School of Historical and Philosophical Studies

This thesis is an attempt to analyse and evaluate the concept of T?) ,ui G zon in the ethical theory of the later dialogues commonly attributed to Plato. While painstaking research has been undertaken by scholars on the text of the dialogues and the basic notions of Plato's philosophy, surprisingly scant attention has been given to the concept of [To Metrion]. Reference to this neglect has been made pertinently and cogently by Joseph Souilhe. In speaking of the the and,LI. 05 with which [Metrion] is closely associated, as being among the most frequent terms running through the dialogues of Plato, Souilhe comments: ...est-il curieux qu'un certain nombre de commentateurs, et non des moindres, aient semble' les negliger. It is important to observe at the outset the limits of our enquiry as defined in the first pars-- graph. The significance of an investigation of this kind is apparent if it is conceded:- (a) that the later dialogues express the maturity of Plato's thought, (b) that ethics remained his chief interest and concern even though his later writings are set in a wider philosophical context than his earlier, and (c) that [To Metrion] rescued from vagueness and ambiguity, came to be a ruling concept in his thought. It is essential for the successful prosecution of this enquiry to be faithful to the text of the dialogues. While in no way depreciating the value of what others have said about Plato, there is always the possibility of "reading into him" thoughts which are not truly his. In this respect, it should be mentioned that historically the doctrine of 'the mean' has been linked with the name of Plato's illustrious successor, Aristotle. But it would not be proper to allow the writings of Aristotle to exert undue influence in arriving at conclusions in the present study. For this reason, the text of the dialogues will be frequently quoted in the following pages. Then too, while readily conceding the orderliness of Plato's thought, it is necessary to guard against the presumption that the dialogues provide a unified system of meanings. This standpoint cannot be accepted without question and qualification. To extract from what purports to be "laissez-faire" conversation a system of rigid, inflexible concepts from which irrefutable deductions are drawn does despite to the dialogue method and to the platonic quest. It is true that the absence of formal argument is more pronounced in the earlier than in the later dialogues, but even in these latter, if systematisation is attempted, it must be undertaken with extreme caution. A prominent platonist has very aptly remarked:2 "Passages taken out of the context in which they occur, and then subjected to the manipulation of formal logic, can, of course, be interpreted in ways which would yield a single system of meanings, but the result might be a mere travesty upon what the interpreter was proposing to explain." If, through remembering this, the ends of our enquiry appear somewhat loose and untidy, faithfulness to the spirit of the man whose work we study is at least observed. Brief mention must here be made as to what we shall regard as 'later' dialogues and some indication of chronological ordering. A considerable amount of effort has been expended by scholars on these issues, and their investigations are far from trivial. It is obviously important to know the placement of an author's particular work in relation to his total output; and to assess,as ire- the case of Plato, 'the philosophic contribution of a dialogue in relation to the maturity of his thought. However, it will not be possible within the compass of this study to enter into argumentation on these issues. It is generally agreed that the so-called 'Socratic' dialogues belong to the early period of Plato's life, the "Republic" to the years of his maturity, and the "Laws" to his old age. Here we follow the list proposed by A.E. Taylor,3 as "post-Republic" or "later" dialogues:- 'Theaetetus', 'Parmenides', 'Sophist', 'Politicus', 'Timaeus', 'Philebus', 'Laws', and in that chronological order.4 The focus of this study will be largely upon the short digression in the "Politicus" where the subject of 1 j f cxt'2httkh t cnh is discussed, though chiefly on the "Philebus" where the concept of [To Metrion] in its ethical relationship is elucidated. It may well be that a major reason for the failure of Plato scholars generally to give due attention to this concept is the comparative neglect of the study of this latter dialogue. While excellent research has been undertaken in years now long past by Badham, Paley, Poste and Bury, and in more recent years by Taylor and Hackforth,5 the "Philebus" has remained for too long a kind of backwater in Plato studies. This may be partly due to the difficulty of placing a dialogue with a paramount ethical interest in this later period of Plato's thought, if it is supposed that in the wider philosophic context of the later dialogues, Plato's ethical emphasis had lessened. In this light the "Philebus" is viewed as a kind of "Socratic reversion", an anachronism. Then too, if it is assumed that Plato is at his best in the "Republic", the concessions to 'the world of becoming' in the "Philebus" may be interpreted as a regrettable 'falling away' from the pristine standards of 'pure idealism'. However, in the opinion of the present writer, the "Philebus" is one of the most significant of the platonic dialogues and represents some of the finest and most mature thought of its author. While it is abundantly clear that Plato has broadened his terms of reference in his later writings, the "Philebus" alone (though evidence elsewhere can be adduced) leaves us in no doubt as to the continued primacy of ethics in his philosophy. Further, by the time of writing this dialogue, in the maturity of his years, he-had uncovered, examined and to a degree elucidated the fundamental principle which lay at the centre of his philosophy and without which his ethical theory would lack life and meaning, viz., the concept of [To Metrion].

A thesis should speak for itself, and prefatory remarks should hardly be necessary. Three brief ones are, perhaps, called for with the present one. The Bibliography does nit stand at the forefront of the work by chance. Rather, because in it is revealed the pitiful inadequacy of the present writer's reading on the subject-matter, even in his native language (for which he can plead no excuse). Had the sections "Books of Reference", and "Articles", been thrice their actual length, and every work studies in detail from cover to cover (not skimmed through, as has all too often been the case), the results reached might have had some claim to significance. F. M. Cornford (The Unwritten Philosophy, pp. 33, 39) has remarked "Temperament is no conventionally recognised reason; so (the philosopher) urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premisses. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hardhearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it" (from William James)... "if we would really understand what a philosopher says, we must keep a wakeful eye on what he does not say, because he and his opponents take it for granted. There are no personal motives for concealment here. The premisses now in question are not mentioned simply because they seem too obvious to be worth mentioning". This testimony is true. For which cause reprove all historians of philosophy sharply, that they, remembering that they are in the same condemnation, may perchance think that themselves may be mistaken. (And the present writer?). Some of this thesis was written with a view to submission to various journals for publication (but vide supra,). Hence there is a certain lack of direct cross-referencing, and a tendency to restate conclusions reached elsewhere. An important change in the present writer's views will be noticed in Ch. 1V - VII. In Ch. 1V, which was written some months before Ch. V - VII, the interpretation of the Sophist offered by F. M. Cornford was accepted. In Ch. V - III that of A. L. Peck was. The major points at issue in Ch. 1V, viz., the exegesis of Tht. 183 a-c, and of Tm. 49c7-50b5, can, however, stand on either view of the Sophist. Also the tentative suggestions made in the last section of Ch. 1V appear to be unsatisfactory, and a fresh suggestion is offered in Ch. VI.

School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses

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