School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe identity theory of mind( 1977)
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ItemA characterization of justice( 1977)There is no shortage of features that can be put forward as the core of, or at least a major part of, an ideal society. Such elusive communities might be described as "just", "fair", "free", "egalitarian", "democratic", "humane", "efficient", "prosperous", "benevolent", or perhaps simply as "good". What people actually mean by such descriptions is by no means clear. At the level of ordinary everyday speech, what one man might call "democracy" another will label "freedom" or "equality". At the height of the cold war each side claimed that its doctrine was the truly democratic one. Each side also proclaimed its support for freedom, but what was meant by "freedom" in each case was vastly different. Moreover the protagonists of the cold war did not have this field of battle all to themselves; with the emergence of former colonial states and societies toward independent nations, "democracy" and "freedom" took on new meanings.
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ItemJohn Ridley's contributions to Australian technology and to the early progress of South Australia( 1979)This study is primarily concerned with the working career of John Ridley (1806-1887), and with his contributions to the flour-milling industry of South Australia, to wheat harvesting technology, and to the progress of the colony generally. Ridley emigrated to South Australia from the north of England in 1840, and remained there until early 1853. Although still a relatively young man, he then returned to England to live in semi-retirement. The following text will show that Ridley contributed substantially to the technical and economic progress of the young- colony in at least two separate ways :- (i) He built the first flour-mill in South Australia in the year 1840, and subsequently operated it as a very successful business until he left the colony in 1853. The mill was steam-driven, of substantial capacity for the time, and of considerable economic significance to the colony. The local flour-milling industry which grew up soon afterwards freed the colony from crippling expenditures for imported flour and other breadstuffs, thus permitting a sound local economy to be developed. During 1842 Ridley leased a second (inoperative) flourmill near Adelaide, completely refitted it, and brought it too into successful operation. As well as helping to alleviate the financial difficulties of the colony at the time, these two mills provided a timely stimulus to local wheat growing. Ridley exerted a considerable influence upon the early development of South Australia's flour-milling industry, by virtue of the high standards for efficiency, operating reliability, and sound profitability he established in his own businesses. The competitors he attracted were forced to achieve similarly high standards in order to survive. His work was thus of importance in helping to secure a sound base for the future growth of the industry. (ii) In late-1843 Ridley invented, constructed, and demonstrated a unique mechanical harvester for gathering grain crops. This machine, later known as the "Ridley Reaper" or the "South Australian Stripper", was subsequently manufactured and used in thousands within the colony. For more than half a century the machine played a major part in stimulating wheat production in the region by providing the simplest and cheapest harvesting method in the world at that time. Ridley's invention embodied a principle of operation which was entirely novel at the time it was introduced. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries this same principle was incorporated into the designs of many other widely used grain harvesters. Ridley's machine therefore occupies an important place in the evolution of modern grain-harvesting machinery. The first two machines (both built by Ridley) were directly responsible for averting a serious harvesting crisis in South Australia at the 1843-44 season. Afterwards, when ever-increasing numbers of the machines went into service, a dramatic expansion of the colony's wheat-growing industry became possible. This in turn led to the development of a large export trade in wheat, and thus to an enviable economic prosperity for the colony. Whilst there is unanimous agreement that Ridley constructed and demonstrated the first successful machine of the "Stripper" type, his claim to have also invented the principle of its operation has been disputed. John Wrathall Full, another. pioneer South Australian settler, insisted that he and not Ridley originated the fundamental principle. In fact, he directly accused Ridley of stealing his idea and putting it into practice. The resulting controversy is examined in detail, and Bull's claim shown to be falsely based. Two further points of historical interest are also made and substantiated. Firstly, the "Stripper" was the first ever harvesting machine to successfully combine the operations of gathering and threshing the grain. And secondly, Ridley's "Stripper" was the first machine in the world to substantially displace hand-methods of cereal harvesting in its region. In the light of all the above considerations, it is suggested that Ridley's machine has not received either fair or sufficient notice in the histories of agricultural technology published to date. John Ridley's importance in the story of the development of mechanical harvesting has thus been unjustly neglected.
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ItemThe Australian missionary endeavour in China, 1888-1953( 1978)Late in the nineteenth century, when cultural and commercial contact between China and Australia was minimal and the Australian public felt a deep, ingrained distaste for its own Chinese immigrant population, Australian missionaries began to join the Christian missionary enterprise in China. The initial stimulus for the movement was, however, provided largely by British missions and their deputationists who visited Australia in the 1890s. The first stage of the movement was not, therefore, an expression of the burgeoning Australian nationalism in which distrust and loathing of the Chinese immigrant was an integral element. Furthermore, it continued as it began. Between 1888 and 1953, more than 500 missionaries worked in China, the great majority in British, not exclusively Australian, mission organizations. The endeavour was a predominantly Protestant phenomenon, characterized by a high proportion of evangelists, a small core of post-secondary or tertiary-trained professionals, and a large number of women. Apart from a few outstanding contributions to China's social welfare and Sinology, most missionaries were fully occupied with converting the Chinese to Christianity. Although initially and continually stimulated by influences which were external to the Australian environment, the movement had its own internal logic. It was highly self-propagating, drawing a large proportion of its members from friends and families within the ecclesia, the religious community. It did not, however, constitute a homogeneous community. This was due to the wide differences in the ethos and methods of the mission societies involved. Once in China, the great majority of missionaries obeyed the rules and followed the policies of the British societies to which they belonged. They responded to the Chinese and conditions in China in this capacity and adopted the image of Christian internationalism which those societies increasingly projected to accommodate to the demands of Chinese nationalism. Most missionaries therefore voluntarily suppressed their Australian identity. Australian branches of mission societies, with few exceptions, followed suit. As a consequence of the way the movement began, and this effort to remain supranational, Australian missionary interest in China never harmonized with developing Australian secular interest. The missionary movement peaked in 1923 and again in 1933 in response to favourable conditions for Christianity in China; secular interest developed after 1938 and during World War II in response to China's valuable resistance to the common enemy, Japan. For the above reasons, and because of their own mission-centrism, Australian missionaries were not effective translators of the Chinese culture to Australia; nor did they transmit Australian secular attitudes to China. Those Chinese who, in the last stages of the endeavour, were aware of the identity of the Australian missionary, saw him as the colonial subject of British imperial domination. Finally, the missionary body's effect on China's culture and historical development is best assessed in terms of its role as an intellectual stimulus to the social revolution which fomented throughout the undertaking, climaxed in 1949, and rejected the entire Western missionary enterprise.
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ItemThe opposition to Montanism from church and state: a study of the history and theology of the Montanist Movement as shown by the writings and legislation of the Orthodox opponents of Montanism( 1978)This thesis is primarily an examination of the ecclesiastical and imperial opposition to the Montanist movement throughout the four centuries of its existence (c. 165-550 A.D.). Section I deals with the pre-Constantinian period, arguing that the earliest ecclesiastical opponents were local bishops who, through oral controversy, conciliar condemnation, and literary activity, tried to negate the influence Montanism was having upon the catholic flock. During the third century a few non-episcopal ecclesiastical scholars joined in the literary struggle against Montanism. It is argued, however, that more important than their non-episcopal status is the fact that these scholars, like more and more third century bishops, opposed Montanism without having any personal contact with contemporary adherents of the sect so that by the end of that century opposition to Montanism had become literary warfare from a distance. The extant fragments of this warfare reveal that pre-Constantinian opponents charged Montanists with a variety of offences centering around three main charges: pseudoprophecy, novelty, and heresy. Each of these charges was vigorously defended by Montanist apologists, the chief of whom was Tertullian. The second section covers the same time-span as the first, but examines state opposition. Before 250 A.D., persecution of Christians was usually instigated by the local pagan population at times when the pax deorum appeared to be threatened. It is argued that, whilst Montanists suffered during these persecutions, pagans did not distinguish between Montanists and catholics even though, in some instances, Montanists may have been the indirect cause of these persecutions. After 250 A.D., emperors became more and more involved in instigating persecutions, but, again, they did not differentiate between various types of Christians. Despite the views of certain modern historians, there is no evidence that any pre-Constantinian emperor or governor instigated a persecution against Montanists, hence this section does not contain specific chapters on imperial opponents and their charges. The major issues discussed in this section are "charges" levelled at Montanists by modern historians, namely that Montanists were invariably volunteer martyrs, that they refused to flee during persecutions, and that, even in times of peace, they displayed a provocative attitude towards the state. Much of this alleged Montanist "fanaticism" disappears as a result of a careful scrutiny of all the available evidence. After Constantine became sole ruler of the Empire, he, and his successors, persecuted Montanists in an attempt to preserve the purity of the catholic church. The distinction between ecclesiastical and imperial opposition, therefore, becomes somewhat blurred for the last phase of Montanism (c. 324-550 A.D.). Hence, church and state opposition are both treated in Section III. During this period the trend of ecclesiastical opposition "from a distance", commenced in the third century, continued. Anti-Montanist tracts, letters, and sermons proliferated and large sections of heresiological surveys and church histories were devoted to condemning the movement. Much of this literature was composed by opponents who had no personal contact with Montanists. Charges still centred on pseudo-prophecy, novelty, and heresy, although the range of specific allegations multiplied. A number of the Christian emperors of this period enacted laws aimed at eradicating contemporary Montanism. As a result, a significant number of Western Montanists joined the catholic church, but many others, especially in Rome, Constantinople, and Phrygia, continued their separatist existence until the combined efforts of church and state finally wiped out the movement during the middle of the sixth century. This thesis also re-evaluates the history and theology of Montanism in the light of what is revealed about the movement by the writings and legislation of its orthodox opponents. The view of Montanism presented by the opponents is compared with the Montanists' self-assessment and both are judged in the context of all other available evidence. As a result, it is argued that Montanists did not practice, or believe, many of the things with which they were charged and that, even when there was some substance to a particular charge, the charge was not always applicable to Montanists everywhere. Montanism, in fact, was a very diverse movement. Despite certain modern assessments, the picture of Montanism which emerges from this study is that of an innovative prophetic movement intent on bringing Christianity into line with what it believed to be the ultimate ethical revelation of the Holy Spirit given to the church via its prophets.
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ItemThe structure of experience and the foundations of science: an evaluation, and modern application, of Kant's views on metaphysics in its relation to science, as set out in the Critique of pure reason and the Metaphysical foundations of natural science( 1977)This thesis begins with an outline of Kant's three types of metaphysics as found in his theoretical philosophy. The aim of this thesis is then specified as twofold: (i) to establish the plausibility of the general Kantian method relating metaphysics and science and (il) to show that a substantial number of the theses which Kant lists in his three types of metaphysics provide the foundation for modern natural science. The first task requires a thorough examination of Kant's methodology in relating the three types of metaphysics to each other and to the theses of science. The second requires an evaluation of Kant's substantive claims as to the general features of experience and their relation to the determinate laws of our world. The pursuit of these aims will require, therefore, a comprehensive reassessment of the Critique of Pure Reason from the point of view of its relation to the MF, both methodologically and substantively. I therefore consider and evaluate Kant's views on the substantive questions falling under each type of metaphysic in the three major parts of the thesis. Thus part B (Sections 4-14) discusses the transcendental metaphysics insofar as it seeks to establish the general conditions for any possible world, which allows for knowledge via sensation. Challenges to the transcendental method and an attempted clarification of its nature will be considered in Section 4. In the remainder of Part B, I shall attempt to state and evaluate Kant's transcendental theses regarding the structure of experience and the general features of objective worlds. I shall here be concerned to show their general plausibility and later on their consistency with developments in modern science. Kant's major transcendental theses are those which attempt to show: (i) that knowledge and self-consciousness are only possible if experience has such structure and unity as to represent an objective world (Deduction and Schematism). (ii) that such an objective world must have certain necessary features, as set down in the Principles. Part C (Sections 15-22) concerns the negative type of metaphysics in Kant. Here I discuss the different forms of transcendental idealism. An attempt is made to erase a difficulty which is often used to undermine any serious consideration of Kant's procedure in metaphysics. For it can be argued that since Kant's transcendental principles are inextricably tied to his doctrine of transcendental idealism to such an extent that they stand or fall together and hence that any defence of his general methodology is bound to fail. This claim rests on certain very tough versions of transcendental idealism which are indeed objectionable. But I shall argue that Kant’s true critical position is in fact not an idealism, but rather a transcendental agnosticism and that the major doctrines of the Critique can be sustained without any commitment to an idealism, provided we do not insist on dogmatic realism. Furthermore I shall argue that Kant is generally correct in his claim that certain metaphysical assertions of an absolute character generate antinomies which cannot be resolved - but can only be conceived as regulative principles governing our scientific search for knowledge. Kant's positive transcendental principles plus the regulative principles developed in the Dialectic are used in the MF to generate his determinate metaphysics of our universe. Kant uses the notion of the construction in setting forth his specific theories on the relativity of space and motion, and on the nature of matter which he develops. I then consider to what extent Kant's general method is consistent with Einstein’s theory and with quantum mechanics. In the concluding part of the thesis, E, I specify where I concur with Kant's view on the relation between metaphysics and science and where I disagree. I shall defend Kant's view as to the central role of transcendental thesis, but I shall reject his claim that determinate metaphysics developed by the a priori method should take precedence over the specific theories offered by science. I shall then develop a modified version of the Kantian view, which calls for a metaphysical negotiation process between philosophers and scientists in arriving at the speculative cosmological theories which provide the foundations of natural science.