School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemKant's distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena( 1979)Kant's primary objective in the Critique was to establish the objectivity of experience in general. This he sought to achieve in terms of a distinction of all objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena, and therefore most doctrines in the Critique are directed towards that end. This essay deals with the final position of the above distinction for which most of those doctrines have likewise to be taken into account. In an essay of this length however, it is not possible to treat each of those doctrines as an individual thesis and give them the detailed attention which each one of them deserves. With the objective of this essay in mind, the doctrines leading into Kant's chapter on the Phenomena/Noumena distinction are treated with respect to their major problems only, whilst those which are even more preliminary to it, are treated at an introductory level in Sections I to III of the first chapter. The first chapter deals with Kant's Sources of Knowledge. It is argued that Kant's theory on the necessity for synthesis for the possibility of awareness and knowledge of experience holds, and that the major problem of the Original Unity of Apperception can be overcome by interpreting it as a first, instead of a second order concept at meta level; that is to say, the implicit 'I am' rather than the 'I know I am'. It is argued the latter is only necessary for consciousness of self-ascription of an experience, i.e. for determining the objectivity of one's experience. The further point made is that objective experience in general requires the postulation of an outer order (as undertaken by Kant) but that in so far as such order cannot be transcendentally known to exist, it is legitimate to point to the need for empirical verification if our objective experience is to be seen to relate meaningfully to the empirical world as opposed to merely an analytic one. It is then concluded that although this last condition need not hold within a Rationalist model, unless Kant means to adopt the latter, he is forced to admit that the original unity of apperception is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the possibility of meaningful objective experience. The major issue of the second chapter is that a limit concept 'applies to our understanding. Kant's third Antinomy and the concept of noumena are dealt with. In the Antinomy it is argued that its limit concept pertains to the first cause and that it is set by the concept of infinity, and in so far as that pertains to Time, it is the concept of temporality as opposed to atemporality which sets a limit to the understanding in the Antinomy. In the discussion of noumena as a limit concept it is said that the postulation of noumana in general presupposes that our senses are limited under any conditions and that the reason for this presupposition is yet another presupposition, namely that objects themselves are non-spatio/temporal. It is thus grounded in its own presupposition and acceptance of it reduces to choice on the basis of credibility if such can be established. The argument then turns to Kant's commitment for a causal connection between the perceiver and the objects affecting the perceiver's senses. As these objects can be neither mere appearances nor noumenal objects, it is concluded that acceptance of the postulated non-spatiality and non-temporality 0f objects themselves is no longer a critical and viable alternative. The third and final chapter opens with Kant's commitments as a Transcendental Idealist and Empirical Realist; then moves to the problems attaching to his theory of space to show that not only is that theory untenable in so far as appearances cannot be spatially extended and therefore space must be postulated as attaching to objects themselves, but also that unless it is so postulated, it violates the position of a Transcendental Idealist per Kantian definition. These problems as well as those discussed in the Section on causal connection are then juxtaposed vis a vis the limit of Sensibility to show the overall untenability of Kant's Distinction and to indicate the conditions which need to obtain if Kant is to be rescued from it. This thought is then developed into an outline of an alternative position on the Distinction and it is argued that the concept of Noumena needs to be seen to apply 'somewhere beyond' our capacity to infer objects themselves. That is to say, that it be restricted to apply as a purely intellectual concept to our understanding. The chapter concludes with a treatment of some possible objections to this alternative model. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Kant refer to the Kemp-Smith Translation of the Critique of Pure Reason and are given in footnotes as per either the first or second edition text prefixes, e.g. A or B respectively.