School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemQuiet in the Balkans: the role of Romania in the German-Soviet relationship during the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact( 2013)Vyacheslav Molotov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), met with Adolf Hitler, the German Führer, in Berlin in November 1940. It was the first time Molotov had left the Soviet Union since 1921. He had arrived to discuss the future of the relationship between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union; the two nations had been cooperating closely since August 1939. The talks, however, achieved nothing. Instead, they demonstrated how shallow the relationship really was and how incompatible their interests were. Joseph Stalin, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and leader of the Soviet Union had ordered Molotov to try to lay the groundwork for further discussions which might even lead to another agreement similar to the Non-aggression Pact of August 1939. Why were the Soviets trying to reach an agreement with the Nazi-led Germans? The Soviet leadership were terrified of war but at the same time believed it was inevitable in the contemporary international climate. Their aim was to put off this war for as long as possible, even if this meant reaching long-lasting agreements with Hitler’s Germany, the archenemy of communism. In the series of conversations that took place however, Hitler’s evasions were revealing. He avoided Molotov’s attempts to discuss concrete proposals, opting instead to discuss a partition of the British Empire and suggesting the Soviets look southwards towards Iran and India, ignoring the Soviet Foreign Minister’s assertions of security interests in the Balkans and the Middle East. The talks were a dead end. Molotov left with no agreement, only vague promises of further discussions.1 Hitler, however, now knew what he had to do. German and Soviet aims were irreconcilable; there was no point putting off the inevitable. A month later, on 18 December 1940, Hitler released Directive No. 21. It ordered: “The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign.” (From Introduction)