there was not a world, we could not make sense of the aboutness of our speech, and, more importantly, if there was not a world which was independent of our possible formulation of it, and larger than our formulation of it, then, once again, no sense could be made of our seeming to make sense. But there is no one-to-one formal correspondence between our terms and "object," in the world; there is no causal, physical link between the two at an individual level, since language is not literal. It is a strong realism because it argues for a full-blooded acceptance of language as being an accurate account of the world at one remove, namely metaphorically. It is important to note that language is not a picture of the world in the conventional sense, because a picture is a literal representation, and language is not a picture. It is the world at one remove. Or I argue that it is best taken that way. We make the inference from language to the world. It is a possible realism because it asserts that we can never know that realism is correct, because to think that one can know that it is correct is to seek to be on both sides of the line at once, to be at once inside language and outside it, and that we cannot be. That might seem to make us prisoners of language, but a possible strong realism allows the possibility that when we speak of that which is ostensibly about us, there is an isomorphism which means that when we do so speak, we can be confident that our speech or marks are capturing something of the way the world is apart from our concerns, concepts and terms. only on the basis of such a supposition can we make sense of the world postulated within our language. Or at least this is what I shall argue. But this isomorphism, this assertion of accuracy, can only be a possibility, and by possibility I don't mean the possibility of error. What I mean is that we can never know realism to be correct, on the account of realism here given, since part of what realism means is that there may be parts of reality which will always escape us. In' chapter 1, I argue that we can make a transcendental inference from language to the world. It is easier to make if the meaning of our words is not wholly determined in their use, but the inference can still be made if use does exhaust meaning. I argue that use does not in fact exhaust meaning. T contend that a view of language as "peculiar metaphor" is a good base on which to build realism, as it avoids on the one hand the eliminative view of the meaning of words being solely in their use, and, on the other hand, it also avoids the insistent attractiveness of language as picture (the contrast between the later and earlier Wittgenstein). Language as metaphor has the added virtues of being a good model for the explanation of the growth of language, and introducing a mental element to meaning. Chapter 2 turns to a consideration of the status of sub-microscopic scientific entities through looking mainly at the anti-realism of van Fraassen with respect to those entities, and argues that the distinction between observables and unobservables, on which distinction he relies for his anti-realism, will not stand up. Possible strong realism asserts that, as well as good metaphor within language, there can be bad metaphor, and the metaphor of language with respect to the macro objects of everyday life is inappropriately applied to the alleged "existence" of the sub-microscopic "particles" of science. The model of existence at the macro level is an inappropriate one at the micro level. Language can be systematically misleading with respect to the world, or part of it, because 0f our nature, as well as systematically leading. Chapter 3 explores the contrasting views of Devitt and Taylor. Along the way, T contrast Devitt's view to Quine's, in order to show the difference in the importance accorded to ontology. A possible strong realism argues for the world of objects that Devitt wants, at least at the macro level, but starts from a different point, from language. Starting from a different point, it comes to a different conclusion, that, while we can be ontologically confident, as Quine claims, to talk of the independent and objective existence of objects is to be a metaphysical realist. The view of language that I advocate does net go outside language for its confidence. My realism also argues that everyday objects at least are not theoretical constructions, as Quine claims Its starting point is once again different from Taylor's, whose position seems to imply that we move from the truth of sentences to the constitution of the world. That is veering too close to anti-realism, and the "truth" used in my realism is both co-extensive with, yet larger than, Taylor's epistemic truth.