School of Historical and Philosophical Studies - Theses
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ItemConventions and speech acts( 1984)Conventions play a large part in our lives. When we exchange money for goods, we do so in conformity to conventions. Our mode of dress and manner of eating is largely determined by convention. When we perform linguistically our actions are governed by conventions. The ubiquity of conventions suggests that an analysis of the notion of a convention would have an important place in the attempt to understand social phenomena. We find that philosophers (in particular) have used the idea of a convention freely and widely. They have on occasion employed the notion of a convention to make substantive claims, where the truth of these claims turned crucially on what exactly that notion of a convention was. For example, rival theorists of speech acts have argued about whether speech acts are essentially conventional, (or perhaps, rule-constituted). It is difficult to see how this matter could be settled without some account being offered of conventions. There is an important place then, for an adequate theory of convention. In Parts A and D of this thesis I will attempt to provide such a theory. In Part C I will make certain applications of this theory. In Part C I will be primarily concerned with the question of the conventionality of speech acts.
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ItemSomething to do with vagueness( 1986)This thesis is in two parts. In the first part I discuss various conceptions of vagueness and outline some of the problems to do with the conception of vagueness as a linguistic phenomenon. The most interesting of these is the Sorites paradox, which occurs where natural languages exhibit a particular variety of borderline case vagueness. I discuss some sources of vagueness of the borderline case variety, and views of the relation between linguistic behaviour and languages which are vague in this sense. I argue that the problems are not to be easily avoided by statistical averaging techniques or attempts to provide a mathematical model of consensus in linguistic usage. I also argue against two currently popular approaches to vagueness; the supervaluation accounts which attempt to provide precise semantic models for vague languages based on the notion of specification spaces, and the attempts to replace laws of classical logic with systems of fuzzy logic. The second part consists of a detailed examination of the Sorites paradox and the development of a novel solution to it. In Chapter Four I concentrate on an argument expounded by Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright which seems to show that languages vague in the strong borderline case sense defined in Chapter One are incoherent. Since vagueness of this kind is, according to their arguments, an essential feature of languages used by creatures with our perceptual limitations, as well as an inevitable source of incoherence, there appears to be no way out of the problem. I look at some recent attempts to resolve this dilemma in Chapter Five, and then argue in Chapter Six for a way out of the paradox which is sensitive to the considerations Dummett and Wright discuss and makes it possible to justify the linguistic behaviour of language users as based on coherent principles. In Chapter Seven I discuss a number if' problems for this approach and in Chapter Eight discuss some further related difficulties to do with visual perception. In the final chapter I relate this solution to Dummett's and Wright's arguments. I also argue there that an adequate approach to vagueness should respect the context-dependence of observational predicates and sketch a development of the framework Lewis provides in Convention for accommodating this feature of natural languages. This thesis contains less than 100,000 words.
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ItemMeaning, truth and understanding( 1983)This thesis defends a version of Donald Davidson's view that the fundamental role of a theory of meaning for a language can be filled by a theory of truth for that language. In particular, I set out and defend a view of the role of a theory of meaning according to which such a theory need provide only correct descriptions of the interpretative contents which speakers assign to expressions (primarily sentences) of their language, and argue that assignments of truth-conditions which meet certain further requirements will do this. This view is contrasted with the view, of which I take Michael Dummett to be a prime exponent, that a theory of meaning must specify propositional knowledge which is constitutive (in some sense) of any competent speaker's ability to understand his or her language, and I attempt to answer Dummett's main objections to the sort of truth-conditional approach I am defending. Chapter 1 is mainly scene-setting. In it I try to clarify Davidson's conception of a theory of truth (and I outline Tarski's work on definitions of truth as a basis for this), and I argue that the justification for his view of the connection between a theory of truth and a theory of meaning for a language rests fundamentally on his idea of the nature and function of a theory of meaning. In Chapters 2 and 3, I set out Davidson's view of the role of a theory of meaning, in particular, a theory for a natural language. This is that the theory should state something knowledge of which would enable someone to interpret the object-language. I then discuss the adequacy requirements for theories of meaning which this view suggests. Chapter 2 concentrates on constraints which ensure empirical adequacy (that a theory gives correct meaning assignments to the sentences of the object-language, according to the data provided by speakers of that language). It is in this context that I argue for an extension of Davidson's view that empirical adequacy is a matter of optimising the true beliefs attributed to speakers on the basis of the theory's meaning assignments. I think a theory needs not only to optimise true beliefs attributed to a speaker, but to fit into an overall assignment of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires and intentions, in particular) which makes the behaviour of that speaker intelligible, in its context, as the activity of a rational agent. I think that this modification is in keeping with the spirit of Davidson's approach. In Chapter 3, I consider Davidson's requirements on the structure of an adequate theory of meaning and defend, in the light of what I take to be the role of a theory of meaning, a basically similar set of requirements to those which he offers. In Chapter 4, I discuss different views of the connection between any theory of meaning for a language and the understanding, or competence, possessed by speakers of that language. In particular, I attempt to clarify Dummett's idea that a theory of meaning should provide an account of speakers' understanding, and I argue, against Dummett, that all that we need really require is that a theory should specify correct interpretative contents for sentences of the language, in a way which mirrors relevant interrelations between such contents. I argue that Davidson's approach to theories of meaning is really an example of the sort of view I espouse here. In Chapters 5 and 6, I tackle two main objections which Dummett has raised against theories of the sort I am defending - which attempt to give meanings of sentences in terms of truth-conditions. Chapter 5 deals with Dummett's view that any modest theory (one which does not explain what it is for someone to have the concepts it uses in describing meanings), cannot provide an account of speakers' understanding. Chapter 6 takes up the objection that speakers could not be taken to know realist truth-conditions (that is, conditions under which any statement is determinately true or false independently of our capacity to ascertain which) for all sentences of their language. Apart from criticisms particular to each case, I argue that these objections arise from a view of the connection between a theory of meaning and speakers' understanding which is not acceptable. Hence, these chapters continue the discussion, and rejection, of Dummett's idea that a theory of meaning should provide a theory of understanding. In Chapter 7, I address the problem of attributing propositional knowledge of (at least the consequences of) any theory of meaning to speakers, because of the need which this creates to take speakers as possessing semantic concepts. I consider the possibility of speakers possessing a language in which such concepts are expressed - both the suggestion that this might be the object-language itself (with its attendent problem of paradox), and Jerry Fodor's idea that it should be a language of thought which is distinct from any natural language. I argue against the idea of such a language of thought, and I conclude that attribution of semantic concepts should depend on the content and nature of the language actually spoken, and not be an a priori attribution deriving from the nature of a theory of meaning. I take this to be yet another defence of the view that the theory of meaning should not be seen as specifying propositional knowledge which is in any sense constitutive of speakers' interpretative ability. Chapter 8 is something of a coda. In it I take up and defend Davidson's account of metaphor, both because if is of intrinsic interest, and because metaphor might be taken as evidence of the inadequacy of any theory of meaning for a natural language which is primarily concerned to assign truth-conditions to sentences. I argue that Davidson's view of metaphor is both correct and consistent with taking a theory of meaning to be a theory which assigns truth-conditions to sentences of its object-language in a way which meets the requirements specified.
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