School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe treatment of the mentally ill in Victoria, 1850-1887 : a study of official policy and institutional practice(University of Melbourne, 1979)
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ItemKant's distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena( 1979)Kant's primary objective in the Critique was to establish the objectivity of experience in general. This he sought to achieve in terms of a distinction of all objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena, and therefore most doctrines in the Critique are directed towards that end. This essay deals with the final position of the above distinction for which most of those doctrines have likewise to be taken into account. In an essay of this length however, it is not possible to treat each of those doctrines as an individual thesis and give them the detailed attention which each one of them deserves. With the objective of this essay in mind, the doctrines leading into Kant's chapter on the Phenomena/Noumena distinction are treated with respect to their major problems only, whilst those which are even more preliminary to it, are treated at an introductory level in Sections I to III of the first chapter. The first chapter deals with Kant's Sources of Knowledge. It is argued that Kant's theory on the necessity for synthesis for the possibility of awareness and knowledge of experience holds, and that the major problem of the Original Unity of Apperception can be overcome by interpreting it as a first, instead of a second order concept at meta level; that is to say, the implicit 'I am' rather than the 'I know I am'. It is argued the latter is only necessary for consciousness of self-ascription of an experience, i.e. for determining the objectivity of one's experience. The further point made is that objective experience in general requires the postulation of an outer order (as undertaken by Kant) but that in so far as such order cannot be transcendentally known to exist, it is legitimate to point to the need for empirical verification if our objective experience is to be seen to relate meaningfully to the empirical world as opposed to merely an analytic one. It is then concluded that although this last condition need not hold within a Rationalist model, unless Kant means to adopt the latter, he is forced to admit that the original unity of apperception is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the possibility of meaningful objective experience. The major issue of the second chapter is that a limit concept 'applies to our understanding. Kant's third Antinomy and the concept of noumena are dealt with. In the Antinomy it is argued that its limit concept pertains to the first cause and that it is set by the concept of infinity, and in so far as that pertains to Time, it is the concept of temporality as opposed to atemporality which sets a limit to the understanding in the Antinomy. In the discussion of noumena as a limit concept it is said that the postulation of noumana in general presupposes that our senses are limited under any conditions and that the reason for this presupposition is yet another presupposition, namely that objects themselves are non-spatio/temporal. It is thus grounded in its own presupposition and acceptance of it reduces to choice on the basis of credibility if such can be established. The argument then turns to Kant's commitment for a causal connection between the perceiver and the objects affecting the perceiver's senses. As these objects can be neither mere appearances nor noumenal objects, it is concluded that acceptance of the postulated non-spatiality and non-temporality 0f objects themselves is no longer a critical and viable alternative. The third and final chapter opens with Kant's commitments as a Transcendental Idealist and Empirical Realist; then moves to the problems attaching to his theory of space to show that not only is that theory untenable in so far as appearances cannot be spatially extended and therefore space must be postulated as attaching to objects themselves, but also that unless it is so postulated, it violates the position of a Transcendental Idealist per Kantian definition. These problems as well as those discussed in the Section on causal connection are then juxtaposed vis a vis the limit of Sensibility to show the overall untenability of Kant's Distinction and to indicate the conditions which need to obtain if Kant is to be rescued from it. This thought is then developed into an outline of an alternative position on the Distinction and it is argued that the concept of Noumena needs to be seen to apply 'somewhere beyond' our capacity to infer objects themselves. That is to say, that it be restricted to apply as a purely intellectual concept to our understanding. The chapter concludes with a treatment of some possible objections to this alternative model. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Kant refer to the Kemp-Smith Translation of the Critique of Pure Reason and are given in footnotes as per either the first or second edition text prefixes, e.g. A or B respectively.
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ItemNames in fiction( 1979)
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ItemJustice, narrowness and conflict( 1979)
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ItemRawls's theory of distributive justice( 1979)This essay examines the two central features of Rawls's theory of distributive justice: the two principles of justice, and the contractian argument through which he seeks to defend them. It is maintained that the contractarian argument fails and for two reasons. The first is that Rawls fails to show, through the maximin argument, that his two principles would indeed be chosen in the original position. The second is that he fails to establish that, even if his principles were chosen, they would thereby be justified as principles of distributive justice - he fails to establish, that is, the justificatory force of his use of the contractarian method. Concerning the principles themselves, it is argued that they do not, as Rawls claims, state a conception of distributive justice superior to utilitarian conceptions. The two major claims he makes for his conception, namely that through the liberty principle and its priority it better safeguards the basic liberties, and that through the difference principle it better protects the economically worst off members of society, can only be substantiated (if at all) as far weaker claims than he intends, which are outweighed by other considerations. Rawls's theory is, however, defended against two criticisms raised by Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia. It is argued that, that Rawls's principles are "patterned" is not a valid objection to them, and that, therefore, it is not a sound criticism of the original position that it can result only in such principles. The difference principle is defended against a further objection by appealing to what Nozick regards as entitlement considerations.
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ItemThe Aboriginal response to white settlement in the Port Phillip district, 1835-1850( 1979)The nature of the Aboriginal response to Europeans in the first years of the settlement in the Port Phillip District has not been sufficiently investigated by historians. We know very little of the ways Aborigines perceived whites. This is not merely because few European contemporaries were interested to record the attitudes of blacks towards whites, but also because this lack of interest has been continued, and has influenced historians to direct study to other fields. Recently, however, works relating to interracial relations in other states have guided the search for understanding the past from the Aboriginal point of view - the 'other side of the frontier'. There are many issues and interests that have sparked this search, and probably the one most important motivation for this has been the ascendancy of black leaders who have offered their version of the past. Perhaps because of this, historical study has concentrated on interracial tensions in the early years of European-Aboriginal contact. However, in Victoria, the Aboriginal response to whites entailed peaceful adaptation and cultural resistance. Aborigines did not instantly recognize Europeans as enemies, and traditional foes were still hated and feared, far more than the newcomers. These traditional foes were Aborigines of hostile or unknown tribes. In this study, I have also been concerned to explain the dramatic population decline among the Aborigines in the years to 1850, as this, also, resulted from Aboriginal responses to whites. White settlement caused disease, depression, increased intertribal warfare, as well as interracial violence. Conflict between blacks and whites was only a minor factor in this depopulation, and it was not recognized as a cause by the Aborigines. According to them, intertribal hostility was the most immediate cause of death; but the white occupation of Victoria must be seen as the cause of the despair that led Aborigines to dispose of their newly-born children rather than raise families. Death, disease and infant mortality worked together to halve the Aboriginal population in the fifteen years to 1850; death and despair later led to the destruction of much of the Aboriginal cultural heritage and social cohesion. I have attempted to reconstruct the nature of Aboriginal population, society and culture at the time of first white settlement, in order to review the extent of change introduced by whites. Although the population dramatically changed in size and distribution, many of the social rules and religious beliefs of the Aborigines were maintained and some were possibly strengthened. This was a magnificent achievement given the pressure and degree of white influence. Most Aborigines peacefully rejected white values, maintaining their own beliefs, and changing only those aspects of their culture which did not intimidate their conceptions of the world. Few Aborigines adopted white values in the period to 1850, although in later years the reduced and disintegrated population came to accept many European principles, having lost many of their own. Whites were recognized as cultural enemies, and for the most part, white ways of thinking were rejected; but the Port Phillip District Aborigines did not regard whites as mortal enemies, for they were only hostile towards few whites, and directed their hatred towards those Aborigines who were strangers to them. For this reason, the Aboriginal resistance offered to whites was predominantly peaceful, a battle of the mind and not of the body.