School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemNorms and reasons( 2009)The concept of normativity is currently enjoying a period in philosophical vogue; it is at the centre of contemporary debates in fields as diverse as ethics and epistemology. Despite its popularity, the question of how we might best understand normativity remains a disputed one. Generally speaking, philosophers have favoured an intellectualist interpretation. It is typically assumed, for instance, that our engaging our higher-order capacities, our capacities for judgment, deliberation and reasoning, constitutes a necessary condition for our being sensitive to normative phenomena. Recently, however, an increasing number of philosophers have made the case for our favouring an anti-intellectualist interpretation, on the grounds, for example, that intellectualist frameworks are overly restrictive. In this study I assess these two competing accounts of normativity at the level of their respective positions regarding the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. Typically, intellectualists hold that if a norm is to guide action such that that action is also guided by reasons it is necessary that it be a norm which has some clear association with judgment and deliberation. Anti-intellectualists typically disagree; they are not inclined to see a norm's being disconnected from judgment and deliberation as decisive against that norm's guiding action which is also guided by reasons. In the first chapter I present Allan Gibbard's intellectualist analysis of the connection between guidance by norms and guidance by reasons. I show how Gibbard's expressivistic analysis of normative discourse supports his intellectualism. In the second chapter I introduce Peter Railton's anti-intellectualist analysis of this connection. I conclude this chapter by presenting a prima facie reason for our favouring Railton's analysis. In the third chapter I examine the metaphysical, semantic and epistemic components of the metaethical position which underwrites Railton's anti-intellectualism before raising an objection to the semantic and epistemic components. I argue that this objection gives us reason to find Railton’s anti-intellectualism untenable. In the fourth chapter I explore the prospects for both anti-intellectualism and intellectualism in light of these problems for Railton’s account.