School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemThe treatment of the mentally ill in Victoria, 1850-1887 : a study of official policy and institutional practice(University of Melbourne, 1979)
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ItemKant's distinction of all objects in general into phenomena and noumena( 1979)Kant's primary objective in the Critique was to establish the objectivity of experience in general. This he sought to achieve in terms of a distinction of all objects in general into Phenomena and Noumena, and therefore most doctrines in the Critique are directed towards that end. This essay deals with the final position of the above distinction for which most of those doctrines have likewise to be taken into account. In an essay of this length however, it is not possible to treat each of those doctrines as an individual thesis and give them the detailed attention which each one of them deserves. With the objective of this essay in mind, the doctrines leading into Kant's chapter on the Phenomena/Noumena distinction are treated with respect to their major problems only, whilst those which are even more preliminary to it, are treated at an introductory level in Sections I to III of the first chapter. The first chapter deals with Kant's Sources of Knowledge. It is argued that Kant's theory on the necessity for synthesis for the possibility of awareness and knowledge of experience holds, and that the major problem of the Original Unity of Apperception can be overcome by interpreting it as a first, instead of a second order concept at meta level; that is to say, the implicit 'I am' rather than the 'I know I am'. It is argued the latter is only necessary for consciousness of self-ascription of an experience, i.e. for determining the objectivity of one's experience. The further point made is that objective experience in general requires the postulation of an outer order (as undertaken by Kant) but that in so far as such order cannot be transcendentally known to exist, it is legitimate to point to the need for empirical verification if our objective experience is to be seen to relate meaningfully to the empirical world as opposed to merely an analytic one. It is then concluded that although this last condition need not hold within a Rationalist model, unless Kant means to adopt the latter, he is forced to admit that the original unity of apperception is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for the possibility of meaningful objective experience. The major issue of the second chapter is that a limit concept 'applies to our understanding. Kant's third Antinomy and the concept of noumena are dealt with. In the Antinomy it is argued that its limit concept pertains to the first cause and that it is set by the concept of infinity, and in so far as that pertains to Time, it is the concept of temporality as opposed to atemporality which sets a limit to the understanding in the Antinomy. In the discussion of noumena as a limit concept it is said that the postulation of noumana in general presupposes that our senses are limited under any conditions and that the reason for this presupposition is yet another presupposition, namely that objects themselves are non-spatio/temporal. It is thus grounded in its own presupposition and acceptance of it reduces to choice on the basis of credibility if such can be established. The argument then turns to Kant's commitment for a causal connection between the perceiver and the objects affecting the perceiver's senses. As these objects can be neither mere appearances nor noumenal objects, it is concluded that acceptance of the postulated non-spatiality and non-temporality 0f objects themselves is no longer a critical and viable alternative. The third and final chapter opens with Kant's commitments as a Transcendental Idealist and Empirical Realist; then moves to the problems attaching to his theory of space to show that not only is that theory untenable in so far as appearances cannot be spatially extended and therefore space must be postulated as attaching to objects themselves, but also that unless it is so postulated, it violates the position of a Transcendental Idealist per Kantian definition. These problems as well as those discussed in the Section on causal connection are then juxtaposed vis a vis the limit of Sensibility to show the overall untenability of Kant's Distinction and to indicate the conditions which need to obtain if Kant is to be rescued from it. This thought is then developed into an outline of an alternative position on the Distinction and it is argued that the concept of Noumena needs to be seen to apply 'somewhere beyond' our capacity to infer objects themselves. That is to say, that it be restricted to apply as a purely intellectual concept to our understanding. The chapter concludes with a treatment of some possible objections to this alternative model. Unless otherwise stated, all references to Kant refer to the Kemp-Smith Translation of the Critique of Pure Reason and are given in footnotes as per either the first or second edition text prefixes, e.g. A or B respectively.
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ItemNames in fiction( 1979)
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ItemJustice, narrowness and conflict( 1979)
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ItemRawls's theory of distributive justice( 1979)This essay examines the two central features of Rawls's theory of distributive justice: the two principles of justice, and the contractian argument through which he seeks to defend them. It is maintained that the contractarian argument fails and for two reasons. The first is that Rawls fails to show, through the maximin argument, that his two principles would indeed be chosen in the original position. The second is that he fails to establish that, even if his principles were chosen, they would thereby be justified as principles of distributive justice - he fails to establish, that is, the justificatory force of his use of the contractarian method. Concerning the principles themselves, it is argued that they do not, as Rawls claims, state a conception of distributive justice superior to utilitarian conceptions. The two major claims he makes for his conception, namely that through the liberty principle and its priority it better safeguards the basic liberties, and that through the difference principle it better protects the economically worst off members of society, can only be substantiated (if at all) as far weaker claims than he intends, which are outweighed by other considerations. Rawls's theory is, however, defended against two criticisms raised by Robert Nozick in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia. It is argued that, that Rawls's principles are "patterned" is not a valid objection to them, and that, therefore, it is not a sound criticism of the original position that it can result only in such principles. The difference principle is defended against a further objection by appealing to what Nozick regards as entitlement considerations.
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ItemJohn Ridley's contributions to Australian technology and to the early progress of South Australia( 1979)This study is primarily concerned with the working career of John Ridley (1806-1887), and with his contributions to the flour-milling industry of South Australia, to wheat harvesting technology, and to the progress of the colony generally. Ridley emigrated to South Australia from the north of England in 1840, and remained there until early 1853. Although still a relatively young man, he then returned to England to live in semi-retirement. The following text will show that Ridley contributed substantially to the technical and economic progress of the young- colony in at least two separate ways :- (i) He built the first flour-mill in South Australia in the year 1840, and subsequently operated it as a very successful business until he left the colony in 1853. The mill was steam-driven, of substantial capacity for the time, and of considerable economic significance to the colony. The local flour-milling industry which grew up soon afterwards freed the colony from crippling expenditures for imported flour and other breadstuffs, thus permitting a sound local economy to be developed. During 1842 Ridley leased a second (inoperative) flourmill near Adelaide, completely refitted it, and brought it too into successful operation. As well as helping to alleviate the financial difficulties of the colony at the time, these two mills provided a timely stimulus to local wheat growing. Ridley exerted a considerable influence upon the early development of South Australia's flour-milling industry, by virtue of the high standards for efficiency, operating reliability, and sound profitability he established in his own businesses. The competitors he attracted were forced to achieve similarly high standards in order to survive. His work was thus of importance in helping to secure a sound base for the future growth of the industry. (ii) In late-1843 Ridley invented, constructed, and demonstrated a unique mechanical harvester for gathering grain crops. This machine, later known as the "Ridley Reaper" or the "South Australian Stripper", was subsequently manufactured and used in thousands within the colony. For more than half a century the machine played a major part in stimulating wheat production in the region by providing the simplest and cheapest harvesting method in the world at that time. Ridley's invention embodied a principle of operation which was entirely novel at the time it was introduced. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries this same principle was incorporated into the designs of many other widely used grain harvesters. Ridley's machine therefore occupies an important place in the evolution of modern grain-harvesting machinery. The first two machines (both built by Ridley) were directly responsible for averting a serious harvesting crisis in South Australia at the 1843-44 season. Afterwards, when ever-increasing numbers of the machines went into service, a dramatic expansion of the colony's wheat-growing industry became possible. This in turn led to the development of a large export trade in wheat, and thus to an enviable economic prosperity for the colony. Whilst there is unanimous agreement that Ridley constructed and demonstrated the first successful machine of the "Stripper" type, his claim to have also invented the principle of its operation has been disputed. John Wrathall Full, another. pioneer South Australian settler, insisted that he and not Ridley originated the fundamental principle. In fact, he directly accused Ridley of stealing his idea and putting it into practice. The resulting controversy is examined in detail, and Bull's claim shown to be falsely based. Two further points of historical interest are also made and substantiated. Firstly, the "Stripper" was the first ever harvesting machine to successfully combine the operations of gathering and threshing the grain. And secondly, Ridley's "Stripper" was the first machine in the world to substantially displace hand-methods of cereal harvesting in its region. In the light of all the above considerations, it is suggested that Ridley's machine has not received either fair or sufficient notice in the histories of agricultural technology published to date. John Ridley's importance in the story of the development of mechanical harvesting has thus been unjustly neglected.
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